Child Support Enforcement Program
Incentive Payments: Background and Policy
Issues
Carmen Solomon-Fears
Specialist in Social Policy
October 5, 2007
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Summary
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local
partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents.
The CSE program serves both welfare and non-welfare families. All 50 states and the four
jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands operate CSE
programs. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child support payments and
served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.6
billion. The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government
bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for
success in meeting CSE program goals.
P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, replaced the old
incentive payment system to states with a revised system that provides incentive payments based
on a percentage of the state’s CSE collections and incorporates five performance measures related
to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support
payments, and cost-effectiveness. P.L. 105-200 set specific annual caps on total federal incentive
payments and required states to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The
exact amount of a state’s incentive payment depends on its level of performance (or the rate of
improvement over the previous year) when compared with other states. In addition, states are
required to meet data quality standards. If states do not meet specified performance measures and
data quality standards, they face federal financial penalties.
P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibited federal matching (effective October
1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive
payments that are received by states can no longer be used to draw down federal funds. The
repeal of federal reimbursement for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has
garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the
incentive payment system per se.
This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, explains how state incentive
payments are derived, presents some of the state trends, and discusses the following list of issues:
(1) does the CSE incentive payment system reward good performance? (2) should incentive
payments be based on additional performance indicators? (3) should TANF funds be reduced
because of poor CSE performance? (4) why aren’t the incentives and penalties consistent for the
paternity establishment performance measure? (5) should incentive payments be based on
individual state performance rather than aggregate state performance? and (6) will the elimination
of the federal match of incentive payments adversely affect CSE programs?
The data analysis in this report covers the five-year period FY2002-FY2006. This report will not
be updated.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 3
Financing Elements of the CSE Program............................................................................... 3
Purpose of the Current CSE Incentive Payment System......................................................... 5
Calculation of State CSE Incentive Payments .............................................................................. 5
Data Reliability..................................................................................................................... 8
Federal Financial Penalties.......................................................................................................... 9
State Trends .............................................................................................................................. 10
Performance Incentive Scores ............................................................................................. 11
Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) ..................................................................... 12
Child Support Order Establishment Percentage ............................................................. 13
Current Child Support Collections Scores ..................................................................... 14
Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores........................................................................... 15
Cost-Effectiveness Scores ............................................................................................. 16
Incentive Payments for All Performance Measures .............................................................. 17
Relationship Between Incentive Payments and Performance Measures ................................ 18
Policy Issues ............................................................................................................................. 19
Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good Performance?................................ 20
CSE Collections............................................................................................................ 20
Artificial Thresholds Related to Performance Levels ..................................................... 21
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance Indicators?...................... 22
Medical Child Support .................................................................................................. 23
Interstate Collections..................................................................................................... 23
Welfare Cost Avoidance ................................................................................................ 24
Payment Processing Performance.................................................................................. 24
Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE Performance? ................................ 24
Why Aren’t the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity Establishment
Performance Measure?..................................................................................................... 26
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State Performance Rather Than
Aggregate State Performance?.......................................................................................... 27
Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect
CSE Programs? ................................................................................................................ 28
Figures
Figure 1. Paternity Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum .................................. 13
Figure 2. Child Support Order Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum................. 14
Figure 3. Child Support Current Collections Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum .................. 15
Figure 4. Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum ....................... 16
Figure 5. Cost-Effectiveness Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum.......................................... 17
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Tables
Table B-1. Actual Incentive Payments, by State, FY2002-FY2005............................................. 36
Table B-2. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2002 ................................................................................................. 38
Table B-3. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2003 ................................................................................................. 41
Table B-4. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2004 ................................................................................................. 44
Table B-5. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2005 ................................................................................................. 47
Table B-6. Child Support Enforcement Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2006........ 51
Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative History of CSE Incentive Payments .................................................... 31
Appendix B. Tables................................................................................................................... 35
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Introduction
Since the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program’s enactment in 1975, the federal
government has paid incentives (monetary payments) to states to encourage them to operate
efficient and effective CSE programs.1 The incentive payment system is part of the CSE
program’s strategic plan that rewards states for working to achieve the goals and objectives of the
program. Incentive payments, although small when compared to federal reimbursement payments
for state and local CSE activities, are a very important component of the CSE financing structure.
Together with the incentive payment system is a penalty system that imposes financial penalties
on states that fail to meet certain performance levels. The purpose of the two complementary
systems is to reward states for results while holding them accountable for poor performance,
thereby motivating states to focus their efforts on providing vital CSE services.
P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 (enacted July 16, 1998),
replaced the old incentive payment system to states2 with a revised revenue-neutral (with respect
to the federal government) incentive payment system that (1) provided incentive payments based
on a percentage of the state’s CSE collections; (2) incorporated five performance measures
related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due
child support payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phased in the incentive system, with it being
fully effective beginning in FY2002; (4) required reinvestment of incentive payments into the
CSE program; and (5) used an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and former TANF families.
P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the revised incentive payment system had to be revenue-neutral (with
respect to the federal government), which resulted in an annual cap on incentive payments.
Congress capped incentive payments by legislating the total amount of incentive payments that
states (in aggregate) could earn in each fiscal year. Federal law stipulates that the aggregate
incentive payment to the states can not exceed the following amounts: $422 million for FY2000,
$429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454 million for
FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and
$483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states
is to be increased to account for inflation. Congress based the capped aggregate incentive
1 The 1975 enacting legislation (P.L. 93-647) based incentive payments solely on child support collections made on
behalf of welfare (i.e., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)) families. In 1984, pursuant to P.L. 98-378,
the law expanded the incentive payments formula to include child support collections made on behalf of nonwelfare
families. For a legislative history of CSE incentive payments, see Appendix A. Also note that the AFDC entitlement
program was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant pursuant to P.L. 104-193
(the 1996 welfare reform law).
2 Under the old incentive payment system, each state received a minimum incentive payment equal to at least 6% of the
state’s total amount of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC/TANF families for the year, plus at least 6%
of the state’s total amount of child support collections made on behalf of non-AFDC/TANF families for the year. The
amount of a state’s incentive payment could reach a maximum of 10% of the AFDC/TANF collections plus 10% of the
non-AFDC/TANF collections, depending on the state’s ratio of CSE collections to CSE expenditures. There was an
additional limit (i.e., cap), however, on the incentive payment for non-AFDC/TANF collections. The incentive payment
for such collections could not exceed 115% of incentive payments for AFDC/TANF collections. In addition, the old
incentive payment system incorporated only one performance measure (i.e., cost-effectiveness) in determining
incentive payments to states. One of the main criticisms of the old incentive payment system was that it did not provide
an incentive for states to improve their programs because every state regardless of performance received the minimum
incentive payment. There was general agreement by Congress that states whose CSE programs performed poorly
should not be rewarded with federal funds.
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payment amount on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections of incentive payments at the
time that the Child Support Performance and Incentive bill was passed.3
P.L. 105-200 also revised the financial penalty system for the CSE program to reflect that
improved performance is especially critical in three areas: paternity establishment, child support
order establishment, and current child support collections. If specified performance standards are
not met in these three areas, financial penalties against the state’s TANF program are imposed.
Before the beginning of FY2008, the federal government was required to match incentive funds
that states reinvested in the CSE program. P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005)
prohibits federal matching (effective October 1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE
incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and
reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. So, instead of
receiving 66% federal matching funds for incentive payments that are reinvested in the CSE
program, the states receive no federal matching funds for such incentive payments. The repeal of
federal matching funds for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has garnered much
concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the incentive payment
system per se.
This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, provides information on
financial penalties that are imposed on states if incentive payment data are unreliable or if
performance standards are not met, explains how state incentive payments are derived, discusses
some of the state trends, and presents some policy issues concerning incentive payments.
In addition, the report includes two appendices. Appendix A presents a legislative history of CSE
incentive payments. Appendix B includes several detailed state tables that display unaudited
incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures.4 Table B-1 shows
incentive payments by state for each of the following years—FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and
FY2005—and the amount that each state received.5 Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments
for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five
performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2003
together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures
for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2004 together with unaudited
incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5
presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005 together with unaudited incentive performance
scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the
unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006.
3 In FY1998, the incentive payment, which at that time came out of the gross federal share of child support collected on
behalf of TANF families, was $395 million. Beginning in FY2002, child support incentive payments were no longer
paid out of the federal share of child support collections made on behalf of TANF families. Instead, federal funds have
been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury for CSE incentive payments.
4 The unaudited incentive performance scores are readily available each year when the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE) publishes its preliminary data report. In this report the unaudited scores serve as a proxy for the
actual (audited) performance indicator scores upon which actual incentive payments are based. (OCSE does not
consistently publish actual (audited) performance indicator scores.)
5 OCSE has not yet published data on CSE incentive payments by state for FY2006.
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Background
The CSE program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local partnership to help strengthen
families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. The CSE program serves both
welfare and non-welfare families. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child
support payments and served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, total CSE program
expenditures amounted to $5.6 billion, of which $458 million were incentive payments (i.e., 8%
of total program expenditures). In FY2006, the CSE program collected $4.58 in child support
(from noncustodial parents) for every dollar spent on the program. The CSE program is funded
with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program
expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program
goals.
Financing Elements of the CSE Program
There are five funding streams for the CSE program. (For more details, see CRS Report
RL33422, Analysis of Federal-State Financing of the Child Support Enforcement Program, by
Carmen Solomon-Fears.)
First, states spend their own money to operate a CSE program; the level of funding allocated by
the state and localities determines the amount of resources available to CSE agencies.6
Second, the federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE
activities. The federal government’s funding is “open-ended” in that it pays its percentage of
expenditures by matching the amounts spent by state and local governments with no upper limit
or ceiling. The federal government’s financial participation in the CSE program is the program’s
largest revenue source.
Third, the federal government provides states with an incentive payment to encourage them to
operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments back
into the CSE program or related activities. Effective October 1, 2007, P.L. 109-171 (enacted
February 8, 2006) prohibits federal matching of state expenditures of federal CSE incentive
payments. This means that beginning October 1, 2007, CSE incentive payments that are received
by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement.
Fourth, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of
6 As indicated earlier, the federal share of total CSE expenditures is 66%. This means that the state’s share of total CSE
expenditures is 34%. The following report found that in aggregate 25% of the state’s share of CSE expenditures is
financed with incentive payments (i.e., dollars received from the federal government). According to a Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)-commissioned report, “While the mix of funding sources for each state is different,
financing for the state and local share of CSE expenditures for the nation as a whole comes from state general fund
appropriations (42%), federal incentive payments (25%), the state share of retained TANF collections (15%), and
county general fund appropriations (9%). Overall, fees and other cost recoveries finance a negligible proportion (2%)
of state and local shares of CSE expenditures.” Source: State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final
Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Department of Health and Human Services, prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc.
and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest, September 3, 2003, p. iii.
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TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive TANF cash
assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive TANF. In addition,
such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child
support. CSE collections on behalf of families receiving TANF cash benefits are used to
reimburse state and federal governments for TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child
support payments go to the state instead of the family, except for amounts that states choose to
“pass through” to the family as additional income that does not affect TANF eligibility or benefit
amounts).
The formula for distributing the child support payments collected by the states on behalf of TANF
families between the state and the federal government is still based on the old Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) federal-state reimbursement rates,7 even though the AFDC
entitlement program was replaced by the TANF block grant program.8 Under existing law, states
have the option of giving some, all, or none of their share of child support payments collected on
behalf of TANF families to the family. Pursuant to P.L. 109-171 (effective October 1, 2008),
states that choose to pass through some of the collected child support to the TANF family do not
have to pay the federal government their shares of such collections if the amount passed through
to the family and disregarded by the state does not exceed $100 per month ($200 per month for a
family with two or more children) in child support collected on behalf of a TANF (or foster care)
family. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL34105, The Financial Impact of Child
Support on TANF Families: Simulation for Selected States, by Carmen Solomon-Fears and Gene
Falk.)
Fifth, application fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare families may help finance the CSE
program. In the case of nonwelfare families, the custodial parent can hire a private attorney or
apply for CSE services on their own. The CSE agency must charge an application fee, not to
exceed $25, for families not on welfare who apply for CSE services. The CSE agency may charge
this fee to the applicant or the noncustodial parent, or pay the fee out of state funds. In addition, a
state may at its option recover costs in excess of the application fee. Such recovery may be either
from the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent. Fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare
cases must be subtracted from the state’s total administrative costs before calculating the federal
reimbursement amount (i.e., the 66% matching rate).
Moreover, effective October 1, 2006, P.L. 109-171 requires families that have never been on
TANF to pay a $25 annual user fee when child support enforcement efforts on their behalf are
successful (i.e., at least $500 annually is collected on their behalf). The state can collect the user
7 Under old AFDC law, the rate at which states were reimbursed by the federal government for the costs of cash
welfare was the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which varies inversely with state per capita income
(i.e., poor states have a higher federal matching rate, wealthy states have a lower federal matching rate). The FMAP
ranges from a minimum of 50% to a statutory maximum of 83%. Like the old AFDC program, current law requires that
child support collections made on behalf of welfare (i.e., TANF) families be split between the federal and state
governments according the FMAP. If a state has a 50% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed $50 for each
$100 in child support collections for TANF families; if a state has a 70% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed
$70 for each $100 in child support collections for TANF families. In the first example, the state keeps $50 and in the
second example, the state keeps $30. Thus, states with a larger FMAP keep a smaller portion of the child support
collections.
8 The TANF block grant replaced the AFDC entitlement program pursuant to P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform
law. Because the CSE incentive payments have changed significantly since 1975 (when the CSE program was enacted),
this report refers to both AFDC families/cases and TANF families/cases, depending on the time frame.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
fee from the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, or the state can pay the fee out of state
funds. This annual user fee is separate from the application fee.
Purpose of the Current CSE Incentive Payment System
From the outset, incentive payments were provided by the federal government to the states to
encourage them to operate effective CSE programs. P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance
and Incentive Act of 1998, was designed to further improve the CSE program by linking incentive
payments to states’ performance in five major areas. Instead of rewarding states only for their
program’s cost-effectiveness, the revised incentive payment system was designed to reward states
for good performance in five different areas that were closely related to children obtaining child
support payments (from their noncustodial parent). The new system was touted as one that would
provide real incentives for the states to improve the CSE program, help families attain self-
sufficiency, and support important societal goals like paternity identification and parental
responsibility.9
The current CSE incentive payment system also adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be
a somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive
higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, the total amount
available is fixed, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the
capped funds. Under the revised incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive
payment for good performance and the total amount of its incentive payment depends on several
factors: the total amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive
payments, the state’s success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload,10 the state’s
performance in five areas (see text box below), the reliability of a state’s data, and the relative
success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting the performance criteria.
Moreover, unlike the old incentive system which allowed states and counties to spend incentive
payments on whatever they chose, the current incentive system requires that the incentive
payment be reinvested by the state into either the CSE program or some other activity which
might lead to improving the efficiency or effectiveness of the CSE program (e.g.,
mediation/conflict-resolution services to parents, parenting classes, efforts to improve the earning
capacity of noncustodial parents, etc.). Further, beginning October 1, 2007, federal matching
funds are not available to increase the value of incentive payments.
Calculation of State CSE Incentive Payments
The CSE incentive payment structure is very complex. For a fuller explanation of how state
incentive payments are calculated, see the example given in the CSE FY2006 data report.11
9 Department of Health and Human Services. News Release. HHS Submits Plan to Congress on New Rewards for
States to Improve Child Support Collections. March 13, 1997.
10 The CSE program serves both welfare and nonwelfare families in its caseload. OCSE defines a CSE “case” as a
noncustodial parent (mother, father, or putative/alleged father) who is now or eventually may be obligated under law
for the support of a child or children receiving services under the CSE program. If the noncustodial parent owes support
for two children by different women, that would be considered two cases; if both children have the same mother, that
would be considered one case.
11 Go to the following website and scroll nearly to the end of the document to the section entitled How an Incentive
(continued...)
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CSE incentive payments to states are based on several factors including state collections of child
support payments and the performance of the states in five areas. The five performance measures
are related to (1) establishment of paternity, (2) establishment of child support orders, (3)
collection of current child support, (4) collection of child support arrearages (i.e., past-due child
support), and (5) cost-effectiveness of the CSE program.
CSE Performance Measures
Paternity Establishment. States have two options:
(1) CSE Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). State performance on paternity establishment is calculated by
dividing the total number of children in the state’s CSE caseload during the fiscal year (or at state option at the end of
the fiscal year) who were born outside of marriage and for whom paternity has been established by the total number
of children in the state’s CSE caseload as of the end of the preceding fiscal year who were born outside of marriage;
(2) Statewide Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). State performance on paternity establishment is calculated by
dividing the total number of minor children who were born outside of marriage and for whom paternity has been
established during the fiscal year by the total number of children born outside of marriage during the preceding fiscal
year.
Establishment of Child Support Orders. State performance on support orders is calculated by dividing the number of
cases in the CSE caseload for which there is a support order by the total number of cases in the program.
Current Payments. State performance on current payments is obtained by dividing the total dollars collected for
current support in cases in the CSE caseload by the total amount owed on support in these cases which is not past-
due.
Arrearage Payments. State performance on arrears (i.e., past-due payments) is obtained by dividing the number of cases
in which there was some payment on arrearages during the fiscal year by the total number of cases in which past-due
support is owed. (Cases in which the family was formerly on welfare, and in which arrearages are collected by federal
income tax intercept, do not count as an arrearage payment case unless the state shares the collection with the
family.)
Cost-Effectiveness. State performance on cost-effectiveness is determined by dividing the total amount collected
through the child support program by the total amount spent by the program to make these col ections.
Under the CSE incentive payment system, each of the five performance measures is translated
into a mathematical formula (see text box that follows). The amount of incentive payments for a
particular performance measure is based on a standard that is specified in law. For each
performance standard, there is an upper threshold. All states that achieve performance levels at or
above this upper threshold are entitled to the maximum possible incentive for that performance
measure. Simultaneously, there is also a minimum level of performance below which states do
not receive an incentive, unless the state makes significant improvement over its previous year’s
performance.
(...continued)
Payment is determined: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report/.
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To determine a state’s incentive payment, the following computations must be made. First, each
state’s performance percentage for each performance measure is separately determined and
translated into the applicable percentage for that particular performance measure. If the
performance percentage is at or above the upper threshold, the applicable percentage for that
performance measure would be 100%. If the performance percentage is below the lower
threshold, the applicable percentage for that performance measure would be 0%.12 If the
performance percentage is in between these two points (the upper and lower thresholds), the
applicable percentage is
obtained by referring to
Performance Thresholds (and applicable percentage)
the tables specified in
If PEP
≥ 80%, then 100%
if < 50%, then 0%
federal law (Section
458(b)(6) of the Social
If order establishment
≥ 80%, then 100%
if < 50%, then 0%
Security Act) for each of
If current support
≥ 80%, then 100%
if < 40%, then 0%
the performance
If arrearages
≥ 80%, then 100%
if < 40%, then 0%
measures. For example,
If cost-effectiveness
≥ 5.00, then 100%
if < 2.00, then 0%
with regard to the
establishment of child
support orders, if the state’s performance percentage for this measure is 70%, meaning that 70%
of CSE cases in the state have a child support order, the applicable percentage is 80% (The tables
showing all of the applicable percentages for each performance measure are in Section
458(b)(6)(B) of the Social Security Act).
Second, after the applicable percentage for each performance measure is determined, that
percentage is multiplied by the “collections” base for an individual state. The collections base is
calculated by multiplying child support collections made on behalf of TANF families, Title IV-E
foster care families and Medicaid families in the state by a factor of 2 and then adding that
amount to the amount of collections made on behalf of families that were never on welfare [2 x
(TANF collections + formerly on TANF collections)+ never on TANF collections].13
Third, if the performance measure is paternity establishment, child support order establishment,
or current collections, then the resulting amount (i.e., the applicable percentage multiplied by the
collections base) is multiplied by 100%. If the performance measure is past-due collections (i.e.,
arrearages) or cost-effectiveness, then the resulting amount is multiplied by 75%. These
calculations result in maximum incentives for each performance measure.
12 At the low end of the performance scale, there is a minimum level below which a state is not rewarded with an
incentive payment unless the state demonstrates a substantial improvement over the prior year’s performance. Even
though substantial improvement is recognized, the law stipulates that the incentive payment in such cases cannot
exceed 50% of the maximum incentive possible for that performance measure. The substantial improvement provisions
do not apply with respect to the cost-effectiveness performance measure.
13 It was decided during the negotiations on revising the incentive payment system that, because collecting child
support on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families is generally more difficult than collecting child support on
behalf of families who had never been on TANF, the incentive formula should provide a greater emphasis on collection
in TANF and former TANF cases. Moreover, it was mentioned that collections in TANF cases provide direct savings to
the state and federal governments. The incentive payment formula thus doubles the collections made on behalf of
TANF and former-TANF cases to give them extra emphasis. (See Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of
Health and Human Services. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. February 1997. p. 8.)
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Fourth, the maximum incentives are added together. The dollar amount that is obtained by adding
together the five maximum incentives for each performance measure is called the maximum
incentive base amount.
Fifth, all of the states’ (includes the four jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands) maximum incentive base amounts are then added together for a total
maximum incentive base amount.
Sixth, each state’s individual maximum base amount is compared to the total maximum incentive
base amount. The mathematical formula would be—maximum state incentive base/sum of all
state incentive bases. An individual state’s share of the total is the percentage that is used to
determine the state’s actual incentive payment. For example, if a state’s share of the total is 17%,
then the state will receive 17% of the capped incentive payment for the fiscal year in question. In
FY2007 for example, the state’s incentive payment would be $80,070,000 (.17* $471 million).
The federal government makes incentive payments to states on an on-going quarterly prospective
basis using state estimates of what their incentive payments will total. After the audited
performance data (discussed below) are available, OCSE reconciles the incentive payment
actually earned with the amount previously estimated, and received, by the state.14
Data Reliability
Before enactment of P.L. 105-200, incentive payments (under the old system) were not dependent
on data reliability. Although audits were performed at least once every three years to ensure
compliance with federal CSE program requirements, the audits were focused on administrative
procedures and processes rather than performance outcomes and results.
Under current federal law, states are accountable for providing reliable data on a timely basis or
they receive no incentive payments. The data reliability provisions were enacted as part of P.L.
105-200, which established the current incentive payment system. They are in the law to ensure
the integrity of the incentive payment system. The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) Office of Audit performs data reliability audits to evaluate the completeness, accuracy,
security, and reliability of data reported and produced by state reporting systems. The audits help
ensure that incentives under the Child Support Performance and Incentives Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-
200) are earned and paid only on the basis of verifiable data and that the incentive payments
system is fair and equitable. If an audit determines that a state’s data are not complete and reliable
for a given performance measure, the state receives zero payments for that measure.15
If states do not meet the data quality standards, they do not receive incentive payments and are
subject to federal financial penalties. Although estimated incentive payments are sent to states on
a prospective quarterly basis, those estimated incentive payments are reconciled to the actual
14 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 19.
15 FY2004 was the fifth year that OCSE calculated and paid incentives to states for meeting performance standards in
five performance measure areas. According to OCSE, 50 states and jurisdictions passed the audits for FY2004. Source:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
Enforcement. Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007.
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/reports/annual_report/#26
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incentive payment earned after the auditing process. Thus, if a state fails the audit on a particular
performance measure, the state would not receive an incentive payment for that measure (i.e., the
state’s funding would be reduced to reflect the audit’s findings).16
The audit for the fiscal year generally begins at the beginning of a calendar year (after the fiscal
year has ended) and is completed by early summer.17 States provide the assigned regional OCSE
office with a universe of cases and audit trails. From this universe, a sample is selected. The
auditor selects at least 150 cases from the state’s universe. State are required to provide auditors
with documentation, through access to state computerized/automated systems and hard copies of
documents for each of the sample cases. The auditor reviews the sample cases to determine if the
items he or she is trying to verify are correct. For example, if the documentation indicates that
$450 in current support was paid during the fiscal year, the auditor looks up the collection history
for that particular case on the state’s automated system to determine if the $450 figure is correct.
Federal regulations (Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i)) require data to meet a 95% standard of
reliability.18 Once the audit is completed, the general practice is for an auditor from a different
field office to review the findings. Moreover, the OCSE headquarters staff that work on audits
also review audit findings. Informational sessions and opportunities to contest the findings are
available during the audit process.19
Federal Financial Penalties
The CSE performance-based penalty system provides that a financial penalty be assessed when
data submitted for calculating state performance is found to be incomplete or unreliable. Penalties
may also be assessed when the calculated level of performance for any of three performance
measures—paternity establishment, support order establishment, or current collections—fails to
achieve a specified level or when states are not in compliance with certain child support
requirements.
There is an automatic corrective action year if performance measures and data reliability are not
achieved. The corrective action year is the immediately succeeding fiscal year following the year
of the deficiency. If the state’s data are determined complete and reliable and the related
performance is adequate for the corrective action year, the penalty is not imposed.
16 According to the federal regulations (45 CFR Part 304.12): Each state calculates the federal government’s share of
child support payments collected on behalf of TANF families. Then the state retains one-fourth of its annual estimate of
incentive payments from the federal government’s share of child support collected on behalf of TANF families each
quarter. Following the end of a fiscal year, the OCSE will calculate the actual incentive payment the state should have
received based on the reports submitted for that fiscal year. If adjustments to the estimate are necessary, the state’s
quarterly TANF grant award will be reduced or increased because of over- or under-estimates for prior quarters and for
other adjustments.
17 Thereby, the audit of FY2007 (October 1, 2006-September 30, 2007) incentive payment data would usually begin in
January 2008 and generally would be completed by July 2008. Once the audit is completed, estimated incentive
payments would be reconciled with actual incentive payments.
18 Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i) states that “ ... data may contain errors as long as they are not of a magnitude that
would cause a reasonable person, aware of the errors, to doubt a finding or conclusion based on the data.”
19 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 14.
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If the corrective action was unsuccessful, the financial penalty is a reduction in the state’s TANF
block grant. Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC)
program. Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with
TANF (and used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the governor of a state must
certify that it will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block
grant funding. Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a
provision in federal law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the
CSE program with a reduction in Title IV-A funding.
Under the performance-based audit procedures (Section 409(a)(8) of the Social Security Act), a
graduated penalty equal to 1%-5% of the federal TANF block grant is assessed against a state if
(1) on the basis of the data submitted by the state for a review, the state CSE program fails to
achieve the paternity establishment or other performance standards set by the HHS Secretary;20
(2) an audit finds that the state data are incomplete or unreliable; or (3) the state failed to
substantially comply with one or more CSE state plan requirements, and the state fails to correct
the deficiencies in the fiscal year following the performance year (i.e., the corrective action plan
year).
The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 1% nor more than 2% of the TANF block grant
program for the first year of the deficiency. The penalty amount increases each year, up to 5%,21
for each consecutive year the state’s data are found to be incomplete, unreliable, or the state’s
performance on a penalty measure fails to attain the specified level of performance.
According to the CSE annual data report for FY2004: “In 2004, nine States received a penalty
after the FY2003 corrective action year for the FY2002 performance period. Six States filed
appeals to the Department Appeals Board.”22
State Trends
A state’s share of incentive payments depends on many factors that are distinct to its population
and CSE caseload. CSE collection can be straightforward. In most CSE cases paternity has
already been established and in a majority of cases the child support order was established at the
time of the divorce or separation. Further, many noncustodial parents are up-to-date in their child
support payments and do not owe any past-due (arrearage) payments. However, in other cases
meeting CSE performance measures can be more difficult. Although not exactly sequential, the
CSE performance measures are very interdependent. A child support order cannot be established
if paternity has not been legally determined. Child support payments cannot be collected or
enforced unless a child support order has been established. Arrearage payments cannot be
20 There are three performance measures for which states have to achieve certain levels of performance in order to
avoid being penalized for poor performance. These measures are (1) paternity establishment [specifically mentioned in
the federal law—Section 409(a)(8)(A) of the Social Security Act], (2) child support order establishment, and (3) current
child support collections [these last two performance measures were designated by the HHS Secretary—45 CFR
Section 305.40].
21 The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 2% nor more than 3% of the TANF block grant program for the
second year of the deficiency. The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 3% nor more than 5% of the TANF
block grant program for the third or subsequent year of the deficiency.
22 Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Child Support
Enforcement FY2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007.
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collected if current child support is not paid. States that have more cases that require services
such as paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and payment of arrearages
generally have a tougher time collecting child support than states that do not face such challenges.
In FY2005, the aggregate incentive payment amount was $446 million. Among the 50 states and
the 4 jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, CSE
incentive payments in FY2005 ranged from a high of $41.7 million in California to a low of
$108,972 in the Virgin Islands.23
As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state’s collections base, which is
largely dependent on population size. Thus, the aggregate amount of incentive dollars received by
individual states are a poor indicator of a state’s performance with respect to individual
performance measures. As discussed in more detail later, incentive payments are not directly
correlated with performance. In other words, even though a state may receive a high incentive
payment, the state’s performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very
poor. This results because child support collections are the critical determinant of incentive
payments to states. In fact, the top ten states with regard to collecting child support (in FY2002-
FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments.24
Performance Incentive Scores
The data presented in this report are based on the unaudited incentive payment performance
scores. These data are readily available each year when OCSE publishes its preliminary data
report. Over the years, states have made significant improvement in the area of data reliability.
According to the final report on FY2004 data, only four jurisdictions failed data reliability audits.
A comparison of FY2002 performance score data to FY2006 performance score data25 shows that
CSE program performance has improved with respect to all five performance measures. The
following scores represent the total score for all 54 jurisdictions for each of the performance
measures (referred to in this analysis as national averages). The national average for the paternity
establishment score went from 73% (CSE program measure rather than statewide measure) in
FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from 70%
to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score for
child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score
increased from 4.13 to 4.58.
If state trends are examined in terms of the median score of the five performance measures rather
than the average score, the time-trend is similar to the trend in the national averages, but the
performance of the median state, over the five-year period, tends to be slightly higher than that of
the average state with respect to paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and
cost-effectiveness. With regard to the other two performance measures (i.e., current collections
23 The OCSE has not yet published actual incentive payment data by state for FY2006.
24 During the four-year period FY2002-FY2005, the states with the highest incentive payments were California, Texas,
Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. These states also are the most populous
states.
25 The table for the FY2002 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/
prelim_datareport/. The table for the FY2006 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/
preliminary_report/.
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and arrearages), the median score is the same or almost the same as the average score.26 The
median score for paternity establishment went from 87% in FY2002 to 94% in FY2006; the score
for child support order establishment increased from 71% to 79%; the score for current child
support collections increased from 57% to 59%; the score for child support arrearage cases did
not change from 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score increased from 4.49 to 4.70.
The following analysis examines the individual CSE performance measures for the five-year
period FY2002-FY2006. It focuses on the median,27 maximum, and minimum scores for all five
performance measures.
Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP)
One of the goals of the CSE program has always been to establish paternity for those needing that
service. In fact the official title of the program when it was enacted in 1975 and to this day is
Child Support and Establishment of Paternity. The CSE program’s strategic plan for FY2005-
FY2009 reiterates this by indicating that goal #1 of the program is that all children have an
established parentage and the program tries to achieve this goal by increasing the percentage of
children with a legal relationship with their parents.
As mentioned earlier in the CSE performance measures text box, states have two options for
determining the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). They can use a PEP that is based on
data that pertains solely to the CSE program or they can use a PEP that is based on data that
pertains to the state population as a whole. In effect, the PEP compares paternities established
during the fiscal year with the number of nonmarital births during the preceding fiscal year.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median PEP score among the 54 jurisdictions28 with CSE
programs ranged from 86.64 in FY2002 to 94.11 in FY2006 (with a slight dip in FY2004). The
maximum PEP score was 130.75 in FY2002, it rose to 190.70 in FY2003 and dropped to 122.12
in FY2006. A PEP of 100% or more generally means that the state has established paternity for
more than just the newborns who were born outside of marriage in the specified year (i.e., the
state has established paternity for many older children as well).29 The minimum PEP score
fluctuated during the period FY2002 through FY2006. It started at 50.83 and ended at 59.44.
26 The median reflects the performance of the middle-ranked state, with all states weighted equally.
27 The median score sometimes better illustrates trends because unlike the mean (i.e., average) it is not affected by very
high or very low scores.
28 According to preliminary FY2002 data, Guam had the maximum PEP score of 452.87, but that score for Guam was
excluded because of conflicting data.
29 As mentioned earlier in the text box, a state may use as its PEP either the CSE PEP or the statewide PEP. The state
CSE PEP is based on the entire number of children in the CSE caseload who had been born outside of marriage,
regardless of year of birth, and whether paternity had been established for them. If the CSE PEP is more than 100%,
then the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage but had paternity established on their
behalf exceeded the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage in any previous year.
Whereas, if the statewide PEP is more than 100%, then the number of paternities established in the current fiscal year
exceeded the number of babies born outside of marriage in the preceding fiscal year.
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Figure 1. Paternity Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median
86.64 90.15 89.85 91.47 94.11
Maximum
130.75 190.70 117.76 112.42 122.12
Minimum
50.83 63.90 63.21 54.05 59.44
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score. In FY2002, on the basis of preliminary data, Guam
had the maximum score (452.87). However, because of other conflicting data for Guam, that outlier PEP for
Guam was excluded from this analysis. The next highest PEP score in FY2002 was 130.75 (Idaho).
Child Support Order Establishment Percentage
Goal #2 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for
all children in the CSE caseload to have child support orders. The second performance measure
focuses on the percentage of CSE cases that have a child support order (i.e., a legally-binding
document that requires the noncustodial parent to pay child support).
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support order establishment score among
the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs rose each year, starting at 71.28 in FY2002 and ending at
78.96 in FY2006. The maximum score for this performance measure fluctuated; it started at
92.03, reached a high of 96.00 in FY2005 and declined back to 92.98 in FY2006. The minimum
score for child support order establishment rose significantly during the five-year period, starting
at 29.66 in FY2002 and ending at 45.43 in FY2006.
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Figure 2. Child Support Order Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median
71.28 74.50 75.41 76.08 78.96
Maximum
92.03 94.10 93.73 96.00 92.98
Minimum
29.66 31.90 34.92 39.60 45.43
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Current Child Support Collections Scores
Goal #430 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for
all children in the CSE caseload to receive the financial support owed by their noncustodial
parents. This goal encompasses both current child support payments and past-due child support
payments (i.e., arrearages). The third performance indicator measures the proportion of current
child support owed that is collected on behalf of children in the CSE caseload.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support current collections score among the
54 jurisdictions with CSE programs was 57.10 in FY2002, dropped to 56.65 in FY2003,
remained relatively unchanged in FY2004, and increased for the next two years to a score of
59.16 in FY2006. The maximum score was relatively stable, ranging from 74.37 to 74.80. The
minimum score increased every year over the five-year period, from 39.11 in FY2002 to 45.92 in
FY2006.
30 Goal #3 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the CSE Program is for all children in the CSE program to have
medical coverage.
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Figure 3. Child Support Current Collections Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median
57.10 56.65 56.66 58.89 59.16
Maximum
74.70 74.80 74.37 74.72 74.65
Minimum
39.11 40.90 42.68 44.36 45.92
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores
The fourth performance indicator measures state efforts to collect money from CSE cases with an
arrearage (i.e., past-due child support payments are owed). This performance measure specifically
counts paying cases—and not total arrearage dollars collected—because states have different
methods of handling certain aspects of arrearage cases. For example, the ability to write off debt
that is deemed uncollectible varies by state. Moreover, some states charge interest on arrearages
(which is considered additional arrearages) while other states do not.31 As mentioned above, this
performance measure is incorporated in goal #4 as listed in the FY2005-FY2009 CSE Strategic
Plan.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support arrearage cases score among the 54
jurisdictions with CSE programs fluctuated slightly during the period. It was 60.71 in FY2002
and was 61.34 in FY2006. The maximum score increased from 71.58 in FY2002 to 75.21 in
FY2006 (with a drop between FY2003 and FY2004). The minimum score rose from 30.21 in
FY2002 to 42.33 in FY2004 and then declined to 41.01 in FY2006.
31 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 7.
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Figure 4. Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median
60.71 59.80 59.15 60.59 61.34
Maximum
71.58 72.20 71.83 73.50 75.21
Minimum
30.21 37.00 42.33 41.36 41.01
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Cost-Effectiveness Scores
Goal #5 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program says
that the CSE program will be efficient and responsive in its operations. The fifth performance
measure assesses the total dollars collected by the CSE program for each dollar spent
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median cost-effectiveness score among the 54
jurisdictions with CSE programs was 4.49 in FY2002, it rose and fell throughout the period, and
ended at 4.70 in FY2006. The maximum score went from 7.80 to 9.45 over the five-year period
(with a drop between FY2004 and FY2005). The minimum score was 1.46 in FY2002 reached
2.10 in FY2005 and dropped to 1.84 in FY2006.
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Figure 5. Cost-Effectiveness Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median
4.49 4.68 4.62 4.77 4.70
Maximum
7.80 7.91 8.70 8.53 9.45
Minimum
1.46 1.57 1.83 2.10 1.84
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Incentive Payments for All Performance Measures
Although CSE incentive payments were awarded to all 54 jurisdictions (including the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) during the FY2002-FY2006
period, some jurisdictions performed poorly on certain performance measures and thereby did not
receive an incentive for that measure. (See the earlier text box on performance thresholds for the
percentage scores on each performance measure that do not warrant an incentive payment.) Even
so, the 54 jurisdictions (in aggregate) improved their performance over the five-year period. In
FY2002, 46 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures compared to 53
jurisdictions in FY2005 and 52 jurisdictions in FY2006.
On the basis of the unaudited FY2002 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 46
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 3 jurisdictions received an
incentive for four performance measures (California, Hawaii, and Mississippi), and 5 jurisdictions
(Illinois, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) received an
incentive for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-2.)
On the basis of the unaudited FY2003 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 48
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 5 jurisdictions received an
incentive for four performance measures (Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands), and the remaining jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive
for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-3.)
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On the basis of the unaudited FY2004 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 51
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, and 3 jurisdictions received
an incentive for four performance measures (New Mexico, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands). (See Appendix, Table B-4.)
On the basis of the unaudited FY2005 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 53
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and the remaining
jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive for four performance measures. (See
Appendix, Table B-5.)
Table B-6 indicates that on the basis of the unaudited FY2006 performance incentive scores of
the 54 jurisdictions, 52 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and
the remaining 2 jurisdictions (the District of Columbia and Guam) received an incentive for four
performance measures.
Relationship Between Incentive Payments and Performance
Measures
Given that the incentive payment is based on five performance measures, it is likely that all
jurisdictions would continue to receive some amount of incentive payments. However, if
individual performance measures are examined, a different picture develops; some states may not
perform well enough to receive an incentive payment with respect to one of the five performance
measures. Table B-2, Table B-3, Table B-4, and Table B-5 show actual incentive payments by
state (includes jurisdictions) for each of the four years FY2002-FY2005, respectively, along with
the five performance measures.32 The states in each of the tables are ranked from highest
performing state (relative to each indicator) to lowest performing state. These tables illustrate that
the relationship between actual performance and CSE incentive payments is not always
transparent. That is, even though a state may receive a high incentive payment, the state’s
performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very poor.
Child support collections are a very important component in determining the amount of a state’s
incentive payment. As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state’s collections
base, which is composed of child support collected on behalf of current and former TANF
families multiplied by two plus the collection amount made on behalf of families who have never
been on TANF.33 The main reason that there is not a more direct relationship between incentive
payments and performance levels is that the incentive payment calculation is so heavily
dependent on child support collections.
Thus, a high collections base can mean that a state receives a high incentive payment despite low
performance measures. For example, although California received the highest incentive payment
in each of the years FY2002-FY2005, it ranked very low with regard to cost-effectiveness (51st in
FY2002, 50th in FY2003, 52nd in FY2004, and 51st in FY2005); current collections (53rd in
FY2002, 51st in FY2003, 52nd in FY2004, and 50th in FY2005); and arrearage cases (40th in
FY2002, 41st in FY2003, 43rd in FY2004, and 37th in FY2005). However, because California
collected at least 31% more child support payments than the next ranking state (and at least 64%
32 OCSE has not yet published data showing the incentive payments received by states in FY2006.
33 State’s Collections Base = 2 x (TANF collections + Formerly on TANF collections) + Never on TANF collections.
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of those collections were on behalf of TANF or former-TANF families), it is not surprising that
California received the highest amount of incentive payments in each of the years FY2002-
FY2005.34 According to OCSE annual data reports, the top ten states with regard to collecting
child support (in FY2002-FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments
(although not in the same rank order).
Policy Issues
The current performance-based incentive payments system is part of the CSE program’s strategic
plan to set goals and measure results. Despite a general consensus that the CSE program is doing
well, questions still arise about whether the program is effectively meeting its mission and
concerns exist over whether the program will be able to meet future expectations in light of recent
reductions in federal funding that were made pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L.
109-171).
Some in the CSE “community” (e.g., states, CSE workers, analysts, state policymakers, and
advocates) contend that several factors may cause a state not to receive an incentive payment that
is commensurate with its relative performance on individual measures. These factors include
static or declining CSE collections; sliding scale performance scores that financially benefit states
at the upper end (but not the top) of the artificial threshold and financially disadvantage states at
the lower end of the artificial threshold; a limited number of performance indicators that do not
encompass all of the components critical to a successful CSE program; and a statutory maximum
on the aggregate amount of incentive payments that can be paid to states—which causes states to
have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds.
Others point out that the current CSE incentive payment system was developed with much
thought and input from the CSE community. They maintain that the incentive payment formula
rewards states for their performance in five critical areas, consistent with the legislated mission of
the CSE program as well as the program’s strategic plan and related outcome measures. They say
that the performance thresholds were designed to provide tough but reachable targets for
performance by rewarding states with higher incentives as they improve. In addition, it is argued
that the annual cap on incentive payments (imposed by P.L. 105-200) has encouraged competition
among the states and that there is no evidence that the cap has stifled the motivation of states to
improve performance.
Many in the CSE community argue that any reduction in the federal government’s financial
commitment to the CSE system could negatively affect states’ ability to serve families. They
contend that a cost shift to the states (during this time when many interests are competing for
limited state dollars) could jeopardize the effectiveness of the CSE program and thereby could
34 California collected 31% more in child support payments than Texas in FY2002. In FY2003, California collected
41% more in child support payments than Texas. In FY2004, California collected 45% more in child support payments
than Texas and in FY2005, California collected 25% more in child support payments than Texas. California was the
highest ranked state with respect to CSE incentive payments in FY2002-FY2005, Texas was the next ranked state.
Given that the incentive formula gives more weight to child support collections made on behalf of TANF and former-
TANF families than on families that have never been on TANF, it is important to note that the majority of the child
support collected in California for the four years illustrated was on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families.
Specifically, in FY2002-FY2005, 75%, 64%, 71%, and 65% (respectively) of CSE collections in California were made
on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families.
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have a negative impact on the children and families the CSE program is designed to serve.
Although most analysts agree that a reduction in CSE funding could result in a less effective CSE
program, several CSE directors who were surveyed in the Lewin Group study said that they
expected their states to replace all or most of federal funding shortfalls in the CSE program.
However, some of the directors moderated their statements by saying that the prospect of the state
replacing eliminated federal dollars with state dollars in years beyond FY2008 is uncertain.35
This section discusses the following list of issues: (1) “Does the CSE Incentive Payment System
Reward Good Performance?” (2)”Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional
Performance Indicators?” (3) “Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE
Performance?” (4) “Why Aren’t the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity
Establishment Performance Measure?” (5) “Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual
State Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance?” and (6) “Will the Elimination of
the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect CSE Programs?”
Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good
Performance?
According to OCSE, all states received a CSE incentive payment in FY2006. This means that all
states attained a certain level of program performance. According to OCSE, for all five
performance measures, all states36 achieved applicable percentage scores that earned them
incentives. Moreover, a comparison of FY2002 data to FY2006 data shows that CSE program
performance has improved for all five performance measures. The national average for the
paternity establishment score increased from 73% (CSE measure rather than statewide measure)
in FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from
70% to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score
for child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score
increased from 4.13 to 4.58.
Nonetheless, many contend that the CSE incentive payment systems is too heavily based on child
support collections and that artificial thresholds adversely affect performance levels in that they
unfairly allow states that are performing at significantly higher levels than other states to be given
the same score (at the high end of the performance scale and at the low end of the performance
scale).
CSE Collections
Ultimately the amount of a state’s incentive payment depends on how much the state collects in
child support payments. If a state has a small amount of child CSE collections, then even if it has
high performance percentages for all five measures, its CSE incentive payment would be small.
35 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing
and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child
Support Directors by the Legin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/
nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf.
36 Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Guam, received incentive payments in four rather than five
performance areas. The District of Columbia failed to meet the performance threshold for child support order
establishment and Guam failed to meet the cost-effectiveness threshold.
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Total child support collections for a state may vary for a number of reasons. Some factors that
may influence the amount of child support a state collects include the population of the state, the
number of single parents in the state, the number of children in the state, the number of unmarried
parents in the state, the number of successful paternity determinations, the number of successful
child support order establishments, the size of the TANF caseload, the size of the former-TANF
caseload, the number of interstate cases, the effectiveness of the state’s CSE program, state per
capita income, state child poverty rate, and unemployment rate.
Artificial Thresholds Related to Performance Levels
All of the performance measures have a sliding scale so that increased performance earns a higher
level of the incentive payment. However, they also all have upper and lower thresholds.37 This
means that above a certain percentage, all percentages are translated into the maximum applicable
percentage. By the same policy, all performance percentages that are below a certain threshold
percentage are translated into zero (i.e., the state would not be eligible for an incentive payment),
unless the program improves sufficiently and quickly.
For performance measures pertaining to the establishment of paternity or the establishment of
child support orders, if a state establishes paternity for at least 80% of its caseload or establishes a
child support order for at least 80% of its caseload, the state receives a percentage score of 100%.
In FY2006, this meant that Louisiana, a state that established paternity for 81.07% of the children
in the state without legally identified fathers, and Oklahoma, a state that established paternity for
122.12%38 of the children in the state without legally identified fathers, both received a paternity
establishment percentage score of 100%. Thus, states separated by more than 40 percentage
points received the same performance ranking—thereby not fully rewarding the performance of
the more successful state. With regard to the establishment of child support orders, in FY2006,
South Dakota, a state with an order establishment percentage of 92.98%, received the maximum
possible percentage score of 100% as did California, a state with a child support order
establishment percentage of 80.57%.
By the same reasoning, the lower threshold of 50% treats states establishing zero paternities and
zero child support orders the same as states establishing paternities or child support orders for
49% of their caseload. (In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (the District of Columbia—order
establishment [45.43%]) had an applicable percentage score below 50% for either paternity
establishment or child support order establishment.) (See Appendix, Table B-6.)
The upper threshold for the current collections performance measure also is 80% but the lower
threshold is 40%. The performance measure for current child support collections is based on the
37 P.L. 104-193 (enacted August 22, 1996), the 1996 welfare reform law directed the HHS Secretary to develop a new
revenue-neutral performance-based incentive payment system in consultation with state CSE directors. The federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) convened an Incentive Funding Work Group in late 1996 to develop a
new incentive payment system. The work group consisted of 26 persons representing state and local CSE programs,
HHS regional offices, and the OCSE central office. The work group determined the minimum and maximum standards
(i.e., thresholds) for each performance measure based on historic performance by the states and state trends. In general,
the upper threshold was based on the view that most states could realistically achieve that level of performance.
38 States are able to establish paternities for more than 100% of children needing paternity established because the
paternity establishment performance measure compares current year data to previous year’s data and includes paternity
established on behalf of newborns born outside of marriage as well as older children who were born outside of
marriage.
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amount of collections (i.e., a dollar measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue
because the highest percentage attained on the current collections performance measure was
74.65% (Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 45.92% (Nevada). (See
Appendix, Table B-6.)
Likewise, the upper threshold for the arrearage (i.e., past-due) collections performance measure is
80% and the lower threshold is 40%.39 The performance measure for arrearage child support
collections assesses the state’s efforts to collect money from noncustodial parents for past-due
support (i.e., a case [“person”] measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue because the
highest percentage attained on the arrearage collections performance measure was 75.21%
(Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 41.01% (Hawaii). (See Appendix, Table
B-6.)
The upper threshold for the cost-effectiveness performance measure is 5.0 and the lower
threshold is 2.0. In FY2006, Mississippi had a cost-effectiveness score of 9.45 and West Virginia
had a score of 5.00. Even though there was a 4.45 percentage point difference between the two
states, the applicable incentive percentage for those two states and the other 22 states with scores
of at least 5.0 was 100%. In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (Guam—1.84) was below the lower
threshold of 2.0. (See Appendix, Table B-6.)
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance
Indicators?
The establishment and implementation of the current CSE incentive payment system was in part a
recognition that a single indicator (i.e., cost-effectiveness) could not effectively evaluate the
performance of the CSE program. The current CSE incentive payment system bases incentives on
the state’s success in achieving a number of goals, in addition to its ability to provide services in a
cost-effective manner. Incentive payments are tied to the rates of paternity establishment, child
support order establishment, collection of current child support payments, and collection of
arrearages (past-due child support payments), as well as the amount of child support collected for
each dollar spent (i.e., cost-effectiveness).
Some in the CSE community contend that several other indicators of performance have just as
much legitimacy as the five measures that were enacted. They include medical child support,
interstate collections, welfare cost avoidance, payment processing performance, and customer
service. In contrast, according to a report on the implementation of the CSE incentive payment
system, many states indicated that the five measures were adequate and that adding new ones
would be premature.40
39 States that fail to attain an applicable percentage score of 40% with respect to arrearage collections can still earn an
incentive payment if the state improves its performance by at least 5 percentage points over its previous year’s score. A
financial penalty is not imposed on states that fail to meet specified performance levels with respect to the arrearage
collections performance measure.
40 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Final Report. Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement by the Legin Group (Karen N. Gardiner, Michael E. Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and
ECONorthwest (John Tapogna), 2004.
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Medical Child Support
P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary in consultation with state CSE directors and custodial
parents to develop a performance indicator that would measure the effectiveness of states in
establishing and enforcing medical child support obligations. Supporters maintained that a
medical child support measure would encourage states to strengthen their efforts to ensure that
every child who is eligible for CSE services has comprehensive health care coverage. But even
supporters of the proposal agree that not enough reliable data exist upon which to calculate a
medical child support measure. Some supporters have also expressed concern about the benefits
of implementing a performance measure before states have adequate tools to improve their
performance in this area.41 According to the CSE Justifications of Appropriations document for
FY2008, OCSE is developing two new indicators to measure the extent to which medical child
support is ordered and provided in child support cases. According to the Justifications, states have
submitted medical support performance measure data for FY2006 and during calendar year 2007
data reliability audits will be conducted on the medical child support data.42
Interstate Collections
Many CSE workers contend that the most difficult child support orders to establish and enforce
are interstate cases. Although states are required to cooperate in interstate child support
enforcement, problems arise due to the autonomy of local courts. Family law has traditionally
been under the jurisdiction of state and local governments, and citizens fall under the jurisdiction
of the courts where they live. Many child support advocates argue that a child should not be
seriously disadvantaged in obtaining child support just because his or her parents do not live in
the same state. Despite several federal enforcement tools intended to facilitate the establishment
and enforcement of interstate collections, problems still exist. Given that about 33% of all CSE
cases involve more than one state, some analysts maintain that a performance indicator that
would measure whether states were successfully establishing and enforcing interstate child
support cases would significantly improve the overall effectiveness of the CSE program.43
Others acknowledge the importance of interstate collections but argue that states are not yet in a
position to perform satisfactorily on an interstate performance measure. They acknowledge that
although interstate collections increased by 39% over the eight-year period FY1998-FY2006,
from $1.032 billion in FY1998 to $1.438 billion in FY2006, interstate collections (i.e., child
support collections forwarded to other states) comprised between 6% and 7% of total CSE
collections over the period FY1998-FY2006.
41 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
Enforcement. 21 Million Children’s Health: Our Shared Responsibility - The Medical Child Support Working Group’s
Report. June 2000. See Chapter 7.
42 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families FY2008 Justification of
Estimates for Appropriations Committee. February 2007. p. 259.
43 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. 2004 Green Book: Background Material and Data
on the Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. March 2004. WMCP:108-6, p. 8-43—
8-49.
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Welfare Cost Avoidance
Unlike other social services programs, the CSE program is intended to transfer private—not
public—funds to nonwelfare families enrolled in the program. Thus, the CSE program imposes
personal responsibility on noncustodial parents by requiring them to meet their financial
obligations to their children, thereby alleviating taxpayers of this responsibility. These child
support payments reduce government spending by providing families with incomes sufficient to
make them ineligible for programs such as TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid.
In FY2004, child support payments enabled 331,000 CSE families to end their TANF eligibility.
Research has indicated that families go on welfare less often and leave sooner when they receive
reliable child support payments. In addition, federal costs for Medicaid, food stamps, and other
means-tested programs decrease when both parents support their children.44
Although it is difficult to determine how much money might have been spent on various public
assistance programs without the collection of child support payments, some analysts contend that
it would be good public policy to add a performance indicator that attempts to measure—or at
least estimate—the impact of CSE collections in reducing or eliminating costs in other public
benefit/welfare programs.45 Other analysts argue that adding a performance indicator to measure
welfare cost avoidance would only add more complexity to an already complicated incentive
payment system.
Payment Processing Performance
Some state policymakers and advocates want to look at an even broader set of factors when
evaluating their state CSE program. They maintain that a legitimate purpose of performance
standards in some instances is to set expectations. They contend that, because the CSE program
has expanded its mission from welfare cost recovery to include promotion of self-sufficiency and
personal responsibility and service delivery, it should account for payment processing
performance. Such a measure would try to capture whether or not child support payments were
accurately accounted, whether families were paid in a timely manner, and whether both custodial
and noncustodial parents were satisfied with the state’s CSE dispute resolution system.46
Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE
Performance?
Several persons who commented on the federal regulations for implementation of the CSE
incentive payment and audit penalty provisions said that incentive payments and financial
44 The Effects of Child Support on Welfare Exits and Re-entries, by Chien-Chung Huang, James Kunz, and Irwin
Garfinkel. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 557-576 (2002);
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/Courses/PA882/Huangm%20et%20al_JPAM.pdf.
45 Urban Institute, prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Child Support Cost Avoidance in 1999, Final Report, by Laura
Wheaton, June 6, 2003, Contract No. 105-00-8303; http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/
cost_avoidance/#N10026.
46 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program
Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm.
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penalties are at odds with each other because they affect different programs (i.e., CSE and
TANF).47 Incentive payments are given to states from federal CSE funding and penalties are
taken from a state’s TANF funding.48
Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC) program.
Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with TANF (and
used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the Governor of a state must certify that it
will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block grant funding.
Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a provision in federal
law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the CSE program with a
reduction in Title IV-A funding.
The principle that there are levels of state performance that would merit an incentive payment and
there are levels that would warrant a penalty was incorporated into the current CSE incentive
payment system. But, the law also provides that, before a penalty is imposed, states with lower
performance levels may be able to receive some incentive, provided their program improves
sufficiently and quickly.49 States with poor performance are able to still qualify for an incentive
payment if a significant increase over the previous year’s performance is achieved in those
measures (i.e., 10 percentage points on the paternity establishment performance level, 5
percentage points on the child support order establishment performance level, 5 percentage points
on the current support collections performance level, and 5 percentage points on the arrearage
collections performance level).
Federal law stipulates that with regard to the three “more important” performance measures,
states must achieve certain levels of performance in order to avoid being penalized for poor
performance. The three performance measures are: paternity establishment, child support order
establishment, and collection of current child support payments. A graduated penalty equal to a
1% to 5% reduction in federal TANF block grant funds is assessed against states that fail to meet
the CSE performance requirements.50
Although there is an interaction between the incentive payment and financial penalty systems,
they affect different programs. Thus, even if a state’s incentive payment is larger than any penalty
assessed against the state, the state cannot easily reconcile the difference because the state is
required to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The state would have to
expend other state funds (that are not earmarked for the CSE program) to replace the loss in
TANF funding.
47 Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 249. Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human
Services. Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit Penalties. Final Rule. December 27, 2000
(p. 50 of 71).
48 Even in cases in which the amount of the child support payment incentive is larger than the amount of the TANF
penalty imposed, a state is required to reinvest its incentive payment in its CSE program, while penalties are assessed
from the TANF funding stream. States that acquire a penalty would find that each quarterly TANF payment for the
upcoming year would be reduced for a total of the TANF penalty amount. These states would then additionally have to
expend an equivalent amount of state funds if they wanted to replace the reduction of federal funds.
49 Under this alternative improvement formula, the CSE incentive payment can never be more than half (50%) of the
maximum incentive possible. The cost-effectiveness performance indicator is the only measure whereby improved
performance does not translate into an incentive payment.
50 The percentage reduction depends on number of times a state fails to comply with CSE state plan requirements (i.e.,
at least 1% but not more than 2% for the 1st failure to comply, at least 2% but not more than 3% for the 2nd failure, and
at least 3% but not more than 5% for the 3rd and subsequent failures).
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An alternative to imposing penalties in the form of reducing TANF funding to a state for the
inadequacies of its CSE program would be to reduce funding for the CSE program instead. This
could be done by taking the financial penalty out of the state’s incentive payment and/or
subtracting the penalty from the federal government’s 66% matching funds to the state.
Why Aren’t the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the
Paternity Establishment Performance Measure?
Unlike the other performance measures, the paternity establishment indicator has two separate
standards to which it must adhere. First, the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP), must meet
a 90% standard (Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). This means that federal law currently
requires that states must establish paternity for at least 90% of the children who need to have their
father legally identified in order to substantially comply with the requirements of the CSE
program.51
If a state does not meet the PEP, it must raise its performance by a specified level of improvement
in order to avoid having a financial penalty imposed. The percentage of improvement required
varies with a state’s performance level. The increase needed to avoid a penalty decreases with
higher PEP scores until a state reaches a 90% or higher PEP, at which point the penalty is avoided
without an increase in performance.52 For example, a state with a PEP of less than 40% needs a 6
percentage point increase over the prior year to avoid the penalty. Whereas, a state with a PEP
between 75% and 90% needs a 2 percentage point increase over the previous year to avoid the
penalty.53 If the state fails to increase the PEP by the necessary percentage points after a
corrective action period, the state is penalized by a 1%-5% reduction in its state’s TANF funding.
Second, in a separate provision (Section 458 of the Social Security Act) the PEP is included as
one of the five CSE performance measures. Thus, states can receive incentive payments if their
PEP meets certain requirements. The incentive payment provision with respect to the PEP is
consistent with the view of the CSE community that only poor performance should be penalized.
Thus, under the incentive formula, an incentive is awarded to a state with a PEP of 50% or more.
The incentive formula provides that a state that achieves a PEP of 80% or more will receive 100%
of the applicable state collection’s base for that measure. If a state has a PEP of less than 50%, the
51 The original Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) was enacted into law as part of the Family Support Act of
1988 (P.L. 100-485, Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L.
103-66) increased the percentage of children for whom a state must establish paternity (PEP) from 50% to 75%. P.L.
103-66 also imposed financial penalties against states that failed to comply with the mandatory paternity standards. The
financial penalty translated into a reduction in federal matching funds for the state’s AFDC program. P.L. 104-193, the
1996 welfare reform law, raised the PEP from 75% to 90%.
52 Report on State Child Support Enforcement Performance Penalties. Recommendations of the State/Federal Penalties
Work Group. July 27, 1998; http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/DCL/1998/dcl9893a.htm.
53 A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 75% and 90% is required to increase its paternity
establishment percentage by two percentage points over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity
establishment percentage at a level between 50% and 75% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage
by three percentage points over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a
level between 45% and 50% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by four percentage points
over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 40% and 45%
is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by five percentage points over the previous year’s
percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level less than 40% is required to increase its
paternity establishment percentage by six percentage points over the previous year’s percentage.
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state must increase its PEP score by at least 10 percentage points over the previous year’s score in
order to receive an incentive payment.
From the outset of the performance measure debate (1996-1998), there was a concern about
whether states should be subject to penalties and be eligible for incentives at the same time. Some
argued that the lack of an incentive payment would make some states doubly penalized by not
improving performance. It was decided that states should be eligible for incentive payments based
on performance even if they were subject to penalties because their performance had not
improved to the extent required to avoid the penalty.54 The work group that developed the current
incentive payment system maintained that the existing statutory PEP standard of 90% was too
high and that it conflicted with their premise that only very poor performance should be
penalized. Thus, the work group overlaid another provision on top of existing law which provided
that a state that had a PEP of 80% or higher would receive 100% of the applicable state
collection’s base for the paternity establishment performance measure. This new PEP for
incentive payment purposes created what many maintain is an inconsistency in CSE law.
According to the National Council of Child Support Directors:
It is inconsistent to reward a state that achieves a paternity establishment percentage of 80%
with maximum child support incentive funding, but impose a penalty against the State’s
TANF funding if a 2 percentage point increase is not achieved between 80% and 90%
performance.55
The National Council of Child Support Directors recommended that “the paternity establishment
penalty provisions set the upper threshold at 80%, which will then make it consistent and uniform
with the existing incentive formula under which a state that has a paternity establishment
percentage of 80% or more receives 100% of the weight allowable for that measure.”56 If this
recommendation was enacted into law, states would be required to establish paternity for at least
80% of the children who need to have their father legally identified rather than 90% (as required
by current law).
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State
Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance?
The CSE incentive payment system adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be a
somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive
higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, these totals are a
fixed amount, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the capped
funds. The revenue-neutral capped incentive payment system creates an interactive effect—an
increase in incentive payments to one state must be matched by a decrease in payments to other
states. Similarly, if one state’s performance weakens or the state fails an audit, every other state
obtains an increase in incentive payments.57
54 Incentive Funding Work Group: Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. January 31, 1997. p. 9.
55 National Council of Child Support Directors. Position Paper on Paternity Performance Penalty Revisions, February
24, 2005.
56 Ibid.
57 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(continued...)
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Although CSE incentive payments were constructed to compare a state’s program performance to
itself rather than a “national average,” the fixed amount of aggregate incentive payments forces a
state to compete with the other states for its share of the aggregate amount.58
Under the current incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive payment for good
performance and the total amount of the incentive payment depend on four factors: the total
amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive payments, the
state’s success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload, the state’s performance in five
areas, and the relative success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting these
performance criteria. Because the incentive payments are now capped, some states face a loss of
incentive payments even if they improve their performance.
Some analysts argue that each state is unique in terms of its CSE caseload and thereby should
only have to make improvements over its performance in previous years with regard to rewarding
of incentive payments. Nevertheless, CSE programs are compared to one another in that there is a
capped funding source and it must be shared by all. So even though Texas has a large CSE
caseload, shares an international border, and has vast cultural and socioeconomic diversity among
its residents, its program is in essence compared to that of a small mid-western state or a wealthy
northeastern state in determining its share of CSE incentive dollars.59
Others contend that if a state deems that it has not received a sufficient amount of incentive
payments and that more CSE funding is necessary, it is the state’s prerogative to augment federal
funding. They maintain that the federal government is carrying too much of the financial burden
of CSE program. They point out that the federal government matches state funds at a 66% rate
and additionally provides states with incentive payments.
Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments
Adversely Affect CSE Programs?
As mentioned earlier, the CSE funding structure requires states to spend state dollars on the
program in order to receive federal matching funds. An important source of those states’ dollars
has been CSE incentive payments. CSE incentive payments represent a significant percentage of
CSE financing for the states. A 2003 report commissioned by HHS indicated that for the nation as
a whole, federal CSE incentive payments represented 25% of CSE financing for the states.60
(...continued)
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 9 and p. 20.
58 P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts,
i.e., $422 million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454
million for FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and $483 million
for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for
inflation.
59 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program
Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm.
60 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final
Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement,
prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc. and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest,
September 3, 2003, p. iii.
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Until now, states have received a 66% federal match for every dollar invested in the CSE
program, including incentive payments (which came from the federal government). Although
incentive payments per se are not affected, P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated
(effective October 1, 2007) the federal match on CSE incentive payments that states, in
compliance with federal law, reinvest back into the CSE program. This provision was passed as
part of the Deficit Reduction Act because many argued that “reinvesting” incentive payments
back into the CSE program was really supplanting state funding. States are no longer entitled to
receive federal matching funds for CSE incentive payments that the state reinvests in the CSE
program. The elimination of federal reimbursement of CSE incentive payments is likely to result
in a significant reduction in CSE financing. Two bills (H.R. 1386/S. 803) have been introduced in
the 110th Congress to repeal the provision that eliminates the federal match on incentive
payments. In other words, both bills would restore the federal match on incentive payments.
Under previous law, the 66% federal matching rate on incentive payments resulted in a near
tripling of state CSE funding—in that for every dollar the state reinvested in the CSE program,
the federal government matched that investment with about $2.61 Thereby, states were able to
significantly leverage their investment through the federal financial structure.
Both a 2003 study by the Lewin Group (mentioned earlier) and a recent 2007 study by the Lewin
Group indicate that CSE incentive payments represent 25% of all funds used to draw down the
federal match for the CSE program. According to the Lewin study:
... there is substantial variation across states in the proportion of the state share financed by
incentives (from 7 percent to 54 percent). This variation may be due to a number of factors,
such as poor state performance on incentive measures (thus low incentive payments) or
higher appropriations from state legislatures. Similarly, the decrease in expenditures
assuming no new state outlays ranges from 5 percent to 36 percent.62
The 2007 Lewin study also indicates that because about a third of the CSE caseload is composed
of interstate cases, CSE directors expect that the elimination of the federal match on incentive
payments will probably result in negative interstate ramifications. The study uses the following
illustration.
For example, consider two states. State A replaces funding and maintains strong
performance, but State B cuts back services due to funding shortfalls and performance
declines. State A needs assistance from State B on interstate cases, but State B cuts back staff
on this labor-intensive unit. State A’s performance is affected negatively as a result.63
61 The general CSE federal matching rate is 66%. This means that for every dollar that a state spends on its CSE
program, the federal government will reimburse the state 66 cents. So if the state spends $1 on its program, the federal
share of that expenditure is 66 cents and the state share of that expenditure is 34 cents. The algebraic formula for this
relationship is represented by .66/.34=x/1. Thereby, if the state share of the expenditure is $1, the federal share is $1.94
(i.e., the federal share is 1.94 times the state share), and the total expenditure by the state is $2.94 ($1+$1.94).
Similarly, if the state share of expenditures amounted solely to the incentive payment of $471 million (i.e., the statutory
cap on the aggregate CSE incentive payment for FY2007), the federal share would amount to 1.94 times that amount,
or $914 million, translating into $1.385 billion in total CSE expenditures/funding.
62 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing
and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child
Support Directors by the Lewin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/
nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf.
63 Ibid., p. iv.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
It is generally agreed that state spending/investment in the CSE program significantly impacts
program performance. Several studies have indicated that most of the best-performing state CSE
programs also have the most generous funding levels.64 The elimination of the federal match of
incentive payments is expected to reduce overall CSE program expenditures and correspondingly
reduce the rate of growth of child support collections. The OCSE expects that while states will
increase their state contributions to cover some of the lost federal funds, they will not completely
make up the shortfall and overall CSE expenditures will be reduced.65
64 Center for Law and Social Policy. You Get What You Pay For: How Federal and State Investment Decisions Affect
Child Support Performance, by Vicki Turetsky. December 1998. See also National Conference of State Legislatures.
Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program Performance, by Teresa A. Myers.
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm
65 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Fiscal Year 2008—
Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees. Child Support Enforcement. p. 443-445.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Appendix A. Legislative History of CSE Incentive
Payments
Before enactment of the CSE program in 1975, when a state or locality collected child support
payments from a noncustodial parent on behalf of a family receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal government was reimbursed for its share of the cost of
AFDC payments to the family.66 Although local units of government (e.g., counties) often
enforced child support obligations, in most states they did not make any financial contributions
toward funding AFDC benefit payments. Therefore the localities were not eligible for any share
of the “savings” that occurred when child support was collected from a noncustodial parent on
behalf of an AFDC family. From the debate on the establishment of a CSE program, Congress
concluded that a fiscal sharing in the results of child support collections could be a strong
incentive for encouraging the local units of government to improve their CSE activities.67
P.L. 90-248, Social Security Amendments of 1967 (January 2, 1968)
Although the formal CSE program was not in existence, P.L. 90-248 provided for the
development and implementation of a program under which a state agency would undertake the
responsibility for (1) determining the paternity of children receiving AFDC and who were born
outside of marriage, and (2) securing financial support from the noncustodial parent for these and
other children receiving AFDC, using reciprocal arrangements with other states to obtain and
enforce court orders for support. (P.L. 89-97, the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (enacted
July 30, 1965), allowed states to use the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) to
determine federal-state cost sharing for Title IV-A (i.e., AFDC expenditures), which ranged from
a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 83%.) Title IV-A included the child support enforcement
provisions indicated above. This meant that if a state collected child support payments on behalf
of an AFDC family, the federal government would be reimbursed at the state’s FMAP. If the state
had an FMAP of 60%, the federal government was reimbursed $60 for every $100 the state
collected (from the noncustodial parent) in child support payments for AFDC families.
P.L. 93-647, Enactment of the CSE Program68 (January 4, 1975)
P.L. 93-647 required that if a child support collection were made by any locality in the state or by
the state for another state, that locality or state was to receive a special bonus—incentive
payment—based on the amount of any child support collected from a noncustodial parent to
reimburse amounts paid out as AFDC. The incentive payment was equal to 25% of the amount of
child support collected on behalf of AFDC families for the first 12 months and 10% thereafter.
The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e.,
collected) on behalf AFDC families.69
66 The federal share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income.
67 U.S. Senate. Committee on Finance. Social Services Amendments of 1974; a report to accompany H.R. 17045.
December 14, 1974. S.Rept. 93-1356. p. 50-51.
68 The CSE program was enacted as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.
69 P.L. 93-647 stipulated that child support payments on behalf of AFDC families were to be paid to the states
following an assignment of child support rights by the AFDC client to the state. Because federal dollars were used to
(continued...)
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P.L. 95-30, Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 (May 23,
1977)
P.L. 95-30 changed the rate at which incentives were paid to states and localities for child support
collections used to reimburse AFDC payments. This amendment to Section 458 of the Social
Security Act simplified the complex process of computing incentive payments at two different
rates by adopting a flat 15% incentive payment rate. The incentive payment was now equal to
15% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families. The incentive payment came
out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 97-248, Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(September 3, 1982)
P.L. 97-248 reduced the incentive payment rate from 15% of child support collections made on
behalf of AFDC families to 12% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families.
The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e.,
collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 98-378, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
(August 16, 1984)
P.L. 98-378 significantly revised incentive payments. Instead of making incentive payments to
localities and states that collected child support payments on another state’s behalf, the federal
government made the incentive payments directly to the states70 and each state was required to
pass incentive payments through to local CSE agencies if those agencies shared in funding the
state CSE program. In order to improve cost-effectiveness and encourage states to emphasize
child support collections on behalf of both AFDC and non-AFDC families, the incentive payment
formula was changed so that states were paid a minimum of 6% of their child support collections
in AFDC cases and 6% of their child support collections in non-AFDC cases. Under this
approach, there was the potential to earn up to 10% of both AFDC and non-AFDC child support
collections depending on the state’s cost-effectiveness in running a child support program (i.e.,
ratio of state collections to the state’s cost of operating the CSE program). The federal
government paid the incentive payments from its share of retained collections for AFDC families
and capped the amount of incentive payments any state could earn on the non-AFDC cases at
(...continued)
finance a portion of the state AFDC benefit payment, states were required to split child support payments collected on
behalf of AFDC families with the federal government. The child support collections obtained on behalf of AFDC
families are divided between the state and the federal government according to their respective share of total AFDC
benefit payments (a small percentage of AFDC collections is paid directly to families). As noted above, the federal
share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income. The federal share
is also called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage or FMAP.
70 Before 1984, a state that initiated a successful action to collect child support from another state did not receive an
incentive payment. Rather, the state that made the collection received the incentive payment. P.L. 98-378 stipulated
that each state involved in an interstate child support collection be credited with the collection for purposes of
computing the incentive payment. This “double-counting” was intended to encourage states to pursue interstate child
support cases as energetically as they pursued intrastate child support cases.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
115%71 of the AFDC incentive payment earned. The incentive payments came out of the federal
share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 100-485, Family Support Act of 1988 (October 13, 1988)
P.L. 100-485 included a provision that authorized Congress to create a U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support to make recommendations to Congress on improving the child support
program. That Commission’s report called for a study of the federal funding formula and changes
to an incentive structure that is based on performance. In addition, other national organizations,
including the National Conference of State Legislatures, the American Public Welfare Association
(now the American Public Human Services Association, APHSA), the National Governors
Association, and several national advocacy organizations recommended the adoption of a new
performance-based incentive system.72
P.L. 104-193, The 1996 Welfare Reform Law (August 22, 1996)
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193)
required the HHS Secretary, in consultation with state CSE program directors, to recommend to
Congress a new incentive funding system for state CSE programs based on program performance.
P.L. 104-193 required that (1) the new incentive funding system be developed in a revenue-
neutral manner; (2) the new system provide additional payments to any state based on that state’s
performance; and (3) the Secretary report to Congress on the proposed new system by March 1,
1997.
The Incentive Funding Workgroup was formed in October 1996. This group consisted of 15 state
and local CSE directors or their representatives and 11 federal staff representatives from HHS.
Earlier efforts of this state-federal partnership produced the National Strategic Plan for the CSE
program and a set of outcome measures to indicate the program’s success in achieving the goals
and objectives of the plan. Using the same collaboration and consensus-building approach, state
and federal partners recommended a new incentive funding system based on the foundation of the
CSE National Strategic Plan.
Over a period of three months, recommendations for the new incentive funding system emerged.
State partners consulted with state CSE programs not represented directly on the Workgroup. The
final recommendations represented a consensus among state and federal partners on the new
incentive funding system. The Secretary fully endorsed the incentive formula recommendations.
The Secretary’s report made recommendations for a new CSE incentive payment system to the
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance.73
71 The total amount of incentives awarded for non-AFDC collections could not exceed the amount of the state’s
incentive payments for AFDC collections for FY1986 and FY1987. The incentive paid for non-AFDC collections was
capped at 105% of the incentive for AFDC collections for FY1988, 110% for FY1989, and 115% for FY1990 and
years thereafter.
72 The incentive payment system had been criticized for focusing on only one aspect of the CSE program: cost-
effectiveness. It was faulted for not rewarding states for other important aspects of child support enforcement, such as
paternity and support order establishment. In addition, because all states received the minimum incentive payment
amount of 6% of both AFDC and non-AFDC collections regardless of the state’s performance, many analysts claimed
that the CSE incentive payment system did not have a real incentive effect.
73 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
(continued...)
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
P.L. 105-200, The Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of
1998 (July 16, 1998)
Most of the HHS Secretary’s recommendations for a new incentive payment system were
included in P.L. 105-200. This law replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a
revised revenue-neutral incentive payment system that provides (1) incentive payments based on
a percentage of the state’s collections; (2) incorporation of five performance measures related to
establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support
payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phase-in of the incentive system, with it being fully
effective beginning in FY2002; (4) mandatory reinvestment of incentive payments into the CSE
program (or an activity that contributes to improving the effectiveness or efficiency of the CSE
program); and (5) an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of TANF and former TANF
families.
P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary to make incentive payments to the states and stipulated
that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts: $422
million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001, $450 million for FY2002,74 $461 million for
FY2003, $454 million for FY2004, $446 million for FY2005, $458 million for FY2006, $471
million for FY2007, and $483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate
incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for inflation.
P.L. 109-171, Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (February 8, 2006)
P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated (effective October 1, 2007) the 66% federal
match on CSE incentive payments that states, in compliance with federal law, reinvest back into
the CSE program. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and
reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement.
(...continued)
Enforcement. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. February 1997.
74 Before FY2002, CSE incentive payments were paid out of the federal share of child support collected on behalf of
TANF families. Since October 1, 2001 (when the revised incentive payment system was fully phased-in), CSE
incentive payments have been paid with federal funds that have been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury.
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Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Appendix B. Tables
Appendix B includes several detailed state tables. Table B-1 shows that all states received
incentive payments in FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005 and the amounts they received.
Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive
performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents
CSE incentive payments for FY2003 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for
each of the five performance measures for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments
for FY2004 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five
performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005
together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures
for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006.75
75 OCSE has not yet published CSE incentive payment data by state for FY2006.
Congressional Research Service
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Table B-1. Actual Incentive Payments, by State, FY2002-FY2005
(arranged by state with the highest incentive payment to state with the lowest incentive payment)
State
FY2002
State
FY2003
State
FY2004
State
FY2005
1
California 36,814,328
1
California 45,258,302
1
California 43,917,140
1
California 41,743,556
2
Texas 33,815,354
2
Texas 36,825,204
2
Texas 35,018,030
2
Texas 37,594,823
3 Ohio
32,204,888 3 New
York
30,829,027 3 Ohio
30,840,836 3 Ohio
28,985,608
4 Pennsylvania
30,284,824 4 Ohio
30,351,415 4 Michigan
29,072,933 4 New
York
26,242,919
5 New
York
30,176,739 5 Pennsylvania
29,533,145 5 Pennsylvania
26,532,361 5 Michigan
26,035,157
6 Michigan
30,128,156 6 Michigan
27,371,576 6 New
York
26,298,854 6 Pennsylvania
25,422,058
7
Florida 21,261,888
7
Florida 22,545,490
7
Florida 25,086,328
7
Florida 25,263,730
8
New Jersey
17,367,328
8 New Jersey
17,895,131
8 New Jersey
16,335,761
8 New Jersey
15,974,982
9
Wisconsin 15,924,085
9
Wisconsin 15,632,872
9
Wisconsin 14,529,242
9
Wisconsin 13,748,475
10
Washington 15,204,033
10
Washington 14,675,136
10
Washington 13,445,851
10
North
Carolina
13,461,627
11
Minnesota 13,555,076
11
Minnesota 13,492,130
11
Minnesota 13,048,434
11
Washington
12,719,377
12 Georgia
11,999,643 12 North
Carolina
12,209,075 12 North
Carolina
12,807,092 12 Minnesota
12,135,231
13 North
Carolina
11,741,877 13 Virginia
11,431,758 13 Virginia
10,673,373 13 Georgia
10,808,188
14 Virginia
11,212,586 14 Georgia
10,453,125 14 Georgia
10,574,394 14 Virginia
10,237,234
15 Massachusetts
9,717,960 15 Massachusetts
9,958,854 15 Missouri
10,525,886 15 Missouri
10,204,439
16 Maryland
8,749,496 16 Missouri
8,653,176 16 Massachusetts
9,168,115 16 Massachusetts
8,898,038
17 Missouri
8,496,830 17 Kentucky
7,954,630 17 Illinois 8,440,244 17 Illinois
8,650,633
18 Kentucky
8,088,515 18 Tennessee
7,716,005 18 Tennessee
7,766,731 18 Indiana
8,385,495
19 Iowa
7,126,528 19 Iowa
7,220,705 19 Kentucky
7,627,918 19 Tennessee
7,837,795
20 Tennessee
6,811,758 20 Illinois
7,166,179 20 Iowa
7,247,439 20 Maryland 7,303,489
21 Oregon
6,541,362 21 Maryland
6,537,765 21 Indiana
7,080,909 21 Iowa
6,917,274
22 Illinois
6,183,369 22 Oregon 6,336,173
22
Oregon 5,956,034
22
Louisiana 6,213,377
23 Indiana
5,564,581 23 Louisiana
6,130,392 23 Louisiana
5,878,940 23 Oregon
5,600,727
24 Connecticut
5,491,503 24 Indiana
5,552,522 24 Maryland
5,478,845 24 Arizona
5,423,112
CRS-36
State
FY2002
State
FY2003
State
FY2004
State
FY2005
25 Colorado
5,356,965 25 Arizona
5,065,465 25 Arizona
4,992,036 25 Kentucky
5,208,111
26 Arizona
5,206,147 26 Colorado
4,920,924 26 Colorado
4,833,238 26 Connecticut
4,865,914
27 Louisiana
4,389,087 27 West
Virginia
4,209,015 27 Alabama
3,923,947 27 Colorado
4,750,251
28 West
Virginia
4,058,389 28 Alabama
4,001,595 28 West
Virginia
3,775,411 28 Alabama
4,020,646
29 South
Carolina
3,899,715 29 Connecticut
3,942,741 29 Utah
3,677,929 29 West
Virginia
3,879,643
30 Arkansas
3,217,437 30 South
Carolina
3,928,609 30 Nebraska
3,635,367 30 Oklahoma
3,643,878
31 Puerto
Rico
3,201,676 31 Utah
3,493,011 31 South
Carolina
3,605,396 31 Nebraska
3,475,303
32 Utah
3,101,832 32 Puerto
Rico
3,463,489 32 Connecticut
3,455,259 32 South
Carolina
3,321,883
33 Nebraska
3,056,992 33 Arkansas
3,146,484 33 Oklahoma
3,437,279 33 Kansas
3,289,970
34 Alabama
2,900,775 34 Kansas
3,105,801 34 Arkansas
3,361,187 34 Utah
3,288,628
35 Oklahoma
2,899,609 35 Nebraska
3,089,869 35 Kansas
3,306,309 35 Puerto
Rico
3,268,672
36 Kansas
2,873,656 36 Oklahoma
3,056,022 36 Puerto
Rico
3,273,456 36 Mississippi
3,222,870
37 Maine
2,596,197 37 Maine
2,556,766 37 Mississippi
3,246,021 37 Arkansas
2,490,610
38 Mississippi
2,526,611 38 Mississippi
2,482,905 38 Maine
2,339,229 38 Idaho
2,389,857
39 Alaska
1,679,107 39 Idaho
2,216,477 39 Idaho
2,335,547 39 Maine
2,167,195
40 South
Dakota
1,656,493 40 Alaska
2,140,882 40 Alaska
1,934,767 40 Nevada
1,826,744
41 Idaho
1,650,232 41 New
Hampshire
1,982,008 41 New
Hampshire
1,803,991 41 Alaska
1,809,329
42 New
Hampshire
1,438,353 42 South
Dakota
1,660,526 42 Hawai
1,566,788 42 New
Hampshire
1,650,128
43 Montana
1,202,605 43 Hawai
1,588,312 43 North
Dakota
1,542,418 43 North
Dakota
1,560,854
44 Wyoming
1,201,957 44 Nevada
1,293,543 44 South
Dakota
1,517,780 44 South
Dakota
1,466,513
45 North
Dakota
1,192,916 45 North
Dakota
1,264,209 45 Nevada
1,355,443 45 Hawai
1,431,973
46 Vermont
1,127,161 46 Wyoming
1,163,775 46 Rhode
Island
1,270,822 46 Rhode
Island
1,211,250
47 Delaware
1,034,185 47 Montana
1,155,004 47 Delaware
1,265,209 47 Wyoming
1,163,702
48 Rhode
Island
1,016,821 48 Vermont
1,086,334 48 Vermont
1,197,334 48 New
Mexico
1,055,389
49 Hawai
973,201 49 Delaware
970,247 49 Wyoming
1,180,509 49 Montana
1,028,469
50 Nevada
857,000 50 Rhode
Island
962,198 50 Montana
1,061,120 50 Vermont
977,267
51 New Mexico
554,604 51 New Mexico
672,821 51 New Mexico
970,705 51 Delaware
900,305
CRS-37
State
FY2002
State
FY2003
State
FY2004
State
FY2005
52 District of Columbia
502,393 52 District of Columbia
491,354 52 District of Columbia
597,907 52 District of Columbia
598,507
53 Guam
101,209 53 Virgin
Islands
99,488 53 Virgin
Islands
105,718 53 Guam
119,823
54 Virgin
Islands
63,968 54 Guam
60,339 54 Guam
80,188 54 Virgin
Islands
108,972
Total
450,000,000
Total
461,000,000
Total
454,000,000
Total
446,000,000
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The shaded areas shows the rank order of each state from state with the highest incentive payment (ranked 1) to the state withe the lowest incentive payment
(ranked 54). The four jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are included in the state totals.
Table B-2. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2002
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Incentive
Paternity
Cases with
Current
Arrearage
Cost-
State
Payments
State
Establish-
State
Orders
State
Collections
State
Cases
State
Effective-
(dollars)
ment
ness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
California 36,814,328
Guam
452.87a South
Dakota 92.03 Pennsylvania 74.70 New
71.58 Indiana
7.80
Hampshire
Texas
33,815,354
Idaho
130.75 Washington 91.00 Minnesota
72.96 Pennsylvania 70.68 South
Dakota 7.59
Ohio
32,204,888
Montana
113.07 Iowa
87.79 Wisconsin
72.68 Vermont
70.64 Mississippi
7.12
Pennsylvania 30,284,824
Texas
108.43 Maine
87.17 North
71.55 South
Dakota 68.59 Pennsylvania 6.85
Dakota
New York
30,176,739 California
107.94
Vermont
85.80
South Dakota
67.70
Washington
68.33
Hawai
6.53
Michigan 30,128,156
New
106.74 Utah
85.11 Ohio
66.77 Delaware
67.83 Virginia
6.34
Hampshire
Florida 21,261,888
South
Dakota
106.46
North
84.76 Nebraska
66.49 Ohio
67.46 Puerto
Rico 6.27
Dakota
New
Jersey 17,367,328
Pennsylvania 106.01 Colorado
83.46 Vermont
66.34 Alaska
67.39 Wisconsin
6.11
Wisconsin 15,924,085
Ohio
103.38 Montana
83.10 New
65.51 North
66.12 South
5.87
Hampshire
Dakota
Carolina
Washington
15,204,033
Colorado
102.85 Pennsylvania 82.97 New
York
65.12 Colorado
66.10 Oregon
5.85
Minnesota 13,555,076
Washington 100.88 Alaska
82.90 New
Jersey 65.00 Utah
66.04 Massachusetts 5.77
CRS-38
Incentive
Paternity
Cases with
Current
Arrearage
Cost-
State
Payments
State
Establish-
State
Orders
State
Collections
State
Cases
State
Effective-
(dollars)
ment
ness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Georgia
11,999,643
Wyoming 97.78
Wyoming 82.75
Washington
63.98
Minnesota 65.07
Iowa
5.63
North
11,741,877 Illinois 97.06
New 82.02 West
Virginia 62.33 Texas
64.45 Texas
5.41
Carolina
Hampshire
Virginia
11,212,586
Maryland 96.67
Virginia 80.20
Maryland 62.02
Maryland 64.29
Idaho
5.29
Massachusetts 9,717,960 Wisconsin
94.50
Wisconsin
78.99
North
61.26 Montana
63.72 Wyoming
5.00
Carolina
Maryland 8,749,496
Oregon
94.40 Missouri
78.93 Rhode
Island 61.11 Iowa
63.34 Washington 4.95
Missouri 8,496,830
Vermont
94.08 New
Jersey 78.90 Delaware
60.74 Florida
62.83 Louisiana
4.87
Kentucky 8,088,515
Maine
93.56 Idaho
78.64 Oregon
60.41 Nevada
62.03 West
Virginia 4.87
Iowa
7,126,528
Michigan
92.04 Arkansas
78.53 Wyoming
60.05 Nebraska
61.66 New
Jersey 4.83
Tennessee 6,811,758
West
Virginia 90.49 Minnesota
78.04 Texas
59.93 Wyoming
61.57 Ohio
4.81
Oregon
6,541,362
Utah
90.27 Michigan
76.22 Massachusetts 59.68 Maine
61.25 Kentucky
4.71
Illinois 6,183,369
Virginia 90.14
Nebraska
76.04 Michigan
59.36 New
Jersey 61.18 North
4.71
Dakota
Indiana
5,564,581
Alaska
89.64 California
75.32 Iowa
59.10 Wisconsin
61.07 Missouri
4.63
Connecticut
5,491,503
Puerto Rico
88.17
West Virginia
74.90
Virginia
58.97
Oregon
61.04
Michigan
4.59
Colorado 5,356,965
New
York 87.77
North
73.15 Utah
58.60 Kansas
61.03 Rhode
Island 4.52
Carolina
Arizona
5,206,147
Iowa
87.57 New
York
73.05 Montana
58.50 Georgia
60.78 Tennessee
4.50
Louisiana 4,389,087
North
87.40 Ohio
71.38 Maine
57.76 Michigan
60.78 Alaska
4.49
Dakota
West
Virginia
4,058,389
Arkansas
85.88 Massachusetts 71.17 Louisiana
56.44 Louisiana
60.63 New
York
4.49
South
3,899,715
Connecticut 85.06 Indiana
70.59 Florida
56.40 New
York
60.43 North
4.43
Carolina
Carolina
Arkansas 3,217,437
North
84.41 Delaware
70.34 Idaho
55.43 New
Mexico 60.33 New
4.37
Carolina
Hampshire
Puerto
Rico 3,201,676
Georgia
83.25 Kentucky
70.04 Kansas
55.06 North
60.32 Maine
4.28
Carolina
CRS-39
Incentive
Paternity
Cases with
Current
Arrearage
Cost-
State
Payments
State
Establish-
State
Orders
State
Collections
State
Cases
State
Effective-
(dollars)
ment
ness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Utah
3,101,832
Kentucky
82.54 Oklahoma
69.69 Connecticut 55.04 Idaho
60.11 Arizona
4.25
Nebraska 3,056,992
Massachusetts 82.45 Texas
69.00 Colorado
54.97 Mississippi
59.84 Georgia
4.24
Alabama 2,900,775
Minnesota
82.06 Maryland
68.65 Alaska
53.84 Massachusetts 58.32 Maryland
4.19
Oklahoma 2,899,609
South
81.44 Georgia
68.16 Kentucky
52.80 Rhode
Island 58.19 Montana
4.10
Carolina
Kansas
2,873,656
Hawai 81.41
Louisiana
67.36
Hawai 51.13
West
Virginia
57.53
Minnesota
4.05
Maine
2,596,197
New
Jersey 81.37 Arizona
66.99 Missouri
50.74 Oklahoma
56.78 Florida
4.03
Mississippi 2,526,611
Nebraska
81.03 Oregon
66.91 Tennessee
50.44 Virginia
56.37 Vermont
3.93
Alaska 1,679,107
Oklahoma 80.69
South
66.71
Arkansas 50.32
Arkansas 55.53
Utah
3.89
Carolina
South
Dakota
1,656,493
Florida
80.10 Alabama
66.22 Georgia
49.73 California
54.92 Connecticut 3.76
Idaho
1,650,232
Missouri
79.74 Florida
65.23 Mississippi
49.55 Tennessee
54.54 Colorado
3.66
New
1,438,353 Delaware
77.21
Connecticut
64.34
South
49.51 Connecticut 53.13 Delaware
3.66
Hampshire
Carolina
Montana 1,202,605
Tennessee
76.94 Kansas
63.91 Puerto
Rico 48.67 Indiana
52.58 Alabama
3.64
Wyoming 1,201,957
Louisiana
76.83
Puerto
Rico 63.76 Indiana
48.52 Illinois
52.30 Nebraska
2.87
North
1,192,916 District
of
75.23 Nevada
60.35 District
of
47.96 South
51.84 Nevada
2.87
Dakota
Columbia
Columbia
Carolina
Vermont 1,127,161
Kansas 74.75
Hawaii 59.22
Alabama 47.77
Puerto
Rico 50.84
Illinois 2.80
Delaware 1,034,185
Mississippi
69.82 Tennessee
56.55 Virgin
Islands 47.02 Arizona
50.63 Oklahoma
2.80
Rhode Island
1,016,821
Rhode Island
68.85
Rhode Island
51.24
Nevada
46.99
Missouri
50.00
District of
2.69
Columbia
Hawai
973,201
Nevada
67.89 Guam
50.17 New
Mexico 46.75 Kentucky
49.97 Arkansas
2.66
Nevada 857,000
Alabama 65.39
Mississippi 49.84
Oklahoma 46.46
Virgin
Islands
48.69
Kansas 2.61
New Mexico
554,604
New Mexico
57.61
New Mexico
47.51
Arizona
44.48
Alabama
47.95
California
1.91
District of
502,393 Virgin
Islands
52.94 Illinois
40.82 Guam
43.16 Guam 37.08
Guam 1.64
Columbia
CRS-40
Incentive
Paternity
Cases with
Current
Arrearage
Cost-
State
Payments
State
Establish-
State
Orders
State
Collections
State
Cases
State
Effective-
(dollars)
ment
ness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Guam
101,209
Arizona
51.02 Virgin
Islands 38.07 California
42.40 Hawai
36.87 Virgin
Islands 1.58
Virgin Islands
63,968
Indiana
50.83
District of
29.66 Illinois
39.11 District
of
30.21 New
Mexico 1.46
Columbia
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
a. Because of conflicting information and data in other reports Guam’s PEP score of 452.87 was excluded from this report’s analysis.
Table B-3. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2003
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
State
Establish-
State
Cases with
State
Current
State
Arrearage
State
Effective-
Payments
ment
Orders
Collections
Cases
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
California 45,258,302
Kentucky
190.70
South
Dakota 94.10 Pennsylvania 74.80 New
72.20 Indiana
7.91
Hampshire
Texas 36,825,204
Texas 112.10
Washington
91.00
North
71.30 Pennsylvania 71.50 South
Dakota 7.80
Dakota
New
York
30,829,027
California 107.10
Maine
90.00
Minnesota 69.90
Vermont 69.80
Mississippi 7.50
Ohio
30,351,415
Montana
103.30 Iowa
88.60 Wisconsin
67.70 South
Dakota 69.20 Pennsylvania 6.80
Pennsylvania
29,533,145
Colorado
101.20 Vermont
87.60 Ohio
67.30 Washington 68.90 Virginia
6.52
Michigan 27,371,576
Idaho
100.80
Wyoming 86.50
South
Dakota
67.10
North
68.80 South
6.32
Dakota
Carolina
Florida 22,545,490
Hawai 100.60
North
85.70 Nebraska
66.30 Minnesota
68.00 Wisconsin
5.95
Dakota
New
Jersey 17,895,131
Pennsylvania 99.70 Utah
84.90 Vermont
65.80 Alaska
67.60 Oregon
5.93
Wisconsin 15,632,872
New
99.30 Montana
84.10 New
Jersey 65.00 Ohio
66.30 Idaho
5.70
Hampshire
CRS-41
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Washington 14,675,136
Maine
99.20 Colorado
83.70 New
York
64.70 Utah
65.80 Puerto
Rico 5.67
Minnesota 13,492,130
South
Dakota 99.20 Virginia
82.90 New
64.30 New
Jersey 65.60 Texas
5.63
Hampshire
North
12,209,075
Washington 98.50
Alaska
82.80
Washington 64.30
Delaware 64.80
Wyoming 5.57
Carolina
Virginia
11,431,758
New
Jersey 98.10 Pennsylvania 81.50 Maryland
63.20 Florida
64.60 Iowa
5.52
Georgia 10,453,125
Wisconsin 97.90
New
81.20 West
Virginia 62.80 Montana
64.30 Tennessee
5.47
Hampshire
Massachusetts 9,958,854
Vermont
96.10 West
Virginia 81.10 North
61.80 Georgia
63.60 Massachusetts 5.46
Carolina
Missouri 8,653,176
Illinois 95.30 Wisconsin
80.30 Rhode
Island 61.80 Iowa
63.40 Louisiana 5.11
Kentucky 7,954,630
North
95.10 Minnesota
79.60 Massachusetts 60.90 New
Mexico 63.20 North
5.10
Dakota
Dakota
Tennessee 7,716,005
Ohio
95.10 Missouri
79.50 Wyoming
60.90 Wyoming
63.20 Hawai
5.08
Iowa
7,220,705
Georgia
95.00 New
Jersey 79.50 Delaware
60.70 Maryland
62.40 New
Jersey 5.06
Illinois 7,166,179
Iowa 95.00
Arkansas
79.00
Iowa 60.00 Texas
62.30 New
York
5.00
Maryland 6,537,765
Alaska
94.60 Idaho
77.90 Oregon
59.90 Kansas
62.00 Maine
4.99
Oregon
6,336,173
Oregon
93.60 Nebraska
77.90 Virginia
59.70 Wisconsin
62.00 North
4.99
Carolina
Louisiana 6,130,392
Oklahoma
92.60 California
76.40 Montana
59.10 Oregon
61.60 Missouri
4.95
Indiana 5,552,522
Maryland 92.20
North
76.40 Utah
58.60 Nevada
61.20 Ohio
4.91
Carolina
Arizona 5,065,465
North
91.00 New
York
75.80 Arkansas
58.30 Colorado
60.50 Kentucky
4.88
Carolina
Colorado 4,920,924
Puerto
Rico 90.30 Texas
75.70 Texas
57.70 Massachusetts 60.40 Michigan
4.79
West
Virginia
4,209,015
Utah
90.30 Indiana
75.10 Louisiana
56.90 Louisiana
59.80 New
4.72
Hampshire
Alabama
4,001,595
New
York
90.00 Massachusetts 73.90 Florida
56.40 New
York
59.80 Rhode
Island 4.63
CRS-42
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Connecticut 3,942,741
Florida
89.40 Michigan
72.90 Alaska
55.70 Maine
59.60 Washington 4.54
South
3,928,609
Wyoming
89.10 Kentucky
72.40 Maine
55.70 West
Virginia 59.40 West
Virginia 4.54
Carolina
Utah
3,493,011
West
Virginia 88.20 Ohio
71.40 Michigan
55.70 Idaho
59.20 Maryland
4.53
Puerto
Rico 3,463,489
Nebraska
88.10 Oklahoma
70.80 Kansas
55.30 Nebraska
59.20 Arizona
4.47
Arkansas 3,146,484
Massachusetts
86.50
South
70.70 Colorado
55.20 Michigan
59.00 Georgia
4.47
Carolina
Kansas
3,105,801
Arkansas
86.00 Delaware
70.50 Connecticut 54.80 Mississippi
58.90 Florida
4.39
Nebraska 3,089,869
Mississippi
85.50 Georgia
70.10 Idaho
53.90 North
58.40 Alaska
4.24
Carolina
Oklahoma 3,056,022
Missouri
85.50 Alabama
69.70 Tennessee
53.70 Virginia
57.50 Utah
4.13
Maine 2,556,766
Kansas 85.30
Florida 68.80
Kentucky
53.60
Oklahoma
57.40
Minnesota
4.05
Mississippi 2,482,905
Virginia
85.10 Maryland
68.80 Virgin
Islands 53.10 Tennessee
57.30 Connecticut 4.04
Idaho
2,216,477
Minnesota
84.90 Oregon
68.60 Missouri
52.70 Rhode
Island 57.20 Alabama
3.78
Alaska
2,140,882
Michigan
83.50 Louisiana
68.50 Puerto
Rico 52.60 Arkansas
56.10 Vermont
3.78
New
1,982,008
Connecticut 83.20 Kansas
68.30 Mississippi
52.00 California
55.40 Montana
3.63
Hampshire
South
Dakota
1,660,526
Guam
81.70 Connecticut 65.30 Hawai
51.30 Indiana
54.80 Colorado
3.22
Hawai
1,588,312
Tennessee
79.00 Puerto
Rico 64.70 Georgia
51.00 Connecticut 54.50 Nebraska
3.22
Nevada
1,293,543
Louisiana
78.80 Arizona
63.20 Indiana
50.50 Puerto
Rico 52.40 Arkansas
3.12
North
1,264,209 South
78.80 Tennessee
60.30 Alabama
49.90 Illinois
51.40 Kansas
3.12
Dakota
Carolina
Wyoming
1,163,775 Virgin Islands
78.60
Hawai
59.80
District of
49.70 South
51.30 Nevada
3.12
Columbia
Carolina
Montana 1,155,004
Delaware 73.70
Virgin
Islands
54.90
South
49.20 Arizona
50.80 Oklahoma
3.12
Carolina
Vermont
1,086,334
Indiana
72.30 Nevada
53.50 New
Mexico 49.00 Missouri
50.80 Delaware
3.03
CRS-43
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Delaware 970,247
Arizona 71.60
Rhode
Island
52.30 Oklahoma
48.40 Kentucky 50.70
Illinois 2.64
Rhode Island
962,198 Alabama
70.00 New
Mexico 52.00 Illinois 47.00
Alabama
48.70 California
2.31
New Mexico
672,821 New Mexico
67.30
Guam
49.90
California
45.20
Virgin Islands
46.20
Guam
2.10
District of
491,354
Nevada
66.20 Mississippi
49.60 Guam
44.60 Guam
45.80 District
of
2.09
Columbia
Columbia
Virgin Islands
99,488 Rhode Island 64.90 Illinois 46.70
Arizona
43.20
Hawaii 40.30 Virgin
Islands 1.84
Guam 60,339
District
of
63.90 District
of
31.90 Nevada
40.90 District
of
37.00 New
Mexico 1.57
Columbia
Columbia
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
Table B-4. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2004
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
State
Establish-
State
Cases with
State
Current
State
Arrearage
State
Effective-
Payments
ment
Orders
Collections
Cases
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
California 43,917,140
California
117.76
South
Dakota 93.73 Pennsylvania 74.37 New
71.83 Hawai
8.70
Hampshire
Texas 35,018,030
Colorado 108.72
Maine
90.31
North
72.02 Pennsylvania 70.97 Mississippi
7.96
Dakota
Ohio 30,840,836
Illinois 106.57
Washington
89.69
Minnesota
69.53 Vermont
70.39 Puerto Rico
7.88
Michigan
29,072,933 New Jersey
106.27
Wyoming
88.33
South Dakota
68.29
South Dakota
68.76
South Dakota
7.49
Pennsylvania 26,532,361
Montana
104.98 Vermont
88.08 Ohio
67.88 North
67.35 Indiana
7.04
Dakota
New
York 26,298,854
Oklahoma
104.62 Iowa
86.96 Wisconsin
67.64 Washington 67.17 Pennsylvania 7.01
Florida
25,086,328
Texas 103.47
Alaska 86.82
Nebraska
67.37
Alaska 66.63
South 7.00
CRS-44
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Carolina
New Jersey
16,335,761 South Dakota
103.31
North
86.59 Vermont
66.12 Ohio
66.34 Virginia
6.33
Dakota
Wisconsin 14,529,242
Ohio
102.59 Montana
85.25 New
Jersey 64.92 Iowa
66.12 Oregon
6.17
Washington
13,445,851
Pennsylvania 101.38 Utah
85.25 New
York
64.75 Minnesota
66.00 Kentucky
5.95
Minnesota 13,048,434
Maine
101.05 Colorado
84.73 New
64.54 Florida
65.75 Texas
5.95
Hampshire
North
12,807,092 North
100.85 Pennsylvania 84.05 Washington 62.87 Utah
65.20 Idaho
5.94
Carolina
Dakota
Virginia
10,673,373
Wisconsin
100.15 Virginia
83.54 West
Virginia 62.85 Colorado
64.93 Wisconsin
5.91
Georgia 10,574,394
New
100.04 West
Virginia 82.82 North
62.72 Nebraska
64.62 Iowa
5.59
Hampshire
Carolina
Missouri 10,525,886
Minnesota
98.78 Wisconsin
81.92 Massachusetts 62.64 Delaware
64.30 Ohio
5.46
Massachusetts 9,168,115 Vermont
97.53
Minnesota
81.00
Iowa
62.18
Wisconsin
64.26
Michigan
5.42
Illinois 8,440,244 Washington
96.82
New
80.98 Rhode
Island 61.92 Wyoming
64.11 Missouri
5.40
Hampshire
Tennessee
7,766,731
Maryland 96.75
Missouri 80.70
Maryland 61.79
Texas
63.54
North 5.37
Dakota
Kentucky 7,627,918
Iowa
96.10 New
York
80.15 Wyoming
60.79 Montana
63.53 New
5.27
Hampshire
Iowa
7,247,439
Puerto
Rico 95.90 Arkansas
79.87 Delaware
60.29 New
Jersey 63.34 Tennessee
5.16
Indiana
7,080,909
Idaho
94.87 Texas
79.83 Michigan
60.21 Kansas
62.30 Wyoming
5.16
Oregon 5,956,034
North
93.32 New
Jersey 79.63 Virginia
60.04 Maryland
62.10 Louisiana
5.04
Carolina
Louisiana 5,878,940
Florida
92.46 Nebraska
78.92 Utah
59.82 New
Mexico 61.22 North
5.01
Carolina
Maryland 5,478,845
Alaska
91.82
North
78.85
Oregon 59.29
Oregon 61.19
Rhode
Island
5.01
Carolina
Arizona
4,992,036
Nebraska
90.56 Idaho
78.55 Texas
58.54 North
61.02 New
Jersey 4.89
CRS-45
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Carolina
Colorado 4,833,238
New
Mexico 90.25 California
78.13 Montana
58.40 Maine
59.75 Massachusetts 4.88
Alabama 3,923,947
New
York
90.25 Kentucky
75.85 Florida
56.75 Tennessee
59.17 Georgia
4.67
West
Virginia
3,775,411
Kentucky
89.45 Michigan
74.96 Maine
56.57 Georgia
59.12 Maryland
4.57
Utah
3,677,929
Missouri
88.89 Massachusetts 74.42 Louisiana
55.93 New
York
59.08 Washington 4.52
Nebraska 3,635,367
Arkansas
88.21 Maryland
73.77 Idaho
55.68 Rhode
Island 58.94 Alaska
4.50
South
3,605,396
Hawai
87.90 Alabama
73.05 Colorado
55.51 West
Virginia 58.86 Florida
4.50
Carolina
Connecticut 3,455,259
West
Virginia 87.52 Kansas
73.00 Alaska
55.49 Massachusetts 58.81 Arizona
4.42
Oklahoma 3,437,279
Virginia
86.98 Delaware
72.05 Arkansas
55.34 Louisiana
58.53 West
Virginia 4.42
Arkansas 3,361,187
Wyoming 86.89 Ohio
71.58 Tennessee
54.71 Illinois 58.22
Maine 4.35
Kansas
3,306,309
Kansas
86.61 Louisiana
71.29 Kentucky
54.70 Mississippi
58.22 New
York
4.31
Puerto Rico
3,273,456
Connecticut
86.40
South
71.17 Connecticut 54.54 Oklahoma
57.51 Vermont
4.22
Carolina
Mississippi 3,246,021
Michigan
86.11 Georgia
71.13 Kansas
54.38 Virginia
57.42 Minnesota
4.10
Maine
2,339,229
Massachusetts 85.86 Indiana
70.54 Puerto
Rico 53.84 Arkansas
57.40 Utah
4.08
Idaho
2,335,547
Utah
84.41 Florida
70.03 Missouri
53.33 Idaho
56.46 Alabama
3.95
Alaska
1,934,767
Oregon
84.38 Oklahoma
69.54 Virgin
Islands 53.24 Indiana
56.19 Montana
3.94
New
1,803,991
Virgin
Islands 83.91 Arizona
68.80 Hawai
53.09 Michigan
55.60 Arkansas
3.88
Hampshire
Hawai 1,566,788
South
82.28 Connecticut 67.63 Mississippi
52.79 Connecticut 55.02 Oklahoma
3.64
Carolina
North
1,542,418
Georgia 81.64
Oregon 67.48
Georgia 51.88
California
54.94
Nebraska
3.63
Dakota
South
Dakota
1,517,780
Indiana
79.52 Puerto
Rico 65.47 Alabama
51.26 Puerto
Rico 53.56 Colorado
3.55
Nevada 1,355,443
Louisiana 78.81
Tennessee 63.92
District
of 51.22 Missouri
51.59 Nevada
3.31
Columbia
CRS-46
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Rhode Island
1,270,822
Tennessee
77.71
Nevada 59.78
Nevada 51.11 Nevada
51.44 Illinois 3.22
Delaware 1,265,209
Arizona
74.75 Hawai
58.66 Indiana
51.04 Kentucky
51.34 Connecticut 3.20
Vermont
1,197,334
Rhode Island
74.75
Virgin Islands
54.85
New Mexico
49.42
Arizona
50.50
Kansas
3.15
Wyoming 1,180,509
Mississippi 74.47 New
Mexico 53.92 Illinois 49.25
Alabama
50.00 District
of
3.14
Columbia
Montana 1,061,120
Delaware
74.13 Rhode
Island 52.53 Oklahoma
48.60 South
49.21 Delaware
3.01
Carolina
New Mexico
970,705
Alabama
73.72
Mississippi
52.13
South
48.39 Virgin
Islands 47.93 Guam
2.26
Carolina
District of
597,907 Guam
71.12 Illinois 51.50
California
47.96
Guam 47.52
California
2.12
Columbia
Virgin Islands
105,718
District of
64.34
Guam 50.11
Guam 46.66
Hawai 42.84
New
Mexico
1.87
Columbia
Guam 80,188
Nevada 63.21
District
of
34.92 Arizona
42.68 District
of
42.33 Virgin
Islands 1.83
Columbia
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
Table B-5. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2005
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
California 41,743,556
Oklahoma 112.42
South
Dakota 96.00
Pennsylvania 74.72
Pennsylvania 73.50
Indiana
8.53
Texas 37,594,823
Maine 111.02
Alaska
92.41
North
72.70 New
71.97 Mississippi
8.53
Dakota
Hampshire
Ohio
28,985,608
Texas
107.95 Washington 89.57 Minnesota
69.31 Vermont
71.01 South
Dakota 7.76
CRS-47
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
New York
26,242,919 California
106.54
Wyoming
89.38
South Dakota
69.04
North
69.69 South
7.07
Dakota
Carolina
Michigan 26,035,157
Montana
105.43 Maine
89.10 Wisconsin
69.01 South
Dakota 69.52 Texas
6.81
Pennsylvania
25,422,058
Alaska
104.79 Montana
88.12 Ohio
68.98 Wyoming
67.76 Michigan
6.70
Florida
25,263,730
Puerto
Rico 104.40 Vermont
88.02 Nebraska
67.84 Utah
67.57 Virginia
6.52
New Jersey
15,974,982 Ohio
104.13
North
86.75 Vermont
66.98 Alaska
67.46 Rhode
Island 6.45
Dakota
Wisconsin
13,748,475 South Dakota
103.56
Colorado
85.38
New Jersey
65.27
Florida
66.71
Pennsylvania
6.39
North
13,461,627 North
102.88 Iowa
85.35 New
York
65.13 Ohio
66.54 Wyoming
6.25
Carolina
Dakota
Washington 12,719,377
New
102.53 Utah
85.25 Iowa
64.74 Washington 66.11 North
6.03
Hampshire
Dakota
Minnesota 12,135,231
New
Jersey 100.45 Pennsylvania 84.71 New
64.63 Minnesota
66.08 Puerto
Rico 6.01
Hampshire
Georgia 10,808,188
Wisconsin 100.23
Virginia
84.68
North
64.52 Iowa
65.70 Kentucky
5.95
Carolina
Virginia
10,237,234
Florida
99.90 Wisconsin
83.55 Massachusetts 63.79 Colorado
65.65 Massachusetts 5.93
Missouri
10,204,439 Vermont
98.82
West Virginia
83.54
West Virginia
63.69
Texas
65.23
Oregon
5.93
Massachusetts
8,898,038
Pennsylvania 98.73 Arkansas
82.41 Wyoming
63.67 Nebraska
64.96 Iowa
5.80
Illinois 8,650,633
Hawaii 98.09
Texas 82.23
Washington
63.31
Wisconsin 64.19
Ohio
5.66
Indiana 8,385,495
North
96.37 Minnesota
82.12 Maryland
63.08 Montana
64.14 Idaho
5.58
Carolina
Tennessee 7,837,795
Minnesota
96.09 Missouri
81.63 Utah
61.39 Maryland
63.92 Tennessee
5.44
Maryland 7,303,489
Washington 95.16
New
81.15 Virginia
60.91 Delaware
63.71 Missouri
5.41
Hampshire
Iowa 6,917,274
Iowa 94.76
North 80.88 Montana
60.68 New
Jersey 63.20 Wisconsin
5.41
Carolina
Louisiana
6,213,377 Idaho
93.97
New Jersey
80.72
Rhode Island
60.63
West Virginia
62.88
Georgia
5.20
CRS-48
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Oregon
5,600,727
Kentucky
92.53 California
80.28 Michigan
60.52 Kansas
62.59 North
5.10
Carolina
Arizona
5,423,112
Missouri
92.52 New
York
80.03 Texas
60.51 North
62.16 West
Virginia 4.90
Carolina
Kentucky 5,208,111
Colorado
92.36 Idaho
78.58 Delaware
60.41 New
Mexico 61.32 Maryland
4.88
Connecticut 4,865,914
Illinois 92.19 Nebraska
77.72 Maine
60.30 Arkansas 60.87
Florida 4.80
Colorado
4,750,251
Oregon 91.71
Kentucky
77.51
Oregon 60.09
Oregon 60.72
New
York
4.79
Alabama
4,020,646
Massachusetts 91.22 Maryland
74.65 Colorado
57.69 Mississippi
60.46 New
4.75
Hampshire
West
Virginia
3,879,643
Kansas
91.19 Michigan
74.50 Arkansas
57.09 Tennessee
60.05 New
Jersey 4.74
Oklahoma 3,643,878
Arkansas
90.57 Georgia
74.47 Florida
56.72 Georgia
59.16 Washington 4.74
Nebraska 3,475,303
Maryland
90.57 Kansas
74.41 Idaho
55.81 New
York
59.02 Arizona
4.73
South
3,321,883 New York
90.33
Alabama
73.93
Virgin Islands
55.66
Rhode Island
58.03
Louisiana
4.71
Carolina
Kansas
3,289,970
Virginia
89.34 Arizona
73.91 Louisiana
55.45 Indiana
58.01 Alaska
4.54
Utah
3,288,628
Connecticut 87.87 Delaware
73.83 Tennessee
55.43 Massachusetts 57.86 Hawai
4.39
Puerto
Rico 3,268,672
West
Virginia 87.65 Massachusetts 73.60 Connecticut 55.38 Virginia
57.76 Maine
4.27
Mississippi 3,222,870
Michigan
86.46 Ohio
72.69 Kentucky
55.31 Louisiana
57.64 Alabama
4.26
Arkansas 2,490,610
South
84.67 Florida
72.18 Hawai
55.30 California
56.03 Minnesota
4.22
Carolina
Idaho
2,389,857
Georgia
83.69 Louisiana
71.99 Puerto
Rico 55.28 Connecticut 55.51 Utah
4.03
Maine 2,167,195
Utah
83.47
South 71.23 Alaska
54.96 Oklahoma
55.18 Montana
4.02
Carolina
Nevada
1,826,744
Wyoming
82.90 Connecticut 69.52 Missouri
54.69 Idaho
54.66 Vermont
3.91
Alaska
1,809,329
Nebraska
82.49 Indiana
69.39 Kansas
54.52 South
53.80 Oklahoma
3.79
Carolina
New
1,650,128
Indiana
82.28
Oklahoma 69.09
Mississippi 53.47
Kentucky 53.44
Arkansas 3.68
Hampshire
CRS-49
Paternity
Cost-
State
Incentive
Establish-
Effective-
Payments
State
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
ness
(dollars)
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
North
1,560,854 Louisiana
81.93
Oregon 67.41
Illinois 53.29
Michigan
53.18 Colorado
3.68
Dakota
South Dakota
1,466,513 Alabama
81.89
Puerto Rico
66.37
District of
52.89 Maine
52.96 Connecticut 3.68
Columbia
Hawaii 1,431,973
Arizona 81.11
Tennessee 64.84
Indiana
52.82
Puerto Rico
52.55
Illinois 3.68
Rhode
Island 1,211,250
Tennessee
80.48 Nevada
62.41 Georgia
52.56 Missouri
52.10 Nebraska
3.57
Wyoming 1,163,702
Virgin
Islands 79.56 Guam
60.18 Alabama
51.74 Arizona
51.37 Kansas
3.39
New Mexico
1,055,389 Guam
79.27
New Mexico
59.83
Oklahoma
50.11
Guam
50.33
Delaware
3.10
Montana 1,028,469
Delaware 79.14
Illinois 59.35
New
Mexico
50.00
Alabama 49.96
Nevada 2.98
Vermont
977,267
Mississippi
77.80 Hawai
58.30 California
49.27 Nevada
49.60 District
of
2.45
Columbia
Delaware
900,305 Rhode Island
77.02
Rhode Island
57.18
South
47.41 Virgin
Islands 47.78 California
2.15
Carolina
District of
598,507 District
of
74.81 Virgin
Islands 55.41 Guam
47.33 Illinois
45.91 Guam
2.11
Columbia
Columbia
Guam 119,823
Nevada 66.30
Mississippi
53.63
Nevada 45.68
District
of
43.68 Virgin
Islands 2.11
Columbia
Virgin Islands
108,972 New Mexico
54.05
District of
39.60 Arizona
44.36 Hawai
41.36 New
Mexico 2.10
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
CRS-50
Table B-6. Child Support Enforcement Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2006
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity
State
Establish-
ment
State
Cases with
State
Current
State
Arrearage
State
Cost-
Orders
Collections
Cases
Effectiveness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Oklahoma 122.12
South
Dakota
92.98
Pennsylvania 74.65
Pennsylvania 75.21
Mississippi 9.45
North Dakota
114.40
Alaska
92.24
North Dakota
73.42
New
72.18 Indiana
8.92
Hampshire
New
113.20 Washington
89.86 Wisconsin
70.64 Vermont
70.68 South
Dakota
8.23
Hampshire
New Jersey
113.20
Wyoming
89.09
South Dakota
69.47
North Dakota
70.15
Texas
7.52
Utah 112.18
Montana
87.96
Ohio 69.14
Wyoming
69.38
South 7.40
Carolina
California 109.88
Utah
87.83
Minnesota 68.83
South
Dakota
68.53
Virginia
6.58
Montana 108.68
Maine
87.67
Vermont 67.46
Utah
68.46
Pennsylvania 6.45
South Dakota
108.68
North Dakota
87.50
Nebraska
67.44
Texas
67.35
Ohio
6.29
Idaho 104.84
Colorado
86.29
Wyoming
65.85
Washington
67.34
Wyoming
6.29
Hawai 103.31
Iowa
85.87
Iowa
65.66
Colorado
67.30
Georgia 6.18
West Virginia
102.57
Vermont
85.87
North
65.64 Ohio
67.30 Kentucky
6.16
Carolina
Vermont 101.01
West
Virginia
85.42
New
Jersey 65.57
Iowa
67.18
Tennessee 6.08
Wisconsin 100.23
Virginia
85.19
Massachusetts
65.44
Alaska
66.51
North
Dakota
5.86
Arkansas 100.13
Pennsylvania
84.50
New
York 64.91
Minnesota 66.22
Oregon
5.86
Pennsylvania 100.11
Wisconsin
83.81 West
Virginia 64.48 Montana
65.41 Iowa
5.79
Puerto Rico
99.29
Arkansas
83.61
New
64.38 Nebraska
65.21 Wisconsin
5.79
Hampshire
Florida 99.22
Missouri 82.81
Washington
64.33
New
Jersey
63.77
Massachusetts
5.59
Illinois 98.32
Texas 82.74
Maryland
64.19
Maryland
63.72
Missouri 5.58
Washington 98.00
Minnesota 82.54
Utah
63.57
Florida
63.71
Puerto
Rico 5.43
Alaska 97.95
New 82.54
Texas 62.33
New
Mexico
63.62
Idaho 5.35
CRS-51
Paternity
State
Establish-
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
Cost-
Effectiveness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Hampshire
North
97.71 New
Jersey
82.03 Virginia
61.61 North
63.40 Michigan
5.29
Carolina
Carolina
Minnesota 96.48
New
York 81.60
Montana 61.49
Kansas
63.28
Maryland 5.20
Massachusetts 96.46 North
81.05 Michigan
61.38 Arkansas
62.51 Hawai
5.00
Carolina
Maine 96.34
California
80.57
Maine 61.05
Oregon
62.51
West
Virginia
5.00
Iowa 95.53
Michigan
79.79
Delaware
60.48
Delaware
62.32
North 4.97
Carolina
Ohio 95.25
Kentucky
79.73
Oregon
60.42
Mississippi
61.35
New
York
4.75
Nebraska 95.23
Idaho
79.49
Rhode
Island
59.23
West
Virginia
61.34
New
4.70
Hampshire
Colorado 92.99
Nebraska 78.42
Colorado 59.09
Tennessee 60.56
Rhode
Island
4.70
Texas 92.96
Maryland
77.66
Arkansas
59.02
Georgia
60.24
Florida 4.60
Missouri 92.91
Arizona 76.48
Virgin
Islands
57.17
Oklahoma 59.92
Louisiana 4.58
Oregon 92.05
Georgia 75.67
Hawai 56.93
Wisconsin
59.03
New
Jersey
4.56
Connecticut 91.99
South
75.65 Kentucky
56.64 Indiana
58.82 Washington
4.41
Carolina
New York
91.75
Delaware
75.11
Idaho
55.86
New York
58.81
Alabama
4.38
Virginia 91.69
Massachusetts
74.85
Missouri 55.68
Massachusetts
58.54
Arizona 4.35
Kansas 91.48
Kansas 74.72
Tennessee
55.68
Rhode
Island
58.44
Utah
4.28
Kentucky 91.39
Florida
73.79
Kansas
55.29
Virginia 58.09
Alaska
4.27
Maryland 90.75
Ohio
73.33
Puerto
Rico
55.07
Connecticut
57.73
Montana 4.19
Michigan 90.71
Louisiana 73.10
Connecticut
54.99
Kentucky 56.92
Maine
4.16
Tennessee 89.48
Connecticut 70.99
Alaska
54.90
California 56.46
Arkansas
4.08
Georgia 87.30
Oklahoma
69.63
Florida 54.38
Louisiana 55.93
Minnesota 4.05
Indiana 86.19
Indiana 68.44
Mississippi
54.32
Arizona 55.49
Oklahoma
3.99
CRS-52
Paternity
State
Establish-
ment
State
Cases with
Orders
State
Current
Collections
State
Arrearage
Cases
State
Cost-
Effectiveness
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Score
Rhode Island
86.15
Puerto Rico
67.44
Louisiana
54.05
Maine
55.02
Colorado
3.94
Wyoming 86.07
Illinois
66.86
Indiana
53.82
Michigan 54.30
Illinois
3.84
Arizona 84.27
Nevada 66.80
New
Mexico
52.97
Idaho 54.05
Vermont 3.80
South
84.24 Oregon
66.36 Alabama
52.87 Missouri
53.36 Nebraska
3.78
Carolina
Virgin Islands
83.53
Tennessee
63.87
Oklahoma
52.68
South
52.98 Connecticut
3.74
Carolina
Alabama
81.69
New Mexico
63.24
District of
52.53 Puerto
Rico 52.37 Kansas
3.38
Columbia
Delaware 81.61
Guam
58.80
Georgia 51.93
Nevada 51.53
Nevada
3.34
Louisiana 81.07
Rhode
Island
58.57
Illinois
51.76
Illinois
51.29
Delaware 2.70
Mississippi 79.98
Hawai
58.53
California 50.39
Guam
49.46
District
of 2.55
Columbia
District of
78.09 Virgin
Islands 55.46 South
49.31
Virgin Islands
47.61
New Mexico
2.36
Columbia
Carolina
Guam 77.29
Mississippi
54.13
Arizona 46.55
District
of
41.66 Virgin
Islands 2.13
Columbia
Nevada 69.35
Alabama 50.91
Guam 46.39
Hawai 41.01
California 2.03
New Mexico
59.44
District of
45.43 Nevada
45.92 Alabama
N.A. Guam
1.84
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
CRS-53
Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues
Congressional Research Service
54