Order Code RL33936
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:
A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?
Updated October 3, 2007
Rhoda Margesson, Coordinator
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Jeremy M. Sharp
Analyst in Middle Eastern Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Andorra Bruno
Specialist in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:
A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?
Summary
The humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 as a result
of the war in Iraq continues to unfold as a result of post-war insurgency and sectarian
violence. It is estimated that in total (including those displaced prior to the war) there
may be as many as 2 million Iraqi refugees who have fled to Jordan, Syria, and other
neighboring states, and approximately 2.2 million Iraqis who have been displaced
within Iraq itself.
The violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife,
terrorism, and insurgency in Iraq has had a marked impact on civilian displacement
in different parts of the country. Many of Iraq’s neighbors fear that they are being
overwhelmed by refugees fleeing over Iraq’s borders. There are now heightened
concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they can
provide adequately for the populations moving across borders, and the impact of
refugee flows on stability in general. Some experts think that the Iraq situation could
well begin to outpace other refugee crises worldwide.
This report provides an analysis of the current crisis, including the conditions
for those displaced in Iraq and the refugee situations in Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.
It also provides information on the U.S. and international response and examines
refugee resettlement options in the United States. Aspects of this crisis that may be
of particular interest to the 110th Congress include a focus on an immediate response
(providing humanitarian relief funding), examining resettlement policies, and
developing a strategy to manage the displaced, particularly within Iraq. This report
will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Iraq, see CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security by Kenneth Katzman; and
CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy coordinated by
Christopher Blanchard.
Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Assessment of Iraqi Internal Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A History of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Profile of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Immediate Consequences of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Assistance to IDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A Profile of the Displaced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. and International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Refugee Program and Iraqi Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Increased International Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Humanitarian Response in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Links to Broader Iraq Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Tables
Table 1. Inside Iraq: Profile of Estimated Populations of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. Inside Iraq: Estimated Displacement Totals Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3. Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian
Crisis?
Overview
The violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife,
terrorism, and insurgency in Iraq has had a marked impact on civilian displacement
in different parts of the country. Since the bombing of the Shiite Muslim Al-
Askariya shrine in Samarra in February 2006, sectarian violence accelerated an
already developing pattern of population displacement and emigration. In terms of
overall figures, including those displaced prior to the 2003 war, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)1 believes that there may be 2 million
refugees who have fled Iraq, mostly to Jordan and Syria, and another 2.2 million who
have fled to other parts of Iraq itself.
The conflict increasingly bears the mark of sectarian polarization and
“cleansing” in neighborhoods formerly of mixed religious orientation. Some argue
that displacement has become a tool of war and the means for feuding sects to
establish territorial control. Overall living standards have declined sharply. Direct
personal threats, abductions, assassinations, and death threats are commonplace.
Many middle class Iraqis with the means to leave have already done so. Religious
belief, political or tribal affiliation, or association with U.S. forces or Iraqi authorities
all can make someone a target for violence. Displacement can be the result of
sectarian conflict and general armed violence, local criminal activity, coalition
military operations, and fighting among militias and insurgents, all of which have
contributed to decreased security and an atmosphere of generalized fear for many
ordinary Iraqis.
In a November 2006 update on the situation, UNHCR suggested that the
humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 as a result of the
1 UNHCR is the U.N. agency dedicated to the protection of refugees and other populations
displaced by conflict, famine, and natural disasters. It provides legal protections,
implements long-term solutions, and coordinates emergency humanitarian relief for refugees
and other displaced persons. In Iraq, UNHCR is the lead on protection and shelter.
“Refugee” as defined under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, is a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to
return because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
“Returnee” is a refugee who returns to his or her home country; and “IDP” is a person who
has not crossed an international border but remains displaced inside his or her own country.
UNHCR considers all categories part of “Populations of Concern.”
CRS-2
war is happening now. “The massive displacement has emerged quietly and without
fanfare but the numbers affected are in excess of what many agencies had predicted
in 2003.”2 Then, as now, there were also concerns about the absorptive capacity of
neighboring countries, whether they could provide adequately for the populations
moving across borders, and the potential impact of refugee flows on stability in the
region. In the first part of 2007, UNHCR estimated that between 40,000 and 50,000
Iraqis were being displaced each month and some observers speculated the pace of
Iraq’s displacement would continue to increase. By the end of August, this number
had increased to an estimated monthly displacement rate of 60,000.3 Some experts
think that the Iraq situation could well begin to outpace other refugee crises
worldwide. UNHCR projects that, at this rate, by December 2007 there could be 2.3
to 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in addition to more than 2 million
refugees scattered throughout the region.4
The figures on population displacement illustrate the challenges ahead. As the
110th Congress considers various policy options toward Iraq, the impact of this level
of displacement — which is the largest in the Middle East since 1948 — cannot be
underestimated in terms of its impact on regional stability and the potential for
humanitarian suffering. Experts suggest that what is badly needed — and quickly —
is the development of a robust response on the part of the international community
that provides and funds humanitarian relief; conducts a close examination of
resettlement policies and options in third countries; develops a strategy to manage the
displaced, particularly within Iraq; and implements increased funding to host
countries and aid agencies outside Iraq.5
Assessment of Iraqi Internal Displacement
A History of Displacement
All internal displacement figures must be taken as estimates due to insufficient
data. Monitoring and registration are incomplete because of poor security, a lack of
access to some areas, and ongoing movement of possibly thousands of people per
day. It also should be noted that there are many patterns of displacement, some that
have their origins decades ago, but have now evolved into a new phase. For
example, approximately 300,000 refugees who were in Iran before the 2003 war, then
2 UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006. See also CRS Report RL31814
Potential Humanitarian Issues in Post-War Iraq: An Overview for Congress, by Rhoda
Margesson and Joanne Bockman. Also, “Iraq Stands on Brink of Civil War, ‘Violence
Seems Out of Control,’” Special Representative Tells Security Council, SC/8895, December
11, 2006. Figures provided are estimates and continue to change,
3 UNHCR, Iraq: Rate of Displacement Rising, August 28, 2007.
4 UNHCR, “Supplementary Appeal Iraq Situation Response: Protection and Assistance to
Iraqi Refugees in Neighbouring States and to IDPs and Non-Iraqi Refugees in Iraq,” January
2007.
5 See also Elizabeth Ferris, Security, Displacement and Iraq: A Deadly Combination, the
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, August 27, 2007; and Carlos Pascual, The
United Nations in Iraq, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper No. 3, September 2007.
CRS-3
returned to Iraq, and now are believed to have been displaced again, this time within
Iraq. Others were refugees from other countries in the region who fled to Iraq and
are now on the move again within its borders. Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime left
a legacy of displacement, as his regime forcibly displaced Iraqi Shiites and Kurds in
order to control territory, terrorize the population, and fight insurrection. Some
experts estimate as many as 1.5 million may have been displaced over the three
decades of his regime.
Current Displacement
Human development indicators — access to health care, social services,
education, employment — all have fractured under the current circumstances and
affected wider social networks in Iraqi society. Limited reconstruction activities and
access by the international community have made implementation of tangible, long-
term policy objectives difficult. Within many areas in Iraq, conditions are
deteriorating and, for those already displaced, are becoming more permanent
problems; many who cannot secure protection or assistance could soon find
themselves in the same situation. According to some estimates, Iraq’s population is
26.8 million, this means that nearly 13% of the population — or one in eight Iraqis
— may be displaced.
Profile of Displacement. There have been no reliable census data on Iraq’s
ethnic and sectarian makeup for decades. Iraq’s population represents a number of
ethnic groups and religions. In recent studies, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) found that IDPs tended to be from mixed neighborhoods and
displaced to homogenous ones.6 The movement was predominantly in and between
urban areas — with more than 70% fleeing Baghdad. In general throughout Iraq,
patterns have shown that Shi’as have moved from the center to the south; Sunnis
from the south to the upper center; Christians fled to Ninevah and Kurds ended up
within Diyala or Tamim/Kirkuk.7
Palestinians in Iraq (who numbered 25,000-30,000 before the war and are
mostly Sunni) may be particularly vulnerable to reprisal attacks by Shiites as they
received preferential treatment from Saddam Hussein. The United Nations estimates
that possibly only 5,000 Palestinians remain in Iraq, many have been killed, and
others have been displaced again. There are several refugee camps on the Syrian and
Jordanian border to which Palestinians have fled from Iraq and reportedly the living
conditions need urgently to be addressed.
6 International Organization for Migration (IOM) “Iraq Displacement 2006 Year in Review,”
January 2007 and “Iraq Displacement 2007 Mid-Year Review,” July 2007.
7 Ibid. In addition, another account of displacement is provided by Al-Khalidid and Tanner,
who define several categories of those displaced, including Sunni Arabs from Shi’a areas;
Shi’a from Sunni areas; Arabs (both Shi’a and Sunni) and other minorities from Kurdish
areas; and minority groups from both Sunni and Shi’a areas. These include Iraqi Christians,
Sabean-Mandeans, Shi’a Turkmen, the Roma, Baghdad and Basra Kurds, and third country
nationals, including Palestinians and Iranian Kurds. See Ashraf al-Khalidid and Victor
Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,” October
2006.
CRS-4
Those Iraqis who have worked with the U.S. government, the new Iraqi
government, or international organizations have been particularly targeted.8 In
addition, there are vulnerable groups within these categories of displaced including
the elderly, sick, pregnant women, and children.
Most of those displaced are moving in with family and friends who live in areas
where one sect overwhelmingly predominates. When this is not possible they go to
public facilities, such as schools and factories (some people are squatting in damaged
or abandoned property, such as mosques) and in much smaller numbers, to camps set
up by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society or Ministry of Displacement and Migration
(MoDM). Repeat-displacement, which means moving a second time, or repeatedly,
most commonly applies to those displaced by military operations.9
Daily behavior by those who are displaced or living in fear for their lives may
also vary to avoid establishing any predictable pattern: Micro and nighttime
displacement means that a person is living in his or her home, but sleeping elsewhere.
Daylight displacement involves shifting routines, routes, and activities. And fake
displacement are those who pretend to be displaced and build homes on government
land or the land of locals.10
Immediate Consequences of Displacement. There are many
consequences to displacement. In the short term, the IOM report examines the
deterioration of basic humanitarian needs and services, not only from displacement
itself, but due to lack of employment and a huge economic decline throughout the
country. Needs expressed by displaced Iraqis include food, water and sanitation, fuel
and electricity, shelter, health care, and education. As displacement continues to
increase, so does competition for limited resources and the impact on host
communities. This is beginning to impact communities that have reached their
saturation point.11
Table 1. Inside Iraq: Profile of Estimated Populations of
Concern
Refugees in Iraq (Palestinian, Syrian, Iranian, Turkish, Sudanese,
50,000 +
many further displaced in Iraq)
Returnees (mainly from Iran; many further displaced in Iraq)
300,000
Stateless (Bedouins, etc.)
130,000
Source: Data from UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006 and Iraq Support Unit,
“Iraq Update,” November 3, 2006.
8 Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, “Humanitarian Issues and Politics in
Iraq,” February 14, 2007.
9 The Ministry of Displaced and Migration, Information Department, is preparing a report
on basic statistics of post-February 2006 Internally Displaced Persons in cooperation with
the IOM, Iraq Mission in Amman.
10 Al-Khalidid and Tanner.
11 International Organization for Migration, “Iraq Displacement 2006 Year in Review,”
January 2007 and “Iraq Displacement 2007 Mid-Year Review,” July 2007.
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Table 2. Inside Iraq: Estimated Displacement Totals Over Time
IDPs (old caseload, prior to 2003)
1,200,000
IDPs (2003-2005)
approx. 200,000
IDPs (since Feb 2006)
800,000
Total
2,200,000
Assistance to IDPs
Government ministries providing assistance to the displaced within Iraq include
the MoDM, the Ministry of Trade, which is in charge of the allocation of food
rations, the Ministry of Interior, which provides documentation for services, such as
registration for food rations, and the Ministry of Education, which is in charge of
registering school children, many of whom have been displaced and need to be
enrolled in local schools. Support of the displaced in the provinces is usually
handled by a committee and is considered more effective. There are also informal
committees set up in local communities and in mosques. As a national aid agency
that had been largely viewed as non-sectarian, the Iraqi Red Crescent assists the
displaced throughout the country.12 In 2007, reports began to surface questioning the
Iraqi Red Crescent’s estimates and needs assessments.
Experts believe that the sectarian groups have tried not only to consolidate
territory, but also to fill the gap as “protector and provider” in the provision of
services the government cannot fulfill for the displaced.13 Few international
humanitarian organizations are working in Iraq due to the unstable security situation.
Those that are there keep a very low profile.
In coordination with the MoDM, UNHCR is the focal point for the United
Nations’ Cluster Approach on refugees and IDPs, such as providing assistance,
finding durable solutions, and preventing new displacement. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) is the deputy coordinator. In addition to working
with the United Nations Assistance Missions for Iraq (UNAMI), other partners
include U.N. Operations (UNOPS), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), U.N.
Habitat, and the World Health Organization (WHO). In neighboring countries,
UNHCR works with the U.N. country teams.
12 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 3.
13 Ibid., p. 1.
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Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries14
Overview
Since 2003, Iraq’s neighbors have willingly or unwillingly absorbed more than
2 million refugees fleeing violence and instability in their home country. Jordan and
Syria have been the primary destination for the displaced, and, by all accounts, both
countries have been stretched thin in trying to provide adequate services for largely
unwanted refugee populations. Although the plight of many Iraqis refugees is
difficult but not dire, there is much concern that the situation could deteriorate over
time if new waves of refugees flood Iraq’s neighbors.
Beyond the dire humanitarian consequences of scattering nearly 10% of Iraq’s
pre-war population into neighboring countries lie the long-term impact of this large
scale displacement on the geopolitics of the Middle East. Many Iraqis have indicated
that they will never return home, raising questions over their future status in their
new homes. Will Iraq’s neighbors move toward integrating refugees into the citizenry
at large? Or, will Iraqis be treated as second-class citizens and form a permanent
underclass similar to the situation of Palestinian refugees? Will Iraqis become
politically active in their host countries and form diaspora organizations? Or, will
they be barred from politics altogether driving the most extreme elements to pursue
radical causes? Will sectarian violence spill over from Iraq into neighboring states,
bringing an added element of instability into an already volatile region?
A Profile of the Displaced. Of those who have fled Iraq, various reports
indicate that many refugees were from Iraq’s now decimated middle class. Numerous
interviews of Iraqi refugees conducted outside Iraq have revealed that Iraqi
professionals who fled the country were the least sectarian elements in society, and
many fled to escape both the general threat of sectarian violence and the specific
threat of kidnapping, which has become a common criminal enterprise conducted by
insurgents and organized gangs.
Table 3. Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries
Country
Refugee Estimates
Syria
1,400,000 - 1,700,000
Jordan
550,000- 800,000
Egypt
100,000
Iran
54,000
Lebanon
40,000
Turkey
10,000
Total
2,154,000 - 2,704,000 (est.)*
Source: UNHCR
14 This section was written by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
CRS-7
* Refugee figures should be considered estimates. UNHCR has been short of funding, staff and
resources, and therefore unable to process all refugee documentation and adequately monitor
borders. It is relying on host governments to record refugee inflows.
Unlike other refugee crises in war-torn areas, the status of Iraqi refugees in
neighboring states is more difficult to discern. At present, there are no makeshift tent
cities for the homeless and destitute, though aid agencies did construct such facilities
in 2003 in anticipation of a refugee crisis that did not materialize. While Iraqis
refugees are far from being assimilated into their host country, they have blended into
urban areas, settling into cities like Amman and Damascus. Many Iraqis who fled the
country before/after the U.S. invasion had some temporary means of supporting
themselves either through their personal savings or remittances from relatives abroad.
Wealthy Baath party members and supporters of the Saddam Hussein regime who
fled to Jordan in 2003 were dubbed “Mercedes refugees” by the diplomatic
community and the press.15 Nevertheless, aid workers assert that the newer waves of
Iraqis streaming over the border are progressively poorer than their predecessors. As
the number of refugees increases, prioritizing those most in need of assistance has
become more critical. Aid workers note that because the Iraqi refugee population has
blended into urban areas, they are harder to identify, document, and assist.
There are many challenges that face Iraqi refugees living abroad. Aside from the
social isolation that accompanies their separation from family and tribe, Iraqis may
face discrimination and disdain from citizens who view them as competition for jobs
and access to strained social welfare services. Unemployment was already high in
Syria and Jordan before the Iraqis’ arrival, and both countries bar them from legally
working during their stay. Access to affordable healthcare is difficult for most
refugees without significant personal savings, forcing many new arrivals to turn to
international aide agencies. Moreover, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are not state
parties to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and/or its 1967 Protocol, which makes UNHCR’s role more difficult, as the term
“refugee” and the protection mandates recognized under international law are not
formally recognized in these countries.16
Syria
Syria has long considered itself to be the vanguard of a pan-Arab identity, a
stance that has led it to maintain a liberal immigration policy toward Arab visitors.17
For the past several years, Syria has been open to accepting Iraqis fleeing their
country. However, in September 2007, the government announced that starting at the
15 U.S. policymakers assert that some senior ex-Baath party members residing in Syria have
provided material and logistic support to the Sunni-led insurgency in Iraq.
16 UNHCR currently operates in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon under a Memorandum
of Understanding that binds UNHCR to resettle every person it determines is a
refugee. For background information, see UNHCR, Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees, March
12, 2007.
17 In the past, the Syrian government did not typically require visas for Arab visitors, a
policy that, according to many U.S. officials, has made Syria an ideal launching pad for
foreign fighters attempting to enter Iraq and join the insurgency.
CRS-8
end of Ramadan in mid-October, all Iraqi passport holders must obtain a special visa
at a Syrian embassy before attempting to cross the border. Acquiring this visa will
most likely be very difficult for the average Iraqi, as the Syrian government has
indicated that only businessmen and academics will qualify for legal entry.
Even if the imposed strict new visa requirement halts the steady stream of Iraqi
refugees, there are an estimated 1.4 - 1.7 million Iraqi refugees already residing in
Syria. Currently, nearly 30,000 Iraqi refugees arrive in Syria each month. Syrian
officials estimate that as many as a million Iraqi refugees have settled at least
temporarily in Damascus and its suburbs, changing the character of entire
neighborhoods and creating strains on the Syrian economy in the form of rising rents,
housing demands,18 and impending water and electricity shortages. Many destitute
Iraqi women have reportedly turned to prostitution to support their families, as Iraqis
are barred from working legally. According to one aide worker in Syria, “I met three
sisters-in-law recently who were living together and all prostituting themselves....
They would go out on alternate nights, each woman took her turn, and then divide the
money to feed all the children.”19
As most Iraqi refugees in Syria struggle to cope with their new situations, there
have been few reports of sectarian violence within the emigre Iraqi community of
little Baghdad in Damascus. Nevertheless, because the sectarian profile of the Iraqi
refugee population in Syria does not overwhelmingly favor one particular group,
there are increasing concerns that the ethnic/sectarian and political factional disputes
among Iraqis could be transferred to the Iraqi refugee communities in Syria as well.20
The Syrian government has sought assistance from the international community
in dealing with the Iraqi refugee issue. Syria claims that because it provides public
subsidies for common household necessities such as bread and fuel, the rising
demand for such benefits due to the influx of Iraqis is straining the national budget.
At a July 2007 conference on Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan, Syrian Deputy
Foreign Minister Faysal Miqdad criticized U.S. assistance for Iraqi refugees calling
it “shameful behavior that is unacceptable from the moral, humanitarian, and material
viewpoints.”21
18 In order to control rising housing prices, the Syrian government passed a law in 2005 that
prohibits Iraqis from investing in real estate.
19 “Iraqi women survive in Damascus by prostituting themselves,” International Herald
Tribune, May 28, 2007.
20 According to one account, between January 2007 and mid-May, 41,000 Sunnis, 18,500
Shiites, 19,700 Christians and 5,000 members of smaller minorities registered with the
UNHCR in Damascus. See, “For Iraqi refugees, Damascus becoming 'little Baghdad',”
International Herald Tribune, July 17, 2007.
21 “Refugee Conference Calls for Aid; US Pledges Disparaged, Ignored,” Tishrin
(government-owned Syrian daily), Open Source Center, Document
ID#FEA20070813277587, August 13, 2007.
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Jordan
Iraqis have perceived Jordan as an escape from violence, as some Jordanian
officials estimate that 800,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan over the last three years.
(Other estimates are considerably lower, and place the number between 400,000 -
500,000.)22 For a small, relatively poor country such as Jordan, this population influx
is creating profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Jordan’s banking and
real estate sectors are soaring with the increased demand for housing and the influx
of capital from middle class expatriate Iraqis. On the other hand, inflation is rapidly
rising, and there have been anecdotal reports of increased tension between Jordanian
citizens and Iraqi refugees due to the strains placed on social services by a near 20%
increase in the country’s population in a short period of time. Some reports indicate
that Sunni-Shiite tensions may be simmering below the surface in Jordan, an
overwhelming Sunni Arab state whose East Bank inhabitants have strong tribal ties
to Sunni Iraqis. At this time, it is unclear whether displaced Iraqis will become a
permanent fixture in Jordan or will return to Iraq if, or when, violence subsides.
The Jordanian government classifies displaced Iraqis living in Jordan as
“visitors” or “guests,” not refugees, as Jordan does not have a domestic refugee law,
nor is it a party to the 1951 UN refugees’ convention.23 Iraqis who are able to deposit
$150,000 in Amman banks are granted residency almost instantly, while the vast
majority of Iraqis in Jordan have become illegal aliens due to the expiration of their
visitor visas.24 According to a Human Rights Watch report on Iraqi refugees in
Jordan, “Jordan has not enforced immigration laws against overstayers in a consistent
manner. Yet, none of the Iraqis interviewed complained of police irregularities, and
many Iraqis even praised the police as treating them humanely and without
discrimination even though they are working and residing illegally.”25 In response to
international pressure, the Jordanian government agreed to let Iraqi children without
residency attend public schools. An estimated 50,000 Iraqi students are expected to
enroll in Jordanian public schools for the 2007-2008 academic year. Nevertheless,
one observer notes that “the dire economic situation of Iraqi refugees is forcing many
youths to leave school and seek menial jobs in order to supplement the family’s
meager income.”26
22 The Jordanian government recently contracted with a Norwegian organization (Fafo
Institute for Applied International Studies) to carry out a census of Iraqis living in Jordan.
There are indications that Fafo’s final accounting may report that there are significantly less
Iraqi refugees living in Jordan than previously estimated.
23 According to the UNHCR’s representative in Jordan, Robert Breen, “The term ‘refugee’
has political implications for the government and Iraqis because of the Palestinian
question.... Most Iraqis, who represent a very diverse group here, don’t view themselves as
refugees.” See, “Uncertain Future for Jordan’s ‘Guests,’” Financial Times, March 12, 2007.
24 Many Iraqis in Jordan lack valid residency permits or visas altogether. “Uneasy Havens
Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, December 8, 2006.
25 “‘The Silent Treatment,’ Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan,” Human Rights Watch,
Volume 18, No.10 (E), November 2006.
26 “Refugees in Limbo: The Plight of Iraqis in Bordering States,” Middle East Report, Issue
(continued...)
CRS-10
In February 2007, Jordan tightened its immigration laws, requiring that all Iraqis
entering Jordan possess the newly-issued G-Series passports, a costly and difficult
item to obtain from the Iraqi government. Most Iraqis possess older passports and
many entered Jordan after obtaining forged documents. In addition to concerns over
absorbing more Iraqis, the Jordanian government may be treating the steady inflow
of Iraqi refugees as a national security issue. On November 9, 2005, near-
simultaneous explosions at three Western-owned hotels in Amman killed 58 persons
and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed
responsibility for the attacks. Jordanian authorities may have imposed restrictions on
young Iraqi males from entering the country in response to security concerns.
U.S. and International Assistance
International Response
Funding. An international conference on Iraqi displacement took place in
Geneva, Switzerland on April 17-18, 2007. The conference approved a Strategic
Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq, which was developed by the United
Nations and partners, and emphasizes the importance of coordination and expansion
of humanitarian assistance activities inside Iraq. Donor contributions from other
governments and intergovernmental entities have also been forthcoming, particularly
towards the emergency U.N. and other humanitarian appeals, but some consider the
response to be inadequate.27 The Iraqi government pledged $25 million to assist Iraqi
refugees and IDPs but no contributions have been received directly from the
government of Iraq.28
UNHCR’s Iraq budget in 2003 was approximately $150 million to deal with
possibly 600,000 refugees. In 2006, its Iraq budget was $29 million (although not
fully funded) until January 31, 2007, when it submitted its 2007 supplementary
appeal for $60 million. This appeal was increased to $123.7 million in July 2007. As
of September 3, seventy-five percent of the appeal had been funded. In addition,
UNHCR and the United Nation’s Childrens Fund (UNICEF) put forward a Joint
Education appeal of $129 million to enroll 150,000 Iraqi children in Jordanian and
Syrian schools. The international community has contributed approximately thirty-
one percent of this appeal. A U.N. interagency appeal of nearly $85 million to
improve health care access for displaced Iraqis in neighboring countries was
submitted on September 18, 2007.29
26 (...continued)
#244, Fall 2007.
27 For one analysis of the response by the international community, see Amnesty
International, Millions in Flight: The Iraqi Refugee Crisis, September 24, 2007.
28 See Chairman’s Summary, International Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian
Needs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Inside Iraq and in Neighboring
Countries, Geneva, April 17-18, 2007.
29 Joint Appeal by UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO, Health Sector Appeal,
(continued...)
CRS-11
Resettlement. Resettlement applications from Iraqi refugees are up in Europe
by almost 100 percent in two years. Sweden has seen a fourfold increase in
applications in the past year. As countries determine their resettlement policies with
regard to Iraqi refugees, it will be possible to compare these with U.S. policy
decisions on the issue. UNHCR has over 300 staff working on its Iraq operation. As
of the end of August, it had registered 170,000 refugees in countries neighboring
Iraq, with over 13,000 of the most vulnerable referred to resettlement countries
including the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Brazil. UNHCR plans to
refer 20,000 Iraqis to resettlement countries in 2007.30
In order to offer protection and assistance to Iraqi refugees, and to identify the
most vulnerable, the UNHCR developed ten categories of risk, which include
“victims of detention or severe trauma or torture; women at risk; those with medical
conditions and disabilities who cannot access treatment; dependants of refugees
residing in resettlement countries; older persons at risk; unaccompanied or separated
children; high profile cases; those who fled as a result of their association with
foreign entities such as the MNF; stateless persons; and those who are members of
minority groups who have been targeted owing to their religious or ethnic
background.” Those considered the most vulnerable may then be referred for
resettlement in a third country.31
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. The State
Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) at the State
Department is providing assistance to refugees and IDPs mostly through
implementing partners, including UNHCR and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). Small groups displaced at the border are also considered
refugees.
In 2007 Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey undertook two separate missions to the
region to expand assistance and protection (including resettlement in the United
States) for vulnerable Iraqis.32 Field assessments by the U.S. government to survey
the situation are also underway. It is unclear what percentage of Iraq’s displaced are
in need of international assistance. There are also different interpretations of what
qualifies a person for IDP status. Furthermore, many IDPs and refugees have thus
29 (...continued)
Meeting the Needs of Iraqis Displaced in Neighboring Countries, September 18, 2007.
30 UNHCR, Iraq: Rate of Displacement Rising, August 28, 2007.
31 See Statement by United Nations High Commission for Refugees Assistant High
Commissioner for Operations Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Migration Policy Institute Briefing,
September 18, 2007.
32 See Statement by Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and
Migration before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Middle East and
South Asia, Iraqi Volunteers; Iraqi Refugees: What is America’s Obligation? March 26,
2007.
CRS-12
far made it on their own, particularly those who have been displaced for some time.
It is expected that newer refugees, and those reaching the limits of their options
inside Iraq, will require support first.
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is
providing assistance focused on IDPs and the host communities inside Iraq. Since
March 2003, OFDA has continued its aid program at various levels.
OFDA has five implementing partners that work mostly with local agencies, in
part because of the security situation and limited access in Iraq. OFDA is continuing
its work with host communities, a number of which are feeling the strain and finding
it hard to cope with the extra burden of the increasing numbers. OFDA’s strategy has
been to support the host to help meet their needs and so they in turn can maintain
their capacity for helping IDPs. Activities include provision of emergency relief
supplies, water systems, and infrastructure rehabilitation in host communities,
support for emergency and mobile medical teams, and small-scale livelihood
projects.
There are a wide range of skills and capacities in the NGO community. The
NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq is reportedly made up of mostly European
NGOs, but it does not interact with the U.S. government. Interaction, the U.S.-based
umbrella organization for American NGOs, also has an Iraq working group.
According to the State Department, since 2003 the United States has contributed
almost $1 billion in humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis. In FY2007 the U.S.
provided nearly $200 million in humanitarian assistance, which includes $37 million
to UNHCR’s appeal and $39 million to the UNHCR/UNICEF Joint Education
Appeal.
U.S. Refugee Program and Iraqi Refugees33
The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are
authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended.34 Under the
INA, a refugee is typically a person who is outside his or her country and who is
unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United
States from abroad. The Department of State (DOS) handles overseas processing of
refugees, which is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission.
Priority One (P-1) covers compelling protection cases and individuals for whom no
33 This section was written by Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Immigration Policy, Domestic
Social Policy Division.
34 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477; 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The Refugee Act (P.L. 96-212,
March 17, 1980) amended the INA to establish procedures for the admission of refugees to
the United States. For additional information on the U.S. refugee program, see CRS Report
RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno.
CRS-13
durable solution exists, who are referred to the U.S. refugee program by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a
designated nongovernmental organization (NGO). Iraqis, like all nationalities, are
eligible for P-1 processing. Priority Two (P-2) covers groups of special humanitarian
concern to the United States. It includes specific groups within certain nationalities,
clans, or ethnic groups. Certain Sudanese Darfurians in Iraq have been designated
as a P-2 group.35 Priority Three (P-3) comprises family reunification cases involving
spouses, unmarried children under age 21, and parents of persons who were admitted
to the United States as refugees or granted asylum. Iraqis are among the nationalities
eligible for P-3 processing in FY2007 and will continue to be eligible for P-3
processing in FY2008.
All refugee applicants are checked through DOS’s Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS).36 In addition, DOS must obtain a Security Advisory
Opinion (SAO) from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on certain applicants. In
the SAO process, additional databases are checked for information on the individual
Iraqi refugees are subject to enhanced security screening procedures established by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Individuals who are preliminarily
determined to qualify for a processing priority are presented to DHS’s U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for an in-person interview. USCIS
makes determinations about whether individuals are eligible for refugee status and
are otherwise admissible to the United States.
Each year, the President submits a report to Congress, known as the consultation
document, which contains the Administration’s proposed refugee ceiling and regional
allocations for the upcoming fiscal year. Following congressional consultations on
the Administration’s proposal, the President issues a Presidential Determination
setting the refugee numbers for that year. From FY2002 through FY2007, the annual
U.S. worldwide refugee ceiling has been 70,000. During this period, the allocation
for the Near East/South Asia region, which includes Iraq, has ranged from a high of
15,000 in FY2002 to a low of 3,000 in FY2004. Since FY2003, the worldwide
ceiling has included a significant unallocated reserve of refugee numbers, which can
be used if, and where, a need develops for refugee slots in excess of the regional
allocations. According to DOS’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(PRM), admissions of Iraqi refugees to the United States totaled 198 in FY2005, 202
in FY2006, and 1,429 in FY2007 through September 25, 2007.37
For FY2008, the President proposes a U.S. worldwide refugee ceiling of 80,000
and a Near East/South Asia allocation of 28,000. According to the FY2008
consultation document, this allocation includes primarily vulnerable Iraqis,
35 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2008: Report
to the Congress (hereinafter cited as FY2008 consultation document), at
[http://www.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/2007/92585.htm], visited September 20, 2007.
36 CLASS contains records on people ineligible to receive visas, including individuals who
are suspected or known terrorists and their associates or who are associated with suspected
or known terrorist organizations.
37 Telephone conversations with PRM, March 21, 2007, and September 27, 2007.
CRS-14
Bhutanese, and Iranian religious and ethnic minorities. With respect to the
resettlement of Iraqi refugees, the document states:
We are expanding our resettlement processing capacity in the region and will
consider all cases referred to us by UNHCR. UNHCR has already referred over
9,000 individuals to the U.S. program and will continue making additional
referrals in coming months. We are also facilitating access to the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program for Iraqis under threat due to their employment with the
U.S. government, among other especially vulnerable categories of Iraqi
refugees.38
PRM estimates that 12,000 Iraqi refugees will arrive in the United States in
FY2008.39
DOS and DHS have established new entities and positions to address Iraqi
refugee issues. In February 2007, DOS established the Iraq Refugee and Internally
Displaced Persons Task Force to coordinate refugee and internally displaced persons
(IDP) assistance to the region and refugee resettlement. Led by Under Secretary of
State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, the task force includes
officials from DOS, USAID and DHS. It is charged with “focus[ing] the State
Department’s coordination with other USG [U.S. government] agencies, the UN
[United Nations], and other stakeholders.”40 In September 2007, the Secretary of
State appointed Ambassador James B. Foley as the Senior Coordinator for Iraqi
Refugee Issues. According to a DOS press statement, “Ambassador Foley will work
with the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force and other
government agencies to enhance [DOS’s] response to this important issue.”41 Also
in September, the Secretary of Homeland Security appointed Lori Scialabba as a
Senior Advisor for Iraqi Refugee Affairs.
Beyond the formal refugee program, other immigration mechanisms have been
established to facilitate the admission to the United States of Iraqis who have worked
for or been closely associated with the U.S. government, including the U.S. military.
Provisions enacted in 2006 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006, as subsequently amended,42 authorize DHS to grant legal permanent
resident status as special immigrants to certain nationals of Iraq and Afghanistan who
have worked directly with the U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of Mission
authority, as translators or interpreters, and their spouses and children. This program
38 FY2008 consultation document, p. 46.
39 Telephone conversation with PRM, September 27, 2007.
40 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Establishes New Iraq Refugee and Internally
Displaced Persons Task Force,” press statement, February 5, 2007, at
[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80090.htm], visited March 22, 2007.
41 U.S. Department of State, “New Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues,” press
statement, September 19, 2007.
42 P.L. 109-163, §1059, January 6, 2006; P.L. 110-28 §3812, May 25, 2007; P.L. 110-30,
June 15, 2007.
CRS-15
is capped at 500 aliens (excluding spouses and children) for FY2007 and FY2008,
and at 50 aliens (excluding spouses and children) for subsequent years.
Congressional Action
Congress has held a number of hearings pertaining to Iraqi refugees and IDPs
and resettlement of Iraqi refugees in the United States. Legislation before the 110th
Congress with a section or more focused on Iraqi refugees includes
H.R. 663, the New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007 (Blumenauer). Introduced and
referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Armed Services
Committee on January 24, 2007.
H.R. 1581, the Iraq Reconstruction Improvement Act of 2007 (Lantos). Introduced
and referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the House Armed Services
Committee on March 20, 2007.
H.R. 2265, the Responsibility to Iraqi Refugees Act of 2007 (Blumenauer).
Introduced and referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on May 10, 2007.
H.R. 2486, President Gerald R. Ford Iraqi Ally and Refugee Responsibility
Memorial Act of 2007 (Ackerman). Introduced and referred to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and the House Judiciary Committee on May 24, 2007.
S. 1651, Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act (Kennedy). Introduced and referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on June 19, 2007.
S.Amdt. 2781 to H.R. 2764 (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2008) To express the sense of the Senate regarding
the need for the President to quickly respond the deepening humanitarian and refugee
crisis in Iraq (Levin). Senate amendment introduced and agreed to on September 6,
2007.
H.R. 3674, Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Humanitarian
Assistance, Resettlement, and Security Act of 2007 (Hastings). Introduced and
referred to House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Judiciary Committee on
September 26, 2007.
CRS-16
Issues for Congress
Increased International Funding
UNHCR and other experts say that more international aid in the form of
contributions and program development is required for host countries, domestic
NGOs, and for organizations providing assistance, such as UNHCR. It is often
difficult for international NGOs to register in these countries, and greater access
needs to be negotiated. UNHCR is short of funds and cannot provide adequate
assistance or protection to Iraqi refugees.
In its findings, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) refers specifically to the dramatic
increase in population displacement that could cause further destabilization both in
Iraq and the region and contribute to a humanitarian crisis. Specifically the ISG
suggests that the United States should “take the lead in funding assistance requests
from the UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies.” (Recommendation 66).43 Some
argue that bringing pressure to bear on other donors to participate in these relief
efforts, either by funding UNHCR’s 2007 supplemental appeal for Iraqi refugees or
by providing bilateral funding to host countries with specific allocations to Iraqi
refugees, could make a measurable difference in the humanitarian situation
developing on the ground.
U.S. Humanitarian Response in Iraq
Determining the immediate steps the United States can take with regard to Iraqi
IDPs in particular (and in a more general sense to the Iraqi refugees) and how other
international partners could be involved may prove to be critical in the next phase of
the U.S. Iraq strategy. Iraq’s internal population displacement appears to be
accelerating into a humanitarian crisis that is well beyond the current capacity on the
ground. Difficult decisions lie ahead including identifying who should be in charge
of any comprehensive relief effort, bringing together key players, and working out
a coordination strategy. Whether or not the MoDM has the resources and competence
to be effective remains to be seen in the long term, but in the immediate
circumstance, it is reportedly overwhelmed. It is not clear what role the U.S. military
might play in the humanitarian response on a local level in Iraq and whether the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) may be an immediate resource to consider.
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities
Amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing
or reducing discretionary spending or finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid
pledges may be difficult. When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the
Administration may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster contingency
accounts. In order to respond to future humanitarian crises, however, these resources
would need to be replenished. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other
emergencies could be curtailed. In the case of Iraq, with a humanitarian crisis
43 The Iraq Study Group Report, p. 58.
CRS-17
looming, the question of whether or not sufficient funds have been requested by the
Administration for a potential crisis remains. Moreover, some believe the United
States has greater responsibility to lead the way on committing funds to address the
needs of Iraqi refugees and IDPs. For broader political reasons, finding a balance on
burdensharing with the international community may be unique in the Iraq context.
Donor fatigue is also an issue, with some experts concerned about funding priorities
and the ongoing need for resources for other disaster areas.
Links to Broader Iraq Policy
With respect to the possible repatriation of Iraqi refugees, the refugee
admissions report to Congress states “It is hoped that significant numbers of Iraqi
refugees located throughout the Middle East and Europe will soon be able to return
home, although the security situation will remain an important consideration in
repatriation.”44 It is not clear whether there are policy implications for refugee
resettlement at present, and whether, when viewed as a temporary situation, the
obligation by the United States to resettle Iraqi refugees becomes less pressing. In
addition, there is some concern that if, among those determined to be most vulnerable
and in need, proportionally more Christian Iraqis are resettled in the United States
than Muslim Iraqis, this could contribute to the perception of preference granted to
groups of one religion over another.
The question of granting preference to vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqis who are at
risk because they have worked for, or been closely associated with, the U.S.
government, including the U.S. military, may also have unforseen consequences.
Some have questioned whether it may create resentment among Iraqis seeking
resettling who do not qualify for preferential treatment. Others have asked whether
Iraqis will see “collaboration” with the United States as a means to resettle in the
United States and therefore will be eager to take advantage of any opportunity to do
so.
44 Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2007: Report to the Congress, p. 40.
CRS-18
Appendix45
Refugees in Iraq (old caseload, prior to 2003) — Total more than 51,000. Many are
now targeted, some displaced again, within Iraq.
Country of Origin
Number
Palestinians
up to 22,500
Iranian Ahwazi
2,460
Sudanese
142
Syrian Arabs
681
Iranian 10,606
Turkish
15,000
Total
51,389
Returnees (those who were refugees) — (2002 - 2006, mainly from Iran to Southern
Iraq) Total nearly 300,000. The majority of returnees are now believed to be
displaced within Iraq.
Year
Number
2002
1,142
2003
50,524
2004
191,645
2005
55,267
2006
401
Total
298,979
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) — An old caseload of approximately 1,200,000
IDPs existed before 2006. Since February 2006 1 million are thought to have been
displaced.
45 Data from UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006 and telephone
conversation with USAID, OFDA, March 21, 2007.