Order Code RL33819
Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Updated September 27, 2007
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Summary
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba under Fidel Castro has consisted
largely of isolating the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the
Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A second policy component has
consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian
donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past
years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress is how to
best support political and economic change in one of the world’s remaining
communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress is now examining policy
toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro’s temporary, and potentially permanent,
departure from the political scene because of health conditions.
In the 110th Congress, both the House-passed and Senate Appropriations
Committee reported versions of the FY2008 Financial Services and General
Government appropriations bill, H.R. 2829, have provisions that would prevent funds
from being used to require the payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of
U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba; the Senate version also would ease restrictions on
travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. S. 1859,
the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2008 agriculture
appropriations bill, also has a provision that would ease travel restrictions for the
marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. On July 27, 2007, the House
rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated
the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in several ways.
Several other initiatives would ease sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel);
H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R.
654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026
(sale of U.S. agricultural products); H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and
medical products and travel); and S. 1268 and H.R. 3182 (development of Cuba’s
offshore oil). S. 554 would terminate U.S.-government sponsored television
broadcasting to Cuba. Several initiatives would tighten sanctions: H.R. 525 (related
to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 (related to Cuba’s offshore oil
development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would amend a provision of
law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks; H.R.
217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, and S. 1673 would repeal the trademark sanction.
Both the House and Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 foreign aid
appropriations bill, H.R. 2764, fully fund the Administration’s $45.7 million request
for Cuba democracy programs. Both versions would provide $33.7 million for Cuba
broadcasting. The House version would prohibit funding for counternarcotics
cooperation with Cuba, while the Senate version would provide $1 million.
This report will be updated regularly. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba:
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; CRS Report RS20468, Cuban
Migration Policy and Issues; and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political
Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches.

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Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Varela Project and the National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Assembly to Promote Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . 13
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Trademark Sanction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Offshore Oil Sector Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Drug Interdiction Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Cuba and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Radio and TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Controversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Migration Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Guantanamo Naval Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Human Rights Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

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Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Recent Developments
In a September 25, 2007, speech before the U.N. General Assembly, President
Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing its end” in Cuba, and
called on the United Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and free
elections as Cuba “enters a period of transition.”
On September 21, 2007, Fidel Castro appeared on Cuban television in an
interview taped earlier that day, his first television interview in more than three
months.
In a September 17, 2007, speech on Cuba, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos
Gutierrez stated, “The Administration’s position has been unfailingly clear and
consistent. Unless the regime changes, our policy will not. We are prepared to
respond to genuine democratic change in Cuba.”
On September 6, 2007, during consideration of the FY2008 foreign aid
appropriations measure, H.R. 2764, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez)
by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million
to fully fund the Administration’s request of $45.7 million. The Senate
Appropriations Committee report to the bill (S.Rept. 110-134) would have provided
$15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
On July 27, 2007, the House rejected, by a vote of 182-245, H.Amdt. 707
(Rangel) to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased
restrictions on the commercial sale of agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the
meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of such products; authorizing
direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for such sales; and
authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities, including
phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro
acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained
that structural changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production.
He also reiterated an offer to engage in dialogue with the United States, and strongly
criticized U.S. trade and economic sanctions on Cuba.
On July 19, 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version
of the FY2008 Agriculture appropriations bill, which included a provision, adopted
in committee by voice vote, that would authorize general licenses for travel to Cuba
for the sale and marketing of U.S. agricultural and medical goods. S. 1859 (Kohl)

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was subsequently introduced and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee
on July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-134), with the provision in Section 741 of the bill.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of
Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between
one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. According to the report,
lifting travel restrictions would result in travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba rising to
between 550,000 and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in 2005. See the full
report available at [http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007
/er0719ee1.htm]
On July 12, 2007, the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on
human rights and U.S. foreign policy that examined the cases of Azerbaijan, Cuba,
and Egypt.
On July 3, 2007, independent journalist Armando Betancourt Reina was
sentenced to 15 months in prison.
On June 28, 2007, the House passed H.R. 2829, the FY2008 Financial Service
and General Government Appropriations Act, which contains a provision in Section
903 that would prevent Treasury Department funds from being used to implement a
February 2005 tightening of policy requiring the payment of cash in advance prior
to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House adopted the provision
when it approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote.
On June 26, 2007, the Senate approved by unanimous consent S. 1612, a
measure that would amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to
increase the potential civil and criminal penalties against violators of U.S. sanctions
law. Civil penalties would increase to not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from
$50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction, while criminal
penalties would increased to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years imprisonment.
On June 22, 2007, the House passed the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, with several Cuba provisions. It
would fully fund the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in Economic Support
Funds (ESF) for Cuba democracy programs. (The House committee-reported bill
would have provided $9 million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007
floor consideration, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-
170 that increased funding for Economic Support Funds (ESF) by $36.7 million in
order to fully fund the Administration’s request.) The House-passed bill, in Section
607, would prohibit direct funding for Cuba, and, in Section 673, would specifically
prohibit International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to the
Cuban government. The report to the bill, H.Rept. 110-197, recommended $33.681
million for Cuba broadcasting, $5.019 million below the Administration’s request of
$38.7 million and identical to the amount provided for FY2007.
On May 9, 2007 a federal judge in Texas dismissed immigration fraud charges
against Luis Posada Carriles, alleged to be involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban

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airliner and 1997 bombings in Cuba. The judge maintained that the U.S. government
mistranslated testimony from Posada and manipulated evidence. Posada had been
released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed to return to Miami
under house arrest awaiting trial.
On May 3, 2007, Cuban authorities prevented a hijacking from Havana to the
United States by two military recruits who killed an army lieutenant colonel that they
had taken hostage. Cuba denounced U.S. immigration policy for encouraging such
violent action.
On April 25, 2007, Cuba expelled U.S. fugitive Joseph Adjmi to the United
States. Adjmi had been convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but disappeared before
beginning his 10-year sentence.
On April 24, 2007, the Cuban government released six dissidents, arrested in
2005, after serving most or all of their sentences.
On April 23, 2007, one of Cuba’s longest serving political prisoners, Jorge Luis
García Pérez, was released from prison after 17 years.
On April 16, 2007, many of Cuba’s leading dissident groups signed a statement
declaring that they were united in their struggle for a peaceful transition toward
democracy.
In April 2007, the Cuban government conducted secret trials sentencing human
rights activist Rolando Jiménez Posada to 12 years in jail, and independent journalist
Oscar Sánchez Madan to four years.
On February 8, 2007, Cuba extradited alleged Colombia drug cartel leader Luis
Hernando Gómez Bustamante to Colombia. Gómez Bustamante was ultimately
extradited to the United States in July 2007 to face on drug trafficking charges.
In February 2007, the Cuban government released three political prisoners that
had been held since July 2005 before a planned protest at the French Embassy:
prominent dissident René Gómez Manzano was released February 8, while dissidents
Julio César López and Raúl Martinez were released on February 3.
In January 11, 2007 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples stated
that “Raúl Castro is firmly in control as Cuba’s acting president and will likely
maintain power and stability after Fidel Castro dies, at least for the short-term.”

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Political Conditions
While Cuba’s long-ruling communist leader Fidel Castro stepped down
provisionally from power in late July 2006 because of poor health, the country has
remained a hardline communist state under the rule of his younger brother Raúl
Castro. On July 31, 2006, Fidel provisionally ceded political power to Raúl in order
to recover from intestinal surgery. As a result, in a proclamation signed by Fidel,
Raúl became First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), Commander in
Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the Council of
State and Government.
Until Fidel stepped down, he had ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which
ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that
the Cuban Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself
to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A
Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the PCC as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. In
October 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was
held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and
reelected Fidel and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.
The Constitution also outlines national, provincial, and local governmental
structures. Executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by a
President. Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power,
currently with 609 members, that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the
Assembly is not in session, a Council of State acts on its behalf. Although Assembly
members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993, only a single slate
of candidates was offered. Direct elections for the National Assembly were again
held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters again were not offered a choice
of candidates. The next National Assembly elections will likely take place in March
2008. The process of nominating candidates for local municipal assemblies is taking
place in September 2007, with municipal elections scheduled for October 21, 2007.
Municipal assembly elections are competitive, with from two to eight candidates. To
be elected, the candidate must receive more than half of the votes cast. As a result,
runoff elections between the two top candidates are common in many municipalities.
For a number of years, Raúl Castro, as First Vice President of the Council of
State and the Council of Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and
was slated to become chief of state with Fidel’s departure. Raúl — who turned 76
on June 3, 2007 — also has served as Minister of the FAR since the beginning of the
Cuban Revolution.
At the same time that Raúl assumed provisional power, Fidel tapped six other
high-ranking government officials on a provisional basis for key roles in health,
education, and energy projects. He delegated the job of promoting public and
international health projects to current Minister of Public Health José Ramón
Balaguer Cabrera. On education, he designated José Ramón Machado Ventura and
Esteban Lazo Hernández, both members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the
Communist Party and both Vice Presidents of the Council of State. On energy, he

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designated Carlos Lage, a Vice President of the Council of State and Executive
Secretary of the Council of Ministers. Lage is known for orchestrating Cuba’s
economic recovery in the 1990s. Fidel also directed Lage, as well as Foreign
Minister Felipe Pérez Roque and Central Bank President Francisco Soberón Valdés,
to form a commission to manage and prioritize funds for the health, education, and
energy programs.

Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro
Because of Fidel’s surgery, celebrations for his 80th birthday on August 13,
2006, were postponed until December 2, 2006 (the 50th anniversary of the arrival of
Fidel and his followers from Mexico on the boat Granma), but Castro was unable to
appear at the celebration, fueling speculation that he was gravely ill and would not
be returning to power. A number of observers speculated that Castro was suffering
from cancer, although Cuban officials denied it. In late December 2006, a Spanish
surgeon who was treating Castro asserted that he did not have cancer, but that he was
recovering from a very serious surgery. In 2007, Fidel’s health condition improved
considerably. He reportedly assumed some duties, and has authored numerous
editorials in Cuba’s state-run media (although some observers question whether Fidel
actually wrote the articles). In early June 2007, Fidel appeared in a lengthy interview
on Cuban television, but he subsequently remained out of public view for over three
months, again fueling speculation that he had suffered a health setback. On
September 21, 2007, however, Castro appeared in another television interview, and
while this quelled speculation about his condition, most observers maintain that it is
unlikely that Fidel will be able to resume his duties or resume his position as chief
of state.
Although many observers believe that the eventual demise of Cuba’s communist
government ultimately is inevitable, there is considerable disagreement over when
or how this may occur. Some still predict that the regime will collapse when Fidel
Castro permanently departs the political scene. Other observers stress that Fidel is
still not out of the picture and that when he does die or become permanently
debilitated, the Cuban government has a plan for the permanent succession of his
brother Raúl. They point to Cuba’s strong security apparatus and the extraordinary
system of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popular support.
Before Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006, observers discerned
several potential scenarios for Cuba’s future after Fidel. These fit into three broad
categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military government; or
a democratic transition or fully democratic government. According to most
observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, is continued leadership
under Raúl. This is likely for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl’s
designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR.
The FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since 1989 and
has played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of numerous
business enterprises. The scenario of a military-led government is viewed by some
observers as a possibility only if a successor communist government fails because of
divisiveness among leaders or political instability. For many observers, the least
likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or departure is a democratic transition government.
With a strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro government has successfully

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impeded the development of independent civil society, with only a small and tightly
regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political
opposition. (For further information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future
Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
Human Rights
Overview. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government
sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time.
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2006, the Cuban
government continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. These
included the frequent use of arbitrary arrest and detention to harass opponents;
beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners, including human rights activists;
frequent “acts of repudiation” consisting of beatings and threats against political
opponents by government-recruited mobs; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions; denial of fair trial, especially for political prisoners; and interference with
privacy, including pervasive monitoring of private communications. As noted in the
report, the government tightly controlled Internet access, with citizens only accessing
it through government-approved institutions or through a few Internet facilities
offered by foreign diplomatic offices. The government reviewed and censored e-
mail, and forbade attachments.
The government conducted a severe crackdown on activists in March 2003 and
imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including independent journalists and librarians
and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties. At present, 59 of the
“group of 75” political prisoners remain incarcerated. The most recent release of the
group of 75 was Hector Palacios, released for health reasons on December 6, 2006;
Palacios had been sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2003.
Since then, the government has released several more political prisoners,
including prominent dissident René Gómez Manzano and two others in February
2007, and Jorge Luis García Pérez and six others in April. Incarcerated for 17 years,
García Pérez was one of Cuba’s longest serving political prisoners. In August 2007,
two more political prisoners were released after serving much of their sentences: on
August 10, Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, a leader of the dissident Cuban Civil
Rights Council, was released on medical parole after serving 13 of 15 years; on
August 14, Lazaro Gonzalez Adan was released after serving three years in prison.
In August 2007, the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) reported that the number of political prisoners
decreased to 244, compared to 283 at the end of 2006 and 333 at the end of 2005.

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The number includes 13 prisoners who have been released on medical parole, such
as Marta Beatriz Roque and Oscar Espinosa Chepe.1
Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, human rights activists
maintain that the overall situation has not improved. They maintain that the releases
could merely be an effort by the government to replace its strategy of political
repression based on long prison sentences with other acts of repression. Cuban
human rights activist Elizardo Sánchez, the head of the CCDHRN, asserts that the
government is still repressing dissidents, with threats, police searches of people’s
homes, interrogations, and short detentions. Sánchez asserts that the police state is
still in force in Cuba, reflected in almost every aspect of national life.2 Miriam Leiva,
a founding member of the Ladies in White human rights organization, maintains that
there has not been any improvement in the human rights situation since the
government’s March 2003 crackdown.3 In April 2007, the government conducted
secret trials sentencing Rolando Jiménez Posada, a lawyer running a Human Rights
Center on the Isle of Youth, to 12 years in prison, and Oscar Sánchez Madan, an
independent journalist, to four years.4 In early July 2007, independent journalist
Armando Betancourt Reina, held since May 2006 when he was attempting to cover
the story of the eviction of poor families, was sentenced to 15 months in prison.
Press rights groups, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters
Without Borders, maintain that Cuba is holding some 25 independent journalist in
prisons, and have expressed concern about the health of several of these prisoners.
In October 2005, a Cuban human rights group known as the Ladies in White
(Damas de Blanco) received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought from the
European Parliament. The group, formed after Cuba’s March 2003 crackdown,
consists of wives, mothers, and sisters of dissidents who conduct peaceful protests
calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners.
In December 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas Hernández
received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters Without
Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding broader
Internet access for Cubans.
Varela Project and the National Dialogue. Named for the 19th century
priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of
slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban
Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights,
1 Anita Snow, “Cuban Rights Group Says There Are Fewer Political Prisoners, But
Repression Continues,” Associated Press, July 5, 2007; Frances Robles, “Fewer Held as
Political Prisoners,” Miami Herald, July 6, 2007; “VOA News: Cuba Releases Second
Dissident in Less Than a Week,” US Fed News, August 15, 2007.
2 Ibid.
3 “Groups Says No Improvement in Cuba 4 Years after Crackdown,” EFE News Service,
March 9, 2007.
4 Frances Robles, “Cuban Dissident Sentence to 12 Years,” Miami Herald, April 24, 2007.

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an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s
electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organized
by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement.
In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to
the National Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”5 In response
to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late
June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution
to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered
despite the 2003 human rights crackdown, which included the arrest of 21 Project
activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to
Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.
Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the
National Dialogue with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of
discussing and preparing for a democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands
of Cubans have met in dialogue groups to discuss a working document covering such
themes as: economic, political, and institutional changes; social issues; public health
and the environment; public order and the armed forces; media, science, and culture;
reconciliation; and reuniting with the exile community.6
Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Led by three prominent Cuban
human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez Manzano, and Felix
Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana
on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because
May 20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government
to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some
Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was
dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959
Cuban revolution.7 The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda
for political and economic change in Cuba.8 Among its provisions, the resolution
called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights,
5 “Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press, May
15, 2002.
6 Oswaldo Payá, “Dissidents’ Goal: A National Dialogue,” Miami Herald, August 9, 2005.
7 Nancy San Martin, “‘A Triumph’ in Cuba as Dissidents Gather,” Miami Herald, May 21,
2005.
8 The full text of the resolution is available in Spanish from Cubanet: [http://www.cubanet.
org/ref/dis/052305.htm].

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CRS-9
demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document
on political and economic rights entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All.”9
Economic Conditions
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline
ranging from 35-50%, but there has been considerable improvement since 1994.
From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented
economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually. From 2001-2006,
economic growth averaged almost 5%.
Economic growth was especially strong over the past two years, registering an
impressive 8.6% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis
and Wilma) and an estimated 11.1% in 2006. The forecast for 2007 is for a growth
rate of 7%.10 The economy has benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and
oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment
commitments and credit lines. Cuba benefits from a preferential oil agreement with
Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Some
observers maintain that Venezuela’s oil subsidies amounted to more than $3 billion
a year 2006 and could increase to $4 billion in 2007. 11 Venezuela is also helping
Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, and reportedly is providing some $300-
500 million in credit for a variety of projects ranging from housing to electricity.12
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in
health and education. In 2004, according to the U.N. Development Programs’s 2006
Human Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba was 77.6 years, adult literacy
was estimated at almost 100%, and the infant mortality rate was 6 per 1,000 live
births, the lowest rate in Latin America. For 2006, Cuba has boasted an infant
mortality rate of 5.3, just second behind Canada in the Western Hemisphere.13
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
9 See the full text of “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” online at [http://www.cubanet.org/
CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm].
10 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August and September 2007.
11 Frances Robles, “Venezuelan Oil Subsidies to Cuba Balloon,” Miami Herald, August 2,
2007.
12 Frances Robles and Steven Dudley, “Chávez May Be Buying Cuba’s Future with Oil,”
Miami Herald, August 30, 2006.
13 “Cuba Says Its Infant Mortality Rate is Lowest in Latin America,” Agence France Presse,
January 4, 2007.

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CRS-10
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993, the
government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural
markets in 1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market,
and it also permitted artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the
government allowed private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares),
in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place), and approved a new
foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by foreigners in all
sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In 1996,
it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of
such zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking
system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and
independent entity.
Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult —
characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of
medicines, and power outages (although these have been significantly reduced).
Pensioners in particular are finding it difficult to survive without supplementing their
income with additional jobs in the informal or underground economy.14
The government also has backtracked on some of its reform efforts. Regulations
and new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s
self-employed. Some home restaurants have been forced to close because of the
regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state
companies for any services or products not considered part of their core business.
Some analysts viewed the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic
reform measures.15 Also in 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer
would be used in entities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and
hotels). Instead, dollars are now exchanged for “convertible pesos,” with a 10%
surcharge for the exchange. Dollar bank accounts are still allowed, but Cubans are
not able to deposit new dollars into the accounts. Beginning in April 2005,
convertible pesos were no longer on par with the U.S. dollar, but instead were linked
to a basket of foreign currencies. This reduces the value of dollar remittances sent
to Cuba and provides more hard currency to the Cuban government.16
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some
expectation that the government would be more open to economic reform. A debate
about potential economic reforms appears to have re-emerged in Cuba, but to date
no substantive reforms have occurred. Some observers believe that Fidel Castro’s
14 Saundra Amhrein, “Hard Times Force Cuban Retirees to Work,” St. Petersburg Times,
April 9, 2007.
15 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once
Again,” CubaNews, April 2004.
16 Larry Luxner, “Cuba’s ‘Convertible Peso’ No Longer Linked to U.S. Dollar,” CubaNews,
April 2005, p. 3.

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CRS-11
apparent recovery is stalling prospects for economic reform.17 On July 26, 2007, in
a speech commemorating Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro
acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained
that structural changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production.
He also maintained that the government was considering increasing foreign
investment in the country. Some observers maintain that the speech could forecast
future economic reforms under Raúl, while others stress that only small marginal
changes have occurred in his first year in power.18
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which
resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo
on trade and financial transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR),
first issued by the Treasury Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of
economic sanctions against Cuba, including a prohibition on most financial
transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States.
The CACR have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in
policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of
1992 (P.L.102-484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton
legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba
and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if
17 Jane Bussey, “With Raúl in Charge, Economic Reforms Debated,” Miami Herald, January
21, 2007; Marc Frank, “Cubans Sense Firs Moves Towards Economic Change,” Financial
Times, February 15, 2007; Cuba Policy Report, E-Newsletter, “Issue #25: Eight Months and
Counting,” Lexington Institute, April 13, 2007; and Frances Robles, “Raul’s Reforms Put
on Hold,” Miami Herald, May 2, 2007.
18 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Cuba’s Call for Economic Detente,” Washington Post, July 27,
2007.

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CRS-12
it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two
U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase
pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition
to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its
long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is
circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are met. Another
significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable
for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law,
however, both President Clinton and President Bush have suspended the
implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second
track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private
humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts,
and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th
Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with
restrictions on financing such exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by U.S. nationals and residents
for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994
in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for
the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In
January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support
the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that
all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances
to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional
U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles
and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening
restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional
researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track U.S. policy of
isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people
through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the
Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic sanctions and has
further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift parcels to
Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening

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CRS-13
of restrictions for family visits and to the Administration’s February 2005 tightening
of restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In May
2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the inter-
agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State
Colin Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to
“hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to
help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy in various areas. The
President directed that up to $59 million be committed to implement key
recommendations of the Commission, including support for democracy-building
activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The report’s
most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten
economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private
humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent
regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June 2004
implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State
Department website at [http://www.state. gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].)
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may
be paid for their sales. In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed
Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct
U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to identify additional
measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a plan to
help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In July
2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its second
report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a
democratic transition. The full report is available at [http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/].
The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two
years for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund
education programs and exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided
by third countries and scholarships for economically disadvantaged students from
Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10 million); to fund additional efforts
to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and expand access to
independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to support
international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15
million). According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be
additional funding beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for
these programs.19 Thereafter, the Commission recommended funding of not less than
$20 million annually for Cuba democracy programs “until the dictatorship ceases to
19 U.S. Department of State, Second Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba, Briefing, July 10, 2006.

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CRS-14
exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently spent on Cuba democracy
programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with
the international community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide
assistance to a Cuban transition government to help it respond to critical
humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair elections, and to move
toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of preparatory
steps that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so
that it will be well prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new
Cuban government. These included steps in the areas of government organization,
electoral preparation, and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.
The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident
community. Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro
Roca, maintain that they would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the
Cuban dissident movement, others expressed concerns about the report. Dissident
economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans
have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe, “We are
thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and
elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.”20 Miriam Leiva,
a founding member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed
concern that the report could serve as a rationale for the government to imprison
dissidents.21 Leiva also faulted the Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban
transition must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be provided. According
to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such singular
importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a
difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”22
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power. In response to Fidel Castro’s
announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother Raúl, President
Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely
committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.”
The President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged
U.S. support to the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in
Cuba. U.S. officials indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach
out” to the new leader. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support
for the Cuban people in an August 4, 2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV
Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who desire peaceful democratic
change can count on the support of the United States.”23
20 Nicholas Kralev, “Bush OKs Initiative to Support Opposition,” Washington Times, July
11, 2006.
21 Frances Robles and Pablo Bachelet, “Plan for Change in Cuba Gets OK,” Miami Herald,
July 11, 2006.
22 Miriam Leiva, “We Cubans Must Decide,” Miami Herald, July 15, 2006.
23 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Message to the People
(continued...)

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CRS-15
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could
prompt a migration crisis, there has been no unusual traffic since Castro ceded power
provisionally to his brother. The U.S. Coast Guard has plans to respond to such a
migration crisis, with support from the Navy if needed. In her August 4, 2006,
message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged “the Cuban people
to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security officials
also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community
wanting to travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba. (For more, see
“Migration Issues” below.)
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has
“always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time
he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he
described as “arrogant and interventionist.”24 In response, Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to
Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was
willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin
a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo
if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the
creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward
free and fair elections.25
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the
United States. He said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the
longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they
accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate
any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the
principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”26
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary
(commemorating the 1953 attack on the Moncada military barracks), Raúl Castro
reiterated for the third time an offer to engage in dialogue with the United States, and
strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic sanctions on Cuba. A U.S. State
Department spokesman responded that “the only real dialogue that’s needed is with
the Cuban people.”27
23 (...continued)
of Cuba,” August 4, 2006.
24 “No Enemy Can Defeat Us,” interview of Raúl Castro by Laszar Barredo Medina, Diario
Granma, August 18, 2006.
25 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Thomas Shannon, Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, August 23, 2006.
26 “English Transcript of Raul Castro’s Speech,” Miami Herald, December 2, 2006.
27 Frances Robles, “Raúl Again Offers ‘Olive Branch’ to U.S.,” Miami Herald, July 27,
2007; “U.S. Government Rejects Dialogue with Cuba,” EFE, July 27, 2007,

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CRS-16
In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush
Administration established five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy
toward Cuba. The State Department is leading working groups on diplomatic
actions, to build international support for U.S. policies; strategic communications,
to ensure that Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic
promotion. The Commerce Department is leading a working group on humanitarian
aid, in the event that a democratic transition government requests assistance. The
Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Council are heading a
working group on migration.28 In addition to these working groups, in August 2006,
then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte announced the
establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela
responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries across the
Intelligence Community.
In September 2007, President Bush and other key Administration officials made
several statements on Cuba. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on
September 21, President Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing
its end,” and called on the United Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and
free elections as Cuba “enters a period of transition.” U.S. Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez stated in a speech on September 17 that “unless the regime changes,
our policy will not,” but indicated that the United States is “prepared to respond to
genuine democratic change in Cuba.” In a speech on September 20, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon contended that
“there is a quiet consensus in the Americas and in Europe that Cuba’s future must be
democratic.” He maintained that there are differences about “how to promote Cuba’s
democratic future” and pointed out how “Latin America’s historic commitment to the
principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty shape how many in the region
are prepared to engage with Cuba.” He maintained, however, that “helping the
Cuban people achieve their democratic destiny and re-integrate into the Americas
will be one of the biggest diplomatic challenges we face.”
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall
objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for
human rights to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how
to achieve those objectives. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure
on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S.
efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes
referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they
believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue.
Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S.
embargo. Fidel Castro’s provisional, and potentially permanent, departure from the
28 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Creates Five Groups to Eye Cuba,” Miami Herald, September 13,
2006.

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CRS-17
political scene could foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. In this new context,
there are two broad policy approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a
status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the
Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach
aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased
contact and engagement. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622,
Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches.)
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several
policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward
Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue — then the seeds
of reform would be planted, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for
peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of
avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United
States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They
argue that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear
imminent, even without Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse
a more pragmatic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of
changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo,
to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the
embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo.
Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China
or Vietnam, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human
rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the
steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the United States to normalize relations.
They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms
would boost the Castro regime, politically and economically, and facilitate the
survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human
rights in Cuba, and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S.
sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,
are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living conditions.
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and
for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CACR, the overall embargo
regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC).

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CRS-18
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to
the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and
may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights
of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist
or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba
travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing
his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are
legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by
thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on
Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to
Cuba have been tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for
people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June
2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and
the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances
and gift parcels. In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious
organizations promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their
license by taking individuals not affiliated with their organizations. OFAC’s actions
were prompted by reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería
had been taking large groups to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions.29
In 2006, the Administration suspended the licenses of several travel service
providers, including one of the largest such providers in Florida, La Estrella de Cuba.
Several religious organizations also had their licenses suspended, and church groups
and several Members of Congress expressed concern about more restrictive licenses
for religious travel.30
Among the June 2004 restrictions that remain in place are the following:
! Family visits were restricted to one trip every three years under a
specific license and are restricted to immediate family members,
with no exceptions. Under previous regulations, family visits could
occur once a year under a general license, with travel more than once
a year allowed, but under a specific license. Previously travel had
been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship
to the traveler.
! Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to
$800 million, were further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300
may still be sent, but are now restricted to members of the remitter’s
immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government
officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The
29 Oscar Corral, “Is Santería Used as Ploy to Skirt Travel Rules?,” Miami Herald, February
27, 2005
30 Oscar Corral, “Feds Lay Down the Law on Cuba to Travel Agents,” Miami Herald, April
29, 2006; Pablo Bachelet, “New Rules Impede Religious Travel,” Miami Herald, March 16,
2006.

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CRS-19
regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances
that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
! Gift parcels were limited to immediate family members and were
denied to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party. The contents of gift parcels may no longer
include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, or soap-making
equipment.
! The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit was reduced from
the State Department per diem rate, currently $167 per day, to $50
per day.
! With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers
may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it
back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to
Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.
! Fully-hosted travel, by a person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, was
prohibited as a permissible category of travel.
! Travel for educational activities was further restricted, including the
elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary
schools.
There has been mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance
restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions will deny the Cuban
government dollars that help maintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that
the tightened sanctions are anti-family and will only result in more suffering for the
Cuban people. There were also concerns that the new restrictions were drafted
without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students
receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the
establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that
the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new
OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimately licensed the
medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies and engage in travel-related
transactions.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that lifting travel
restrictions would result in travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba rising to between 550,000
and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in 2005.
Legislative Initiatives. From 2000-2004, one or both houses of Congress
approved amendments to appropriations bills that would have eased restrictions on
travel to Cuba in various ways, but these provisions ultimately were stripped out of

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final enacted measures. The Administration regularly threatened to veto legislation
if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.
In the 110th Congress, two pending Senate Appropriations Committee reported-
versions of appropriations bills have provisions that would ease restrictions on travel
to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. The Senate
version of the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations
bill, reported July 19, 2007, H.R. 2829, has a provision in Section 620 that would
ease such travel restrictions, while the Senate version of the FY2008 Agriculture
appropriations bill, S. 1859, reported July 24, 2007, has such a provision in
Section741.
A number of other initiatives would ease Cuba travel restrictions. H.R. 654
(Rangel), S. 721 (Enzi), and Section 254 of S. 554 (Dorgan) would prohibit the
President from regulating or prohibiting travel to Cuba or any of the transactions
incident to travel. Two bills that would lift overall economic sanctions — H.R. 217
(Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would also lift travel restrictions. H.R. 177
(Lee) would ease restrictions on educational travel to Cuba. H.R. 757 (Delahunt)
would lift restrictions on family travel and the provision of remittances for family
members in Cuba. H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry), which would facilitate the sale of U.S.
agricultural products to Cuba, includes a provision that would provide for general
license authority for travel-related transactions for people involved in agricultural
sales and marketing activities or in the transportation of such sales. H.R. 2819
(Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), which would ease restrictions on U.S. agricultural
and medical exports to Cuba, would also lift restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several
years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling
agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign
assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance
such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with
financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods
from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct
business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that
TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received
by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at
which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress
strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the intent
of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba.
OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the

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CRS-21
common understanding of the term in international trade.”31 On July 29, 2005,
OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign
bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at
ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims
while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005
amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were pleased by the
clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February rule.32
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased over $1.7 billion in agricultural products
from the United States, although exports have declined annually beginning in 2005.
Overall U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to about $7 million in 2001, $146 million
in 2002, $259 million in 2003, $404 million in 2004, $369 million in 2005, $340
million in 2006, and $212 million in the first seven months of 2007, the majority in
agricultural products.33 U.S. exports to Cuba have declined as Cuba’s overall
worldwide imports have increased, from $3.5 billion in 2004 to $4.7 billion in
2005.34
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report,
requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of
Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between
one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. See the full report available
at [http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm]

Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba.
They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban
population. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of restrictions on
agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market
of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some exporters want
to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to
Cuba.35 Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on
financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies
expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.36
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba
maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the
31 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before
the House Committee on Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
32 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents
on Nominees,” International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
33 World Trade Atlas. Department of Commerce Statistics.
34 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 2006.
35 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal,
February 11, 2003.
36 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III, No. 7, February 17, 2003.

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large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department,
since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed
billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that
easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and
extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that
could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural
producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing
for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 110th Congress, the House-passed version of
the FY2008 Financial Service and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R.
2829, has a provision in Section 903 that would prevent Treasury Department funds
from being used to implement the February 2005 tightening of policy requiring the
payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
The House adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it
approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations
Committee reported version of the bill includes a similar provision in Section 619,
and in Section 620 would ease travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of
agricultural and medical goods. The Administration’s statement of policy on the bill
maintained that the President would veto the measure if it contained a provision
weakening current restrictions against Cuba. In other action, the Senate
Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2008 Agriculture
appropriations bill, S. 1859 (S.Rept. 110-134) includes a provision that would
authorize general licenses for travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of
agricultural and medical goods.
On July 27, 2007, the House rejected, by a vote of 182-245, H.Amdt. 707
(Rangel) to H.R. 2419, the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007, also known
as the 2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased restriction on the
commercial sale of agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the meaning of
“payment of cash in advance” for the sale of such products; authorizing direct
transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for such sales; and
authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities, including
phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.
Several other initiatives would ease restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba:
! H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry) would facilitate the sale of U.S.
agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license
authority for travel-related expenses for people involved in sales
and marketing activities or in the transportation for such sales;
authorizing the issuance of a temporary visa for a Cuban national
conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural
goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment
of cash in advance” term used in TSRA to mean that the payment
by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller
occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to
the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or

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CRS-23
product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from
restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a
U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.
! H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), among other provisions,
would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;”
authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for the execution of payments for sales pursuant to
TSRA; establish an agricultural export promotion program with
respect to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or
from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly established
Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund.
! Two broader bills that would lift economic sanctions on Cuba —
H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel) — would include lifting
restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba by amending TSRA.
Three bills that would lift overall travel restrictions — H.R. 654
(Rangel), S. 554 (Dorgan), and S. 721 (Enzi) — would have the
effect of lifting travel restrictions for those involved in travel
related to agricultural sales.
Trademark Sanction37
A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of
Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the
United States from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from
Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in
Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has
consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks
without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based
Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government
to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi, whose company in Cuba was
expropriated in the 1960s, maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name.
Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because
of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement
proceedings in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO
ultimately found that the trademark sanction violated WTO provisions on national
treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.
37 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status
of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS Report RS21764,
Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response, by
Margaret Mikyung Lee.

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CRS-24
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into
compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.38
That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken
to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005,
however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request
authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.39 On August 3, 2006,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club
trademark registration was “cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a
Cuban government company the license that it needed to renew the registration of
the trademark.40
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211
would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited
to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the
United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed
is based on a foreign compensation.”41 Others want Section 211 repealed altogether.
They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.42 They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against
U.S. companies under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection.
In the 110th Congress, four initiatives — H.R. 217 (Serrano), H.R. 624
(Rangel), H.R. 2819 (Rangel), and S. 1673 (Baucus) — have provisions that would
repeal the Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while two other initiatives —
H.R. 1306 (Wexler) and S. 749 (Nelson) would advance the narrow fix to Section
211 in order to comply with the WTO ruling. Similar legislative initiatives on both
sides of the issue were introduced in the 108th and 109th Congresses, but no action
was taken on these measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which
the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United States, but reserved the right to do
so at a later date, reduced pressure on Congress to take action to comply with the
WTO ruling.
Offshore Oil Sector Development
The issue of Cuba’s development of its offshore oil reserves along its northwest
coast, which reportedly could amount to more than 5 billion barrels of oil, has been
38 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside
U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
39 “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 15, 2005.
40 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,”
International Trade Daily, August 10, 2006.
41 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An
Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
42 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.

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CRS-25
a concern among some Members of Congress. Cuba has signed agreements for five
concessions involving seven foreign oil companies for the exploration of offshore
oil and gas. Repsol (Spain), Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC (India) are partners
in a joint project, while Sherritt International (Canada), ONGC (India), PdVSA
(Venezuela), and Petronas (Malaysia) also have additional concessions.43 Some
Members expressed concern about the oil development so close to the United States
and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast. While there has been
some concern about China’s potential involvement in offshore deepwater oil
projects, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused on onshore
oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).44
In the 110th Congress, two legislative initiatives — H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen)
and S. 876 (Martinez) — would impose sanctions related to Cuba’s offshore oil
development on its northern coast. Both bills would exclude from admission to the
United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement
of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its coasts; and require
the President to impose sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that
are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that
contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of
the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. In contrast, two initiatives, S. 1268 (Dorgan)
and H.R. 3182 (Udall) would allow U.S. companies to work with Cuba for the
offshore exploration and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern coast.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations
in the United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed
concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as
increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of
measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for
traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with
a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics
agreements with 33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others,
according to the Department of State. For several years, Cuba’s Operation Hatchet
has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed
up on Cuban shores. Narcotics smuggling through Cuban territory deceased in
2006, according to both U.S. and Cuban officials.45 According to the Department
of State, Cuba aggressively pursues an internal enforcement and investigation
43 Jorge Piñon, “Cuba’s Energy Future,” Canadian Foundation for the Americas, FocalPoint,
April 2007, Vol. 6, No. 3.
44 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuban Again Invites U.S. Oil Giants to Invest in Oil Sector,”
CubaNews, May 2007.
45 Frances Robles, “Drug-Trafficking at 11-Year Low, Cuba Says,” Miami Herald, March
3, 2007; U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March
2007, p. 188.

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program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on
anti-drug efforts. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in
the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-
flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully
in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the
United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials
met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted
an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the
U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction
Specialist (DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official
was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time,
coordination has increased.
The State Department, in its March 2007 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, maintains that narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis
primarily through the Coast Guard DIS. The report noted that in 2006 Cuba
provided investigation information to the United States on narcotics trafficking
cases, but contended that this sharing of information was not systematic. The report
stated that Cuban authorities reported 33 sightings of suspected aircraft and go-fast
boats to the U.S. Coast Guard in 2006, up from 31 sightings reported in 2005. The
report noted that the development of bilateral agreements with Cuba is not possible
until Cuba “grants access to international narcotics traffickers seeking refuge and
protection” and “stops using alleged counternarcotics efforts as a pretense to also
repress economic and political activities.”
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat
drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug
cooperation agreement with the United States.46 In January 2002, Cuba deported to
the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in
early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael
Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s
actions, but indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not
through a bilateral agreement.47 In February 2007, Cuba extradited drug trafficker
Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante to Colombia, an action that drew praise from
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
46 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and
the State Department in Washington proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism,
and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Prominent Drug
Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17,
2002; “Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
47 Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-Drug Accord,” Reuters, March
19, 2002.

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CRS-27
Affairs Anne Patterson.48 Gómez Bustamante was subsequently extradited to the
United States in July 2007 to face drug trafficking charges.
Legislative Initiatives. Over the past several years, House and Senate
versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills have contained contrasting
provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on counternarcotics efforts.
House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while Senate versions
would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included
in enacted measures.
In the 110th Congress, the House-passed version of the FY2008 State, Foreign
Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, contains a
provision, in Section 673, that would specifically prohibit International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. In
contrast, the Senate-passed version of the bill would, in Section 696, provide $1
million in INCLE funding for preliminary work by the Department of State, or such
other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation with
the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters. The amount would not be
available if Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the
loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction
of illegal drugs, and if there is credible evidence of involvement of the Cuban
government in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years.
Cuba and Terrorism49
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism
and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a long history of
supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa,
but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was
a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 report (issued April 30, 2007),
Cuba has “continued to publicly oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the War
on Terror.” The State Department report also noted that Cuba maintains close
relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, and has provided
safe haven for members of three designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Basque
Homeland and Freedom (ETA), and two Colombian insurgent groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN). Colombia has publicly acknowledged that it wants Cuba mediation
48 U.S. Department of State, Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, On-The-Record Briefing, March 1, 2007.
49 For further information, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.

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with the ELN. Since December 2005, the Colombian government and the ELN have
held six rounds of exploratory talks in Havana, and in April 2007 the Colombian
government agreed to discuss a temporary cease-fire with the ELN.50
The 2006 report also maintained that Cuba permits U.S. fugitives from justice
to live legally in Cuba. Most of the fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s, and are
accused of hijacking or committing violent actions in the United States. The State
Department report noted that Cuba has stated that it will no longer provide safe
haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba, and cited Cuba’s return of a U.S.
fugitive who had sequestered his son and flew a stolen plane to Cuba in September
2006. The report did not mention Cuba’s return in late April 2007 of another U.S.
fugitive, Joseph Adjmi, who was convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but
disappeared before beginning his 10-year sentence. The State Department report also
cited Cuba’s demand that the United States surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three
Cuban Americans that it accused of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cuban
airliner in 1976 (see below for further details on the Posada case).
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 525 (King), would amend the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a
democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the Cuban government extradite
to the United States individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape
prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States. A
similar initiative was introduced in the 109th Congress, H.R. 332 (King), but no
legislative action was taken. In addition, Section101(1)(H) of House-passed H.R.
2601 would have authorized funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to
disseminate the names of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their
capture, but action on the measure was not completed before the end of the
Congress.
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that
there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the
government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin
America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members
of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining
Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and
maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles
against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various
terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73
people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana
and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and
several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to
death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to
50 “Colombia Accepts Temporary Cease-Fire with ELN Rebels, Agence France Presse,
April 18, 2007.

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CRS-29
prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain
that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot
to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly
involved in the 1976 Cuban airline bombing noted above.51 The four stood trial in
March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms
ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President
Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term.
Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received
strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles
reportedly traveled to another country.
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United
States after entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States
because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel
Castro.52 Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the
bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from
prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden.53 He had been
acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal.54
Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of
bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.55 Posada
subsequently withdrew his application for asylum on May 17, 2005. Later that day,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada, and
subsequently charged him with illegally entering the United States. A Department
of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not generally deport
people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.56 Venezuela
requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to
Cuba. On September 26, 2005, however, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that
Posada likely faced torture in Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with
U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.57
51 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald,
September 4, 2003.
52 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami
Herald, April 14, 2005.
53 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post,
April 17, 2005.
54 Although Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian
trial. Reportedly a first set of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a
second set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada escaped during that time in 1985.
See Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.
55 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005.
56 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
57 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,”
(continued...)

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ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would
not be freed from a detention federal immigration facility in El Paso, Texas.58 In
November 2006, however, a U.S. federal judge, who was considering Posada’s plea
that he be released, ordered the government to supply evidence, by February 1,
2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a federal grand jury
in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the United
States illegally in March 2005, whereupon he was transferred from immigration
detention in El Paso to a country jail in New Mexico near the Texas border. The
Cuban government responded by maintaining that Posada needs to be charged with
terrorism, not just lying about how he entered the United States. Another grand jury
in New Jersey is reportedly examining Posada’s alleged role in the 1997 bombings
in Cuba.59 Press articles in early May 2007 reported that the FBI has been gathering
evidence in the 1997 bombing and that FBI agents have visited Havana as part of
their investigation.60
Posada was released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed
to return to Miami under house arrest to await an upcoming trial on immigration
fraud charges, but on May 9, 2007 a federal judge in Texas dismissed the charges.
The judge maintained that the U.S. government mistranslated testimony from
Posada and manipulated evidence.61 On June 5, 2007, Justice Department
prosecutors filed an appeal with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans to the judge’s dismissal of the case. Both Cuba and Venezuela strongly
denounced Posada’s release, contending that he is a terrorist.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Over the past several years, the United States provided assistance — primarily
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through
the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — to
increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba.
In mid-November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and
concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better
57 (...continued)
Associated Press, September 28, 2005.
58 Oscar Corral, “Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Denied Release,” Miami Herald, March
22, 2006.
59 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami
Herald, November 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada
Carriles,” Miami Herald, January 12, 2007.
60 Alfonso Chardy, Oscar Corral, and Jay Weaver, “FBI, Cuba Cooperating on Posada,”
Miami Herald, May 3, 2007; “U.S., Cuba Unite to Investigate Former CIA Op,” National
Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 4, 2007.
61 Carol J. Williams, “Pressure Grows to Prosecute Cuban Exile,” Los Angeles Times, May
10, 2007.

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management and oversight. According to GAO, internal controls, for both the
awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in
compliance with applicable law and regulations.”62 Investigative news reports on
the program maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished
its effectiveness.63 Representative William Delahunt, new Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight, had requested the GAO study along with Representative Jeff
Flake, and promised hearings on Cuba democracy funding in the 110th Congress.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-
governmental organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition
to democracy, helping develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s
human rights activists.64 These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. Funding for such
projects amounted to about $5 million for each of FY2001 and FY2002, $6 million
in FY2003, $21.4 million in FY2004 (because of re-programmed ESF assistance to
fund the democracy-building recommendations of the Commission to Provide
Assistance for a Free Cuba), and $8.9 million in FY2005. In FY2006, $10.9 million
in Cuba democracy funding was provided, including $8.9 million in ESF and $2
million in Development Assistance.
For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the
recommendations of the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and
to support USAID-administrated democracy and human rights programs. The report
to the House-passed version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill,
H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of USAID in promoting
democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue
to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522
(S.Rept. 109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs,
$6.5 million less than the Administration’s request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was
not completed before the end of the 109th Congress. Foreign Operations
appropriations for FY2007 was funded by a series of continuing resolutions
completed in the 110th Congress. Ultimately, the Administration provided $13.3
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs in FY2007, $4.3 million more than
it requested.
For FY2008, the Administration has requested $45.7 million in ESF for
democracy assistance for Cuba, more than four times the amount provided in
FY2006 and more than five times the amount requested in FY2007. According to
the State Department’s FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the
62 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs
Better Management and Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
63 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami
Herald, November 14, 2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald,
November 15, 2006.
64 See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america
_caribbean/country/cuba/].

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increase in assistance in order to fulfill the recommendations of the July 2006 report
of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to provide support for Cuban civil
society, expand international awareness, break the regime’s information blockade,
and continue support for a democratic transition. That report, as described above,
recommended $80 million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s
transition to democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba
democracy programs.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, would fully fund
the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy
programs. The House committee-reported version of the bill would have provided
just $9 million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor
consideration, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170
that increased funding for ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the
Administration’s request. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill
would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. However,
during September 6, 2007, floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694
(Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by
$30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
Until this year, the NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been
funded largely through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS)
appropriations measure, although NED has also received State Department ESF for
its Cuba program. NED funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past
several years: $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003;
and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED funded 17 Cuba projects with
$2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost $1.5 million,
including $0.4 million from State Department ESF.
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba —
Radio and TV Martí — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2008 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Martí are (1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; (2) to
be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through
use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; (3) to serve as a consistently
reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news;
and (4) to provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba
and elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the
Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV

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Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress
(P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south
Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24
hours six days per week, and for18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission
facilities in Marathon, Florida; Greenville, North Carolina; and Delano, California.
TV Martí broadcasts daily on the Hispasat and New Skies 806 satellites, and
is available on the Internet 24 hours a day. Until July 2005, TV Martí had also been
broadcast via blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half
hours daily, but the aerostats were destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. Since mid-2004,
TV Martí programming has been transmitted for several hours once a week via an
airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the Department of
Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use a contracted
private aircraft to transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and
by late October 2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known
as Aero Martí with the capability of transmitting live broadcasts transmitted by a
Gulfstream turboprop airplane. Aero Martí transmits broadcasts five hours daily
from Monday to Saturday during the evening. In the future, Radio Martí broadcasts
potentially will be broadcast on FM from the Aero Martí airborne platform.
In December 2006, the OCB contracted with two private U.S. commercial
stations to transmit Radio and TV Martí.65 It provided a six-month contract with
Radio Mambí (710 AM) in Florida, at a cost of $182,500, to broadcast one hour of
Radio Martí programming five days a week from midnight to 1:00 am. Radio
Mambí is a popular station in south Florida, with a 50,000 watt capacity, that is
well-known for its strong anti-Castro stance. A second six-month OCB contract
with WPMF (Channel 38) in Miami, known as TV Azteca, at a cost of $195,000,
provides for two 30-minute TV Martí newscasts at 6 pm and 11:30 pm weekdays,
along with one-minute news updates hourly over a 12 hour period weekdays. OCB
chose the station because it is offered on DirecTV and because it has a small
audience in Miami. In June 2007, the two contracts were extended for an additional
six months with similar terms, and both will expire in December 2007.
Controversies. Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of
controversies, including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There
have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially
for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience because of Cuban jamming
efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s
operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.66 In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S.
65 Christina Hoag, “Radio, TV Martí To Be Aired Locally,” Miami Herald, December 19,
2006.
66 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Martí Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald,
December 18, 2006, and “Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.

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federal court to receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period
from a vendor receiving OCB contracts.67
Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of Radio
and TV Martí, including investigations by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV
Martí, and by the State Department’s and BBG’s Office Inspector General offices
in 1999, 2003, and 2007.68
The most recent State Department/BBG Office of Inspector General (OIG)
report, issued in June 2007, maintained that OCB has significantly improved its
operations under its current director, Pedro Roig, with an organizational realignment
that has streamlined operations and has helped improve the quality of broadcasts.
According to the report, “IBB quality reviews show that radio and television
broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality
and content,” although the report also called for greater emphasis on internal quality
control to ensure that editorial standards are followed. The report lauded the
introduction of new technology allowing OCB to broadcast television signals live
into Cuba using airborne platforms, and maintained that there are indications that
more Cubans are watching TV Martí broadcasts. It recommended that the BBG’s
International Broadcasting Bureau should review and assess the leases with Radio
Mambí and TV Azteca at the end of the lease period to determine whether they
provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost, or whether they
could be replaced with lease options for other stations. Looking ahead, the report
maintained that OCB needs a “long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future
needs of the Cuban audience, provides a template on how to compete with
commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB and its broadcasting
facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic
Cuba.”69
67 Jay Weaver, “TV Martí Executive Admits Taking Kickbacks,” Miami Herald, February
14, 2007.
68 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV
Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements,
GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon.
John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February
17, 1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
and TV Marti, Three Volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review
Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S.
Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Inspector General, Review of Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti
Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010, June 1999; U.S. Department of
State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of the
Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program
Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection , Office of
Cuba Broadcasting, Report No. ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007.
69 The State Department originally issued a two-page summary of the report on its website
(continued...)

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One of the most controversial aspects of the OIG report, and one that has often
been at the center of past congressional debate over TV Martí, is the extent to which
TV Martí can be viewed in Cuba. The report maintains that there is anecdotal
evidence that the Aero Martí airborne transmissions have increased viewership. The
report refers to a January 2007 survey of Cuban arrivals — commissioned by
Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade College — that
found listening rates for Radio and TV Martí within Cuba were significantly higher
than previously reported, especially for TV Martí. Although specific survey figures
are not cited in the OIG report, OCB officials maintain that the survey shows that
17% of recent Cuban arrivals had watched TV Martí.70 The OIG report also points
to a February 2007 survey by the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana that
reflected increased viewership. According to the BBG, that survey was completed
by 500 Cuban visitors to the USINT (where TV Martí can be viewed) in January and
February 2007, with 10% of the visitors indicating that they could watch TV Martí
via UHF for brief periods.
Other observers contend that TV Martí can hardly be viewed in Cuba because
of the government’s jamming efforts. John Nichols, a Pennsylvania State University
communications professor, visited Cuba in late June 2007 on a factfinding mission
sponsored by the Center for International Policy (a group that opposes U.S. policy
toward Cuba), and concluded “that the signal from the plane is essentially unusable”
and that there was “no evidence of significant viewership of TV Martí.”71 In recent
interviews with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban immigrants to
Florida contended that while Radio Martí can be heard throughout Cuba, TV Martí
can rarely be seen.72 Prior BBG commissioned phone surveys in Cuba from 2003,
2005, and November 2006 estimated past week TV Martí viewership between 0.1%
and 0.3% of those surveyed and past month viewership of almost 0.5%. The
November 2006 survey, reportedly designed to show the early effects of the Aero
Martí transmissions that began in late October, showed no statistically significant
change from the 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the same surveys, Radio Martí had
listenership of between 1% to 2% in the past week and 4% to 5% in the past month.
Funding. From FY1984 through FY2007, about $564 million has been spent
for broadcasting to Cuba, with $28.6 million in FY2005, $37.5 million in FY2006,
and an estimated $33.6 million in FY2007. The FY2008 request is for $38.7
million. Until FY2005, the Administration provided funding information for Cuba
broadcasting with a breakdown of the amounts spent for Radio versus TV Martí.
69 (...continued)
on June 5, 2007, and pointed out that the full report received only “limited official
distribution.” On July 31, 2007, the State Department issued the entire 43-page report on its
website, with certain sections redacted. That version is available at
[http://oig.state.gov/lbry/].
70 Pablo Bachelet, “Martí Extending Its Reach, U.S. Says,” Miami Herald, June 20, 2007.
71 Vanessa Bauza, “TV Martí Signal Weak in Cuba, Broadcast Specialist Says,” South
Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 31, 2007.
72 Laura Wides-Muñoz, “Despite Expenditures, TV Martí Still Tough to See in Cuba,”
Associated Press, July 30, 2007.

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Since FY2005, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has not made such
a distinction in its annual budget request.
FY2007 Funding. The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7 million of this to purchase an aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The request was slightly below the $37.129 million
appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request to
acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts
to Cuba), but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in FY2005.
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice,
Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba
broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report
to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting,
including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Martí. The Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report
to the bill (S.Rept. 109-277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s
request of $36.279 million. Final action was not completed on either bill before the
end of the 109th Congress, but ultimately was funded by a series of continuing
resolutions completed in the 110th Congress that provided $33.6 million for Cuba
broadcasting for FY2007.
FY2008 Request. For FY2008, the Administration is requesting $38.7
million for Cuba broadcasting, including $3.2 million to enhance programming to
Cuba in support of the recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission
for Assistance to a Free Cuba. According to the BBG’s FY2008 budget request, of
the $3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba, $1.2 million would be to
improve programming and Radio and TV Martí program production in OCB’s
Miami facility by adding a second television studio, virtual sets, and additional
portable production capability. The remaining $2 million would be spent to
continue and expand transmission leases begun in FY2007 for DirecTV and medium
wave radio frequencies.
Both the House and Senate committee reports to the bill recommend $33.681
million for Cuba broadcasting, $5.019 million below the Administration’s request
of $38.7 million and identical to the amount provided for FY2007. S.Amdt. 2695
(Martinez), which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would
have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s request.
Migration Issues
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995
designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States
by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which
125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In
response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S.
resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans,
on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy,
under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United
States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans

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rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change
in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change
of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to
all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take
measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to
enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries
would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no
action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of
their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and
housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled
into the United States.
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted
thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed
at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum
in a third country or eventually the United States. Those Cubans who reach shore
are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has
been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make
it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that
U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not
they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in
recent years, from 931 in 2002 to 1,464 in 2003 and 1,499 in 2004. In 2005, 2,952
Cubans were interdicted, almost twice the number of Cubans interdicted in 2004,
but in 2006, the number of interdictions declined to 2,293 for the year. Interdictions
have risen again in 2007. As of September 24, 2007, over 2,500 Cubans have been
interdicted by the Coast Guard.73
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent
years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in
which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials
73 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement,
“Total Interdictions, Calender Year 1982 to Present,” April 24, 2007.

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have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In July 2003, a U.S. federal
court in Florida convicted a Cuban national for hijacking a plane to Key West on
April 1, 2003. Another six Cubans were convicted in Key West in December 2003
for hijacking a Cubana Airlines plane to Florida earlier in the year.
The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging
in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against
those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a
life sentence may be imposed. On April 11, 2003, the Cuban government executed
three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April 2 in an attempt to reach the
United States. The ferry hijacking had been preceded by the hijacking of two small
planes to the United States. The summary execution prompted worldwide
condemnation of the Cuban government. The Cuban government maintained that
it took the action to prevent additional hijackings.
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 2006, announcement that he was
temporarily ceding political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security
officials announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives
on the open seas. On August 11, 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban people to stay on the island”
and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in order to travel
to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United
States. The measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of
Cuban migrants admitted to the United States each year who have family members
in the United States, although the overall number of Cubans admitted to the United
States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans who attempt to enter the United
States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new family reunification
procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries are now allowed
to enter the United States; their families in Cuba are also allowed to enter the United
States.74
In early March 2007, some 50 federal, state, and local agencies conducted a
two-day mass migration response exercise in Florida, dubbed Operation Vigilant
Sentry, that was designed to prepare for potential mass migration from Cuba in the
event of the collapse of the communist government. Coordinated by the Coast
Guard, the exercise was designed to improve migrant-interdiction skills as well as
skills to intercept vessels heading to Cuba.
On July 17, 2007, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
maintaining that the United States had only awarded 10,724 visas so far in FY2007
as of the end of June 2007, out of an annual minimum of 20,000 agreed to in the
74 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Additional Measures to Combat
Alien Smuggling of Cubans,” and “USCIS Will Further Strengthen Measures that Support
the Reunification of Families Separated by the Castro Regime,” Press Releases, August 11,
2006; Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Program for Defecting Cuban Doctors a Success,” Miami
Herald, March 12, 2007.

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1994 bilateral migration accord. The State Department subsequently responded that
the United States was not going to meet its minium quota because Cuba has
impaired the ability of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to operate in several
ways. It maintains that Cuba has refused to allow the U.S. Interests Section to hire
local staff to replace those who have resigned or retired; for over a year, has held at
least 28 shipping containers with essential supplies and materials for the operation
of the diplomatic facility; and has refused to issue temporary visas for U.S. technical
personnel to visit Havana to maintain systems in the diplomatic facility.75
Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba
and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and
1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks
scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since.
According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified
migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant
lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the
repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S.
diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept
the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.76
In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S.
decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues
raised by the United States.77
Guantanamo Naval Base
The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a
U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S.
presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the
United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the
new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments,
including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however,
as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence
as illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base
was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to
the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential
military operations in the region. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house
thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of the
refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant
to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while
75 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Sean McCormack, July 18, 2007.
76 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January
7, 2004.
77 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.

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a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to
Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country.
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global
campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States decided to send some captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned
in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected to the U.S. presence
at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing detainees.
Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the
base.78 The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the treatment
of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the international
community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects.79 In January 2005, it
denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the Guantanamo base.80
Some Members of Congress have called for the closure of the Guantanamo
detention facility. S. 1249 (Feinstein) and H.R. 2212 (Harman) would require the
President to close the detention facility at Guantanamo within one year, while S.
1469 (Harkin) would require the closure of the facility within 120 days. House-
passed H.R. 1585, the FY2008 defense authorization bill, contains a provision
(Section 1057) that would require the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report within
60 days that contains a plan for the transfer of each “enemy combatant” presently
detained at Guantanamo. That provision was added to the bill by H.Amdt. 297
(Moran, Virginia), approved during May 17, 2007 floor consideration.
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states that
once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to be
prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate
the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.
Legislation in the 109th Congress
The following listing consists of enacted appropriations measures with Cuba-
related provisions, FY2007 appropriations bills with Cuba provisions that were not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress, and human rights resolutions that were
approved. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, see
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
78 “Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raúl Castro Says,” Miami Herald, January 20, 2002.
79 For information on terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo, see CRS Report RL31367,
Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
80 Ana Radelat, “Cuba Turns Up Rhetoric on Guantanamo as UN Condemns Human Rights
Abuses,” CubaNews, April 2005.

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Appropriations Measures
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs. Signed into law November 14, 2005. Funds FY2006 democracy
and human rights funding for Cuba. The Administration requested $15 million in
ESF assistance for democracy activities for Cuba. Neither the House nor the Senate
versions addressed this issue, and the conference report did not include a specific
earmark for Cuba.
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 109-118). House passed June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005.
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed November 7, 2005. House approved
conference November 9; Senate approved conference November 16, 2005. Signed
into law November 22, 2005. The report to the House bill included a committee
recommendation of $27.9 million for Cuba broadcasting, $10 million below the
Administration’s request, and did not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit
Radio and TV Marti programming. Senate action on appropriations for Cuba
broadcasting were included in the Senate version of H.R. 3057 rather than H.R. 2862,
and fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million. The conference
report fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million for Broadcasting
to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations account.
H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23,
2006. Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-266). The Senate version contained a provision, Section 755, providing for travel
to Cuba under a general license for travel related to the sale of agricultural and
medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a specific license
issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House Appropriations
Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006. The Senate
Appropriations reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-277). With
regard to Cuba democracy programs, the Senate-reported version recommended $2.5
million in ESF, $6.5 million less than the request, while the House report to the bill
recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance
for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program. With
regard to counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, the House-passed bill, in Section
570, would have provided that no International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funds may be made available for Cuba, while the Senate-
reported version, in Section 551(e), would have provided $5 million in INCLE funds
for preliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba. The money would not be
available if the President certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate
procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in
connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of
involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking. The Senate-reported
version also would have funded Cuba broadcasting, with the Senate report to the bill

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recommending full funding of the Administration’s $36.279 million request. The
House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science,
State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, described below.
Final action was not completed before the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced June 9, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed (406-22) June 14,
2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July 26,
2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section 950
in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds from
being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. In the House bill, the provision
was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), approved by voice vote during floor
consideration on June 14, 2006. Final action on the measure was not completed by
the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related
Agencies appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As
approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the International Broadcasting
Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102 million for Cuba
broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat
for broadcasting TV Marti. Final action on the measure was not completed before
the end of the 109th Congress.
Human Rights Resolutions
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 2,
2005; approved by the House Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005.
House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27, 2005.
H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of
Representatives to the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005;
approved by the Committee on International Relations April 27, 2005. House passed
(392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of
Representatives regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against
members of Cuba’s pro-democracy movement in July 2005; condemns gross human
rights violations committed by the Cuban regime; calls on the Secretary of State to
initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of the immediate release of all
Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine its current
policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations and other international organizations to work with member
countries of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong

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resolution on Cuba at the 62nd session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005.
House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12,
2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman). Condemns the April 25, 2006, beating and
intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Introduced May 8, 2006;
Senate passed May 25, 2006, by unanimous consent.
Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress
H.R. 177 (Lee). Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2007. Prohibits
the use of funds available to the Department of the Treasury to implement regulations
from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational activities.
Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 216 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions with
respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized baseball.
Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.
H.R. 217 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo.
Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal
of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with
respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial
Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 525 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government
in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted felon William
Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape
prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United States.
Introduced January 17, 2007; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 624 (Rangel). Free Trade With Cuba Act. Would lift most economic
sanctions on Cuba, including a trademark sanction in Section 211 of the Department
of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999. Introduced January
22, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy
and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform,
and Agriculture.
H.R. 654 (Rangel). Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2007. Would lift overall
restrictions on travel to Cuba. Introduced January 24, 2007; referred to House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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H.R. 757 (Delahunt). Cuban-American Family Restoration Act. Would lift
restrictions on family travel and the provision or remittances for family members in
Cuba. Introduced January 31, 2007; referred to House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry). Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2007.
Would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for
general license authority for travel-related expenditures for persons engaging in sales
and marketing activities for agricultural products or in the transportation by sea or air
of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a temporary visa for a Cuban
national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods,
including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in advance” term
used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA)
to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the
seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser
and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and
prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial
institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.
Introduced February 13, 2007; referred to House Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/S. 749 (Nelson). Identical bills would modify the
prohibition on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks,
trade names, or commercial names. H.R. 1306 introduced March 1, 2007; referred
to House Committee on the Judiciary. S. 749 introduced March 2, 2007; referred to
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen). Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act. Would
exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments
contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources off its coast; require the President to impose economic sanctions on persons
(including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal
to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to
develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced
March 26, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government
Reform. Similar, but not identical, to S. 876 described below.
H.R. 2419 (Peterson). Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007. Introduced
May 22, 2007; House passed July 27, 2007. During floor consideration on July 27,
2007, the House rejected (182-245) H.Amdt. 707 Rangel, that would have clarified
the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of agricultural commodities
to Cuba; authorized direct transfer between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for
a product authorized for sale under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000; and would have authorized the issuance of U.S. visas for
Cubans to conduct activities, including phytosanitary inspections, related to the
export of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
H.R. 2764 (Lowey). FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by Committee on Appropriations,

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(H.Rept. 110-197) June 18, 2007. House passed (241-178) June 22. Senate
Appropriations Committee reported July 10, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-128). Senate passed
(81-12) September 6, 2007.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions would fully fund the
Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
The House committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in ESF for such
programs. During June 21, 2007, floor consideration, however, the House approved
H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased funding for Economic
Support Funds (ESF) by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s
request. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have
provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. However, during
September 6, 2007, floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694
(Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by
$30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
Similar to previous years, both the House and Senate versions would, in Section
607, prohibit direct funding for Cuba.
Section 673 of the House bill would also specifically prohibit International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to the Cuban government. The
Senate bill would, in Section 696, provide $1 million in International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement assistance for preliminary work by the Department of
State, or such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish
cooperation with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters.
Section 620 of the Senate bill would add Cuba to the list of countries requiring
a special notification to the Appropriations Committees for funds obligated or
expended under the Act.
Both the House and Senate committee reports to the bill recommend $33.681
million for Cuba broadcasting, $5.019 million below the Administration’s request of
$38.7 million and identical to the amount provided for FY2007. S.Amdt. 2695
(Martinez), which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would
have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s request.
H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/S. 1673 (Baucus). Promoting American Agricultural and
Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2007. H.R. 2819 introduced June 21, 2007; referred
to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Agriculture, and
Financial Services. S. 1673 introduced June 21, 2007; referred to the Committee on
Finance. Among other provisions, the bills would clarify the meaning of “payment
of cash in advance;” authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for the execution of payments for sales pursuant to the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act; establish an agricultural export promotion
program with respect to Cuba; repeal the so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark
sanction; lift restrictions on travel to Cuba; repeal an onsite verification requirement
for the commercial sale of medicines and medical devices to Cuba; and increase the
airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly
established Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund.

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H.R. 2829 (Serrano). FY2008 Financial Service and General Government
Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 110-207) June 22, 2007. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee
July 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-129). House passed (240-179) June 28, 2007. As
approved by the House, Section 903 would prevent Treasury Department funds from
being used to implement a February 2005 regulation that requires the payment of
cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House
adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved
H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee
version has a similar provision in Section 619, as well as another provision in Section
620 that would allow for travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing and
sale of agricultural and medical goods.
H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). FY2008 Agricultural, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act. H.R. 3161 introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee July
24, 2007; House passed August 2, 2007. S. 1859 introduced and reported by Senate
Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-134). Section 741 of the
Senate bill would authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing
and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba.
H.R. 3182 (Udall). U.S. Participation in Cuban Energy Exploration Act. Would
allow U.S. persons to participate in energy development offshore from Cuba and
other nearby countries. Introduced July 25, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means.
S. 554 (Dorgan). Act For Our Kids. Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S.
government-sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. Title
II, Section 254, the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007, would prohibit the
President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or
legal residents, or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel.
Introduced February 12, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 721 (Enzi). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007. Would prohibit the
President from regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or
legal residents, or any of the transaction ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced
March 1, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 876 (Martinez). Would exclude from admission to the United States aliens
who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba
to develop its petroleum resources off its coast; require the President to impose
economic sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined
to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the
enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged
lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced March 14, 2007; referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Similar, but not identical, to H.R. 1679
described above.
S. 1268 (Dorgan). Would provide for the development of certain outer
Continental resources. Amends the Cuba embargo regulations to provide for general

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license authority for travel-related expenditures by persons engaging in hydrocarbon
exploration and extraction activities. Introduced May 2, 2007; referred to the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1612 (Dodd). International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act.
Introduced and reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
on June 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-82). Senate approved, amended, by unanimous
consent on June 26, 2007, whereby it was received in the House and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. As approved by the Senate, the bill would amend the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to increase the potential
civil penalty imposed on any person who commits an unlawful act under the Act to
not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from $50,000) or an amount that is twice the
amount of the transaction. It would also increase a criminal penalty to not more than
$1 million and/or 20 years imprisonment.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33998, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG):
FY2008 Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL33551, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies (TTHUD): FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL32905, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies: FY2006 Appropriations, coordinated
by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL33412, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by Jim Monke.
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy
Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and
Maureen Taft-Morales.

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CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An
Overview, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL32826, The Medical Device Approval Process and Related
Legislative Issues, by Erin D. Williams.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and
Issues Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006 and
FY2007 Appropriations and FY2008Request, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by
David M. Ackerman.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in
Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.

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