Order Code RL34176
Statutory Inspectors General:
Legislative Developments and Legal Issues
September 18, 2007
Vanessa K. Burrows
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

Statutory Inspectors General:
Legislative Developments and Legal Issues
Summary
Congress has long taken a leadership role in establishing and sustaining offices
of inspector general (OIGs), which now exist in more than 60 federal departments
and agencies. This effort began with Congress’s initiation of the first of the
contemporary statutory inspectors general (IGs) in 1976; it has continued with
passage of the broadly encompassing 1978 Inspector General Act and 1988
Amendments as well as with additions and modifications in the meantime.1 In the
110th Congress, several bills designed to increase the IGs’ independence and
accountability or otherwise modify specific provisions have been introduced —
H.R. 928, approved by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
and S. 1723. The major changes include: a fixed term of office for IGs; removal for
cause only; apprisal of the intention to remove or transfer an IG given to the
Congress 15 or 30 days in advance; notification of the annual IG budget request to
Congress and to the Office of Management and Budget, when the IG submits it to
agency administration; establishment of a Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, replacing the two current councils operating under executive order;
and creation of an Integrity Committee composed of Council members to investigate
allegations of wrongdoing by an inspector general or officials in the office.
This report, which will be updated as developments dictate, covers the main
provisions of the proposals.
1 Codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix and 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(25). For background, see CRS
Report 98-379, Statutory Offices of Inspector General: Past and Present, by Frederick M.
Kaiser; U.S. House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and
Procurement, Inspectors General: Independence and Accountability, hearings, 110th Cong.,
1st sess.; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors General, hearings, 110th Cong.,
1st sess.; and Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General: Opportunities to
Enhance Independence and Accountability
, GAO-07-108T (2007).

Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Proposed Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Removal for cause only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A set term of office (seven years, with possible reappointment) . . . . . . 7
A Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency . . . . . 9
Integrity Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IG budgets and appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Program evaluation information in IG semi-annual reports . . . . . . . . 11
Law enforcement authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Differences Between H.R. 928 and S. 1723 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix. Select Statutes Limiting President’s Authority to Remove
Officials Appointed with Advice and Consent of Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Positions Where Statutes Stipulate that the President May Remove
an Official Only for the Cause or Causes Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B. Positions Where Statutes Omit the Term “Only” Before the Cause
or Causes Cited for Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Positions Where President Need Only Communicate Reasons
for Removal to the Senate or to Both Houses of Congress . . . . . . . . . 15

Statutory Inspectors General:
Legislative Developments and Legal Issues
Overview
The Inspector General Act, as amended, will reach its 30th anniversary in 2008,
and today there are more than 60 offices of inspectors general (OIGs). This longevity
and growth built on the efforts of the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform (then the Committee on Government Operations) in spearheading their
origination, beginning in 1976. Substantial bipartisan and bicameral support was
necessary at their creation, given the across-the-board opposition by executive
agencies early on, and for their continued development.
There are two types of Inspectors General (IGs): (1) federal establishment IGs
are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and may be removed only
by the President except in the case of impeachment; and (2) designated federal entity
(DFE) IGs are appointed and removed by the agency head in usually smaller
agencies. The establishing mandates and statutory supports for the IGs2 provide a
useful vantage point to view the current proposals to modify the IGs, their statutory
powers and political power. In combating waste, fraud, and abuse, IGs have been
granted a substantial amount of independence, authority, and resources. In
combination, these assets are probably greater than those held by any similar internal
auditing-investigating office at any level of government, here or abroad, now or in
the past. Some of these purposes and powers of the IGs include their charges to
! conduct and supervise audits and investigations within an agency;
! provide leadership and coordination for recommending policies and
activities to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
programs and operations;
! have access to agency information and files and subpoena power for
records and documents;
! receive complaints from agency employees whose identities are to
remain confidential (with certain stated exceptions);
! implement the cash incentive award program for employee
disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse;
! hold independent law enforcement authority (in offices in
establishments);
! receive a separate appropriations account for offices in
establishments;
! be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in relevant professions;
2 Codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix and 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(25).

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! remain in office without term or tenure limits;
! report suspected violations of federal criminal law immediately and
directly to the Attorney General; and
! operate under only the “general supervision” of the agency head,
who is prohibited (with only a few express exceptions3) from
preventing or prohibiting an IG from initiating or carrying out an
audit or investigation.
Along with these, IGs have critical reporting requirements to keep the agency
head and Congress “fully and currently informed” through specified reports and
otherwise (which includes testifying at hearings and meeting with Members and
staff).4 The reports include semi-annual reports as well as immediate reports
regarding “particularly serious or flagrant problems.”5 For both types, the IG reports
are submitted to the agency head who transmits them unaltered, but with comments
deemed necessary, to Congress within a designated period of time. The resulting
connections between the IGs and Congress not only enhance legislative oversight
capabilities, but also provide an avenue for potential support for IG findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective action.
Proposed Changes
H.R. 928 and S. 1723 attempt to address recent, and in some cases,
longstanding, congressional concerns regarding OIGs. Despite their institutional
arrangements and authorities, modifications to the IG Act, as amended, have been
seen as useful to enhance the IG’s independence and power. Along these lines is the
wide range of proposed changes in these two bills. Their overarching theme is to
strengthen and clarify the authority, tenure, resources, oversight, and independence
of the inspectors general. The bills’ specific proposals and considerations set up
additional protections for IGs, including “for cause” removal and terms of office;
consolidation and codification of two existing councils established by executive order
— the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), which consists of the
presidentially appointed IGs, and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency
(ECIE), which consists of agency head appointed IGs — into a single Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; the reporting of the IG’s initial budget
and appropriations estimates to the Office of Management and Budget, the agency
3 The heads of only six agencies — the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S. Postal Service and Federal Reserve Board — may
prevent the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or
issuing a subpoena, and then only for specified reasons: to preserve national security
interests or protect ongoing criminal investigations, among others. When exercising this
power, the agency head must transmit an explanatory statement for such action within 30
days to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and other appropriate congressional panels.
The CIA IG Act similarly allows the agency head to prohibit the IG from conducting
investigations, audits, or inspections; but the director must then notify the House and Senate
intelligence panels of his or her reasons, within seven days.
4 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(5).
5 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(d).

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head, and congressional committees; program evaluation in IG semi-annual reports;
and the grant of law enforcement authority to IGs in designated federal entities.
Removal for cause only. First, H.R. 928 and S. 1723 propose a change in
the removal provision for IGs by requiring that removal by the President or the
agency head must be for cause on specified grounds. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 provide
that “[a]n Inspector General may be removed from office prior to the expiration of
his or her term only on any of the following grounds: (1) Permanent incapacity.
(2) Inefficiency. (3) Neglect of duty. (4) Malfeasance. (5) Conviction of a felony or
conduct involving moral turpitude.”6 Congress has provided these specific grounds
for other officials, and an appendix to this report lists other examples of statutory
terms used to limit the President’s authority to remove officials appointed with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Under current law, IGs have limited protection with respect to removal from
office. Presidentially appointed IGs may be removed from office for any reason by
the President. The President is required to communicate the reasons for such
removal to Congress; however, the reasons need not be given in writing and no time
limit is set.7 There is no requirement that Congress be given advance notice of an
IG’s removal. IGs who are appointed by an agency head may be removed or
transferred for any reason by the agency head, and the only limitation on such
removal is that the agency head must promptly communicate to both Houses of
Congress, in writing, the reasons for the IG’s removal or transfer.8 An amendment
to H.R. 928 adopted by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
would require agency heads to give Congress “a written explanation of the decisions
to remove or transfer inspectors general 30 days in advance of [such] actions.”9
S. 1723 would require the agency head of a DFE to notify Congress, in writing, of the
reasons for the DFE IG’s removal or transfer by that agency head “not later than 15
days before” the agency head takes such action.
The Supreme Court has held as constitutional congressional conditions limiting
the President’s ability to remove appointed officers. In Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States
,10 the Court determined that appointed officers, other than officers
performing “purely executive” functions, could not be removed during their terms
of office “except for one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute,”11
such as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”12 The Court
reasoned that “the fixing of a definite term [of office] subject to removal for cause
... is enough to establish legislative intent that the term not be curtailed in the absence
6 H.R. 928, § 2(a); S. 1723, § 2(a).
7 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(b).
8 5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(e).
9 Terry Kivlan, Panel Votes Seven-Year Terms for IGs, Congress Daily AM, August 3, 2007.
10 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
11 Id. at 632.
12 Id. at 621; 15 U.S.C. § 41.

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of such cause.”13 Congressional restraints on the President’s power of removal fall
within the principle of separation of powers, according to the Court, which
recognized the “fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct
or indirect, of either of the others.”14
Subsequently, in Morrison v. Olson,15 the Supreme Court expanded the
congressional authority established in Humphrey’s Executor. The Court removed the
limitations with respect to inapplicability to officers performing “purely executive”
functions, holding that now Congress has the authority to provide “for cause”
removal protection to any advice and consent officer. The Court established a
two-step balancing test for such separation of powers situations. First, the President
must establish that the congressional action interferes with a core power. If so,
Congress must show a necessity for its action to overcome the interference. In
Morrison, the Supreme Court held that congressional restrictions on the Attorney
General’s ability to remove an executive officer did not violate the constitutional
principle of separation of powers.16 In analyzing the issue, the Court reasoned that
the “good cause” standard for removal did not impermissibly interfere with the
functions of the executive branch because Congress had not tried “to gain a role in
the removal of executive officials” beyond its current powers.17 Additionally, even
with its limitations, removal power remained within the executive branch,18 thus
enabling the executive branch to perform its constitutional duty to “take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.”19 In the IG context, the executive branch would
“retain[] ample authority to assure that the [IG] is competently performing his or her
statutory responsibilities” according to the IG Act.20 The Court also noted that
Congress’s limitation on the executive’s removal power “was essential, in the view
of Congress, to establish the necessary independence of the office.”21
13 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 623.
14 Id. at 629-30.
15 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
16 The now-lapsed independent counsel provision in the Ethics in Government Act
prohibited the Attorney General’s removal of an independent counsel except for “good
cause, physical or mental disability (if not prohibited by law protecting persons from
discrimination on the basis of such a disability), or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
17 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686; see also id. at 694-95.
18 Id. at 686; see also id. at 694, 696.
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
20 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
21 Id. at 693. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which addressed the removal of a
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, the Supreme Court viewed the President’s
power of removal as a “coercive influence that threatens the independence” of independent
agencies. 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688; Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 411 (1989).

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Congress may grant “for cause” removal protection to officers at all levels of
departments and agencies for reasons varying from general “cause” to discrete,
limited reasons such as inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office. For
example, the Commissioner of Social Security “may be removed from office only
pursuant to a finding by the President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”22
Yet the Chief Actuary of the same agency23 and the Chief Actuary of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services24 “may be removed only for cause.” During the
Clinton Administration, Congress even provided temporary protection from the
President’s authority to remove appointed officials for the Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy.25 An appendix to this report lists
other statutory examples of constitutional limits on the President’s authority to
remove officials appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Precedents also exist for limiting the removal of an individual with an analogous
position to an IG to “for cause” reasons. The Special Counsel, who heads an
independent agency dedicated to protecting federal employees and applicants from
prohibited personnel practices, may be removed for cause, which the relevant statute
defines as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”26 In the cases of
the Comptroller General, who heads the Government Accountability Office, and
Deputy Comptroller General, the grounds for removal for cause extend to permanent
disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude.27 H.R. 928 and S. 1723 outline the same removal provisions for IGs
as the for cause requirements for the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller
22 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3).
23 42 U.S.C. § 902(c)(1).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1).
25 P.L. 106-398, App. § 3151, 114 Stat. 1654A-464. The first Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security of the Department of Energy, after its reorganization incorporating the National
Nuclear Security Administration, was given a term of office of three years and “the
exclusive reasons for removal from office ... shall be inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” Id.
26 5 U.S.C. § 1211. Regarding grounds for removal, it should be noted that there is no clear
standard clarifying the statutory terms “inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office.” See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies
, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1144-45 (2000).
Congress has stated, however, that a removal for good cause must be based on “some type
of misconduct,” as opposed to the refusal to carry out a presidential order. See
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT of 1987, S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 1-3 (1st
Sess. 1987). Regarding the question of congressional removal, “Congress may typically
remove such officers only for impeachable offenses.” S.E.C. v. Davis, 689 F. Supp. 767,
770 (S.D. Ohio 1988). For a discussion of conduct that may give rise to an impeachment,
see CRS Report 98-186A, Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions,
Procedure, and Practice
, by Elizabeth B. Bazan.
27 31 U.S.C. § 703. However, the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General are
legislative branch officials, and they can only be removed by joint resolution of Congress.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

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General, except that the bills would add a conviction of a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude.28
In the IG context, one IG, the IG for the United States Postal Service (USPS),
may be removed “upon the written concurrence of at least 7 [of 9] Governors [of the
USPS Board of Governors], but only for cause.”29 What constitutes cause for
removal is not defined in the USPS IG statute.
In sum, Congress has the authority to limit removal of individuals by the
President or an agency head and can determine for which reasons that individuals
should be removed. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 list the reasons for which Congress wants
to allow IGs to be removed. Different written formulations of the removal for cause
provision — for example, “neglect of duty or malfeasance” as opposed to
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance” — do not diminish the purpose of
giving IGs a degree of independence if Congress deems it proper. The addition of
the restriction of removal only for cause, without delineating the causes for which
individuals could be removed, would protect IGs from being removed by the
President or an agency head based on policy reasons or because of a disagreement
with an IG’s determination. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 specify particular grounds for
removal and thus makes clear that those reasons are the only reasons the President
or an agency head can remove an IG.
“For cause” removal, however, does recognize that some minimal due process
procedures are required. This was implicit in Humphrey’s Executor. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt removed Federal Trade Commissioner William E. Humphrey,
noting “I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the
policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission.”30 Humphrey, and
later his estate, contested his removal in court and succeeded. We are not aware of
any instance in which a “for cause” removal officer has been fired by the President
since Humphrey, and therefore there has been no establishment of a mechanism to
determine the appropriateness of presidential removal. However, there is one
recorded instance of an advice and consent officer who demanded and was offered
a minimal hearing.31
28 The “for cause” removal requirements for the Comptroller General and Deputy
Comptroller General do not require a conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral
turpitude, as H.R. 928 would require.
29 39 U.S.C. § 202(e)(3).
30 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
31 The White House delineated charges of improprieties justifying the removal of Civil
Aeronautics Board member Robert D. Timm in a letter to him in 1975. He alleged that the
White House wanted to remove him based on policy differences. Presidential advisors
created an informal hearing process and set a date for the hearing, in which Timm refused
to participate, instead demanding “a full hearing before an independent hearing officer, with
the right to judicial review.” The Administration next detailed the charges against Timm
and again offered the hearing. Timm then resigned. S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. V: REGULATORY ORGANIZATION, S. DOC.
NO. 95-91, at 37-38 (2d Sess. 1977).

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The removal for cause requirement is viewed by its proponents as a way to
strengthen and preserve the independence of the IGs, whose ability to investigate
allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse within their respective agencies would be
enhanced by prohibiting their firing without cause.32 Requiring “for cause” removal
could potentially prevent the removal of an IG whose investigations were proving
embarrassing to the agency. However, requiring removal only for cause would
meaningfully restrict the President’s and agency heads’ discretion, and may make it
difficult to remove a poor-performing IG. An alternative approach might be to
require the President or agency head to notify the IG and Congress in advance (i.e.,
30 or 60 days) about the prospect of a dismissal and the reasons for it. This would
allow an opportunity before the removal occurs for the IG to challenge the specific
concerns or allegations, for Congress to inquire into them, and, possibly, for a
resolution of the dispute. H.R. 928, as amended and reported by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, would require agency heads to
notify Congress 30 days in advance of the decision to remove or transfer an IG.33
S. 1723 would require similar congressional notification from the head of a DFE at
least 15 days in advance of such action.34
The Council of the IGs on Integrity and Efficiency proposed by H.R. 928 and
S. 1723, discussed in greater detail below, would not have enforcement authority to
remove an IG after investigating and reporting on allegations. The current
presidentially established IG councils, PCIE and ECIE, also lack such authority.
Presidents and agency heads may be reluctant to adopt recommendations for
disciplinary action from such oversight councils, and statutory “for cause” removal
may not increase the likelihood of action on such recommendations. Some questions
may be raised as to whether the current system of independence, which falls short of
protection and tenure, has provided an overall satisfactory result. Apparent failures
may be attributable to the effectiveness of current oversight mechanisms to monitor
the appropriateness of IG activities.
A set term of office (seven years, with possible reappointment).
H.R. 928 and S. 1723 would institute fixed terms of office for all establishment and
designated federal entity IGs. The new provision is designed to encourage IGs to
remain in office for at least seven years, as it appears that many leave before then. 35
The grant of a fixed term of office does not run contrary to precedent and has
been viewed as providing the incumbent with the chance to gain expertise,36 as well
32 See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 630; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688
(1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411 (1989).
33 Terry Kivlan, Panel Votes Seven-Year Terms for IGs, Congress Daily AM, August 3,
2007.
34 S. 1723, § 8.
35 However, there is no systematic survey of IG tenure in office. It may be possible for the
PCIE and the ECIE, which already have a database covering each IG’s length of service, to
conduct a study of this matter.
36 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 624.

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as independence.37 However, only one IG, the USPS IG, has a fixed term of office;
it is a seven-year term and is renewable. All other IGs have no fixed terms. Several
other executive branch positions also have fixed terms of office, such as the Director
of the Office of Personnel Management (four years),38 the Director of the Office of
Government Ethics (five years),39 and the Special Counsel (five years).40 The
Director of the Office of Government Ethics and the Special Counsel are similar to
IGs in that they perform investigative functions. The Comptroller General of the
Government Accountability Office, a legislative branch position, serves for fifteen
years, and like IGs, conducts audits and investigations.41 Similar to the provisions
regarding the USPS IG, H.R. 928 and S. 1723 would establish the seven-year,
renewable fixed term of office for all other IGs.
Questions might arise over whether seven years is sufficient, since it does not
extend across a two-term presidency. Such a term would likely extend the IG’s tenure
beyond that of most agency heads, arguably providing greater continuity, stability,
and independence for IGs and their offices. At a day-long session on IG
independence which took its guidance, in part, from Representative Cooper’s bill in
the 109th Congress, H.R. 2489, panelists including “current and past administration
officials, current PCIE and ECIE leadership, former IGs, participants from research
organizations and academia, and congressional staff” discussed this issue.42 It
appears that a majority of panelists participating did not favor statutory IG terms of
office.
Allowing for reappointment, which would extend the incumbent’s tenure, might
impinge on the IG’s independence; he or she would be reappointed by an official who
(or whose political allies) might be subject to an IG audit or investigation at the time.
Term limits, even if renewable, would also allow for a lame-duck IG, if it becomes
evident that he or she will not be reappointed. And such limits would still permit a
vacancy awaiting a full-fledged inspector general until a replacement arrives (with
the position being filled by an acting IG). These characteristics both affect the
stability of the office and continuity of its operations, projects, orientation, and
priorities. Some may suggest a single but longer term (10 or 15 years without the
possibility of reappointment), as currently applied to the Comptroller General.
37 “The authority of Congress ... cannot well be doubted, and that authority includes, as an
appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue in office, and
to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime.” Id. at 629.
38 5 U.S.C. § 1102.
39 5 U.S.C. App. § 401.
40 5 U.S.C. § 1211(a).
41 31 U.S.C. § 703.
42 Government Accountability Office, Highlights of the Comptroller General’s Panel on
Federal Oversight and the Inspectors General
, GAO-06-931SP, at 2, 5-6 (2006). The
concerns of the panelists expressed in the GAO report do not appear to focus on the length
of the term limit, but rather discuss term limits in conjunction with “for cause” removal
provisions. Id.

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The term of office section of H.R. 928 and S. 1723 may necessitate additional
clarification. Though the bill specifies that an establishment (presidentially
appointed) IG could serve more than one term of office, the bill also states that such
an IG may only “holdover” for no more than an additional year after the expiration
of his or her seven-year term:
An individual may continue to serve as Inspector General beyond the expiration
of the term for which the individual is appointed until a successor is appointed
and confirmed, except that such individual may not continue to serve for more
than 1 year after the date on which the term would otherwise expire.43
Since H.R. 928 and S. 1723 state that IGs may serve for more than one term,
reappointment and confirmation would be required before the IG could serve another
full seven-year term due to the holdover language for establishment IGs in § 2(b) of
the bills. This would also be true for designated federal entity IGs (appointed by
agency heads), for whom there is no holdover provision.
Additionally, a technical amendment to the bill may be necessary. The Peace
Corps IG currently has a term of office that is indirectly fixed. It appears that no
Peace Corps IG has served more than five years since the creation of the IG position.
The Peace Corps IG’s tenure limit ranges from five to eight-and-a-half years, due to
employment time-limits for all Peace Corps personnel. A conforming or technical
amendment may help to address the five-year employment limit on Peace Corps
employees in 22 U.S.C. § 2506. That statute states that the Director of the Peace
Corps may grant a one-year extension to an individual employee, plus a
two-and-a-half year addition with the agency. This additional two-and-a-half year
extension would only appear to be granted to an IG in the case the IG’s extension
would “promote the continuity of functions in administering the Peace Corps.”44
A Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
H.R. 928 and S. 1723 would statutorily establish a Council of IGs on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) in which all of the federal government IGs who are currently part
of PCIE and ECIE would participate. The PCIE and ECIE were established by
executive order in 1992.45 The merger of the two councils would combine their
forces and arguably reduce overlap and duplication. One concern, however, might
be the size of the new collective and whether it would prove unwieldy. Nonetheless,
it appears that the proposed CIGIE would be an interagency council of the kind
widely seen throughout the federal government.
The CIGIE would also include other relevant executive agencies and officials,
as the PCIE and ECIE do now. The new council’s membership would also extend
to two other IGs not included in the existing councils; these offices (i.e., at the
Central Intelligence Agency and at the Government Printing Office, a legislative
43 H.R. 928, § 2(b)(1); S. 1723, § 2(b)(1).
44 22 U.S.C. § 2506(a)(5) and (6).
45 Exec. Order No. 12805, 57 FR 20627 (May 14, 1992). The PCIE was originally
established in 1981 by Executive Order 12301 and amended in 1988 by Executive Order
12625, but both of these orders were replaced when the ECIE was established.

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branch agency) do not operate directly under the IG Act but instead under their own
separate statutory authority. A question might arise as to whether it would be
appropriate for a legislative branch IG to be a member of an interagency council
which is chaired by an executive official (now, and as proposed, the Office of
Management and Budget’s Deputy Director for Management). A similar problem
arises under S. 1723, which, unlike H.R. 928, would require the CIGIE to “submit
recommendations of 3 individuals to the appropriate appointing authority for any
appointment” to an office of an establishment IG, a designated federal entity IG, the
Central Intelligence Agency IG, and the Government Printing Office IG.46 Such a
provision would allow mostly executive branch officials to submit recommendations
for positions in a legislative branch IG office — that of the Government Printing
Office IG. Additionally, the phrase “appropriate appointing authority” implies that
IGs and executive branch officials on the CIGIE would be able to submit their three
recommendations to the President, agency head, or IG for “any appointment,”
including that of the IG or any member of the IG’s staff. Once again, executive
branch officials could potentially influence the internal composition of the IG office
of a legislative branch agency.
The bills’ proposals would modify the existing arrangements, which have grown
under executive orders issued by Presidents Ronald W. Reagan, George H. W. Bush,
and William J. Clinton. The statutory structure, although incorporating some notable
changes, would more strongly institutionalize the current structure, endorsed by
successive Presidents, giving it greater stability as well as legislative approval. This
change could also add opportunities for congressional oversight of the inspectors
general as well as of the coordinative arrangements among themselves and between
the IGs and other relevant executive entities. Additionally, the legislation would
provide “a separate appropriation account” for CIGIE appropriations.47 The CIGIE
would also provide for an Integrity Committee (which already exists under executive
order) to handle allegations of wrongdoing by IGs and top officials in their offices.
Integrity Committee. As mentioned above, H.R. 928 and S. 1723 propose
adding § 11(d) to the IG Act, which would establish the Integrity Committee of the
CIGIE. Such committee “shall receive, review, and refer for investigation allegations
of wrongdoing that are made against Inspectors General and certain staff members
of the various Offices of Inspector General.”48 This section does not appear to
specify how allegations of wrongdoing that are made against an IG would be referred
to the Integrity Committee. This may raise also the question of who could refer an
allegation of an IG’s wrongdoing to the committee: Would another IG be able to
allege wrongdoing by an IG? However, § 11(d)(5)(A) states that the Integrity
Committee shall “review all allegations of wrongdoing it receives against an
Inspector General” (emphasis added), so clarification as to who may make such
allegations may not be necessary.49 The use of the term “all” in § 11(d)(5)(A) seems
46 See S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(c)(1)(F)).
47 H.R. 928, § 4(c)(2); S. 1723, § 4(c)(2).
48 See H.R. 928, § 4(a); S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(d)(1)).
49 See William J. Esposito, Chairman of the Integrity Committee of the PCIE, Policy and
(continued...)

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to indicate that the Integrity Committee would be required to review every allegation
of wrongdoing, including allegations by Members of Congress or by the general
public.
After the proposed Integrity Committee reviews allegations of wrongdoing, it
must refer to the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee any allegation of
wrongdoing that the Integrity Committee determined is “meritorious that cannot be
referred to an agency of the executive branch with appropriate jurisdiction over the
matter.”50 Next, the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee must thoroughly and
timely investigate each referred allegation. The Chairperson must report to the
Executive Chairperson of the CIGIE “the results of any investigation that
substantiates any [referred] allegation.”51 It is unclear from the bills whether such
information would also be transmitted to the President or the agency head. Nor does
the relevant section guarantee that Congress or the public would receive access to the
Integrity Committee’s findings and conclusions. A finding by the Integrity
Committee, after a complete investigation that substantiates any allegation, could be
presumptively deemed a finding of cause under the statute that the President or
agency head could use in deciding whether to remove an IG. Such a finding would
not be binding on the President or the agency head, but could serve as a prima facie
basis for removal if the President or agency head agreed with the finding.
IG budgets and appropriations. The IG legislation, H.R. 928, as reported
by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and S. 1723 would
require reporting the IG’s initial estimates directly to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the agency head, and appropriate congressional committees. This
would ensure that all three units were aware of the initial estimate and, thus, enable
each to calculate any decreases or adjustments made afterwards by agency officials
or OMB. In addition to finding any such alterations, the change in budget reporting
could also contribute to congressional oversight of the IG offices and their projected
spending as well as OMB and agency leadership.
Program evaluation information in IG semi-annual reports.
Inspectors general now issue semi-annual reports on their activities and operations,
with specific information and data about their investigations and audits. H.R. 928
and S. 1723 would add information about their program evaluations and inspections,
which, in the IG community, refer to short-term evaluations of specific, narrow
projects, whose findings and conclusions might be used to promote better
management practices, among other things. Such inspections apparently reflect a
growing field of endeavor for the IGs; periodically updated information about these
arguably would benefit the users of the semi-annual reports in Congress, other
executive agencies, and the public.
49 (...continued)
Procedures for Exercising Authority of the Integrity Committee of the President’s Council
on Integrity and Efficiency
, at 5-6 (April 24, 1997).
50 See H.R. 928, § 4(a); S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(d)(5)(B)).
51 See H.R. 928, § 4(a); S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(d)(7)(C)).

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Law enforcement authority. Qualified law enforcement authority (e.g., to
carry firearms and execute warrants) has been granted to IGs in federal
establishments, that is, the cabinet departments and larger federal agencies. H.R. 928
and S. 1723 would extend this coverage, under the same controls, to IGs in
designated federal entities, the usually smaller boards, commissions, foundations, and
government corporations. A rationale for expanding the scope of this authority to the
OIGs of the designated federal entities is that this would increase the capabilities of
their criminal investigators, who currently may need to rely on piecemeal statutory
authorizations or on special deputation by the U.S. Marshals Service, which is
limited in time and location. The additional authority, however, would mean that IGs
would need to be vigilant in approving and monitoring the conduct of OIG staff in
this regard, ensuring that they receive necessary training, meet relevant qualifications,
and use the powers appropriately.
Differences Between H.R. 928 and S. 1723
While H.R. 928 and S. 1723 are identical in most respects, S. 1723 adds several
provisions, other than those discussed in the relevant section above. First, S. 1723
would require both establishment and designated federal entity IGs “to appoint a
Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General.”52
Second, S. 1723 would expand the mission of the CIGIE from the one stated in H.R.
928. Both bills call on the CIGIE to “increase the professionalism and effectiveness
of personnel by developing policies, standards, and approaches to aid in the
establishment of a well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the offices of the
Inspectors General.”53 S. 1723 would expand the Council’s mission to “address
integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government
agencies.”54 Third, the Senate version of the bill would prohibit establishment and
DFE IGs from receiving cash awards or bonuses, such as incentive awards for
superior accomplishments or cost savings disclosures.55 Fourth, S. 1723 would move
mostly establishment IGs, but also some DFE IGs from a Level IV to a Level III
position on the Executive Schedule, which amounts to a pay raise.56 Fifth, the
Senate-proposed Improving Government Accountability Act, would require that DFE
IGs, like their establishment IG counterparts, be appointed “without regard to
political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations.”57 Finally, S. 1723 would increase the visibility of
IG webpages on agency websites, as well as require IG offices to post reports and
audits online and create a place for individuals to report fraud, waste, and abuse.58
52 S. 1723, § 2(c).
53 See H.R. 928, § 4(a); S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(a)).
54 S. 1723, § 4(a) (would establish IG Act § 11(a)(2)(A)).
55 S. 1723, § 5.
56 S. 1723, § 6.
57 S. 1723, § 7.
58 S. 1723, § 12.

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Concluding Observations
These two bills — H.R. 928 and S. 1723 — are designed to provide broad-
based, across-the-board initiatives to enhance the independence and accountability
of the inspectors general operating under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended. This would occur through changes in the removal of IGs, notification of
the OIG budget requests to Congress, fixing a term of office for the IGs, and
establishing a Council on Integrity and Efficiency as well as an Integrity Committee,
replacing counterparts created by executive order. In the 110th Congress, the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has approved a version of
H.R. 928, while the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs has held hearings on proposals along these same lines.

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Appendix. Select Statutes Limiting President’s
Authority to Remove Officials Appointed with
Advice and Consent of Senate
A. Positions Where Statutes Stipulate that the President
May Remove an Official Only for the Cause or Causes Cited

Only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office:
! Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Commissioners, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7171(b)
! Federal Labor Relations Authority, Members, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b)
! Merit Systems Protection Board, Members, 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d)
! Merit Systems Protection Board, Chairman of Special Panel, 5
U.S.C. § 7702(d)(6)(A)
! Office of Special Counsel, Special Counsel, 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b)
Only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or ineligibility:
! National Mediation Board, Members, 45 U.S.C. § 154, First
Only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office:
! Consumer Product Safety Commission, Commissioners, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2053(a)
! National Labor Relations Board, Members, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
! Social Security Administration, Commissioner, 42 U.S.C. §
902(a)(3)
Only for general cause:
! Postal Rate Commission, Commissioners, 39 U.S.C. § 3601(a)
B. Positions Where Statutes Omit the Term
“Only” Before the Cause or Causes Cited for Removal

Inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office:
! Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,
Commissioners, 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(1)
! Federal Trade Commission, Commissioners, 15 U.S.C. § 41
! National Transportation Safety Board, Members, 49 U.S.C. §
1111(c)
! Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commissioners, 42 U.S.C. §
5841(e)
! Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
Commissioners, 29 U.S.C. § 661(b)
! Surface Transportation Board, Members, 49 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3)

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For cause:
! Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, 12 U.S.C. § 242
C. Positions Where President Need Only Communicate
Reasons for Removal to the Senate or to Both Houses
of Congress

! Archivist of the United States, 44 U.S.C. § 2103
! Chief Benefits Officer, Department of Veterans Affairs, 38 U.S.C.
§ 306(c)
! Chief Medical Officer, Department of Veterans Affairs, 38 U.S.C.
§ 305(c)
! Comptroller of the Currency, 12 U.S.C. § 2
! Director of the Mint, 31 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)