Order Code RL33793
Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy
Updated September 12, 2007
Christopher M. Blanchard, Coordinator
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, Jeremy Sharp
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy
Summary
Iraq’s neighbors have influenced events in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam
Hussein regime in 2003, and developments in Iraq have had political, economic, and
security implications for Iraq’s neighbors and the broader Middle East. Ongoing
insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq and discussion of options for modifying
U.S. policy toward Iraq are fueling intense consideration of Iraq’s future and the
current and potential policies of Iraq’s neighbors. Policymakers and observers are
considering a number of different “Iraq scenarios,” ranging from the resolution of
outstanding Iraqi political disputes and the successful consolidation of Iraq’s
government and security forces, to greater escalation of sectarian violence into
nationwide civil war and the potential for greater intervention by Iraq’s neighbors.
Understanding regional perspectives on Iraq and the potential nature and
likelihood of regional responses to various scenarios will be essential for Members
of the 110th Congress as they consider proposed changes to U.S. policy, including
the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), the troop surge initiative, and
annual appropriations and authorization legislation. The National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq released in August 2007 assessed that “Iraq’s neighbors will
continue to focus on improving their leverage in Iraq in anticipation of a Coalition
drawdown.” The NIE identified Iranian assistance to armed groups and the
“reluctance” of Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors to support the Iraqi government as
particularly problematic.
Proposals for more robust U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iraq’s neighbors,
including Iran and Syria, may be of particular interest to Members during the first
session of the 110th Congress: the Iraq Study Group report asserted that Iraqis will not
be able to achieve security and national reconciliation goals necessary to prevent a
wider conflict without regional and international support. Press reports suggest that
the Administration plans to strengthen security cooperation with some of Iraq’s
neighbors and that new arms sales and security assistance authorization and
appropriations requests may be submitted to Congress to support these plans during
2007.
This report provides information about the current perspectives and policies of
Iraq’s neighbors; analyzes potential regional responses to continued insurgency,
wider sectarian or ethnic violence, and long-term stabilization; discusses shared
concerns and U.S. long-term regional interests; and reviews U.S. policy options for
responding to various contingencies. For more information on Iraq and regional
perspectives, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security; CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq; and CRS Report
RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq. This report will be updated to reflect major
developments.

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Contents
Common Questions, Unique Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Regional Strategic Balance and Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Sectarian and Ethnic Politics and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Transnational and Nationalist Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Economic Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraq’s Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Continued Insurgency and Disorder? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Sectarian or Ethnic Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A Stable Iraq? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iraq’s Neighbors: Perspectives and Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Other Regional Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
U.S. Regional Interests and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Maintaining Political Stability and Energy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Eliminating Transnational Terrorist Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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Managing the Rise of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Promoting Political and Economic Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Regional Diplomatic Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Containment Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Responding to Hostile Regional Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
List of Figures
Figure 1. Iraq and its Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Table 1. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

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Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy
Regional perspectives on the conflict in Iraq and the nature of potential
responses by Iraq’s neighbors will be relevant to Members of the 110th Congress as
they consider the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, new Administration
policy proposals, and annual appropriations and authorization legislation. Principal
current concerns include alleged Iranian political, financial, and military support for
various Iraqi Shiite political parties and militia groups; Turkish apprehension about
the future of northern Iraq’s Kurdish and Turkomen populations and a potential bid
for Kurdish independence; and Sunni Arab states’ anxiety about the fate of Iraq’s
minority Sunni Arab population and the growth of Iran’s regional influence. Longer
term concerns focus on the challenges likely to arise during the reintegration of a
deeply changed Iraq into the region’s strategic military balance and global economic
and energy markets.
Iraq and other regional security problems, such as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the enduring threat of transnational terrorism, Iran’s nuclear program, and
the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon, are becoming increasingly intertwined. Some
observers believe that, in order for the United States and its allies to reach a
sustainable reconciliation and find a lasting solution in Iraq, related regional crises
also must be addressed. Others contend that lasting resolutions to these problems can
only be secured according to their own time-lines and that efforts to link them to the
stabilization of Iraq are unlikely to produce desirable results. The Iraq Study Group
and others have argued that if Iraqis are unable to resolve their differences and rein
in armed groups, then Iraq could continue to descend into violence, and Iraq’s
neighbors might intervene to defend their perceived national interests. Should Iraq
stabilize, Iraq’s neighbors are expected to deepen their economic and political re-
engagement with Iraqis while seeking to minimize the potential for the post-Saddam
Iraq to threaten their security or regional standing.
Common Questions, Unique Concerns
The United States, Iraq’s neighbors, and Iraqi political groups have distinct
views and interests with regard to a common set of policy questions about Iraq’s
future. As observers of and participants in Iraqi affairs, Iraq’s neighbors are seeking
to understand and influence changes in the following five areas:
! the regional strategic balance;
! prospects for sectarian and ethnic violence (in Iraq and elsewhere);
! the strength of Iraq-based transnational terrorist groups;
! the status of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons; and
! the emergence of viable long term economic opportunities.

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CRS-2
The manner in which the United States and regional parties prioritize and pursue
their interests in these areas will determine whether greater cooperation or
confrontation define Iraq’s future and its long-term relations with its neighbors.
The Regional Strategic Balance and Political Stability. The removal
of the Saddam Hussein regime upset the tenuous political and economic balance that
had existed in the Persian Gulf region since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. In political
and military terms, the regime’s fall and the subsequent dismantling of Iraq’s armed
forces removed a potential military threat to the Arab Gulf states but also eliminated
the region’s principal strategic counterweight to Iran. Subsequent elections have
installed a Shiite-dominated government, some of whose members are friendly to
Iranian interests. In economic terms, the termination of the U.N. sanctions on Iraq
created new trade and investment opportunities that have contributed to regional
economic growth but remain limited by ongoing violence. Other trends that have
defined the postwar environment in Iraq are reflected elsewhere in the region and are
creating significant concern among regional powers: the mobilization of populations
along ethnic or sectarian lines and the emboldening of politically affiliated, armed
non-state actors have upended established patterns of rule and created challenges to
central government authority.1
From the U.S. perspective, regime change in Iraq brought an end to the need for
a policy of containment toward Iraq and the attendant U.S. military posture that had
supported it since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Stabilization and training efforts
in Iraq, regional counterterrorism activities, and the potential for confrontation with
Iran have replaced containment of Saddam’s Iraq as the principal strategic drivers of
the U.S. military presence in the region. Subsequent developments in Iraq and the
region will affect future consideration of U.S. basing, access, and pre-positioning
needs and, by extension, bilateral relations between the United States and a number
of regional governments.2 Containment of violence in Iraq and potential Iranian
threats to neighboring countries or international shipping in the Persian Gulf may
emerge as strategic concerns that could require significant changes to U.S. policy and
military presence in the region.

Sectarian and Ethnic Politics and Violence. The hardening of sectarian
and ethnic identities in Iraq has created significant anxiety among Iraq’s neighbors,
many of whom also have religiously and ethnically diverse populations. Sunni Arab
governments and religious figures have characterized the empowerment of Iraq’s
Shiite Arabs and close relationships between the Iranian government and some Iraqi
and non-Iraqi Shiite political parties and armed groups as evidence of an emerging
and potentially hostile “Shiite crescent.” Sunni Arabs in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Egypt also have accused Iraqi Shiite militia groups and Shiite-dominated Iraqi
security forces of targeting Sunni Arab civilians. Similarly, Shiites outside of Iraq
have expressed alarm about the targeting of Iraqi Shiite civilians by Sunni Arab-led
insurgent and terrorist groups and the potential for Sunni Arab-led governments to
1 For a discussion of these trends, see Graham Fuller, “The Hizballah-Iran Connection:
Model for Sunni Resistance,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006-2007.
2 See Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S.
Middle Eastern Basing Policy, U.S. Army War College, December 15, 2006.

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CRS-3
intervene in Iraqi affairs to the detriment of Iraqi Shiites. Turkish concerns about
Kurdish separatism and the fate of Iraq’s ethnically-Turkish Turkoman minority
group are well documented and drive Turkish policy regarding Iraq.
The post-Saddam strengthening of Iraqi Shiite political parties and the Shiite
hawza, or religious establishment in An Najaf also have regional implications. Both
phenomena contribute to concern in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain that indigenous Shiite
Arabs may become more politically active or hostile, based on the example of Iraq’s
empowered Shiite population or in response to future pronouncements from Iraq-
based clerics. Sectarian tension continues to characterize Bahrain’s domestic
politics, and Saudi Arabia’s minority Shiite population has come under renewed
scrutiny from some Sunni Saudis in spite of a recent trend toward rapprochement.
Iran, the traditional target of Sunni Arab concerns about Shiite interference, also may
harbor concerns that clerics in An Najaf could challenge or undermine the religious
authority of the hawza in the Iranian city of Qom.
Transnational and Nationalist Terrorism. The United States and Iraq’s
neighbors have expressed concern about the establishment and growth of various
transnational terrorist organizations in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime. Ongoing conflict and the unreliable state of Iraq’s security forces create the
potential for a chaotic Iraq to serve as an ungoverned space that terrorist
organizations can exploit. Under the late Jordanian terrorist leader Abu Musab al
Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq grew to embody these fears by creating a sophisticated
Iraqi and regional terrorist network that claimed responsibility for deadly attacks in
neighboring Jordan. Ethnic nationalist terrorist organizations such as the Mojahedin-
e Khalq (MEK/MKO), the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan, and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) pose similar transnational threats to Turkey and
Iran. From a U.S. perspective, these groups may contribute to regional instability if
their activities provoke hostile responses by Iraq’s neighbors.3
Broader international concerns focus on the foreign fighters who continue to
travel to Iraq. Although the overall numbers of volunteers reportedly remain limited
and their survival rates are reported to be quite low, the foreign fighter phenomenon
has led many observers to suspect that non-Iraqi fighters who survive their
experiences in Iraq may attempt to follow the example of the so-called “Afghan
Arab” veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan by returning to their countries
of origin or traveling to other conflict zones and helping to ignite and sustain
insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. Recent research has determined that
experienced “Afghan Arab” fighters and their recent trainees formed the core cadre
of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and contributed to the group’s lethality and
resilience in the face of Saudi counter-terrorism efforts.4 Coordination between the
3 The MEK is designated by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
The U.S. military and U.S. intelligence services disarmed and screened 3,000 MEK
members present in Iraq, who remain at a facility northeast of Baghdad known as Camp
Ashraf. They have been granted “protected persons” status under the Geneva Conventions.
4 See Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,”
Middle East Policy, Volume XIII, Winter 2006, Number 4.

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CRS-4
United States, regional governments, and the wider international community may be
required to effectively stem any eventual reverse flow of volunteers from Iraq.
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. The conflict in Iraq has
produced a serious humanitarian situation for millions of Iraqis who have become
internally displaced or have fled Iraq to other regional countries. Non-Iraqi refugees
within Iraq also have suffered. Iraq’s neighbors are faced with the dual pressures of
responding to the steady flows of displaced Iraqis reaching their borders as well as
to the needs of Iraqis and non-Iraqis displaced within Iraq. At the popular level,
strong religious charitable imperatives and the bonds of ethnicity and sectarian
concern have produced calls for greater involvement, while, in some countries, the
massive influx of Iraqi refugees has created economic and political disruptions. The
United Nations continues to call on the countries of the region and the international
community to coordinate a more effective relief response. In the event of wider or
more lasting conflict, those needs could increase substantially.
Table 1. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
Refugees and IDPs in Iraq
Refugees in Iraq
43,840
(Palestinian, Syrian, Iranian, Turkish, Sudanese, etc.)
Returnees in Iraq (2003-2006)
300,000
Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq
1,908,400
(# of new IDPs Oct’06)
(425,000)
Stateless (“Bidoons,” etc.)a
130,000
Total
2,382,240
Iraqi Refugees in the Region
Jordan
750,000
Syria
1,200,000
Lebanon
40,000
Iran
54,000
Gulf States
200,000
Turkey
10,000
Egypt
100,000
Total
2,354,000
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Update on the Iraq Situation,
Nov. 2006; Supplementary Appeal - Iraq Situation Response, Jan. 2007, and Statistics on Displaced
Iraqis around the World, April 2007.
a. The term “bidoon” refers to Bedouin Arabs and others who do not hold or have not been granted
citizenship in any of the region’s countries.

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CRS-5
Economic Opportunities. Iraq’s vast energy resources, its large consumer
market, and its position as a geographic crossroads make it an attractive economic
partner for its neighbors and the international community. However, since 2003, the
lingering effects of over a decade of international sanctions and continuing postwar
violence have created conditions that limit the ability of Iraq’s neighbors to expand
trade with and investment in Iraq to its full potential. Bilateral and intra-regional
trade levels have increased from the Saddam era, especially with regard to regional
demand for Iraq’s energy resources. However, ongoing violence has limited the
extent to which entities and individuals in the region have been willing and able to
invest and conduct business in Iraq. Over the medium to long term, the rehabilitation
of Iraq’s oil production infrastructure and the expansion of exploration and
production are expected to increase the availability of oil and refined petroleum
products in the region, but may also create production quota competition within
OPEC and affect prices and consumption patterns in global energy markets.
Iraq’s Future
The diversity of political actors in Iraq and the confluence of regional and
international policy problems with Iraqi affairs complicate efforts to predict the
course of events in Iraq. As U.S. policy and circumstances in Iraq and the region
have changed since 2003, the perspectives and policies of Iraq’s neighbors have
evolved. Looking forward, Iraq’s neighbors can be expected to react differently to
different scenarios and U.S. policy choices. The following discussion uses a scenario-
based framework to illustrate challenges that may confront the United States and
Iraq’s neighbors during the term of the 110th Congress and beyond.5
Continued Insurgency and Disorder? From mid-2003 through early
2006, the foremost concerns of U.S. policymakers and the new Iraqi government
were the Sunni-led insurgency against coalition and Iraqi forces, the presence of
foreign terrorist operatives in Iraq, and the growth of organized criminal activity such
as kidnaping, extortion, and drug trafficking. These problems remain serious and
will need to be addressed by U.S., Iraqi, and regional policy makers over the short
term. Iran and Turkey have engaged directly with Iraq’s Kurdish and Shiite Arab
populations, respectively, in order to secure their interests and guard against some of
the potentially negative implications of these problems. However, Iran’s intervention
on behalf of Iraq’s Shiites may be contributing to the persistence of Sunni-led
resistance activities and Iraq’s Kurds remain wary of Turkish intentions.
Relations between Iraq and its Sunni Arab neighbors remain characterized by
limited diplomatic engagement, limited investment and trade, and a Sunni Arab
general reluctance to embrace the new Iraqi government. In much of the Arab world,
governments and citizens remain divided on the question of whether the U.S. military
presence in Iraq is an ultimately stabilizing or aggravating factor. Most Arab
governments fear a general failure of the new Iraqi government and the prospect of
5 See Alan Schwartz, Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace
(USIP), Special Report No. 174, October 2006; and, Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe,
“Widening War? If Iraq Worsens, Allies See ‘Nightmare’ Case,” Wall Street Journal,
January 9, 2007.

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CRS-6
chaos that could leave Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population vulnerable or create
opportunities for terrorist elements to prosper. Many Arab citizens oppose the
continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq, and some view the current Iraqi
government as an illegitimate outgrowth of U.S. occupation. Reconciling these
differences of opinion is likely to remain difficult and could complicate efforts to
secure the cooperation of Iraq’s Arab neighbors with new stabilization initiatives.
Sectarian or Ethnic Civil War? In addition to responding to the security
threats that have persisted since 2003, U.S. forces also are now engaged in efforts to
prevent reduce sectarian and ethnic violence, which has jeopardized security goals
and prevented the emergence of a stable Iraqi government. The bombing of an
important Shiite mosque in the Iraqi city of Al Samarra in February 2006 sparked a
cycle of retaliatory sectarian attacks between Sunnis and Shiites that continued in
earnest through early 2007, leading many observers to characterize the violence
between rival communities and militias as the beginnings of a civil war.6 The further
escalation of sectarian violence would likely increase domestic pressure on the
governments of Iraq’s neighbors to intervene on behalf of members of specific sects
or ethnic groups. Wider conflict and outside intervention in turn could exacerbate
humanitarian crises inside Iraq and speed the flow of Iraqi refugees to neighboring
countries. Members of Congress may be asked to consider U.S. responses to
intervention by Iraq’s neighbors in any wider sectarian or ethnic conflict.
A Stable Iraq? To many observers, ongoing violence makes the prospect of
stability and political reconciliation in Iraq appear unlikely in the near future. In
considering longer term possibilities for Iraq’s stability and unity, the United States
and Iraq’s neighbors are seeking to determine and influence “which Iraq” will emerge
from the current chaotic situation. Faced with the prospect of destabilizing violence
in Iraq or terrorist threats from Iraq-based entities, such as Al Qaeda and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Iraq’s neighbors may welcome the long term
consolidation of strong central government control in Iraq as opposed to federal
arrangements that leave local security responsibilities in the hands of weaker or less
responsive regional governments. On the other hand, some analysts have argued that
the “demonstration effect” of a united, democratic Iraq in which Islamist political
parties, Shiites, and ethnic minority groups are represented in government and are
allowed to participate freely would create political pressure on neighboring countries,
where similar parties and groups do not enjoy comparable opportunities.7
A stable Iraq, its neighbors, and the United States also will need to reconcile
several outstanding differences in order to define the new Iraqi government’s role in
the region’s economic and strategic environment. Long term questions about key
issues remain unresolved and could prove to be divisive, such as:
6 The Al Askari Mosque in Al Samarra was bombed on February 22, 2006.
7 See Joseph McMillan, “Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry,”
USIP, Special Report No. 157, January 2006.

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CRS-7
! Iraq’s participation in OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council;8
! Iraq’s future ability to project military force beyond its borders;
! the presence in Iraq of U.S. or other military bases or personnel; and
! the new Iraq’s sovereign economic, political, and military relations
with regional powers such as Iran and Syria and with global powers
such as China and Russia.
Iraq’s Neighbors: Perspectives and Policies
Official policy statements and independent sources of analysis are available that
help to illustrate regional governments’ perspectives and policies on Iraq.
Nevertheless, there remain inherent limits on the ability of outside observers to fully
understand and describe the priorities, perspectives, and policies of foreign
governments, particularly on an issue of such fluidity and importance. The influence
of broader regional and international issues such as the Arab-Israeli peace process
and Iran’s nuclear program further complicate analysis. With these limits in mind,
the profiles below seek to define the key interests of Iraq’s neighbors, review their
diplomatic engagement and trade with post-Saddam Iraq, and discuss their
perspectives on Iraq’s future in light of the issues and scenarios outlined above.
8 The GCC members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.

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CRS-8
Figure 1. Iraq and its Neighbors
Iran9
Perspectives and Interests.
Iran’s interests in Iraq reflect its longstanding
regional ambitions as well as its desire to affect its ongoing dispute with the United
States over nuclear technology development and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran
views Iraq’s majority Shiite Arab population as a potential strategic asset in light of
these interests, and thus, Iran’s overall goals in Iraq have differed little from the main
emphasis of U.S. policy — establishing a democratic process that reflects majority
preferences and thereby empowers potential Shiite allies. Iran sees continued
control by Iraq’s diverse Shiite parties as providing Iran with “strategic depth” and
ensuring that Iraq remains pliable and attentive to Iran’s interests. However, Iran’s
reputed aid to some Iraqi Shiite parties and their militias has contributed to escalating
sectarian violence that is undermining U.S. stabilization efforts and threatening U.S.
efforts to strengthen the central government.
9 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs. See also CRS Report
RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-9
Policy Priorities. In the first three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein,
Iran’s leaders and diplomats worked to persuade all Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq
to work together through the U.S.-orchestrated political process, because the number
of Shiites in Iraq (roughly 60% of the population) virtually ensures Shiite
predominance of government. Iran’s strategy bore fruit with victory by a Shiite
Islamist bloc (the “United Iraqi Alliance” or UIA) in the two National Assembly
elections in 2005. The UIA bloc, which won 128 of the 275 Assembly seats in the
December 15, 2005 election, includes Iran’s primary Shiite Islamist proteges in Iraq
— the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Dawa (Islamic Call) party.
Also in the UIA bloc is the faction of Moqtada al Sadr, whose ties to Iran are less
well developed, largely because Sadr and his family remained in Iraq during
Saddam’s reign rather than fleeing to Iran or elsewhere. Like his predecessor as
Prime Minister, Ibrahim al Jafari, the current Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is from
the Dawa Party. Al Maliki spent most of his exile in Syria. Most ISCI leaders spent
their years of exile in Iran, and the organization is considered to be the most pro-
Iranian of Iraq’s Shiite political groups.
Over the past eighteen months, U.S. and allied officials have emphasized the
adverse aspects of Iranian policy — its purported financial and materiel support to
the Shiite militias discussed above. On several occasions, senior U.S. commanders
in Iraq have provided specific information, including displaying captured weaponry,
that Iran’s “Qods Force” - the force within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard that conducts
operations outside Iran’s borders – has supplied to Shiite militias in Iraq explosives
(including highly lethal “explosively forced projectiles,” or EFP’s) and other
weaponry. On August 7, 2007, the operational commander of U.S. forces in Iraq,
Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, said that EFP’s accounted for one-third of the 79 U.S. troop
deaths in July 2007, and that the Shiite militias accounted for 73% of the attacks that
killed or wounded U.S. soldiers that month. He added that Iran had supplied the
Shiite militias with 122 millimeter mortars.10
In supporting these reported activities, Iran might be seeking to develop a
broader range of options in Iraq that include sponsoring sectarian violence to pressure
U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq or to deter the United States from action against
Iran to curb its purported nuclear ambitions. On the other hand, Iran might not
necessarily want to support attacks on U.S. forces because a U.S. departure from Iraq,
if that were the result, might leave the pro-Iranian government vulnerable to the
well-organized and well-trained Sunni insurgents, many of whom were officers in the
former Iraqi military. Shiite militia attacks on Sunni Arab civilians also could
produce unrest that would undermine the Iraqi government. Those who take this
view tend to believe that Iran is aiding Shiite militias not to instigate attacks on the
United States but instead as a means of increasing its influence over the Iraqi Shiite
factions that field these forces.
In an effort to try to limit opportunities for Iran to act against U.S. interests in
Iraq, the United States has begun a dialogue with Iranian officials on the issue of
Iraqi stability and Iran’s aid to Shiite militias. The issue of U.S.-Iran talks on the Iraq
10 Gordon, Michael. “U.S. Says Iran-Supplied Bomb Is Killing More Troops in Iraq.” New
York Times, August 8, 2007.

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CRS-10
issue was brought to the fore by the Iraq Study Group report, issued in December
2006, that recommended that the United States open multilateral talks with both Iran
and Syria to enlist their assistance in stabilizing Iraq. Other experts believed Iran
would neither be willing nor necessarily able to assist U.S. policy in Iraq,11 and, in
an interview with journalists on December 14, 2006, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice appeared to reject the Study Group recommendation by saying that
the United States would not likely bargain with Iran to obtain its assistance in
stabilizing Iraq.12
However, perhaps in part to demonstrate that it is implementing the Iraq Study
Group report as part of broader new efforts in 2007 to bring stability to Iraq (the
“New Way Forward,” encompassing a “surge” of U.S. forces in Baghdad and Anbar
Province), the Administration subsequently began talks with Iran. The United States
supported and attended an Iraq-sponsored regional conference in Baghdad on March
10, 2007. Iran and Syria attended, as did the United States, with most participants
terming the discussions “constructive.” Both Secretary of State Rice and Iranian
Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki attended the follow up meeting in Egypt during
May 3-4, 2007, but held no substantive bilateral discussions, according to both sides.
The two countries subsequently held a high profile meeting in Baghdad on May 28,
2007, hosted by Maliki and confined to the Iraq issue. U.S. officials said both sides
presented similar visions of governance in Iraq, but U.S. officials said the dialogue
would be evaluated by whether the United States saw evidence that Iran was ending
some of the arming and training activity discussed earlier. Another round of talks
was held on July 24; it reportedly included mutual accusations but resulted in an
agreement to establish a working group to discuss ways to stabilize Iraq. This
working group met for the first time on August 6, 2007. The talks have been headed
on the U.S. side by Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and on the Iranians side by its
Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, who was appointed in May 2006.
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. At the same time, some aspects of
Iran’s civilian cooperation with Iraq do not appear to conflict with U.S. interests. A
December 2006 publication of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization shows that Iraq
is now the second largest market for Iran’s non-oil exports, accounting for about $1
billion in Iranian exports during January - September 2006.13 Iran has offered Iraq a
$1 billion credit line as well, some of which is to be used to build a new airport near
An Najaf. The two are also developing a “free trade zone” at the southern Iraqi city
of Basra. During exchanges in July 2005, the two countries signed military
cooperation agreements, as well as agreements to open diplomatic facilities in Basra
and Karbala (two major cities in Iraq’s mostly Shiite south) and agreements on new
transportation and energy links, including oil swaps and possibly future oil pipeline
connections. U.S. officials, according to observers, have sought to ensure that any
military cooperation between the Iraqi government and Iran remains limited to joint
11 Kenneth Pollack, “Don’t Count on Iran to Pick Up the Pieces,” New York Times,
December 8, 2006.
12 Glenn Kessler,”Rice Rejects Overture to Iran and Syria,” Washington Post, December 15,
2006.
13 “Trade Performance of Islamic Republic of Iran (From 2005 - 2006). Trade Promotion
Organization of Iran, Trade Planning Division. December 2006.

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CRS-11
border security, intelligence sharing on cross-border threats, smuggling prevention,
and similar issues, and does not expand to Iranian training or arming of Iraqi
government forces.
Potential Responses. Although Iran appears to be benefitting from Iraq’s
current political structure, events in Iraq might possibly rebound to Iran’s
disadvantage. Should Iraq’s Sunni neighbors intervene on behalf of Iraq’s Sunni
Arabs, Iranian leaders might decide to intervene militarily in Iraq to help preserve
Shiite domination, particularly if Iran’s Iraqi allies begin to suffer substantial losses
that threaten a governmental collapse. Were a secular, strong Arab nationalist leader,
whether Sunni or Shiite, to emerge from Iraq’s turmoil, Iran might face a far less
pliable Baghdad than it does now. Such a government might serve as an inspiration
to Iran’s Arab population (about 3% of the population), which is concentrated in
Khuzestan Province (across the border from Basra). Iran has faced some anti-
government bombings and other unrest there in 2006, although not necessarily related
to events in Iraq. A nationalist government in Iraq might also emphasize bilateral
disputes that existing during Saddam’s rule, such as the border demarcation along the
Shatt al Arab waterway, and forcefully demand return of the approximately 150 Iraqi
combat aircraft still in Iran that were flown there after the start of the 1991 Gulf war.
An alternate government might even reverse the current government’s threats to
expel from Iraq the approximately 4,000 operatives of the Mojahedin-e Khalq
(MEK/MKO) under U.S.-led coalition guard at Camp Ashraf, or support the Iranian
Kurdish opposition Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan.
Even if Iraq is stabilized under leadership similar to that now in power in Iraq,
various alternative scenarios might not necessarily be beneficial to Iran. Some
analysts believe that Iran’s clerical leadership fears a successful non-cleric-led
democracy in Iraq because that outcome would increase pressure for political
liberalization in Iran — and maybe for an end to clerical rule there. Others feel that
a stable Iraq would help the traditional center of Shiite theology, An Najaf, reassert
itself to the detriment of Iran’s holy city of Qom, which benefitted during Saddam’s
secular rule in Iraq. On the other hand, Iran’s position might be enhanced if its main
ally, ISCI, succeeds in establishing a large Shiite region in southern Iraq. Such a
region would presumably cooperate extensively with Iran on oil, electricity, and road
linkages, and facilitate and protect the flow of Iranian pilgrims to the Shiite holy sites
at An Najaf and Karbala.
Turkey14
Perspectives and Interests. Turkey’s bilateral relationship with Iraq since
the 1991 Gulf war has been defined by Turkish fears about Kurdish separatism and
ambiguity toward the regime of Saddam Hussein and the new Iraqi government.
After the 1991 Gulf war, Turkey allowed U.S. and British planes flying from Incirlik
Air Base to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq (Operation Provide
Comfort/Operation Northern Watch) to protect Iraq’s Kurds from Saddam Hussein
and to monitor Iraq’s armed forces. Turkish leaders expressed serious concerns
about U.S. regime change plans before the 2003 invasion and, on March 1, 2003, the
14 Prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, August 28, 2007.

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CRS-12
Turkish parliament refused to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces to Turkey for
the purpose of opening a northern front against Iraq.
It is difficult to exaggerate Turkey’s anxiety about Iraq and its future. Turkish
officials say that they want to see a stable, democratic, and unified Iraq emerge from
the current chaotic environment. Foremost, they want Iraq to maintain its territorial
integrity and view preventing the creation of ethnic/sectarian states in Iraq as key to
regional stability. Concerned that chaos will follow an anticipated U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq, the Turks have been encouraging all Iraqi parties to resolve problems
through reconciliation and negotiations.
In addition, Turks care about the Iraqi Turkomen (or Turkmen), their ethnic kin,
and about building economic ties with Iraq.
Policy Priorities. The high priority that Turkey puts on Iraq’s territorial
integrity stems from its desire to thwart the emergence of an independent Iraqi
Kurdish state that could serve as a model for separatist Turkish Kurds and a staging
site for anti-Turkish terror. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey fought a war costing more
than 30,000 lives against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), mainly in southeast
Turkey. The U.S. State Department lists the Kongra-Gel(KGK)/PKK as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO). Of an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 PKK members, about
3,000 to 3,500 have taken refuge in the Qandil (or Kandil) Mountains of northern
Iraq.15 Turkish authorities blame the PKK for an upsurge of terrorism in Turkey
since 2004. In 2006, the PKK took about 600 lives and, in the Turkish election year
of 2007, funerals of soldiers often were transformed into political rallies calling for
an anti-PKK offensive . Turkey has sought to have PKK leaders in northern Iraq
arrested, camps that shelter the PKK there closed, and PKK offices in the country
shut down permanently.16 The Turkish government maintains that if Iraq is not able
to stop terrorists from using its territory against Turkey, then it is Turkey’s right,
under international law, to protect itself. While Ankara mainly addresses Baghdad,
it also holds Washington responsible and demands that it act. Most Turks view the
United States as the authority in Iraq and have been dissatisfied with U.S.
explanations that other Iraqi regions and issues are a higher priority for U.S. forces
or suggestions that means of tackling the PKK other than force, such as cutting off
its financial sources, might be as effective in achieving Turkey’s goals.

15 These figures are from U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006,
released April 30, 2007, accessible at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/]. On June 27,
2007, Turkish Land Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug reported that there are 2,800
and 3,000 PKK terrorists in northern Iraq out of a total group strength of 5,150 to 5,650.
“Live Press Briefing on War Against Terrorism,” CNN Turk, June 27, 2007, Open Source
Center Document GMP 20070627734009. In November 2003, the PKK began to call itself
the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel/KGK). The U.S. State Department uses
both names, but the group still is commonly referred to as the PKK.
16 Turkish officials contend that the PKK usually has opened new offices or offices under
different front names after closures. Interview with an official of the Turkish Embassy in
Washington, D.C. December 8, 2006.

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CRS-13
In the summer of 2006, Turkey built up its military forces on the border to
signal its impatience with the continuing PKK presence in northern Iraq. Although
observers suggested that an incursion was imminent, one did not occur. The Bush
Administration responded to Turkey’s message by appointing retired General Joseph
Ralston, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), as Special Envoy for Countering
the PKK. His mission is to coordinate with the governments of Turkey and Iraq in
order to eliminate the terrorist threat of the PKK and other terrorist groups operating
across the border. The Turkish government viewed Ralston’s appointment
positively as an indication of high level U.S. government interest and named retired
General Edip Baser, former 2nd Army Commander, to be Ralston’s counterpart. In
the past year, however, Ralston has not achieved concrete results and even suggested
that his key mission is reconciling Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, not combating the
PKK.17 In May 2007, Baser was replaced by Deputy Undersecretary of the Foreign
Ministry Rafet Akgunay.18
Another Turkish military buildup was reported in spring 2007, coinciding with
a regular seasonal escalation in activities. Thus far, Turkish military action has been
limited to increased operations within southeast Turkey and to “hot pursuit” raids and
artillery shelling of alleged PKK camp sites into northern Iraq.
As of September 2007, the military option has receded from public discourse
and the Turkish government appears determined to pursue a diplomatic not a
military course. This could change should a major incident occur. At the invitation
of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al
Maliki, a Shiite, visited Ankara on August 7, and Vice President Tariq al Hashimi,
a Sunni, visited on August 23 for consultations with then Foreign Minister (now
President) Abdullah Gul. Maliki and Erdogan signed a memorandum of
understanding on countering terrorism, including the PKK, but Maliki said that his
parliament has to approve an agreement and action. Maliki will be unable to
implement an agreement without the cooperation of the leaders of the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, and Iraqi Kurds are noticeably absent
from Turkey’s diplomatic offensive. Turks distrust Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a
Kurd, and, especially, KRG President Massoud Barzani. Barzani, whose language
regarding Turkey sometimes is inflammatory, admits that he supports the PKK.19
Claiming diplomatic protocol as the reason for his lack of contact with the KRG,
Erdogan rebuffs Barzani as a “tribal leader.”
17 “US Strategy to Contain PKK in Turkish Election Year,” Turkish Daily News, April 5,
2007.
18 The government said that Baser was dismissed because his public statements “negatively
affect counterterrorism efforts,” but noted his controversial comments on domestic politics
in a May 12 interview with the German newspaper Die Welt. “Dismissal of Baser Reveals
Power Struggles in Ankara,” Turkish Daily News, May 23, 2007.
19 In a March 2007 Al Arabiya TV interview broadcast on April 6, Barzani threatened to
interfere in predominantly Kurdish populated southeast Turkey if Turkey intervened in
northern Iraq. Such comments may have been in response to Turkish saber rattling.

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CRS-14

A related concern for Turkey are the Iraqi Turkomen, ethnic kin of the Turks
who reside alongside the Kurds in northern Iraq.20 Ankara sympathizes with
Turkomen complaints of being displaced and outnumbered by Iraqi Kurds returning
to the north, after having been moved out of the region by Saddam. Although the
Turkomen issue appeared less acute after the Iraqi national elections in which
Turkomen turnout was far less than the Turks had expected, it remains a focus of
attention because both Ankara and the Turkomen are concerned about Kirkuk, a
multiethnic city claimed by the Iraqi Kurds situated in the heart of an oil-producing
region.21 Ankara had advocated postponing a referendum scheduled for December
2007 on the fate of Kirkuk, fearing that it could prove that the city is predominantly
Kurdish at the expense of Turkomen residents and that the oil resources on which the
city sits could be used to finance an independent Iraqi Kurdish state. Turkish
officials argue that Kirkuk and Iraq’s natural resources must be equitably shared by
all the Iraqi people. Tensions revolving around the Kirkuk issue have abated
somewhat as Iraqi officials have postponed the referendum until at least May 2008
“for technical reasons.”
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. Turks have taken advantage of
economic opportunities offered in post-Saddam Iraq and economic ties may even
eventually moderate calls for a Turkish military incursion in the north. Bilateral trade
increased to $3 billion in 2006 and could reach $3.5 billion this year, according to
Minister of State (for Trade) Kursad Tuzman, who favors a free trade agreement with
Iraq.22 Traffic at the single border gate at Habur is notoriously backed up, with trucks
waiting days or weeks to cross. The Iraqi Kurds collect tariffs on this border trade.
The Iraqi Kurds admit that Turkey is their most important trading partner, and some
15,000 Turks, many Kurds, work in northern Iraq.23 Turks also are involved in a
wide range of infrastructure construction projects. In addition, the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik oil pipeline, although often sabotaged, is a source of income for both
countries and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation expects to bid on oil tenders after
the Iraq National Oil Law is passed. Finally, the two countries plan to cooperate on
the transfer of Iraqi natural gas to Europe. Playing this economic role is not without
cost. About 150 Turkish lives have been lost, including truck drivers, engineers,
construction workers, and contractors.
20 Before the Iraq war, the Turkish government and Turkomen leaders claimed that there
were 3 million Turkomen in Iraq out of a total population of about 25 million. Sources
suggest, however, that this number is highly inflated and estimate that Turkomen number
about 330,000 and that they have assimilated with other Iraqi groups for years. See Colbert
C. Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Boulder, Colorado, Westview
Press, 2000; according to the author, there are about 1.5 million Turkomen in the Middle
East, residing in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.
21 The electoral slate of the Iraqi Turkomen Front won 3 seats in the January 2005 Iraqi
parliamentary election, but only 1 out of 275 total seats in the December 2005 election in
which Sunnis also ran.
22 “Turkey Vows $3.5 bln Trade Volume with Iraq, Despite Tension,” Turkish Daily News,
April 11, 2007.
23 Director General of the Ministry of Trade in Irbil Aziz Ibrahim Abdo quoted in Nicholas
Birch, “Kurds Rely on Turkey for Workers, Goods,” [http://www.washingtontimes.com],
July 2, 2007.

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CRS-15
As a sign of Iraq’s importance, Turkey has an ambassador in Baghdad, an
ambassadorial level Special Representative to Iraq, an ambassador based in Ankara
responsible for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, a consulate in Mosul, and
plans to open a consulate in Basra. The Turkish government kept its embassy in
Baghdad open despite a suicide bombing against it in 2003 and attacks on its
diplomats.

Potential Responses. A unilateral declaration of an independent Iraqi
Kurdistan might trigger Turkish military intervention as might another sharp spike
in terror within Turkey. For now, however, Turkish authorities accept the Iraqi
Kurds’ claim that independence is not their goal and say that they will respect
decisions made by all of the Iraqi people. Ankara has made overtures to other Iraqi
ethnic groups, encouraging Sunni Arab participation in elections and establishing
good relations with Shiite prime ministers in an effort to further Iraqi unity and
bilateral relations. Turkey also has improved ties with Iran and Syria and consults
them regularly about Iraq. Kurdish and other media reports have alleged that Turkish
military forces have operated with Iranians against the PKK and a related Iranian
Kurdish group, Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), in northern Iraq. Turkey
was pleased with the Iraq Study Group’s emphasis on reaching out to Iraq’s
neighbors and believes that its constructive approach will resonate more in a regional
format. Turkish officials insist that multilateral contact groups include all of Iraq’s
neighbors, meaning Syria and Iran. Recent meetings of neighbors have included
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Arab League.
Much Turkish saber rattling coincided with the campaign for the July 2007
national elections as the secular military establishment and the nationalist political
opposition sought to portray what they view as an Islamist ruling party as weak in its
prosecution of the fight against PKK terrorists. The Chief of the General Staff
declared that an operation in northern Iraq would be useful and implied that the
government was preventing action. Government officials responded by escalating
their own rhetoric, criticizing Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the United States, in order not
to lose points to the opposition as well as to pressure Baghdad, Washington, and the
Iraqi Kurds to take action so that they would not have to do so. The government and
the military both understand that an incursion would be difficult and would have
detrimental repercussions in the region and on Turkey’s relations with the United
States and the European Union. Of concern to Washington is the cacophony and
unanimity of complaints against the United States that has fueled Turkish anti-
Americanism and that is unlikely to abate unless the PKK is brought down.24
24 The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, released on June 27, 2007, indicates that 83%
of Turks have unfavorable views of the United States, while only 9% hold favorable views.
See [http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256]. U.S. visitors to Turkey
report that they would be hard-pressed to find the 9%.

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CRS-16
Saudi Arabia25
Perspectives and Interests. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iraq has been
tense historically, although periods of Saudi-Iraqi cooperation have occurred when
supported by convergent interests, most notably during the Iran-Iraq war of the
1980s. Saudi Arabia publicly opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but
provided logistical support to U.S. forces,26 and Saudi officials have called on U.S.
forces not to leave Iraq on an “uninvited” basis.27 Saudi Arabia’s principle interests
with regard to the conflict in Iraq are — first, to prevent instability and conflict in
Iraq from threatening Saudi Arabia’s internal security and stability; second, to
prevent the repression of Iraq’s Sunnis by newly dominant Shiites; and, third, to limit
the regional influence of a potentially hostile Iran.28 Saudi Arabia’s longer term
interests include ensuring that the revival of Iraq’s oil industry does not threaten
Saudi preeminence and preferences in global energy markets and that Iraq does not
re-emerge as a strategic military threat to the Arab Gulf states.
Policy Priorities. The Saudi Arabian government has refrained from overt
political or military intervention in Iraq since 2003, in spite of the threat that
instability in Iraq has posed to Saudi Arabia’s national security. To date, Saudi
policy initiatives have sought to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqis displaced by
ongoing violence; to promote political and religious reconciliation among Iraqis by
hosting and participating in various regional conferences; and, to take preventive
security measures to limit the spread of violence into Saudi Arabia. Some analysts
believe that Saudi Arabia has not fulfilled pledges of aid to Iraq because it does not
want to support an Iraqi government that many Saudis believe has a Shiite sectarian
agenda.
The willingness of influential Saudi clerics, wealthy Saudi individuals, and
young Saudi citizens to offer rhetorical,29 financial,30 or personal support to various
25 Prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
26 See CRS Report RL33533 for a full discussion of Saudi support for U.S. combat efforts.
See also “U.S. And Saudis Agree On Cooperation,” Washington Post, February 26, 2003;
and John Solomon, “Saudis had wider role in war,” Associated Press, April 26, 2004.
27 In October 2006, and repeatedly thereafter, then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States
Prince Turki al Faisal argued that, “The kingdom’s position has always been that since the
United States came into Iraq uninvited, they shouldn’t leave uninvited.” Arshad Mohammed,
“Saudi envoy warns US against abrupt Iraq withdrawal,” Reuters, October 30, 2006.
28 For the Saudi cabinet’s statement of its key principles for Iraq, see Saudi Press Agency
(Riyadh), “King Abdullah Chairs Cabinet’s Session,” November 20, 2006.
29 “Saudi Clerics Appeal Iraqi Islamic Insurgency Factions to Unite Against ‘Enemy,’”Open
Source Center (OSC) Document - GMP20070411860009, April 11, 2007; “Saudi Cleric Al
Jibrin Statement Denounces Shiites’ Acts Against Sunnis in Iraq,” OSC Document -
GMP20070122836001, January 20, 2007; “Saudi Arabian Clerics Issue Statement Backing
Iraq’s Sunni Muslims,” OSC Document - GMP20061211837002, December 10, 2006.
30 Saudi officials generally deny that Saudi citizens provide financial support for Iraqi
combatants, and little specific information is publicly available to corroborate claims to the
(continued...)

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CRS-17
combatants in Iraq remains a persistent challenge. In particular, the phenomenon of
Saudis traveling to Iraq to fight alongside other foreign fighters has created a long
term security risk: Saudi veterans of similar conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya, and other regions constituted the hard core of the Al Qaeda-affiliated
group responsible for the series of successful and attempted terrorist attacks that
occurred in the kingdom from late 2002 through early 2006. Official Saudi clerics,
including Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al Aziz bin Abdallah Al Shaykh, have released
fatwas stating that travel to Iraq for the purpose of participating in violent activity is
illegitimate and not religiously sanctioned.31
Estimates of the number of Saudis who have traveled to Iraq to fight remain
imprecise and difficult to verify. In November 2006, a U.S. military spokesman
stated that of the approximately 1,100 foreign fighters killed or captured in Iraq over
the past year, 12% were Saudi nationals.32 One July 2007 press report cited unnamed
U.S. military and intelligence officials as claiming that 30 to 40 Saudis were traveling
to Iraq to fight each month and that the majority of foreign suicide bombers in Iraq
were Saudis.33 To help prevent the return of Saudi volunteers or the flow of other
combatants and materiel from Iraq into Saudi Arabia, Saudi officials have
strengthened their border control efforts and reportedly are planning to implement a
significant border security infrastructure improvement program.34 In August 2007
Prince Saudi al Faisal dismissed reports that Saudis were traveling to Iraq as
combatants in disproportionate numbers and argued that volume of “the traffic of
30 (...continued)
contrary. Nevertheless, a number of press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials allege that
such support exists and the Iraq Study Group report (p. 25) stated that, “funding for the
Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.”
31 “Iraqi Newspaper Reports on Saudi Fatwas Forbidding Travel to Fight in Iraq,” OSC
Document - GMP20070610621002, June 3, 2007.
32 In a February 13, 2006, interview, Prince Turki al Faisal said that as of mid-2005
approximately 10% of captured foreign fighters held in Iraq were Saudis. See Mark Huband
and William Wallis, “Saudi Arabia Fears Attacks from Insurgents Battle-hardened in Iraq,”
Financial Times (London), December 20, 2004; “U.S. Faults Saudi Efforts on Terrorism,”
Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2006; and, Remarks by Major General William Caldwell,
Spokesman, Multinational Force-Iraq, Defense Department News Briefing, November 20,
2006.
33 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis, Citing Role in Iraq,” New
York Times, July 27, 2007.
34 According to press reports, Saudi Arabia is considering plans to construct a high-tech
system of fences and detection systems along its entire 900 kilometer border with Iraq, but
some Saudi officials have stated that the structures will be targeted to certain key areas
rather than stretching along the entire border. The Saudi government claims to have spent
$1.8 billion on strengthening the border with Iraq since 2004. See P.K. Abdul Ghafour,
“Work on Iraq Border Fence Starts in 2007,” Arab News, November 15, 2006 ; and, Raid
Qusti, “Kingdom Denies Plans to Build Fence on Border With Iraq,” Arab News, November
20, 2006.

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CRS-18
terrorists” from Iraq to Saudi Arabia was greater than the volume flowing in the other
direction.35
Saudi official and public views of Iraq also reflect concern about the
empowerment of Iraq’s Shiite Arab population and the growth of Iranian influence
in the Persian Gulf region and broader Middle East. During a well publicized speech
in New York in September 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal
commented that “we are handing the whole country [Iraq] over to Iran without
reason,” and warned of increased Sunni-Shiite violence.36 The historically tense
relationship between Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Arab majority and Shiite Arab minority
further compounds the situation: some Saudi Shiites have welcomed the
empowerment of Iraq’s Shiite Arabs and recognize Iraq-based Shiite clerics as their
religious leaders. In turn, some conservative Sunni Saudis regard the Shiite minority
as religiously aberrant and potentially politically disloyal.37
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. Sectarian and strategic anxieties
complicate Saudi efforts to engage the Shiite-led Iraqi government, to establish
strong trade links, and to discourage and prevent Saudi clerics and individuals from
supporting Sunni Arab combatants in Iraq. Saudi leaders maintain regular contact
with prominent Iraqi government officials, clerics, and political figures, although
Saudi Arabia has not named an ambassador to Iraq. A Saudi Foreign Ministry
delegation visited Iraq in August 2007 to explore the possibility of reopening an
embassy in Baghdad. The Saudi government has pledged $500 million from the
Saudi Development Fund to sponsor Iraqi government-requested development
projects, along with $500 million to finance potential bilateral trade and close to $90
million in humanitarian relief assistance.38 However, since 2003, trade between Iraq
and Saudi Arabia has remained very limited. According to the Saudi Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, the total value of Iraqi-Saudi trade in 2005 was equal to
$5.32 million.39
Debt forgiveness remains a key outstanding issue in Iraqi-Saudi relations. As
of January 2004, Iraq reportedly owed the Saudi government $9 billion for debt
incurred under the Saddam Hussein regime (mostly during the Iran-Iraq war of the
1980s). Private Saudi firms and banks hold about $19 billion in additional Iraqi
35 Transcript of Press Availability with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al
Faysal, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, August 1, 2007.
36 Reuters, “Saudi Says U.S. Policy Handing Iraq over to Iran,” September 20, 2005.
37 See International Crisis Group, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, Middle East Report
No. 45, September 19, 2005; and, John Solomon, “Saudi Arabia’s Shiites and their Effect
on the Kingdom’s Stability,” Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 15, July 27, 2006.
38 Statement of Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal to United Nations meeting on Iraq,
September 18, 2006. Available at [http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp
?InNewsItemID=55259].
39 Sources: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - Ministry of Commerce and Industry and International
Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, June 2006.

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CRS-19
debt.40 Questions have been raised about whether Iraq’s debt to Saudi Arabia should
be subject to interest payments, and both parties have agreed to discuss the matter
further. U.S. officials have encouraged Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to forgive Iraq’s
outstanding debt to support Iraqi reconstruction and economic recovery efforts, and
the Iraq Study Group report speculated that Saudi Arabia could agree to cancel the
outstanding debt as part of a regional effort to support and stabilize Iraq.41
Potential Responses. The Saudi Arabian government’s restraint from overt
involvement in the Iraq conflict stands in contrast to reported patterns of private
Saudi support for anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi government activity. In the face of
continued Sunni Arab-led insurgency in Iraq, the Saudi regime is likely to continue
to refrain from providing direct support for insurgent forces in order to avoid
confrontation with the United States and out of fear that the collapse of Iraq’s
government could strengthen Iraq-based transnational terrorist elements hostile to the
Al Saud family. However, the escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq since February
2006 and more assertive Iranian foreign policies appear to be undermining domestic
support for a policy of restraint among Saudis. Since late 2006, a number of
influential figures and religious scholars in Saudi Arabia have called for their
government and fellow citizens to provide direct political and security assistance to
Iraq’s Sunni Arab community and to confront what they perceive as Iranian-led Shiite
ascendance in the region.42
In November 2006, one well known Saudi security analyst fueled debate about
Saudi Arabia’s potential intentions toward Iraq by arguing in a Washington Post
editorial that :
To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the
principles upon which the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] was founded. It would
undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Sunni world and would be a
capitulation to Iran’s militarist actions in the region. To be sure, Saudi
engagement in Iraq carries great risks — it could spark a regional war. So be it:
The consequences of inaction are far worse.
Saudi officials repeatedly denied that the editorial represented Saudi policy and
Prince Saud al Faisal sought to reinforce this message in mid-December, stating, that
“since the start of the crisis in Iraq ... the Kingdom has said it will stand at an equal
distance from all Iraqi groups and does not describe itself as the guardian of any
group or sect.”43 Nevertheless, Saudi officials have refrained from fully embracing
40 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376 - Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss; and Tom Everett-
Heath, “Opposing Views of the Kingdom to Come,” Middle East Economic Digest, January
23-29, 2004, p. 1.
41 Mariam Karouny and Alister Bull, “Iraq Finance Minister Says Still no Deal on Gulf
Debt,” Reuters, August 1, 2006; and Iraq Study Group Report, p. 35.
42 Nawaf Obaid, “Stepping Into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves,”
Washington Post, November 29, 2006.
43 Arab News (Jeddah), “Kingdom Won’t Take Sides in Iraq, Says Saud,” December 20,
(continued...)

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CRS-20
the current Iraqi government and reportedly remain frustrated with what they
perceive to be Prime Minister Al Maliki’s anti-Sunni sectarian policy approach and
his administration’s unduly close relationship with Iran.

Similar views have been evident in Saudi religious circles since 2003, where a
number of Saudi clerics have encouraged support for insurgents and Iraq’s Sunni
Arab minority. In December 2006, leading cleric Salman al Awdah called “honest
resistance [in Iraq] ... one of the legitimate types of jihad,” and an October 2006
petition signed by 38 prominent religious figures called on Sunnis everywhere to
oppose a joint “crusader [U.S.], Safavid [Iranian] and Rafidi [Shiite] scheme” to
target Iraq’s Sunni Arab population.44 Anti-Shiite sectarian rhetoric has been a
consistent feature of statements on Iraq from other Saudi clerics, including Abdallah
bin Jibrin, Abd al Rahman al Barrak, Nasser al Omar, and Safar al Hawali.45
Confrontation with these religious figures over their remarks and activities poses
political challenges for the Saudi government, since some of them, such as Al
Awdah and Al Hawali, have supported government efforts to de-legitimize terrorism
inside the kingdom and have sponsored or participated in efforts to religiously re-
educate former Saudi combatants.
Reconciliation and long term stability in Iraq could ease Saudi fears of creeping
instability, but could also create new challenges. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concern
in a post-conflict environment would be the reintegration or elimination of returning
Saudi militants. The outcome of reconciliation or conflict in Iraq and the leadership
and character of Iraq’s government will determine whether Saudi fears about the
empowerment of Shiite Arabs and the growth of Iranian influence persist or diminish.
Future Iraqi choices in key areas such as energy and military policy will have
important implications for Iraqi-Saudi relations over the long term.46
43 (...continued)
2006; and Robin Wright, “Royal Intrigue, Unpaid Bills Preceded Saudi Ambassador’s Exit,”
Washington Post, December 23, 2006.
44 Al Awdah’s comments were made at the “Conference for Supporting the Iraqi People”
in Ankara, Turkey. OSC Document - GMP20061211837002, December 10, 2006.
45 Both clerics signed the October 2006 statement. Al Awdah did not: he has been
outspoken in his criticism of Iranian intervention in Iraq, but has spoken out against Sunni-
Shiite conflict on his website: [http://www.islamtoday.net/]. See “Saudi Shaykh Al-Awdah
Warns of Sectarian War in Iraq, Holds US Responsible,” OSC Document -
GMP20061107866002, November 5, 2006.
46 With regard to oil policy, there is a possibility, in the words of one analyst, that over the
long term, “the Saudi interest in moderate prices and preserving market share will run afoul
of the Iraqi need for maximum production at high prices to fund national reconstruction.”
See Joseph McMillan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry,
USIP, Special Report No. 157, January 2006, p. 14.

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CRS-21
Syria47
Perspectives and Interests. The Syrian regime desires a weak and divided
Iraqi state on its eastern border, though it fears a total Iraqi central government
collapse and full-blown Iraqi civil war due to the potential for ethnic and sectarian
violence to spill over into Syria. Syria itself is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional
society with a sizeable Kurdish minority. President Asad’s regime is controlled by
a minority Alawite sect in a country with a reported 70% Sunni Muslim majority. In
order to reinforce his regime’s rule, Syrian President Bashar al Asad has repeatedly
pointed to the violence and instability in Iraq as a warning to those dissidents and
opposition figures in Syria seeking political reform. Some experts believe that Asad’s
strategy has succeeded, as the central government has arrested dozens of activists and
opposition figures in recent years. Syrian authorities often claim that many ordinary
Syrians prefer the status quo to Iraq’s experiment with U.S.-initiated democratic
reform. While this may be true to a limited extent, ultimately, Syria views the
situation in Iraq through the prism of its own domestic politics, as its rulers value
regime survival above all else.
Syria opposed the U.S. decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom which
overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein and, since then, has sought to make life
difficult for U.S. forces in Iraq. Though Syria claims that it cannot totally control its
porous 375-mile border with Iraq, many observers assert that Syria could do more to
prevent the transit of foreign fighters to and from Iraq. The United States has accused
Syria of instigating or allowing the transfer of weaponry through Syria to Iraq and
aiding the anti-U.S. insurgency. Syria also is accused of harboring Baathist ex-regime
officials.
However, like many of Iraq’s neighbors, Syria may be apprehensive over the
possible total withdrawal of U.S. troops form Iraq. Thus, Syria has sought to
maintain relationships with many different Iraqi factions and has engaged Prime
Minister Maliki’s government on a variety of issues, including energy cooperation,
water, and border security. In November 2006, Syria reestablished diplomatic
relations with Iraq for the first time since the early 1980s.48 In August 2007, Iraqi
Prime Minister Maliki paid his first visit to Syria to discuss security issues, the
reactivation of commercial agreements that pre-date the US invasion of Iraq in 2003,
and the possible reopening of an oil pipeline between the two countries.

Policy Priorities. The Syrian regime sees Iraq as an important neighboring
state with which it shares many affinities but which it regards as a potential threat and
a rival for leadership in the Arab world. Syria’s Alawite leadership does not
necessarily have a favorite among Iraq’s Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, but is anxious
47 Prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
48 For many years, Syria and Iraq had an uneven and often troubled relationship, stemming
from political disputes, border tensions, demographic differences, and personal animosity
between the two countries’ late leaders: Syrian President Hafiz al Asad and Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the two countries were governed by rival wings of the pan-
Arab Baath Party. In the late 1990s bilateral relations improved markedly, primarily in the
economic sphere.

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CRS-22
that Iraq’s leadership be amenable to Syrian regional goals. Also, given Syria’s long-
standing reliance on Iran for regional political support, Syrian leaders are likely to
accept and support a degree of Iranian influence over the already Shiite dominated
Iraqi government, especially given parallel Syrian and Iranian goals in Lebanon. By
the same token, Syria is inclined to support the goals of the radical Lebanese Shiite
fundamentalist organization Hezbollah not only in Lebanon but in Iraq as well.
Perhaps as an indication of its growing proximity to Iran, Syrian officials openly
criticized Saudi Arabia, a regional rival to Iran, when Syrian Vice-President Farouq
al Shara remarked in August 2007 that Saudi Arabia’s decision not to attend a recent
regional conference on Iraqi security hosted by Syria, was “regrettable.” In response,
Saudi Arabia claimed that Shara'a’s statements “contained numerous lies” and were
aimed at “stoking disorder in the region.” Some analysts have interpreted this rare
public inter-Arab dispute as Syrian “grandstanding,” in which the government
distances itself from Iraq’s other Arab neighbors. Syria’s policy toward Iraq differs
from that of its other Sunni Arab neighbors, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. While
all three countries maintain close ties to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, Syria’s
strategic relationship with Iran forces it to balance regional Sunni-Shiite tensions.
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. Economic relations between Syria
and Iraq are built on a variety of largely unofficial contacts, including illicit trade,
smuggling, and influx of refugees. A partial rapprochement between the two
countries began in the late 1990s with the resumption of oil shipments on the order
of 200,000 barrels per day from Iraq to Syria; these shipments were halted by allied
coalition forces after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, but
commercial ties continued in other sectors, particularly through traditional barter and
low level trade between tribal groups straddling the Syrian-Iraqi border. In 2005,
Iraq’s imports from Syria were worth $2.987 billion and Iraq’s exports to Syria were
worth $500 million.49
In a related vein, the large-scale disruption of the Iraqi economy and mounting
security threats following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein have created a new
dimension to Syrian-Iraqi economic relations in the form of a mass movement of
Iraqi refugees seeking to escape privation and insecurity, particularly to Syria and
Jordan. Syrian officials reportedly estimate that between 1.3 and 2 million Iraqi
refugees have settled at least temporarily in the Damascus suburbs, changing the
character of entire neighborhoods and creating strains on the Syrian domestic
economy in the form of rising rents, housing demands, and impending water and
electricity shortages. The sex trade in Syria has grown, as many Iraqi women work
as prostitutes in Syria. The Iraqi refugee population in Syria has more female-headed
households in which mothers lack personal savings and cannot work legally. So far,
Syrian authorities have kept an open door policy regarding new arrivals, but are
demanding additional assistance from the international community.
Potential Responses. The development of future Syrian policy toward Iraq
depends on a number of complex variables, including the stability and orientation of
the Syrian regime itself and the course of events in Iraq. Syrian goals in Iraq are in
49 International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2006.

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CRS-23
some ways obscure, and there are significant differences among outside observers
over what the present Syrian regime is seeking and what type of outcome a future
Syrian regime might want to see. Some commentators believe that neither Syria nor
Iran want to see Iraq fragment along the lines of Lebanon during its 15-year civil war,
with Sunnis and Shiites locked in continued and apparently open-ended fighting.
Others counter that Syria seems inclined to continue fomenting strife in Iraq in an
effort to tie down U.S. resources, while gaining a free hand to recoup ground it lost
in Lebanon over the past two years.50 However, Syria’s ability to affect the balance
of power in the region is constrained by its limited military capabilities, which are
adequate to maintain internal security but suffer from poor training and obsolescent
equipment. There is also a possibility that significant differences over Iraq exist
within the Syrian policy-making community and that the young and relatively
inexperienced Syrian president, Dr. Bashar al Asad, is vacillating among various
policy options, giving the impression of a contradictory approach to Syria’s Iraq
policy. A drastic change in the regime governing Syria could have significant effects
on Syria’s view of Iraq and the policies it might adopt toward the Iraqi leadership.

As noted above, there are divergent views among U.S. commentators regarding
whether Syria would best be served by disorder or stability in Iraq. Should Iraq slide
into full-fledged civil war, however, Syria would face intricate decisions. Foremost
among these would be whether to support the Sunni-led insurgency or to support
more extremist elements of the Shiite militia, particularly strongly pro-Iranian groups
and militants such as the hard line Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr. An attempt by
Syria to cultivate both Sunnis and Shiites would be difficult and could jeopardize the
preeminent position of President Bashar al Asad’s Alawite sect within Syria.
Should Iraq stabilize, an Iraqi regime that appeared to be making progress
toward containing the insurgency and establishing a measure of control over much
of Iraq would confront Syria with its most intricate challenge of all. On one hand,
a move toward stability in Iraq could deprive the Syrian regime of an important lever
in dealing with the United States on Lebanon and other issues; however, given
President Asad’s periodic espousal of stability in Iraq it would be difficult for him
to appear to reject this goal. Under any or all of these scenarios, Recommendations
9 and 12 of the Iraq Study Group report might be relevant. The two recommendations
call, variously, for engagement with Syria to enlist its support for constructive
policies in Iraq and the region, to encourage Syria to control its border with Iraq, to
establish hot lines between Syria and Iraq, and to increase bilateral political and
economic cooperation. Critics of the Iraq Study Group recommendations argue that
the concessions necessary to convince Syria to adopt a more cooperative strategy
remain undefined and could prove too costly in light of other U.S. interests.
Jordan51
Perspectives and Interests. Jordan’s relations with Iraq during the Saddam
Hussein era were strong. In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed military action against
50 For further discussion, see Evan Thomas, “So Now What, Mr. President,” Newsweek,
December 11, 2006, pp. 36-37.
51 Prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

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CRS-24
Iraq, but it informally and quietly provided logistical support to the U.S.-led
campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Jordanians have repeatedly criticized
what they perceive to be the political marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arab
population. Unlike Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan has a limited ability to intervene
in Iraq’s affairs at present, and, since 2003, Jordanian leaders have been far more
concerned with Iraq’s influence on the kingdom’s own politics, trade, and internal
security. The Jordanian government’s principal interests with regard to Iraq include
managing Jordanian Islamist opposition movements in light of the empowerment of
Islamist groups in Iraq; preventing the creation of safe-havens for terrorists in
western Iraq that could threaten Jordan’s internal security; and limiting the growth
of Iran’s regional influence as a means of preventing the development of serious
strategic threat to Jordan.
Looking forward, Jordan would prefer the emergence of a stable Iraq under
Sunni Arab control. As this scenario appears unlikely given current circumstances,
Jordan seems committed both to supporting the continued presence of U.S. troops in
Iraq and the fledgling Iraqi government so long as the latter makes an effort to
reintegrate Sunni Arab Iraqis into the military and government and does not become
a vehicle for destabilizing Iranian initiatives. Over the long term, the Jordanian
government has serious concerns regarding Iraq’s future and the potential deleterious
consequences that may arise from wider sectarian warfare within Iraq.
Policy Priorities. Although Jordan always has been dependent on foreign
patrons, King Abdullah has brought Jordanian policy closer to that of the United
States since his ascension to the throne in 1999 than at any previous point in the
kingdom’s history. Since mid-2003, Jordan has made modest contributions to Iraq’s
stability that have been widely interpreted as symbolic attempts to cooperate with
U.S. rebuilding efforts and to minimize the negative consequences for Jordan of
instability in Iraq. The centerpiece of Jordan’s stabilization efforts remains the
Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) located outside of the capital city
of Amman, which has prepared more than 30,000 Iraqi cadets since 2003 with the
support of approximately $100 million in annual U.S. funding. According to allied
coalition officials, Jordan also has donated military and police equipment to support
the new Iraqi security forces.52
While the pursuit of these policies has brought tangible benefits to Jordan, such
as increased U.S. trade and foreign assistance, Jordan’s close ties to the United States
make it an easy target for the king’s opponents, especially Jordanian Islamists who
are largely opposed to U.S. policy in the region. Some Jordanians fear that, like the
2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority elections, the political participation of
Islamist parties in Iraq is accelerating a growing pattern of Islamist political
ascendance in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Although many believe that Arab
regimes deliberately stoke Western fears of a growing Islamist radicalism to justify
the repression of domestic opposition, the potential for Jordanian groups to emulate
52 Jordanian supplied equipment reportedly includes 250 Ukranian-built BTR-94 armored
personnel carriers (APCs), 100 British Spartan APCs, and U.S. M113A1 APCs, along with
2 C-130BHercules transport aircraft and 16 UH-1H utility helicopters.

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Iraqi Islamists cannot be wholly dismissed and is viewed with great consternation by
Jordan’s royal family and its allies.
Potential threats from transnational terrorism and increased Iranian influence
also dominate Jordan’s Iraq policy agenda. Despite the killing of Jordanian terrorist
mastermind Abu Musab al Zarqawi in June 2006 by U.S. and Iraqi forces (reportedly
with assistance from Jordanian intelligence), the threat of Al Qaeda-affiliated or
inspired terrorists using Iraq’s predominately Sunni Al Anbar Province as a
launching pad to destabilize Jordan remains high. On November 9, 2005, near
simultaneous explosions at three Western-owned hotels in Amman killed 58 persons
and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed
responsibility for the attacks. In December 2006, Jordan and Iraq signed an
agreement to coordinate intelligence on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Overall,
Jordanian Islamists have stressed their loyalty to the monarchy in the face of the
terrorist threat, although four Islamist parliamentarians were arrested in the summer
of 2006 for praising Al Zarqawi by calling him a “martyr.”
As violence continues unabated in Iraq, Jordan continues to be both a source of
foreign fighters joining the Sunni insurgency and a target of Al Qaeda-inspired
terrorist groups. The industrial town of Zarqa, several miles northeast of Amman, has
been well documented as a source of Sunni militancy, as dozens of its young men
have traveled to Iraq to die as suicide bombers. According to one Islamist community
leader in Zarqa, “Most of the young people here in Zarqa are very religious.... And
when they see the news and what is going on in the Islamic countries, they
themselves feel that they have to go to fight jihad. Today, you don't need anyone to
tell the young men that they should go to jihad. They themselves want to be
martyrs.”53
In 2004, King Abdullah warned that Iran was seeking to create “a Shiite
crescent” in the Middle East, which alarms not only Jordan, but its oil-rich Sunni-led
Gulf allies upon whom it relies for political and financial support. Iran’s ability to
further inflame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the use of radical proxy
groups, such as the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah organization and the Palestinian
Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups, could have potentially adverse effects on Jordan’s
security, a fact also recognized by Jordan’s Sunni Islamists.54
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. International efforts to rebuild Iraq
have reverberated throughout various sectors of Jordan’s economy. Since 2003,
many observers have dubbed Jordan as the “gateway to Iraq,” as thousands of
contractors, businessmen, and foreign officials have used Jordan as a base for their
53 “In Jihadist Haven, a Goal: To Kill and Die in Iraq,” New York Times, May 4, 2007.
54 In one recent press release, Hamzah Mansur, a leader of Jordan’s main Islamist party, the
Islamic Action Front (IAF), warned Iran to cease provoking sectarianism in Iraq, stating, “If
Iran’s involvement in the bloodshed in Iraq is ascertained, then the Islamic movements will
find themselves forced to reconsider their stand on Iran since its involvement in sectarian
sedition would lead to serious consequences across the Islamic world.” See, “Jordan: IAF
Calls on Iranian President To End Sectarian Sedition in Iraq,” Al Arab Al Yawm, OSC
Document - GMP20061208641001, December 8, 2006.

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Iraq operations.55 Iraqi-Jordanian trade has yet to return to pre-2003 levels, but has
recovered since 2003, reaching an estimated $834 million in total trade in 2005.56
Iraqis have perceived Jordan as an escape from violence, as some foreign officials
estimate that between 700,000 and 1 million57 Iraqis have fled to Jordan over the last
three years. For a small, poor country such as Jordan, this population influx is
creating profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Jordan’s banking and
real estate sectors are soaring with the increased demand for housing and the influx
of capital from middle class expatriate Iraqis. On the other hand, inflation is rapidly
rising,58 and there have been anecdotal reports of increased tension between
Jordanian citizens and Iraqi refugees due to the strains placed on social services by
a near 20% increase in the country’s population in a short period of time.59
Iraqi refugees in Jordan face difficult circumstances. Many cannot obtain
residency permits which would allow them to work legally. Anecdotal reports
suggest many families are living off dwindling personal savings, and the Jordanian
border authorities have begun restricting entry of refugees into Jordan. In August
2007, the Jordanian government, perhaps under international pressure, announced
that Iraqi children without residency could attend Jordanian public schools, a right
not extended to any other foreigners. At this time, it is unclear whether displaced
Iraqis will become a permanent fixture in Jordan or will return to Iraq if, or when,
violence subsides. According to a U.S. State Department-conducted survey of Iraqi
refugees in Jordan, “Nearly all [Iraqi] participants say they would return to Iraq if the
security situation alone improved -- even with continued problems in basic services
or lack of job opportunities.”60 Other Iraqis may be using Jordan as a gateway for
obtaining residency/asylum in the West.
In August 2006, Jordanian diplomat Ahmed al Lozi became the first accredited
Arab ambassador to serve in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Iraq reciprocated by
announcing shortly thereafter its intention to re-establish direct oil shipments to
55 See Scott Lasensky, Jordan and Iraq: Between Cooperation and Crisis, USIP, Special
Report No. 178, November 2006.
56 Total trade is equal to exports plus imports. Iraq imports from Jordan during 2005 totaled
$809 million, whereas Iraq exports totaled $25 million. In 2002, Iraq’s exports to Jordan
were worth $684 million and imports from Jordan were worth $664 million. Source:
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
57 In 2007, the Jordanian government issued a contract to a Norwegian group, Fafo, to
conduct a survey of Iraqi refugees in Jordan in order to obtain more accurate data on their
demographics and total population.
58 One foreign official noted that, “The impression of many Jordanians is that the Iraqis here
are all wealthy ... and that they are the cause of the inflation and the rising cost of prices in
Jordan.” See “Iraqi Refugees Spill into Jordan, Driving Up Prices,” Christian Science
Monitor, November 29, 2006.
59 One report noted that Iraqi Shiite refugees in Jordan feel they are being unfairly targeted
by police out of fear that Iraqi Shiite militias are trying to organize in Jordan. See, “Uneasy
Havens Await Those Who Flee Iraq,”New York Times, December 8, 2006.
60 "Iraqi Refugees in Jordan Await Stability before Returning,” Office of Research, Opinion
Analysis, U.S. Department of State, February 28, 2007.

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CRS-27
oil-deprived Jordan at preferential market prices.61 Some of Iraq’s new Shiite leaders
view with suspicion Jordan’s former close ties to the Saddam Hussein regime and
continuing strong relations with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Frictions between Jordan and
Iraq continue over the future status of Saddam Hussein’s relatives and former Baath
Party officials residing in Jordan as guests of the government.62 Jordan has hosted
and facilitated meetings between U.S. officials and Iraqi leaders aimed at resolving
these and other political disputes, including the highly publicized summit in Amman
between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in December 2006.
Recent reports also suggest that Jordan has facilitated meetings between members of
the Sunni Arab-led insurgency and U.S. representatives at the Iraqi Embassy in
Amman.63
Potential Responses. As a country with a limited ability to project political
or military power in Iraq, it is doubtful that Jordan alone could bring about a
compromise solution to Iraq’s sectarian violence and insurgency. Nevertheless,
should the Administration heed the main recommendations of the Iraq Study Group
report and pursue an all out push for Iraqi national reconciliation, Jordan could be
useful in serving as one of several symbolic bridges to Iraq’s Sunni community. The
ISG report argues that Jordan has the professional capability to train and equip Iraqi
military and security forces, and Iraqi-Jordanian tribal ties may facilitate this process
should more Sunni Iraqis join Iraq’s army.
Under the more grave scenario of a nationwide civil war that draws Iraq’s
neighbors into the ongoing conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the Jordanian
government would provide support to Sunni militias with possible ties to Al Qaeda.
On the other hand, it is plausible that Jordan, along with neighboring Saudi Arabia
and other states, could provide financing and materiel support to other elements of
Iraq’s Sunni Arab population, including tribally-led and -organized groups or, more
controversially, to Iraqis formerly associated with the military, intelligence, or
security services of the Saddam Hussein regime. In the event of continuing or
61 Reportedly, Jordan will receive approximately 10,000-30,000 barrels of oil per day
(roughly 10%-30% of their daily consumption) from Iraq, at a price of $10 per barrel. This
quantity would increase to 50,000 barrels at a later stage, based on the memorandum of
understanding signed between the two countries.
62 King Abdullah granted Saddam’s eldest daughter, Raghdad, and her sister, Rana, asylum
on humanitarian grounds after the start of U.S. military operations in 2003. The Iraqi
government has placed Raghdad on a list of its 41 most wanted persons and demanded that
Raghad be extradited to Iraq to stand trial. Iraqi officials have alleged that members of
Saddam Hussein’s family and inner circle currently in Jordan are providing financial and
media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize the Baath Party in Iraq. In
August 2007, Interpol issued a wanted notice against Raghdad Hussein at the reported
request of the Iraqi government. According to government a Jordanian government
spokesperson, “Handing over Mrs Raghad Saddam Hussein has not been raised.”
63 According to Saad al Hayani, Iraq’s Ambassador to Jordan, “Two large meetings
happened here in the embassy.... They included leaders from the last government, the
Baathists, and the old Army. They were offered the opportunity to participate in the political
situation if their hands were clean. The meetings were successful and necessary and
beneficial.” See “Quiet U.S. Bid to Talk to Iraqi Insurgents,”Christian Science Monitor,
December 7, 2006.

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CRS-28
widened conflict in Iraq, Jordan also could move to seal its border with Iraq or
establish a security zone inside western Iraq in order to insulate itself from any
spillover of violence or destabilizing refugee flows.
Other Regional Governments
The Gulf States64
Prior to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the Sunni Arab-led governments of the
Gulf Cooperation Council had predicted that removing the Saddam Hussein regime
would not necessarily produce stability in Iraq, and several were reluctant to support
U.S. military operations. For the most part, Gulf leaders publicly indicated that they
would only support a U.S. attack if such action were authorized by the United
Nations and had broad international support. Two of the Gulf states, Kuwait and
Qatar, were more openly supportive of U.S. plans.65
The fall of the Saddam Hussein regime initially generated a sense of relief by
removing the principal conventional threat to the Gulf states’ security. However,
instability and violence in Iraq, coupled with Arab perceptions of an emboldened and
potentially hostile Iran, have created new shared fears among Gulf leaders.
Specifically, Gulf leaders fear that escalating sectarian violence in Iraq could draw
in Iraq’s neighbors and bring them into conflict with Iran. The rise of Shiite Islamist
factions in post-Saddam Iraq has compounded these threat perceptions. Several of
the Gulf states have substantial Shiite populations but most Gulf Shiite communities
consider themselves to be under-represented in government and to lack key economic
opportunities. Gulf governments also generally believe that parts of Iraq could
become a safe-haven for terrorists if the Iraqi government were to collapse or the
United States were to withdraw militarily from Iraq.
In response to these and other concerns, the Gulf states and the United States
have renewed security discussions under the framework of so-called “GCC plus two”
(GCC plus Egypt and Jordan) consultations and a new Gulf Security Initiative, which
may generate U.S. arms sale requests in 2007.66 The United States has deployed
additional aircraft carrier strike groups and Patriot air defense systems to the Gulf
region and reportedly has expanded intelligence-sharing with U.S. allies. Press
reports suggest that some Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates may
purchase sophisticated U.S. weapons systems to improve their ability to secure
64 Prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Kenneth
Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
65 Both governments hosted buildups of U.S. forces and equipment that were used in the
offensive against Iraq. Kuwait, which wanted to see its former invader, Saddam Hussein,
overthrown, hosted the bulk of the personnel and equipment used in the ground assault.
66 Inside the Pentagon, “New Persian Gulf Security Effort Expected to Fuel Arms Sales in
FY-07,” November 9, 2006; and, Inside the Navy, “State Department Promotes New Persian
Gulf Security Architecture,” November 27, 2006

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maritime transport routes and to deter potential Iranian military attacks in the event
of conflict.
Egypt67
Iraq is not Egypt’s highest foreign policy priority in the Middle East, but Iraq’s
stability and unity greatly affect Egypt’s position as a regional power. Egypt
identifies itself as part of the “moderate” bloc of Sunni Arab governments which are
partially aligned with U.S. interests in the region (e.g., peace with Israel, regional
stability) and opposed to Iran and its regional ambitions. Iranian foreign policy runs
counter to Egyptian interests in the Middle East in that Iran has provided support to
terrorist groups seeking to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. From an
ideological standpoint, radical Sunni Islamists in Egypt have seized upon the Iranian
revolution as a model in their own attempts to overthrow the secular Mubarak
regime. Thus, for Egypt, Iraq is a battleground of sorts in which Iranian influence
must be checked. In an April 2006 interview with Al Arabiya television, President
Hosni Mubarak accused Shiites in Iraq and elsewhere of being loyal to Iran,
remarking that, “there are Shiites in all these countries of the region, significant
percentages, and Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where
they live.... Naturally Iran has an influence over Shiites who make up 65 percent of
Iraq’s population.”
The Egyptian public’s opposition to the Iraq war precluded the government from
publicly supporting the United States. Nevertheless, Egypt expedited the passage of
U.S. warships through the Suez Canal prior to (and during) Operation Iraqi Freedom
in 2003, allowed U.S. overflights en route to the Persian Gulf, and has provided some
training for Iraq’s security forces in Egypt. Egypt’s envoy to Iraq, who was expected
to become the first ambassador to Iraq named by an Arab government, was kidnaped
and murdered in July 2005. Significant numbers of Egyptians have traveled to Iraq
to fight U.S. and Iraqi forces, raising concern about their eventual return to Egypt.68
Should the situation in Iraq spiral out of control and sectarian violence attract outside
intervention, Egypt could extend some support to anti-Iranian elements in Iraq.
However, in all likelihood, Egypt would remain mainly on the sidelines, but support
the policies of Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia which have a more direct stake
in Iraq’s stability.
Israel69
On November 22, 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert claimed, “Iraq
without Saddam Hussein is so much better for the security and safety of the State of
67 Prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.
68 Of the approximately 1,100 foreign fighters killed or captured by U.S. forces in Iraq over
the prior twelve months year, over 20% were Egyptian nationals. Remarks by Major
General William Caldwell, News Briefing, November 20, 2006.
69 Prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

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Israel,” and praised President Bush for his leadership.70 Olmert later added that the
removal of Saddam was a “major, major contribution to stability in our part of the
world.”71 Yet, Israelis had not viewed Iraq as a significant threat after the first Gulf
war and other Israeli voices have been skeptical about the chances of achieving the
U.S. goal of bringing democracy to the region via the second war.
Many in Israel are very concerned that, as a result of the war in Iraq, an arc of
Iranian-led Shiite enemies of Israel, including Iran, a Shiite-led Iraq, Alawite-led
Syria, and a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon has emerged. Some maintain that a
permanently weak Iraq would interrupt this geographical/ideological/sectarian
formation and, therefore, would be in Israel’s interest. Others see the need for a
stronger Iraq to act as a counterpoise to an Iran elevated by the removal of Saddam
Hussein from Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Decentralization or partition of
Iraq might accomplish the goals of the former analysts. There have been reports that
Israelis are training the Iraqi Kurdish militia (peshmerga) and that Israelis of Kurdish
origin are establishing economic ties in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdish leaders deny
these reports, while Israeli officials insist that they continue to see Iraq as one unit.72
As the debate about the future of U.S. forces in Iraq has intensified, some Israeli
analysts have suggested that no Israeli interest would be served by a continued U.S.
presence in Iraq. They argue that Israel’s main interest is in not having the United
States, Israel’s preeminent ally and benefactor, perceived as a weak or failing power.
In their view, Israel is less safe to the extent that the United States is so perceived.73
The late Israeli pundit Ze’ev Schiff suggested that Israel could look forward to a
radical Arab shift that will strengthen extremists if Arabs interpret America’s
withdrawal as a sign of defeat.74 In a March 12, 2007, speech, Prime Minister
Olmert warned against the consequences of a “premature” U.S. withdrawal, arguing
that a negative outcome would harm Israel, the Gulf States, and the stability of the
Middle East as well as the ability of the United States to address threats emerging
from Iran.75 In the same vein, Israel’s Ambassador to the United States Sallai
70 Speech to biennial national convention of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
of American, in Jerusalem, cited in “Olmert: Israel Safer Post-Saddam and After Lebanon
War,” Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2006.
71 Remarks at annual meeting with Daily Newspaper Editors’ Committee, December 7, 2006,
BBC Monitoring Middle East.
72 See Seymour M. Hersh, “Plan B; Annals of National Security,” New Yorker, Vol. 80,
Issue 17, June 28, 2004. Umit Enginsoy and David Judson, “Israel Denies Helping Iraqi
Kurds, sees One Iraq,” Turkish Daily News, April 20, 2007. Others suggest that Israeli
trainers are former members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and not soldiers on active
duty.
73 Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S. Policy Stirs Israeli Backlash; Prolonged War in Iraq Puts Jewish
State at Greater Risk, Analysts Increasingly Say,” McClatchy printed in The Sacramento
Bee, January 15, 2007.
74 Ze’ev Schiff, “US Withdrawal in Iraq to Strengthen Arab Extremists Around Israel,”
Ha’aretz, April 20, 2007.
75 For text of speech, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/
(continued...)

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Meridor expressed hope that the withdrawal from Iraq would be done “in such a way
that does not strengthen Iran and Al Qaeda or boost organizations such as Hezbollah
and Hamas, so that we don’t face a new eastern front from Iran to Kfar Saba (center
of Israel).”76 Others added that Israel fears that if the U.S. withdrawal is seen as a
victory for Iran, then Syria might consider military options to recover the Golan
Heights.77 Some of these sentiments may have influenced H.Rept. 110-60, March
20, 2007, to accompany H.R. 1591, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
FY2007, which states, “The fight is Iraq is also critical to the future of Israel. A
failure in Iraq will further destabilize the region, posing a direct threat to Israel. We
must not let that occur to our friend and ally.”
Olmert disagreed strongly with the conclusions of the Iraq Study Group Report
that a positive outcome in Iraq is linked to achieving Israeli-Arab peace. He
specifically rejected the Report’s suggestion to engage Syria in order to get its help
regarding Iraq before Damascus ends support for Palestinian terrorist groups and the
Lebanese Hezbollah, although his more recent statements have not included those
preconditions. Perhaps to counter the “Shiite crescent,” the Prime Minister has
reached out to moderate Sunni states with which Israel has no ties. This was evident
in his reference in a November 26, 2006, speech to “positive parts” of the 2002 Saudi
peace initiative and offer to meet Saudi officials. (It was reported that Olmert met
with a Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006.)78 In
addition, some Israelis have expressed concern that Israel might be left alone to face
an Iranian nuclear threat if the Bush Administration follows the Report’s advice to
engage Iran over Iraq and those talks involve acceptance of Iran’s nuclear
ambitions.79
Issues for Congress
The divergent interests and policies of Iraq’s neighbors and the United States’
need to reconcile its policy in Iraq with the pursuit of wider regional interests create
a challenging context for U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress. During the
first session of the 110th Congress, Members will consider policy proposals designed
to modify U.S. policy in Iraq and to ensure comprehensive regional and international
support for Iraq’s stabilization. The following section reviews stated U.S. objectives
in Iraq and the region and outlines how Congress may influence the Administration’s
use of various instruments of national power to pursue them.
75 (...continued)
speechaipac130307.htm].
76 Interview by Tal Schneider, Ma’ariv, April 27, 2007, Open Source Center Document
GMP20070427754006.
77 Hussein Agha, “The Last Thing the Middle East’s Main Players Want is US Troops to
Leave Iraq...,” The Guardian, April 25, 2007.
78 Greg Myre, “Israeli Premier and Saudi Said to Hold Secret Meeting,” New York Times,
September 26, 2006.
79 “Israel Fears US Plans to Involve Syria, Iran in Iraq Diplomacy,” Voice of Israel, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, December 6, 2006.

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U.S. Regional Interests and Concerns
Maintaining Political Stability and Energy Security. The security and
stability of the Persian Gulf region and its energy resources are of critical strategic
and economic importance to the United States and the wider international
community. Insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq have created unique political
challenges and security threats for Iraq’s neighbors, contributing to regional
uncertainty and insecurity. Disputes between Iran and the United States over Iraq,
Iran’s nuclear program, and Iranian support for terrorist groups opposed to peace with
Israel also heighten regional tension. The U.S. military presence in Iraq and
elsewhere in the Middle East remains politically unpopular in the region in spite of
a measure of support from Sunni Arab-led governments and Sunni citizens’ fears of
terrorist threats and possible Iranian ambitions. Insurgent attacks on Iraqi oil
infrastructure continue and similar attacks have been attempted by terrorist
organizations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Greater coordination between the United
States and its regional allies may improve U.S. chances of meeting and overcoming
these challenges. However, local political developments will continue to affect U.S.
efforts to shape the region’s strategic landscape.
Eliminating Transnational Terrorist Threats. The success of U.S. efforts
to contain terrorist elements within Iraq and reduce the flow of foreign fighters to and
from Iraq remains largely dependent on cooperation from Iraqi political parties and
regional governments. The concern over potential Iraqi government cooperation with
terrorist groups that drove U.S. policy toward Iraq in 2002 and early 2003 has given
way to a wider concern that instability in Iraq has created safe-havens for expanded
operations by Al Qaeda and regional terrorist entities such as the PKK. The Iraq
Study Group report concluded that although Al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq remains
relatively small, its organization there could grow in an atmosphere of instability or
if a prompt withdrawal of U.S. forces provided it with a propaganda victory.
Coalition and Iraqi military forces are continuing their efforts to eliminate foreign Al
Qaeda operatives and to separate nationalist Iraqi insurgent elements and tribal
groups from terrorist organizations.
Managing the Rise of Iran. Iran’s role in the strategic balance of the Persian
Gulf region has been a central policy concern for the United States since the Second
World War. The removal of the Saddam Hussein regime and the disbanding of Iraq’s
armed forces removed the region’s principal military counterweight to Iran. The
subsequent political successes of Iraq’s Shiite Arab majority has created new
opportunities for the expansion of Iran’s political influence. However, some built-in
barriers to the spread of Iranian influence in the region persist, such as political
divisions among Iraq’s Shiite Arab population, Arab-Persian ethnic and linguistic
differences, and policy coordination mechanisms such as the GCC and the Arab
League. Israel and the Sunni Arab-led governments of the region largely share U.S.
apprehension about Iran’s regional ambitions, its nuclear program, and the potential
consequences of armed confrontation with Iran. Political sensitivities and the
priorities of individual governments will continue to complicate U.S. consultations
and cooperation with these countries and their citizens with regard to Iran.
Promoting Political and Economic Reform. The Bush Administration
has made the advancement of political and economic reform a centerpiece of its

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Middle East policy agenda. In some countries, governments and interest groups have
carried out parallel reform efforts to increase political participation and broaden
economic development, fueled by shared concerns about the potential for political
dissatisfaction and limited economic prospects among young, growing populations.
Reformers and their opponents have closely monitored the course of the U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq and the establishment of the democratically elected, yet
politically divided Iraqi government. Some observers have suggested that events in
Iraq have encouraged Islamist parties, opposition groups, and minorities to push for
greater representation and reform, while others warn that Iraq’s instability and
political paralysis have tarnished the image of groups promoting political and
economic change. In the event of continuing or widening conflict in Iraq, regional
governments and their citizens may begin to favor steps that promote short term
stability and security at the expense of reforms designed to meet long term
development goals and requirements.
Policy Options
Of the policy options currently under review by the Administration and
Congress, proposals for greater diplomatic engagement, efforts to contain the
negative effects of conflict to Iraq, and potential responses to hostile regional
intervention are the most relevant to congressional consideration of U.S. policy
toward Iraq’s neighbors and other regional governments. For Members of the 110th
Congress, consideration of annual appropriations and authorization legislation, as
well as ongoing oversight activities and outreach efforts by individual members and
committees will provide opportunities to discuss these and other proposals and
recommendations and to influence their implementation.
Regional Diplomatic Engagement.
Many of the Iraq Study Group’s
recommendations proposed increased regional, multi-lateral, and international
diplomacy, and the Administration has taken steps since late 2006 to expand
engagement with Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria and Iran. The unifying theme of
the Group’s regional diplomacy recommendations (Recommendations 1 through 18)
is a “diplomatic offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region.” As
a complement to this “offensive,” the Iraq Study Group recommends the creation of
a “Support Group” made up of Iraq, its immediate neighbors, key regional states such
as Egypt and the Arab Gulf states; the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council; the European Union; and other interested countries. Many
observers have noted that such a group has begun to coalesce in the form of the
United Nations-sponsored International Compact for Iraq. Similar ideas were
included in several resolutions introduced in the 109th Congress, including S.J.Res.
36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although several of these bills also provided
for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal.80 The Iraq Study Group also recommended
direct U.S. engagement with Syria and Iran (Recommendations 9 through 12), and
the resolution of outstanding Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian disputes as part of
a comprehensive regional peace initiative (Recommendations 13 through 17).
80 All four bills were read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

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From early 2003 through early 2007, the United States engaged regularly with
Iraq’s neighbors on Iraq-related issues of common concern, with the exception of
Syria and Iran.81 U.S.-supported diplomatic efforts include the international
conference on Iraq that was held in November 2004, in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt,
which included high level representatives from Iraq, its key neighbors (including Iran
and Syria), the G-8, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, and
the Organization of the Islamic Conference.82 Select multilateral fora, such as the
meetings of the U.N.-sponsored International Compact for Iraq, also provided
opportunities for U.S. officials to hear from and potentially interact with Iraq’s
neighbors, including their Iranian and Syrian counterparts.
Although most U.S. engagement efforts since 2003 have focused on the so-
called “GCC plus two” group, which includes the six members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council plus Jordan and Egypt, engagement with Syria and Iran has
expanded since early 2007. The International Compact for Iraq was adopted in May
2007 at a two-day summit in Sharm al Shaykh, at which U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam. As described
above, the Administration also has opened discussions with Iranian government
representatives regarding Iraq, and a working group chaired by the U.S. and Iranian
ambassadors to Iraq has begun meeting in Baghdad. In August 2007, the United
States participated as observer in a regional meeting on securing Iraq’s borders held
in Damascus. Iraqi leaders and political figures continue to conduct high-level
discussions of their own with neighboring governments, including those of Iran and
Syria.
Iraqis generally have welcomed regional mediation initiatives since 2003, but
some efforts, such as an October 2006 religious dialogue conference in Mecca, Saudi
Arabia,83 have suffered from a lack of direct participation by some key Iraqi religious
scholars and political figures.84 The Arab League’s Special Committee on Iraq has
been attempting to convene a regionally supported national reconciliation conference
for Iraqis since late 2005, when prominent Iraqis met in Cairo and adopted a common
statement recognizing “resistance” as a “legitimate right” distinct from terrorism and
81 Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Syria in May 2003 in an unsuccessful
attempt to secure Syria’s support for U.S. counterterrorism policy and U.S. efforts to
stabilize Iraq. After the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents, Secretary of State Rice recalled U.S.
Ambassador Margaret Scobey to Washington for consultations. She has not been replaced.
82 See Agence France Presse, “List of Participants at Iraq Conference,” November 22, 2004;
“Egypt: Summit’s Final Communique Reaffirms Iraqi Sovereignty, Unity,” OSC Document -
GMP20041124000066, November 24, 2004.
83 See closing statement: [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/iraq-meeting/makka-doc.htm].
84 Key Sunni figures, such as Association of Muslim Scholars secretary general Harith al
Dhari, and prominent Shiites, such as Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) chairman Abd
al Aziz al Hakim and Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al Sistani, did not participate in the Mecca
conference. Al Sistani and Al Dhari subsequently expressed their support for the effort, as
did a number of other important regional clerics.

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calling for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal.85 In early December 2006, Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al Maliki told reporters that his government accepts regional and
international diplomatic intervention, “but not on the premise that it finds solutions
on its own, but in light of what the national unity government wants.”86
The key questions with regard to diplomatic outreach proposals and new
Administration engagement initiatives remain: how much political and material
support will Iraq’s neighbors be willing to provide to sustain the implementation of
reconciliation arrangements; and, which Iraqis will be willing to cooperate with
regionally supported initiatives? Statements agreed to and commitments made by
Iraqis and their neighbors in regional conferences held since 2003 generally have not
been implemented. Critics of a new expanded diplomatic approach argue that Iraq’s
neighbors are unlikely to abandon the pursuit of their individual national interests in
favor of a collective settlement, and that Iraq’s constituent political and ethnic groups
are unlikely to give up their pursuit of parochial interests in favor of national unity.87
In particular, many critics argue that Iran and Syria, strengthened by the difficulties
faced by the U.S. military in Iraq and cognizant of the need to carefully manage their
respective confrontations with the United States over Lebanon and nuclear
technology development, are unlikely to cooperate fully with a comprehensive U.S.-
led diplomatic initiative on Iraq.
Containment Strategies. The ability of the Iraqi people and their leaders
to resolve outstanding political differences and to eliminate security threats from
militias, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal organizations may remain chronically
limited or deteriorate significantly. In the event that greater international engagement
and support or enhanced U.S. stabilization and training efforts fail to produce
reconciliation and renewed security, U.S. efforts to contain the negative effects of
continued insurgency, civil conflict, and criminality in Iraq may become necessary
in order to preserve wider regional interests. Policy proposals in support of
“containment strategies” may require congressional authorization, new
appropriations, or expanded oversight, and could include
! appropriation and authorization requests for increased levels of
military and counterterrorism assistance for some of Iraq’s
neighbors;
! border security cooperation and/or joint efforts to target
transnational groups of primary concern to the U.S. and Iraq’s
neighbors, such as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and Al
Qaeda in Iraq;
! initiatives to limit the illicit sale of Iraqi oil;
85 Jonathan Wright, “Iraq’s Arab Neighbors Meet, Afraid of Chaos,” Reuters, Dec 5, 2006;
and, “Closing Statement of Iraqi Meeting Calls For Supporting Iraqi Political Process”
Cairo Nile News TV, OSC Document - GMP20051121710037, November, 21, 2005
86 John O’Neil, “Maliki Urges Regional Meeting on Stabilizing Iraq,” New York Times,
December 5, 2006.
87 See Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Bartering with Nothing,” The Weekly Standard, Volume 12,
Issue 11, November 27, 2006; and, Frederick W. Kagan, Choosing Victory: A Plan for
Success in Iraq - Phase I Report, American Enterprise Institute, January 5, 2007, pp. 40-2.

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! modification of sanctions laws targeting Iran, Syria, or introduction
of new sanctions legislation targeting other governments;
! efforts to restrict the reverse flow of foreign fighters and other
combatants from Iraq; or
! the provision of emergency support for humanitarian operations.

Responding to Hostile Regional Intervention. Most observers believe
that continued violence in Iraq is less likely to spark a conventional war between
Iraq’s neighbors than it is to lead Iraq’s neighbors to intervene and potentially
confront each other in the future via unconventionally supported Iraqi proxies.
Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq, increased Iranian materiel and
intelligence support for Shiite militias, or new Sunni Arab support to Sunni insurgent
groups or tribal militias would each challenge the Congress and the Administration.
The status of U.S. relations with Iraq’s neighbors could change drastically based on
the conduct of Iraqi government forces during any overt interventions, the content
and amounts of provided support, and the behavior of proxy elements. For Members
of Congress, weighing these factors when considering bilateral relationships may
prove difficult: observers of past regional conflicts that have featured external
interventions (i.e. Lebanon’s civil war and the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan)
emphasize that support for proxy groups rarely translates to direct control over
proxies’ activities and can have unintended and unexpected consequences over the
long term.

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