Order Code RL34141
Diplomacy for the 21st Century:
Transformational Diplomacy
August 23, 2007
Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein
Foreign Policy Analysts
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Diplomacy for the 21st Century:
Transformational Diplomacy
Summary
Many foreign affairs experts believe that the international system is undergoing
a momentous transition affecting its very nature. Some, such as former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, compare the changes in the international system to those of
a century ago. Secretary of State Rice relates the changes to the period following the
Second World War and the start of the Cold War. At the same time, concerns are
being raised about the need for major reform of the institutions and tools of
American diplomacy to meet the coming challenges. At issue is how the United
States adjusts its diplomacy to address foreign policy demands in the 21st Century.
On January 18, 2006, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington,
D.C., Secretary Rice outlined her vision for diplomacy changes that she referred to
as “transformational diplomacy” to meet this 21st Century world. The new diplomacy
elevates democracy-promotion activities inside countries. According to Secretary
Rice in her February 14, 2006 testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
the objective of transformational diplomacy is: “to work with our many partners
around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will
respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system.” Secretary Rice’s announcement included moving people and
positions from Washington, D.C., and Europe to “strategic” countries; it also created
a new position of Director of Foreign Assistance, modified the tools of diplomacy,
and changed U.S. foreign policy emphasis away from relations among governments
to one of supporting changes within countries.
Except for needed appropriations, Congressional involvement in the
implementation of the transformational diplomacy proposal appears to some
observers to have been minimal. Changes were made under existing authorities, and
no legislation or new authority was requested from Congress. This year, however,
the State Department is seeking legislative authority (S. 613/H.R. 1084) to authorize
funding and personnel issues for some aspects of the plan.
As the transformational diplomacy proposal continues to be implemented,
increased transformational diplomacy-related appropriations may be requested.
Congress may also exercise its oversight responsibilities to monitor the effect that
transformational diplomacy has on achieving foreign policy goals, maintaining a top
quality Foreign Service, and providing the best possible representation around the
world.
This report provides an overview of Secretary of State Rice’s transformational
diplomacy plan. It examines the calls for reform of America’s current diplomatic
institutions, and the Administration’s response — transformational diplomacy. The
report also presents the concerns many experts have expressed regarding specific
elements of this proposal, and a sample of reactions in other countries. Finally, the
report discusses various issues that may be considered by Congress. This report will
be updated as warranted.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Diplomacy — Need for Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Foreign Affairs Institutional Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
U.S. Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
State Department and DOD Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Transformational Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Washington Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Director of Foreign Assistance and the Integration of Foreign
Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
and the Civilian Reserve Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Expanded Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Global Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Repositioning of Foreign Service Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
American Presence Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
New Regionalization Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Information Technology Strategies — Virtual Presence Posts and
Digital Outreach Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Support and Concerns About Transformational Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reconstruction and Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Global Repositioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Staffing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Overseas Reactions to Transformational Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
People’s Republic of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Possible Considerations for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Transformational Diplomacy and Global Repositioning . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Foreign Assistance Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Diplomacy for the 21st Century:
Transformational Diplomacy
Introduction
Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between
representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the
conduct of international relations through professional diplomats with regard to
issues of treaties, trade, war and peace, economics and culture. According to Senator
Hagel, “Diplomacy is not a weakness ... but rather an essential tool in world affairs
using it where possible to ratchet down the pressure of conflict and increase the
leverage of strength.”1
Going back to Benjamin Franklin, America’s first diplomat, and Thomas
Jefferson, America’s first Secretary of State, the United States has engaged in
diplomacy to represent America and further its interests around the world. According
to the Henry L. Stimson Center, “Since 1945, the United States has conducted its
foreign relations in the context of a world that practiced what can be called Classic
Diplomacy. It was a world in which government-to-government relations were the
principal activity. A world in which ambassadors and embassies were often a
nation’s only venue for expressing its national interests. A world in which heads of
state met to discuss the great questions of the day. It was a world, in short, in which
nations were more sovereign and independent actors than today’s environment allows
them to be on the cusp of the 21st century.”2
Many viewed the first term of the George W. Bush Administration as not
engaging in diplomacy often enough or as a first line of action in implementing its
foreign policy. The Administration gained the reputation in some quarters as
conducting “cowboy diplomacy” or having a “go-it-alone” approach to international
relations. The Bush Administration has responded to its critics by saying that the
world is a different place since September 11th, and traditional diplomacy may not
always be the right strategy.3
1 Senator Hagel, Speech on Iraq/Middle East at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), December 7, 2006.
2 Equipped for the Future, Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century, The Henry
L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1998, p. 3.
3 See Secretary Rice’s interview with the Financial Times, April 20, 2007, as she discusses
that after September 11th, the inadequacies of U.S. doctrines and policies with the new
threats became very clear [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/apr/83369.htm ].

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Diplomacy became a more visible option in December 2006 when the Iraq
Study Group highlighted diplomacy in its recommendations and urged the
Administration to launch a comprehensive “new diplomatic offensive” to deal with
the problems of Iraq and the region.4 In early 2007, Secretary Rice seemed to shift
the Administration’s Iraq policy when she stated in testimony that the Administration
would engage in talks with Syria and Iran.5
As transformational diplomacy continues to be implemented, Congress may opt
to consider the implications it has for future funding requests, changes to the Foreign
Service system and its representation of U.S. interests around the world, the nature
of the U.S. foreign assistance program, the reconstruction and stabilization initiative,
and ultimately how the proposal in its totality addresses U.S. interests. At issue is
how the United States adjusts its diplomacy to address foreign policy demands for
the 21st Century.
U.S. Diplomacy — Need for Change
Many foreign affairs experts believe that the international system is undergoing
a momentous transition affecting its very nature. For indicators of this change, they
point to the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War, the changing nature of the
nation state on which the existing international system is based, the rise of new
national power relationships, as well as the growth in the number and the role of non-
state participants in the international arena. These experts also note the impact that
the changes in worldwide communications, due to advances in technology, have had
on international relations. For the United States to continue to lead in this world,
they argue, it will have to make adjustments to how it operates and relates within the
changing system and the new, intense political aspirations causing these changes.6
Even before the United States entered the 21st Century, however, foreign affairs
officials and experts were calling for reforms of the foreign affairs infrastructure,
foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs, as well as the need to address the
changing roles between the Department of State (State) and the Department of
Defense (DOD) in foreign affairs. According to then Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright in 1999,
The past decade has witnessed a transformation of the world political situation....
Challenges such as transnational law enforcement, global terrorism, democracy
4 The Iraq Study Group Report, 2006, p. 45.
5 Secretary of State Rice testimony before Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing on
Supplemental War Funding, February 27, 2007.
6 See comments by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former National Security
Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies “New York Leadership Dinner and Dialogue,” New York, June 14,
2007. See also Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, New
York, March/April 2007, pp. 34-46, which discusses changes in the international arena
based upon the changing economic strengths of countries such as China and India and the
impact they could have unless their concerns and new status are addressed.

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building, protection of the environment, refugee issues, and access to global
markets and energy sources now compete with traditional security and political
issues for policymakers’ attention. These changes demand that we reexamine the
nature and basic structure of our overseas presence.7
The Foreign Affairs Institutional Infrastructure. In the 1990s, several
organizations and think tanks voiced concerns about the inadequacy of the U.S.
diplomatic infrastructure. The Department of State’s own report said that the United
States overseas presence “is near a state of crisis” and “perilously close to the point
of system failure.”8 Experts called for the enhancement of the security of U.S. posts
and missions abroad, the right-sizing of these posts based upon U.S. interests in a
particular country and a continual readjustment as policy needs changed, the
improvement of training opportunities in terms of foreign language skills and job-
related training, and the modernization of communications/information technology
at the State Department and its posts and missions abroad. Furthermore in 1999,
Congress reorganized the U.S. foreign policy mechanism by eliminating the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
and merging those functions into the Department of State. State, however, was not
fully reorganized to incorporate these functions.
U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs. Many foreign assistance experts have
concluded that, after six decades, U.S. foreign assistance lacks strategic coherence
and accountability and needs major readjustments. Critics point out that U.S. foreign
assistance has been highly fragmented among the State Department, the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and approximately 20 other federal
government agencies that have their own assistance programs.9 In looking at U.S.
foreign assistance allocations, many observers conclude that application of U.S.
foreign aid has been neither strategic nor consistent.
Further as early as 2002, the President Bush called for a change in the
methodology of foreign assistance that looks not just at the resources spent but results
achieved.10 Going beyond the use of traditional foreign assistance programs, the
7 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the formation of the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel, Washington, February 23, 1999.
8 The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, America’s Overseas Presence in the
21st Century, the U.S. Department of State, Washington, November 1999, p. 5. Also see
Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century, by the Henry
L. Stimson Center, October 1998; Independent Task Force Report on State Department
Reform, Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2001.
9 See CRS Report RL33420, Foreign Operations (House) /State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs (Senate): FY2007 Appropriations, by Connie Veillette, Susan B. Epstein,
and Larry Nowels, for a discussion of the changing nature of foreign assistance, pp. 7-11.
Also refer to CRS Report RL33491, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the
Director of Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development, by Connie Veillette.
10 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for
Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002. It was also at this time that President
(continued...)

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Bush Administration began new initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge
Account, the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) and the President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).11
U.S. Public Diplomacy.12 Due to a myriad of reasons, including the
elimination of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the transfer of its
functions to State, some have contended that public diplomacy has become the
weakest part of U.S. foreign policy and is in need of significant reform.13 However
it appears that while public diplomacy programs were becoming weaker, the
importance of public diplomacy quickly became apparent as the image and influence
of the United States decreased around much of the world. Questions were raised as
to whether the United States is losing the “war of ideas and inspiration.” The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others criticized State’s public
diplomacy program for its general lack of strategic planning, inadequate coordination
of agency efforts, problems with measuring performance and results, and posts not
pursuing a campaign-style approach to communications that incorporates best
practices endorsed by GAO and others.14
State Department and DOD Roles. Among many who have voiced
similar concerns, the 9/11 Commission Report said that the role of the Department
of State has diminished somewhat over the decades following the 1960s. “State
came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with
little support for its budget either in Congress or in the President’s Office of
Management and Budget.... Increasingly, the embassies themselves were
10 (...continued)
Bush announced the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account, and the
importance of investing in better health care and increase efforts in the fight against AIDS.
Also see Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, “The New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance,”
Keynote Address at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Gala, Washington, November
17, 2006 for additional remarks regarding the Bush Administration’s views on the need to
change thinking about foreign assistance.
11 See Dr. Lael Brianard’s response to Senator Lugar’s Question for the Record on New
Institutions following her June 12, 2007 Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations [http://www3.brookings.edu/global/Brainard_QFR_response.pdf ]. Also see CRS
Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Account , by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL33771,
Trends in U.S. Global AIDS spending: FY 2000 — FY2007, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; and
CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria:
Progress Report and Issues for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
12 For a discussion of the development and changes in public diplomacy, see CRS Report
RL32607, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations, by Susan Epstein.
13 Foreign Affairs Council, Task Force Report: Managing Secretary Rice’s State
Department: An Independent Assessment, Washington, June 2007, p. 20.
14 Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic
Planning Efforts Have improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges,
Prepared testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights and Oversight, U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO 07-795T, April 26,
2007, p. 8.

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overshadowed by powerful regional commanders in chief reporting to the
Pentagon.”15
Since the 1990s with experience in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, some
concluded that calling on the military for nation-building placed a heavy burden on
these forces that were neither trained nor equipped for such assignments.16
Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers continued to turn to the military because there was
no civilian government organization with either the same resources or on-going
organizational and management experience required for complex reconstruction and
stabilization situations. Many experts suggested that a designated civilian office was
needed. Those calling for a new civilian organization believed winning a war as
opposed to winning the peace draws on different attitudes and training, and that
State’s role in nation-building needs to be more clearly defined.
Transformational Diplomacy
On January 18, 2006, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington,
D.C., Secretary Rice outlined her vision for diplomacy that she referred to as
“transformational diplomacy.” According to Secretary Rice, the objective of
transformational diplomacy is to “work with our many partners around the world to
build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of
their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”17 Her
proposal included moving people and positions from Washington, D.C., and Europe
to “strategic countries;” it also created a new position of Director of Foreign
Assistance and changed U.S. foreign policy emphasis away from relations among
governments to one of supporting changes within countries. The Administration did
not request new authority from Congress for these changes, but used existing
authority. This year, the Administration is seeking legislative authority (S. 613/H.R.
1084) to authorize funding and personnel issues for some aspects of the plan.
Implementing the transformational diplomacy proposal includes significant
changes to the very culture and view of diplomacy, as well as the structure of the
foreign affairs institutions in Washington and abroad; to diplomats’ post assignments
and their roles at the post; and to the tools of diplomacy, including reconstruction and
stabilization efforts, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy programs. Fully
instituting transformational diplomacy is expected to take years, beyond the Bush
Administration’s second term.
15 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 94.
16 Many institutions and experts have recommended strengthening civilian capabilities for
post-conflict response. Among these are the U.S. Institute for Peace, Council on Foreign
Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Stimson Center, and the
Gingrich-Mitchell task force on U.N. reform.
17 Testimony by Secretary Rice before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February
14, 2006.

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Washington Changes
Organizational changes to the diplomatic infrastructure include efforts to (1)
bring U.S. foreign assistance programs more in line with foreign policy objectives
through the creation of a new Deputy Secretary-level Director of Foreign Assistance;
(2) improve U.S. civilian capability to assist countries and societies rebuild and
stabilize themselves; (3) increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy; and (4)
renew efforts to expand long-needed Foreign Service training programs.
Director of Foreign Assistance and the Integration of Foreign
Assistance Programs.18 On January 19, 2006, a day after she announced the
concept of transformational diplomacy at Georgetown University, Secretary of State
Rice announced the creation of the position of the Director of Foreign Assistance
(DFA). The appointee holds a rank equivalent to a Deputy Secretary (to denote the
importance of the position, but does not confer any legal power or increased salary,
according to State’s Office of Legal Affairs) and serves concurrently as USAID
Administrator — a position that requires confirmation by the Senate.
The DFA, with offices and staff at both the State Department and USAID, has
authority over most but not all State Department and USAID foreign assistance
funding, and is to provide improved organizational structure and coordination of
more than 18 federal foreign assistance funding programs to bring this assistance into
alignment with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The DFA has direct jurisdiction over
most of State’s and USAID’s approximately $20 billion in foreign assistance funds.
Foreign assistance programs, now under the DFA, accounted for about 53% of the
total calendar year 2005 U.S. development assistance disbursements. The DFA is to
provide guidance to the other agencies that control the remaining 47% of U.S. foreign
assistance funds.
A starting point in understanding the reforms proposed for transformational
development is the new Foreign Assistance Framework developed by the DFA. (See
Appendix B for the new Foreign Assistance Framework matrix). The Foreign
Assistance Framework is a tool to help policy makers with strategic choices on the
distribution of funds and to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance advances the
Administration’s foreign policy objectives.19 The Framework identifies as the
ultimate goal “to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond
to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves
responsibly in the international system.” Five transformational diplomacy objectives
funnel funds and programs toward that goal. The five objectives are
! Peace and Security,
! Governing Justly and Democratically,
! Investing in People,
18 See CRS Report RL33491, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of
Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development, by Connie Veillette.
19 Henrietta H. Fore, Acting Director of Foreign Assistance and Acting Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, Testimony before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, June 12, 2007.

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! Economic Growth, and
! Humanitarian Assistance.
These five objectives are linked to the traditional account structure, such as
Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), or the Economic
Support Funds (ESF). The objectives are also linked to activities such as “Rule of
Law and Human Rights programs” under the “Governing Justly and Democratically”
objective or “Health programs” under the “Investing in People” objective.
Corresponding to the five foreign assistance objectives, the new Foreign
Assistance Framework also has five country categories, with countries in those
categories sharing common development challenges. The country categories are as
follows:
! Rebuilding States — States in, or emerging from, and rebuilding
after internal or external conflict.
! Developing States — States with low or lower-middle income, not
yet meeting certain economic and political performance criteria.20

! Transforming States — States with low or lower-middle income,
meeting certain economic and political performance criteria.
! Sustaining Partnership States — States with upper-middle income
or greater for which U.S. support is provided to sustain partnerships,
progress, and peace.
! Restrictive States — Those States where the State Department or
Congress has determined that serious freedom and human rights
issues are of concern.
! Global or Regional Programs — The category is for assistance
programs that extend beyond country boundaries.
An end goal for U.S. assistance is also designated for the countries in a
particular country category as well as what the next step would be for countries
graduating from a particular country category. For instance, those nations designated
as “Developing States” would have as their end goals the “continued progress in
expanding and deepening democracy, strengthening public and private institutions,
and supporting policies that promote economic growth and poverty reductions.”21
Country categories are also used to determine the distribution of funds among the
various five objectives to help those countries graduate. For example, large portions
of the assistance provided to the “Developing States” nations would be for the Peace
20 For both the Developing States category and the Transforming States category, the
economic and political performance criteria established by the DFA includes, but is not
limited to, criteria similar to that used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
21 U.S. Department of State, “Summary and Highlights International Affairs Function 150,”
op. cit., p. 13.

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and Security and Investing in People objectives. In explaining the funding
distribution for the “Developing States” category as proposed in the FY2008
Administration request, the DFA states that the main obstacles facing the countries
in this category are poverty, governance, and human capacity.22
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
and the Civilian Reserve Corps.23 Since the late 1990s, foreign affairs
observers have recognized that, in lieu of what had become a de facto military
responsibility, a civilian capability needed to be established to provide large-scale
humanitarian assistance and nation-building following conflict and crisis situations.
However, despite the issuance of a Presidential Decision Directive and the interest
of influential Senators and Representatives in developing a civilian response
capability, such an organization has proved difficult to institutionalize.24
In June 2004 while awaiting congressional action, Secretary of State Colin
Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS), to serve directly under and report to the Secretary of State. The military
supported Secretary Powell’s action in creating S/CRS. In February 17, 2005
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Richard B. Myers,
then Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, said that the creation of S/CRS was
important to helping post-conflict countries by providing a synchronized, integrated
U.S. government approach to reconstruction and stability efforts. In her January
2006 transformational diplomacy announcement, Secretary Rice included the office
and its role as part of the proposal as she discussed the linkage between struggling
states to a growing global threat. The State Department described the threat
struggling states can pose as providing “breeding grounds for terrorism, crime,
trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.”25
According to the State Department, S/CRS assists societies and countries in
stabilizing and rebuilding themselves as they emerge from conflict and crisis
situations. The office, which has a staff of about 70 people, is composed of 19
22 Ibid, p. 7.
23 For a full discussion of the developing role of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization and concerns that have been expressed about the concept,
see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and
Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.
24 In 1997, President William Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56,
which though not fully implemented sought to address interagency planning and
coordination. Several bills, including S. 2127 by then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairperson Richard Lugar and Ranking Member Joseph Biden, were introduced to
authorize an organization to provide a civilian response to international stabilization and
reconstruction efforts during both the 108th and 109th Congress. None of these authorizing
bills was enacted. Section 408 of the Department of State and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act , 2005 (Division B , Title IV of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
FY2005, H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447), endorsed the creation of S/CRS, and defined six
responsibilities for the Office.
25 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “About S/CRS,”
Department of State, May 18, 2006 [http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm].

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permanent State Department personnel, and others detailed from USAID, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers,
Joint Forces Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Treasury Department, which
reflects the wide array of departments and agencies that have been involved in
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. S/CRS’s role is to coordinate U.S. civilian
agencies and the military, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations;
create plans for a unified response; develop training of civilian personnel; and
manage an interagency response to deploy civilians to peace operations in partnership
with the military and other multilateral institutions. Further, S/CRS monitors
political and economic instability worldwide and anticipates needs to prevent conflict
when possible and provide a response when reconstruction and stabilization efforts
warrant.26
Beyond the planning, training, and the development of links to the international
community, S/CRS is also in the process of creating integrated groups of crisis
response personnel. An Active Response Corps (ARC), was established in 2006 and
as of August 2007 has 11 trained ARC staff. The President’s FY2008 Budget request
would increase the ARC to 33 people. The ARC is composed of current State
Department employees who volunteer for one-year tours. Secretary Rice described
ARCs as an “expeditionary arm of the Department of State” that could be
immediately deployed to a failed or failing state, anywhere in the world, possibly
embedded with the military, to begin the assessments and arrangements that would
accommodate larger follow-up teams of civilians who are expert in law enforcement
and justice administration, soil experts, urban planning and infrastructure repair, and
other skills required to rebuild a nation.27 The larger follow-up groups referred to by
the Secretary include a second tier, the Stand-by Reserve Corps (SRC), composed
of active duty and retired Foreign Service personnel. About 300 people are on the
SRC roster and have identified themselves are willing to be deployed. SRC
personnel would be deployed within 30-60 days after call-up, and would serve up to
six months. President George W. Bush, in his 2007 State of the Union address,
discussed a third tier, Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The CRC would be composed
of, at least, 350 individuals from a variety of sources and professions needed to help
nations stabilize and rebuild. The CRC would be deployed as security conditions
allow.
Currently, ARC teams of one-five people are working in Sudan, Kosovo,
Liberia, and Afghanistan. The ARC deployments to Nepal, Haiti, Iraq, and Chad are
completed.
Public Diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a multi-faceted effort extending
beyond the government and official channels in a host country to influence the
people’s views about U.S. policies, culture, society, and values. There is, however,
a new dynamic in the public diplomacy world that is the result of the
information/communications technology revolution. Under Secretary of State for
26 United States Institute of Peace News Release, “New USG Office to Address Need for
Coordination of Post-conflict Civilian Resources,” Washington, August 10, 2004.
27 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, State Department Town Hall Meeting, East
Auditorium, February 23, 2007.

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Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes has said that, unlike the era of
the Cold War, today, “there is an information explosion and no one is hungry for
information. We are now competing for attention and for credibility in a time when
rumors can spark riots, and information, whether it’s true or false, quickly spreads
across the world, across the internet, in literally instants.”28
After USIA’s elimination in 1999, public diplomacy activities were merged into
the State Department. Since then, public diplomacy has been viewed by many at
State as less important than political-military functions. Under Secretary Rice’s plan,
however, public diplomacy is elevated to be an integral component of
transformational diplomacy, and part of every diplomats’ job description. According
to the Department of State, the strategic framework for U.S. public diplomacy now
consists of three goals:
! foster a sense of common interests and values with the people of
other countries;
! isolate, marginalize, and discredit violent extremists; and
! foster a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in U.S.
values (i.e., a belief in freedom, equality, the dignity and worth of
every human being).
Several new programs were created to advance the transformational public
diplomacy agenda in today’s communications environment.
! Rapid Response Unit — The Bureau of Public Affairs now monitors
foreign broadcasts and blogs and produces a daily one-to-two page
report on stories and issues that are discussed. It also provides a
U.S. position on those issues. This daily report, which is sent to an
e-mail list of several thousand senior officials from Cabinet
secretaries to ambassadors and military commanders, serves to
provide a common “American message.”
! “Echo Chamber” Technique — Policy statements are posted on the
State Department Intranet to present a unified message on key issues
attracting attention in the international media. This provides a
common position for those who need to write speeches, draft
editorials, and prepare responses to inquiries. A common message
is “echoed” instead of several different messages.
! “Unleashing” ambassadors — Under Secretary Hughes eliminated
former pre-clearance rules so that ambassadors or senior embassy
officers can engage the media in their host countries without
permission from Washington. Ambassadors and senior embassy
28 Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes,
“Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations,” New York City, May 10, 2006.

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officers are expected to speak out, and the ability to engage in public
diplomacy is now part of their rating system.
Further, transformational diplomacy also treats public diplomacy on a regional
basis by establishing three new regional public diplomacy hubs — in London, Dubai,
and Brussels — to focus on regional news outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, instead of
focusing on the bilateral relations with those countries. Reporting an approximate
25% rise in broadcast media appearances in Europe and the Middle East, the State
Department says that these hubs “are having a tremendous impact, helping to make
U.S. officials a regular on TV and radio news programs, as well as talk shows in
Europe and the Middle East.”29
Expanded Training. Inadequate training opportunities for the Foreign
Service was one of the major criticisms in the 1990s. Former Secretary Powell had
made expanded training one of his priorities under the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative (DRI) designed to increase State Department hiring, training, and
technology funding. Today, enrollment in State’s training classes at the Foreign
Service Institute (FSI) has increased by 62% above the FY2000 level, the year prior
to the DRI-related hiring increases. Enrollment in the critical needs languages has
more than doubled since FY2002 from 569 students to 1,277 students, and training
in Arabic has increased from 173 students in FY2002 to 468 students in FY2006.
Secretary Rice, in her announcement on transformational diplomacy, indicated
that enhanced training would be available to Foreign Service Officers to improve
skills in public diplomacy, technology, languages, and administering programs “to
help foreign citizens strengthen the rule of law, start businesses, improve health, and
reform education.”30
To meet the increased language and new trade craft training needs of
transformational diplomacy, FSI developed a new series of transformational
diplomacy training seminars in such topics as Democracy Building and Rule of Law
that bring together leaders from across the government. FSI also developed new
curricula on Reconstruction and Stabilization, Foreign Assistance and Development,
and Public Diplomacy and the Media. The Long Term Economic Training course is
being revised. FSI is also placing a greater emphasis on Distance Learning (DL)
programs so personnel can study at their posts instead of returning to Washington.
Currently about 90 in-house developed DL products are being offered including
language courses in Russian, Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, Pashto, Korean, French,
Polish, and Spanish; as well as courses in Asset Management; Grants and
Cooperative Agreements and an Intellectual Property Curriculum.31 Providing
individuals the opportunity to take training at FSI, however, requires the State
Department to have sufficient personnel so that some can take training without
29 “Regional Media Hubs are Amplifying U.S. Voice Abroad,” Public Diplomacy UpDate,
Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State, May 2007, p. 5.
30 Transformational Diplomacy: Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service,
Secretary Condoleezza Rice, January 18, 2006.
31 “The Foreign Service Institute,” Department of State, Washington, January 2007, pp. 6-
7.

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leaving a post empty. The Department is requesting $20.8 million in FY2008 for 104
additional training positions. The Foreign Affairs Council estimates that the State
Department needs an additional 900 positions beyond its current training
complement.32
Global Changes
Secretary Rice has stated that she believes the current use of resources no longer
reflects 21st Century diplomacy demands to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Therefore, she is shifting the Department’s resources to begin (1) a global
repositioning of the Foreign Service by moving diplomatic assignments to different
countries and new types of postings such as the use of American Presence Posts
(APP), (2) a new emphasis on regionalization, and (3) more effective use of
technology with Virtual Presence Posts (VPP) and a Digital Outreach Team.
Repositioning of Foreign Service Personnel. Secretary Rice has stated
that many U.S. diplomatic personnel, responsible for implementing U.S. foreign
policy on a day-to-day basis, are in the wrong place and need to be repositioned
globally. Under the Global Repositioning Initiative, several hundred positions —
primarily political, economic, and public diplomacy diplomats — are being
transferred largely out of Washington and Europe often to more difficult “strategic”
posts in the Near East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America viewed, according to
Secretary Rice, as either “emerging” influential nations, or countries critical to U.S.
interests. In these new positions, U.S. diplomats are called upon to do more than
manage the relations between United States and the host government; they will be
called upon to manage programs and build institutions to help these nations move
toward a more democratic and prosperous world, according to the Secretary. The
plan is to reposition several hundred positions, a total of about 200 of which will be
filled by Fall 2007, with the exception of those requiring skills in the hardest
languages. Appendix A shows the movement of diplomatic personnel in Phases 1
and 2 of the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy initiative. Phase 3, affecting 93
positions, is part of the FY2008 State Department budget request.
American Presence Posts. The Secretary’s plan “localizes” U.S.
diplomacy by establishing small offices called American Presence Posts (APP)
outside of the world’s capitals to a host country’s provincial, trade, and opinion
centers. There are currently eight APPs in four countries.
APPs, which were first established in France in 1999, are generally staffed by
one or two Foreign Service Officers with support from a few locally hired staff. The
office space is generally rented, classified material is not kept in an APP, and the
diplomats assigned there are to engage in public diplomacy, outreach, and the
promotion of American commercial and strategic interests. The APPs maintain a
working liaison with local government, labor, and commercial officials, the media,
civic organizations, opinion leaders, American businesses in the area, and the
resident American community.
32 Foreign Affairs Council, Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 4.

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CRS-13
New Regionalization Efforts. Under the plans for transformational
diplomacy, regional and transnational strategies are taking a higher profile. State
Department officials believe this is necessary because of the changing nature of the
nation-state, and the growth of non-state and regional actors such as the European
Union, the African Union or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the
growing number of transnational issues including international terrorism,
international criminal syndicates, trafficking of people, environmental, and global
health concerns. For example, the plan calls for deploying rapid response teams
(small, transnational networks of diplomats) to monitor and combat the regional
spread of pandemics, rather than having experts in every embassy. As noted earlier,
the plan also establishes public diplomacy hubs to promote understanding of U.S.
culture and policies in a regional effort.
Information Technology Strategies — Virtual Presence Posts and
Digital Outreach Teams. A major effort behind the implementation of
transformational diplomacy is to go beyond the traditional diplomacy of relations
between governments to engage the people in “localized diplomacy.” American
Presence Posts are one part of this localization effort. Another approach is to utilize
new opportunities presented by changes in information technology with the
development of Virtual Presence Posts (VPP) and Digital Outreach Teams.
VPPs are one or two officers at an embassy managing an internet site explaining
U.S. policy, providing news of U.S. relations with the host country, answering
questions, and providing requested material. As of July 2007, there were 40 VPPs
worldwide with more planned. One example is the VPP in Davao, the second largest
city in the Philippines. The Davao VPP website provides news pertinent to U.S.-
Philippines relations such as an article on “USAID Helps Former Moro Rebels
Diversify into Banana Production.” It also has hyperlinks for “Residents of Davao,”
“Americans in Davao,” “Students,” and “Business Info.” The virtual aspect of the
VPP is augmented with many other programs including frequent travel to Davao,
outreach programs, cultural and commercial exchanges, and regular chat sessions.33
Digital Outreach Teams, started in November 2006, are based in the State
Department and engage Arabic language blogs and forums to provide information
about U.S. policies and to counter misinformation and myths posted on the blogs.
The team members identify themselves as employees of the State Department. The
Department reports that “the tenor of the views on these blogs and forums is
decidedly unfavorable to the United States and often exhibits a virulent strain of
elaborate conspiracy theories.” The State Department estimates that on average, a
few hundred to several thousand people see the team’s postings on each site.34
33 See “U.S. Virtual Consulate, Davao,” for an example of a Virtual Presence Post
[http://www.usvirtualconsulatedavao.org.ph/].
34 “Digital Outreach Team Created to Counter Misinformation about the U.S. in the
Blogosphere,” Public Diplomacy UpDate, Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
Department of State, February 2007, p. 4.

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CRS-14
Support and Concerns About
Transformational Diplomacy
Many view a shake up of U.S. diplomacy and foreign aid mechanisms as
necessary in this era of transboundary issues and actors. Retired Ambassador Robert
P. Finn said, “Secretary Rice ... outlined a vision for a refocusing of United States
diplomatic efforts to make them conform to the realities of politics and population
in the twenty-first century.... Her admirable vision for making our diplomats be in
touch with the real world, both physically and virtually, is an inescapable
imperative.”35 Likewise, the American Foreign Service Association, while
expressing concern for certain aspects, stated, “The American Foreign Service
Association strongly supports Secretary of State Rice’s proposals to adapt the
Foreign Service and the foreign affairs institutions to meet the foreign policy
challenges of the new world that began to come into being....”36
There have also been important criticisms of specific aspects of the
transformational diplomacy plan and how it is being carried out. Observers believe
that many of the criticisms could have been avoided if there had been greater
transparency as well as inclusion of diplomats, Congress, and other stakeholders in
the planning stages.
Reconstruction and Stabilization
While there is support for a civilian capability to provide reconstruction and
stabilization assistance, some question whether a small office has the “clout” to fulfill
this responsibility. S/CRS is given the responsibility to lead, coordinate and
institutionalize the U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization response. To
do so, it must work with several Departments and agencies throughout the
government, as well as several bureaus in its own Department. However, while
S/CRS has been given an extremely large mandate, many supporters are concerned
that it has not been given the authority to compel cooperation. Some have suggested
that what is really needed is a new cabinet-level Department that encompasses parts
of State and the other federal Departments as well as the entire USAID.37
Further, supporters are concerned as to S/CRS having an adequate level of
funding to meet its mandate. Beyond the operating expenses portion of S/CRS, the
Bush Administration requested $100 million in FY2006 and $75 million in FY2007
for a new Conflict Response Fund to be available to accelerate delivery of critical
expertise and resources to address post-conflict situations. Congress is hesitant to
35 Ambassador Robert P. Finn (Ret.), “Transformational Diplomacy,” presented at Princeton
University Celebrations for the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and international Affairs, Princeton, N.J., June 3, 2006.
36 American Foreign Service Association position paper, “The American Foreign Service
Association on Secretary of State Rice’s ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ Proposal,”
Washington, D.C., January 19, 2006.
37 Peter H. Gantz,”Peacebuilding: A New National Security Imperative,” Foreign Service
Journal, February 2006, pp. 36-37.

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CRS-15
provide funding as a “blank check,” and did not appropriate funding for a new
Conflict Response Fund for either fiscal year. Instead in 2006, appropriators
requested a “... comprehensive, disciplined and coherent strategy detailing how the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will coordinate United
States Government-wide efforts to respond to international post-conflict
contingencies.”38
To provide financial support to the work of S/CRS, the Department of Defense
is authorized, through September 30, 2007, to transfer up to $100 million to the
Secretary of State in FY2006 and in FY2007 for services, defense articles, and
funding for reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance if required. It was
also clear that such funding is considered a temporary authority until S/CRS has
adequate resources.39 The Senate’s proposed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, (S. 1547) extends the transfer authority to September 30, 2008, and
increases the amount to $200 million. The accompanying Senate Committee Report,
describes the transfer authority as a “pilot program,” and expresses the Committee’s
intention to review the implementation of the authority carefully to determine if and
in what manner it might be reauthorized.40 The measure is awaiting full Senate
consideration.
In its Fiscal Year 2008 budget request, the Administration requested $14.6
million for S/CRS to fund an additional 57 positions for the S/CRS office and the
Active Response Corps. Congress already provided $50 million, contingent upon
specific authorization, for the Civilian Reserve Corps in the FY2007 supplemental
appropriation41 (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28). The State Department is seeking
authorizing legislation to fully implement and fund the Civilian Reserve Corps. The
“Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007” (S. 613/H.R.
1084), introduced by Senator Lugar and Representative Sam Farr, respectively,
would provide necessary authority for personnel and expenditure of funds for S/CRS
and the Civilian Reserve Corps.
Foreign Assistance42
Beyond the concerns that only a small group within the new DFA office had
input on the formation of the transformational development program and the lack of
38 “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006,”
H.R. 3057/ P.L 109-102, Conference Report H.Rept. 109-265, p. 101.
39 Sec. 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (H.R. 1815,
P.L. 109-163, signed January 6, 2006).
40 Sec. 1202 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, (S. 1547, with
accompanying Committee Report S.Rept. 110-77) placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar
under General Orders, June 29, 2007.
41 Sec. 3810 of “U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007” (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28).
42 For a full discussion of the Secretary’s Transformational Development approach, see CRS
Report RL33491, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The role of the Director of Foreign
Assistance in Transformational Development, by Connie Veillette.

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CRS-16
transparency and consultation involved, some proponents of development assistance
have concerns about the proposal. For example, some are questioning whether the
DFA has sufficient authority to truly coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance, noting
that DFA authority extends to only about 53% of the total, government-wide foreign
aid funds.43
Among the greatest concerns expressed by traditional supporters of development
assistance is the continued importance of U.S. development and humanitarian
programs. They ask about the meaning of a phrase stated by Acting DFA Henrietta
Fore and others in the Administration: “foreign assistance ... advances our foreign
policy objectives.”44 These supporters of traditional development assistance question
whether sustainable development and poverty alleviation as rationales for U.S.
foreign assistance are being replaced by national security and democracy promotion
considerations. As evidence, those concerned point to the fact that earlier versions
of the Foreign Assistance Framework had no reference to “poverty alleviation,” the
shifting of a large amount of foreign assistance funds from Development Assistance
(DA) to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in the Administration’s FY2008 budget
request, and the “overwhelming focus on the capacity of states and little reference to
the well being of the poorest,” as evidence that long-term development is being
subordinated to short-term strategic, diplomatic goals.45 Furthermore, physically
locating the DFA in the State Department adds to their concerns of potential
politicization of foreign assistance and a diminishing of USAID’s role.
The Administration counters that the emphasis on development continues and
the changes in funding for DA and ESF was to make the distribution of these funds
more easily identified in terms of the funding the needs of each country categories.
Acknowledging criticism by the Congress, non-governmental organizations, and
from USAID personnel in the field regarding the lack of transparency and
consultation in developing these plans, Acting DFA Fore said, “We are at the
beginning of this important reform process, not the end. We must continually work
to improve our reform,” and she expressed her commitment to an increased spirit of
consultation and transparency.46
43 CRS Report RL33491, by Connie Veillette, op. cit., p. 3.
44 Henrietta H. Fore, Testimony, June 12, 2007, op cit.
45 Dr. Lael Brainard, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, June 12, 2007. Traditionally, the Development
Assistance account (DA) focused on long-term sustainable development progress and
poverty alleviation while Economic Support Funds (ESF) provided assistance to strategic
allies based upon geo-political concerns. Also see Samuel A. Worthington, Testimony
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, InterAction, Washington, June 12, 2007,
pp. 5-6, for his discussion regarding what he believes is politicization in the distribution of
U.S. foreign assistance and his concerns regarding the use of ESF funding.
46 Henrietta H. Fore, Testimony, June 12, 2007, op. cit.

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Public Diplomacy
Dr. James Zogby, a noted pollster and President of the Arab American Institute,
testified in early 2007 before two House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees that Arabs
generally have a favorable view of Americans, their values, culture and products.
More often now, though, according to Zogby, it is Bush Administration policies that
are negatively influencing their opinions of the United States. He reports that while
they express positive views regarding Americans, they overwhelmingly assert that
they do not want U.S. help in dealing with matters of internal reform or the
propagation of American-style democracy in their countries.47
Organizational and structural difficulties continue to impede the full
implementation of public diplomacy within transformational diplomacy. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that there are too few public
diplomacy officers, they have insufficient time to do their work, and many positions
are filled by officers without the requisite language skills.48 Further, questions
continue as to the appropriate balance between Foreign Service personnel posted
abroad and limitations, largely due to security concerns, that impede them getting out
to talk to local officials and citizens. GAO reports that, in many cases, the security
requirements at overseas posts send an “ancillary message that the United States is
unapproachable and distrustful.”49
Another concern developed with the establishment of the public diplomacy
strategic framework. The framework and the new implementing programs resulted
in a single message being provided to U.S. officials, as well as foreign audiences.
Some public diplomacy experts are concerned that the “top down” approach is
reflective of a public relations-style approach to public diplomacy more suited to
politics than foreign affairs.50 Some also raise the concern that public diplomacy is
a matter of persuasion and not one-sided propaganda. When the United States
Information Agency existed, there were on-going debates between public diplomacy
officers and political officers as to whether official speakers and official events
should support only the “party line” or incorporate opposing ideas, as well. Two
retired, USIA Public Diplomacy Foreign Service Officers explained the reaction to
the USIA approach of providing a diversity of views:
47 James Zogby, “Arab Opinion on American Policies, Values and People,” Testimony
before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight, and on Middle East and South Asia, Washington, May 3, 2007.
48 Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs and Trade, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State
Department Efforts Lack Certain Communications Elements and Face Persistent
Challenges,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State,
Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations,
General Accounting Office, Washington, May 3, 2006, pp. 9-10.
49 Ibid, pp. 11-12. Also see Richard Feinberg, “Get Out of Our Garrisons — Fortress
Embassies Damage Diplomacy,” Washington Post, Washington, May 24, 2007, p. A 31.
50 Shawn Zeller, “Damage Control: Karen Hughes Does PD,” Foreign Service Journal,
October 2006, p. 23.

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In our experience, when foreign audiences heard U.S. officials discussing policy,
they were attentive. When USIA-sponsored academics respectfully differed with
current policy, the result from the audiences was unalloyed admiration for the
courage of the U.S. in showcasing free and open discussion. Some report that
this showcasing of a diversity of opinion is no longer allowed.51
Global Repositioning
Security Issues. In January 2006, AFSA expressed its concerns to both the
Administration and Congress regarding the security of U.S. diplomats as more are
deployed to more dangerous posts under transformational diplomacy. Service in the
APPs is of particular concern because Foreign Service personnel are working away
from host country capitals, in rented offices, and without Marine Guard security.
Following the February 15, 2006, testimony by Secretary Rice before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes expressed similar concerns
when he asked, as part of the Questions for the Record, about the security studies
being done prior to the opening of APPs.
The Department of State, in response to Senator Sarbanes question, explained
that State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, working with an inter-departmental
working group, studies the security needs of APPs. Once a post has identified a
potential site for an APP and before it can be occupied, State’s Diplomatic Security
Bureau will examine whether the proposed site meets security standards or is being
modified and will soon meet security requirements. If a waiver of certain
requirements is found to be necessary so that an APP can be opened and staffed, the
Secretary may make such a waiver in compliance with the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act (P.L. 106-113).52
Staffing Issues. Staffing shortfalls, the increasing amounts of time spent at
unaccompanied and hardship posts, and the perception of increased pressure to
volunteer for these posts could have a negative impact on Foreign Service morale.
Reports of Foreign Service personnel assigned to extremely difficult postings
developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) add additional concerns about the
relationship between staffing and morale. The Foreign Affairs Council states in
discussing the issue of staffing shortages and morale:
... under existing conditions morale is increasingly precarious even though
current attrition rates are close to normal except for senior officers. This was the
lesson of the 1990s cutbacks. Personnel shortages cause lengthy staffing gaps,
particularly overseas, and, eventually, burnout for those at posts.... Danger and
turmoil have increased as well at many posts. The number of positions at
51 Patricia H. Kushlis and Patricia Lee Sharpe, Foreign Service Journal, October 2006, p.
32.
52 Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
February 15, 2006.

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overseas posts where families may not go is up, adding more stress.... The world
of transformational diplomacy is not easy.53
Of the 7,500 State Department Foreign Service positions around the world,
about 750 positions (250 of which are in Iraq) are designated as unaccompanied or
limited-accompanied-by-family-members assignments because of the difficult and
dangerous situation in those countries. Most of these unaccompanied tours are one
year in duration as opposed to the two or three years for a normal tour. Because of
the nature and short term of the unaccompanied tours, new personnel need to be
found to staff those positions every year.
The Secretary of State has the authority to assign a qualified member of the
Foreign Service to any position classified as a Foreign Service position as the needs
of the Service may require.54 She says, however, that she prefers to staff the positions
on a voluntary basis, and currently both the hardship positions and other regular
positions around the world are being filled, with growing difficulty, by Foreign
Service personnel bidding for these positions.
Since January 2005, the State Department has made several changes to the
personnel and assignment bidding systems. Changes include requiring a hardship
tour before a person can be considered for promotion to the Senior Foreign Service
and changing the bidding system itself so that hardship/danger posts would have to
be filled first. However, indicative of the difficulty of staffing posts, especially in
Iraq, the State Department announced further changes to the bidding system in June
2007 — an unprecedented country-specific assignment cycle for Iraq.55 The Iraq
assignments would have to be filled before any of the other positions, including other
hardship/danger posts, for the 2008 assignment cycle. The announcement further
states that if Iraq was not fully staffed, State’s Human Resources Bureau will hold
the assignments of highly qualified individuals until the Iraq staffing issue is
resolved.56
In addition, staffing became stretched when Congress did not provide the
Administration-requested appropriations to fund additional generalist staffing
positions in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007. Some also believe increased staffing levels
called for by the global repositioning of the Foreign Service and transferring
53 Foreign Affairs Council, Task Force Report, op cit., p. 1. Also see, Shawn Dorman, “New
Hires and the Foreign Service,” Foreign Service Journal, June 2004, pp. 33-51. This article
discusses “generational” differences between current Junior Officers and their predecessors,
where the concerns of the spouse and the family now have become important factors in a
decision to remain the Foreign Service.
54 See Section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 19980, as amended (P.L. 96-465; 22 U.S.C.
3982).
55 Director General George M. Staples, “Announcing a Special Iraq Assignment Cycle for
2008,” Department of State, Unclassified ALDAC 85014, Washington, June 2007.
56 Ibid.

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personnel slots to an increasing number of hardship assignments will only aggravate
the staffing situation further.57
Overseas Reactions to Transformational Diplomacy
Transformational diplomacy is about the nature of political regimes in other
countries, and it promotes the United States “working with partners to build and
sustain democratic, well-governed, responsible states that will respond to the needs
of their people.”58 The views of other nations then become important as to whether
sovereign governments accept this agenda of the United States. For instance, will
other governments take issue with Secretary Rice’s January 2006 speech on
transformational diplomacy in which she stated that U.S. diplomats will be “helping
foreign citizens to promote democracy building, fight corruption, start businesses,
improve healthcare, and reform education?” Will other governments allow the
expansion of U.S. representation to American Presence Posts around their countries?
And how receptive will people in other countries be to the new U.S. initiatives?
The following are examples of international reactions to the Administration’s
transformational diplomacy plan. The State Department intends to increase U.S.
representation through the Global Repositioning initiative in three of these countries,
China, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
People’s Republic of China
“Many people think the logic in transformation of diplomacy [sic] is wrong
because it thinks the character of a regime is the fundamental issue of the current
international politics.... As long as the supreme state characterized by the
disappearance of the borders of states has not come, it is reasonable to protect a
country’s sovereignty. Therefore, the theory that in order to protect the U.S. national
security, it denies other country’s sovereignty is an arbitrary logic as if it only let
itself live, but not others.... U.S. democracy is not necessarily the prioritized choice
for every country. Under the pretext of promoting democracy to intervene in other
country’s domestic affairs, U.S. action will surely inflict boycott from various nations
and peoples.”59
Israel
“Where the Middle East is concerned, the plan signifies a change in attitude, not
in policy. Its call for many more Middle East specialists and Arabic-speakers in the
57 John K. Naland, “The New Foreign Service,” The Foreign Service Journal, Washington,
February 2007, p. 41.
58 “Transformational Diplomacy Fact Sheet,” Department of State, Washington, January 18,
2006.
59 Wang Honggang of the China Modern International Relations Research Institute, “What
does the US transformational diplomacy imply,” People’s Daily Online
[http://english.people.com.cn/ ], June 2, 2006.

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CRS-21
Foreign Service and for greater openness to the people will not affect American
policy in terms of the region’s conflicts. But it might help ease some of the tension
— ... a positive step in the Middle East.”60
Malaysia
“The U.S. Secretary of State Rice has recently elaborated on her
transformational diplomacy strategy in an effort to transform the posture of U.S.
diplomacy to focus more on promoting democratic and economic changes.
Washington has apparently recognized the rapid changes in the global political
environment and is now making preparations to cope with these changes. But we are
afraid that this U.S.-style democracy may not be applicable in the present day
emerging world environment.... If this U.S.-style democracy cannot improve the
lives of people of other countries, this transformational diplomacy can only remain
a political slogan of U.S. politicians. It is only when the United States is able to
reduce the 30 percent high unemployment rate in Iraq, we can see a successful model
of U.S. democracy taking shape in the Middle East.”61
Indonesia
“[Indonesia] is receiving extraordinary attention in Secretary Rice’s vision of
‘Transformational Diplomacy.’ Five new positions have been added to American
posts in Indonesia — second only to China in the number of new positions created
in Asia. As a convert to the democratic system, Indonesia seeks to improve its bonds
with the birthplace of modern democracy. This, however, does not mean that we
agree with Washington’s unilateralist view of the world... . We end in the same way
that we began. By exchanging views on how to emancipate the world via democratic
processes (sic). And by being honest about our views and the fact that we cannot
condone many of her country’s international exploits nor the way in which it is
seeking to reshape the world.”62
Possible Considerations for Congress
Except for needed appropriations, congressional involvement in the
implementation of the transformational diplomacy proposal appears to some
observers to have been minimal. Changes were made under existing authorities, and
no legislation or new authority was requested from Congress. This year, at the State
Department’s request, Congress is considering bills to authorize the full
implementation of the Civilian Response Corps in the “Reconstruction and
Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007 (S. 613/H.R. 1084).”
60 Nathan Guttman, “Showdown at the State Department,” The Jerusalem Post, February 24,
2006.
61 “US — Style Democracy Not Applicable in Present World Environment,” Nanyang Siang
Pau, Malaysia, February 7, 2006.
62 Editorial, “Friends, not allies,” The Jakarta Post, Indonesia, March 13, 2006.

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CRS-22
As the proposal continues to be implemented, increased transformational
diplomacy-related appropriations may be requested. Congress may also exercise its
oversight responsibilities to monitor the effect that transformational diplomacy has
on achieving foreign policy goals, maintaining a top quality Foreign Service, and
providing the best possible representation around the world. Some areas of
consideration may include the following:
! Foreign Service Personnel and Security Issues — Reports of
personnel shortfalls at the Department of State, because of the
staffing effects of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the new transformational
diplomacy proposal, and the lack of authority to expand the number
of positions may need to be addressed in future appropriations and
authorizations. Concern about adequate security may also need to
be monitored as Foreign Service personnel are regularly posted to
more difficult and dangerous assignments. Monitoring the impact
of transformational diplomacy on Foreign Service morale,
recruitment, and attrition may be required to maintain a strong and
effective diplomatic representation of America overseas in the
future.
! Funding — While the 110th Congress passed the FY2007 Continuing
Appropriations (P.L. 110-5), which included funding for the
Department of State, no FY2007 money was provided specifically
to implement transformational diplomacy as requested by the
Administration.63 Instead, funds were reprogrammed from other
accounts within State to handle early implementation. In order to
implement transformational diplomacy changes in FY2008, the
Department of State is requesting a total of $124.8 million: $20.8
million for training, $14.6 million for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, $39.9 million for global repositioning, $34.5 million
for Foreign Service Modernization, and $15 million for public
diplomacy. Through the appropriation and authorization process,
Congress will likely provide oversight and funding for the plan.
! Foreign Assistance in the Future — The Administration’s foreign
assistance reform proposals appear to some as already being
amended by Congress. The Administration requested an increase in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and a decrease in Development
Assistance (DA) funds in FY2008. On June 22, the House passed
63 The Continuing Appropriations for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5) provided increased funding for
certain portions of the accounts. Examples of the subaccounts funded include exchanges,
and the Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service, that are directly related to the
State Department. Certain international activities such as the Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) also received specific appropriated amounts. However, the
majority of the appropriations for the Department of State, including those accounts
requested for transformational diplomacy, were limited by Section 101 of P.L. 110-5 to the
FY2006 level adjusted for certain rescissions. Subsequently $50 million was appropriated
in the FY2007 emergency supplemental (P.L. 110-28) for the Civilian Response Corps
(CRC). The appropriated funds cannot be used until the CRC receives an authorization.

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CRS-23
H.R. 2764, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations, 2008. According to the House
Appropriations Committee’s summary, the House shifted $365
million in requested ESF and International Disaster and Famine
Assistance (IDFA) accounts to the DA account to “reassert the role
of USAID as the primary development agency of the U.S.
Government.” Likewise when the Senate Appropriations Committee
reported its version of H.R. 2764, it took similar steps.
! The Future of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Initiative —
Congress may consider whether to codify the existence S/CRS by
adding its authorization to the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956, and to increase S/CRS authority to lead and coordinate
a government-wide response to international reconstruction and
stabilization. Further, there continues to be a question of providing
an authorization and funding for a Conflict Response Fund. Some
supporters have suggested that such a fund might be created as a no-
year revolving fund similar to the Emergency Refugee Migration
Assistance (ERMA) fund. Also, the State Department requested
authorizing legislation for the CRC.
! The Future of Transformational Diplomacy — While many foreign
policy experts generally agree that the world has changed and
diplomacy must change with it, experts and foreign governments
have raised concerns about specific aspects of the Administration’s
proposal. Secretary Rice said that “Transforming our diplomacy and
transforming the State Department is the work of a generation.”64 If
transformational diplomacy is perceived as negatively affecting U.S.
interests around the world, the next administration may rethink or
replace it. It is unclear how flexible the plan is and how difficult, in
terms of financial and human resource costs, this plan may be to
adjust or replace.
! Transformational diplomacy still does not address State’s
organizational structure, which was never fully reorganized when the
U.S. foreign policy mechanism was reformed, merging new
functions into the Department. Some, including the former House
Speaker, Newt Gingrich, have said the Department is “broken” and
needs to be overhauled.65
! State and Defense Departments’ roles in some activities, and
division of labor between the two, continue to be unclear.
According to former USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, “If
State doesn’t become more operational, it’s going to be
64 Transformational Diplomacy: Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, January
18, 2006, op.cit.
65 “Gingrich Again Assails State Department, Calling It ‘Broken,’” by Eric Schmitt, New
York Times, June 18, 2003.

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CRS-24
overwhelmed by the Defense Department.” Retired Ambassador
Prudence Bushnell said: “To implement transformational diplomacy
you need a clear chain of command and accountability. This is
lacking. We don’t seem to have settled the role of the military and
the role of the career diplomat.”66
66 “New Order,” by Shane Harris, GOVEXEC.Com, August 1, 2006, at
[http://www.govexec.com/features/0806-01/0806-01s1.htm].

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CRS-25
Appendix A. Transformational Diplomacy and
Global Repositioning
Phase I (2006) Phase II (2007) Phase I and
Net Gains/
Lost Slots
Lost Slots
II Gains
Losses
AFRICA
Angola
1
+1
Benin
1
+1
Cote D’Ivoire
1
-1
Ghana
1
-1
Kenya
4
+4
Liberia
2
+2
Mali
1
+1
Nigeria
3
+3
Senegal
1
+1
South Africa
2
+2
Sudan
2
+2
Tanzania
1
+1
Zambia
1
+1
Subtotal Africa
1
1
19
+17
EAST ASIA and
PACIFIC (EAP)
Burma (Myanmar)
1
+1
Cambodia
1
-1
China
24
+24
China (Hong Kong)
2
1
-3
Fiji
1
+1
Indonesia
5
+5
Japan
3
1
-4
Korea
1
2
1
-2
Malaysia
1
3
+2
Philippines
1
2
+1
Singapore
1
-1
Thailand
2
1
-3
Vietnam
4
+4
Subtotal EAP
11
6
41
+24

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CRS-26
Phase I (2006) Phase II (2007) Phase I and
Net Gains/
Lost Slots
Lost Slots
II Gains
Losses
EUROPE (EUR)
Armenia
1
1
0
Austria
1
-1
Azerbaijan
1
+1
Belarus
1
+1
Belgium
3
2
-1
Croatia
1
-1
Czech Republic
1
-1
France
2
-2
Germany
7
4
1
-10
Greece
1
-1
Hungary
2
-2
Ireland
1
-1
Italy
2
1
-3
Lithuania
1
-1
Macedonia
1
-1
Moldova
1
+1
Norway
1
-1
Poland
3
1
-4
Portugal
1
-1
Romania
1
-1
Russia
10
3
-13
Serbia (Kosovo)
1
1
1
-1
Spain
2
-2
Turkey
1
2
+1
Ukraine
2
-2
United Kingdom
1
3
2
-2
USEU (Belgium)
1
-1
Subtotal EUR
39
22
12
-49
NEAR EAST/
NORTH AFRICA (NEA)
Algeria
1
2
+1
Egypt
1
+1
Jerusalem
3
+3
Jordan
1
2
+1
Kuwait
1
-1

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CRS-27
Phase I (2006) Phase II (2007) Phase I and
Net Gains/
Lost Slots
Lost Slots
II Gains
Losses
Lebanon
3
+3
Libya
1
+1
Morocco
3
+3
Saudi Arabia
4
+4
Syria
1
-1
United Arab Emirates
(UAE)
6
+6
Subtotal NEA
1
3
25
+21
Afghanistan (Bagram)
1
+1
SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIA (SCA)
Afghanistan
8
+8
Bangladesh
1
1
-2
India
17
+17
Kazakhstan
1
+1
Kyrgystan
2
+2
Nepal
2
+2
Pakistan
2
+2
Sri Lanka
1
-1
Tajikstan
3
+3
Turkmenistan
2
+2
Uzbekistan
1
-1
Subtotal SCA
2
2
37
+33
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE (WHA)
Argentina
1
-1
Bolivia
4
+4
Brazil
3
2
3
+1
Canada
1
-1
Chile
1
-1
Colombia
1
-1
Equador
3
+3
Guatemala
1
+1

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CRS-28
Phase I (2006) Phase II (2007) Phase I and
Net Gains/
Lost Slots
Lost Slots
II Gains
Losses
Guyana
1
-1
Haiti
4
+4
Jamaica
1
-1
Nicaragua
4
+4
Panama
1
-1
Paraguay
1
-1
Venezuela
6
+6
Subtotal WHA
8
5
25
+12
Regional Overseas
Subtotal
62
39
160
59
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
(Abroad)
U.S. Mission/Geneva
1
-1
UNESCO Paris
1
-1
Subtotal IO Overseas
2
-2
DOMESTIC (FS & CS)a
NEA/IRI
4
INR
1
DRL
2
FSI
4
S/CRS
4
PM
2
Subtotal Domestic
39
84
17
-106
Global Repositioning
Positions Reserve
0
0
23
TOTAL
REPOSITIONED
POSITIONS
101
125
200
Source: The Department of State.
a. Specific numbers of domestic slots that would be lost by each State Department bureau were not
provided.

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CRS-29
Appendix B. Foreign Assistance Framework
(Prepared by the Department of State)

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