Order Code RS22409
Updated August 15, 2007
NATO and Energy Security
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Energy security is of increasing importance to the United States and its European
allies, as some energy producers are using oil and gas for political leverage. Although
most European allies believe that a market solution exists to ensure security of energy
supplies, NATO has begun to discuss the issue as an allied concern. This report1 will
be updated periodically. See also CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy
Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin.
Energy as a Security Issue
The growth of China and India as large consumers of energy, coupled with an
inability to develop reliable and affordable alternatives to oil and natural gas, has led to
the belief that the power to ensure access to international energy resources has shifted
from energy consumers to energy producers.2 In December 2005-January 2006, when
Russia dramatically raised the price of natural gas that it was supplying to Ukraine, many
saw an effort to squeeze Ukraine politically and economically to secure Kiev within
Russia’s orbit. Moscow’s effort also underscored the shift towards the ability of energy
producers to exert pressure on countries dependent upon them for supplies.3
The United States and its European allies have begun to discuss the appropriate
institutions and policies for ensuring energy security. The Bush Administration
introduced a discussion of energy security at NATO in February 2006, with the support
of key allies. At the same time, EU governments view energy security in a broad manner,
and most believe that political and economic measures are the first steps to ensure access
1 This study was originally a memorandum for Senator Richard Lugar and is printed as a CRS
report with his permission.
2 Paolo Scaroni, “Europeans Must Face the Threat to Energy Supplies,” Financial Times, January
18, 2006, p. 15. Scaroni is head of ENI, the large Italian energy firm.
3 See CRS Report RS22378, Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine: Context and
Implications, by Bernard Gelb, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel.

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to energy resources. Most EU members are also members of NATO, and the two
organizations may handle energy security in a complementary manner.
European Views on Energy Security
Most European countries are heavily reliant upon imported energy. Today, EU
countries as a whole import 50% of their energy needs, a figure expected to rise to 70%
by 2030. Russia is a key supplier of oil and natural gas. Germany imports 32% of its
energy from Russia. Poland imports two-thirds of its natural gas needs from Russia, and
97% of its oil. As a whole, EU countries import 25% of their energy needs from Russia.
In one estimate, by 2030 EU countries will import 40% of their gas needs from Russia,
and 45% of their oil from the Middle East.4 In addition, oil in particular is found largely
in unstable areas of the world such as the Middle East, a factor in U.S. and European
concerns over energy security.
European governments view energy security primarily in an economic and political
context. The EU floated a proposal meant to build interdependence between EU members
and Russia to secure reliable energy supplies from Russia. The EU has discussed with
Russia a structured arrangement in which Russia would sell energy not only to its
principal customers in central and eastern Europe, but to more distant customers in
western Europe. In return, the EU is asking Moscow to allow European companies to
develop Russian energy reserves.5 But Russia has rejected key elements of this proposal.
Moscow for the most part has not allowed foreign ownership of its pipelines, and has
squeezed out some foreign companies that have been developing its energy reserves. At
the same time, it has secured access to some European markets, for example, through
agreements to sell gas to Hungary and France.6
Russia has taken steps to build its leverage in European energy markets. In May
2007, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan agreed to build a new gas pipeline around
the Caspian Sea. The new pipeline would send Central Asian natural gas to the Russian
energy grid; Russia has repriced such gas, from another pipeline, twofold before selling
it to European customers. The United States and some European governments have
sought instead a trans-Caspian Sea pipeline that would bypass the Russian grid, and
provide natural gas more cheaply to Europe, thereby diminishing as well greater potential
Russian leverage tied to the supply of energy.7 Russia has also discussed the linking its
natural gas supply grid to that of Algeria, which also supplies gas to Europe. EU energy
4 The United States also relies heavily on imported energy. In 1960, the United States imported
18% of its petroleum; in 2003, that figure reached 58%. “Schroeder and Putin Cementing
Relationship,” International Herald Tribune, September 8, 2005, p. 3; “Gas Crisis a Warning for
Europe,” International Herald Tribune, February 16, 2006, p. 3.
5 “Russia Insists It Is Reliable Gas Supplier,” Financial Times, March 14, 2006, p. 5.
6 “Russia Defiant on Energy,” International Herald Tribune, December 13, 2006, p. 1; and
“Gazprom Gains Access to Hungary Market,” Financial Times, July 14, 2006, p. 4. An exception
to this policy is an agreement between Gazprom and Eni, an Italian company, to co-develop the
large Shtokman gas field in eastern Russia.
7 “Russia Will Get Central Asian Pipeline,” New York Times, May 13, 2007, p. 12.

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commissioner Andris Piebalgs has charged that the two governments may be planning to
develop an energy cartel that would further weaken competitive pricing.8
To prevent impediments to competition and to improve energy security, the EU
Commission is urging new infrastructure, including terminals for receiving liquified
natural gas; the construction of new pipelines from the Caspian region and North Africa;
and single European energy grids for both continental electricity and natural gas markets
that would challenge the grip of national energy firms on their national markets.9 The
Commission has also recommended that companies that produce raw energy not be
allowed to own distribution networks, a step intended to encourage competition. Some
EU governments, such as France, have large public entities that own both the sources of
energy and the distribution network, and oppose this proposal. Should the EU eventually
adopt the Commission’s proposal, Russian efforts to buy parts of the European energy
grid might be set back.
Few observers believe that Moscow’s pricing agreement for its gas exports to
Ukraine indicates that the market process is working successfully. Some EU officials say
that the agreement lacks transparency, and may mask involvement by criminal enterprises.
They contend that Russia needs European (and other) firms’ good will and continued
investment in its decaying energy infrastructure to maintain existing production and
develop its oil and gas reserves to sell energy products abroad.10
Some European and U.S. officials believe that Germany may become too reliant on
Russian energy supplies and move away from its EU partners and the United States. East
European states in particular, once in Moscow’s sphere, believe that they could find
themselves unable to ensure reliable and affordable energy supplies from Gazprom, the
powerful state-controlled Russian energy company. They point to the former Schroeder
government’s deal with Gazprom to involve German companies in the development of
a Russian-German gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea as a special arrangement that appears
to promise a supply to Germany that other states might not enjoy.11
Some governments believe that Russia has little interest in market forces in the
energy sector. In this view, Russia seeks high energy prices to maximize profits. These
governments note that the Russian government has a prevailing control over Gazprom,
hardly a model of capitalist entrepreneurship, and that Gazprom was behaving like a
monopoly in ratcheting up the price of natural gas to Ukraine. Knowing that Ukraine had
no reliable alternatives for gas supply, Gazprom raised prices threefold and threatened a
sixfold rise. Gazprom also controls the transit of non-Russian energy supplies to Ukraine,
and threatened rapid rises in transit fees as well. Russia has temporarily followed similar
policies towards Georgia, Lithuania, and Belarus. Political motives seem apparent in such
8 “EU Official Says Russia is Seeking Gas Cartel,” International Herald Tribune, January 27,
2007, p. 1.
9 “EU To Issue Warning on Foreign Energy Use,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2006,
p. 1.
10 Interviews with European officials, 2006-2007; see also CRS Report RL33212, Russian Oil
and Gas Challenges, by Robert Pirog.
11 Interviews with U.S. and east European officials, 2006-2007.

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policies. In 2003, Putin himself said that Gazprom is a “powerful political and economic
lever of influence over the rest of the world.”12
NATO and Energy Security
Some U.S. officials believe that NATO could play a role in building international
political solidarity in the event of a deliberate disruption of energy flows. In this view,
NATO might coordinate policies among member states and with non-member partner
governments to share resources and to bring an end to an energy disruption. NATO might
also provide security for infrastructure in energy-producing states facing unrest.
Iran has threatened to use its energy reserves to attain political objectives. In
response to possible sanctions due to its refusal to comply with requirements by the
International Atomic Energy Agency on its nuclear program, Iran has threatened to cut off
or limit its energy supplies to buyers. Beyond deliberate policies affecting energy
security, there are many countries in Central Asia and the Middle East that are unstable,
have a need for new energy infrastructure investment, and have insecure transportation
systems due to political unrest. Some of these countries are in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace program, or desire a closer association with NATO.
NATO member states increasingly believe that the alliance must be a global player
with global partners. This trend is evident in Afghanistan, for example, where Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan are expending resources to bring stability through NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force, even though the three countries are not NATO
members. NATO’s role in energy security could be complementary to the EU’s effort to
strengthen market forces and interdependence in the international energy sector. U.S.
officials agree with their EU counterparts that market forces can lead to greater energy
security. Diversification of supply, for example, through building more pipelines that are
secure, is one course of action. Joint investment efforts to build such pipelines in and
with energy producers such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan could be an important step in
this direction. Both countries are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program,
and are seeking closer relations with the United States and its allies.
Development of more liquified natural gas (LNG) transport and reception facilities
from distant suppliers, such as Nigeria, into Europe could be another course of action.
Coupled with the development of new oil and gas pipelines could be an offer from NATO
(and/or EU) members to provide security for energy infrastructure in periods of unrest or
conflict in supplier and transit countries.13
The Military Option. NATO governments (although not NATO as a whole) have
already been involved in military efforts to secure energy resources. The first Gulf War,
while not a NATO operation, involved key member states such as the United States,
France, Britain, and Italy that sought not only to liberate Kuwait but also to ensure that
Iraq did not control Kuwaiti oil and threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers.
12 Jamestown Eurasian Daily Monitor, January 19, 2006; Putin cited in “EU’s Barroso Demands
Natural Gas Supply Assurances from Russia,” Bloomberg News, March 16, 2006.
13 Discussions at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, February 2006.

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NATO governments also took part in a military operation in the 1980s explicitly
designed to secure the supply of oil. Operation Earnest Will was an effort, primarily by
NATO states, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).
Beginning in 1984, Iran first, and then Iraq, attacked neutral oil tankers to cut off the
other’s means of financial support. Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers in those two
countries’ own waters to ensure that all Gulf states understood that none was secure. The
Soviet Union, followed shortly thereafter by the United States, made offers to the
Kuwaitis, who lost the most tankers, to reflag their vessels under the USSR and the U.S.
flags, an offer that was accepted. After Iraqi aircraft attacked the USS Stark in 1987,
killing 37 sailors, the Reagan Administration formed a coalition of like-minded states,
above all from NATO, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf. Britain, France, and the
Netherlands were important participants in Operation Earnest Will. The allies captured
Iranian vessels mining shipping lanes in the Gulf, and engaged in firefights with Iranian
troops using oil platforms to fire on ships.
In February 2006, NATO governments discussed a range of potential actions in the
event of future disruption of oil supplies caused by military action. Some member states
reportedly raised the possibility of protecting tanker traffic and oil platforms in periods
of conflict, and using satellites to monitor developments in areas where energy resources
come under threat.14
Congressional Action
There was increasing congressional interest in energy security during the 109th
Congress. The Senate passed S.Res. 456, which urged the Administration to raise the
issue of energy security in the North Atlantic Council, and to report the results of such a
meeting to Congress. Senator Lugar gave a speech during the NATO Riga summit in
November 2006 in which he urged that energy security be raised to an Article V, or
mutual security, issue. Several House and Senate committees held hearings on the issue
of energy security, with attention to NATO’s possible role. Similar hearings and
legislation are possible in the 110th Congress.
Conclusion
NATO is attempting to become a global security organization, still concentrating on
protection of the interests of the United States and its Canadian and European partners,
but engaging non-member states as global partners. NATO’s role in energy security
remains uncertain, however, as some individual members may prefer a greater role for the
EU.
A political role in energy security for NATO seems most likely in the near future.
Under NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, the allies have begun discussions
with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to build practical cooperation
in the security field, including the fight against terrorism.15 Some Middle Eastern
14 Discussions with officials from several NATO governments, February 2006.
15 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO, Brussels, January 2006.

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governments are concerned about terrorist attacks on their oil facilities, but it is not
publicly known whether NATO has discussed this issue with the four governments.
Partnership for Peace countries, such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, that are
important energy producers often seek ways to associate themselves more closely with
NATO, in part to diminish Russian influence on their soil, in part to develop reliable
partners in an unstable region. It is possible that NATO will seek ways to provide
security for the energy infrastructure of such countries. At the same time, the EU may
encourage its member states to invest more heavily in that infrastructure.
There is division in the EU over management of the Union’s growing dependence
on Russian oil and gas. Several states, led by Poland, wish to engage NATO more fully
in ensuring energy security in this relationship. While in the early stages of discussion,
Poland is exploring a role for NATO and the United States, perhaps only diplomatically,
in which U.S. leverage on Moscow could be an element for encouraging responsible
Russian behavior and deflecting any Russian attempt to divide the Europeans.
A NATO role in energy security could prove to be premature. Most EU
governments clearly prefer that market forces secure access to energy. A well-structured
commercial partnership with Russia might be one mark of such a policy. Another would
be the effort of the EU3 (Germany, France, and Britain) and the United States to curtail
Iran’s nuclear program. The EU3 desire completion of that effort in the UN before there
is any discussion of a military organization like NATO assuming responsibility for a
broader policy of energy security.
Some EU governments also believe that discussion of energy security at NATO
sends the wrong signal to other governments, which might assume that the allies are
contemplating military action to ensure the flow of oil and gas. Some of these
governments propose instead that there first be a high-level “seminar” that includes the
United States, representatives of key EU countries, Russia, and such countries as
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. There, some participants would reiterate the
importance of market forces and the interdependence of producers and suppliers, and the
need to protect and maintain energy infrastructure.
In addition, some NATO partner governments in Central Asia and the Middle East
might be reluctant to accept allied assistance in securing the resource that is central to
their survival. The belief is widespread in the Middle East that the United States invaded
Iraq in part to secure access to its oil. There might be popular opposition to any NATO
effort to secure energy infrastructure in some of these countries. Moreover, the United
States has been unable to provide full security to pipelines in Iraq, and NATO might have
similar difficulties in partnership countries. Russia is also a factor. Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan depend upon Russia as a transit country for their pipeline shipments to the
west, and could be subject to Moscow’s pressure to spurn NATO proposals of assistance.

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