Order Code RS22030
Updated August 10, 2007
U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union
(EU) initiatives to improve law enforcement cooperation against terrorism both among
its member states and with the United States. Washington has largely welcomed these
efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks.
However, the United States and the EU continue to face several challenges as they seek
to promote closer cooperation in the police, judicial, and border control fields. This
report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing
challenges that may be of interest in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as
needed. For more information, see CRS Report RL31509, Europe and
Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation, by Kristin Archick.
Background on EU Efforts Against Terrorism
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent
revelation of Al Qaeda cells in Europe gave new momentum to EU initiatives to combat
terrorism and other cross-border crimes. For many years, EU efforts to address such
challenges were hampered by national sovereignty concerns, insufficient resources, and
a lack of trust among law enforcement agencies. Immediate European efforts following
September 11 to track down terrorist suspects and freeze financial assets, often in close
cooperation with U.S. authorities, produced numerous arrests, especially in Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Germany and Spain were
identified as key logistical and planning bases for the attacks on the United States. As a
result, European leaders recognized that the largely open borders within the then-15
member EU and Europe’s different legal systems enabled some terrorists and other
criminals to move around easily and evade arrest and prosecution.1
1 The EU has since enlarged twice and now has 27 members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

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Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize
national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities
so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously.
Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a list of
terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to investigate terrorist financing,
and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls. The EU has been working
to bolster Europol, its fledgling joint criminal intelligence body, and Eurojust, a unit
charged with improving prosecutorial coordination in cross-border crimes.
The March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid injected a greater sense of urgency
into EU counterterrorism efforts, and gave added impetus to EU initiatives aimed at
improving travel document security and impeding terrorist travel. In the wake of the
Madrid attacks, the EU also created a new position of Counterterrorist Coordinator. Key
among the Coordinator’s responsibilities are enhancing intelligence-sharing among EU
members and promoting the implementation of already agreed EU anti-terrorism policies,
some of which have bogged down in the legislative processes of individual members.2
The July 2005 terrorist attacks on London’s mass transport system prompted
additional EU efforts to improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation. In
December 2005, the EU adopted a new EU counterterrorism strategy outlining EU goals
to prevent, protect, pursue, and respond to the international terrorist threat. The EU also
set out a plan to combat radicalization and terrorist recruitment. And following the plot,
foiled in August 2006, to bomb airliners flying from the UK to the United States, the EU
reached political agreement on a package of new measures to improve and harmonize air
security among its member states.
U.S.-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation: Progress to Date
As part of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, the EU has made
improving law enforcement cooperation with the United States a top priority. The Bush
Administration and many Members of Congress have largely welcomed this EU initiative
in the hopes that it will help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond that could be
planning other attacks against the United States or its interests. This is in line with the
9/11 Commission’s recommendations that the United States should develop a
“comprehensive coalition strategy” against Islamist terrorism, “exchange terrorist
information with trusted allies,” and improve border security through better international
cooperation. Some measures in the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) and in the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mirror these sentiments and are consistent
with U.S.-EU counterterrorism efforts, especially those aimed at improving border
controls and transport security.
2 Gijs de Vries, the first EU Counterterrorism Coordinator; stepped down in March 2007 at the
end of his three-year mandate and the post is currently vacant; press reports suggest that some
EU member states question the need or utility of this position, while others argue that the
Coordinator’s mandate needs to be better defined. See “EU President Portugal Calls for
Appointment of New EU Anti-terrorism Coordinator,” Associated Press, July 11, 2007.

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Developing U.S.-EU Links. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials — from the
cabinet level to the working level — on police, judicial, and border control policy matters
have increased substantially since 2001, and have played a crucial role in developing
closer U.S.-EU ties. The U.S. Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the
Treasury have been actively engaged in this process. The Secretary of State, U.S.
Attorney General, and Secretary of Homeland Security meet at the ministerial level with
their respective EU counterparts at least once a year, and a U.S.-EU working group of
senior officials meets once every six months to discuss police and judicial cooperation
against terrorism. Europol has posted two liaison officers in Washington, DC and the
United States has stationed an FBI liaison officer in The Hague, Netherlands to work with
Europol on counterterrorism. In November 2006, a U.S. liaison position was established
at Eurojust headquarters in The Hague as part of a wider U.S.-Eurojust agreement to
facilitate cooperation between European and U.S. prosecutors on terrorism and other
cross-border criminal cases. U.S. and EU officials have also bridged many gaps in their
respective terrorist lists and have developed a regular dialogue on terrorist financing. A
U.S. Secret Service liaison posted in The Hague works with Europol on counterfeiting
issues. In addition, the United States and the EU have established a high-level policy
dialogue on border and transport security to discuss issues such as passenger data-sharing,
cargo security, biometrics, visa policy, and sky marshals.3
New Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation Agreements. U.S.-
EU efforts against terrorism have produced a number of new accords that seek to improve
police and judicial cooperation. In 2001 and 2002, two U.S.-Europol agreements were
concluded to allow U.S. law enforcement authorities and Europol to share both “strategic”
information (threat tips, crime patterns, and risk assessments) as well as “personal”
information (such as names, addresses, and criminal records). U.S.-EU negotiations on
the personal information accord proved especially arduous, as U.S. officials had to
overcome worries that the United States did not meet EU data protection standards. The
EU considers the privacy of personal data a basic right, and EU regulations are written to
keep such data out of the hands of law enforcement authorities as much as possible. EU
data protection concerns also reportedly slowed negotiations over the 2006 U.S.-Eurojust
cooperation agreement noted above.
In September 2006, President Bush transmitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent two new treaties signed with the EU on extradition and mutual legal assistance
(MLA). These treaties, agreed in 2003, seek to simplify the extradition process and
promote better prosecutorial cooperation. The U.S. death penalty and the extradition of
EU nationals posed particular challenges in these negotiations. Washington effectively
agreed to EU demands that suspects extradited from the EU will not face the death
penalty, which EU law bans. U.S. officials also relented on demands that the treaty
guarantee the extradition of any EU national. They stress, however, that the extradition
accord modernizes existing bilateral agreements with individual EU members. The MLA
treaty will provide U.S. authorities access to European bank account information, speed
MLA request processing, and permit joint investigations. The treaties must now be
3 On the U.S. side, the State Department has the lead in managing the interagency policymaking
process toward enhancing U.S.-EU police, judicial, and border control cooperation, while the
Justice and Homeland Security Departments provide the bulk of the legal and technical expertise.
The Treasury Department has the lead on efforts to suppress terrorist financing.

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transposed into national law by EU members and the U.S. Senate must give its advice and
consent to ratification before they can enter into force.4 In April 2007, the United States
and the EU also signed an agreement that sets common standards for the security of
classified information to facilitate the exchange of such information.
Border Control and Transport Security. The United States and the EU have
been placing increasing emphasis on cooperation in the areas of border control and
transport security, as seen by the creation of the high-level policy dialogue on these issues.
Several agreements have also been concluded. In April 2004, the United States and EU
signed a customs cooperation accord; among other measures, it calls for extending the
U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) throughout the Union. CSI stations U.S. customs
officers in foreign ports to help pre-screen U.S.-bound cargo containers to ensure that they
do not contain dangerous substances such as weapons of mass destruction.
In May 2004, the United States and EU reached an agreement permitting airlines
operating flights to or from the United States to provide U.S. authorities with passenger
name record (PNR) data in their reservation and departure control systems within 15
minutes of a flight’s departure. This accord was controversial because of fears that it
compromised EU citizens’ data privacy rights. As a result, the European Parliament
lodged a case against the PNR agreement in the EU Court of Justice; in May 2006, the
Court annulled the PNR accord on grounds that it had not been negotiated on the proper
legal basis. EU officials stressed, however, that the Court did not rule that the agreement
infringed on EU citizens’ privacy rights. In July 2007, the United States and the EU
concluded negotiations on a new, seven-year agreement to ensure the continued transfer
of PNR data. U.S. officials appear pleased with this new deal, which will allow U.S.
Customs and Border Protection to share PNR data with other U.S. agencies engaged in
the fight against terrorism, will extend the length of time that the United States can store
such data, and will permit the United States to access sensitive information about a
passenger’s race, ethnicity, religion, and health in exceptional circumstances. The new
accord, beginning in January 2008, will also require airlines to send data from their
reservation systems to U.S. authorities at least 72 hours before a flight departs.5
The United States and the EU have also pledged to enhance international information
exchanges on lost and stolen passports and to promote travel document security through
the use of interoperable biometric identifiers. In addition, the United States and the EU
reportedly continue to discuss the use of armed air marshals on some transatlantic flights.
U.S. requirements issued in December 2003 for countries to deploy armed marshals on
certain flights to and from the United States were contentious in Europe. Some European
countries claimed that guns on board planes would increase the security risks, while
others were more receptive. In April 2004, U.S. officials pledged to consider alternative
measures that could be put in place for European countries opposed to armed air marshals.
In November 2004, U.S. and EU officials agreed to exchange information about aviation
security technologies, such as airline countermeasures against shoulder-fired ground-to-air
missiles known as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs).
4 The White House also transmitted for Senate advice and consent separate bilateral instruments
signed by the United States and individual EU member states that reconcile the terms of existing
bilateral extradition and MLA treaties with the new EU-wide treaties.
5 “Travelers Face Greater use of Personal Data,” Washington Post, July 27, 2007.

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Ongoing Challenges
Despite U.S.-EU strides since 2001 to foster closer counterterrorism and law
enforcement cooperation, and a shared commitment to do so, some challenges remain.
Some U.S. officials doubt the utility of collaborating with EU-wide bodies given good
existing bilateral relations between the FBI and CIA (among other agencies) and national
police and intelligence services in EU member states. Many note that Europol and
Eurojust lack enforcement capabilities, and that national services are often reluctant to
share information with each other, let alone with U.S. authorities. Meanwhile, European
officials complain that the United States expects intelligence from others, but does not
readily share its own. Others point out that European opposition to the U.S. death penalty
or resistance to handing over their own nationals may still slow or prevent the extradition
of terrorist suspects. And some differences persist in the U.S. and EU terrorist lists. For
example, some EU members continue to resist U.S. entreaties to add suspected Hamas-
related charities or the Lebanon-based Hezbollah to the EU’s common terrorist list.
Data privacy also remains a sticking point. Washington would like to establish an
umbrella agreement in which the EU would largely accept U.S. data privacy standards as
adequate and permit the routine transfer of personal data between EU and U.S. law
enforcement. The EU resists this idea, claiming that only tailored agreements will
guarantee an “added level of protection” for EU citizens against possible U.S.
infringements of their privacy rights. They point out that it would be burdensome for EU
citizens to gain redress for any wrongs committed through the U.S. judicial system.
Observers suggest that any U.S.-EU umbrella agreement is unlikely in the near term given
ongoing European concerns to sharing personal data with U.S. authorities; they note that
some European Parliamentarians and European civil liberty and privacy groups may still
challenge the new July 2007 PNR agreement. Many also note that European data privacy
concerns have been heightened by the controversy over a U.S. government program, as
part of efforts since 2001 to track terrorist financing, to secretly obtain banking records
from a Belgian-based consortium of international banks (SWIFT, or the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications). In June 2007, the U.S. and EU
reached a deal to allow continued U.S. access to SWIFT data for counterterrorism
purposes, but it remains controversial for some European politicians and privacy groups.6
Another challenge confronting U.S. and EU officials is finding a balance between
improving border security and facilitating legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce.
The United States and the EU remain at odds over the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
and the EU’s desire to have it applied equally to all EU members. The VWP allows for
short-term visa-free travel to the United States from 27 countries, most of which are in
Europe. New EU members are eager to join the VWP, but most are excluded due to
problems meeting the program’s requirements. Amid growing EU frustration, President
Bush announced in November 2006 that he would ask Congress to modify the VWP to
allow new EU members (and other interested states) to qualify more quickly, while also
strengthening the program’s security components. Although some Members of Congress
have expressed skepticism about the VWP in general because of security concerns (noting
that terrorists with European citizenship have entered the United States on the VWP),
6 “Frattini Claims Major Advance in Data Privacy Dispute,” European Report, June 29, 2007;
“Travelers to U.S. Face Personal Data Trawl,” The Observer, July 22, 2007.

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other Members are more supportive of extending the VWP to new EU members given
their roles as U.S. allies in NATO and in the fight against terrorism.
In July 2007, Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), which includes changes to the VWP. However,
EU officials remain disappointed with the legislation, noting that some VWP
requirements are still set too high to allow most new EU members to qualify in the near
term. Furthermore, EU officials are concerned about the act’s mandate to create a new
U.S. electronic travel authorization system, which will require that visitors submit
biographical information to U.S. authorities prior to traveling to the United States. They
contend that this system will essentially comprise a new type of visa requirement, could
be a hardship for business travelers in particular, and could infringe on EU privacy and
data protection rights. In addition, EU officials are concerned with a separate provision
in P.L. 110-53 that sets a five-year goal of scanning all container ships bound for the
United States for nuclear devices, arguing that it could disrupt trade and would place a
heavy financial burden on EU ports and businesses.7
Some analysts also suggest that transatlantic tensions could negatively affect future
U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism. Most EU members continue to view terrorism
primarily as an issue for law enforcement and political action rather than a problem to be
solved by military means. Many Europeans fear that the United States is losing the battle
for Muslim “hearts and minds” because of the war in Iraq, past prisoner abuse at Abu
Ghraib, and the detentions of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay. They have also
expressed serious concerns about U.S. rendition policy and a CIA program to detain and
question suspected terrorists outside of the United States. Despite these frictions, others
assert that Europe remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and law enforcement
cooperation will continue because it serves both EU and U.S. interests.
U.S. Perspectives and Issues for Congress
The Bush Administration and many Members of Congress have supported efforts
to enhance U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism. Although some skeptics worry that
such U.S.-EU collaboration could weaken strong bilateral law enforcement relationships
with EU members, the Bush Administration appears to have determined that the political
benefits of engaging the EU as an entity on police and judicial matters outweigh the
potential risks. U.S. officials say that the Union’s renewed initiatives in the police and
judicial field may be the first steps on a long road toward a common EU judicial identity.
Thus, they assert it is in U.S. interests to engage with the EU, given Europe’s role as a
key U.S. law enforcement partner. They also hope that improved U.S.-EU cooperation
on border controls and transport security will help authorities on both sides keep better
track of suspected terrorists and prevent them from entering the United States or finding
sanctuary in Europe. Congressional decisions related to improving U.S. travel security
and border controls may also affect how U.S.-EU cooperation evolves in these fields.
The U.S. Visa Waiver Program, cargo security, and data privacy issues will continue to
be salient issues for Congress in this respect.
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7 “Europeans Fear New U.S. Requirements Could Hurt Travelers,” New York Times, June 18,
2007; “EU Hits at U.S. Plan To Scan Containers,” Financial Times, August 2, 2007.

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