Order Code RS21968
Updated August 10, 2007
Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 produced a permanent constitution and a broad-based but Shiite-
led government that has been unwilling or unable to take major steps to reduce Sunni
popular resentment and is now showing significant signs of fragmentation. A
congressionally mandated (P.L. 110-28, FY2007 supplemental appropriation) report
(July 12, 2007) presented few signs of progress on political reconciliation. See CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
After about one year of a post-Saddam U.S.-led occupation government, the United
States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A
government and a permanent constitution were voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a
March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was
proportional representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a
party, a coalition of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third
position on electoral lists in order to ensure 25% female membership. A total of 111
entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. The cost
was about $250 million — $130 million, funded by international donors including the
United States, which paid $40 million to improve Iraqi election capacity; $42.5 million
for monitoring by Iraqis (international monitoring was limited in all the elections in
2005); and $40 million for political party development. In this and the December
election, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) ran “out-of-country voting” (OCV) in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (Iraqi father) registered, and about 90% voted.
1 Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].

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OCV cost $92 million ($11 million was for U.S.-based voting), but no U.S. funds were
spent for OCV.
In all the 2005 votes, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling centers were guarded primarily by Iraq’s security forces (ISF), with U.S. forces
as backup. Violence did not materially disrupt the voting. The January election was
dominated by the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA), the Kurds, and a few
secular parties. The UIA bloc was underpinned mainly by the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which in May 2007changed its named to the Supreme
Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI), and the Da’wa Party. The two main Kurdish parties, the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) offered
a joint 165-candidate list. Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-
candidate “Iraqis List” led by his secular Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. Sunni Arabs
(20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won
only 17 seats spread over several lists and very few seats on the provincial councils, even
in provinces they dominate. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad’s 51-seat provincial
council. During April and May 2005, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials
said was not sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly
speaker, one of two deputy presidents, one of three deputy prime ministers, Defense
Minister, and five other ministers. The presidency went to PUK leader Jalal Talabani and
Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. The elected Assembly was to draft
a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject
to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. The Assembly
appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting committee which included only two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, although 15 Sunnis were later added as
committee members, with 10 more as advisors. The talks produced a draft on August 28
that set a December 31, 2007, deadline to resettle Kurds in Kirkuk and to hold a
referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designated
Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);2 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowed
families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and inheritance
(Article 39); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said that the
federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and experts
(Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that too much discretion
was given to males of their families.
The major disputes centered (and continue) on the draft’s provision allowing two or
more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and on provisions to allocate
oil revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces,
which would legitimize the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed
by the TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in
determining allocation of revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators
opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas
deposits, although some oil fields are said to lie in Anbar Province. Article 62 established
2 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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a “Federation Council,” a second chamber of size and powers to be determined by
subsequent law (not passed, to date).
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a full
term (four year) government, an election formula was adopted to attract Sunni
participation; each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council
of Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with
45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were
multi-party coalition slates. The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as well as
other hard line Shiite parties including Fadilah (Virtue). Former Prime Minister Allawi’s
“Iraqis List” was broader than his January 2005 list, adding several smaller secular
parties. The Kurdish alliance remained roughly intact.
The major Sunni slate was a three-party “Iraq Consensus Front” led by the Iraq
Islamic Party (IIP), which had entered but then withdrew from the January elections.
Another major Sunni faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran
separately. The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate,
although it did not, as it had in January, call for a Sunni boycott. Violence was minor
because Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation, facilitated the voting.
As shown in the table, results suggest that voters chose lists representing their sects and
regions, not ideological platforms.
The COR was inaugurated on March 16, and was quickly engulfed in factional
wrangling. With nearly two thirds of the COR seats, the UIA and the Kurds continued
to dominate, but Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa
deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22, the COR approved
Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SICI’s Adel Abd al-
Mahdi (incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. Another Front
figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen
COR speaker. Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37 member cabinet
(including himself and two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8
because of infighting. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie are
deputy prime ministers. Of the 37 posts, there are nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; nineteen
Shiites; and one Christian. Four are women.

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Iraqi Performance on Political “Benchmarks”/U.S. Policy
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, should achieve reconciliation among the
major communities. Under Section 1314 of the FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
110-28), progress on — not necessarily completion of or implementation of — these and
several security-related benchmarks (18 total) — as assessed in July 15 and September
15, 2007, Administration reports — is required for the United States to provide $1.5
billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to the Iraqi government. The president may
provide the aid, even if no progress is reported, if he provides written justification. P.L.
110-28 also mandates a separate assessment of Iraqi progress by the Comptroller General,
and an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside commission (headed by
ret. Gen James Jones). As noted in the July 15, 2007, report (released July 12) and
analyzed below, little progress has been made on the most significant political
reconciliation benchmarks, but there has been progress on some of minor political
milestones as well as on several security benchmarks. However, Administration officials
say that progress is occurring in reconciliation at the local level, with more significant
effect than would be produced by progress on the stated benchmarks. Dates below reflect
the original political benchmarks (and deadlines) pledged by Iraqi leaders.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under the special
amendment process (Article 137); approval of a law to implement formation of regions; approval
of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC). The July 12, 2007 reports assessed progress on P.L. 110-28 benchmark #
1 (constitutional review process) as satisfactory. The constitution review committee was
appointed in November 2006 and made partial recommendations in late May 2007, but it did not
meet a new deadline of July 2007 (beyond the May 15 deadline) to finish its draft and no
referendum on amendments is scheduled. Major decisions on presidential powers, powers of
individual regions, and on the status of Kirkuk (which the Kurds want to affiliate with their
region) await compromise by major factions. An investment law (not one of the P.L. 110-28
benchmarks) was adopted in October 2006. The regions law (P.L. 110-28 benchmark # 4) was
adopted October 12, 2006, although, to mollify Sunni opposition, major factions agreed to delay
the formation of new regions for 18 months. The IHEC law (the first of three parts of benchmark
# 5) was passed on January 23, 2007, and the nine commissioners were appointed.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law; and approval of a new oil law. The
drafting of a provincial election law is at an early stage; it is considered key to easing Sunni
resentment because the current councils, which expire in January 2009, have few Sunnis on them.
(The Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 elections that formed the councils.) A draft law
stipulating the powers of the provinces has received two readings in parliament, although
differences remain on the powers of the provincial governors and related issues. (These are the
remaining two of the three parts of benchmark # 5, and progress is assessed as unsatisfactory.)
The oil law is benchmark # 3; progress is assessed as unsatisfactory because the Iraqis did
not meet their revised deadline of May 31, 2007 for all related oil laws. On February 26, 2007,
Iraq’s cabinet passed a draft framework oil law that would set up a Federal Oil and Gas Council
with broad powers to review exploration contracts signed with foreign energy companies,
including those signed by Iraq’s regions. However, implementing laws need to be adopted
simultaneously, including a law on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s communities, a law
regulating the dealings with foreign energy firms, and a law delineating how Iraq’s energy
industry will run (“INOC law” - Iraq National Oil Company). The Kurds vigorously oppose the
draft INOC law, which the Kurds say was drafted secretly, because it puts 93% of Iraq’s oil fields

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under state control. Poorer Shiites and many Sunnis opposed fear foreign domination of the key
sector and oppose a provision of the draft gives seats on the Federal Oil and Gas Council to
foreign energy firms. Some movement on the revenue sharing law came in late June 2007 when
the Kurds reportedly agreed to a 17% share of oil revenues collected, to be deposited in a
separate account at the Central Bank.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a flag and
national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law (benchmark # 2) remains stalled;
members of the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission, claiming support from revered
Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, expressed opposition to a draft reform law reportedly
agreed to in late March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The draft would
have allowed all but members of the three highest Baath Party levels to return to their jobs or
obtain pensions. However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered pensions be given to senior officers
in the Saddam-era military and permission for return to service of lower ranking soldiers.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to insurgent
supporters (benchmarks # 6 and 7). The July 12, 2007 progress report says that the pre-requisites
for these laws are not in place, given the security environment. Iraq’s factions, concerned about
the general lack of security, are unwilling to disarm. The Shiite-led government reportedly fears
that Sunnis are plotting to return to power and that offering amnesty to Sunni insurgent
supporters would only accelerate that process. U.S. officials say Maliki has verbally committed
to a militia demobilization program, and an executive director of the program was named on May
12, 2007, but committee members have not yet been appointed and a demobilization work plan
is not drafted.

(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee governance. (Not
one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks.) No progress is evident to date.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi Army divisions
are now under Iraqi control. The P.L. 110-28 benchmarks do not include this milestone, but
instead require progress creating units capable of operating independently (benchmark # 15).
Progress on that was judged unsatisfactory in the July 12 report.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. (Not a P.L. 110-28
benchmark.) Iraq Security Forces now have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi
Qar, Najaf, Maysan, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk - the latter three are Kurdish (turned over
May 30, 2007).
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance. (Not a P.L. 110-28 benchmark.)
Several other security related benchmarks required by P.L. 110-28 — and on which
the July 12 report finds Iraqi performance generally satisfactory — center around assisting
the Baghdad security plan/”U.S. troop surge” — for example by providing three Iraqi
brigades to Baghdad (benchmark # 9); setting up joint security stations (benchmark # 14);
making available over $10 billion in reconstruction funds (benchmark # 17); and on
ensuring that the Baghdad security plan does not provide safe haven for any outlaw,
regardless of sectarian affiliation (benchmark # 12). The July 12, 2007, report gives Iraq
an unfavorable assessment on the politically-relevant benchmark of ensuring even handed
law enforcement by the security forces (benchmark # 11). The assessment of benchmark
# 13 is mixed; Iraq has reduced sectarian violence but it has not eliminated militia control
of local security.

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Political Fragmentation. As sectarian violence continues, splits within the
power structure have widened to the point where some predict governmental collapse.
In March 2007, the Fadilah Party left the UIA on the grounds that it is not represented in
the cabinet. Five Sadrist cabinet members (Health, Transportation, and Agriculture; as
well as two ministers of state) resigned on April 16, 2007 and replacements have not been
agreed. Sadr — formerly a strong ally of Maliki — instructed his bloc to boycott
parliament from the June 13, 2007 second bombing of the Grand Mosque in Samarra (the
first was in February 2006) until mid-July 2007.
On August 1, 2007, the Sunni Consensus Front implemented a week-old threat to
pull out its six cabinet members, who already had not attended cabinet meetings for one
month, asserting that Maliki is not committed to political reconciliation. The Front did
not withdraw its 44 members from parliament; they had just returned to parliament in
mid-July after a month long boycott over the COR’s June 12, 2007 vote to require
Mashhadani’s resignation as COR speaker for alleged intimidation of parliamentarians.
Adding to Sunni distrust was the June 2007 arrest warrant issued for Culture Minister
Asad al-Hashimi, a Sunni. Perhaps sensing Maliki’s vulnerability, on August 6, 2007,
former Prime Minister Allawi began a boycott by four of the five cabinet ministers from
his bloc. That means that at least 15 cabinet seats are boycotting now, including all
affiliated Sunnis. Deputy President Hashimi is still in the government, as is unaffiliated
Sunni Abd-al Qadir Jasim al-Mifraji, the Defense Minister. The COR was able to obtain
a quorum (138 members attending) throughout most of July 2007, and it has now
adjourned until September 4, 2007 (reducing its summer recess to one month from the
original two months of planned vacation).
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Slate/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(SICI- 29; Da’wa (two factions) - 25; Sadr - 29; Fadilah (Virtue, now out of
140
128
UIA,Virtue) - 15; independents - 30)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
11
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
5
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

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