Order Code RL34127
Highway Bridges: Conditions and the
Federal/State Role
August 10, 2007
Robert S. Kirk
Specialist in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
William J. Mallett
Analyst in Transportation Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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Highway Bridges: Conditions and the
Federal/State Role
Summary
The sudden failure and collapse of the I-35W Interstate System bridge in
Minneapolis has raised policy concerns in Congress regarding the condition of the
nation’s transportation infrastructure in general, and in particular the federal role
funding, building, maintaining, and ensuring the safety of roads and especially
bridges in the United States. Highway bridges are of particular interest both because
of the recent tragedy in Minneapolis and the catastrophic results of a major bridge
failure, in terms of loss of life and economic impact.
Of the 600,000 public road bridges listed in the National Bridge Inventory,
roughly 12%, or 74,000, are classified as structurally deficient. This is, however,
roughly half the number classified as deficient in 1990. Given the I-35Wcollapse,
however, even this lower number of deficient bridges leaves Americans potentially
exposed to what some might consider an unacceptable level of risk. A policy
question is how fast can and should the remaining deficient bridges be replaced or
improved. At current annual spending levels, roughly $10.5 billion (2004 dollars at
all levels of government), the bridge investment backlog (in dollar terms) would be
reduced by roughly half by 2024. Reducing the backlog to near zero during the same
period would require an estimated annual spending rate of roughly $12.4 billion (in
2004 dollars).
The Emergency Relief Program (ER), administered by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), provides funding for bridges damaged in natural disasters
or that were subject to catastrophic failures. The program provides funds for
emergency repairs immediately after the failure to restore essential traffic, as well as
for longer-term permanent repairs. Most, if not all, the funds for both the initial
cleanup and traffic adjustment, as well as for the replacement of the I-35W bridge,
will come from this program, although most of these funds will have to be provided
through a supplemental appropriation.
In the broader context, most federal funding for bridge reconstruction,
replacement, or repair of structurally deficient or functionally obsolete bridges is
provided through the FHWA’s Highway Bridge Program (HBP). Many credit this
program as being an important reason for the decline in the number of deficient
bridges over the last 15 or so years. Although ER and HBP are federal programs, as
is true with virtually all FHWA programs, most of the money provided is under the
control of the states. The state departments of transportation let the contracts,
oversee the project development and construction process, and, in particular, provide
for the inspection of bridges.
Among the congressional issues regarding the nation’s highway bridge
infrastructure are whether to increase spending on deficient bridges and accordingly
modify the federal-aid highway programs; whether to enlarge the federal role in
bridge inspection; and, within the context of large projected deficits in highway trust
fund revenues, how to fund potential increased spending on highway bridges.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bridge Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bridge Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Future Bridge Funding Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Bridge Infrastructure: The Federal/State Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Highway Bridge Program (HBP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bridge Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigation of
Bridge Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
United States Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers
Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Condition of the Nation’s Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Providing More Money for Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Inspection Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Emergency Relief Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Figures
Figure 1. Structurally Deficient Bridges in the United States,
1990-2006 (in percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1. Projected Changes in 2024 Bridge Investment Backlog Compared
with 2004 Levels for Different Possible Funding Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Highway Bridges: Conditions and the
Federal/State Role
The sudden failure and collapse of the I-35W Interstate System bridge in
Minneapolis has raised policy concerns in Congress regarding the condition of the
nation’s transportation infrastructure in general, and in particular the federal role
funding, building, maintaining and assuring the safety of roads and especially bridges
in the United States. Highway bridges are of particular interest both because of the
recent tragedy in Minneapolis and the catastrophic results of a major bridge failure,
in terms of loss of life and economic impact. Both the federal government’s response
to catastrophic bridge failures and its role in helping states address structurally
deficient bridges have come under increased public scrutiny since the August 1,
2007, bridge collapse.
This report examines the federal and state roles in the maintenance, inspection,
reconstruction, and replacement of the nation’s highway bridge infrastructure, as well
as the emergency response and reconstruction role of the Department of
Transportation (DOT). The report first describes what is known about the condition
of the nation’s bridges and whether the problem of structural deficiency is improving
or worsening. It then briefly describes the programmatic and budgetary context,
including federal efforts to reduce the number of deficient bridges, and examines
highway bridge spending. Finally, the report discusses issues Congress may face in
light of the I-35W bridge collapse and the emergence of questions of the
appropriateness and effectiveness of related federal infrastructure policies, programs,
and spending.
Background
Bridge Characteristics
There are nearly 600,000 public road bridges in the United States, as
documented in the National Bridge Inventory (NBI), that are subject to the National
Bridge Inspection Standards.1 Almost all of these bridges are owned by either state
or local government, 48% and 51% respectively. Only 1% are owned by the federal
government (these are primarily on federally owned land). About 40% of bridges
serve local roads, 33% serve Interstate or other arterial highways, and 27% serve
collectors.2 Interstate bridges comprise about 9% of all bridges, with about half in
1 Bridges that are 20 feet (6.1 meters) in length or longer.
2 Arterials, including Interstates, are roads designed to provide for relatively long trips at
(continued...)

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CRS-2
urban areas and half in rural areas. Interstate and other arterial bridges carry almost
90% of average daily traffic (ADT). Urban Interstate bridges alone carried 35% of
ADT in 2004.3
Bridge Conditions
Federal law requires states to periodically inspect public road bridges and to
report these findings to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). This
information permits FHWA to characterize the existing condition of a bridge
compared with one newly built and to identify those that are deficient, either
structurally or functionally. A bridge is considered structurally deficient
if significant load-carrying elements are found to be in poor or worse condition
due to deterioration and/or damage, or the adequacy of the waterway opening
provided by the bridge is determined to be extremely insufficient to the point of
causing intolerable traffic interruptions.4
A bridge classified as structurally deficient is not necessarily unsafe, but may require
the posting of a vehicle weight restriction.
A functionally obsolete bridge, on the other hand, is one where its current
geometric characteristics — deck geometry (such as the number and width of lanes),
roadway approach alignment, and underclearances — are deficient compared with
current design standards and traffic demands. A bridge can be both structurally
deficient and functionally obsolete, but structural deficiencies take precedence. As
a result, a bridge that is structurally deficient and functionally obsolete is classified
in the FHWA NBI as structurally deficient. About half of structurally deficient
bridges are also functionally obsolete.5
Overall, in 2006, about 26% of bridges were classified as either structurally
deficient, functionally obsolete, or both. About 12% of bridges in that year,
approximately 74,000, were classified as structurally deficient. This is much lower
than the number and share of bridges classified as structurally deficient in 1990 (see
Figure 1). Indeed, over that period, the number of structurally deficient bridges has
been cut almost in half.6
2 (...continued)
high speed and usually have multiple lanes and limited access. Collectors are typically two-
lane roads that provide for shorter trips at lower speeds and collect and distribute traffic
between arterials and local roads.
3 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit
Administration, 2006 Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and
Performance (Washington, DC, 2007), chapter 2, at [http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/
2006cpr/index.htm].
4 Ibid., pp. 3-14.
5 Ibid., pp. 3-16.
6 U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration,
(continued...)

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CRS-3
Figure 1. Structurally Deficient Bridges in the United States,
1990-2006
(in percent)
30
25
t 20
n
Al Bridges
ficie
e
Rural Bridges
15
rally D
Urban Bridges
ctu
tru
S
% 10
5
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, National Transportation Statistics (Washington, DC), table 1-27.
Bridges on the most heavily traveled roads, such as Interstates and other
arterials, are less likely to be classified as structurally deficient than bridges on more
lightly traveled routes. Despite the fact that traffic has grown markedly on Interstate
and other arterials over the past decade, structural deficiencies have declined. The
one exception to this trend is rural Interstate bridges. In 2004, FHWA classified
about 5% of Interstate bridges and 8% of bridges serving other arterials as
structurally deficient, compared with 12% serving collectors and 19% serving local
roads. Between 1994 and 2004, the share of structurally deficient Interstate bridges
declined from 6.0% to 5.1%, with the share of deficient Interstate bridges in rural
areas increasing slightly from 4.0% to 4.2% and the share in urban areas declining
from 8.3% to 6.0%. Over the same period, the share of structurally deficient other
6 (...continued)
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation Statistics (Washington, DC),
table 1-27, at [http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/].

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CRS-4
arterial bridges in rural areas declined from 9.5% to 6.9% and the share of those in
urban areas declined from 12.7% to 8.6%.7
Future Bridge Funding Needs
Every two years, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) assesses the
condition and performance of the nation’s highways, bridges, and transit systems;
documents current spending by all levels of government; and estimates future
spending needs to either maintain or improve current conditions and performance.8
As with any attempt to forecast future conditions, there are a host of simplifying
assumptions, omissions, and data problems that influence the results of the estimates
of future funding needs. Among other things, the estimates of future needs rely on
a forecast of travel demands and assumes that the most economically productive
projects (i.e., projects with the highest benefits relative to costs) will be implemented
first. Despite such uncertainties and assumptions, these estimates provide a way to
assess the level of current spending compared with what will be needed in the future
under different scenarios.
The most recent needs assessment shows that in 2004, $70.3 billion was spent
on capital improvements to the nation’s highways and bridges.9 Of that amount,
$58.3 billion was spent on roadways and $12.0 billion was spent on bridges. The
expenditures on bridges are composed of $10.5 billion on the rehabilitation of
existing bridges and $1.6 billion on the building of new bridges. Because of the
modeling involved, DOT’s future needs estimates for bridges are limited to fixing
deficiencies in existing bridges, thus are comparable with the $10.5 billion figure.
With that in mind, DOT estimates that it would cost a total of $65.3 billion to fix all
existing bridge deficiencies (in 2004 dollars), which is called the existing bridge
investment backlog.10 This figure includes dealing with bridges classified as
structurally deficient and functionally obsolete as well as other deficiencies, if the
benefits outweigh the costs.
Of course, fixing all deficient bridges overnight, whatever the cost, is not
possible. FHWA, therefore, estimates how this investment backlog will change at
various levels of spending over the next 20 years, 2005 through 2024, taking into
account the deterioration of existing bridges over that period. The results of this
analysis can be seen in Table 1. All dollar figures are adjusted for inflation and
expressed in 2004 dollars. To maintain the existing level of bridge deficiencies over
the next 20 years (i.e., to keep the backlog at the current level in total dollar terms)
would require $8.7 billion annually, less than the level of spending in 2004.
Investment at the maximum economically justified level would be $12.4 billion
7 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit
Administration, 2007, exhibit 3-18.
8 The “improve” scenario is the level of spending in which the investment is made in all
projects where the economic benefits are equal to or greater than the economic costs.
9 These spending figures do not include routine maintenance costs.
10 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit
Administration, 2007, pp. 9-13.

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CRS-5
annually, approximately 20% per year more than spending in 2004. At this level, the
backlog of deficiencies would be entirely eliminated. Spending between the level
needed to maintain current conditions, $8.7 billion per year, and the maximum
economically justifiable level, $12.4 billion per year, would improve the conditions
of the nation’s bridges but would not entirely eliminate the economic backlog. At the
level of spending in 2004, $10.5 billion per year, the total dollar cost of deficiencies
would be halved over the next 20 years. If spending is less than $8.7 billion per year,
the economic backlog will grow.11 Funding to build new bridges, $1.6 billion in
2004, would be in addition to these spending estimates.
DOT does not report in a comparative way on the federal share of all bridge
capital expenditures, but instead reports on the share of capital spending on roadways
and bridges as a whole. Of the $70.3 billion capital expenditures on roads and
bridges, the federal share was 43.8%, amounting to $30.8 billion. The federal share
of capital expenditures has hovered around 40% since the mid-1980s.12
Table 1. Projected Changes in 2024 Bridge Investment Backlog
Compared with 2004 Levels for Different Possible
Funding Levels
2024 Backlog
Percentage
Average Annual Investment
(billions of 2004
Change from
Funding Level
(billions of 2004 Dollars)
dollars)
2004
Description
Maximum economic
12.4
0
-100.0%
investment scenario
11.1
21.4
-67.2%
2004 spending on
10.5
34.5
-47.2%
existing bridges
9.4
53.6
-17.8%
Maintain investment
8.7
65.3
0.0%
backlog
8.2
75.2
15.2%
7.0
97.8
49.8%
5.9
120.7
84.9%
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit
Administration, 2006 Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and
Performance (Washington, DC, 2007), exhibit 9-8.
11 Ibid., pp. 9-12, 9-13.
12 Ibid., exhibit 6-8.

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Bridge Infrastructure: The Federal/State Role
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is the main federal player in
regard to the maintenance and safety of highway bridges, as well as in the emergency
response to reestablish mobility and reconstruct bridges after a catastrophic failure.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), however, is the entity that usually
investigates the causes of bridge failures, and when a navigable waterway is
involved, the Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers may be involved in
clearing and reopening the waterway.
A number of characteristics of the FHWA’s Federal-Aid Highway Program
need to be kept in mind during a discussion of the federal role in maintaining and
improving the nation’s highway bridge infrastructure. To begin with, although the
federal-aid highway program provides federal money to highways and highway
bridges, the money itself is normally under the control of the states. The state
departments of transportation (state DOTs), within the federal programmatic
framework, determine, for the most part, where and on what the money is spent (but
have to comply with detailed federal planning guidelines as part of the decision
making process). The state DOTs let the contracts, oversee the project development
and construction process, and provide for the inspection of bridges. Most of the
federal-aid highway program money provided to the state DOTs is apportioned to
them through several large “core” formula-driven programs, including the Interstate
Maintenance program (IM), the National Highway System (NHS), the Surface
Transportation Program (STP), the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality
Improvement program (CMAQ), and the Highway Bridge Replacement and
Rehabilitation program (HBRR). These programs were designed to meet certain
policy goals. Over time, the state DOTs have been given increasing flexibility to
shift funds from one program to another to help fulfill their state transportation plans.
The HBRR is the primary source of federal funds for highway bridge replacement,
reconstruction, and capital maintenance, but if a state wishes, it can also “flex” funds
from other federal-aid highway programs to increase spending on bridges. States
may also flex bridge program funds to certain non-bridge programs under certain
conditions.
Also, a number of smaller discretionary programs nominally under the control
of the FHWA were designed to provide funds to projects chosen through competition
with other projects. In recent years, however, most of the discretionary program
funding has been earmarked by Congress. This has been true of the $100 million
discretionary bridge program set-aside provided under the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU;
P.L. 109-59).
The Federal-aid Highway program is funded from the Highway Account of
the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). This Highway Account is experiencing financial
difficulties and may go into deficit in FY2009. Consequently, an increase in federal
spending for highway bridge repair would require a decrease in other highway
spending, an increase in revenues to the trust fund (tax or fee increases), or
appropriations from the Treasury’s general fund.

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The Highway Bridge Program (HBP).13 The main federal source of
funding for highway bridges is the HBP, also referred to as the Highway Bridge
Replacement and Rehabilitation program (HBRR). The HBP is the primary federal
program to fund the replacement or rehabilitation of structurally deficient or
functionally obsolete bridges. The program received $4.1 billion for FY2007. As
mentioned earlier, the plans for the spending of these funds are under the control of
the state DOTs. These funds are usually not to be spent on new bridges, but are
available for
! the total replacement of a structurally deficient or functionally
obsolete highway bridge on any public road with a new facility
constructed in the same general traffic corridor;
! rehabilitation to restore structural integrity of a bridge on any public
road or to correct major safety defects;
! replacement of certain ferryboat operations and bridges destroyed
before 1965, low-water crossings, and bridges made obsolete by
certain Corps of Engineers (COE) projects and not rebuilt with COE
funds;
! bridge painting, seismic retrofitting, anti-scour measures, and de-
icing applications; and
! systematic preventative maintenance (eligibility was recently
expanded to include such maintenance).
HBRR funds are apportioned to the states by formula based on each states’s
relative share of the total cost to repair or replace deficient highway bridges. Each
state is guaranteed at least 1/4% of total program allocation, and no state may receive
an allocation greater than 10%. The federal share under HBP is 80%, except that for
Interstate bridges, the federal share rises to 90%.
The most recent authorization act, SAFETEA-LU, provides on average $4.1
billion annually for HBP. Over the life of the Act, the program was to receive
roughly 11% of all the contract authority apportioned by formula. Over the last 20
years, the percentage of actual annual HBP apportionments has varied roughly within
the range of 11% to 14% of total annual apportionments.14
As with other federal-aid highway programs, the states have a great deal of
control over how, where, and on what the HBP funds allocated to their state
transportation programs are spent. In addition, the states have the option of not
spending all of HBP on bridge projects. The Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA; P.L. 102-240) included a provision to allow up to
40% of a state’s bridge program apportionment to be transferred, or “flexed,” to the
13 23 U.S.C. 144. See also the FHWA website at [http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/federalaid/
projects.cfm?progProj=curr#c29].
14 Based on FHWA data.

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CRS-8
National Highway System (NHS) or the Surface Transportation Program (STP); this
authority continues to exist.
On the other hand, states may also, if they wish, spend funds from other large
“core” formula program apportionments on their state’s bridges. In addition, there
is nothing preventing a state from spending its own funds on bridge projects beyond
the minimum local matching share.
Bridge Inspection. Under the National Bridge Inspection Program
(NBIP), all bridges longer than 20 feet (6.1 meters) are inspected and reported on by
state inspectors, based on federally defined data requirements, and data from these
inspections are reported by the states and federal agencies to the Federal Highway
Administration. This program sets up a mechanism to identify the nation’s deficient
or functionally obsolete bridges, to evaluate the overall conditions of bridges
nationwide, and to form the statistical basis for developing the cost-to-repair
estimates that are used in the HBP apportionment formula.15
The federal government sets the standards for bridge inspection through the
National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS; 23 CFR 650 subpart C), which is the
basis for the Bridge Inspectors Reference Manual used by federal, state, and
contractor personnel for guidance in bridge inspection. The Manual sets forth how,
with what frequency, and by whom bridge inspection is to be completed.
Characteristics of the NBIP include the following:
! States are responsible for the inspection of all public highway
bridges within the state (except for those owned by the federal
government or that are tribally owned). Although the state may
delegate some bridge inspection responsibilities to smaller units of
government within the state, the responsibility for having the
inspections done in conformance with federal requirements remains
with the state.
! The vast majority of inspections are done by state employees or by
certified inspectors employed by consultants under contract to a state
DOT.
! Inspections of federally owned bridges are the responsibility of the
federal agency that owns the bridge.
! The NBIS sets the standards for the qualification and training of
bridge inspection personnel.
! In general, the required frequency of inspection is every 24 months.
States are to identify bridges that require less than a 24-month
frequency. States can also, however, request FHWA approval to
15 The National Bridge Inspection Program was initiated in 1968 following the 1967 collapse
of the Silver Bridge over the Ohio river. The National Bridge Inspection Standards were
first implemented in 1971.

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CRS-9
inspect certain bridges on an up to 48-month frequency. Frequency
of underwater inspection is generally 60 months but may be
increased to 72 months with the permission of the FHWA Division
Office.
! The most common on-site inspection is a visual inspection by
trained inspectors, one of whom must meet the requirements of a
Team Leader. Damage and special inspections do not require the
presence of a Team Leader.
! Load rating of a bridge must be under the responsibility of a
registered professional engineer. Structures that cannot carry legal
loads must be posted.
! The vast majority of inspections are done by state employees or
consultants working for the states. FHWA inspectors do, at times,
conduct audit inspections to assure that states are complying with the
bridge inspection requirements.
! FHWA provides on-site engineering expertise in the examination of
the reasons for a catastrophic bridge failure.
FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program. The Emergency Relief Program
(ER) provides funding for bridges damaged in natural disasters or that were subject
to catastrophic failures.16 The program provides funds for emergency repairs
immediately after the failure to restore essential traffic, as well as for longer-term
permanent repairs.
ER is authorized at $100 million per year, nationwide. Funding beyond this
is generally provided for in supplemental appropriations acts. ER also has a $100
million cap on the amount that can be spent in any one state, for any one disaster or
catastrophic failure. In the case of most large disasters, additional funds are provided
for in an appropriations bill (usually a supplemental appropriations bill) to meet the
needs for additional ER funding. Usually, the $100 million state cap is waived
legislatively in the same bill. In the past, this funding often came from the HTF, but
with the HTF facing financial problems, any supplemental funding, under ER, for the
Minneapolis Bridge would probably have to come from the Treasury’s general fund.
Secretary of Transportation, Mary Peters, announced that FHWA is providing $5
million in immediate ER funding for “clearing debris, setting up detours, and making
repairs.” On August 8, President Bush signed legislation providing $250 million for
rebuilding the bridge.17
16 For a more detailed discussion of the ER program, see CRS Report RS22268, Repairing
and Reconstructing Disaster-Damaged Roads and Bridges: The Role of Federal-Aid
Highway Assistance, by Robert S. Kirk.
17 H.R. 3311 authorizes $250 million in ER funding for rebuilding the I-35W bridge. The
bill also eliminates the $100 million state limitation, authorizes ER funds for transit, and
lifts the federal share for reconstruction to 100%.

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The federal share for the emergency repairs to restore essential travel during
the first 180 days following a disaster is 100%. Later repairs, as well as permanent
repairs such as reconstruction or replacement of a collapsed bridge, are reimbursed
at the same federal share that would normally apply to the federal-aid highway
facility. Recently, Congress has often legislatively raised the federal share under the
ER program to 100%.
The ER program is considered by most in the transportation community to
have a good track record in getting traffic alternatives (detours, transit, or ferryboat
service) in place and using innovative contracting to accelerate the rebuilding of
damaged federal-aid highway facilities. As is true with other FHWA programs, the
ER program is administered through the state DOTs in close coordination with
FHWA’s division offices (there is one in each state). Most observers see this as a
strength of the program, in that FHWA staff at the state level have established and
ongoing relationships with their state counterparts, which facilitates a quick,
coordinated response to disasters.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigation of
Bridge Collapse.18 The NTSB has deployed a seven-person team to the site of the
August 1, 2007, interstate 35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis, MN. The NTSB
team is being accompanied by NTSB Chairman Mark Rosenker, who will serve as
the principal on-scene spokesman regarding the ongoing federal investigation of this
event.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the general authority
under 49 U.S.C. § 1131 to investigate selected highway accidents in cooperation with
state authorities. The provision stipulates that NTSB investigations carried out under
this authority shall have priority over any investigation by any other component of
the federal government. However, the NTSB must provide for appropriate
participation by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities in the investigation.
If, however, the Attorney General, in consultation with the NTSB chairman, were to
determine that circumstances of an accident reasonably indicate that the event was
caused by a criminal act, then the Federal Bureau of Investigation would assume
investigative priority.
The statute allows the NTSB to select highway accidents to investigate. The
NTSB selects those highway accidents it chooses to investigate based on a variety of
factors and considerations, such as the severity of the incident, the suspected role of
key transportation safety concerns or issues, media and public interest in the event,
and stated or perceived congressional concern or interest in the event and its possible
implications for public safety.
The NTSB uses a “party” process in conducting its investigations, allowing
entities that can contribute technical expertise and specific knowledge regarding the
circumstances of an accident to participate in the fact-finding phase of an
investigation. Parties to an investigation of a highway infrastructure failure or
collapse may include, for example, structural engineers and other technical experts
18 This section regarding the NTSB was written by Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy.

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from state transportation departments and construction engineers or other technical
specialists from private firms contracted to build or maintain the infrastructure
involved in the event. As previously noted, the NTSB must accommodate
participation from other federal entities, including components of the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and does so by granting these federal entities status as a party
to the investigation. While the various entities or parties, including federal, state,
local, and private industry participants, are directly involved in the fact-gathering
portion of the investigation, the NTSB retains sole responsibility for the analysis,
investigative findings, and determination of probable cause.
Other major NTSB investigations of highway infrastructure damage,
collapses, and failures since 1987 include the following:
! Ceiling Collapse in the Interstate 90 Connector Tunnel, Boston,
Massachusetts, July 10, 2006 (NTSB Report HWY-06-MH-024).
! Highway Accident Brief — Passenger Vehicle Collision with a
Fallen Overhead Girder Eastbound on Interstate 70 at the Colorado
State Route 470 Overpass, Golden, Colorado, May 15, 2004 (NTSB
Report HAB-06-01).
! Highway-Marine Accident Report — U.S. Towboat Robert Y. Love
Allision with the I-40 Highway Bridge near Webbers Falls,
Oklahoma, May 26, 2002 (NSTB Report HAR-04-05).
! U.S. Towboat Chris Collision with the Judge William Seeber
Bridge, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 28, 1993 (NTSB Report
HAR-94-03).
! Tractor-Semitrailer Collision with Bridge Columns on Interstate 65,
Evergreen, Alabama, May 19, 1993 (NTSB Report HAR-94-02).
! Collapse of the Harrison Road Bridge Spans, Miamitown, Ohio,
May 26, 1989 (NTSB Report HAR-90-03).
! Collapse of the Northbound U.S. Route 51 Bridge Spans over the
Hatchie River near Covington, Tennessee April 1, 1989 (NTSB
Report HAR-90-01).
! Collapse of the S.R 675 Bridge Spans over the Pocomoke River near
Pocomoke City, Maryland August 17, 1988 (NTSB Report
HAR-89-04).
! Collapse of New York Thruway (I-90) Bridge over the Schoharie
Creek, Near Amsterdam, New York, April 5, 1987 (NTSB Report
HAR-88-02).

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CRS-12
United States Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers
Activities.19 The I-35W bridge is located just down river from St. Anthony Falls
lock and dam (the first lock on the Mississippi River) and about six miles upriver
from the second lock and dam (which is actually designated as Lock and Dam No.
1 by the Army Corps of Engineers). The Coast Guard has closed a nine mile section
of the river between these two locks. These locks are half the width of the standard
Mississippi lock, and the vast majority of commercial barge traffic begins
downstream from these locks. The Army Corps of Engineers is the agency
responsible for clearing federal navigation channels and is assisting in the removal
of river debris with a barge-based crane operation. The Coast Guard is the authority
that will declare the river safe for navigation once river debris have been removed.
Issues for Congress
Some see the I-35W bridge collapse as an example not only of the problem
of structurally deficient bridges but for a purported infrastructure crisis in general.
Ironically, as is indicated by the Conditions and Performance Report, the typical and
aggregate condition of bridges has actually improved since 1990. However, the
condition of roads has not experienced the same degree of improvement.20
Condition of the Nation’s Bridges
The number of deficient bridges in the United States has fallen to less than
half the number identified in 1990. Some would argue that this casts doubt on the
need for a major policy response to eliminate or more rapidly reduce the roughly
74,000 remaining deficient bridges. In light of the I-35W collapse, however, even
that lower number of deficient bridges leaves Americans exposed to what some
might consider an unacceptable level of risk. That level of risk may be clarified
when the actual cause of the collapse is determined, which may take many months.
The policy question is how fast can or should the remaining deficient bridges can be
replaced or repaired. Some would argue that Congress should consider the spending
levels (described in Table 1) that would more quickly reduce or even eliminate the
nation’s deficient bridges by 2024.
A related issue is one of terminology. The terms structurally deficient and
functionally obsolete are not synonymous with unsafe. The goal of eliminating all
structurally deficient bridges quickly could lead to inefficient spending, if a
significant percentage of these bridges do not actually have significant safety issues.
Congress might, therefore, consider challenging FHWA to come up with a rating
system more directly tied to risk.
19 This section on U.S. Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers Activities was written by
John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy.
20 For a more broadly defined discussion of trends on infrastructure, see Congressional
Budget Office, Trends in Public Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure, 1956
to 2004, by Nathan Musick, August 2007, p. 29.

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CRS-13
Providing More Money for Bridges
Given that the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) may go into deficit in FY2009,
Congress may consider a number of financing options should increasing spending on
bridges be under policy consideration.
! Provide a special treasury general fund transfer to the HTF dedicated
to acceleration of the repair of the remaining structurally deficient
bridges.
! The fuel taxes that provide the vast majority of revenues to the HTF
were last raised in 1993. Some have proposed raising the fuel taxes
to support the HTF generally, others have suggested an increase just
for the bridge program.
! Some observers have suggested redirecting existing earmarked funds
to the bridge program.
! Tighten the flexibility rules on the spending of HBP funds to require
that all apportioned funds be spent on bridges and not flexed to other
uses.
! The Equity Bonus distribution could be rewritten to favor the bridge
program. This could, however, also require a change in the rate-of-
return guarantee for the whole program.
! Some have mentioned using public private partnerships (PPPs) as a
mechanism to help reduce the number of structurally deficient
bridges. Many are skeptical of the use of PPPs because it would
probably require the conversion of most of these bridges from free
to toll facilities.
! Require the states to pay more of the costs. A GAO study found that
since the mid-1990s, states had not maintained their level of effort
in highway spending.21
Oversight
Congress could require more FHWA oversight of the composition and
priorities inherent in the state transportation implementation plans (STIPs) that direct
program funding and require that states meet certain bridge deficiency benchmarks
before states could flex any of their core formula funds to any program other than the
HBP.
21 Government Accountability Office, Federal-Aid Highways: Trends, Effect on State
Spending, and Options for Future Program Design (August 2004), available at
[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04802.pdf].

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CRS-14
Inspection Auditing
FHWA could be directed to take a more active role in ensuring that
inspections done by the states or their contractors are done in conformance with the
National Bridge Inspection Standards, including on-site audits of state inspections.
Emergency Relief Issues
The Emergency Relief Program’s costs related to the I-35W bridge are
uncertain at this time but will certainly be well above the $100 million authorized
annually. Because of the condition of the highway trust fund, the additional funding
will probably have to be drawn from the Treasury’s general fund. Because these
funds will not be trust-funded contract authority, they must be appropriated prior to
their obligation. This means that supplemental funding will be required in the near
term. Otherwise, the reimbursements for repair work to the state of Minnesota may
be delayed.
Some have expressed interest in obtaining waivers of certain federal
requirements that would normally apply to any federally funded construction project.
Davis-Bacon wage rate requirements apply to all ER contracts. These requirements
may not be waived by the FHWA but can be suspended by executive order (ref. 40
U.S.C. 276a-5). President Bush did this in response to Katrina; however, he
reimposed the requirements almost immediately thereafter. “Buy American”
regulation waivers may be granted by FHWA based on a public interest rationale
under 23 CFR635.4109(c)(1)(I).
For some disasters, Congress has legislatively raised the federal share for ER
projects to 100%. The Government Accountability Office has called for a
reexamination of this increasingly common occurrence.22 Others argue that because
the maintenance of the bridge was the responsibility of the state, the state should
shoulder some of the cost of the bridge’s replacement.
Legislative Initiatives
Before leaving for its Summer District Work Period, Congress enacted
legislation to provide the aforementioned funding authorization for the reconstruction
of the I-35W bridge. When Congress returns in September, it is expected to consider
the bridge situation in the larger congressional policy context. The House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure (T&I), for example, has stated that it will hold
hearings on the state of the nation’s bridges in September.
When the T&I Committee holds its hearings, it will also be considering a
legislative proposal put forward by Committee Chairman Oberstar that would create
a special multi-element initiative to repair structurally deficient bridges on the
22 GAO, Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance
and Long-Term Sustainability, GAO-07-245, at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07245.
pdf].

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CRS-15
national highway system (NHS), of which the interstate highways are a part.23
Chairman Oberstar’s proposal would create a separate trust fund for this effort
funded by an increase in the federal motor fuels tax (5 cents per gallon) and/or a tax
on each barrel ($1 barrel) of imported oil refined into motor fuels. These taxes,
which could raise approximately $25 billion over five years, are viewed as
temporary, as is the initiative. The proposal, which must be translated into
legislation, would distribute funding to the states on a needs basis.
President Bush reacted to the proposal by stating that he opposes any increase
in the fuels tax at this time and suggested instead that Congress revisit the funding
priorities in existing transportation legislation, especially as regards to earmarking.24
The Ranking Member of the T&I Committee, Representative Mica, has also
suggested that Congress needs to revisit its transportation spending priorities, stating
that the existing program lacks “a true comprehensive transportation strategy.”25
Several other Members of Congress have also expressed an interest in seeing
federal spending for bridge infrastructure increased. Among them are Senator
Clinton, who has suggested establishment of an emergency $10 billion repair fund,
and Senator Murray, who has announced her intention to amend FY2008
transportation appropriations legislation by adding $1 billion for bridge repair and
replacement. Additional Members are likely to add their own proposals in the weeks
ahead, and it is likely that House and Senate committees, in addition to House T&I,
will hold hearings on the bridge issue this fall.26
23 See [http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Full%20Committee/NHS_Bridge_
Reconstruction_Initiative.pdf].
24 Rutenberg, Jim, “Bush Opposes Raising Gas Tax for Bridge Repairs,” The New York
Times, August 9, 2007.
25 See [http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=218].
26 “Bridge Collapse Continues to Spur Legislative Proposals, Funding Discussion,” Daily
Report for Executives, August 10, 2007, p. A-11.

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