Order Code RL34027
Honduran-U.S. Relations
Updated August 10, 2007
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Nelson Olhero
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Summary
The Central American nation of Honduras, one of the hemisphere’s poorest
countries, faces significant challenges in the areas of crime, human rights, and
improving overall economic and living conditions. While traditional agricultural
exports of coffee and bananas are still important for the economy, nontraditional
sectors, especially the maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown
significantly over the past decade. Among the country’s development challenges are
a poverty rate over 70%, high infant mortality, and a significant HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Despite these challenges, increased public spending on health and education have
reaped significant improvements in development indicators over the past decade.
Current President Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party won a four-year term in
the November 2005 elections. The country has enjoyed 25 years of uninterrupted
elected civilian democratic rule. The economy grew an estimated 6% in 2006,
benefitting from significant debt reduction by the international financial institutions
that is freeing government resources to finance poverty-reduction programs. A key
challenge for the government is curbing violent crime and the growth of youth gangs.
The United States has a close relationship with Honduras, characterized by an
important trade partnership, a U.S. military presence in the country, and cooperation
on a range of transnational issues. Honduras is a party to the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). There has been extensive
cooperation on port security, with the largest port in Honduras, Puerto Cortés,
included in both the Container Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative.
Some 78,000 Hondurans living in the United States who have been provided
temporary protected status (TPS) since 1998 when the country was devastated by
Hurricane Mitch. In early May 2007, TPS was extended for an additional 18
months. U.S. foreign aid to Honduras amounted to $53 million in FY2006, and the
Administration requested $47 million in FY2007 and $43 million in FY2008. The
Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year $215 million compact with
Honduras in 2005. In the 110th Congress, H.Res. 532 (Gohmert), would recognize the
energy and economic partnership between the United States and Honduras; H.Res.
564 (Engel), would recognize the threat that violence poses to Central America and
support expanded cooperation between the United States and Central America to
combat crime and violence; and House-passed H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State
Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, would
provide $8 million to combat transnational crime and criminal youth gangs, including
in Central America.
This report will be updated to reflect major developments. For additional CRS
information on Honduras, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status:
Current Immigration Policy and Issues; CRS Report RS22141, Gangs in Central
America; CRS Report RL32001, HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean and Central America;
CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge
Account.

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Contents
Political and Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Economic Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S. Military Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Drug Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Human Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2005-FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

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Honduran-U.S. Relations
Political and Economic Conditions
A Central American nation with a population of about 7.4 million, Honduras has
enjoyed 25 years of uninterrupted civilian democratic rule since the military
relinquished power in 1982 after free and fair elections. With a per capita income
of $1,190, Honduras is classified by the World Bank as a lower middle income
developing economy, and remains one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere.1
Traditional agricultural exports of coffee and bananas are still important for the
Honduran economy, but nontraditional sectors, such as shrimp farming and the
maquiladora, or export-processing industry, have grown significantly over the past
decade. Among the country’s development challenges are an estimated poverty rate
over 70%; an infant mortality rate of 31 per 1,000; and chronic malnutrition for one
out of three children under five years of age. Honduras also has a significant
HIV/AIDS crisis, with an adult infection rate of 1.5% of the population. The
Garifuna community (descendants of freed black slaves and indigenous Caribs from
St. Vincent) concentrated in northern coastal areas has been especially hard hit by the
epidemic. Despite these challenges, the World Bank maintains that increased public
spending on health and education has reaped significant improvements in
development indicators over the past decade.2
Current President Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party won the November 2005
election by the close margin of 49.9% to 46.17%, narrowly defeating his National
Party rival Porfirio Lobo Sosa, the head of the Honduran Congress. While the
process was deemed free and fair, technical difficulties caused a delay in the official
vote count, and resulted in Lobo waiting until December 7, 2005, to concede defeat.
The Liberal and National parties traditionally have been the country’s two
dominant political parties. Both are considered center-right parties, and there appear
to be few major ideological differences between the two. During the 2005 campaign,
both candidates broadly supported the direction of the country’s market-oriented
economic policy, but they emphasized different approaches in dealing with crime
perpetrated by youth gangs. Lobo called for tougher action against gangs by
reintroducing the death penalty (which was abolished in 1957) and increasing prison
sentences for juvenile delinquents, whereas Zelaya opposed the death penalty and
1 World Bank, World Development Report, 2007.
2 World Bank, “Honduras Country Brief,” September 2006, and “Fighting Malnutrition in
Central America,” December 19, 2006; U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean, “Social Panorama of Latin America 2006,” Preliminary Version, December
2006. Also see CRS Report RL32713, Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations
for U.S. Policy, by Clare M. Ribando.

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CRS-2
emphasized a more comprehensive approach that would include job creation and
training. Zelaya also campaigned for more citizen involvement and transparency in
government and promised to increase social programs and combat corruption.
Inaugurated to a four-year term on
Manuel Zelaya
January 27, 2006, Zelaya succeeded
President Ricardo Maduro of the
Born in 1952, José Manuel “Mel”
National Party, who was elected in
Zelaya Rosales hails from Olancho
2001. During his tenure, President
department in rural eastern Honduras.
Maduro faced enormous challenges in
Zelaya studied civil engineering in college,
the areas of crime, human rights, and
but left his studies for business, investing
improving overall economic and living
in timber and cattle. He owns a ranch in
conditions in one of the hemisphere’s
Olancho. Zelaya joined the Liberal Party
poorest countries, challenges that
in 1970, and became party coordinator for
Zelaya is also facing. In the 2005
the departments of Olancho and Colón in
1980. He was first elected to Congress in
legislative elections that were held
1985 and won three additional terms. He
simultaneously with the presidential
served as head of the Honduran Social
elections, Zelaya’s Liberal Party won 62
Investment Fund from 1994-1997 and
seats in the 128-member Congress, just
again from 1998-2001 in two Liberal Party
short of a majority, which has made it
Administrations. He founded a
more difficult for the Zelaya
progressive faction of the Liberal Party,
government to enact its legislative
and won the party’s presidential primary in
agenda.
February 2005 before winning the general
election.
In early 2007, public support for
Sources: “Manuel Zelaya,” Biography
the Zelaya government had been firm,
Resource Center Online, Gale, 2006; People
with a majority of Hondurans
Profile Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, LatinNews.com,
maintaining that President Zelaya was
November 15, 2006.
doing a good job. Zelaya’s high ratings
were buoyed by the strong performance
of the economy, his efforts to fulfill campaign pledges of free school enrollment and
an increase in teachers’ pay, and his efforts to curb rising fuel costs.3 More recently,
however, there has been a drop in public support for President Zelaya, due in large
part to the government’s inability to achieve concrete results in terms of reducing
crime rates, poverty and unemployment, preventing fuel prices from rising, as well
as failing to tackle the corruption that is pervasive in Honduran society. In May 2007,
the government appeared to be on the defensive, as President Zelaya lashed out at
media owners for unfair coverage and was especially critical of the media for
allegedly sensationalizing violent crime.4 The President ordered television and radio
stations to broadcast two hours of interviews and conversations with government
officials for ten consecutive days in order to counteract what he contended was unfair
press coverage. This action, however, was opposed by Honduran press groups as well
as by the political opposition. As a result, Zelaya was forced to back down somewhat
3 “Un 57 Pct de Hondureños Aprueba Gestión Presidente Zelaya,” Reuters, January 24,
2007; “Honduras Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2007.
4 “Honduran Government Dictates to Media,” LatinNews Daily, May 25, 2007; “Honduras:
Zelaya Accuses Media of Running the Country,” Caribbean and Central America Report,
May 17, 2007.

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CRS-3
by reducing the amount of government programming that media outlets would be
required to broadcast.
Reducing corruption and crime are key challenges that have been testing the
Zelaya government. On the corruption front, President Zelaya has pressed for
transparency in government and access to public administration, but a new
transparency law has been criticized by some observers as having too many loopholes
allowing the government to prevent public access to “restricted” documents.5 During
Zelaya’s first year, several high ranking officials resigned as a result of corruption
scandals. Critics of the government also point to an increase in crime, with over
3,000 murders during 2006, including the assassination of environmentalists and
human rights advocates.6 In early December 2006, for example, human rights
attorney Dionisio Díaz García was killed by unknown assailants in Tegucigalpa. The
State Department’s 2006 report on human rights practices in Honduras, issued in
March 2007, stated that, despite some positive steps, government corruption,
impunity for violators of the law, and gang violence have exacerbated serious human
rights violations in the country. (For more, see discussion on “Crime” below.)
Honduras was devastated by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which killed more than
5,000 people and caused billions of dollars in damage. The gross domestic product
declined by 1.4% in 1999, and the country felt the effects of the storm for several
years, with roads and bridges washed out, the agricultural sector hard hit, and scores
of orphaned children, many of whom joined criminal gangs. Spurred on by
substantial U.S. foreign assistance, however, the economy rebounded by 6% in 2000,
and has remained positive ever since. More recently, the economy registered growth
rates of 4.1% in 2005 and 6% in 2006, while the forecast for 2007 is for 4.8%
growth.7
Honduras has signed two poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF)
agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1999 that have
imposed fiscal and monetary targets on the government to maintain firm
macroeconomic discipline and to develop a comprehensive poverty reduction
strategy. The most recent PRGF agreement, which expired in February 2007, made
Honduras eligible for about $1 billion in debt relief under the IMF and World Bank’s
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The Honduran government has
faced the dilemma of balancing the IMF’s calls for reducing public expenditures and
the public’s demands for increased spending. The government is negotiating a new
economic program with the IMF to replace the expired PRGF agreement. Under a
likely Policy Support Instrument, the IMF would provide advice and support as well
as more flexibility in setting fiscal targets that it would allow it to increase
expenditure on healthcare and education, but would not have access to a credit line
5 Thelma Meja, “Corruption: Honduras Grapples with Murky Transparency Law,” Global
Information Network, February 23, 2007.
6 “Honduras: Rocky First Year for Zelaya,” Central America Report, February 17, 2007.
7 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2007.

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CRS-4
as under the PRGF.8 An IMF staff visit to Honduras in late 2006 commended the
Honduran government for implementing policies that led to strong economic
performance in 2006, but noted that fiscal policy will need to be strengthened in
order to ensure macroeconomic stability, sustained growth, and finances for anti-
poverty and investment programs.9 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
also announced a debt forgiveness program in late 2006 for its poorest members,
including Honduras, which will benefit from a reduction of $1.4 billion in foreign
debt, freeing government resources to finance poverty-reduction programs.10
Figure 1. Map of Honduras

8 Ibid
9 “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2006 Article IV Consultation with Honduras,”
International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice, March 8, 2007.
10 “Honduras: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2007; Nestor Ikeda,
“Inter-American Development Bank Forgives Debt of 5 Nations,” Associated Press, March
17, 2007.

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CRS-5
Issues in U.S.-Honduran Relations
The United States has had close relations with Honduras over many years,
characterized by significant foreign assistance, an important trade relationship, a U.S.
military presence in the country, and cooperation on a range of transnational issues.
The bilateral relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras
returned to democratic rule and became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central
America. At that time, the country became a staging area for U.S.-supported
excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista opponents known as the contras.
Today, overall U.S. policy goals for Honduras include a strengthened democracy
with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of
law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy
and improved living conditions. The United States also cooperates with Honduras
to deal with such transnational issues as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, the
fight against terrorism, illegal migration, and trafficking in persons, and supports
Honduran efforts to protect the environment and combat HIV/AIDS. There are over
800,000 Hondurans residing in the United States, who sent some $2.4 billion in
remittances to Honduras in 2006, or about one fourth of the country’s gross domestic
product.11
Economic Linkages
U.S. trade and investment linkages with Honduras have increased since the early
1980s, and will likely increase further with the implementation of the Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) that
entered into force with Honduras in April 2006. In 1984, Honduras became one of
the first beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the one-way U.S.
preferential trade arrangement providing duty-free importation for many goods from
the region. In the late 1980s, Honduras benefitted from production-sharing
arrangements with U.S. apparel companies for duty-free entry into the United States
of certain apparel products assembled in Honduras. As a result, maquiladoras or
export-assembly companies flourished, most concentrated in the north coast region.
The passage of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act in 2000 (CBTPA), which
provided Caribbean Basin nations with NAFTA-like preferential tariff treatment,
further boosted Honduran maquiladoras.
The United States is by far Honduras’ largest trading partner, and is the
destination of about two-thirds of Honduran exports and the origin of about half of
its imports. Honduras is the second largest Latin American exporter of apparel to the
United States after Mexico. In 2006, U.S. exports to Honduras amounted to about
$3.7 billion, with knit and woven apparel inputs accounting for a substantial portion.
U.S. imports from Honduras amounted to about $3.7 billion, with knit and woven
apparel (assembled products from the maquiladora sector) accounting for the lion’s
share. Other Honduran exports to the United States include bananas, seafood,
electrical wiring, gold, tobacco, and coffee. In terms of investment, the stock of U.S.
foreign direct investment in Honduras amounted to $402 million in 2005,
11 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Honduras,” October 2006.

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CRS-6
concentrated largely in the manufacturing sector.12 In the 110th Congress, H.Res.
532 (Gohmert), introduced July 10, 2007,would recognize the energy and economic
partnership between the United States and Honduras.
Honduras views CAFTA-DR as a way to make the country more attractive for
investment and as a way to protect its apparel benefits under the Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act, which expire in September 2008. Honduran officials also
view the CAFTA-DR as an important tool in helping transform the country’s
agricultural sector. Nevertheless, there are concerns about the adverse effects of
opening the Honduran market to U.S. agricultural products, especially for several
sensitive products such as corn, rice, beef, poultry, and pork. Most significantly,
Honduran officials are concerned about the loss of jobs in some sectors, which could
lead to social unrest if not addressed properly through long-term investment in the
agricultural sector.
One of the controversial issues in the CAFTA-DR debate in the United States
was how labor provisions would be handled. The agreement has provisions that
provide for the enforcement of domestic laws, establish a cooperative approach with
the International Labor Organization (ILO) to improve working conditions, and build
local capacity to improve labor rights. Opponents argue that the agreement should
have had provisions enforcing international standards, maintaining that Central
American countries have a history of non-enforcement of inadequate domestic laws.
In April 2005, Honduras and other Central American countries endorsed a work plan
with the goals of strengthening enforcement of labor laws in the region. In March
2006, the U.S. Department of Labor announced that it would be providing $5 million
in support of an International Labor Organization program to promote labor justice
under DR-CAFTA and evaluate its progress.13 Honduras has received criticism for
its poor labor conditions. According to the State Department’s 2006 human rights
report, there was credible evidence that blacklisting occurred in the maquiladoras
because of employees’ union activities.
U.S. Foreign Assistance
The United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras
over the past two decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion
in economic and military aid as the country struggled amid the region’s civil
conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional
conflicts subsided and competing foreign assistance needs grew in other parts of the
world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the United States provided almost
$300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the 1998 storm. As a
result of the new influx of aid, total U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s
amounted to around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of
2001, U.S. foreign aid levels to Honduras again began to decline.
12 United States Trade Representative, 2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Survey of
Current Business,” September 2006.
13 “ILO Awarded $5 Million for CAFTA-DR Labor Program,” International Trade
Reporter, March 23, 2006.

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CRS-7
Recent foreign aid funding to Honduras amounted to almost $54 million in
FY2005 and $53 million in FY2006 (see Table 1). The Bush Administration
requested $46.8 million for FY2007; country foreign aid allocations for FY2007 have
not yet been released. For FY2008, the Administration has requested almost $42.5
million in assistance, including $16.7 million in Development Assistance, $10.6
million in Child Survival and Health assistance, $10 million in food aid, and $3.3
million for a Peace Corps program.
These amounts include support for a variety of development projects in the area
of health, education, trade and investment capacity, agricultural sector productivity,
and the environment, as well as a large Peace Corps presence of over 200 volunteers.
For FY2008, no assistance was requested for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
because of competing priorities worldwide. In past years, small amounts of FMF
were used to provide critical maintenance, training, and operational support for the
Honduran Armed Forces, and to enhance maritime interdiction capabilities. For
FY2008, the Administration is requesting $750,000 in International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement Assistance (INCLE). In previous years, INCLE
assistance had been provided as part of a regional Latin America program and was
not reflected in bilateral assistance figures.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Honduras, FY2005-FY2008
(U.S. $ in thousands)
FY2007
FY2008
Account
FY2005
FY2006
(request)
(request)
Child Survival and Health
13,192
13,140
12,170
10,600
Development Assistance
20,856
20,604
13,290
16,731
Foreign Military Financing
1,492
891
675
0
International Military Education
1,322
1,218
1,285
880
& Training
International Narcotics Control
0
0
0
750
and Law Enforcement
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism &
0
315
0
0
Demining
Food Aid (P.L. 480)
13,538
13,105
16,000
10,000
Peace Corps
3,285
3,832
3,336
3,549
Total
53,685
53,105
46,756
42,510
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY2007
and FY2008.

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CRS-8
In addition to regular foreign assistance funding, in May 2005, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved a five-year $215 million compact for
Honduras. The MCC compact has two components, a rural development project and
a transportation project. The rural development project involves providing Honduran
farmers with the skills needed to grow and market horticultural crops. The
transportation project will improve a highway linking the Atlantic port of Puerto
Cortés to Pacific ports and major production centers in Honduras, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua. It will also involve improvements to main highways, secondary, and rural
roads to enable farmers and other businesses to get their products to markets more
efficiently.14
U.S. Military Presence
The United States maintains a troop presence of about 550 military personnel
known as Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first
established in 1983 with about 1,200 troops, who were involved in military training
exercises and in supporting U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the
region. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief,
medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and
rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American countries.
Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty and reserve components
provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and
reconstruction effort. In 2005, JTF Bravo deployed teams to provide disaster
assistance in response to Hurricane Stan in neighboring Guatemala and to Tropical
Storms Beta and Gamma in Honduras.15 In November 2006, about 50 troops from
JTF Bravo were dispatched to Panama to provide assistance after flooding in the
country.
In June 2006, President Zelaya announced that Honduras would seek to convert
part of the Soto Cano Air Base into a commercial air cargo terminal, while later in
the year the Honduran Defense Minister suggested that the conversion of Soto Cano,
which would take more work than originally thought and cost some $100-200
million, might not be viable financially.16 In a January 2007 speech to the Honduran
Congress, however, President Zelaya again reiterated that Soto Cano Air Base would
be upgraded so that it could be used as a commercial airport for exporting
merchandise to the United States.17
14 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Honduras Overview,” available at
[http://www.mcc.gov/countries/honduras/index.php].
15 Edmund Woolfolk and James Marshall, “JTF-Bravo and Disaster Relief,” Joint Force
Quarterly, Issue 42, 3rd Quarter 2006.
16 “Honduras: Upgrading Palmerola Base,” Latin America Regional Report, Caribbean &
Central America, October 2006.
17 “Honduras Usará Comercialmente Base Aérea de EEUU,” Associated Press, January 25,
2007.

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Migration Issues
As noted above, there are over 800,000 Hondurans living in the United States
who annually send back more than $2 billion to their families in Honduras. A
significant issue in bilateral relations has been the migration status of Hondurans
living in the United States. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United
States provided temporary protected status (TPS) to eligible Hondurans in the United
States, protecting them from deportation, because the Honduran government would
not be able to cope with their return. Originally slated to expire in July 2000, TPS
status for the eligible Hondurans has been extended six times. Most recently, TPS
was scheduled to expire on July 5, 2007, but on May 2, 2007, Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff announced that TPS for eligible nationals of Honduras (as
well as El Salvador and Nicaragua) would be extended for an additional 18 months.
Some 78,000 Honduras currently benefit from TPS.18 The extensions generally have
been granted because of the difficulty that Honduras would have in coping with their
return. For the most recent extension, a Homeland Security official maintained that
while Honduras, along with El Salvador and Nicaragua that also have TPS
designations, have made significant progress in recovery and rebuilding, each country
continues to face social and economic challenges in efforts to restore their nations to
normalcy.19
Although Mexico by far accounts for the largest share of U.S. border
apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol, Honduras is the second largest country of
origin of U.S. border apprehensions. In 2005, almost 53,000 Hondurans were
apprehended at the U.S. border, accounting for 4.4% of total border apprehensions,
with most apprehended at the U.S. southern border with Mexico.20
According to the Department of Homeland Security, in 2005 Honduras became
the first foreign country to agree to the use of video teleconferencing by Honduran
consular officers for travel document interviews in order to speed the deportation
process.21 The United States deported over 26,000 Hondurans in FY2006, while in
the first nine months of FY2007, over 18,000 Hondurans were deported.22 In March
2007, the Honduran Congress approved a motion calling for the United States to halt
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Secretary Chertoff Extends Temporary Protected Status for Eligible Hondurans,
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans,” Press Release, May 2, 2007.
19 “El Salvador-Honduras: Holding Out Hope for Immigration Reform,” Caribbean &
Central America Report, May 17, 2007.
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, “Border
Apprehensions: 2005,” Fact Sheet, November 2006.
21 “Homeland Security Department Introduces New Procedure to Expedite Honduran
Removals,” U.S. Fed News, April 19, 2005.
22 Information Provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal.

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CRS-10
deportations of undocumented Honduran migrants who live and work in the United
States.23
Drug Trafficking
Honduras is a transhipment country for cocaine flowing north from South
America by air, sea, and land. According to the State Department’s 2007
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, recent reports indicate that such
transit is increasing as drug traffickers have been shifting their boat traffic from
Guatemala to Honduras. Remote areas of Honduras, particularly the country’s
eastern Gracías a Díos department, are natural safe havens for drug traffickers,
providing them with isolated areas to refuel maritime assets and make boat-to-boat
transfers.
The State Department report lauded Honduras for its cooperation with the
United States on counternarcotics efforts, noting close bilateral cooperation in
investigation and operations. A “Special Vetted Unit” in the Honduran police uses
sensitive narcotics intelligence to target major traffickers operating in the country
and to disrupt and disband transnational organized crime groups. The State
Department maintained that Zelaya government has made combating drug trafficking
a priority. This has included the expansion of maritime interdiction, especially along
the north coast, strengthened international cooperation, and initiatives to weed out
corrupt officials. It noted the government’s passage of two important laws in 2006:
a transparency law to provide public access to the workings of the government, and
reforms to the country’s civil procedure code that will speed up the judicial process
and allow for public oral arguments. The report also stated that the government took
action to fire police who have committed crimes or are linked to drug traffickers, and
to institute procedures to polygraph members of special investigative units.
At the same time, the State Department report stated that effective
counternarcotics efforts face such obstacles as funding constraints, a weak judicial
system marred by corruption and heavy caseloads, a lack of coordination, and
leadership challenges. It noted that the United States is encouraging Honduran law
enforcement to conduct cooperative criminal investigations on drug trafficking
organizations on the north coast and other areas of the country. Looking ahead, the
State Department noted that Honduras would like to make improvements to the
police academy and institutionalize anti-corruption efforts. It also maintained that
Honduras’ participation in the Container Security Initiative (discussed below) will
be a major deterrent to drug smuggling, weapons trafficking, and terrorism.
In mid-March 2007, the Zelaya government announced a plan to combat the
transit of drugs from Colombia to the United States along the Atlantic coast of
Honduras. Government officials stated that it would be establishing police
installations in the rural department of Gracías a Díos (in the Mosquitia region that
borders Nicaragua) with the technical assistance of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
23 “CN Pide a EEUU que Cesen las Deportaciones de Compatriotas,” La Tribuna (San Pedro
Sula, Honduras), March 14, 2007.

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CRS-11
Administration.24 President Zelaya also reactivated an interagency Council for the
Fight Against Drug Trafficking (CNLCH) that with the Ministers of Security and
Defense participating along with the Attorney General. The military’s role in
combating drug trafficking and other crimes will be expanded.25
Human Trafficking
According to the State Department’s 2007 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report,
Honduras is a source country for women and children trafficked for the purpose of
sexual exploitation, with many victims trafficked from rural areas to tourist and
urban areas such as San Pedro Sula, the north Caribbean coast, and the Bay Islands.
According to the government and NGO’s, an estimated 10,000 victims had been
trafficked in Honduras, mostly internally. However, the report also maintained that
women and children were trafficked to Mexico, the United States, and Guatemala.
In 2005, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) worked with Honduran
authorities to break up a human smuggling ring that lured young Honduran women
to the United States for forced labor.26 The State Department’s 2006 human rights
report highlighted Guatemala as a destination country for the trafficking of Honduran
women, with Honduran authorities estimating that 20 to 30 children are trafficked
across the border daily for purposes related to sexual exploitation.
Although the State Department stated in the TIP Report that Honduras does not
fully comply with the minimum standards of trafficking, it noted that the government
is making significant efforts to do so (a so-called Tier 2 country). It pointed to a law
that prohibits trafficking for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and the
enactment of a separate anti-trafficking statute in February 2006. However, not all
forms of trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation are prohibited. The
government also conducted 27 anti-trafficking training sessions for its civilian police
force in 2006 and 10 anti-trafficking sessions that reached thousands of Hondurans.
The report indicates that Honduras has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol and it
recommends that the Honduran government intensify efforts to initiate prosecutions
under its new anti-trafficking law to achieve more convictions and increased
sentences against suspected traffickers. The State Department’s 2006 human rights
report maintains the application of the new anti-trafficking law has been limited. The
report also calls on the government to make greater efforts to increase shelter and
victim services. The Bush Administration’s FY2008 foreign aid request for
Honduras includes $200,000 to combat trafficking-in-persons and migrant
smuggling.
24 “Anuncian Plan Antidrogas en Honduras,” Associated Press, March 14, 2007.
25 “Honduran Government Launches Plan to Fight Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking,”
Open Source Center, March 15, 2007.
26 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “10
Charged in International Human Smuggling Ring that Lured Young Honduran Women to
U.S. for Forced Labor,” News Release, July 21, 2005.

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CRS-12
Crime
Crime and related human rights issues have been among the most important
challenges for the Honduran government. When President Maduro took office in
2002, kidnaping and murder were common in major cities, particularly in the
northern part of the country. Youth gangs known as maras terrorized many urban
residents, while corresponding vigilantism increased to combat the crime, with
extrajudicial killings increasing, including killings of youth.
Honduras, along with neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, has become
fertile ground for the gangs, which have been fueled by poverty, unemployment,
leftover weapons from the 1980s, and the U.S. deportation of criminals to the region.
The two major gangs in Honduras — Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, and the 18th Street
gang, or M-18 — were first established in Los Angeles in the 1980s by Salvadoran
immigrants who were excluded from Mexican-American gangs. The U.S.
deportation of Central American criminals back to the region in the 1990s may have
helped lay the foundation for the development of MS-13 and M-18 in Central
America.27 Although estimates of the number of gang members in Central America
vary widely, the U.S. Southern Command maintains that there are some 70,000,
concentrated largely in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.28
President Maduro, who campaigned on a zero-tolerance platform, increased the
number of police officers and cracked down on delinquency. The government signed
legislation in July 2003 making maras illegal and making membership in the gangs
punishable with 12 years in prison. Some human rights groups expressed concerns
about abuses and the effect of the crackdown on civil liberties. There were also
concerns that the crackdown would exacerbate already poor prison conditions.
Subsequently in 2004, a fire in the San Pedro Sula prison killed 107 inmates, mostly
gang members. Although the crackdown initially reduced crime (for example, an
80% decline in kidnapping and a 60% decline in youth gang violence)29 and was
popular with the public, crime subsequently picked up again. On December 23,
2004, MS-13 gang members massacred 28 people, including 6 children, on a public
bus crowded with Christmas shoppers in San Pedro Sula, an event that shocked the
Honduran nation.
Beginning in 2006, the Zelaya government — in a move to replace the Maduro
government’s zero-tolerance policy — initially announced measures to use dialogue
and other outreach techniques to convince gang members to give up violence and
reintegrate into society, but subsequently has focused more on traditional law
enforcement action to crack down on the gangs.30 In September 2006, the
27 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2005.
28 House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of Gen. Bantz Craddock,
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, March 9, 2005.
29 John Authers and Sara Silver, “Death of Son Persuades Honduran to Take Political
Stage,” Financial Times, August 11, 2004.
30 “Honduran Government Reaches Out to Rehabilitate Gangs,” ACAN-EFE, January 30,
(continued...)

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government launched Operation Thunder to increase the number of police and
military troops in the streets and conduct raids against suspected criminals. The
operation led to 1,600 arrests.31 The government has also pledged to increase the
police force by 1,000 members each year. The Zelaya government has been criticized
by human rights organizations for proposing reforms to the national police force law
that would include the creation of a Special Forces Battalion; these groups fear that
such a move could lead to the “militarization” of the police.32
Despite the Zelaya’s government’s efforts, crime and violence in Honduras have
continued unabated. According to the government’s Human Rights Commissioner,
the murder rate in 2006 stood at 46 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, third in Latin
America behind Colombia and El Salvador.33 Several high-profile killings have
drawn greater attention to the issue of violent crime in Honduras. In early March
2007, the second ranking officer in the Honduran police force was killed, reportedly
by the Cartel del Atlántico, a drug trafficking organization.34 Also on June 22, 2007,
Zelaya’s military chief of staff, Captain Alejandro Montino, was gunned down, less
than a month after the murder of the husband of Zelaya’s secretary.35
Several recent studies on the gangs in Central America contend that so-called
mano dura (strong arm) policies focused on repressing the gangs with law
enforcement may have contributed to the gangs becoming more organized and more
violent. They contend that Central American governments need to develop social
and economic prevention programs as a means of effectively dealing with the gang
crisis. Best practices are seen as involving strategies that are developed with
community collaboration so that prevention and law enforcement programs are
accepted by all sectors and the general population.36
30 (...continued)
2006.
31 “Honduras’ Operation Thunder: The Effort to Stem Rising Crime,” Stratfor, October 30,
2006.
32 “Honduras: Police Reform Suffers Serious Setbacks,” Central America Report, September
1, 2006; “Honduras Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2007.
33 “Homicide Rate in Violence-Prone Honduras One of the Region’s Highest,” Global
Insight Daily Analysis, March 12, 2007.
34 “Honduras: Gangsters Blamed for Killing Police Chief, LatinNews Daily, March 5, 2007.
35 “Military Chief of Staff Killed in Honduras”, Global Insight Daily Analysis, June 25,
2007
36 “Youth Gangs in Central American, Issues in Human Rights, Effective Policing and
Prevention,” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), November 2006;
“Transnational Youth Gangs in Central America, Mexico, and the United States,” Executive
Summary, WOLA and the Center of Inter-American Studies and Programs of the Instituto
Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), February 2007.

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Several U.S. agencies have been involved in assisting Honduras and other
Central American countries in dealing with the gang problem.37 On the law
enforcement side, the FBI established a task force in 2004 focusing on MS-13 that
allows the exchange of information with Central America law enforcement agencies.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has worked closely with
Honduran law enforcement pertaining to MS-13 and other gangs.38 The United
States has also conducted anti-gang training for Honduran law enforcement officials.
In January 2007, police and prosecutors from Honduras and other Central American
countries completed an anti-gang training program conducted at the U.S.-funded
International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador.39 The U.S. Agency for
International Development, while not having a specific program focusing on gangs,
supports several programs that attack the risk factors associated with gang
membership and violence. These include a program to provide basic education skills
to at-risk youths and a program to improve the effectiveness and transparency of the
justice system.40
In July 2007, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Thomas
Shannon, announced that the United States would pledge $4 million to help Central
American governments draft a regional security strategy to fight street gangs and
drug trafficking.41 Such a strategy would consist of five areas in which the United
States would work with partners in Central America: diplomacy, repatriation, law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.42
In the 110th Congress, H.Res. 564, approved by the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs July 31, 2007, would recognize that violence poses an increasingly
serious threat to peace and stability in Central America and would support expanded
cooperation between the United States and the countries in the region, including
Honduras. House-passed H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State Department, Foreign
Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, would provide $8 million to
combat transnational crime and criminal youth gangs, including in Central America.
Port Security
Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security.
For the United States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland
37 See CRS Report RS22141, Gangs in Central America, by Clare M. Ribando.
38 House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Statement of John P. Torres, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, Hearing on “Gangs and Crime in Latin America,” April 20, 2005.
39 U.S. Department of Justice, “Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
at the Press Conference Following Bilateral Meetings in El Salvador,” February 5, 2007.
40 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Central America and Mexico Gang
Assessment, Annex 3: Honduras Profile,” April 2006.
41 “U.S. Offers Funds to Help Fight Central America Gangs”, Reuters, July 18, 2007
42 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico”, July 18, 2007

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security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Honduras views
such cooperation as important in order to ensure the speedy export of its products to
the United States, which in turn could increase U.S. investment in the country.
In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest port in
Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI), becoming
the only port in Central America under the CSI. Puerto Cortés is the major facility
used for the export of apparel to the United States. The CSI program, operated by the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security,
uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for
terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on
vessels destined for the United States.
Honduras and the United States signed a Declaration of Principles in December
2005 that ultimately led to Honduras’ inclusion in the CSI. The Declaration also led
to Honduras’ involvement in the Megaports Initiative run by the National Nuclear
Security Administration of the Department of Energy. That initiative has the goal of
deploying radiation detection equipment to ports in order to detect nuclear or
radioactive materials.
In December 2006, the U.S. Departments of Energy and Homeland Security
launched a Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) with the goal of deploying a globally
integrated network of radiation detection and container imaging equipment to be
operated in seaports worldwide. Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world
chosen to be part of the first phase of the SFI, with the deployment of radiation
technology and nuclear detection devices. Testing of containers at Puerto Cortés
began in April 2007, with an end of year goal of having all containers bound for the
United States scanned for radiation before they are allowed to depart.43
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight
Initiative,” Press Release, December 7, 2006; R.G. Edmonson “U.S. Unveils Container
Security Test,” Journal of Commerce Online, December 7, 2006; “U.S. Begins Testing of
Secure Freight Initiative,” Journal of Commerce, April 13, 2007.

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