Order Code RL33512
Transportation Security:
Issues for the 110th Congress
Updated August 3, 2007
David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

---

Transportation Security: Issues for the 110th Congress
Summary
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to
terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is
difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is
how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response
that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack
without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. In the 110th
Congress, aviation, rail, and transit security have been a major focus of congressional
activity. On January 9, 2007, the House passed the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1), which contains provisions,
among others, on aviation and cargo security. On March 13, 2007, the Senate passed
the Improving America’s Security Act of 2007 (S. 4), which is similar but not
identical to H.R. 1. At the end of July 2007, the House and Senate passed a
conference agreement on H.R. 1 (H.Rept. 110-259) that was signed into law on
August 3, 2007 (P.L. 110-53).
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners
to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The act gave the TSA broad
authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these
risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been the subject of considerable
congressional oversight. P.L. 110-53 extends the existing authorization of such sums
as may be necessary for the TSA’s aviation security functions through FY2011.
The vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks is well
documented. Steps that can be taken to reduce the risks and consequences of an
attack include vulnerability assessments, emergency planning, and emergency
response training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police,
fire, and emergency medical personnel. A leading issue with regard to securing
truck, rail, and waterborne cargo is the desire of government authorities to track a
given freight shipment at any time, particularly the tracking of marine containers as
they are trucked to and from seaports. Security experts believe this is a particularly
vulnerable point in the container supply chain. Debate over who should pay for cargo
security, government or industry, and whether mandates or guidelines are the best
approach to ensure industry’s due diligence in protecting their supply chains are other
leading issues. Hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation raises numerous security
issues.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Passenger Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Baggage Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
In-Flight Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Transit and Passenger Rail Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Cargo Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Imported Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Private Industry’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Paying for Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program . . . . . . . . . 13
Hazmat Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

---

Transportation Security:
Issues for the 110th Congress
Introduction
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack.
The difficulty and cost of protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a
core question for policymakers: how much effort and resources to put towards
protecting potential targets versus pursuing and fighting terrorists. While hardening
the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to
deter terrorists. The focus of this report is how best to construct and finance a system
of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and
consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel,
commerce, and civil liberties.
For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principle policy objectives
that would support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the passengers and the cargo flowing through the system, (2)
ensuring the trustworthiness of the transportation workers who operate and service
the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle the cargo, (3) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the system, such as the
carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers, and (4) establishing a perimeter of security
around transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy
objectives are concerned with preventing an attack from within a transportation
system, such as occurred on September 11, 2001. The concern is that attackers could
once again disguise themselves as legitimate passengers (or shippers or workers) to
get in position to launch an attack. The fourth policy objective is concerned with
preventing an attack from outside a transportation system. For instance, terrorists
could ram a bomb-laden speed boat into an oil tanker, as they did in October 2002
to the French oil tanker Limberg, or they could fire a shoulder-fired missile at an
airplane taking off or landing, as they attempted in November 2002 against an Israeli
charter jet in Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these objectives is difficult,
at best, and in some modes, is practically impossible. Where limited options exist for
preventing an attack, policymakers are left with evaluating options for minimizing
the consequences from an attack.
Aviation Security
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the TSA and mandating a federalized

---

CRS-2
workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The
act gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and
take steps to mitigate these risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been
the subject of considerable congressional oversight. Aviation security policy and
programs will likely be of considerable interest in the 110th Congress as funding
authorization for most of the TSA’s aviation security functions expired at the end of
FY2006, and others are set to expire at the end of FY2007. Both the House and the
Senate have passed legislation to extend the existing authorization of such sums as
may be necessary for the TSA’s aviation security functions through FY2011 (see P.L.
110-53, section 1618).
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach. Aviation security policy since
September 11, 2001, consists of two basic principles: a risk-based approach for
allocating limited security resources to where they are considered most needed, and
a multi-layered strategy that establishes redundancies to thwart a potential terrorist
attack.
The risk-based approach implemented by the TSA has been criticized by some
who believe that an overemphasis on allocating resources to screening airline
passengers has left the system vulnerable to attacks in other areas — namely air cargo
operations; airport access controls; protecting airliners from shoulder-fired missiles;
and the security of general aviation aircraft. In essence, these critics argue that the
implementation of aviation security policy since September 11, 2001, has focused too
heavily on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios — such as suicide hijackings
and luggage bombs carried out by airline passengers — and has not given enough
attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
Given the emphasis on protecting against bombings and suicide hijackings, the
multi-layered concept for aviation security is most apparent in the protection of
passenger airliners. Passengers undergo prescreening to check their names against
lists of known and suspected terrorists, then passengers and their carry-on items are
screened and checked baggage is passed through explosive detection systems (EDS)
prior to aircraft boarding. Once onboard, security measures such as air marshals,
hardened cockpit doors, and armed pilots provide added layers of security to thwart
an attempted hijacking. The principle objectives of these measures are to prevent
aircraft bombings and hijackings by terrorist passengers. However, the effectiveness
of the TSA’s implementation of virtually all of these security layers has been brought
into question at some time or another since its creation.
Passenger Prescreening. Efforts to improve passenger prescreening have
been impacted by concerns over the adequacy of measures to protect fliers’ personal
information and not infringe upon their civil rights. Critics argued that the TSA’s
ever-expanding vision for prescreening was to include data mining of commercial
and government databases to look for indicators that someone may pose a threat, and
searches of notoriously inaccurate criminal databases. These concerns were spurred
by vague statements issued by the TSA as to how it might authenticate passenger
identity and check for possible links to terrorism along with media reports linking
passenger prescreening to controversial proposals such as the Department of
Defense’s Total Information Awareness program to detect terrorists by mining
personal data. This controversy ultimately led the TSA to scrap its proposed

---

CRS-3
enhanced passenger prescreening system, the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening II (CAPPS II), in August 2004, and pursue enhanced prescreening
capabilities under a new system called Secure Flight. While Secure Flight is touted
to be a significantly scaled down approach to prescreening compared to CAPPS II,
concerns over data protections and redress procedures for passengers falsely
identified by the system have also delayed its deployment. Provisions in the FY2007
Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-295) prohibit the TSA from fully
deploying the Secure Flight program until these ongoing concerns are adequately
addressed and also prohibit the use of commercial data or the transfer of passenger
data to a non-federal entity. While commercial databases have potential to
authenticate the identity of passengers, concerns have been raised about TSA’s past
handling of passenger data in a manner that was not fully explained to the public,
leading to this restriction on the transfer of personal data between the government
and private entities other than the initial exchange of passenger name records from
the airlines. A provision in P.L. 110-53 (section 1605) would require the TSA to
submit to Congress a plan for testing and implementing an advanced passenger
prescreening system to replace the current “no fly” and “selectee” lists distributed to
airlines for vetting passengers.
Recently, privacy advocates have raised considerable concerns over the
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a data-mining program for assessing the risk of
all international travelers, as well as freight carried on international flights. Recent
public disclosure regarding the scope of this program and associated data collection
and data retention policies, in November 2006, have renewed debate over whether
certain passenger information collection and analysis practices unduly infringe upon
privacy rights, or whether they are necessary actions to assess terrorism risks to
aviation. Provisions in P.L. 110-53 would require the DHS to establish an Office of
Appeals and Redress that would be charged with implementing a “timely and fair
process” for airline passengers delayed or denied boarding due to suspected
misidentifications during the prescreening process.
The TSA is also implementing a Registered Traveler (RT) program designed to
speed the passage through security checkpoints of frequent fliers who voluntarily
submit background information and biometric identifiers. Initial trials of the RT
program concept concluded in October 2005, and the TSA is currently rolling out
a nationwide RT program. According to the TSA, it will be up to individual airports
to determine if they wish to participate in this program. About 20 airports are
expected to be part of the initial roll out of the nationwide RT program. However,
as TSA moves forward with RT, the airline industry, which once backed this program
as a means to reduce hassles for frequent fliers, now characterizes the manner in
which it is being implemented as having limited and questionable benefit.
Passenger Screening. With regard to screening passengers, the TSA has
struggled to strike a balance between effectively screening passengers for threat
objects without causing undue delays and hassles to travelers. While the TSA is
usually keeping passenger wait times below the stated objective of 10 minutes at
smaller airports, average passenger wait times at major airports are typically greater.
Further, audits of airport screening have concluded that screener performance still
needs improvement. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General found that screener training, screening technology, policies and procedures,

---

CRS-4
and management and supervision of screening operations all contributed to observed
deficiencies in screener performance.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA give priority attention to
implementing technology and procedures for screening passengers for explosives,
something not currently done routinely at screening checkpoints. Provisions to
improve checkpoint technologies to detect explosives were included in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, hereafter
the “Terrorism Prevention Act”). To address the issue of detecting explosives carried
by passengers, the TSA pilot tested walk-through trace detection portals and has
implemented procedures for conducting pat-down searches of passengers for
explosives. Full deployment of the walk-through trace detection portals, or puffer
machines, for use in secondary screening of selected passengers has been part of the
TSA’s strategy for screening passengers for explosives, but this initiative has been
put on hold due to maintenance issues with deployed systems. The effectiveness of
the strategy has also been brought into question by the recent foiled plot to bomb
U.S.-bound airliners using liquid explosives. The TSA is working to identify
strategies and technologies that more completely address the explosives threat posed
by passengers and carry-on items.
Provisions in P.L. 110-53 (see section 1607) would require the TSA to finalize
within 30 days the strategic plan for checkpoint explosives detection required by the
Terrorism Prevention Act, and fully implement the plan within one year of
enactment. The act also contains provisions (see section 1612) that would eliminate
the cap on the system-wide number of TSA screeners, and would require specialized
training for screeners on security skills such as behavioral observation and analysis,
explosives detection, and document examination. The act directs the TSA to hire
sufficient personnel to ensure adequate aviation security and reduce average security-
related delays to less than 10 minutes. The act would also establish a separate
“Checkpoint Security Screening Fund,” specifying that $250 million in security fees
collected during FY2008 be deposited into this fund (see section 1601). Amounts
deposited into the fund would be available for research, development, deployment,
and installation of equipment to improve the detection of explosives at passenger
checkpoints. The act also directs the TSA to carry out a pilot study to examine
technologies to improve the security at exits to airport secured areas (see section
1613).
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening. A key issue in
the debate over aviation security immediately following September 11, 2001, was
whether airport security screeners should be federalized. At that time, airport
screening operations suffered from high turnover, poor supervision and training, low
wages, and a lack of regulatory oversight. All of these factors were believed to have
contributed to a poor performing and highly vulnerable screening system.
Federalizing the screener workforce was offered as a potential solution to address
these deficiencies. However, while Congress ultimately resolved to federalize the
screener workforce at most airports under ATSA, the act also set up a pilot program
using contract screeners at five airports and gave all airports the option to request
private screeners on an airport-by-airport basis starting November 19, 2004. While
several airports had expressed an interest in private screening, they are being cautious
in proceeding because the TSA has offered few details and limited guidance on how

---

CRS-5
private screening will be implemented. Another factor that has limited airport
interest in private screening has been lingering liability concerns. Language in the
FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90, section 547)
indemnifies airports from liability relating to their decisions to either request private
screeners or continue using federal screeners and from any claims that may arise due
to negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of airport security screeners,
whether they be federal or private. Nonetheless, while the pilot program airports
have all continued to use private screeners, interest in the TSA’s Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) — or opt-out program — for private screeners among
other airports has been limited, and only one has been fully converted to private
screening operations since the program was made available.
Baggage Screening. While airports are, for the most part, meeting
mandated requirements to inspect checked bags with explosive detection system
(EDS) equipment 100% of the time, airports are continuing to struggle with the
daunting task of integrating these systems into baggage handling and sorting
facilities. To address these needs, Congress established (in Vision 100, P.L. 108-
176) an Aviation Security Capital Fund with a mandatory funding level of $250
million annually and a total authorized funding level of $500 million per year through
FY2007. Congress also gave the TSA the authority to issue letters of intent (LOIs)
to airports, committing future funding toward in-line EDS integration projects.
Despite these measures, efforts to integrate EDS systems at all airports is progressing
slowly, prompting the 9/11 Commission to recommend that the TSA expedite
installation of these in-line baggage screening systems. Provisions to expedite and
increase funding for in-line baggage screening were included in the Terrorism
Prevention Act. However, in contrast to authorization language in Vision 100 (P.L.
108-176) that set federal funding levels for aviation security capital projects at 90%
for large and medium hubs and at 95% for all other airports, appropriations language
(see P.L. 109-90; P.L. 109-295) has limited the federal share of project costs under
LOIs to 75% for medium and large hubs, and 90% for all other airports in FY2006
and FY2007. Meeting funding needs for airport security projects and setting priorities
amid budgetary constraints remains an ongoing challenge for Congress. Provisions
in P.L. 110-53 would extend authority for mandatory funding of the Aviation
Security Capital Fund through 2028, would authorize an increased discretionary
funding level of $450 million in FY2008 through FY2011 for in-line baggage
screening, and would require the TSA to prioritize airport projects based on risks and
other considerations (see sections 1603 and1604).
Air Cargo Security. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns that,
while 100% of passenger baggage is required to be screened, only a relatively small
amount of cargo carried on passenger airplanes is physically inspected. The 9/11
Commission recommended that TSA intensify its efforts to identify, track, and screen
potentially dangerous cargo. Congress responded by increasing funding for air cargo
security operations and research to $115 million in FY2005, compared to $85 million
in FY2004, and designating funds for expanding the known shipper program for
vetting shipments on passenger aircraft; increasing oversight of cargo security; and
continuing research and development of technologies to improve air cargo security.
In both FY2006 and FY2007, funding for air cargo security operations has been set
at $55 million. Language in the FY2006 DHS appropriations act also directs the
TSA to work with other DHS components to develop technologies that will aid in

---

CRS-6
meeting the objective of screening 100% of all cargo placed on passenger airliners,
and language in the FY2007 direct the TSA to work with industry to increase the use
of EDS equipment for cargo screening. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, section 1602) contains a provision that
would require screening of all air cargo placed on passenger aircraft, using methods
such as X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection,
TSA-certified canine teams, or physical searches with manifest verification, in a
manner that provides a level of security equivalent to the screening of passenger-
checked baggage. The provision would phase-in the percentage of cargo required to
be inspected, setting these levels at 50% within 18 months, and 100% within three
years of enactment. The measure is opposed by various stakeholders in the air cargo
industry that believe its requirements are overly burdensome and costly.1
The 9/11 Commission also recommended deploying at least one hardened cargo
container on each passenger airliner for carrying suspect cargo. While this
recommendation was reflected in a Terrorism Prevention Act provision mandating
a study of the proposal to deploy blast-resistant cargo containers, the 9/11
Commission noted that this is progressing slowly. P.L. 110-53 contains a provision
that would require the DHS to complete its evaluation of this pilot program by
January 1, 2008, and, based on this evaluation, provide hardened cargo containers for
risk-based deployment on commercial flights. Under this provision, the cost of
acquiring, maintaining, and replacing hardened cargo containers would be provided
for by the DHS (see P.L. 110-53, section 1609).
While hardened containers are designed to mitigate the threat of a terrorist bomb
carried in a cargo shipment or luggage, some policymakers believe that the only
effective way to mitigate such a threat is to screen all cargo placed on passenger
aircraft as is currently done for checked baggage. As noted above, P.L. 110-53
contains a provision that would require 100% physical inspection of all cargo placed
on passenger aircraft within three years. The TSA, however, has cautioned that such
an approach is not technically and logistically feasible at the present time without
unduly impacting cargo operations on passenger aircraft. The TSA has instead
proposed a strategic plan calling for the use of risk-based prescreening techniques to
identify cargo for targeted inspection or exclusion from carriage on passenger aircraft
and a threefold increase in random inspections. The TSA has been working on a
freight assessment system for assigning risk to cargo shipments and targeting
screening and inspection efforts on elevated risk cargo. It is anticipated that the TSA
will introduce this system sometime in FY2008.
In addition to improving the screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft,
improvements in security programs for all-cargo operations are planned to protect
against unauthorized access to large all-cargo aircraft. Under new cargo security
rules, secured areas of airports are being expanded to include cargo operations areas
thus requiring criminal background checks and security threat assessments for an
estimated 50,000 additional airport workers. The new regulations also impose
requirements on freight forwarders that ship by air and require security threat
1 “House To Consider Bill Today Requiring Additional Cargo Screening,” Transportation
Weekly, January 9, 2007, p. 7.

---

CRS-7
assessments for workers with access to air cargo including an estimated 51,000 off-
airport employees of freight forwarding companies. Also, under these regulations,
an industry-wide database of known shippers has been established and is being
maintained by TSA to allow freight forwarders and airlines to vet cargo shipments.
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls. While ATSA mandated background
checks for all workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft and secured areas
of airports, concerns over the adequacy of security measures for these workers have
been raised because, in some cases, airport workers are permitted to bypass airport
screening checkpoints. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress called for the
physical screening of all workers with access to aircraft or secured areas. Report
language accompanying both the Senate (S. 1644; S.Rept. 110-84) and the House
(H.R. 2638; H.Rept. 110-181) FY2008 appropriations bills would provide funding
for a pilot program to assess physical screening of airport employees.
ATSA also called for the TSA to explore the use of biometrics and other
identification technologies for credentialing transport workers and the use of
biometrics for airport access controls. The Terrorism Prevention Act required the
TSA to issue guidance on the use of biometrics for airport access controls and the use
of biometric technology to verify the identity of law enforcement officers authorized
to carry firearms on passenger airliners. P.L. 110-53 includes language that would
require the TSA to report on its progress implementing access control measures for
airline flight and cabin crew members and would establish a national registry and
biometric access credential for law enforcement officers authorized to fly armed on
commercial passenger aircraft (see sections 1614 and 1615). Another provision in
P.L. 110-53 (section 1616) would suspend further certification of foreign repair
stations one year after enactment, unless and until required security regulations are
put in place and regulatory compliance audits of repair station facilities are carried
out by TSA inspectors.
In-Flight Security Measures. Existing in-flight security measures consist
primarily of federal air marshals, armed pilots on some flights, and hardened cockpit
doors. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was greatly expanded under ATSA
and air marshals are required on all high risk flights. In November 2003, the Federal
Air Marshal program was taken out of the TSA and realigned with the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, the DHS Second Stage
Review (2SR), issued in June 2005, proposed that the FAMS be placed back in the
TSA, a proposal that Congress agreed to in report language accompanying the
FY2006 DHS appropriations act. FAMS is once again part of the TSA. Recently,
FAMS has been criticized by some current and former air marshals for procedures
— such as dress codes and check-in procedures — that, they assert, compromise the
covert mission of FAMS and place marshals and the traveling public at risk.
Despite the administration’s initial reservations over allowing airline pilots to
be armed, airline pilots may receive training allowing them to serve as armed Federal
Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) under provisions set forth in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program to
include all-cargo pilots and other flight crew members such as flight engineers.
Congress appropriated $25 million for FY2006 for the Federal Flight Deck Officer
(FFDO) program and cabin crew self-defense training. However, there are lingering

---

CRS-8
concerns that the procedures to apply for the FFDO program are too cumbersome and
the training site is too remote to accommodate many pilots interested in participating
in the program. Some participants and observers have also voiced concerns that
restrictive policies over carrying guns outside the cockpit potentially limit the
program’s effectiveness.
ATSA also mandated the implementation of hardened cockpit doors and
stringent controls regarding access to the flight deck. The Terrorism Prevention Act
contains a provision to study the use of secondary flight deck barriers — a concept
United Airlines had been moving forward with on its own initiative — to mitigate
the vulnerability introduced when a hardened cockpit door is opened in flight for
meal service or when a pilot needs to access the aircraft lavatory.
P.L. 110-53 (section 1610) includes a provision directing the DHS to expedite
research and development of technologies to mitigate the introduction of an
explosive device on a passenger airplane or reduce the damage such a device could
cause on the ground or in flight. The provision calls for pilot projects to test such
technologies and also explore the use of deployable flight recorder devices and
remote flight data-recording capabilities for security purposes. Along similar lines,
the FAA has issued proposed rulemaking for security considerations in the design of
large jet airliners, including improving systems survivability, cockpit and cabin fire
suppression, improving flight deck barriers, and creating areas onboard where
explosives discovered during flight can be contained to mitigate damage caused by
a detonation.2
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat. Concerns have also been raised over
the potential threat to civil aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles (also known as
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS). Appropriations language in
FY2003 directed the DHS to establish a program evaluating the feasibility of
adopting military aircraft anti-missile systems for use on passenger jets. This
program is still ongoing. Two contract teams, led by Northrop-Grumman and BAE
Systems, are developing prototype anti-missile systems. Language in the Terrorism
Prevention Act calls for the FAA to implement an expedited process to certify the
safety of aircraft-based counter-MANPADS systems and also includes language
directing the administration to urgently pursue international arms-control agreements
to limit the proliferation of MANPADS. FY2007 DHS appropriations (P.L. 109-
295) provided $40 million for counter-MANPADS research and development. Of
this, $35 million is designated for evaluating the suitability of aircraft-based systems
in the airline industry. This appropriation is down from the FY2006 level of $110
million, reflecting a shift from a technology development effort to a technology
evaluation phase during FY2007. In addition to the funding of aircraft-based
counter-MANPADS systems, a smaller amount of funding has been allocated for
research on ground-based protection systems. In April 2006, the DHS issued a
solicitation seeking alternative counter-MANPADS technologies for a demonstration
project and recently awarded contracts for research and development efforts that will
2 Federal Aviation Administration, “Security Related Considerations in the Design and
Operation of Transport Category Airplanes; Proposed Rule,” Federal Register, 72(3), pp.
629-639, January, 5, 2007.

---

CRS-9
assess ground-based MANPADS countermeasures and other alternative mitigation
options, in addition to the ongoing aircraft-based counter-MANPADS system
development and evaluation initiatives.
General Aviation Security. While some policymakers have expressed
concern that security measures for general aviation aircraft are, in their estimation,
weak and practically non-existent, general aviation operators have countered that they
have been overburdened by unnecessary airspace and airport restrictions. General
aviation restrictions are most prevalent in the Washington, DC area, where the city
is encircled by a 15-mile radius flight restricted zone (FRZ) in which general aviation
operations are significantly limited, and a larger air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) where pilots must strictly adhere to special air traffic control procedures. In
August 2005, the DHS implemented a security plan permitting certain general
aviation flights — mostly large charter and corporate operations — to resume at
Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA) which is located at the center of the
flight restricted area.
At various times, flight restrictions have also been put in place over New York
City, Chicago, and elsewhere. General aviation pilots have been restricted from
flying over Disney theme parks and over stadiums during major sporting events,
leading some general aviation advocates to question whether special interests were
using the umbrella of security concerns to curtail unwanted advertising overflights.
General aviation advocates also point to a large number of restricted airspace
violations — more than 1,000 per year since the terrorist attacks of 2001 — as
evidence that security-related restrictions are overly complex and too broad in scope.
Almost one-half of these violations occurred in the airspace around Washington, DC,
where complex communications procedures have been put in place over a wide area.
The FAA announced in July 2007 that it will reduce the size of the Washington
ADIZ to a 30-mile ring, but will impose speed restrictions within that ring, as well
as inside a larger 60-mile ring below 18,000 feet. Most small general aviation
aircraft will not be affected by the proposed speed limits.
Also, about one-quarter of airspace violations have occurred in airspace
temporarily restricted around sites during presidential visits. The scope of restricted
airspace around sites visited by the President has been of particular concern to
general aviation operators because the size of these areas has grown significantly,
identifying the boundaries of these temporary restrictions is often difficult for pilots,
and systems for disseminating information regarding the location and effective times
of restrictions are imperfect.
Securing general aviation operations continues to be a significant challenge
because of the diversity of operations, aircraft, and airports. Measures put in place
thus far, such as the Airport Watch program and TSA’s general aviation security
guidelines, rely heavily on the vigilance of the pilot community to detect and report
suspicious activity. In the area of flight training, flight training providers are engaged
in verifying citizenship or confirming that background checks have been properly
completed by the TSA before providing training to foreign nationals, as mandated
under P.L. 109-176. A provision in the Terrorism Prevention Act would allow
aircraft leasing and charter companies to voluntarily provide the TSA with names of
prospective customers for prescreening against the consolidated terrorist watchlist.

---

CRS-10
Also, the FY2006 DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-90) requires the DHS to assess
security vulnerabilities from general aviation aircraft and identify steps that can be
taken to enhance the security of general aviation aircraft and airports. A provision
in H.R. 1 would require the TSA to develop and implement a standardized risk
assessment program at GA airports. Provisions in the bill also call for establishing
a grant program to enhance security at GA airports, if such a program is deemed
feasible, and would establish a requirement for foreign-registered GA aircraft to
submit passenger information to the TSA prior to entering U.S. airspace. (CRS
contact: Bart Elias)
Transit and Passenger Rail Security
A number of recent bombings — of passenger train in Mumbai in July 2006, of
transit trains and a bus in London in July 2005, and of commuter trains and subway
trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004 — illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail
systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems — primarily subway systems —
in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do
airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed
primarily for easy access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led
to concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to ‘softer’ targets, such as transit
or passenger rail. A key challenge Congress faces is balancing the desire for
increased rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of transit systems,
with the potential costs of an attack, and with other federal priorities.
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to
subject all rail passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo.
Consequently, transit security measures tend to emphasize managing the
consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to reduce
the risks, as well as the consequences, of an attack. These include conducting
vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; and emergency response training and
drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency
medical personnel. Additional options include increasing the number of transit
security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations,
and conducting random inspections of passengers’ bags, platforms, and trains
visually and with the aid of bomb-sniffing dogs.
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of
securing bus passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers
each weekday in the United States. Some transit systems have installed video
cameras on their buses, and Congress has provided grants for security improvements
to intercity buses. But the number and operation characteristics of transit buses make
them all but impossible to secure.
TSA has not issued a plan assessing the risks to the passenger rail sector and
prioritizing security investments for the sector. The Department of Homeland
Security provides grants for transit, passenger rail, and freight rail security under the
Urbanized Areas Security Initiative program. Congress provided $150 million for
these grants for FY2005 and again for FY2006, and $275 million for FY2007. The
Administration requested $175 million for these grants for FY2008; the House and
Senate have approved $400 million.

---

CRS-11
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53), passed by Congress on July 27, 2007, includes provisions on passenger rail
and transit security. These include authorizing $3.5 billion for grants for public
transportation security, of which $840 million can be used for security-related
operating expenses and $100 million for research and development (sections 1406
and 1409); $2 billion for grants for railroad security (section 1513), of which $200
million is for safety improvements to rail tunnels in New York, Baltimore, and
Washington, DC (section 1515); and $132 million is for research and development
(section 1518), and $95 million for grants for over-the-road bus security (sections
1532 and 1535). Public transportation agencies and railroads considered to be high-
risk targets by DHS would be required to have security plans approved by DHS
(sections 1405 and 1512).
Other provisions include funding for TSA to hire up to 100 more surface
transportation security inspectors (section 1304); currently TSA has 100 such
inspectors, requiring DHS to conduct a name-based security background check and
an immigration status check on all public transportation and railroad frontline
employees (sections 1414 and 1522), and giving DHS the authority to regulate rail
and transit employee security training standards (sections 1408 and 1517). (CRS
contact: David Randall Peterman)
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security
Cargo Visibility. A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and
waterborne cargo is to what extent government authorities need the capability to track
a given shipment at a particular time. Much of the attention with regard to cargo
visibility concerns the tracking of marine shipping containers. Marine containers are
not currently outfitted with tracking devices, but it is common practice to seal
container doors with tamper-evident fixtures. Security officials are concerned that
a particularly vulnerable stage in the container shipping process occurs when
containers are trucked to the overseas port of loading or when they are trucked from
the U.S. port of unloading to their final U.S. destination. At this stage, the integrity
of the shipment rests solely with the trustworthiness or due diligence of the truck
driver. A sensor or tracking device could help ensure the integrity of container
shipments during these vulnerable stages. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, there
has been rapid development of palm-sized tracking devices and sensors that could be
inserted on an interior wall of a container. However, while this so-called “smart-
box” technology is being tested in selected routes, it has not been resolved whether
and how best to deploy it on a widespread basis. In the near term, shippers and
carriers favor using the best container seals currently in use rather than moving to the
more costly sensor and tracking devices. Congress is likely to continue its oversight
of the technological development of container security devices and debate whether
these devices can be effectively deployed to improve cargo security.
Imported Cargo. Of particular concern is ensuring the integrity of imported
cargo. Over 11 million marine containers from all corners of the globe arrive at U.S.
seaports annually, while 11 million truckloads and over 2 million railcars arrive at
U.S. land border crossings. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has issued new requirements requiring freight carriers to
report cargo manifests (shipment information) before they reach U.S. borders.

---

CRS-12
Container ships must report shipment details on each container 24 hours before it is
loaded at a foreign port. Truckers from Canada and Mexico must report their trailers’
contents from 30 minutes to an hour prior to border arrival and railroads must report
this information two hours prior to border arrival. CBP analyzes the cargo manifests
and other intelligence to select which cargo units to physically inspect. CBP’s
selection process is thus critical in keeping terrorists and their weapons from being
smuggled into the country.
In its oversight role, Congress is scrutinizing CBP’s cargo inspection process.
In the Port Security Improvement Act (P.L. 109-347), Congress required DHS to
evaluate whether additional cargo information is needed to evaluate shipment risk
and required DHS to reexamine its targeting system to determine where
improvements to the system could be made. Congress also required DHS to set up
a pilot program at three overseas ports to test the feasibility of scanning all U.S.-
bound containers at those ports, a program DHS refers to as “The Secure Freight
Initiative.” The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 (P.L. 110-53, section 1701), requires that all imported containers be scanned
by nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign
loading port by July 1, 2012, but the Secretary of DHS may extend the deadline at a
port or ports by two-year increments if two of the following six conditions are met:
! scanning systems are not available for purchase and installation;
! scanning systems do not have a sufficiently low false alarm rate for
use in the supply chain;
! a port does not have the physical characteristics to install a scanning
system;
! scanning systems cannot be integrated with existing systems;
! scanning systems will significantly affect trade capacity and the flow
of cargo; and
! scanning systems do not adequately provide an automated
notification of questionable or high-risk cargo as a trigger for further
inspection by trained personnel.
Proponents of 100% scanning argue that the manifest information CBP relies
on to flag which containers to scan is simply not an adequate basis for determining
risk and thus requiring all containers to be scanned is necessary. Container shippers
and carriers have argued that 100% scanning will severely bottleneck port operations,
not only because of the time required to scan a container but more significantly, the
time required for a customs official to analyze the results of a container scan.
Opponents of 100% scanning also assert that current scanning equipment is not
accurate enough and could be relatively easily circumvented by terrorists.
Private Industry’s Role. Because most surface and marine freight
transportation assets are owned by private industry, and because there are too many
shipments for government to monitor on its own, government officials have to rely
extensively on private industry to tighten control over their supply chains. Industry
has taken steps to protect their operations from terrorist infiltration. The Association
of American Railroads has conducted a security risk assessment that prioritizes the
industry’s assets and lists countermeasures to be taken at different alert levels.
Railroads have also created a “Railway Alert Network” that is designed to make sure

---

CRS-13
individual railroads receive timely threat information. Barge operators have created
a “Model Vessel Security Plan” through their industry association, the American
Waterways Operators. The American Trucking Associations has expanded a
“Highway Watch” program to include training for drivers on how to spot suspicious
activity. Intermodal (container) shippers have created a “Smart and Secure Trade
Lanes” program to evaluate anti-tampering and tracking devices for marine
containers. An issue for policymakers is determining the best approach for ensuring
private industry’s cooperation and due diligence over the long term. For example,
policymakers are evaluating which security measures should be mandated versus
which ones should be issued as guidelines or “best practices.” How to validate that
the agreed upon security measures are in fact being carried out by industry is also an
issue. With regard to CBP’s Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program,
Congress requested DHS to conduct a pilot program to test whether third party
entities could be used to validate shippers’ compliance with the program.3
Paying for Cargo Security. Freight carriers and shippers are private, for-
profit corporations, which raises the issue of whether they or general taxpayers
should pay for security improvements. Advocates for public funding argue that
homeland security is a national concern and therefore a federal government
responsibility that should be paid for from the general Treasury. Others argue that
carriers and shippers are the direct beneficiaries of improved cargo security. They
argue that it is in their own economic interest to protect their assets from terrorist
attack, that additional security measures also deter cargo theft which is costly to the
freight industry, and that therefore they should bear the cost of security
improvements. Several legislative efforts to establish a security fee paid by industry
to generate funds for a federal port security grant program have failed in Congress.
Meanwhile, some ports and freight carriers are beginning to add security surcharges
to their freight invoices while other carriers are presumably incorporating extra
security-related costs in their freight rates. The Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, section 1308) requires DHS to
conduct a study of the need for and feasibility of creating a user fee in the maritime
and surface modes for funding transportation security improvements.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. On January
25, 2007, the TSA and Coast Guard issued a final rule for implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports.4
Longshoremen, port truck drivers, merchant mariners, and other maritime workers
will need to apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted access to port facilities or
vessels. The card will use biometric technology for positive identification and TSA
will conduct a security threat assessment on each worker before issuing a card. The
security threat assessment will use the same procedures and standards established by
TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous materials. These standards examine
criminal history, immigration status, mental capacity, and terrorist activity to
determine whether a worker poses a security threat. A worker will pay a fee of about
$137 that is intended to cover the cost of administering the cards. Port facility
operators will be responsible for deploying card readers at the gates to their facilities.
3 See section 218 of P.L. 109-347.
4 Federal Register, v. 72, no. 16, January 25, 2007, pp. 3492 - 3604.

---

CRS-14
TSA is considering whether to incorporate the TWIC system into all modes of
transportation. As TWIC nears implementation, issues for Congress include what
affect implementation could have on the near-term supply of port workers.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53, section 1309) codifies in statute a list of criminal offenses that would
disqualify a worker from obtaining a TWIC card, but allows the Secretary of DHS,
by rulemaking, to add to or modify the list of disqualifying offenses. These offenses
were included in the final regulation issued by DHS on January 25, 2007. (CRS
contact: John Frittelli)
Hazmat Cargo Security
Hundreds of thousands of trucks and railroad tank cars transport tons of
hazardous materials (hazmat) daily. These shipments can be used as instruments or
targets of terror. There is a virtually unlimited number of ways that the hazmat
transportation system is at risk from terrorists. For example, tank trucks can be
attacked, drivers can be killed, and loads can be hijacked and released during
shipment. Simply put, there are too many points of vulnerability to ensure security
during hazmat transportation. A major challenge is to cost effectively increase the
security of these shipments, especially those that pose the most danger to the public,
while still meeting, to the extent possible, the transportation requirements of
commerce.
Industry and government are gradually implementing a “layered” system of
measures affecting shippers, carriers, and drivers to reduce associated security risks.
This system involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. The
Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Homeland Security (DHS) have taken
actions to enhance the security of hazmat transportation. For example, DOT requires
shippers and carriers to implement security plans regarding specified hazmat
transportation. DOT grants encourage state and some local governmental personnel
to conduct hazmat inspections and to plan and train for spills of these materials.
Also, this Department has contacted thousands of companies that are seeking to
improve their security programs, and has established communication links with
industry.
DHS conveys threat information to law enforcement and industry, and conducts
vulnerability assessments. DHS administers a grant that provides for the training and
communications infrastructure which truck drivers, highway workers, and others use
to report potential security threats and safety concerns on the Nation’s roads. DHS
screens commercial drivers applying for an endorsement to carry hazardous materials
to determine whether a driver poses a security threat necessitating denial of the
hazmat endorsement. DHS has also deployed radiation detection equipment at
interstate truck inspection stations. Whether the pace of these actions is adequate or
not is subject to debate. It is widely recognized that more could be done to promote
hazmat transportation security, but additional costs would be incurred and tradeoffs
would need to be considered.
There remain many issues associated with hazmat transportation security. Many
Members of Congress want to know whether current federal policies, regulations, and

---

CRS-15
grants could more effectively promote hazmat transportation security at reasonable
costs. There are issues regarding routing of hazmat through urban centers and debate
persists over the pros and cons of rerouting high hazard shipments. Requiring
tracking devices for hazmat shipments and limiting security requirements to just
those hazardous commodities that are potentially the most dangerous are also topics
of debate. Other options include increased security awareness training for state truck
inspectors and certain employees of truck leasing companies, and requiring enhanced
security plans and communication systems for carriers of high hazard materials
shipments beyond those now required. Each of these options poses costs that need
to be evaluated within the context of other investments.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53) requires DHS, in consultation with the DOT, to develop a program to
encourage railroads to equip their railcars carrying “security-sensitive” materials with
tracking devices indicating their location and condition (see section 1552). The act
requires railroads to annually compile data on certain hazardous materials shipments,
provide a written analysis of the safety and security risks associated with those
shipments, and identify any practical alternative routes that may be more safe and
secure, including routes that involve interchange agreements with other railroads (see
section 1551). Regarding the trucking of hazardous materials (hazmat), the act
requires DOT, in consultation with DHS, to review existing hazmat routes and
develop criteria based on safety and security concerns to assist states in designating
routes for hazmat transportation (see section 1553(a)). The act requires DOT to
assess whether route plans currently required for trucks carrying radioactive or
explosive materials should also be required for trucks carrying other types of hazmat
(see section 1553(b)). The act requires DHS, in consultation with DOT, to develop
a program to facilitate the tracking of “security-sensitive” material shipments (see
section 1554). (CRS contact: John Frittelli)

---