Order Code RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security
Updated August 3, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but much of Iraq
remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency,
compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that a January 2007 national intelligence
estimate (NIE) said has key elements of a “civil war.” Mounting U.S. casualties and
financial costs — without dramatic improvements in levels of violence or clear
movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq’s major communities
— have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S.
involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals.
President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 (“New Way
Forward”) consisting of deployment of at an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to help
stabilize Baghdad and restive Anbar Province. The strategy is intended to provide
security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key
reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as “benchmarks” of political progress. The
FY2007 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 110-28, linked some U.S. reconstruction
aid to progress on the eighteen named benchmarks, but allows for a presidential
waiver to continue the aid even if little or no progress were observed in
Administration reports due July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007. According to the
required July 15, 2007 Administration report, released on July 12, the Baghdad
security plan has made progress on several military indicators and some political
indicators, but progress is unsatisfactory on the most important political
reconciliation indicators. The Administration report asserts that the “overall
trajectory... has begun to stabilize.” U.S. officials assert that the security plan builds
on important successes: two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an
interim and then a full-term parliament and government; a referendum that adopted
a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005); progress in building Iraq’s security
forces; and economic growth.
Some in Congress — as well as the Iraq Study Group — believe that the United
States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. Both chambers
adopted a FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan (H.R. 1591) that would have set an outside deadline of March 31, 2008
for U.S. combat withdrawal if the President did not certify Iraqi progress on the
“benchmarks.” President Bush vetoed it on May 1, 2007 and subsequent bills
mandating forms of withdrawal or combat reduction have not moved forward,
although some observers say such legislation might see further action after the
Administration’s September 15 progress report. Some bills support the Iraq Study
Group’s recommendations.
This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff;
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS
Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by
Christopher Blanchard.

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Contents
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SICI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . . . 5
Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Early Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 13
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.N. Involvement/Coalition Military Mandate/Status of
U.S. Forces/Permanent Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Resolutions 1511 and 1546 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Elections in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Maliki Government, Political Reconciliation, and “Benchmarks” . . . . . . . 19
Political Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq
Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Democracy and Local Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Oil Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Iranian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Iraq’s Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security/”Troop Surge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
“Clear, Hold, and Build” Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction
Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Baghdad Security Plan/”Fardh Qanoon”/Troop Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Surge Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

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President’s January 10 Initiative, Iraq Study Group Report, Legislation, and
Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Iraq Study Group Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Congressional Reaction to Troop Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Further Options: Altering Troop Levels or Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Further Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Immediate and Complete Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Troop Reduction/Mission Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Planning for Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
International and Regional Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Reorganize the Power Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Decentralization and Break-Up Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Negotiating With Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Economic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
List of Tables
Table 1. Iraq Basic Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Major Factions in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that
is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British
forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in
1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but
were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni
Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance,
facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941,
during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of
Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence
of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was
killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was
only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-
Sa’id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of
Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a
Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria,
although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during
Saddam’s rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian
philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was
to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring

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CRS-2
Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by
Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Table 1. Iraq Basic Facts
Population
27.5 million
Demographics
Shiite Arab - 60%; Sunni Arab - 17-20%; Kurd - 15-
20%; Christian - 3%.
Comparative Area
Slightly more than twice the size of Idaho
GDP
$87.9 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP per capita
$3,000 per year
Unemployment Rate
25-30%
Inflation Rate
60%+
Source: CIA World Factbook, updated June 2007
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to try to do so
militarily because (1) the United Nations had approved only liberating Kuwait; (2)
Arab states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad; and (3) the
Administration feared becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.1 Within
days of the war’s end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds
in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support,
rebelled. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim
Republican Guard forces were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S. forces and
were intact to suppress the rebellion. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for
not intervening on their behalf. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly
zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and
remained autonomous thereafter.
Subsequent to the war, the thrust of U.S. policy was containment, consisting of
U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international economic
embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and southern
Iraq.2 However, President George H.W. Bush did pursue regime change to some
1 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
2 The implementation of these policies is discussed in CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former
(continued...)

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CRS-3
extent, including reportedly sending Congress an intelligence finding that the United
States would try to promote a military coup. The Administration apparently believed
that a coup could produce a favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After
a reported July 1992 coup failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad
movement,3 but the United States did not help them militarily.
The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions
During the Clinton Administration, the United States built ties to and
progressively increased support for several of the Shiite and Kurdish factions
analyzed below. Some of these factions have provided major figures in post-Saddam
politics, while also fielding militias that are allegedly conducting acts of sectarian
reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq. Also discussed in the table are Sunni factions, almost
all of which, to varying degrees, oppose the dominant Shiites and Kurds. They are
discussed in greater depth later, in the analysis of post-Saddam security issues.
During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to overthrow Saddam,
beginning with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 105-174). The
sentiment was expressed more strongly in the “Iraq Liberation Act” (ILA, P.L. 105-
338, October 31, 1998). Signed by President Clinton despite doubts about
opposition capabilities, it was viewed as an expression of congressional support for
the concept of promoting an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air power. That law, which
states that it should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove
the regime headed by Saddam Hussein, is often cited as evidence of a bipartisan
consensus that Saddam should be toppled. Section 8 states that the act should not
be construed as authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
The ILA did not specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from
power. Section 7 provides for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups
with “democratic goals.” The law also gave the President authority to provide up to
$97 million worth of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in
broadcasting funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration. In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was a
component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton made seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S.
2 (...continued)
Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June
2, 1992.

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military assistance under the ILA (P.D. 99-13): INC; INA; SICI; KDP; PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);4 and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM). In May 1999, the Clinton Administration provided $5 million
worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles under the ILA. About 150
oppositionists underwent Defense Department-run training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida on how to administer a post-Saddam Iraq. However, the Administration
judged that the opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat
training. These trainees were not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the
Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups had
authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim, to run the INC on a daily basis. (A table on U.S.
appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).5
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi. The INA enjoyed Clinton Administration support in 1996 after squabbling
among other opposition groups reduced their viability,7 but the INA was penetrated
by Iraq’s intelligence services, which arrested or executed over 100 INA activists in
June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The incursion
enabled Baghdad to rout INC and INA agents in the north.
The Kurds.8 The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. Historically fearful of persecution
by the Arab majority, the Kurds have carved out a high degree of autonomy and run
4 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally de-listed.
5 Chalabi’s father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the
1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American
University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran
afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In April 1992, he was convicted
in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of $400 million.
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New York
Times, June 9, 2004.
7 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
8 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.

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CRS-5
their own three-province region run by a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Through legal procedures as well as population movements, the Kurds are trying to
secure the mixed city of Kirkuk, which they covet as a source of oil that would
ensure their autonomy or eventual independence. The Kurds achieved insertion of
language in the permanent constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on
whether Kirkuk might formally join the Kurdish administered region. (The Iraq Study
Group report, released December 6, 2006, in Recommendation 30 believes that this
referendum should be delayed.)9 Both major Kurdish factions — the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
led by Masud Barzani — are participating in Iraqi politics, but the PUK more so;
Talabani is Iraq’s president.
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SICI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have become dominant in post-Saddam politics; Shiites
constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented in all pre-2003
governments. Several Shiite Islamist factions cooperated with the U.S. regime
change efforts of the 1990s, but others did not. The undisputed Shiite religious
leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, remained in Iraq, taking a low profile, during
Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he was not involved in U.S.-backed regime change
efforts. As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of emulation) and the most senior of the
four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of
seminaries).10 About 85 years old, Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran,
before relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, was Ayatollah Abol Qasem
Musavi-Khoi, was head of the Hawza until his death in 1992. Like Khoi, Sistani is
a “quietist” — generally opposing a direct political role for clerics, but he believes
in clerical supervision of political leaders. He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic
culture and favors modest dress for women, and curbs on sales of alcohol and
Western music and entertainment.11
Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI). SICI (in May 2007 it changed
its name from the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, SCIRI),
considers itself the largest party within the “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA) of Shiite
political groupings. SICI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in
1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to
overthrow him. During Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978), he was
hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, then head of the Hawza, and the father
of the Hakim brothers (including current leader Abd al-Aziz) that founded SICI.
SICI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but
SICI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and other aid from Iran.
Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SICI refused to accept U.S.
funds, although it did have contacts with the United States.
9 The report can be obtained at [http://www.usip.org].
10 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
11 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

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Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Da’wa (Islamic Call)
Party, which did not directly join the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein
during the 1990s, is both an ally and sometime rival of SCIRI. The leader of its
main faction in Iraq was Ibrahim al-Jafari, a Da’wa activist since 1966 who fled to
Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown, later going to London. He was
transitional Prime Minister during April 2005-April 2006. His successor as Prime
Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, was named Da’wa leader in early July 2007, prompting an
attempt by Jafari to agitate against Maliki. Although there is no public evidence that
Jafari or Maliki were involved in any terrorist activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the
Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of
Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait.
(It was reported in February 2007 that a UIA/Da’wa parliamentarian, Jamal al-
Ibrahimi, was convicted by Kuwait for the 1983 attacks.) Lebanese Hezbollah,
founded by Lebanese Da’wa Party activists, attempted to link release of the
Americans they held hostage in Lebanon in the 1980s to the release of 17 Da’wa
prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. In post-Saddam Iraq,
another faction of Da’wa – also under the UIA umbrella – is loyal to Abd al-Karim
al-Anazi.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction. Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as a major —
some believe the most powerful — figure in Iraq. After the fall of Saddam Hussein,
he was viewed as a young firebrand who lacked religious and political weight, but
the more established Shiite factions have since built ties to him because of his large
following among poor Shiites who identify with other “oppressed Muslims” and who
oppose virtually any U.S. presence in the Middle East. He is now perceived as clever
and capable — at the same time participating in the political process to avoid all-out
confrontation with the United States but at the same time denouncing the “U.S.
occupation.” This criticism has a central feature of his activities during 2007, and
his “Mahdi Army” militia forces are increasingly active against British forces in
southern Iraq, against U.S. forces, and against rival Shiite factions and Iraqi security
forces. Pro-Sadr candidates won pluralities in several southern Iraqi provinces in
the elections held in January 2005. (In Recommendation 35, the Iraq Study Group
recommended that the United States try to talk to Sadr, as well as Sistani, as well as
with other parties except Al Qaeda-Iraq.)

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CRS-7
Table 2. Major Factions in Iraq
Major Shiite and Kurdish Factions
Iraq National
The INA leads the main secular bloc in parliament. Allawi, about 60 years old
Accord
(born 1946 in Baghdad), a former Baathist who helped Saddam silence Iraqi
(INA)/Iyad al-
dissidents in Europe in the mid-1970s. Subsequently fell out with Saddam,
Allawi
became a neurologist, and presided over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe.
Survived an alleged regime assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a
secular Shiite, but many INA members are Sunni ex-Baathists and ex-military
officers. Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-April 2005). Won 40
seats in January 2005 election but only 25 in December 2005. Spends most of
his time outside Iraq and reportedly trying to organize a non-sectarian
parliamentary governing coalition.
Iraqi National
Chalabi, who is about 67 years old, educated in the United States
Congress
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. One of the rotating
(INC)/Ahmad
presidents of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). U.S.-backed Iraqi police
Chalabi
raided INC headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as
part of an investigation of various allegations, including provision of U.S.
intelligence to Iran. Case later dropped. Since 2004, has allied with and fallen
out with Shiite Islamist factions; was one of three deputy prime ministers in the
2005 transition government. With no INC seats in parliament, now spends
substantial time abroad, but remains chair of the Higher National De-
Baathification Commission and has resisted de-Baathification reform efforts.
Serves as liaison between Baghdad neighborhood committees and the
government in 2007 Baghdad security plan.
Kurds/KDP and
Together, the main factions run Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with
PUK
its own executive headed by “president” Masud Barzani, Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, and a 111 seat legislature (elected in January 30, 2005
national elections). PUK leader Talabani remains president, despite March
2007 health problems that required treatment in Jordan and the United States.
Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s base in the Kurdish north and has
distanced himself from national politics. Many Kurds are more supportive of
outright Kurdish independence than are these leaders. Kurds field up to
100,000 peshmerga militia. Their joint slate won 75 seats in January 2005
national election but only 53 in December 2005. Grudgingly supported
framework draft oil law sent to parliament, but strongly oppose related draft
implementing law that would place 93% of Iraq’s oil fields under control of a
revived Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). Both factions intent on securing
control of Kirkuk.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position in government
Ayatollah Ali
but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become instrumental in major
al-Sistani
political questions, particularly in 2003 and 2004. Helped forge UIA and
brokered compromise over the selection of a Prime Minister nominee in April
2006. Strongly criticized Israel’s July 2006 offensive against Lebanese
Hezbollah. However, acknowledges that his influence is waning and that calls
for Shiite restraint are unheeded as Shiites look to armed parties and militias for
defense in sectarian warfare. Does not meet with U.S. officials. Has a
network of agents (wakils) throughout Iraq and among Shiites outside
Iraq. Treated for heart trouble in Britain in August 2004. Aide stabbed
to death by unknown assailant in July 2007.

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CRS-8
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party and generally allied
Islamic Council
with Da’wa Party in UIA. It was established in 1982 by Tehran to centralize
of (SICI)
Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq. First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim,
killed by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Current leader is his younger brother,
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric and a member of
parliament (UIA slate), but he holds no government position. Hakim currently
undergoing lung cancer treatment in Iran, instilling uncertainty in SICI
leadership. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance Minister, and
another, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is a deputy president. Controls “Badr Brigades”
militia. Son, Ammar al-Hakim, is a key SICI figure as well and is said to be
favored to take over SICI should his father leave the scene. As part of UIA,
SICI has 29 members in parliament. Supports formation of Shiite “region”
composed of nine southern provinces and dominates provincial councils on
seven of those provinces. Supports draft oil law as the means to develop the
oil sector.
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active against Saddam
Call) Party
Hussein in early 1980s. Its founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, uncle of
Moqtada Al Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by
Saddam regime in 1980. Da’wa members tend to follow senior Lebanese Shiite
cleric Mohammad Hossein Fadlallah rather than Iranian clerics, and Da’wa is
not as close to Tehran as is SICI. Has no organized militia and a lower
proportion of clerics than does SICI. Within UIA, its two factions control 25
seats in parliament. Supports draft oil law.
Moqtada Al-
Young (about 31), the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah Mohammed
Sadr Faction
Sadiq al-Sadr (killed, along with his other two sons, by regime security forces
in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam). Inherited father’s political
base in “Sadr City,” a large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad,
but also strong in Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Basra, Amarah, and other major
Shiite cities. Still clouded by allegations of involvement in the April 10, 2003,
killing in Iraq of Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi
and head of his London-based Khoi Foundation. Formed “Mahdi Army”
militia in 2003. Now part of UIA, faction controls 30 seats in parliament (under
UIA) and two more under the “Mission” bloc. Sadr faction, prior to its April
2007 pullout from the cabinet, held ministries of health, transportation, and
agriculture and two ministry of state posts. Opposes Shiite “region” in the
south, and generally opposes draft oil law as a “sellout.”
Fadilah Party
Fadilah (Virtue) won 15 seats parliament as part of the UIA coalition but
publicly broke from the UIA on March 6, 2007, possibly to negotiate a new
coalition with Allawi. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, who was a
leader of the Sadr movement after the death of Moqtada’s father in 1999 but
was later removed by Moqtada and subsequently broke with the Sadr faction.
Holds seats on several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces and
dominates Basra provincial council, whose governor is a party member. Also
controls protection force for oil installations in Basra, and is popular among oil
workers in Basra. Opposes draft oil law as too favorable to foreign firms.
Hezbollah Iraq
Headed by ex-guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC and now in parliament. Party’s power base is southern marsh areas around
Amara (Maysan Province), north of Basra. Has some militiamen.
Tharallah
Led by Sayyid Yusuf al-Musawi. Small Shiite faction in southern Iraq.
Islamic Amal
A relatively small faction, Islamic Amal (Action) Organization is headed by
Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a moderate cleric. Power base is in
Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against Saddam regime in the 1980s.
Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s
and 1990s. One member in the cabinet (Minister of Civil Society Affairs).

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CRS-9
Ayatollah
Another Karbala-based faction, loyal to Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hassani, who
Hassani Faction
also was a Sadrist leader later removed by Moqtada. His armed followers
clashed with local Iraqi security forces in Karbala in mid-August 2006.
Hassani, along with Fadilah, are considered opponents of Iran because of Iran’s
support for SICI and Da’wa Party.
Major Sunni Factions
Iraqi Consensus
Often referred to by Arabic name “Tawafuq,” Front is led by Iraqi Islamic
Front
Party (IIP), headed by Tariq al-Hashimi, now a deputy president. (Ousted)
(Tariq al-
COR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani, a hardliner, is a senior member; in July
Hashimi and
2006, he called the U.S. invasion “the work of butchers.” IIP withdrew from the
Adnan al-
January 2005 election but led the Sunni “Consensus Front” coalition in
Dulaymi)
December 2005 elections, winning 44 seats in COR. Front, critical but
accepting of U.S. presence, also includes Iraqi General People’s Council of the
hardline Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the National Dialogue Council (Mashhadani’s
party). Hashimi visited the United States in December 2006 and met with
President Bush. Opposes draft oil law as sellout to foreign companies and
distrusts Shiite pledges to equitably share oil revenues. Pulled five cabinet
ministers out of government on August 1; defense minister Mifraji remains in
post, as does Hashimi.
Iraqi Front for
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis on the new
National
constitution, but was dissatisfied with the outcome and now advocates major
Dialogue
revisions. Bloc holds 11 seats, generally aligned with Consensus Front.
(Saleh al-
Opposes draft oil law on same grounds as Consensus Front.
Mutlak)
Muslim
Hardline Sunni Islamist group, has boycotted all post Saddam elections.
Scholars
Believed to have ties to/influence over insurgent factions. Wants timetable for
Association
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Iraqi government issued a warrant for Dhari’s arrest
(MSA, Harith
in November 2006 for suspected ties to the Sunni insurgency, causing Dhari to
al-Dhari and
remain outside Iraq (in Jordan). Opposes draft oil law as too likely to produce
Abd al-Salam
Shiite/Kurdish control over the oil sector.
al-Qubaysi)
Sunni Tribes
Not an organized faction per se, but one group of about 20 tribes, the National
Salvation Council of Shaykh Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi, credited by U.S.
commanders as a source of anti-Al Qaeda support that is helping calm Anbar
Province. Some accounts in June 2007 say Council is splintering due to
jealousy of Rishawi. Some large tribal confederations include Dulaym
(Ramadi-based), Jabburi (mixed Sunni-Shiite tribe), Zobi (near Abu Ghraib),
and Shammar (Salahuddin and Diyala regions). (See CRS Report RS22626,
Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, by Hussein Hassan.)
Iraqi Insurgents
As discussed below, numerous factions and no unified leadership. Some groups
led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others by Islamic extremists. Major Iraqi
factions include Islamic Army of Iraq, New Baath Party, Muhammad’s Army,
and the 1920 Revolution Brigades; perceived as increasingly opposed to Al
Qaeda-Iraq leadership of insurgency, a trend promoting stability in Anbar.
Al Qaeda in
AQ-I was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, until his death
Iraq (AQ-I) /
in U.S. airstrike June 7, 2006. Succeeded by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (Abu
Foreign
Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian. Estimated 3,000 in Iraq from many nations,
Fighters
including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but increasingly subordinate to Iraqi Sunni
insurgents under the banner of the “Islamic State of Iraq.” ISI has named
“ministers” of a post-occupation Iraq. Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite
civilians to accelerate civil conflict. Related foreign fighter faction, which
includes some Iraqis, is Ansar al-Sunna, based in/around Mosul.

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CRS-10
Post-September 11, 2001:
Regime Change and War
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been advocates of a
regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy led the Bush
Administration initially to continue its predecessor’s containment policy.12 Some
accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to confront
Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During its first year, the
Administration tried to prevent an asserted erosion of containment of Iraq by
achieving U.N. Security Council adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a
“smart sanctions” plan. The plan relaxed U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to
Iraq of purely civilian equipment13 in exchange for renewed international
commitment to enforce the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.
Bush Administration policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002, given as major combat in the U.S.-led war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as
Iraq, that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in
March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the Arab leaders visited urged greater U.S.
attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed war with Iraq.
Some accounts, including the books Plan of Attack and State of Denial by Bob
Woodward (published in April 2004 and September 2006, respectively), say that then
Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential
consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a
democracy after major hostilities ended. Press reports in May 2007 indicate that
warnings of such difficulties were issued by the CIA before the invasion. Other
accounts include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British
intelligence officials (based on conversations with U.S. officials) saying that by mid-
2002 the Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and that it
sought to develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President Bush
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the House
passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N.
weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
12 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.
13 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Christopher Blanchard and Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-11
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. A “comprehensive”
September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the
“Duelfer report,”14 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The formal U.S.-led
WMD search ended December 2004,15 although U.S. forces have
found some chemical weapons caches left over from the Iran-Iraq
war.16 The UNMOVIC work was formally terminated by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1762 of June 29, 2007.
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.17 For more information, see CRS Report RL32217,
Iraq and Al Qaeda, by Kenneth Katzman.
14 Duelfer report text is at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
15 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
16 Pincus, Walter. “Munitions Found in Iraq Renew Debate.” Washington Post, July 1, 2006.
17 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.

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CRS-12
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
As major combat in Afghanistan wound down in mid-2002, the Administration
began ordering a force to Kuwait (the only Gulf country that agreed to host a major
U.S. ground combat force) that, by early 2003, gave the President an active option
to invade Iraq. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and broaden the Iraqi
opposition and, according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002), authorizing
stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces against Saddam
Hussein. In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments jointly invited six
major opposition groups to Washington, D.C., and the Administration expanded its
ties to several groups composed primarily of ex-military officers. The
Administration also began training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,18
although reportedly only about 70 completed training at Taszar air base in Hungary,
eventually serving as translators during the war. The Administration blocked a
move by the major factions to declare a provisional government, believing that doing
so would prevent the emergence of secular, pro-democracy groups.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002) that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration then gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with all applicable
Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection. Iraq reluctantly
accepted it. In January and February 2003, UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei briefed
the Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002.
Although they were not denied access to suspect sites, they criticized Iraq for failing
to actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions, but also noted progress and
said that Iraq might not have retained any WMD.
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and
“to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq.” It passed the
House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and the Senate the following day (77-23). It was
signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely, and no U.N. resolution authorizing
force was adopted. At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that Iraq was not
complying with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively revealing
information, and that diplomatic options had failed. The following day, President
18 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,” Washington
Post, October 19, 2002.

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CRS-13
Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave
Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country19 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles. Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics. Some
post-major combat evaluations (for example, “Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and
Bernard Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused
more on combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored
forces. No WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into
Kuwait; it is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than
150 km). The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein
appeared with supporters that day in Baghdad’s mostly Sunni Adhamiya district.
(Saddam was captured in December 2003, and on November 5, 2006, was convicted
for “willful killing” of Shiite civilians in Dujail in 1982. He was hanged on
December 30, 2006.)
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance
According to statements by President Bush, U.S. goals are for an Iraq that can
sustain, govern, and defend itself and is a partner in the global war on terrorism.
Administration officials have, for the most part, dropped an earlier stated goal that
Iraq serve as a model of democratic reform in the Middle East.
Early Transition Process
The formal political transition has advanced since the fall of Saddam Hussein,
but has not achieved political reconciliation among the newly dominant Shiite
Arabs, Sunni Arabs that have been displaced from their former perch at the apex of
Iraqi politics, and the Kurds who have felt perennially oppressed by Iraq’s Arabs.
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly
grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not
produce democracy. The Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.)
to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S. government personnel to administer
Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003. He headed the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of
Defense, created by a January 20, 2003, executive order. The Administration largely
discarded the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year
19 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. See Washington Post, March 27, 2003, p. A19.

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CRS-14
before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.20
Garner and then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, tried to establish a
representative successor regime by organizing a meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15,
2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and ethnicities. A subsequent meeting of
over 250 notables was held in Baghdad (April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold
a broader meeting one month later to name an interim administration.
In May 2003, the Administration, reportedly preferring what they perceived as
stronger leadership in Iraq, named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace Garner by
heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed ORHA. The
CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). Bremer discontinued Garner’s political transition process and
instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body: the 25-
member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-
member “cabinet” to run the ministries, with roughly the same factional and ethnic
balance of the IGC (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). Although there were some
Sunni figures in the CPA-led administration, many Sunnis resented the new power
structure as overturning their prior dominance. Adding to Sunni resentment were
some of the CPA’s most controversial decisions, including to pursue “de-
Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 Iraqis at four top ranks
of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and not to recall members of the armed forces to
service (CPA Order 2).
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The Bush Administration
initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent on the completion of a new
constitution and the holding of national elections for a new government, tasks
expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah Sistani and others
agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty and direct elections. In November 2003, the
United States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and
that national elections would be held by the end of 2005. That decision was
incorporated into an interim constitution — the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), drafted by the major anti-Saddam factions and signed on March 8, 2004.21
It provided a roadmap for political transition, including (1) elections by January 31,
2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; (2) drafting of a permanent
constitution by August 15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15,
2005; and (3) national elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), by December 15, 2005. Under the TAL, any three
provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds majority. If that happened, a
new draft would be written and voted on by October 15, 2006. The Kurds maintained
their autonomous KRG and their peshmerga militia could still operate.
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
20 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/]. The project cost
$5 million and had 15 working groups on major issues.
21 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website at [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].

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CRS-15
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.” After considering several other options, the
United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to select a government.22
Dominated by senior faction leaders, it was named and began work on June 1, 2004.
The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the
advertised June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. There was a president (Ghazi
al-Yawar), and Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, heading
a cabinet of 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was
roughly the same as in the IGC. The defense and interior ministers were Sunnis.
U.N. Involvement/Coalition Military Mandate/Status of U.S.
Forces/Permanent Basing. The Administration asserts that it has consistently
sought and obtained U.N. and partner country involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution
1483 (cited above) provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq, and “called on”
governments to contribute forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14,
2003) established U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)23. The size of UNAMI
in Iraq, headed by former Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, exceeds 100 in
Iraq, with at least an equal number “offshore” in Jordan. It is focused on promoting
political reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring human rights practices
and humanitarian affairs. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Baghdad in
March 2007 and later said that UNAMI would expand its presence in Iraq and
perhaps take on additional duties to promote political reconciliation. A reported
draft U.N. Security Council resolution, circulating in August 2007, would renew
UNAMI’s mandate (which expires August 10, 2007) with an enhanced responsibility
to be lead promoter of political reconciliation in Iraq and plan a national census. (In
Recommendations 7 and 26 and several others the Iraq Study Group calls for
increased U.N. participation in promoting reconciliation in Iraq.)
Resolutions 1511 and 1546.
In an attempt to satisfy the requirements of
several nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition force presence, the United
States achieved adoption of Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), authorizing a
“multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.” Resolution 1546
(June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by endorsing the handover of
sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim government, and spelling
out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq, as well as authorizing a
coalition component force to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. Resolution 1546
also:
! It “authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for security. Iraqi
forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and the
relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The
U.S.-led coalition retained the ability to take prisoners.
22 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post,
April 15, 2004.
23 Its mandate has been renewed each year since, most recently by Resolution 1700 (August
10, 2006).

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CRS-16
! It stipulated that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.” Resolution 1637 (November 11, 2005) and Resolution
1723 (November 28, 2006) each extended the coalition military
mandate for an additional year (now lasting until at least December
31, 2007), unless earlier “requested by the Iraqi government.” The
renewal resolutions also required review of the mandate on June 15,
2006 and June 15, 2007, respectively. In early June 2007, Iraq’s
parliament passed a motion, led by the Sadr faction, to require the
Iraqi government to seek parliamentary approval before asking that
the coalition military mandate be extended. The interim review was
completed on June 14, 2007 and made no changes.
! Resolution 1546 deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces
(Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi government.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in July 2005 that U.S. military
lawyers were working with the Iraqis on a SOFA, but no such
agreement has been signed to date. Major facilities include Balad,
Tallil, and Al Asad air bases, as well as the arms depot at Taji; all
are being built up with U.S. military construction funds in various
appropriations. P.L. 109-289 (FY2007 DoD appropriations) contains
a provision that the Defense Department not agree to allow U.S.
forces in Iraq to be subject to Iraqi law.
! On permanent basing, the Defense Appropriation for FY2007 (P.L.
109-289) and the FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28) contain
provisions prohibiting use of U.S. funds to establish permanent
military installations or bases in Iraq. These provisions comport with
Recommendation 22 of the December 2006 Iraq Study Group report,
which recommends that the President should state that the United
States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. The latter law
also says that the United States shall not control Iraq’s oil resources,
a statement urged by Recommendation 23 of the Iraq Study Group
report. Another bill, H.R. 2929, forbidding the use of appropriated
funds to establish permanent bases in Iraq or control Iraq’s oil,
passed the House on July 25, 2007 by a vote of 399-24.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. As of the June 28, 2004,
handover, the state of occupation ceased, and a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte)
established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991. A
U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with about 1,100 U.S.
personnel.24 Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, and he was succeeded in April 2007 by Ryan Crocker, formerly
24 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.

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Ambassador to Pakistan. The large new embassy complex, with 21 buildings on 104
acres, is under construction. 25 A reported May 2007 memo by Ambassador Crocker
asking for experienced State Department personnel to be assigned to Iraq was
perhaps foreshadowed by the December 2006 Iraq Study Group report. In
Recommendations 73-76, the Iraq Study Group report lays out several initiatives that
could be taken “to ensure that [the United States] has personnel with the right skills
serving in Iraq.” In conjunction with the handover:
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). (Resolution 1723 of November 28, 2006, extends
the IAMB monitoring of the DFI until December 31, 2007, subject
to review by June 15, 2007. That review made no changes.)
Resolution 1546 also gave Iraq responsibility for close-out of the
“oil-for-food program;”26 Resolution 1483 ended that program as of
November 21, 2003.
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by a State Department component called the “Iraq
Reconstruction and Management Office” (IRMO). With the
expiration of that unit’s authority in April 2007, it was renamed the
“Iraq Transition Assistance Office,” ITAO, headed since June 2007
by Mark Tokola. ITAO is is intended to promote the efficiency of
Iraq’s ministries and Iraq’s takeover of management of the projects
built with U.S. reconstruction funds, although Iraq reportedly has
been unable or unwilling to take control of a large percentage of
completed projects, according to press reports in July 2007. The
authority has also expired for a separate DoD “Project Contracting
Office (PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William McCoy (under the
Persian Gulf division of the Army Corps of Engineers). It funded
large infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants, and school
renovations.
Elections in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq focused on three
national votes held in 2005. On January 30, 2005, elections were held for a
transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and the Kurdish regional
assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, mostly boycotted, and no major
Sunni slates were offered, enabling the UIA to win a slim majority (140 of the 275
seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate the provincial and national
25 A FY2005 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of $658
million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad; an FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $1.327 billion for U.S. embassy operations and
security.
26 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Christopher Blanchard and Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-18
governments formed subsequently. PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named president;
Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister. Although it had a Sunni Arab as Assembly
speaker; deputy president; deputy prime minister; Defense Minister; and five other
ministers, it did not inspire Sunni support and violence around Iraq continued to
worsen. (See CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Government Formation and Performance,
by Kenneth Katzman.)
Permanent Constitution. Over Sunni opposition, the constitution drafted
by a committee appointed by the elected transition government was approved on
October 15, 2005. Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in two provinces,
but not in the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni opposition
was the provision for a weak central government (“federalism”): it allows groups of
provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with their own regional
governments, internal security forces, and a large role in controlling revenues from
any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this concept because their region,
unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites, has thus far lacked significant
proven oil reserves and they depend on the central government for revenues, although
some new substantial oil and gas fields have recently been reported to lie in Anbar
Province. It contained an article (137) that promises a special constitutional review,
within a set deadline, intended to mollify Sunnis on key contentious points.
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some harder line Sunnis,
seeking to strengthen their position to amend the constitution, moved into the
political arena: the Sunni “Consensus Front” and Iraqi Front for National Dialogue
put forward major slates. With the UIA alone well short of the two-thirds majority
needed to unilaterally form a government, Sunnis, the Sadr faction, secular
groupings, and the Kurds demanded Jafari be replaced; they subsequently accepted
as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (April 22, 2006). Talabani was selected to continue
as president, with two deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi of SICI and Tariq al-Hashimi of
the Consensus Front. (The former has lost one and the latter has lost three siblings
to sectarian violence in 2006; Abd al-Mahdi was nearly assassinated in a March 2007
bombing.)
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won approval of a 36-
member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Among
his permanent selections were Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam
al-Zubaie as deputy prime ministers. (Zubaie was seriously wounded in an
assassination attempt purportedly orchestrated by one of his aides on March 22,
2007; he has now recovered.) Four ministers (environment, human rights, housing,
and women’s affairs) are women. Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts named, a
total of seven are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one is Christian
(minister of human rights, Ms. Wijdan Mikha’il). Maliki did not immediately name
permanent figures for the major posts of Interior, Defense, and Ministry of State for
National Security because major factions could not agree on nominees. But, on June
8, 2006, he achieved COR confirmation of compromise candidates for those posts.

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CRS-19
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968. Fled Iraq in 1980 after
Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran, but then to Syria when he refused Iran’s orders
that he join Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Headed Da’wa
offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party newspaper. Reputed advocate of
aggressive purge of ex-Baathists as member of the Higher National De-Baathification
Commission after Saddam’s fall. Elected to National Assembly (UIA list) in January
2005 and chaired its “security committee.” Publicly supported Hezbollah (which shares
a background with his Da’wa Party) during July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict,
prompting congressional criticism during July 2006 visit to Washington DC. Believed
sympathetic to Kurds’ efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish region. Has tense
relations with SICI, whose activists accuse him of surrounding himself with Da’wa
members. Believed to be politically dependent on Sadr’s support and had, prior to 2007,
repeatedly shielded Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia from U.S. military sweeps. In October
2006, said he is a U.S. ally but “not America’s man in Iraq.” Following Bush-Maliki
meeting in Jordan (November 30, 2006), President Bush reiterated that Maliki is “the
right guy for Iraq.”
Maliki Government, Political Reconciliation, and
“Benchmarks”
Most observers agree that the “troop surge” announced on January 10, 2007 and
discussed further below will be judged by whether or not it facilitates political
reconciliation. The FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation Act (P.L. 110-28)
conditions the release of some funds for Iraq operations upon achievement of
eighteen stated benchmarks, and the Administration is required to report on progress
by July 15 and September 15, 2007. A presidential waiver to permit the flow of
funds is provided for and is being exercised by the Administration following the July
15 report, which was released on July 12, 2007.
By all accounts, including those of top U.S. commander in Iraq General David
Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and discussed in the July 15, 2007
progress report, progress on the most significant political reconciliation efforts has
been unsatisfactory to date, although Iraqi factions are continuing to negotiate
outstanding issues and even though the COR has passed over 50 laws since it was
established in early 2006, including a law adopted in July 2007 to regulate the
running of Iraq’s oil refineries. Senior Administration officials, including Vice
President Cheney (May 9, 2007), deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte (June
13-14, 2007), and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (June 15, 2007) have visited
Iraq recently and expressed to Iraqi leaders U.S. disappointment at the relative lack
of progress to date and to urge accelerated efforts. The dates below indicate the
benchmarks — and deadlines — to have been completed — as pledged by the Iraqis
in August 2006 — although U.S. officials say that, for the required reports,
particularly the July 12, 2007 report, they were looking for concrete signs of progress
and not necessarily completion.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under the
special amendment process (Article 137); approval of a law to implement formation of
regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the Independent

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CRS-20
High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The July 12, 2007 reports assessed progress on P.L.
110-28 benchmark # 1 (constitutional review process) as satisfactory. The constitution
review committee was appointed in November 2006 and made partial recommendations in
late May 2007, but it did not meet a new deadline of July 2007 (beyond the May 15
deadline) to finish its draft and no referendum on amendments is scheduled. Major
decisions on presidential powers, powers of individual regions, and on the status of Kirkuk
(which the Kurds want to affiliate with their region) await compromise by major factions.
An investment law (not one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks) was adopted in October 2006.
The regions law (P.L. 110-28 benchmark # 4) was adopted October 12, 2006, although, to
mollify Sunni opposition, major factions agreed to delay the formation of new regions for
18 months. The IHEC law (the first of three parts of benchmark # 5) was passed on
January 23, 2007, and the nine commissioners were appointed. (Recommendation 26 of the
Iraq Study Group report recommended that the constitution review be conducted on an
urgent basis.)
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law; and approval of a new oil law.
The drafting of a provincial election law is at an early stage; it is considered key to easing
Sunni resentment because the current councils, which expire in January 2009, have few
Sunnis on them. The Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 elections that formed the councils.
A draft law stipulating the powers of the provinces has received two readings in parliament,
although differences remain on the powers of the provincial governors and related issues.
( These are the remaining two of the three parts of benchmark # 5, and progress is assessed
as unsatisfactory.) Recommendation 29 of the Iraq Study Group report says provincial
elections “should be held at the earliest possible date.”
The oil law is benchmark # 3; progress is assessed as unsatisfactory because the Iraqis
did not meet their revised deadline of May 31, 2007 for all related oil laws. On February
26, 2007, Iraq’s cabinet passed a draft framework oil law that would set up a Federal Oil
and Gas Council with broad powers to review exploration contracts signed with foreign
energy companies, including those signed by Iraq’s regions. However, implementing laws
need to be adopted simultaneously, including a law on sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s
communities, a law regulating the dealings with foreign energy firms, and a law delineating
how Iraq’s energy industry will run (“INOC law” - Iraq National Oil Company). The
Kurds vigorously oppose the draft INOC law, which the Kurds say was drafted secretly,
because it puts 93% of Iraq’s oil fields under state control. Poorer Shiites and many
Sunnis opposed fear foreign domination of the key sector and oppose a provision of the draft
gives seats on the Federal Oil and Gas Council to foreign energy firms. Some movement
on the revenue sharing law came in late June 2007 when the Kurds reportedly agreed to a
17% share of oil revenues collected, to be deposited in a separate account at the Central
Bank. (Recommendation 28 of the Iraq Study Group report says that all oil revenues
should accrue to the central government, not regions.) For further information on the oil
law, see CRS Report RL34064. Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher Blanchard.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a flag
and national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law (benchmark # 2) remains
stalled; members of the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission, claiming support
from revered Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, expressed opposition to a draft reform
law reportedly agreed to in late March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister
Maliki. The draft would have allowed all but members of the three highest Baath Party
levels to return to their jobs or obtain pensions. However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki ordered
pensions be given to senior officers in the Saddam-era military and permission for return to
service of lower ranking soldiers. (Recommendation 27 of the Iraq Study Group says that
the United States should encourage reintegration of ex-Baathists.)

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CRS-21
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to insurgent
supporters (benchmarks # 6 and 7). The July 12, 2007 progress report says that the pre-
requisites for these laws are not in place, given the security environment. Iraq’s factions,
concerned about the general lack of security, are unwilling to disarm. The Shiite-led
government reportedly fears that Sunnis are plotting to return to power and that offering
amnesty to Sunni insurgent supporters would only accelerate that process. U.S. officials
say Maliki has verbally committed to a militia demobilization program, and an executive
director of the program was named on May 12, 2007, but committee members have not yet
been appointed and a demobilization work plan is not drafted.

(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee governance.
No progress is evident to date. (Not one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks.)
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi Army
divisions are now under Iraqi control. The P.L. 110-28 benchmarks do not include this
milestone, but instead require progress creating units capable of operating independently
(benchmark # 15). Progress on that was judged unsatisfactory in the July 12 report.
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security Forces
now have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Maysan, Irbil,
Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk - the latter three are Kurdish provinces turned over May 30, 2007.
(Not a P.L. 110-28 benchmark.)
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance. (Not a P.L. 110-28 benchmark.)
Several other security related benchmarks required by P.L. 110-28 – and on
which the July 12 report finds Iraqi performance generally satisfactory – center
around assisting the Baghdad security plan/ “U.S. troop surge” – for example by
providing three Iraqi brigades to Baghdad (benchmark # 9); setting up joint security
stations (benchmark # 14); making available over $10 billion in reconstruction funds
(benchmark # 17); and on ensuring that the Baghdad security plan does not provide
safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of sectarian affiliation (benchmark # 12). The
July 12, 2007 report gives Iraq an unfavorable assessment on the politically-relevant
benchmark of ensuring even handed law enforcement by the security forces
(benchmark # 11). The assessment of benchmark # 13 is mixed; Iraq has reduced
sectarian violence but it has not eliminated militia control of local security. These
are discussed further in the sections on security issues below.
Political Fragmentation. As U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government grows
while sectarian violence continues, splits within the power structure are widening to
the point where some predict collapse. In March 2007, the Fadilah Party left the
UIA on the grounds that it is not represented in the cabinet. Five Sadrist cabinet
members (Health, Transportation, and Agriculture; as well as two ministers of state)
resigned on April 16, 2007 and replacements have not been agreed. Sadr - formerly
a strong ally of Maliki - has been more vocal in opposing the U.S. “occupation,” and
his bloc boycotted parliament from the June 13, 2007 second bombing of the Grand
Mosque in Samarra (the first was in February 2006) until mid-July 2007. Press
reports say that even fellow Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari is now agitating against
Maliki because the Da’wa elevated Maliki to Da’wa Party leader (replacing Jafari).
In an effort to preserve harmony in the core of the UIA, in late June 2007 SICI and

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CRS-22
Da’wa signed an agreement to back each others’ choices to fill vacant cabinet seats
and forge agreement among moderates within the parliament.27
On August 1, 2007, the Sunni Consensus Front implemented a week-old threat
to pull out its six cabinet members (although some reports say Defense Minister
Mifraji is still in his position, as is deputy President Hashimi), who already had not
attended cabinet meetings for one month, asserting that Maliki is not committed to
political reconciliation. However, the Front did not also withdraw its 44 members
from parliament; they had just returned to parliament in mid-July after a month long
boycott over the COR’s June 12, 2007 vote to require Mashhadani’s resignation as
COR speaker for alleged intimidation of parliamentarians. Adding to Sunni distrust
was the June 2007 arrest warrant issued for Culture Minister Asad al-Hashimi, a
Sunni, for allegedly orchestrating a failed assassination attempt against Ummah Party
leader Mithal al-Alusi. Despite the turmoil, the COR was able to obtain a quorum
(138 members attending) throughout most of July 2007, and it has now adjourned
until September 4, 2007 (reducing its summer recess to one month from the original
two months of planned vacation).
The Kurds are, for now, fully engaged in the political structure in Baghdad. No
Kurds are boycotting either the cabinet or the parliament at this time. However,
potential troubles loom as the oil laws (discussed above) reach crucial decisions on
final adoption and passage and many of the Kurds’ objections and reservations
remain not fully resolved. An even greater concern is the promised referendum on
whether Tamim (Kirkuk) Province will affiliate formally with the Kurdistan Regional
Government, a vote that, under Article 140 of the constitution, is to take place by
December 31, 2007. The Kurds are insisting – to the point of threatening “civil war”
– that the referendum proceed as planned but the other major communities, Shiite and
Sunni Arabs, backed by the United States, are said to be trying to persuade the Kurds
to accept a delay in the referendum until the broader sectarian conflicts in Iraq ease.
There is speculation among observers that the Kurds might accept a delay in the
referendum in exchange for favorable provisions in the oil laws under consideration.
Suggesting the possibility of a postponement, the Kurds did not meet a July 31, 2007
deadline to furnish voter rolls for this planned referendum. At the same time,
Kurdish participation in government might also unravel if the United States fails to
persuade Turkish military leaders not to launch military incursions in the Kurdish
north in pursuit of PKK guerrillas that Turkey says have safehaven there.
To date, Administration officials have maintained that the United States
continues to fully support Maliki and his government, but many observers say that
U.S. backing could erode if his government continues to fracture or if the Baghdad
security plan — in a U.S. assessment planned for September 2007 — is judged a
failure. Some speculate that the secular former Prime Minister Allawi is
maneuvering to replace Maliki, but he appears to have little chance of winning a vote
of confidence in parliament to form a government. His faction only has 25 seats in
parliament.
27 Rubin, Alissa. “Iraqi Shiite Parties Agree to Try to Unite Moderates.” New York Times,
June 29, 2007.

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CRS-23
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq
Stability. The Iraqi government has received diplomatic support, even though
most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the
regime. There are about 50 foreign missions in Iraq, including most European and
Arab countries. Jordan has appointed an ambassador and Kuwait has pledged to do
so. Iran upgraded its representation to Ambassador in May 2006. On the other hand,
some countries, such as Portugal in March 2007, have closed their embassies because
of security concerns. There were attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco, and Russia in 2005 and 2006. Saudi Arabia, which considers the Shiite
dominated government in Baghdad an affront to what it sees as rightful Sunni pre-
eminence, has thus far refused to establish an embassy in Iraq, but its leaders told
visiting Secretary of State Rice in August 2007 that the Kingdom will now consider
doing so.
Iraq continued its appeal for regional support an the Iraq-sponsored regional
conference of its neighbors and major regional and outside powers (the United States,
the Gulf monarchy states, Egypt, the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council) in Baghdad on March 10, 2007. Iran and Syria attended, as did the
United States. A follow-on meeting in Egypt was held May 3 and 4, 2007, resulting
in some additional pledges of aid for Iraq, and agreement to establish regional
working groups on Iraq’s security, fuel supplies, and Iraqi refugees. U.S.-Iran
meetings on Iraq on May 28 and on July 24 are discussed later.
Democracy and Local Governance. The United States and its coalition
partners have tried to build civil society and democracy at the local level, and U.S.
officials in July 2007 have said that local political reconciliation might, in some
cases, be a better indicator of overall progress than the national legislative
“benchmarks” discussed above. In July 2007, U.S. officials and some outside
observers reported anecdotal evidence of such local reconciliation in some areas of
Iraq.
The State Department’s report on human rights for 2006, released March 6,
2007, appears to place the blame for much of the human suffering in Iraq on the
overall security environment and not on the Maliki government’s performance or
intentions. It says that “widespread violence seriously compromised the
government’s ability to protect human rights.” U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than
at any time in the past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize
politically. A State Department report to Congress details how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”
(IRRF) is being spent (“2207 Report”):
! About $1.014 billion for “Democracy Building;”
! About $71 million for related “Rule of Law” programs;
! About $159 million to build and secure courts and train legal
personnel;
! About $128 million for “Investigations of Crimes Against
Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses;
! $10 million for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil society/
conflict resolution activities;

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CRS-24
! $10 million for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime); and
! $15 million to promote human rights and human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! Several projects that attempt to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives. About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), local enclaves to
provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as discussed in the
section on security, below. The conference report on an FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) designated $50 million
in ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP operating. That level of
aid is expected in FY2007 under provisions of a continuing
resolution (P.L. 109-383).
! Programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote independent media.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul. In August 2006,
another $130 million in U.S. funds (and $500 million in Iraqi funds)
were allocated to assist Baghdad neighborhoods swept by U.S. and
Iraqi forces in “Operation Together Forward.”
! As noted above, according to Iraq’s national timetable, a law on
elections for provincial councils was to be drafted by the end of
October 2006 and provincial elections to be held by June 2007,
although it this timetable has not been met.
In addition to what is already allocated:

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CRS-25
! the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations (conference report on
P.L. 109-102) incorporated a Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 1299)
providing $28 million each to the International Republican Institute
and the National Democratic Institute for Iraq democracy promotion.
! The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided
another $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy promotion, allocated
to various organizations performing democracy work there (U.S.
Institute of Peace, National Democratic Institute, International
Republican Institute, National Endowment for Democracy, and
others).
! The FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28) provides
$250 million in “democracy funding.”
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. As discussed in
reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the difficult
security environment has slowed reconstruction.28 (In Recommendation 64, the Iraq
Study Group says that U.S. economic assistance to Iraq should be increased to $5
billion per year rather than be “permitted to decline.” Recommendation 67 calls on
the President to appoint a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.) For
more detail, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
A total of about $34 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funding
(including security forces), of which $20.917 billion has been appropriated for the
“Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) in two supplemental appropriations:
FY2003 supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the
FY2004 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.42
billion. Of the IRRF funds, about $19.95 billion has been obligated, and, of that,
about $18.1 billion has been disbursed. According to State Department reports, the
sector allocations for the IRRF are as follows:
! $5.03 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.014 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.724 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
28 The defense authorization bill for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) set October 1, 2007, for
termination of oversight by the SIGIR. However, P.L. 109-440 extends that term until 10
months after 80% of the IRRF have been expended but includes FY2006 reconstruction
funds for Iraq in the definition of the IRRF. The SIGIR’s mandate is therefore expected to
extend until some time in 2008.

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CRS-26
! $469 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $746 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental/FY2007/FY2008. The FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $1.485 billion for Iraq reconstruction. The
regular FY2007 appropriation (P.L. 109-383, as amended) provided approximately:
$182 million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction, and $20 million for counter-narcotics.
The FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-289) provided another $1.7 billion for
the Iraqi security forces (discussed further below) and $500 million in additional
funds for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) under which U.S.
military can expend funds for small construction projects intended to build good will
with the Iraqi population. For FY2007 supplemental funds, P.L. 110-28 provides:
$3.842 billion for the security forces; $1.574 billion in ESF; $50 million in a DoD
“Iraq Freedom Fund”; $250 million in a “democracy fund;” $150 million for counter-
narcotics; and $456.4 million in CERP funds (includes for Afghanistan as well).
These are close to requested amounts. The July 12, 2007 progress report indicates
that the President will exercise waiver authority to provide FY2007 ESF even though
progress on some of the “benchmarks” was judged unsatisfactory.
For FY2008 (regular), the Administration requested: $2 billion for the security
forces; and $456 million for operations and reconstruction. The House version (H.R.
2764) of the FY2008 regular foreign aid appropriation does not provide the
requested amount for operations and reconstruction. For FY2008 (supplemental), the
Administration requested about $2.8 billion for operations and reconstruction. The
FY2008 request asks for $1 billion in CERP funds (DOD funds).
Iraq provides some additional funds for reconstruction. In 2006 the Iraqi
government allocated $2 billion in Iraqi revenues for development activities. Iraq’s
2007 budget, adopted February 8, 2007, allocates $10.5 billion in unspent funds for
reconstruction under President Bush’s January 10, 2007 plan, discussed below.
Oil Revenues. The oil industry is the driver of Iraq’s economy, and
rebuilding this industry has received substantial U.S. and Iraqi attention, as
encapsulated in the U.S. push for the Iraqi political structure to pass the draft oil law
and annexes to be considered by the COR (see above under Maliki government).29
Before the war, it was widely asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s
vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much,
if not all, reconstruction costs. The oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage
during the U.S.-led invasion (only about nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has
29 For further information, see CRS Report RL34064, Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation,
Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy, by Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-27
become a target of insurgents and smugglers. Insurgents have focused their attacks
on pipelines in northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at
Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total pipeline system is over 4,300
miles long.) The U.S. military reports in the June 2007 Measuring Stability report
that elements of the protection forces for the oil sector (Strategic Infrastructure
Battalions and Facilities Protection Service for the Oil Ministry) are suspected of
complicity for smuggling as much as 70% of the output of the Baiji refinery, cost Iraq
as much as $2 billion in revenue per year. The northern export route is operating,
although it is only exporting about 300,000 barrels per day, about half its pre-war
capacity. On the other hand, high world oil prices have, to some extent,
compensated for the output shortfall. The Iraqi government needs to import refined
gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining capacity. A GAO report released August
2, 2007 said that inadequate metering, re-injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage,
says that Iraq’s oil production might be 100,000 - 300,000 lower than the figures
shown below, taken from State Department report. (In Recommendation 62, the Iraq
Study Group says that the Iraqi government should accelerate oil well refurbishment
and that the U.S. military should play a greater role in protecting oil infrastructure.)
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Some are concerned that the draft oil law, when implemented, will
favor U.S. firms because the draft does not give preference to development contracts
signed during the Saddam era, such as those signed with Russian and Chinese firms.
Even before the hydrocarbons law has been enacted, some investors began entering
Iraq’s energy market, primarily in the Kurdish north. South Korea and Iraq signed a
preliminary agreement on April 12, 2007, to invest in Iraq’s industrial reconstruction
and, potentially, its energy sector as well. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq
for possible investments in Iraq’s energy sector. Several small companies, such as
Norway’s DNO, Turkey’s Genel; Canada’s Western Zagros; Turkish-American
PetPrime; and Turkey/U.S.’s A and T Energy have already contracted with the
Kurdistan Regional Government to explore for oil (potential output of 100,000
barrels per day) near the northern city of Zakho. The Kurds’ position is that these
deals will go forward even though they were signed before a formal hydrocarbons
law has been enacted. (In Recommendation 63, the Iraq Study Group says the United
States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector and assist in eliminating
contracting corruption in that sector.)

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CRS-28
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Oil Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2007 to
(weekly avg.)
(pre-war)
war)
(2005)
(2006)
date)
2.06 million
$23.5
$31.3
$19.1
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.84 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War Load
Current
(hrs. per
Served (MWh)
Load Served
day)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
100,000
5.3
9.6
Power shortage has caused lack of water in several Baghdad districts in early August 2007 due
to lack of pumping and purification capability.
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 estimate by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.9 billion (2002)
$33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
U.S. oil imports from Iraq
approx. 660,000 bpd
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
August 1, 2007. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. In an effort to encourage private U.S. investment
in Iraq, the Bush Administration has lifted nearly all U.S. sanctions on Iraq,
beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under authorities provided by P.L.
108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental). As a
result, there are almost no restrictions on U.S. trade with and investment in Iraq.
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export

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CRS-29
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services. Exports
of dual use items (items that can have military applications) are no
longer subject to strict licensing procedures.30
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime,
with mixed success. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not including
reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. In 2004, the “Paris Club” of 19
industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes them.
The Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have resisted
writing off Iraq’s approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar). In mid-April 2007, Saudi Arabia agreed
to write off 80% of the $15 billion Iraq owes it, but no new debt relief commitments
by the UAE ($4 billion in Iraq debt) or Kuwait ($15 billion) were reported at the May
3-4, 2007, meetings on Iraq in Egypt. On December 17, 2004, the United States
signed an agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the
United States; that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in
defaults on Iraqi agricultural credits from the 1980s.31 On December 13, 2004, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States has employed a multi-
faceted approach to stabilizing Iraq. However, a January 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate (unclassified key judgments) said: “... in the coming 12 to 18 months, we
assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates
comparable to the latter part of 2006.”32 The Iraq Study Group said in its December
6, 2006, report that the “situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.”33 President
Bush, in his January 10, 2007, speech on Iraq, said, “The situation in Iraq is
unacceptable to the American people and it is unacceptable to me.” The
30 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
31 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss.
32 Text of key judgments at [http://www.dni.gov].
33 See p. xiii of the Executive Summary of the Iraq Study Group Report. December 6, 2006.

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CRS-30
deterioration was, at least partly, the result of continuing sectarian violence
superimposed on a tenacious Sunni-led insurgency, and prompted the revision of
U.S. strategy. The new U.S. strategy, as discussed below, may be producing some
security improvements, although it is not clear whether such progress is sustainable
were the U.S. troop presence to be reduced.
In addition to the July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007 progress reports, as
well as the GAO report due September 1, 2007 and the outside report on the Iraqi
security forces, Congress has mandated two major periodic Administration reports
on progress in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department quarterly report, which DOD
has titled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” was required by an FY2005
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13), and renewed by the FY2007 Defense
Appropriation (P.L. 109-289). Another report (“1227 Report”), is required by
Section 1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency
The duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab-led insurgency has defied many
expectations, probably because, in the view of many experts, it is supported by a
large segment of the Iraqi Sunni population who feel humiliated at being ruled by the
Shiites and their Kurdish partners. Many Sunni insurgents are motivated by
opposition to perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political
dominance; others want to return the Baath Party to power, while others would
accept a larger Sunni political role without the Baath. Still others are pro-Al Qaeda
fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the United States and spread
radical Islam throughout the region. The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely
coordinated within cities and provinces.
The insurgency failed to derail the political transition,34 but it has caused high
levels of sectarian violence and debate in the United States over the continuing U.S.
commitment in Iraq. Sunni insurgent groups are conducting increasingly complex
and well-coordinated attacks on police stations and other fixed positions, suicide
attacks on markets frequented by Shiites, and occasional mass kidnappings. One
attack in April 2007 in Diyala Province was directed at a U.S. base and killed nine
U.S. soldiers. Since January 2007, insurgent groups have, on about ten occasions,
exploded chlorine trucks to cause widespread civilian injury or panic. Targets of
insurgent grenades, IEDs (improvised explosive devices), mortars, and direct
weapons fire are U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces, as well as Iraqi
civilians of rival sects, Iraqis working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid
workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and other
facilities. A growing trend in 2007 has been attacks on bridges, particularly those
connecting regions of differing sectarian domination. A New York Times report of
December 19, 2006, said that Sunni insurgents had succeeded in destroying many of
the power stations that feed electricity to Baghdad. The April 12, 2007, bombing of
34 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, April 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, December 2005.

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CRS-31
the Iraqi parliament, coming amid increasing mortar attacks on the heavily fortified
International Zone, demonstrate the ability of the insurgency to operate in Baghdad.
Prior to 2007, whole Sunni-dominated neighborhoods of Baghdad, including
Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and Dora (once a mostly Christian
neighborhood) were serving as Sunni insurgent bases. Sunni insurgents also made
substantial inroads into the mixed province of Diyala, pushing out Shiite inhabitants.
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency
in Resolution 1618 (August 4, 2005), condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers and foreign
diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.3 million
in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I).35 A numerically small but politically significant
component of the insurgency is non-Iraqi, mostly in a faction called Al Qaeda-Iraq
(AQ-I). Increasingly in 2007, U.S. commanders have seemed to equate AQ-I with
the insurgency, even though most of the attacks each day are carried out by Iraqi
Sunni insurgents. AQ-I was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Arab
who reputedly fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan alongside other
Arab volunteers36. He was killed in a June 7, 2006, U.S. airstrike. AQ-I has been a
U.S. focus from very early on in the war because, according to U.S. commanders in
April 2007, it is responsible for about 90% of the suicide bombings against both
combatant and civilian targets.
Zarqawi’s strategy was to spark Sunni-Shiite civil war, an outcome that
President Bush has said largely succeeded. Under his successor, Abu Ayyub al-
Masri, however, AQ-I appears to be more integrated with Sunni Iraqi factions in
operations. In large parts of Anbar Province and now increasingly in parts of other
Sunni provinces, Sunni tribes are trying to limit Al Qaeda’s influence, which they
believe is detrimental to Iraq’s interests, by cooperating with U.S. counter-insurgency
efforts. In other cases, there have been clashes between AQ-I and Iraqi insurgent
groups, such as in June 2007 in the Amiriyah neighborhood of Baghdad, apparently
representing differences over targets and insurgency methods. U.S. commanders say
they are trying to enlarge this wedge between Sunni insurgents and AQ-I by
selectively cooperating with Sunni insurgents - a strategy that is controversial
because of the potential of the Sunni Iraqis to later resume fighting U.S. forces and
35 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda, by Kenneth Katzman.
36 Zarqawi went to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates, after escaping
the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, settling in northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and
Saddam-controlled Iraq. He took refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-
Islam near the town of Khurmal. After the Ansar enclave was destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi
went to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the Association of Unity and Jihad.
He then formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a reputed exchange of letters) and
changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia (Iraq).” It is named as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that designation from the earlier Unity and
Jihad title, which was designated as an FTO in October 2004.

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CRS-32
Iraqi Shiites. The strategy is reported to have led to increased tensions between
Maliki and the lead U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus.
Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said
that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and
weapons),37 although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not
decisive. Largely because of this outside support, the first 17 recommendations of
the Iraq Study Group report call for intensified regional diplomacy, including multi-
lateral diplomacy with Syria and Iran, in an effort to persuade outside parties not to
stoke the violence in Iraq by aiding protege factions in Iraq.
In September 2005, then-U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of
allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going
into Iraq. These reports led to U.S. warnings, imposition of additional U.S. sanctions
against Syria, and U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some suspected
insurgent financiers. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by moves such as the February
2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi authorities. The
latest DOD “Measuring Stability” report says that Syria provides help to Sunni
insurgents, mainly Baathist factions, and remains a foreign fighter gateway into Iraq.
However, some U.S. commanders said in May 2007 that they had recently observed
some Syrian tightening of the border.
Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,38 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Press reports say that Saudi officials told visiting Vice President Cheney in
November 2006 that the Saudis might be compelled to assist Iraq’s Sunnis if the
United States withdraws from Iraq. As noted above, the Saudi leadership has been
notably cool to the Maliki government publicly - even to the point of refusing visits
by him – which likely means that the Saudi leadership is at least tolerating aid to
Sunni insurgents privately.
37 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 21, 2004.
38 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates By
U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, October 22, 2004.

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CRS-33
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators
Indicator
Current Level
Number of U.S. forces
About 160,000 includes all of “surge” of 28,500 U.S. forces (17,500
in Iraq
combat soldiers, 4,000 Marines, and 7,000 support personnel) in
place. Almost all 10,000 extra ISF are in place in Baghdad, bringing
total to about 90,000 U.S. and Iraqi forces in the city. Roughly the
same U.S. level as most of 2005 during election periods.
U.S./Other Casualties
3,651 U.S. forces; about 260 coalition (including 160 British). Of
U.S. deaths, 3,505 since end to “major combat operations” declared
May 1, 2003. 3,002 by hostile action. 250 U.S. citizen contractors.
U.S. Casualties by
“Explosively-Forced
170+
Projectiles”
Partner forces in Iraq
11,508 from 25 other countries. Down from 28,000 in 2005
Number of Iraqi
25,000 U.S. estimates; Iraqi estimates run to 40,000, plus 150,000
Insurgents
supporters
AQ-I fighters
1,300 - 3,500
Number of Iranian Qods
150+
Forces in Iraq
Number of all
About 150/day, up from about 120/day in mid-2006, but possibly
Attacks/day
decreasing from 200/day in early 2007 due to “troop surge”
Iraqi Police Killed since
12,000 +
2004
Number of Shiite
80,000 (60,000 Mahdi, 15,000 Badr, 5,000 other); up from 20,000
militiamen
(2003)
Iraqis Leaving Iraq
2 million left, incl. 700,000 to Jordan, 1 million to Syria; another 2
or Displaced since fall of
million internally displaced or relocated.
Saddam
Sectarian murders/day
15 - 30 per day, down from 50/day pre-surge, but up from 10-15/day
just after surge began. Some murders now outside Baghdad, in
Kirkuk, Mosul, Kut, and other cities.
Iraq Civilian Deaths
About 60/day in June 2007, including sectarian murders, but
subject to large fluctuations depending on presence or absence of
large car/suicide bombings. Trend appears somewhat lower since
troop surge began.
Iraqi Army and Police
128; up from 104 in November 2006
Battalions in operations
Total ISF Equipped and
353,100, with new reported goal of 395,000
Trained
Iraqi Army Battalions in
98; up from 57 in May 2006, of which as many as 7 can operate
the Lead or Fully
independently.
Independent

National Police
6; same as level in May 2006
Battalions in the Lead
Number of Provinces
7: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Maysan, Irbil, Dahuk, and
Under ISF Control
Sulaymaniyah (latter three in May 2007). All turned over since
2005
Sources: Information provided by a variety of sources, including U.S. government reports on Iraq, Iraqi
statements, the Iraq Study Group report, DoD Measuring Stability report, and press reports. See Tables 5 and
6 for additional figures on total numbers of Iraqi security forces, by force component.

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CRS-34
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War?
The security environment in Iraq became more complex since 2006 as Sunni-
Shiite sectarian violence increased. Top U.S. officials said in late 2006 that
sectarian-motivated violence — manifestations of an all-out struggle for political and
economic power in Iraq — had displaced the Sunni-led insurgency as the primary
security challenge. According to the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate,
“... the term ‘civil war’ does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in
Iraq, [but] the term ‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi
conflict....” In assessing benchmark # 13, the July 12, 2007 progress report says
that there has been satisfactory progress reducing sectarian violence but
unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local security, and the
report generally gives the Iraqis poor reviews for reducing sectarianism.
U.S. officials date the escalation of sectarian violence to the February 22, 2006,
Al Qaeda-Iraq bombing of the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The attack set off
a wave of purported Shiite militia attacks on Sunni mosques and civilians in the first
days after the mosque bombing. Since then, Shiite militias have retaliated through
attacks on Sunni insurgents and Sunni civilians, intended in part to drive Sunnis out
of mixed neighborhoods. Press accounts say the attacks have largely converting
mixed Sunni-Shiite districts of Baghdad, such as Hurriya, into predominantly Shiite
districts and that the Sunnis have largely “lost” the “battle for Baghdad.” Many of
those abducted turn up bound and gagged, dumped in about nine reported sites
around Baghdad, including in strainer devices in the Tigris River, although murdered
bodies are also now turning up in cities in the north, such as Mosul and in Diyala
Province. Sunnis are accusing the Shiites of using their preponderant presence in
the emerging security forces, as well as their party-based militias, to commit the
atrocities, but many Shiites, for their part, blame Sunni insurgents for the instigation.
The Samarra mosque was bombed again on June 13, 2007 and their were reprisal
attacks on Sunni mosques in Basra and elsewhere, although the attack did not spark
the large wave of reprisals that the original attack did, possibly because the political
elite appealed for calm after this second attack.

Iraqi Christians and their churches and church leaders have become major
targets of Shiite and Sunni armed factions, viewing them as allies of the United
States. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, as many as 100,000 Christians might have
left Iraq, leaving the current size of the community in Iraq at about 600,000 -
800,000. The two most prominent Christian sects in Iraq are the Chaldean Catholics
and the Assyrian Christians.
Discussed below are the three major organized militias in Iraq: the Kurdish
Peshmerga, the Badr Brigades, and the Mahdi Army.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as many
as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of which are providing
security in the Kurdish regional area (Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, and
Irbil Provinces). Some are in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and
deployed in such cities as Mosul, Tal Affar, and Baghdad (as part of
the 2007 Baghdad security plan). Peshmerga units have sometimes
fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with

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CRS-35
each other over territory, customs revenues, and control over the
Kurdish regional government in Irbil. Peshmerga do not appear to
be involved in the Sunni Arab-Shiite Arab sectarian violence
gripping Iraq.
! Badr Brigades. This militia is led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of
parliament). The Badr Brigades were recruited, trained, and
equipped by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, aligned with Iran’s
hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas
conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party
officials. Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi
prisoners of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed
SICI as an Iranian puppet and Badr operations in southern Iraq
during the 1980s and 1990s did not shake Saddam’s grip on power.
The Badr “Organization” is under the UIA as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SICI parent. Many Badr militiamen have
now folded into the ISF, as discussed further later in this paper.
! Mahdi Army. Recent “Measuring Stability” reports say this militia
“has replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of
potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq.” It is
purportedly the main perpetrator of the killings of Sunni civilians.
This U.S. assessment is evolving as the Mahdi Army has largely
ceased patrolling since the U.S. “troop surge” began in mid-February
2007. Still, Mahdi assertiveness is evident in southern Iraq has
increased as Britain has reduced its forces during 2007. At least 50
British soldiers have died in suspected Mahdi attacks in southern
Iraq since mid-2006; Mahdi forces also shelled a British base near
Amarah in August 2006, contributing to a British decision to leave
the base, and killed 11 British soldiers in southern Iraq in April 2007
alone. The militia took over Amarah briefly for a few days in late
October 2006, and violence there resumed in June 2007. Some
experts, citing independent-minded Mahdi commanders such as one
named Abu Deraa, believe Sadr himself has tried to rein in Mahdi
violence but no longer has full control of his armed following.
Iranian Support. U.S. officials, most specifically in a February 11, 2007,
U.S. defense briefing in Baghdad, have repeatedly accused Iran of aiding Shiite
militias. More specifically, they assert that the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard is providing armed Iraqi Shiite factions (most likely Sadr’s
Mahdi forces) with explosives and weapons, including the highly lethal “explosively
forced projectiles” (EFPs). A new development came on April 11, 2007, when U.S.
military officials said they had found evidence that Iran might also be supplying
Sunni insurgent factions, presumably in an attempt to cause U.S. casualties and
promote the view that U.S. policy in Iraq is failing. In July 2007, U.S. commanders
asserted that Iran was using its protege, Lebanese Hezbollah, to train and arm Iraqi
Shiite militias, based on information from Hezbollah operatives captured in Iraq.
Iran’s support for Shiite militias contributed to a U.S. decision to conduct direct
talks with Iran on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. The December 2006 Iraq Study Group

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CRS-36
(Recommendations 9, 10, and 11) said that the United States should engage Iran
multilaterally to enlist its assistance on Iraq. The Administration initially rejected
that recommendation — the President’s January 10, 2007, Baghdad security initiative
included announcement of an additional aircraft carrier group and additional Patriot
anti-missile systems to the Gulf, moves clearly directed against Iran. He also said that
U.S. forces would work to dismantle Iranian (and Syrian) networks that are aiding
armed elements in Iraq, and a Washington Post report of January 26, 2007, said that
the Administration has altered its policy to allow for U.S. forces to combat Iranian
agents in Iraq directly if they are observed actively assisting Iraqi armed factions.
Also in December 2006 and January 2007, U.S. forces arrested alleged Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Qods Forces agents — two at a SICI compound in Baghdad and
five more at a compound in Irbil. The Iraqi government compelled the release of the
first two; the others are still held and their incarceration will be reviewed in October
2007.
However, in an apparent shift, the Administration supported and participated in
the March 10, 2007, regional conference in Baghdad and the follow-up regional
conference held in Egypt on May 3 and 4, 2007. Subsequently, the two sides
announced and then held high profile direct talks, at the Ambassador level, on May
28, 2007. The two sides said they shared similar visions for Iraq, but the U.S. side
said it would judge the potential to continue the dialogue on Iran’s performance “on
the ground” — restraint in arming Iraqi militias. Another meetings was held on July
24, 2007, with little agreement apparent at the meeting but with a decision to form
a U.S.-Iran working group to develop proposals for both sides to help ease Iraq’s
security difficulties. (For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s
Influence in Iraq, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses, both by Kenneth Katzman.)
Iraq’s Northern Border
At the same time, security on Iraq’s northern border appears to be increasingly
fragile. Turkey is complaining that Iraq’s Kurds are harboring the anti-Turkey PKK
guerrilla group in northern Iraq, and Turkey’s top military leader called on April 12,
2007, for a military operation into northern Iraq to quash the group. That call came
several days after Barzani, in comments to journalists, claimed that Iraqi Kurds were
capable of stirring unrest among Turkish Kurds if Turkey interferes in northern Iraq.
Previously, less direct threats by Turkey had prompted the U.S. naming of an envoy
to Turkey on this issue in August 2006 (Gen. Joseph Ralston (ret.), former Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). On February 8, 2007, Turkish Foreign
Minister warned against proceeding with the December 31, 2007, referendum on
Kirkuk’s affiliation with the Kurdish region, reflecting broader concerns that the
referendum could set off additional sectarian violence and pave the way for Kurdish
independence. The most serious crisis to date occurred on June 6, 2007 when Turkish
military sources said that several thousand Turkish troops had crossed into Iraq to
conduct “hot pursuit” of PKK guerrillas, although Iraqi and U.S. officials denied
there had been any Turkish incursion. In July 2007, Iraq asserted that Turkey has
massed 140,000 forces on the northern border amid reports that Turkish political and
civilian leaders have agreed on criteria under which Turkish troops might stage
incursions into Iraq.

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CRS-37
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security/”Troop Surge”
For the nearly four years since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Administration
has tried to refine its stabilization strategy, with increasing focus on curbing sectarian
violence. The Administration position is that the U.S. stabilization mission requires
continued combat operations. U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined
Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7) is a multi-national headquarters “Multinational Force-
Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by Gen. Petraeus, who previously led U.S. troops in the Mosul
area and the training and equipping program for the ISF. As of December 2006, the
head of Multinational Corps-Iraq is Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno.
In prior years, a major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat was Anbar
Province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi (provincial capital), the
latter of which was the most restive of all Iraqi cities and in which the provincial
governor’s office was shelled or attacked nearly daily. In the run-up to the December
15, 2005, elections, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted several major operations (for
example Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel
Curtain, and Ram) to clear contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from
Sunni cities in Anbar, along the Euphrates River. None of these operations
succeeded, causing the Administration to examine other options.
“Clear, Hold, and Build” Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
In its November 2005 “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the Administration
publicly articulated a strategy called “clear, hold, and build,” intended to create and
expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction
experts in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy, based partly on an idea advanced
by Andrew Krepinevich in the September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,39
stipulates that the United States should devote substantial resources to preventing
insurgent re-infiltration and promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating
these areas as a model that could eventually expand throughout Iraq. The strategy
formed the basis of Operation Together Forward (I and II) as well as the President’s
January 10, 2007, Baghdad security plan.
In conjunction with the U.S. strategy, the Administration began forming
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used extensively in Afghanistan.
Each PRT in Iraq is civilian led, to be composed of about 100 U.S. State Department
and USAID officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing
institutions, such as the provincial councils, representatives of the Iraqi provincial
governors, and local ministry representatives. The concept ran into some U.S.
military objections to taking on expanded missions, but the debate was resolved with
an agreement by DOD to provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs. Initially, ten PRTs
were inaugurated, of which seven are run by the United States: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla,
Baghdad, Anbar Province, two in Salah ad-Din Province, and Baquba. Of the
partner-run PRTs, Britain has formed a PRT in Basra, Italy has formed one in Dhi
Qar province, and South Korea runs one in Irbil. In conjunction with the President’s
“New Way Forward” January 10, 2007, strategy announcement, another ten PRTs
have been opened, including six more in Baghdad and three more in Anbar. This
39 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.

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CRS-38
necessitated adding 400 diplomats and contractors to staff the new PRTs, although
about half of these new positions are filled with military personnel at least
temporarily.
PRT Funding. An FY2006 supplemental request asked for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs, of which the enacted version, P.L. 109-234, provides
$229 million. The requested $675 million for development grants to be distributed
by the PRTs is fully funded through the ESF appropriation for Iraq in this law. The
FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28) provides about $700 million (ESF) for PRT
security, operations, and PRT-funded reconstruction projects.
Baghdad Security Plan/”Fardh Qanoon”/Troop Surge.
Acknowledging that the initiatives above had not brought security or stability, the
President’s January 10, 2007, Baghdad security initiative (referred to in Iraq as Fardh
Qanoon, Arabic for “Imposing Law”) is intended primarily to bring security to
Baghdad and create conditions under which Iraq’s communities and political leaders
can reconcile. The plan, which in many ways reflects recommendations in a January
2007 report by the American Enterprise Institute entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan
for Success in Iraq,”40 was announced as formally under way on February 14, 2007,
and includes the following components:
! The deployment of an additional 28,700 U.S. forces to Iraq —
17,500 combat troops (five brigades) to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines to
Anbar Province; and the remainder are support troops and military
police. The plan envisioned that these forces, along with additional
Iraqi forces, would secure and hold neighborhoods and areas cleared
of insurgents and thereby cause the population not to depend on
militias or other armed elements for security. The plan envisions
that these forces, along with additional Iraqi forces, will be able to
secure and hold neighborhoods and areas cleared of insurgents and
thereby cause the population not to depend on militias or other
armed elements for security. The forces are being based, along with
Iraqi soldiers, in about 100 fixed locations around Baghdad, of
which about 33 are so-called “Joint Security Stations.” The July 12,
2007 progress reports says that establishment of the Joint Security
Stations has been satisfactory.
! cooperation from the Iraqi government, such as progress on the
reconciliation steps discussed earlier, the provision of $10 billion in
new capital spending on reconstruction, and the commitment of the
Iraqi forces discussed previously 3 brigades (about 6,000 soldiers),
plus about 4,000 police commandos and regular police. The July 12,
2007 progress report indicates satisfactory Iraqi performance on
these measures.
40 The two principal authors of the report are Frederick W. Kagan and Jack Keane (General,
U.S. Army, ret.).

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CRS-39
! provision of at least $1.2 billion in new U.S. aid, including funds for
job creation and CERP projects, in part to revive long-dormant state-
owned factories.
! In an apparent attempt to demonstrate cooperation with President
Bush’s security plan, Maliki reportedly communicated to Sadr that
Maliki would not stand in the way of operations against the Mahdi
forces. Application of the surge to all factions comprised two of the
benchmarks under P.L. 110-28 (benchmarks 10 and 12). The July
12, 2007 report indicates satisfactory progress on benchmark 12
(not allowing safehaven for any outlaw of any sect), but
unsatisfactory progress on benchmark 10 (refraining from political
interference over ISF efforts to pursue militants of all sects.
Benchmark 11, even handed ISF enforcement of the law, another
very closely related indicator, is also rated as unsatisfactory. It is
not clear why there were different assessments for these closely
related benchmarks. In 2006, U.S. commanders expressed
frustration with Maliki for forcing them to release suspected Mahdi
militia commanders and to dismantle U.S. checkpoints in Sadr City,
set up to try to prevent Shiite sectarian militiamen from operating –
are continuing. U.S. officers blamed these restrictions, in part, for
the failure of “Operation Together Forward I and II,” Baghdad
security operations involving about 4,000 additional U.S. troops
deployed in Baghdad (supplementing the 9,000 U.S. forces there
previously). Contributing to the previous failures were Iraq’s
deployment of only two out of the six Iraqi battalions committed to
the operation, which was only 1,500 soldiers out of 4,000 pledged.
Perhaps suggesting new ability to operate against Shiite elements, U.S. forces
arrested the deputy Health Minister on February 8, 2007, for allegedly funneling
money to Mahdi Army forces engaged in sectarian killings. As the Baghdad security
plan began to operate, U.S. forces began to pressure Mahdi forces and to patrol at
least the outskirts of Sadr City, and the Mahdi Army largely ceased active patrolling.
Sadr himself fled, or at least visited, Iran as the U.S.-Iraqi plan began, perhaps fearing
that he would be a U.S. target, even though he is based in Kufa (near Najaf), not
Baghdad; he returned in late May 2007. On the other hand, the Mahdi Army is
reviving somewhat in concert with Sadr’s May 2007 call for the ISF and militias to
join hands to combat U.S. “occupation” forces (but not Iraqis). Some fighting
between the U.S., partner, and Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army have taken place
since April 2007 in Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Basra, Amarah and parts of Sadr City.
Also, U.S. officials say that Shiite militias, presumably the Mahdi Army, are
directing increasingly accurate mortar fire from areas near Sadr City in northeast
Baghdad into the “Green Zone.” (Sunni insurgents are firing on the zone from the
south.)
Surge Assessments.
The July 12, 2007 progress report
gives
preliminary assessments of the surge, although the report is primarily focused on
performance against the political and security benchmarks. In briefings and
comments, General Petraeus, Secretary of Defense Gates, Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute
(named in May 2007 to be the new White House aide to coordinate policy toward

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CRS-40
Iraq and Afghanistan), as well as outside observers,41 have given preliminary but
mostly positive assessments of the surge, while noting that the last of the five combat
brigades only arrived in June 2007. These assessments have prompted U.S.
commanders to suggest that the “surge” be continued beyond the fall of 2007, and
that ending the surge prematurely would squander the progress they note. On the
other hand, officials and observers express disappointment (as expressed by Secretary
Gates on August 2, 2007) on political reconciliation. Results of the surge to date
include:
! a reduction in the number of sectarian murders per day from about
50 per day to 20 or below per day.
! Substantial progress in calming approximately half of Baghdad. In
a June 14, 2007 USA Today interview, Gen. Petraeus said that he
sees “astonishing signs of normalcy” in half, or perhaps two thirds,
of Baghdad, as indicated by soccer games, amusement parks in
operation, and vibrant markets.
! the return of some displaced families to their Baghdad homes;
! a possible Iraq-wide decrease in civilian deaths per day, from about
100 per day to about 60 per day in June 2007.
! continuing setbacks to progress produced by AQ-I and other car and
suicide bombs that cause mass casualties, although some figures in
July 2007 show that there has been a reduction in the frequency of
car bombings;
! substantial progress in Anbar Province that Gen. Petraeus has called
“breathtaking,” including a substantial reduction of violence;
although violence picked up in previously quiet Fallujah in May-
June 2007;
! decreasing concern about violence in Diyala Province and in the
towns in “belts” around Baghdad where insurgents have moved to
in order to regroup and try to thwart the “surge.” On August 2,
2007, the commander of Multi-National Division-North, Benjamin
Mixon, said Baqubah (capital of Diyala) is transitioning to the
“hold” phase of “clear, hold, and build.” He had deployed 3,000
additional U.S. forces to Diyala in recent months, and launched
“Operation Arrowhead Ripper” on June 18, 2007, involving about
10,000 U.S. soldiers, to try to capture AQ-I fighters in Diyala.
41 One such assessment includes, O’Hanlon, Michael and Kenneth Pollack. “A War We
Might Just Win.” New York Times op-ed. July 30, 2007.

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CRS-41
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)42
A major pillar of U.S. policy had been to equip and train Iraqi security forces
(ISF) that could secure Iraq by themselves, although the 2007 Baghdad security plan
moves away from reliance on this strategy. President Bush stated in a June 28, 2005
speech, “Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down.”43 However, the Baghdad security plan relies more heavily on combat
by U.S. forces than on transferring security responsibilities to the ISF, and a former
senior leader of training the Iraqis (Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard) said in July 2007 that
training the ISF had slowed since the “troop surge” began. The commander of the
ISF training mission, the Multinational Transition Security Command-Iraq (MNSTC-
I), is Lt. Gen. James Dubik, who in June 2007 replaced Gen. Martin Dempsey.
There are about 5,000 U.S. forces embedded with or mentoring the ISF.
(Recommendations 42, 43 and 44 of the Iraq Study Group report advised an increase
in training the ISF, and completion of the training by early 2008, but the “troop
surge” strategy appears to represent a move away from that recommendation.)
Iraqi leaders are holding to proposed timetables for Iraqi security control.
President Talabani said in a June 2007 press interview that he expected the ISF could
assume full security responsibilities by the end of 2008. The degrees to which the
Iraqi government has assumed operational ISF control, and of ISF security control
over territory, are shown in the security indicators table. A map showing areas under
Iraqi control and ISF lead can be found in the Iraq Weekly Status Report of the State
Department, available online at [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/c3212.htm].
At the same time, U.S. commanders have repeatedly said the ISF is not ready,
or even nearly ready, to take over security in Iraq. With the total ISF goal of 325,000
reached in early 2007, the target level of the ISF has been increased to 395,000 to try
to compensate for the forces’ weaknesses. Some observers go so far as to say that the
ISF is part of the security problem in Iraq, not the solution, because of incidents of
involvement in sectarian involvement or even possible anti-U.S. activity. Lt. Gen.
Dubik said in late July 2008 that it is still difficult to find ISF leaders free of sectarian
loyalties.
The July 12, 2007 progress report assesses the ISF and political leadership of
it in: the ability of the ISF to operate independently, which is assessed as
unsatisfactory (benchmark # 15). Enforcing the law even-handedly, which the
report says is generally unsatisfactory (benchmark # 11), although some
improvement is being noted. Ensuring that the political authorities are not making
false accusations against or undermining the ISF (benchmark 18), assessed as
unsatisfactory. Preventing political interference in ISF operations in conjunction
with the troop surge (benchmarks 10),assessed as satisfactory. Enforcing the law
even-handedly (benchmark 11), assessed as unsatisfactory. Ensuring the Baghdad
42 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
43 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/06/20050628-7.html].

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CRS-42
security plan does not allow safehaven for outlaws of any sect (benchmark 12),
assessed as satisfactory.
In addition, the most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report and other
accounts reiterate previously reported criticisms of the ISF, including

! that the ISF continue to lack an effective command structure or
independent initiative, and that there continues to be a culture of
corruption throughout the ISF structure.

! as much as one-third of ISF members are absent-without-leave or
might have deserted at any given time, significantly reducing the
actual fielded forces.

! as note above, that the ISF, particularly the police, are unbalanced
ethnically and by sect, penetrated by militias or even insurgents, and
involved in sectarian violence, particularly among the police forces.
Widely reported is that many ISF members view themselves as loyal
to their former militias or party leaders, and not to a national force.
In late 2005, U.S. forces uncovered militia-run detention facilities
(“Site 4”) and arrested those (Badr Brigade and related Iraqi police)
running them.

! press reports in June 2007 said that some roadside bombs intended
for U.S. forces were being planted near police stations, presumably
by Iraqi police.

! most of the ISF, particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish
units mainly deployed in the north, and many Sunnis distrust the ISF
as instruments of repression and responsible for sectarian killings.

! one controversial element of the Baghdad security plan is its
apparent reliance on several mostly Kurdish brigades, a deployment
reportedly resented by both Shiite and Sunni Arabs in the capital.
there are several press reports and official comments that the
members of the “Facilities Protection Force,” (FPS), which are
security guards attached to individual ministries, are involved in
sectarian violence. U.S. and Iraq began trying to rein in the force in
May 2006 by placing it under some Ministry of Interior guidance,
including issuing badges and supervising what types of weapons it
uses. (In Recommendation 54, the Iraq Study Group says the
Ministry of Interior should identify, register, and otherwise control
FPS.)
On the other hand, while reports continue to point to sectarianism in the Interior
Ministery, U.S. officials have praised Interior Minister Jawad Bolani for trying to
remove militiamen and death squad participants from the ISF; in October 2006, he
fired 3,000 Ministry employees for alleged sectarian links, along with two
commanders of National Police components. That same month, an entire brigade of

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CRS-43
National Police were taken out of duty status for retraining for alleged toleration of
sectarian killings in Baghdad.
Another positive trend noted by U.S. officials, even before the troop surge, is
what they say is increasing tribal cooperation in Anbar Province, particularly from
the National Salvation Council of an anti-Al Qaeda tribal leader, Abd al Sattar al-
Rishawi. According to press reports, he has persuaded 13,000 men (almost all Sunni)
to join police forces in the province, and these forces are participating in securing the
border with Syria as well as helping secure Ramadi and other parts of Anbar,
particularly against AQ-I. U.S. commanders are reported to be attempting a similar
strategy to try to stabilize Diyala, Salahuddin, and Nineveh provinces.
The Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 50-61) contain several suggestions
for reforming and improving the police. Among the recommendations are: assigning
the lead role in advising and training the anti-crime portions of the police forces to
the U.S. Department of Justice; and transferring those police forces that are involved
in anti-insurgency operations to the Ministry of Defense from their current
organizational structure under the Ministry of Interior.
Weaponry. Most observers say the ISF are severely underequipped,
dependent primarily on donations of surplus equipment by coalition members. The
Iraqi Army is using mostly East bloc equipment, including 77 T-72 tanks donated by
Poland, but has now received about 2,500 up-armored Humvees from the United
S t a t e s . T h e O c t o b e r 2 0 0 6 r e p o r t o f t h e S I G I R
[http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx] notes problems with
tracking Iraqi weapons; of the approximately 370,000 weapons turned over to Iraq
by the United States since Saddam’s fall, only 12,000 serial numbers were properly
recorded. Some fear that some of these weapons might have fallen into the hands of
insurgents or sectarian militias, although it is also possible the weapons are still in
Defense and Interior Ministry stocks but are not catalogued. In August 2007, the
GAO reported that the Defense Department cannot fully account for the total of
$19.2 billion worth of equipment provided to the ISF by the United States and partner
forces. (In Recommendation 45, the Iraq Study Group said the United States should
encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests for
U.S. arms and that departing U.S. combat units should leave behind some of their
equipment for use by the ISF.)
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. The Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this
training and equipping mission:
! According to the State Department, a total of $5.036 billion in IRRF
funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for,
and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, as of
June 4, 2007, about $4.975 billion has been obligated and $4.797
billion of that has been disbursed.
! An FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be

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CRS-44
controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.
Of that amount, about $4.7 billion has been obligated.
! The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provided another $3
billion for the ISF.
! The FY2007 Defense appropriations law (P.L. 109-289) provides an
additional $1.7 billion to train and equip the ISF.
! The FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28) provides the requested
$3.84 billion for this purpose. The FY2008 request is for $2 billion.

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CRS-45
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
150,900 total. Forces in units are in 129
$1.097 billion for
battalions (about 90,000 personnel), with new
facilities; $707
goal of 132 battalions. Remainder not in
million for
formed units. Trained for eight weeks, paid
equipment; $656
$60/month.
million for training,
personnel, and
operations
Special
About 1,600 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Operations
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando
Forces
Battalion. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in
Jordan.
Strategic
About 2,900 personnel in seven battalions to
Infrastructure
protect oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure.
Battalions
The goal is 11 battalions.
Mechanized
About 1,500. Recently transferred from
Police
Ministry of Interior control.
Brigade
Air Force
About 900, its target size. Has 9 helicopters, 3
$28 million allocated
C-130s; 14 observation aircraft. Trained for
for air fields (from
six months. UAE and Jordan to provide other
funds for Iraqi
aircraft and helos.
Army, above)
Navy
About 1,100, the target size. Has a Patrol Boat
Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment.
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at
Umm Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya
oil terminals. Some training by Australian
Navy.
Totals
158,900
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units (10 per
Trainers
battalion), involves about 4,000 U.S. forces (increasing to 10,000),
run by Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-
I). Training at Taji, north of Baghdad; Kirkush, near Iranian border;
and Numaniya, south of Baghdad. All 26 NATO nations at NATO
Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at Rustamiyah (300 trainers).
Others trained at NATO bases in Norway and Italy. Jordan,
Germany, and Egypt also have done training.

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CRS-46
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces
Force/Entity
Size/Strength
IRRF Funds
Allocated
Ministry of Interior
Total size unknown. 3,000 employees dismissed
in October for corruption/sectarianism.
Iraqi Police Service
135,000, including 1,300 person Highway Patrol.
$ 1.806
(IPS)
(About the target size.) Gets eight weeks of
billion
training, paid $60 per month. Not organized as
battalions.
Dignitary Protection About 500 personnel
National Police
About 26,300. Comprises “Police Commandos,”
Public Order Police,” and “Mechanized Police.”
Organized into 28 battalions. Overwhelmingly
Shiite. Gets four weeks of counter-insurgency
training. Iraq Study Group (Recommendation 50)
proposes transfer to MOD control.
Emergency
About 300, able to lead operations. Hostage
Response Unit
rescue.
Border Enforcement 32,000. Controls 258 border forts built or under
$437 million
Department
construction. Has Riverine Police component to
(incl. $3
secure water crossings. Iraq Study Group
million for
(Recommendation 51) proposes transfer to MOD
stipends to
control.
150 former
WMD
workers).
Totals (all forces)
194,200
Training
Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel (DOD-lead) as embeds and
partners. Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International
Police Training Center; Baghdad Police College and seven
academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Iraq Study Group
(Recommendation 57) proposes U.S. training at local police
station level. Countries doing training aside from U.S.: Canada,
Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria,
Finland, Czech Republic, Germany (now suspended), Hungary,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Accounted for separately, they number about
$53 million
Service (FPS)
145,000, attached to individual ministries.
allocated for
this service
thus far.

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CRS-47
Coalition-Building and Maintenance44
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military contributions.
The Administration view is that partner drawdowns reflect a stabilizing security
environment in the areas those forces are serving. A list of contributing countries,
although not force levels, can be found in the Department of State’s “Iraq Weekly
Status Report” referenced earlier. Britain continues to lead a multinational division
in southern Iraq, based in Basra, but, in line with plans announced by then Prime
Minister Tony Blair on February 21, 2007, British forces have been reduced from
7,100 to about 5,500 currently, and will be reduced further to below 5,000 by the end
of 2007. New Prime Minister Gordon Brown did not alter these plans in his
meetings with President Bush in late July 2007, and he added that Basra Province is
on track to be turned over to ISF control later this year. A Poland-led force (Polish
forces number 900, down from a high of 2,600 in 2005) has been based near
Diwaniyah and includes forces from the following foreign countries: Armenia,
Slovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia,
and Kazakhstan. Poland said in July 2007 that it has not decided whether to extend
the mission beyond the end of 2007.
The coalition shrinkage began with Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300
troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings
and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war
effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua followed Spain’s
withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in July 2004 after one
of its citizens was taken hostage. On the other hand, many nations are replacing their
contingents with trainers for the ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to
Iraq. Among other changes are the following.
! Ukraine, which lost eight soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent attack,
withdrew most of its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 2005
elections. However, in March 2006 it sent in a 150-person force to
take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where
Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000
in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil
in Kurdish-controlled Iraq). The deployment has been extended until
the end of 2007, and the government and parliament are discussing
further extensions.
44 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-48
! Japan completed its withdrawal of its 600-person military
reconstruction contingent in Samawah on July 12, 2006, but it
continues to provide air transport (and in June 2007 its parliament
voted to continue that for another two years). The Australian forces
protecting the Japanese contingent (450 out of the total Australian
deployment in Iraq of 1,350) moved to other areas, and security in
Muthanna was handed over to ISF control.
! Italy completed its withdrawal in December 2006 after turning over
Dhi Qar Province over to ISF control.
! Romanian leaders are debating whether to withdraw or reduce their
890 forces.
! In line with a February 21, 2007 announcement, Denmark is in the
process of withdrawing its 460 troops from the Basra area, and
Denmark reportedly is also evacuating about 200 Iraqis who helped
that contingent, in regard for their safety.
! Lithuania said in early 2007 that it is “seriously considering”
withdrawing its 53 troops from Iraq.
! On the other hand, Georgia is increasing its Iraq force to 2,000 (from
850) to assist the policing the Iran-Iraq border, a move that Georgian
officials said was linked to its efforts to obtain NATO membership.
NATO/EU/Other Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO countries
have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to contribute funds
or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to also train civilian
personnel. In addition to the security training offers discussed above, European
Union (EU) leaders have offered to help train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges
outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005 Brussels conference discussed above, the EU
pledged a $130 million package to help Iraq write its permanent constitution and
reform government ministries. The FY2005 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-
13) provided $99 million to set up a regional counter-terrorism center in Jordan to
train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
President’s January 10 Initiative, Iraq Study Group
Report, Legislation, and Other Options
In formulating the new strategy announced on January 10, 2007, President Bush
said he weighed the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq Study Group, as well as
input from several other reviews, including one directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and another under direction of the National Security Council. In the time
surrounding the speech, a number of senior personnel shifts were announced: U.S.
Ambassador Khalilzad’s replacement by Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker,
Gen. Abizaid’s replacement by CENTCOM Commander by Admiral William Fallon;
Gen. Casey’s replacement as head of MNF-I by General David Petraeus. Robert

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Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary in December 2006. In May
2007, the White House named Lt. Gen Douglas Lute, as a new aide to focus on
promoting rapid and effective inter-agency cooperation on the combat and policy in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2007, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Pace was not put
forward for another term as Joint Chiefs Chairman; he is being replaced by Admiral
Michael Mullen.
Iraq Study Group Report
The President’s Baghdad security plan appeared to deviate from many aspects
of the Iraq Study Group report, although the differences have narrowed since January.
The Administration has noted that the Study Group report said the Group might
support a temporary surge along the lines proposed by the President. The Iraq Study
Group itself was launched in March 2006; chosen by mutual agreement among its
congressional organizers to co-chair were former Secretary of State James Baker and
former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee Lee Hamilton. The
eight other members of the Group are from both parties and have held high positions
in government. The group was funded by the conference report on P.L. 109-234,
FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for
operations of the group.45 Some of the specific recommendations have been discussed
throughout this paper and, among the major themes of the 79 recommendations,
along with comparable or contrasting features of the President’s plan, are the
following.
! Foremost, transition from U.S.-led combat to Iraqi security self-
reliance by early 2008 (Recommendations 40-45), with continued
U.S. combat against AQ-I and force protection, in addition to
training and equipping the ISF. The Administration has rejected any
timetable for winding down U.S. combat.
! Heightened regional and international diplomacy, including with
Iran and Syria, and including the holding of a major international
conference in Baghdad (Recommendations 1-12). As noted above,
the Administration, after appearing to reject this recommendation,
has backed the series of regional conferences on Iraq.
! As part of an international approach, renewed commitment to Arab-
Israeli peace (Recommendations 13-17). This was not a major
feature of the President’s plan, although he has authorized stepped
up U.S. diplomacy by Secretary of State Rice on this issue.
! Additional economic, political, and military support for the
stabilization of Afghanistan (Recommendation 18). This was not
specified in the President’s January 10 plan, although, separately,
there have been increases in U.S. troops and aid for Afghanistan.
45 Full text at [http://www.usip.org].

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CRS-50
! Setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to achieve political
reconciliation, security, and governance, including possibly
withholding some U.S. support if the Iraqi government refuses or
fails to do so (Recommendations 19-37). The President initially
opposed threatening to reduce support for the Iraqi government if it
fails to uphold its commitments but signed P.L. 110-28 which does
link U.S. economic aid to progress on the benchmarks.
! Giving greater control over police and police commando units to the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which is considered less sectarian than the
Ministry of Interior that now controls some of these forces, and
reforming the Ministry of Interior (Recommendations 50-58). The
President’s plan, according to a White House fact sheet released on
January 10, requires reform of the Ministry of Interior.
! Securing and expanding Iraq’s oil sector (Recommendations 62-63).
The President’s plan expects Iraq to pass the pending oil laws, which
would, in part, encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector.
! Increasing economic aid to Iraq and enlisting more international
donations of assistance (Recommendations 64-67). The President’s
plan includes increases in aid, as discussed above.
! Ensuring that the United States has the right skills serving in Iraq
and has sufficient intelligence on developments there
(Recommendations 73-79). This is not specifically addressed in the
President’s plan.
In the 110th Congress, an amendment to H.R. 2764, the FY2008 foreign aid bill,
would revive the Iraq Study Group (providing $1 million for its operations) to help
assess future policy after the “troop surge.” The amendment passed 355-69, but press
reports say the Administration does not support reviving the Group’s work. In the
Senate, some Senators from both parties in June 2007 proposed legislation (S. 1545)
to adopt the recommendations of the Group as U.S. policy.
Congressional Reaction to Troop Surge
Judging from legislative action, congressional reaction to the President’s
Baghdad security plan was somewhat negative. In House action, on February 16,
2007, the House passed (246-182) a non-binding resolution (H.Con.Res. 63)
expressing opposition to the sending of additional forces to Iraq. However, on
February 17, 2007, the Senate did not vote to close off debate on a version of that
resolution (S. 574). Earlier, a Senate resolution opposing the troop increase
(S.Con.Res. 2) was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
January 24 (12-9 vote). A cloture motion on this measure failed on February 1, 2007.
The sections below discuss options that have been under discussion even before
the report of the Iraq Study Group or the troop surge, and some of these options are
being more actively debated in light of the upcoming September 15, 2007 progress
report by Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and the failure of the Iraqi political

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structure to achieve political reconciliation. Some of the ideas discussed may be
similar to some of the recommendations of the Study Group as well as the President’s
plan.
Further Options: Altering Troop Levels or Mission
Insisting that the “troop surge” is producing positive military results, President
Bush continues to publicly oppose major reductions in troop levels, stating that the
United States must uphold its “commitment” to the Iraqi government and
maintaining that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate pullout.
Other consequences, according to the Administration, would be full-scale civil war,
safehaven for AQ-I and emboldening of Al Qaeda more generally, and increased
involvement of regional powers in the fighting in Iraq. Supporters of the
Administration position say that Al Qaeda terrorists might “follow us home” —
conduct attacks in the United States — if the United States were to withdraw.
Further Troop Increase. Some argue that the “surge” was too small —
limited only to Baghdad and Anbar — and that the United States should consider
increasing troops levels in Iraq even further to tamp down sectarian violence and
prevent Sunni insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by U.S. operations. In
comments in July 2007, Gen. Petraeus says he does not rule out recommending
augmenting the troop surge when he has a full assessment of the results some time
later in 2007. However, this option appears increasingly unlikely in light of trends
in public and congressional support for the overall Iraq effort.
Immediate and Complete Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the
United States should begin to withdraw immediately and nearly completely,
maintaining that the decision to invade Iraq was a mistake in light of the failure to
locate WMD, that the large U.S. presence in Iraq is inflaming the insurgency, and
that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S. casualties without securing U.S.
national interests. Other Members argue that U.S. forces are now policing a civil war
rather than fighting an insurgency. Based on the arguments discussed above, the
Administration has largely ruled out this option.
Those who support a withdrawal include most of the approximately 70
Members of the “Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,” formed in June 2005. In the
110th Congress, some have introduced legislation (H.R. 508 and H.R. 413) that would
repeal the original authorization for the Iraq war. A similar measure might be
considered in the Senate.
In the 109th Congress, Representative John Murtha, ranking member (now
chairman) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, introduced a resolution
(H.J.Res. 73) calling for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable date” and the
maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence, mostly in Kuwait (some say
U.S. troops could be based in the Kurdish north) from which U.S. forces could
continue to battle AQ-I. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative
Duncan Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the
sense “that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;” it
failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005. Representative Murtha has introduced a similar

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bill in the 110th Congress (H.J.Res. 18); a Senate bill (S. 121) as well as a few other
House bills (H.R. 663, H.R. 455, and H.R. 645) contain similar provisions.
Withdrawal Timetable. The Administration has opposed legislation
mandating a withdrawal timetable on the grounds that doing so would allow
insurgents to “wait out” a U.S. withdrawal. The Iraq Study Group suggests a
winding down of the U.S. combat mission by early 2008 but does not recommend a
firm timetable.
The House leadership inserted a binding provision of FY2007 supplemental
appropriations legislation (H.R. 1591) that would require the president, as a condition
of maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq, to certify (by July 1, 2007) that Iraq had made
progress toward several political reconciliation benchmarks, and by October 1, 2007
that the benchmarks have been met. Even if the requirements were met, the
amendment would require the start of a redeployment from Iraq by March 1, 2008,
to be completed by September 1, 2008. The whole bill passed the House on March
23, 2007. In the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1591, a provision would set a non-
binding goal for U.S. withdrawal of March 1, 2008, in line with S.J.Res. 9 cited
above. The conference report adopted elements of both bills, retaining the benchmark
certification requirement and the same dates for the start of a withdrawal but making
the completion of any withdrawal (by March 31, 2008, not September 1, 2008) a goal
rather than a firm deadline. President Bush vetoed the conference report on May 1,
2007, and the veto was sustained. The revised provision in the FY2007 supplemental
(H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28) was discussed previously.
Some Members, such as Senate majority leader Harry Reid and Representative
John Murtha say they will continue to try to enact such legislation in such bills as the
FY2008 Defense authorization (H.R. 1585) and the FY2008 defense appropriation.
One proposed amendment (S.Amdt. 2087) to H.R. 1585 would begin a withdrawal
within 120 days and complete it (down to a limited presence) by April 1, 2008. A
similar House bill, (H.R. 2956), was adopted on July 12, 2007 by a vote of 223-201.
A Senate bill (S. 433), would set a deadline for withdrawing combat troops by March
31, 2008.
In the 109th Congress, the timetable issue was debated extensively. In November
2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs to force internal
compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042
(FY2006 defense authorization bill) to compel the Administration to work on a
timetable for withdrawal during 2006. Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal
into an amendment that stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but
requires an Administration report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could
permit a U.S. withdrawal. That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006
should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-
partisan support, passing 79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications
by House conferees, in the conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-
163). On June 22, 2006, the Senate debated two Iraq-related amendments to an
FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766). One, offered by Senator Kerry, setting
a July 1, 2007, deadline for U.S. redeployment from Iraq, was defeated 86-13.
Another amendment, sponsored by Senator Levin, called on the Administration to

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begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006, but with no deadline for full
withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39.
Troop Reduction/Mission Change. Depending on the results of the
“troop surge,” there might later be debate on a possible significant but not wholesale
troop reduction. U.S. officials have said that success of the surge — or its failure —
might pave the way for a U.S. force reduction to fulfill a scaled-back U.S. mission
that would involve: (1) operations against AQ-I; (2) an end to active patrolling of
Iraqi streets; (3) force protection; and (4) training the ISF. A press report in June
2007 (Washington Post, June 10, 2007) said that, if this were the new mission of U.S.
forces, fulfilling the mission might require retaining about 50, 000 - 60,000 U.S.
forces. Of these forces, about 20,000 would be assigned to guaranteeing the security
of the Iraqi government or assist the ISF if it is having difficulty in battle. A reduced
U.S. mission similar to those described are stipulated in H.R. 2451, which might be
taken up in September 2007.
In the past, U.S. commanders presented to President Bush options for a
substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, dependent on security progress, to about
120,000. The plans faded when the security situation did not calm. A change of
mission similar to that described — and without a deadline for withdrawal — has
been proposed by several Senators for consideration of the FY2008 defense
authorization (H.R. 1585).
Planning for Withdrawal. Administration officials say they will not
publicly discuss whether or not there is planning for a substantial withdrawal because
doing so would undermine the ongoing troop surge and other efforts. However,
Secretary Gates toured facilities in Kuwait in August 2007 in what was reported as
an effort to become familiar with the capabilities of the U.S. military to carry out a
redeployment, if ordered. Some Members want the Administration to plan for a
substantial U.S. redeployment from Iraq and to inform Congress accordingly. A bill,
introduced in July 2007 by Representative Tanner (H.R. 3087) and reported out by
the House Armed Services Committee on July 31, 2007, would require the
Administration to give Congress a plan for redeployment from Iraq. Senator Hillary
Clinton reportedly was briefed on August 2, 2007 by Defense Department officials
on the status of planning for a withdrawal, if one is decided, and she and several
others introduced legislation on August 2, 2007 (S. 1950), to require contingency
planning for redeployment from Iraq.
International and Regional Diplomacy
As noted above, many of the Iraq Study Group recommendations propose
increased regional, multi-lateral, and international diplomacy. One idea, included in
the Study Group report, is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi
neighbors to prevail on Iraq’s factions to compromise. The Administration has taken
significant steps in this direction, including a bilateral meeting with Syria at the May
3-4, 2007 meeting on Iraq in Egypt, and the bilateral meeting with Iran in Baghdad
on May 28, 2007. In the 110th Congress, a few bills (H.R. 744, H.Con.Res. 43, and
H.Con.Res. 45) support the Iraq Study Group recommendation for an international
conference on Iraq. In the 109th Congress, these ideas were included in several

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resolutions, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although
several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal.
Other ideas involve recruitment of new force donors. In July 2004, then-
Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider a Saudi proposal for
a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq,
reportedly under separate command. Some Iraqi leaders believed that such
peacekeepers would come from Sunni Muslim states and would inevitably favor
Sunni factions within Iraq. On the other hand, several experts believe that the lack
of progress in stabilizing Iraq is caused by internal Iraqi disputes and processes and
that new regional or international steps would yield minimal results. For more
information, see CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
Another idea is to identify a high-level international mediator to negotiate with
Iraq’s major factions. Some Members of Congress wrote to President Bush in
November 2006 asking that he name a special envoy to Iraq to follow up on some of
the Administration’s efforts to promote political reconciliation in Iraq.
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization
Many proposals focus on the need for a “political solution,” a requirement
acknowledged by General Petraeus and almost all senior U.S. officials. These
proposals involve differing methods for altering Iraq’s power structure so that no
major community feels excluded or has incentive to back violence.
Reorganize the Power Structure. Some experts believe that adjusting U.S.
troop levels would not address the underlying causes of violence in Iraq. Those who
want to build a unified and strong central government, including the Bush
Administration, have identified the need to assuage Sunni Arab grievances, and
several of the benchmarks required of the Iraqi government are intended to achieve
that objective. Others believe that more sweeping political reconciliation efforts are
needed, but there is little agreement on what additional or alternative package of
incentives, if any, would persuade most Sunnis leaders — and their constituents —
to support the government. Some believe that Sunnis might be satisfied by a
wholesale cabinet/governmental reshuffle that gives several leading positions, such
as that of President, to a Sunni Arab, although many Kurds might resent such a move
because a Kurd now holds that post. Others oppose major governmental change
because doing so might necessitate the voiding of the 2005 elections, a move that
would appear un-democratic.
Decentralization and Break-Up Options. Some commentators maintain
that Iraq cannot be stabilized as one country and should be broken up into three
separate countries: one Kurdish, one Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab. Another
version of this idea, propounded by Senator Biden and Council on Foreign Relations
expert Leslie Gelb (May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed) is to form three
autonomous regions, dominated by each of the major communities. A former U.S.
Ambassador and an adviser to the Kurds, Peter Galbraith, also advocates this option.
According to this view, decentralizing Iraq into autonomous zones would ensure that
Iraq’s territorial integrity is preserved while ensuring that these communities do not

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enter all-out civil war with each other. Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns
about equitable distribution of oil revenues, an international organization should be
tapped to distribute Iraq’s oil revenues. S.Con.Res. 37, with several co-sponsors from
both parties, expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should support
a political settlement in Iraq that creates a federal system of government and allows
for the creation of federal regions.
Critics of both forms of this idea believe that any segregation of Iraq, legal or
de-facto, would cause parts of Iraq to fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful
neighbors. Others believe that the act of dividing Iraq’s communities in any way
would cause widespread violence, particularly in areas of mixed ethnicity, as each
community struggles to maximize its territory and its financial prospects. This
recommendation was rejected by the Iraq Study Group as potentially too violent.
Negotiating With Insurgents. A related idea is to negotiate with insurgents.
The Iraq Study Group report welcomes contact with almost all parties in Iraq, with
the exception of AQ-I (Recommendations 34-35). The Administration — and the
Iraqi government — appears to have adopted this recommendation to some extent.
Gen. Odierno, in June 2007, discussed with reporters a new U.S. tactic of reaching
local ceasefires with Iraqi insurgent groups and, as discussed above, some U.S.
commanders have gone even further by cooperating with Sunni insurgents willing to
fight against AQ-I. In an interview before leaving Iraq, outgoing Ambassador
Khalilzad said in late March 2007 that he had had talks with some insurgents in
Jordan who are believed open to reconciliation.
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option. As discussed above, another option
began receiving discussion in October 2006 as Iraqi elites began to sense a growing
rift between the Administration and Maliki. Some Iraqis believe the United States
might try to use its influence among Iraqis to force Maliki to resign and replace him
with a military strongman or some other figure who would crack down on sectarian
militias. Some say former Prime Minister Allawi might be trying to position himself
as such an alternative figure. However, experts in the United States see no concrete
signs that such an option might be under consideration by the Administration. Using
U.S. influence to force out Maliki would, in the view of many, conflict with the U.S.
goal of promoting democracy and rule of law in Iraq.
Economic Measures
Some believe that the key to calming Iraq is to accelerate economic
reconstruction, and they see the draft oil law as drawing in the foreign investment to
Iraq’s key energy sector that is needed to drive economic development. According
to this view, accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating
employment, improving public services, and creating confidence in the government.
This idea was incorporated into the President’s January 10 initiative, in part by
attempting to revive state-owned factories that can employ substantial numbers of
Iraqis. Prior to that, this concept was reflected in the decision to form PRTs, as
discussed above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone will produce major
political results because the differences among Iraq’s major communities are
fundamental and resistant to economic solutions.

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Another idea has been to set up an Iraqi fund, or trust, that would ensure that all
Iraqis share equitably in Iraq’s oil wealth. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal
(December 18, 2006) Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator John Ensign
supported the idea of an “Iraq Oil Trust” modeled on the Alaska Permanent Fund.

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Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
INC
War crimes Broadcasting
opposition
Total
activities
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio
Free Iraq”)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-
(about 14.5
FY2003
million of this
went to INC)
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (April 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and an
estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to funding
disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on how U.S.
funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department agreed that the
Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s “Information
Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end its funding
of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its use of U.S.
funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, but was
halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do not include covert aid
provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war crimes” funding was
used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi human rights; the
translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the Administration
donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war crimes tribunal is
formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See General Accounting
Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress
Support Foundation, April 2004.

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Figure 1. Map of Iraq

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