Order Code 98-958 A
Extradition To and From the United States:
Overview of the Law and
Recent Treaties
Updated August 3, 2007
Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist
American Law Division

---

Extradition
To and From the United States:
Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties
Summary
“Extradition” is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for
prosecution or punishment. Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of
treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations
of the world, although they are many with whom it has no extradition treaty.
International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly
important law enforcement tool. This is a brief overview of the adjustments made in
recent treaties to accommodate American law enforcement interests, and then a
nutshell overview of the federal law governing foreign requests to extradite a fugitive
found in this country and a United States request for extradition of a fugitive found
in a foreign country.
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the most
controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may not be had. In
addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most
modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which
extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding
purely military and political offenses; capital offenses; crimes that are punishable
under only the laws of one of the parties to the treaty; crimes committed outside the
country seeking extradition; crimes where the fugitive is a national of the country of
refuge; and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of limitations.
Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic channels. In
this country, it proceeds through the Departments of Justice and State and may be
presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the request
is in compliance with an applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to
satisfy probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty
offense(s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so, the
magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not inquire into the nature of
foreign proceedings likely to follow extradition.
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern
extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. Requests travel
through diplomatic channels and the only issue likely to arise after extradition to this
country is whether the extraditee has been tried for crimes other than those for which
he or she was extradited. The fact that extradition was ignored and a fugitive forcibly
returned to the United States for trial constitutes no jurisdictional impediment to trial
or punishment. Federal and foreign immigration laws sometimes serve as a less
controversial alternative to extradition to and from the United States.
This report is available in an abridged version, without quotations, citations or
footnotes as CRS Report RS22702, An Abridged Sketch of Extradition To and From
the United States, by Charles Doyle.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Contemporary U.S. Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bars to Extradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
No Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
No Treaty Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Military and Political Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Capital Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Want of Dual Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Extraterritoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Double Jeopardy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Lapse of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Other Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Constitutionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Procedure for Extradition from the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Arrest and Bail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Surrender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Extradition for Trial or Punishment in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Specialty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Alternatives to Extradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Immigration Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Irregular Rendition/Abduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Foreign Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Books and Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Notes and Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Countries with Whom the United States Has an Extradition Treaty . . . . . . 42
Countries with Whom the United States Has
No Extradition Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

---

Extradition
To and From the United States:
Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties
Introduction
“‘Extradition’ is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for
prosecution or punishment.”1 Extradition to or from the United States is a creature
of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations
of the world, although there are many with whom the United States has no
extradition treaty.2 International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition
an increasingly important law enforcement tool.3
Although extradition as we know it is of relatively recent origins,4 its roots can
be traced to antiquity. Scholars have identify procedures akin to extradition scattered
1 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (Supp. 1935); see also, 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 556-57 (1986)(RESTATEMENT). In
the parlance of international law nations are identified as “states.” In order to avoid
confusion, the several states of the United States will be referred to as “the states of the
United States.”
Interstate rendition, the formal surrender of a person by one of the states of the United
States to another, is also sometimes referred to as extradition, but is beyond the scope of this
report.
2 The list of countries along with the citations to our treaties follow 18 U.S.C. 3181. A
similar list is appended to this report, as is a list of the countries with whom we have no
extradition treaty in force at the present time.
3 Until the early 1970's, the United States received and submitted fewer than 50 extradition
requests a year; by the mid 1980's the number had grown to over 500 requests a year, IV
ABBELL & RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL ‚ EXTRADITION
(ABBELL & RISTAU) 11-18 (1990).
4 Even the term “extradition” did not appear until the late eighteenth century, BLAKESLY,
TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE, ROLE, AND IMPACT IN
MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND EXTRADITION 171 (1992). For
a more extensive examination of the history of extradition, see, Blakesly, The Practice of
Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief History, 4
BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 39 (1981); Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-6 (Supp. 1935); BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (BASSIOUNI) 31-5 (4th ed. 2002); ABBELL & RISTAU at
3-11.

---

CRS-2
throughout history dating as far back as the time of Moses.5 By 1776, a notion had
evolved to the effect that “every state was obliged to grant extradition freely and
without qualification or restriction, or to punish a wrongdoer itself” and the absence
of intricate extradition procedures has been attributed to the predominance of this
simple principle of international law.6
Whether by practice’s failure to follow principle or by the natural evolution of
the principle, modern extradition treaties and practices began to emerge in this
country and elsewhere by the middle eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.7
Our first extradition treaty consisted of a single terse article in Jay’s Treaty of
1794 with Great Britain, but it contained several of the basic features of
contemporary extradition pacts. Article XXVII of the Treaty provided in its entirety,
5 Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite king, Hattusili III, entered into a pact under which they
promised to extradite fugitives of both noble and humble birth, Treaty Between Hattusili and
Ramesses II, §§11-14, transliteration and translation in, Langdon & Gardiner, The Treaty
of Alliance Between Hattusili, King of the Hittites, and the Pharaoh Ramesses II of Egypt,
6 JOURNAL OF EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179, 192-94 (1920). Until fairly recently, nations
seem have been happily rid of those who fled rather than face punishment. The Egyptian-
Hittite treaty reflects the fact that extradition existed primarily as an exception to the more
favored doctrines of asylum and banishment. Fugitives returned pursuant to the treaty
received the benefits of asylum in the form of amnesty, “If one man flee from the land of
Egypt, or two, or three, and they come to the great chief of Hatti, the great chief of Hatti
shall seize them and shall cause them to be brought to Ramesse-mi-Amun, the great ruler
of Egypt. But as for the man who shall be brought to Ramesse-mi-Amun, the great ruler of
Egypt, let not his crime be charged against him, let not his house, his wives or his children
be destroyed, let him not be killed, let no injury be done to his eyes, to his ears, to his mouth
or to his legs . . .” §17, id. at 197.
6 1 RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Subchapter 7B, 557, citing, GROTIUS, DE JURE
BELLI AC PACIS, Vol.II, ch.21, §§3-4 (Scott ed. 1925).
7 “By the latter part of the nineteenth century that [principle] had yielded to the view that
delivery of persons charged with, or convicted of, crimes in another state was at most a
moral duty, not required by customary international law, but generally governed by treaty
and subject to various limitations. A network of bilateral treaties, differing in detail but
having considerable similarity in principle and scope, has spelled out these limitations, and
in conjunction with state legislation, practice, and judicial decisions has created a body of
law with substantial uniformity in major respects. But the network of treaties has not
created a principle of customary law requiring extradition, and it is accepted that states are
not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty,” ID.
From the perspective of one commentator, “The history of extradition can be divided
into four periods: (1) ancient times to the seventeenth century – a period revealing an almost
exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and half
of the nineteenth century – a period of treaty-making chiefly concerning military offenders
characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) 1833 to 1948 – a period of
collective concern for suppressing common criminality; and (4) post 1948 developments
which ushered in a greater concern for protecting human rights of persons and revealed an
awareness of the need to have international due process of law regulate international
relations,” BASSIOUNI at 33.

---

CRS-3
It is further agreed, that his Majesty and the United States, on mutual
requisitions, by them respectively, or by their respective ministers or officers
authorized to make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons, who, being
charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of the other,
provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of criminality, as,
according to the laws of the place, where the fugitive or person so charged shall
be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence
had there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall
be borne and defrayed, by those who make the requisition and receive the
fugitive.8
Contemporary U.S. Treaties
Bars to Extradition
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and by operation of
international law, “[a] state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply with
the request of another state party to that treaty to arrest and deliver a person duly
shown to be sought by that state (a) for trial on a charge of having committed a crime
covered by the treaty within the jurisdiction of the requesting state, or (b) for
punishment after conviction of such a crime and flight from that state, provided that
none of the grounds for refusal to extradite set forth in [the treaty] is applicable.”9
Subject to a contrary treaty provision, federal law defines the mechanism by
which we honor our extradition treaty obligations.10 Although some countries will
extradite in the absence of an applicable treaty as a matter of comity, it was long
believed that the United States could only grant an extradition request if it could
claim coverage under an existing extradition treaty, 18 U.S.C. 3181, 3184 (1994).11
Dicta in several court cases indicated that this requirement, however, was one of
congressional choice rather than constitutional requirement.12
No Treaty.
Congress appears to have acted upon that assumption when in 1996 it first
authorized the extradition of fugitive aliens even at the behest of a nation with whom
8 8 Stat. 116, 129 (1794).
9 1 RESTATEMENT §475 at 559.
10 18 U.S.C. 3181 to 3196.
11 18 U.S.C. 3181 (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who
have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence
of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government”); 18 U.S.C. 3184 (“Whenever
there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign
government . . .”).
12 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) (“Valentine v. United
States ex rel. Neidecker, supra, 299 U.S., at 8-9. . . (United States may not extradite a citizen
in the absence of a statute or treaty obligation)” (emphasis added)).

---

CRS-4
we have no extradition treaty,13 and then by statute making the extradition procedures
applicable to requests from international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.14
The initial judicial response has left the vitality of those efforts somewhat in
doubt. A district court in Texas initially ruled that constitutional separation of
powers requirements precluded extradition in the absence of a treaty, but the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutional validity of extradition by statute
rather than treaty when it overturned the district court finding on appeal.15
A question has occasionally arisen over whether an extradition treaty with a
colonial power continues to apply a former colony becomes independent. Although
the United States periodically renegotiates replacements or supplements for existing
treaties to make contemporary adjustments, we have a number of treaties that pre-
date the dissolution of a colonial bond or some other adjustment in governmental
status. Fugitives in these situations have sometimes contested extradition on the
grounds that we have no valid extradition treaty with the successor government that
asks that they be handed over for prosecution. These efforts are generally
unsuccessful since successor governments will ordinarily have assumed the
extradition treaty obligations negotiated by their predecessors.16
No Treaty Crime.
Extradition is generally limited to crimes identified in the treaty. Early treaties
often recite a list of the specific extraditable crimes. Jay’s Treaty mentions only
murder and forgery; the inventory in our 1852 treaty with Prussia included eight
13 18 U.S.C. 3181(b)(“The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the
exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent
residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of
the United States in foreign countries without regard to the existence of any treaty of
extradition with such foreign government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that
– (1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the
offenses been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence as
defined under section 16 of this title; and (2) the offenses charged are not of a political
nature”).
14 18 U.S.C. 3181 note, P.L. 104-132, §443, 110 Stat. 1280 (1996).
15 “The Constitution calls for the Executive to make treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Throughout the history of this Republic, every extradition from the United
States has been accomplished under the terms of a valid treaty of extradition. In the instant
case, it is undisputed that no treaty exists between the United States and the Tribunal. This
is so even when, the Government insists, and the Court agrees, the Executive has the full
ability and right to negotiate such at a treaty. The absence of a treaty is a fatal defect in the
Government’s request that the Extraditee be surrendered. Without a treaty, this Court has
no jurisdiction to act, and Congress’ attempt to effectuate the Agreement in the absence of
a treaty is an unconstitutional exercise of power,” In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988
F.Supp. 1038, 1042 (S.D.Tex. 1997), rev’d, Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 424-27
(5th Cir. 1999).
16 Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2006); Kastnerova v. United States, 365
F.3d 980, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2004); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 853-55 (9th Cir. 1996),
see generally, ABBELL & RISTAU, at 52-3, 180-81.

---

CRS-5
others;17 and our 1974 treaty with Denmark identifies several dozen extradition
offenses:
1. murder; voluntary manslaughter; assault with intent to commit murder. 2. Aggravated injury
or assault; injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 3. Unlawful throwing or
application of any corrosive or injurious substances upon the person of another. with schemes
intended to deceive or defraud, or by any other fraudulent means. 4. Rape; indecent assault;
sodomy accompanied by use of force or threat; sexual intercourse and other unlawful sexual
relations with or upon children under the age specified by the laws of both the requesting and
the requested States. 5. Unlawful abortion. 6. Procuration; inciting or assisting a person under
21 years of age or at the time ignorant of the purpose in order that such person shall carry on
sexual immorality as a profession abroad or shall be used for such immoral purpose; promoting
of sexual immorality by acting as an intermediary repeatedly or for the purpose of gain; profiting
from the activities of any person carrying on sexual immorality as a profession. 7. Kidnaping;
child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment. 8. Robbery; assault with intent to rob. 9. Burglary.
10. Larceny. 11. Embezzlement. 12. Obtaining property, money or valuable securities: by false
pretenses or by threat or force, by defrauding any governmental body, the public or any person
by deceit, falsehood, use of the mails or other means of communication in connection. 13.
Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting. 14. Extortion. 15. Receiving or
transporting any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to have been
unlawfully obtained. 16. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator
or by a director or officer of any company. 17. An offense against the laws relating to
counterfeiting or forgery. 18. False statements made before a court or to a government agency
or official, including under United States law perjury and subornation of perjury. 19. Arson. 20.
An offense against any law relating to the protection of the life or health of persons from: a
shortage of drinking water; poisoned, contaminated, unsafe or unwholesome drinking water,
substance or products. 21. Any act done with intent to endanger the safety of any person
traveling upon a railway, or in any aircraft or vessel or bus or other means of transportation, or
any act which impairs the safe operation of such means of transportation. 22. Piracy; mutiny
or revolt on board an aircraft against the authority of the commander of such aircraft; any
seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft.
23. An offense against the laws relating to damage to property. 24. a. Offenses against the laws
relating to importation, exportation or transit of goods, articles, or merchandise. b. Offenses
relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties. c. Offenses against the laws relating to
international transfers of funds. 25. An offense relating to the: a. spreading of false intelligence
likely to affect the price of commodities, valuable securities or any other similar interests; or b.
making of incorrect or misleading statements concerning the economic conditions of such
commercial undertakings as joint-stock companies, corporations, co-operative societies or
similar undertakings through channels of public communications, in reports, in statements of
accounts or in declarations to the general meeting or any proper official of a company, in
notifications to, or registration with, any commission, agency or officer having supervisory or
regulatory authority over corporations, joint-stock companies, other forms of commercial
undertakings or in any invitation to the establishment of those commercial undertakings or to
the subscription of shares. 28. Unlawful abuse of official authority which results in grievous
bodily injury or deprivation of the life, liberty or property of any person, [or] attempts to
commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the offenses mentioned in this Article,
Art. 3, 25 U.S.T. 1293 (1974).18
17 10 Stat. 964, 966 (1852)(“murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged papers, or the fabrication or
circulation of counterfeit money, whether coin or paper money, or the embezzlement of
public moneys”).
18 Section 203 of Public Law 105-323 purports to require construction of an extradition
treaty that permits extradition for kidnaping to authorize extradition for parental kidnaping
as well; the impact of section 203 remains to be seen.

---

CRS-6
While many of our existing extradition treaties continue to list specific
extraditable offenses, the more recent ones feature a dual criminality approach, and
simply make all felonies extraditable (subject to other limitations found elsewhere
in their various provisions).19
Military and Political Offenses.
In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted,
most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which
extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding
purely military and political offenses. The military crimes exception usually refers
to those offenses like desertion which have no equivalents in civilian criminal law.20
The exception is on relatively recent vintage.21 In the case of treaties that list specific
extraditable offenses, the exception is unnecessary since purely military offenses are
not listed. The exception became advisable, however, with the advent of treaties that
make extraditable any misconduct punishable under the laws of both treaty partners.
With the possible exception of selective service cases arising during the Vietnam
War period,22 recourse to the military offense exception appears to have been
infrequent and untroubled.
19 E.g., Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 6,
2000)(“An offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both
Parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more than one year or by a more
severe penalty”); see also, Paraguyan Extradition Treaty, Art. IV, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 106-4
(eff. Aug. 25, 2003); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); French Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1,
2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Mar. 18, 1997);
Jordanian Extradition Treaty , Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); and
Italian Extradition Treaty, Art. V, ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3027 (1984).
Where an official citation is unavailable for particular treaty, we have used the Senate
Treaty Document citation along with the date upon which the treaty entered into force
according the State Department’s Treaties In Force 2007, available on July 25, 2007 at
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83046.pdf]. Beginning with the 104th
Congress, Senate Treaty Documents are available on the Government Printing Office’s
website, [http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress].
20 E.g., Italian Extradition Treaty, Art. V, §3, 35 U.S.T. 3029 (1984) (“Extradition shall not
be granted for offenses under military law which are not offenses under ordinary criminal
law”). See generally, In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 676, 702-3 (N.D.Cal.
1988)(the military offense exception covers crimes like “mutiny and desertion which are
outside the realm of ordinary criminal law”); BASSIOUNI at 676-78; ABBELL & RISTAU at
116-17, 212-13.
21 ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES (ABBELL) §3-2(25)(No United
States extradition treaty negotiated prior to 1960 contains an express military offense
exception).
22 Even there the political offense exception was thought more hospitable, except in the case
of desertion, see generally, Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32 ALBANY
LAW REVIEW 337 (1968).

---

CRS-7
The political offense exception, however, has proven more troublesome.23 The
exception is and has been a common feature of extradition treaties for almost a
century and a half. In its traditional form, the exception is expressed in deceptively
simple terms.24 Yet it has been construed in a variety ways, more easily described in
hindsight than to predicate beforehand. As a general rule, American courts require
that a fugitive seeking to avoid extradition “demonstrat[e] that the alleged crimes
were committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance such
as a war, revolution or rebellion.”25

Contemporary treaties often seek to avoid misunderstandings in a number of
ways. They expressly exclude terrorist offenses or other violent crimes from the
definition of political crimes for purposes of the treaty;26 they explicitly extend the
political exception to those whose prosecution is politically or discriminatorily
23 See generally, BASSIOUNI, at 594-676; RESTATEMENT, §476, Comment g. & Reporters’
Notes 4-8; ABBELL & RISTAU at 199-212; Phillips, The Political Offense Exception and
Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposals for its Future, 15
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (1997); The Political Offense Exception:
Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63
GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 585 (1995).
24 Egyptian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, 19 Stat. 574 (1874)(“The provisions of this treaty
shall not apply to any crime or offence of a political character”).
25 Kostotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171 (1st Cir. 1991), citing, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d
504, 512 (7th Cir. 1981); Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596-97 (4th Cir. 2007); Vo v.
Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 2006); Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 750 (9th
Cir. 2005); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980); Sindona v.
Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807-9 (9th Cir.
1986); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 689, 692 (1896).
26 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996)(“For purposes of this Treaty, the following offenses shall not be considered to be
political offenses: a. a murder or other willful crime against the person of a Head of State
of one of the Contracting Parties, or a member of the Head of State’s family; . . . c. murder,
manslaughter, or other offense involving substantial bodily harm; d. an offense involving
kidnaping or any form of unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage; e. placing
or using an explosive, incendiary or destructive device capable of endangering life, of
causing substantial bodily harm, or of causing substantial property damage; and f. a
conspiracy or any type of association to commit offenses as specified in Article 2, paragraph
2, or attempt to commit, or participation in the commission of, any of the foregoing
offenses”); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art.5, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17,
1999)(murder or other offense against heads of state or their families; murder, manslaughter,
assault; kidnaping, abduction, hostage taking; bombing; or attempt or conspiracy to commit
any of those offenses); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art.4, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
10 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002)(virtually the same); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.4, ¶2, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-17, (eff. Oct. 11, 1991)(violent crimes against a Head of State or a member
of his or her family).

---

CRS-8
motivated;27 and/or they limit the reach of their political exception clauses to conform
to their obligations under multinational agreements.28
Capital Offenses.
A number of nations have abolished or abandoned capital punishment as a
sentencing alternative.29 Several of these have preserved the right to deny extradition
in capital cases either absolutely or in absence of assurances that the fugitive will not
be executed if surrendered.30 More than a few countries are reluctant to extradite in
27 Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)
(“Extradition shall also not be granted if . . . (b) it is established that the request for
extradition, though purporting to be on account of the extraditable offence, is in fact made
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions; or (c) the person sought is by reason of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, likely to be denied a fair trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty for such reasons” ); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 3, ¶(1)(c), S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“Extradition shall not
be granted when: . . . the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request was politically or racially motivated”); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.4, ¶3,
S. Treaty Doc. 105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999)(politically motivated); French Extradition
Treaty, Art.4, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002)(prosecution or punishment on
account of the fugitive’s “race, religion, nationality or political opinions”).
28 Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.4, ¶2(b), S. Treaty Doc. 98-17, (eff. Oct. 11, 1991);
Peruvian Extradition Treaty, Art. IV, ¶¶1-3 (eff. Aug. 25, 2003); Korean Extradition
Treaty, Art. 4, ¶2(b), S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Indian Extradition Treaty,
Art.4, ¶2(b)-(g), S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 21, 1999); Hungarian Extradition Treaty,
Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)(“For purposes of this Treaty, the
following offenses shall not be considered to be political offenses . . . an offense for which
both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international
agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their competent authorities
for decision as to prosecution”). The State Department has noted that the list of crimes
subject to such international agreements includes air piracy, aircraft sabotage, crimes of
violence committed against foreign dignitaries, hostage taking and narcotics trafficking,
Letter of Submittal, Id. at VI. Unless restricted in the Treaty, the list apparently also
includes genocide, war crimes, theft of nuclear materials, slavery, torture, violence
committed against the safety of maritime navigation or maritime platforms, theft or
destruction of national treasures, counterfeiting currency and bribery of foreign officials.
BASSIOUNI at 665-66.
29 SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 239-45 (1997);
HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY, 240-47 (2d ed. 1996).
30 E.g., Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)
(“when the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in
the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State,
the Requested State may refuse extradition unless the Requesting State provides such
assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty, if imposed,
shall not be carried out”); see also, Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. IV, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec.
9, 1996); South African Extradition Treaty, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25,
2001); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991).

---

CRS-9
a capital case even though their extradition treaty with the United State has no such
provision, based on opposition to capital punishment or to the methods and
procedures associated with execution bolstered by sundry multinational agreements
to which the United States is either not a signatory or has signed with pertinent
reservations.31
Want of Dual Criminality.
Dual criminality exists when the two parties to an extradition treaty each
punishes a particular form of misconduct. Historically, extradition treaties have
handled dual criminality in one of three ways. They list extraditable offenses and do
not otherwise speak to the issue. They list extraditable offenses and contain a
separate provisions requiring dual criminality. They identify as extraditable offenses
those offenses condemned by the laws of both nations. Today, “[u]nder most
international agreements . . . [a] person sought for prosecution or for enforcement of
a sentence will not be extradited . . . (c) if the offense with which he is charged or of
which he has been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime in both the
requesting and requested state. . .”32
On the other hand, the capital punishment mutuality provision can redound to our interests
when another nation has a wider range of capital offenses than do we, see e.g., S. Ex. Rept.
104-2, at 9 (1995)(“The United States delegation sought this provision because Jordan
imposes the death penalty for some crimes that are not punishable by death in the United
States”).
Some capital punishment clauses do not apply in murder cases, see e.g., Extradition
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“When the
offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the
Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State, the
competent authority of the Requested State may refuse extradition unless: (a) the offense
constitutes murder under the laws in the Requested State; or (b) the competent authority of
the Requesting State provides such assurances as the competent authority of the Requested
State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not
be carried out”); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May
17, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34 (eff. Jan. 12,
2001); see also, Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 230 (eff.
May 17, 1977).
31 BASSIOUNI at 735-44; ABBELL & RISTAU at 117-19, 295-6; International and Domestic
Approaches to Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and
Kindler Decisions, 34 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 225 (1996); Extradition, Human
Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged
with a Capital Crime, 25 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 189 (1994).
32 1 RESTATEMENT, §476; United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1995).
Examples include the Italian Extradition Treaty, Art II, 35 U.S.T. 3027 (1984) (“An offense,
however denominated, shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws
of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or
by a more severe penalty. . .”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty
Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.
105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 2, 35 U.S.T. 3201
(1973); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996);
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Bolivian
Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Extradition

---

CRS-10
Although there is a split of authority over whether dual criminality resides in all
extradition treaties that do not deny its application,33 the point is largely academic
since it is a common feature of all American extradition treaties.34 Subject to varying
interpretations, the United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to
honor an extradition request if possible. Thus, dual criminality does not “require that
the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be same; nor that
the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the
two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both
jurisdictions.”35 When a foreign country seeks to extradite a fugitive from the United
States dual criminality may be satisfied by reference to either federal or state law.36
Our treaty partners do not always construe dual criminality requirements as
broadly. In the past, some have been unable to find equivalents for attempt,
conspiracy, RICO, CCE, and crimes with prominent federal jurisdictional elements.37
Many modern extradition treaties contain provisions addressing the problem of
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Extradition
Treaty with Thailand, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991).
33 In re Extradition of Loharoia, 932 F.Supp. 802, 810 (N.D.Tex. 1996) (“The principle is
a general policy of extradition, and arguably applies even absent explicit inclusion in the
treaty in question. See, Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903); Bauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d
843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980). On the other hand, there is authority suggesting that the principle
does not apply unless it is expressly stated in the treaty. See, Factor [v. Laubenheimer], 290
U.S. [276], at 287-90 [(1933)]”).
34 Soma, Muther, & Brissette, Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes; Are New
Treaties and Laws Needed? 34 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 317, 324 (1997).
35 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922); United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662,
664-65 (9th Cir. 2006); Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir.
2000); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997); LoDuca v. United States,
93 F.3d 1100, 1112 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir.
1995); In re Extradition of Platko, 213 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1236 (S.D.Cal. 2002); see
generally, Test of “Dual Criminality” Where Extradition to or From Foreign Nation Is
Sought, 132 ALR FED 525 (1996 & Oct. 2006 Supp.).
36 International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 191, 207 (“The current state of the law appears
to be that if the offense is considered criminal under federal law, the law of the asylum
State, or under the law of the preponderance of States, the dual criminal requirement is
satisfied”); Test of Dual Criminality Where Extradition From Foreign Nations Is Sought,
132 ALR FED. at 539-40.
37 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions prohibit
acquisition or operation of an interstate commercial enterprise through the patterned
commission of various other “predicate” offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1961 to 1966. The Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) or drug kingpin provisions, 21 U.S.C. 848, outlaw management
of a large drug trafficking operation. Along with attempt, conspiracy and federal crimes
with distinctive jurisdictional elements, they pose difficulties when they approximate but
do not exactly matching the elements for extraditable offenses. They present a distinct
problem, however, when they are based entirely on predicate offenses that are not
themselves extraditable offenses. BASSIOUNI at 504-11; RICO, CCE, and International
Extradition, 62 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 1281 (1989).

---

CRS-11
jurisdictional elements38 and/or making extraditable attempt or conspiracy to commit
an extraditable offense.39 Some include special provisions for tax and customs
offenses as well.40
Extraterritoriality.
As a general rule, crimes are defined by the laws of the place where they are
committed. There have always been exceptions to this general rule under which a
nation was understood to have authority to outlaw and punish conduct occurring
outside the confines of its own territory. In the past, our extradition treaties applied
to crimes “committed within the [territorial] jurisdiction” of the country seeking
extradition.41 Largely as a consequence of terrorism and drug trafficking, however,
the United States now claims more sweeping extraterritorial application for our
criminal laws than recognized either in our more historic treaties or by many of
38 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶3.b., S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“For the purpose of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense . . . whether or
not the offense is one for which United States federal law requires the showing of such
matters as interstate transportation or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the purpose of establishing
jurisdiction in a United States federal court”); see also, Lithuanian Extradition Treaty, Art.
2, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 107-4 (eff. Mar. 31, 2003); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶4(c),
S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.2, ¶3(b), S.
Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Korean Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶3(c), S. Treaty
Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999).
39 E.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept.
22, 1994)(“An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an attempt or a
conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting, counselling, causing or procuring the commission
of, or being an accessory before or after the fact to, an [extraditable] offense. . .”);
Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov.
29, 1999); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995)(“An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an attempt or a
conspiracy to commit, or participation in the commission of, an [extraditable] offense. . .”);
Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art.2, ¶1(a), (b), S. Treaty Doc. 105-10 (eff. Feb. 1,
2002); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. III, ¶2, 28 U.S.T. 230
(1977)(“Extradition shall also be granted for any attempt or conspiracy to commit an
[extraditable] offense . . .”).
40 E.g., South African Extradition Treaty, Art. 2 ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25,
2001)(“Where extradition of a person is sought for an offense against a law relating to
taxation, customs duties, exchange control, or other revenue matters, extradition may not
be refused on the ground that the law of the Requested State does not impose the same kind
of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, customs duty, or exchange regulation of the same
kinds as the law of the Requesting State”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4(B), S.
Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Korean Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc.
106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff.
Sept. 17, 1999); but see, Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 5, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10
(eff. Feb. 1, 2002) (“The executive authority of the Requested State shall have discretion to
deny extradition when the offense for which extradition is requested is a fiscal offense [i.e.,
purely a tax, customs, or currency offense]”).
41 ABBELL & RISTAU at 64-7, 278-80.

---

CRS-12
today’s governments.42 Here, our success in eliminating extradition impediments by
negotiating new treaty provisions has been mixed. More than a few call for
extradition regardless of where the offense was committed.43 Yet perhaps an equal
number of contemporary treaties permit or require denial of an extradition request
that falls within an area where the countries hold conflicting views on extraterritorial
jurisdiction.44
Nationality.
The right of a country to refuse to extradite one’s own nationals is probably the
greatest single obstacle to extradition. The United States has long objected to the
impediment45 and recent treaties indicate that its hold may not be as formidable as
42 Even among countries with a fairly expansive view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction,
there may be substantial differences between the perceptions of common law countries and
those of civil law countries, Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH LAW REVIEW 685.
43 E.g., Peruvian Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶3(c), S. Treaty Doc. 107-6 (eff. Mar. 25,
2003)(“For the purposes of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense,
regardless of . . . (c) where the offense was committed”); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art.
II, ¶3(b), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996) (“To determine . . . whether an offense
is punishable under the laws in the Requested State, it shall be irrelevant . . . where the act
or acts constituting the offense were committed”); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4,
S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995) (“An offense described in this Article shall be an
extraditable offense regardless of where the act or acts constituting the offense were
committed”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1,
2002); Indian Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1(4) (eff. July 21, 1999); Extradition Treaty with
Luxembourg, Art.2, ¶1(4), S. Treaty Doc. 105-10, (eff. Feb. 1, 2002).
44 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“If the offense has been committed outside the territory of the Requesting State, extradition
shall be granted if the laws of the Requested State provide for the punishment of an offense
committed outside of its territory in similar circumstances. If the laws of the Requested
State do not so provide, the executive authority of the Requested State may, in its discretion
grant extradition”); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17
(eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“An offense described in this Article shall be an extraditable offense
whether or not the offense was committed within the territory of the Requesting State.
However, if the offense was committed outside the territory of the Requesting State,
extradition shall be granted if the law of the Requested State provides for punishment of an
offense committed outside of its territory in similar circumstances”); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art III, 35 U.S.T. 3028 (1984) (“When an offense has been committed outside the
territory of the Requesting Party, the Requested Party shall have the power to grant
extradition if its laws provide for the punishment of such an offense or if the person sought
is a national of the Requesting Party”); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 2, ¶2, 35
U.S.T. 3206 (1973)(“. . . When the offense for which extradition has been requested has
been committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, extradition may be granted if
the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in
similar circumstances”); French Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff.
Feb. 1, 2002)(“Extradition shall be granted for an extraditable offense committed outside
the territory of the Requesting State, when the laws of the requested Party authorize the
prosecution or provide the punishment of that offense in similar circumstances”).
45 1 RESTATEMENT, §475, Reporters’ Note 4.

---

CRS-13
was once the case. At one time it was fair to say that “United States extradition
treaties contained generally three types of such provisions. The first does not refer
to nationals specifically, but agrees to the extradition of all persons. Judicial
construction, as well as executive interpretation, of such clauses have consistently
held that the word ‘person’ includes nationals, and therefore refusal to surrender a
fugitive because he is a national cannot be justified . . . . The second and most
common type of treaty provision provides that ‘neither of the contracting parties shall
be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects . . . .’ [Congress has enacted
legislation to overcome judicial construction that precluded the United States from
surrendering an American under such provision.46] The third type of treaty provision
states that ‘neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own
citizens under the stipulations of this convention, but the executive authority of each
shall have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper do
so.’”47
These basic three have been joined by a number of variants. A growing number
go so far as to declare that “Extradition shall not be refused on the ground that the
fugitive is a citizen or national of the Requested State.”48 Another form limits the
nationality exemption to nonviolent crimes;49 a third allows a conflicting obligation
46 The Supreme Court in Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936),
held that a national exemption clause that denied an obligation to extradition denied the
United States the authority to honor a treaty request to surrender an American. Congress
sought to reverse the result with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. 3196 (“If the applicable treaty
or convention does not obligate the United States to extradite its citizens to a foreign
country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the surrender to that country of a
United States citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country if the other
requirements of that treaty or convention are met”). At least two lower federal courts have
held that the statute grants the government authority to extradite an American, Hilario v.
United States, 854 F.2d 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F.Supp. 241 (E.D.Pa.
1992); see also, Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1325-326 (9th Cir. 1997)(section
3196 and a treaty provision stating that the parties “may” extradite their own nationals
affords to the Secretary of State discretion).
47 BASSIOUNI at 683-84; ABBELL & RISTAU at 67-71, 186-87, 280-81.
48 Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 20, 2000); South
African Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25, 2001); Extradition
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 4, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art IV, 35 U.S.T. 3028 (1983); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 4, 35 U.S.T.
3206 (1973).
49 Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶1(b), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996)
(“Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition
request refers to . . . (b) murder; voluntary manslaughter; kidnaping; aggravated assault;
rape; sexual offenses involving children; armed robbery; offenses related to the illicit traffic
in controlled substances; serious offenses related to terrorism; serious offenses related to
organized criminal activity; fraud against the government or involving multiple victims;
counterfeiting of currency; offenses related to the traffic in historical or archeological items;
offenses punishable in both States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least
ten years; or (c) an attempt or conspiracy, participation in, or association regarding the

---

CRS-14
under a multinational agreement to wash the exemption away.50 Even where the
exemption is preserved, contemporary treaties more regularly refer to the obligation
to consider prosecution at home of those nationals whose extradition has been
refused.51
Double Jeopardy.
Depending on the treaty, extradition may also be denied on the basis of a
number of procedural considerations. Double punishment and/or double jeopardy
(also know as non bis in idem) clauses are among these.52 The more historic clauses
are likely to bar extradition for a second prosecution of the “same acts” or the “same
event” rather than the more narrowly drawn “same offenses.”53 The new model
limits the exemption to fugitives who have been convicted or acquitted of the same
offense and specifically denies the exemption where an initial prosecution has simply
been abandoned.54
commission of any of the offenses described in subparagraphs (a) and (b)”).
50 Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶1(a), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996)
(“Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition
request refers to: (a) offenses as to which there is an obligation to establish criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to multilateral international treaties in force with respect to the
Parties”).
51 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 3, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“If extradition is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, the
Requested State shall, at the request of the Requesting State, submit the case to its
authorities for prosecution”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-16
(eff. Sept. 14, 1999); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May
17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11,
1991); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. VII, ¶¶2, 3, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7,
1991)(but also requiring extradition if a fugitive is a national of both the Requesting and
Requested State).
52 BASSIOUNI at 693-707; ABBELL & RISTAU at 96-100, 192-98, 290-93.
53 Italian Extradition Treaty, Art VI, 35 U.S.T. 3030 (1984) (“Extradition shall not be
granted when the person sought has been convicted, acquitted or pardoned, or has served
the sentence imposed, by the Requested Party for the same act for which extradition is
requested”); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. V, ¶1(a), 28 U.S.T. 230
(1977) (“Extradition shall not be granted if: (a) the person sought would, if proceeded
against in the territory of the requested Party for the offense for which his extradition is
requested, be entitled to be discharged on the grounds of a previous acquittal or conviction
in the territory of the requesting or requested Party or of a third State”).
54 E.g., Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. V, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996)
(“Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted
in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is requested. Extradition shall
not be precluded by the fact that the authorities of the Requested State have decided to
refrain from prosecuting the person sought for the acts for which extradition is requested or
to discontinue any criminal proceedings which have been initiated against the person sought
for those acts.”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34
(eff. Jan. 12, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc.

---

CRS-15
Lapse of Time.
Lapse of time or statute of limitation clauses are prevalent as well. “Many
[states] . . . preclude extradition if prosecution for the offense charged, or
enforcement of the penalty, has become barred by lapse of time under the applicable
law. Under some treaties the applicable law is that of the requested state,55 in others
that of the requesting state;56 under some treaties extradition is precluded if either
state’s statute of limitations has run.57 . . . When a treaty provides for a time-bar only
under the law of the requesting state, or only under the law of the requested state,
United States courts have generally held that time-bar of the state not mentioned does
not bar extradition. If the treaty contains no reference to the effect of a lapse of time
neither state’s statute of limitations will be applied.”58 Left unsaid is the fact that
some treaties declare in no uncertain terms that the passage of time is no bar to
extradition.59
In cases governed by American law and in instances of American prosecution
following extradition, applicable statutes of limitation and due process determine
whether pre-indictment delays bar prosecution60 and speedy trial provisions govern
105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 5, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty
Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 5, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty
Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995). Some include language to avoid confusion over whether
an American dismissal with prejudice is the same as an acquittal, Hungarian Extradition
Treaty, Art. 5, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996) (“Extradition shall not be granted
when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed by court order
with finding and final effect in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is
requested”).
55 E.g., Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.7, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
French Extradition Treaty, Art.8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002).
56 E.g., Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Indian
Extradition Treaty, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 21, 1999); Extradition Treaty
with the Bahamas, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Hungarian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art VII, 35 U.S.T. 3030 (1983).
57 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 5, ¶3, 35 U.S.T. 3207 (1973); see also,
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Extradition
Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. V, ¶1(b), 28 U.S.T. 230 (1977).
58 1 RESTATEMENT §476, Comment e; see also, BASSIOUNI at 707-12; ABBELL & RISTAU
at 94-6, 187-90, 289-90.
59 E.g., Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)
(“The decision whether to grant the request for extradition shall be made without regard to
provisions of the law of either Contracting State concerning lapse of time”); Extradition
Treaty with Belize, Art.8,106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.7,
S. Treaty Doc.105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999).
60 U.S.Const. Amends. V, XIV; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977);
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982);United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farmer, 312 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2003).

---

CRS-16
whether post-indictment delays preclude prosecution.61

Other Features.
Expenses and Representation. Our extradition treaties, particularly the
more recent ones, often have other less obvious, infrequently mentioned features.
Perhaps the most common of these deal with the expenses associated with the
procedure and representation of the country requesting extradition before the courts
of the country of refuge. The distribution of costs is ordinarily governed by a treaty
stipulation, reflected in federal statutory provisions,62 under which the country
seeking extradition accepts responsibility for any translation expenses and the costs
of transportation after surrender, and the country of refuge assumes responsibility for
all other costs.63 Although sometimes included in a separate article, contemporary
61 U.S.Const. Amends. VI, XIV; Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 774 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2003).
62 18 U.S.C. 3195 (“All costs or expenses incurred in any extradition proceeding in
apprehending, securing, and transmitting a fugitive shall be paid by the demanding authority.
All witness fees and costs of every nature in cases of international extradition, including the
fees of the magistrate, shall be certified by the judge or magistrate before whom the hearing
shall take place to the Secretary of State of the United States, and the same shall be paid out
of appropriations to defray the expenses of the judiciary or the Department of Justice as the
case may be. The Attorney General shall certify to the Secretary of State the amounts to be
paid to the United States on account of said fees and costs in extradition cases by the foreign
government requesting the extradition, and the Secretary of State shall cause said amounts
to be collected and transmitted to the Attorney General for deposit in the Treasury of the
United States”).
63 Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996)(“2. The Requesting State shall bear the expenses related to the translation of
documents and transportation of the person surrendered. The Requested State shall pay all
other expenses incurred in that State by reason of the extradition proceedings. 3. Neither
State shall make any pecuniary claim against the other State arising out of the arrest,
detention, examination, or surrender of persons sought under this Treaty”); Indian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 21, 1999); French
Extradition Treaty, Art. 22, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Extradition Treaty
with Thailand, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Jamaican Extradition
Treaty, Art. XVII, ¶¶1, 3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)(also requesting state
may be subject to a claim due to special expenses or concerning third party interests in
transferred property); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 18, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty
Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XXI, 35 U.S.T. 3041
(1984); but see, Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶¶3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996)(“The Requesting State shall bear expenses related to the translation of
documents and the transportation of the person sought. 4. Neither Party shall make any
pecuniary claim against the other arising from the arrest, detention, custody, examination,
or surrender of a person sought under this Treaty”)(note absence of language as to the
responsibility for cost other than transportation or translation); Extradition Treaty with
Uruguay, Art. 18, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (similar).

---

CRS-17
treaties generally make the country of refuge responsible for legal representation of
the country seeking extradition.64
Transfer of Evidence. Contemporary treaties regularly permit a country to
surrender documents and other evidence along with an extradited fugitive. An
interesting attribute of these clauses is that they permit transfer of the evidence even
if the fugitive becomes unavailable for extradition. This may make some sense in the
case of disappearance or flight, but seems a bit curious in the case of death.65
Transit. A somewhat less common clause permits transportation of a fugitive
through the territory of either of the parties to a third country without the necessity
of following the treaty’s formal extradition procedure.66
64 Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)(“The
Requested State shall advise, assist, appear in court on behalf of the Requesting State, and
represent the interests of the Requesting State, in any proceedings arising out of a request
for extradition”); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 1-5-10
(eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art. 19, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.106-34
(eff. Jan. 12, 2001); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5;
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 18, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22,
1994); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991);
Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶¶1 & 2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996);
Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 18, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (1983); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art XX, 35 U.S.T. 3040 (1984) Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XVII, ¶2, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)(“The Requested State shall also provide for the
representation of the Requesting State in any proceedings arising in the Requested State out
of a request for extradition”); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 18, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc.
98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991).
65 The typical clause provides that “All articles, instruments, objects of value, documents,
and other evidence relating to the offense may be seized and, upon granting of extradition,
surrendered to the requesting State. The property mentioned in this Article may be
surrendered even when extradition cannot be granted or effected due to the death,
disappearance, or escape of the person sought. The rights of third parties in such property
shall be duly respected,” Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17
(eff. Oct. 11, 1991); see also, South African Extradition Treaty, Art.16, S. Treaty Doc. 106-
24 (eff. June 25, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art. 13, ¶1, S. Treaty
Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 15, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.
104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5;
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 16, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22,
1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XIV, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996);
Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 16, 35 U.S.T. 3215 (1983); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art XVIII, 35 U.S.T. 3039 (1984) Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶1, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 16, S. Treaty
Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991).
66 E.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22,
1994)(“(1) Either Contracting State may authorize transportation through its territory of a
person surrendered to the other State by a third State. A request for transit shall be made
through the diplomatic channel and shall contain a description of the person being
transported and a brief statement of the facts of the case. (2) No authorization is required
where air transportation is used and no landing is scheduled on the territory of the
Contracting State. If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the other Contracting

---

CRS-18
Constitutionality
The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends
to certain cases and controversies.67 Historically, this has lead to discomfort
whenever an effort is made to insert the federal courts in the midst of an executive
or legislative process, such as the issuance of purely advisory opinions.68 The fact
that extradition turns on the discretion of the Secretary of State following judicial
certification has led to the suggestion that the procedure established by the
extradition statute is constitutionally offensive to this separation of powers. First
broached by a district court in the District of Columbia,69 subsequent courts have
rejected the suggestion in large measure under the view that much like the issuance
of a search or arrest warrant the task is compatible with tasks constitutionally
assigned to the judiciary.70
Procedure for Extradition from the United States
A foreign country usually begins the extradition process with a request
submitted to the State Department71 sometimes including the documentation required
State, transit shall be subject to paragraph (1) of this Article. That Contracting State shall
detain the person to be transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is
effected, so long as the request is received within 96 hours of the unscheduled landing”); see
also, Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
Korean Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jordanian Extradition
Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Hungarian Extradition Treaty,
Art. 19, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XV, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff.
May 17, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 17, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (1983); Italian
Extradition Treaty, Art XIX, 35 U.S.T. 3040 (1984).
67 U.S. Const. Art. III, §2.
68 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911); Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, 37 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1002 (1924).
69 Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F.Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vac’d on juris. grounds, 82 F.3d
1081 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
70 In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1998), redesignated
after rehearing, In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2001); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d
1100, 1105-10 (2d Cir. 1996); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also, In re Extradition of Seong-I, 346 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1154-156 (D.N.M. 2004); Noel
v. United States, 12 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1304-305 (M.D.Fla. 1998); In re Extradition of
Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 508-9 (D.Del. 1996); Sandhu v. Bransom, 932 F.Supp. 822, 826
(N.D.Tex. 1996); Werner v. Hickey, 920 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (M.D.Cal. 1996); see also,
Innocence Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of International Extradition, 33
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1997).
71 Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]hrough the diplomatic channel”
seems to be the phrase favored most recently, see e.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art.
8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)(“All requests for extradition shall be made
through the diplomatic channel”); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art.9, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Korean Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff.

---

CRS-19
by the treaty.72 When a requesting nation is concerned that the fugitive will take
flight before it has time to make a formal request, it informally asks for extradition
and provisional arrest with the assurance that the full complement of necessary
documentation will follow.73 In either case, the Secretary of State, at his discretion,
may forward the matter to the Department of Justice to begin the procedure for the
arrest of the fugitive “to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered.”74
Dec. 20, 1999); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff.
Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8 ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. VI, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996);
Italian Extradition Treaty, Art. X, 35 U.S.T. 3031 (1983); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay,
Art. 10, ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3210 (1973).
72 Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8 ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995)(“2. All requests shall contain: (a) documents, statements, photographs (if possible),
or other types of information which describe the identity, nationality, and probable location
of the person sought; (b) information describing the facts of the offense and the procedural
history of the case; (c) the text of the law describing the essential elements of the offense
for which extradition is requested; (d) the text of the law prescribing the punishment for the
offense; and (e) the documents, statements, or other types of information specified in
paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of this Article, as applicable.”); 3. A request for extradition of
a person who is sought for prosecution shall also contain: (a) a copy of the warrant or order
of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; (b) a copy of the charging
documents; and (c) such information as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the
person sought committed the offense for which extradition is requested. 4. A request for
extradition relating to a person who has been found guilty of the offense for which
extradition is sought shall also contain: (a) a copy of the judgment of conviction or, if such
copy is not available, a statement by a judicial authority that the person has been found
guilty; (b) information establishing that the person sought is the person to whom the finding
of guilt refers; (c) a copy of the sentence imposed, if the person sought has been sentenced,
and a statement establishing to what extent the sentence has been carried out; and (d) in the
case of a person who has been found guilty in absentia, the documents required in paragraph
3"); see also, South African Extradition Treaty, Art.9, ¶¶2, 3 & 4 S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff.
June 25, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
10 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S. Treaty Doc.
104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S.
Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. VI, ¶¶2-6, S.
Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996).
73 ABBELL at §3-3(7).
74 “Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and
any foreign government, or in cases arising under section 3181(b)[relating to the extradition
from the United States of foreign nationals charged with, or convicted of, crimes of violence
committed against Americans overseas, without reference to an extradition treaty], any
justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the
United States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may,
upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention . . . issue his warrant for the apprehension of the
person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered,” 18 U.S.C. 3184;
Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005); see generally, ABBELL & RISTAU

---

CRS-20
The United States Attorneys Manual encapsulates the Justice Department’s
participation thereafter in these words:
1. OIA [Office of International Affairs] reviews . . . requests for sufficiency
and forwards appropriate ones to the district [where the fugitive is found].
2. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case obtains a
warrant and the fugitive is arrested and brought before the magistrate judge or
the district judge.
3. The government opposes bond in extradition cases.
4. A hearing under 18 U.S.C. 3184 is scheduled to determine whether the
fugitive is extraditable. If the court finds the fugitive to be extraditable, it enters
an order of extraditability and certifies the record to the Secretary of State, who
decides whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting government. In some
cases a fugitive may waive the hearing process.
5. OIA notifies the foreign government and arranges for the transfer of the
fugitive to the agents appointed by the requesting country to receive him or her.
Although the order following the extradition hearing is not appealable (by either
the fugitive or the government), the fugitive may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus as soon as the order is issued. The district court’s decision on the writ is
subject to appeal, and extradition may be stayed if the court so orders.75
Arrest and Bail.
Although United States takes the view that an explicit treaty provision is
unnecessary,76 extradition treaties sometimes expressly authorize requests for
provisional arrest of a fugitive prior to delivery of a formal request for extradition.77
at 159-71. The requesting nation is usually represented in federal court by an Assistant
United States Attorney or other Justice Department attorney, ABBELL at §3-3(9);
Semmelman & Snell, Defending the International Extradition Case, CHAMPION 20, 21
(June, 2006).
75 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL (USAM) §9-15.700, available on July 27, 2007 at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foi_reading_room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm].
76 ABBELL at §3-3(7).
77 Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 10, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991)(“In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of any
accused or convicted person. Application for provisional arrest shall be made through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Department of Justice . . . and the Ministry of
Interior in Thailand . . . . (2) The application shall contain: a description of the person
sought; the location of that person, if known; a brief statement of the facts of the case
including, if possible, the time and location of the offense; a statement of the existence of
a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction against that person . . . and a statement that
a request for extradition of the person will follow”). Such provisions usually also call for
the release of the fugitive upon the failure to submit a formal request within a designated
period of time, e.g., id., Art. 10 ¶4 (60 days); Argentine Extradition Treaty (60 days), Art.
11, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Korean Extradition Treaty (two months),
Art. 10, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Hungarian Extradition Treaty (60

---

CRS-21
Regardless of whether detention occurs pursuant to provisional arrest, as a
consequence of the initiation of an extradition hearing or upon certification of
extradition, the fugitive is not entitled to release on bail except under rare “special
circumstances.”78 This limited opportunity for pre-extradition release may be further
restricted under the applicable treaty.79
Hearing.
The precise menu for an extradition hearing is dictated by the applicable
extradition treaty, but a common check list for a hearing conducted in this country
would include determinations that:
1.
There exists a valid extradition treaty between the United States and
the requesting state;
2.
The relator is the person sought;
3.
The offense charged is extraditable;
4.
The offense charged satisfies the requirement of double criminality;
5.
There is ‘probable cause’ to believe the relator committed the offense
charged;
6.
The documents required are presented in accordance with United States
law, subject to any specific treaty requirements, translated and duly
authenticated . . . ; and
7.
Other treaty requirements and statutory procedures are followed.80
days), Art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas (60 days), Art. 10, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty (60 days with a possible 30-day extension), Art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3
(eff. July 29, 1995); Bolivian Extradition Treaty (60 days), Art. VIII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Italian Extradition Treaty (45 days), Art. XII, 35 U.S.T. 3034-35
(1984); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay (45 days), Art. 11, ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3212-213 (1973).
78 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 61-3 (1903)(no bail following certification absent special
circumstances); United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1996) (no bail
during pendency of extradition proceedings absent special circumstances); In re Requested
Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 1996) (release on bail pending the
completion of extradition hearings requires special circumstances); Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136
F.Supp.2d 125, 128-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Hababou v. Albright, 82 F.Supp.2d 347, 349-52
(D.N.J. 2000); see also, In re Extradition of Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); In re Extradition of Molnar, 182 F.Supp.2d 684, 686-89 (N.D.Ill. 2002)(suggesting
it may be easier to demonstrate special circumstances following provisional arrest than after
a formal request has been presented); Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 786 (9th Cir.
1997) (suggesting that the strong presumption against bail be abandoned), opinion withdraw
upon the flight of the respondent, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998); International Extradition
and the Right to Bail, 34 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (1998).
79 See e.g., Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 12, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11,
1991)(“A person detained pursuant to the Treaty shall not be released until the extradition
request has been finally decided, unless such release is required under the extradition law
of the Requested State or unless this Treaty provides for such release”).
80 In re Extradition of Valdez-Mainero, 3 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1114-115 (S.D.Cal. 1998), citing,
Bassiouni, at Ch. IX, §5.1; see also, ABBELL & RISTAU at 172-241; shorthand versions
appear in Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)(“The judicial officer’s
inquiry is confined to the following: whether a valid treaty exists, whether the crime charged

---

CRS-22

An extradition hearing is not, however, “in the nature of a final trial by which
the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him. . . .
Instead, it is essentially a preliminary examination to determine whether a case is
made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the
demanding nation. . . . The judicial officer who conducts an extradition hearing thus
performs an assignment in line with his or her accustomed task of determining if
there is probable cause to hold a defendant to answer for the commission of an
offense.”81
The purpose of the hearing is in part to determine whether probable cause exists
to believe that the individual committed an offense covered by the extradition treaty.
The individual may offer evidence to contradict or undermine the existence of
probable cause,82 but affirmative defenses that might be available at trial are
irrelevant.83 The rules of criminal procedure and evidence that would apply at trial
have no application.84 Hearsay is not only admissible but may be relied upon
is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the
complaint for extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof”); and Vo v.
Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006)(“The authority of a magistrate judge serving as
an extradition judicial officer is thus limited to determining an individual’s eligibility to be
extradited, which he does by ascertaining whether a crime is an extraditable offense under
the relevant treaty and whether probable cause exists to sustain the charge”); United States
v. Lin Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997).
81 LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1996)(internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting, Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888); Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 316 (1922); and Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also,
Kastnerova v. United States, 365 F.3d 980, 987 (11th Cir. 2004); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125
F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Extradition of Molnar, 202 F.Supp.2d 782, 786
(N.D.Ill. 2002).
82 Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554,
561 (3d Cir. 2006).
83 DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997)(legal custodian defense to
kidnaping charge), citing, Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), and Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309 (1922); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997)(due process bar
to criminal trial of incompetent defendant); In re Extradition of Schweidenback, 3 F.Supp.2d
113, 117 (D.Mass. 1998)(evidence related to a defense is excludable); In re Extradition of
Diaz Medina, 210 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (N.D.Tex. 2002).
84 Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1164-165 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kin-
Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1996);
In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 188F.Supp.2d 921, 932 (N.D.Ill. 2002); F.R.CRIM.P.
54(b)(5), F.R.EVID. 1101(d)(3). Evidence offered to support an extradition request need
only be authenticated, Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2005); 18 U.S.C.
3190 (“Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon the
hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evidence on such hearing
for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as
to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country
from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be
proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required”); 22 C.F.R. §92.40
(foreign extradition requests are authenticated by the U.S. chiefs of mission).

---

CRS-23
exclusively;85 the Miranda rule has no application;86 initiation of extradition may be
delayed without regard for the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or the Fifth
Amendment right of due process;87 nor does the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel apply.88 Due process, however, will bar extradition of
informants whom the government promised confidentiality and then provided the
evidence necessary to establish probable cause for extradition.89
Moreover, extradition will ordinarily be certified without “examining the
requesting country’s criminal justice system or taking into account the possibility that
the extraditee will be mistreated if returned.”90 This “non-inquiry rule” is premised
85 Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, (3d Cir. 2006); Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1165
(11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997), citing, Collins
v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922); In re Extradition of Platko, 213 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1237
(S.D.Cal. 2002).
86 In re Extradition of Powell, 4 F.Supp.2d 945, 951-52 (S.D.Cal. 1998); Valenzuela v.
United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002)(noting that even compelled statements
that incriminate the fugitive under the laws of the requesting country would be admissible
in an extradition hearing); cf., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998)(the Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit compelled statements simply because they are incriminating
under the laws of a foreign nation).
87 Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994); McMaster v. United States, 9 F.3d
47, 49 (8th Cir. 1993); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993); Bovio v. United
States, 989 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1993); Sabatier v. Daborwski, 586 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir.
1978); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Extradition of
Fulgencio Garcia, 188F.Supp.2d 921, 932 (N.D.Ill. 2002)(internal citations omitted)(“the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth Amendment right against undue delay
are inapplicable to an extradition. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
does not apply to extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court has found no constitutional
infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been denied an opportunity
to confront their accusers. Finally, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy
and the right to a Miranda warning are inapplicable to an extradition proceeding”).
88 DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1999).
89 Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229-230 (11th Cir. 2002).
90 In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F.Supp. 791, 798-99 (D.Conn, 1997)(“The rule of non-
inquiry is well-established in the circuits and has been applied in extraditions to a panoply
of nations. Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1993)(Canada); Koskotas v. Rocke,
931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991)(Greece); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986
(U.K.); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981)(Israel); Escobedo v. United States, 623
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980)(Mexico) . . .”); see also, Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, (3d Cir.
2006); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kin-
Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir.
1995)(explaining the exception in the U.K. Supplementary Treaty); see also, Semmelman,
Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition
Proceedings, 76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1198 (1991).
Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), declined to depart from the rule but
observed that under some circumstance an extraditee might face “procedures or punishments
so antipathetic to a federal court’s sense of decency as to require re-examination” of the
question. The courts appear to have rarely if ever encountered such procedures or
punishments, In re Extradition of Marinero, 990 F.Supp. 1208, 1230 (S.D.Cal. 1997)(“There

---

CRS-24
on the view that, “[w]hen an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country,
he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such
punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a
different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the
United States.”91
Nevertheless, unique irritants in the diplomatic relations between the United
States and Great Britain stimulated a supplementary extradition treaty with singular
characteristics.92 “The Supplementary Treaty alters the extradition procedures in
force under the 1977 Treaty in three significant ways: (1) it limits the scope of the
political offense exception;93 (2) it authorizes a degree of judicial inquiry into the
factors motivating a request for extradition;94 and (3) it creates a limited right to
is no legal support for a judicially created ‘humanitarian exception’ [of the type foreseen in
Gallina] in an extradition proceeding”); In re Extradition of Sandhu, 886 F.Supp. 318, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)(“The ‘Gallina exception’ to the rule of non-inquiry has yet to be applied”);
Corneljo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000)(“Our research failed to
identify any case in which this [humanitarian exception] has been applied . . . .”).
91 Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829-30 (11th Cir. 1993), quoting, Neely v. Henkel, 180
U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
92 “The Treaty was a response by the United States and British executive branches to
several recent federal court decisions denying requests by the United Kingdom for the
extradition of members of the Provisional Irish Republic Army . . . . [T]he denied requests
were for PIRA members who had committed violent acts against British forces occupying
Northern Ireland . . . Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 559 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Mullen, No.
3-78-1099 MG (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979),” Questions of Justice; U.S. Courts’ Powers of
Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 474, 475-76 n.8 (1987); see also, Comparative
Application of the Non-Discrimination Clause in the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 5 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 493 (1993).
93 “For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be regarded as
an offense of a political character: (a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have
the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person
sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; (b)
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; (c) kidnaping,
abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; (d) an offense
involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any
incendiary device if this use endangers any person; (e) an attempt to commit any of the
foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts
to commit such an offense,” British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Art. 1, S. Exec. Rep.
99-17 (eff. Dec. 23, 1986).
94 “(a) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Supplementary Treaty, extradition shall
not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial
authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions,” id. at Art. 3(a).

---

CRS-25
appeal an extradition decision,”95 In re Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d at 465 (9th Cir.
1998), redesignated, In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2001). The United States and
the United Kingdom subsequently negotiated a more contemporary replacement96 to
which the Senate has given its advice and consent97 but which has yet to enter into
force.98
Some may view implementation of the Torture Convention as a second
exception. In implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Congress enacted
section 2422 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act which states in
relevant part, “It shall be the policy of the United States not to . . . extradite . . . any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States.”99 The Secretary of State is bound to enforce
the policy.100 Although the Act asserts that the declaration of policy and its
accompanying enforcement responsibilities are not intended to create a basis for
judicial review, some fugitives have argued that the Secretary’s decision to extradite
following court certification and in the face of a challenge under the Convention or
implementing legislation is subject to habeas corpus review or to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. At least as of this writing, circuit law is to the
contrary.101
95 “(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the defense
to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for defenses listed in Article 1 of this Supplementary
Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by either party to the
United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive
expedited consideration at every stage. The time for filing notice of appeal shall be 30 days
from the date of the filing of the decision. In all other respects, the applicable provisions
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as appropriate, shall govern
the appeals process,” id. at Art. 3(b).
96 S. Treaty Doc. 108-23 (2004).
97 152 Cong. Rec. S10766-767 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
98 For a more extensive discussion, see CRS Report RL32096, Extradition Between the
United States and Great Britain: The 2003 Treaty, available in abbreviated form as CRS
Report RS21633, Extradition Between the United States and Great Britain: A Sketch of the
2003 Treaty.
99 Sec. 2242(a), P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998), 8 U.S.C. 1231 note.
100 Sec. 2242(b), 8 U.S.C. 1231 note; 22 C.F.R. pt.95.
101 Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673-77 (4th Cir. 2007); see also, Hoxha v. Levi, 465
F.3d 554, 565 (3d Cir. 2006)(declining to address the issue since the Secretary had not rule
at the time and consequently it was not ripe for decision). The Hoxha court also describes
the Ninth Circuit’s struggles with the question: “The Ninth Circuit discussed this issue in
a series of cases beginning in 2000. In Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir.2000) (“Cornejo-Barreto I ”), the Ninth Circuit held that, under FARR and the APA, “a
fugitive fearing torture may petition [through habeas corpus] for review of the Secretary's
decision to surrender him” following a court certification of extraditability. Id. at 1014-15.
Because the Secretary had not yet made an extradition decision in the case, the Court
affirmed the denial of habeas relief without prejudice to a new filing should the Secretary
decide to extradite the petitioner. Id. at 1016-17. After the Secretary made the decision to

---

CRS-26
Review.
If at the conclusion of the extradition hearing, the court concludes there is some
obstacle to extradition and refuses to certify the case, “[t]he requesting government’s
recourse to an unfavorable disposition is to bring a new complaint before a different
judge or magistrate, a process it may reiterate apparently endlessly.”102
If the court concludes there is no such obstacle to extradition and certifies to the
Secretary of State that the case satisfies the legal requirements for extradition, the
fugitive has no right of appeal, but may be entitled to limited review under habeas
corpus.103 “[H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had
jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat
liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there
was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”104 In this last assessment,
appellate courts will only “examine the magistrate judge’s determination of probable
cause to see if there is ‘any evidence’ to support it.”105
extradite, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, based on Cornejo-Barreto I. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the conclusion in Cornejo-Barreto I as to the availability
of APA review was non-binding dicta, because the Secretary had not yet made a decision
to extradite when that case was decided. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1082
(9th Cir.2004) ( “Cornejo-Barreto II ”). Considering the issue anew, the Court concluded
that, under the doctrine of non-inquiry, the Secretary's decision to extradite was not subject
to judicial review, and FARR and the APA did nothing to change this result. Id. at 1087. The
Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in the case, but following the government's decision
to withdraw its extradition claim, the case was dismissed as moot. Cornejo-Barreto v.
Siefert, 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.2004); Cornejo-Barretto v. Siefert, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th
Cir.2004). As a result, neither Cornejo-Barreto I nor Cornejo-Barreto II is binding
precedent in the Ninth Circuit,” 465 F.3d at 564 n.16. The view that Cornejo-Barretto I is
no longer binding may be something of an overstatement. As a later 9th Cir. panel pointed
out, “The holding in Cornejo-Barreto I was disapproved of by Cornejo-Barretto v. Siefert,
379 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.2004)(“Cornejo-Barreto II”). The en banc court, however, later
vacated Cornejo-Barreto II and denied the government’s request to vacate Cornejo-Barreto
I. Cornejo-Barretto v. Siefert, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir.2004)(en banc),” Prasoprat v. Benov,
421 F.3d 1009, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).
102 Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.Supp. 1028, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), citing, In re Doherty, 786 F.2d
491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Extradition of Massieu, 897 F.Supp. 176, 179 (D.N.J. 1995);
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1978), citing inter alia, Collins v. Loisel, 262
U.S. 426 (1923); ABBELL & RISTAU at 252-54.
103 Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 598 (4th Cir. 2007); Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235,
1240 (9th Cir. 2006); Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2005); Sidali v.
I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997), citing, Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920);
ABBELL & RISTAU at 243-52.
104 Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 598 (4th Cir. 2007), quoting Fernandez v. Phillips,
268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002);
Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2000); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi,
125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997); Smith
v. United States, 82 F.3d 964, 965 (10th Cir. 1996).
105 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1997), citing, Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1997);

---

CRS-27
Surrender.
If the judge or magistrate certifies the fugitive for extradition, the matter then
falls to the discretion of the Secretary of State to determine whether as a matter of
policy the fugitive should be released or surrendered to the agents of the country that
has requested his or her extradition.106 The procedure for surrender, described in
treaty107 and statute,108 calls for the release of the prisoner if he or she is not claimed
within a specified period of time,109 often indicates how extradition requests from
and Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996); Valenzuela v. United States, 286
F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002).
106 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)(“It is then within the
Secretary of State’s sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually
be extradited. See 18 U.S.C. §3186 (`The Secretary of State may order the person
committed under section 3184 . . . of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such
foreign government . . .’”); Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
1313 (1962).
107 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 11, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991)(“If the extradition has been granted, surrender of the person sought shall take place
within such time as may be prescribed by the laws of the Requested State. The competent
authorities of the Contracting Parties shall agree on the time and place of the surrender of
the person sought. If, however, that person is not removed from the territory of the
Requested State within the prescribed time, that person may be set at liberty and the
Requested State may subsequently refuse extradition for the same offense”); Argentine
Extradition Treaty, Art.12, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Austrian
Extradition Treaty, Art.14, ¶¶2, 3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Hungarian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jamaican Extradition
Treaty, Art. IX, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty,
Art. IX, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 12,
S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XIII, 35 U.S.T.
3036 (1984).
108 18 U.S.C. 3186 (“The Secretary of State may order the person committed under sections
3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign
government, to be tried for the offense of which charged. Such agent may hold such person
in custody, and take him to the territory of such foreign government, pursuant to such treaty.
A person so accused who escapes may be retaken in the same manner as any person accused
of any offense”).
109 18 U.S.C. 3188 (“Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign
government to remain until delivered up in pursuance of a requisition, is not so delivered
up and conveyed out of the United States within two calendar months after such
commitment, over and above the time actually required to convey the prisoner from the jail
to which he was committed, by the readiest way, out of the United States, any judge of the
United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by or on behalf of the person
so committed, and upon proof made to him that reasonable notice of the intention to make
such application has been given to the Secretary of State, may order the person so committed
to be discharged out of custody, unless sufficient cause is shown to such judge why such
discharge ought not to be ordered”).

---

CRS-28
more than one country for the same fugitive are to be handled,110 and frequently
allows the fugitive to be held for completion of a trial or the service of a criminal
sentence before being surrendered.111
Extradition for Trial or Punishment in the United States
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern
extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. The request for
extradition comes from the Department of State whether extradition is sought for trial
in federal or state court or for execution of a criminal sentence under federal or state
law.112
110 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“If the Requested State receives requests from the other Contracting Party and from any
other State or States for the extradition of the same person, either for the same offense or
for different offenses, the executive authority of the Requested State shall determine to
which State it will surrender the person. In making its decision, the Requested State shall
consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to: a. whether the requests were made
pursuant to treaty; b. the place where the offense was committed; c. the respective interests
of the Requesting States; d. the gravity of the offense; e. the nationality of the victim; f. the
possibility of further extradition between the Requesting State; and g. the chronological
order in which the requests were received from the Requesting States”); Extradition Treaty
with Trinidad and Tobago, Art.12, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Polish
Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Extradition Treaty
with Thailand, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition
Treaty, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art.
XIII, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with the Uruguay, Art. 14,
35 U.S.T. 3214-215 (1973); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. X, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XV, 35 U.S.T. 3037 (1984).
111 E.g., Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XII, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991) (“If
the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is being prosecuted or is
serving a sentence in the territory of the Requested State for a different offence, the
Requesting State shall, unless its laws otherwise provide, defer the surrender of the person
sought until the conclusion of the proceedings against that person or the full execution of
any punishment that may be or may have been imposed”); Extradition Treaty with Sri
Lanka, Art.13, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34 (eff. Jan. 12, 2001); French Extradition Treaty,
Art. 16, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art.
14, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 12, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 14, S. Treaty
Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XI, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July
29, 1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XIV, 35 U.S.T. 3036-37 (1984).
112 RESTATEMENT, §478, Comment e (“Requests for extradition of persons from foreign
states may be made only by the Department of State. If the offense with which the person
is charged or of which he has been convicted is one under federal law, the application for
extradition must be submitted by the prosecutor to the Department of Justice, which will
review the documents and, if satisfied of their sufficiency, transmit them to the Department
of State for forwarding to the requested state. If the offense is one under [the law of any of
the states of the United States], the application must be submitted by or with the
endorsement of the Governor of the State, and must be reviewed by the Department of

---

CRS-29
The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs must approve requests
for extradition of fugitives from federal charges or convictions and may be asked to
review requests from state prosecutors before they are considered by the State
Department.113 Provisions in the United States Attorneys Manual and the
corresponding Justice Department’s Criminal Resource Manual sections supplement
treaty instructions on the procedures to be followed in order to forward a request to
the State Department.114
The first step is to determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. The Justice
Department’s checklist for determining extraditability begins with an identification
of the country in which the fugitive has taken refuge.115 If we have no extradition
treaty with the country of refuge, extradition is not a likely option.116 When there is
a treaty, extradition is only an option if the treaty permits extradition. Common
impediments include citizenship, dual criminality, statutes of limitation, and capital
punishment issues.
Many treaties permit a country to refuse to extradite its citizens even in the case
of dual citizenship.117 As for dual criminality, whether the crime of conviction or the
crime charged is an extraditable offense will depend upon the nature of the crime and
where it was committed. If the applicable treaty lists extraditable offenses, the crime
must be on the list.118 If the applicable treaty insists only upon dual criminality, the
underlying misconduct must be a crime under the laws of both the United States and
the country of refuge.119
Justice before transmission to the Department of State. If the State Department is satisfied
that the conditions for extradition under the applicable treaty have been met, it will request
extradition in the name of the United States, and, where appropriate, will arrange for
representation of the United States at the proceedings in the requested state. When
extradition proceedings in the foreign state have been completed and the person sought has
been certified to be extraditable, the Secretary or [her] authorized deputy may issue a
warrant to federal or State officials to act as agents of the United States for the purpose of
taking custody of the person in the requested state for return to the United States”).
113 “The Office of International Affairs (OIA) provides information and advice to Federal
and State prosecutors about the procedure for requesting extradition from abroad. OIA also
advises and provides support to Federal prosecutors handling foreign extradition requests
for fugitives found in the United States. Every formal extradition request for international
extradition based on Federal criminal charges must be reviewed and approved by OIA. At
the request of the Department of State, formal requests based on State charges are also
reviewed by OIA before submission to the Department of State,” USAM §9-15.210.
114 Criminal Resource Manual (CRM) §§601-610, available on July 27, 2007 at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foi_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00601.htm]; USAM
§§9-15.100 to 9-15.800.
115 CRM §603[A].
116 Id.
117 CRM §603[B].
118 CRM §603[C].
119 Id.

---

CRS-30
Where the crime was committed matters; some treaties will only permit
extradition if the offense was committed within the geographical confines of the
United States.120 Timing also matters. The speedy trial features of U.S. law require
a good faith effort to bring to trial a fugitive who is within the government’s reach.121
Furthermore, the lapse of time or speedy trial component of the applicable extradition
treaty may preclude extradition if prosecution would be barred by a statute of
limitations in the country of refuge.122 Some treaties prohibit extradition for capital
offenses; more often they permit it but only with the assurance that a sentence of
death will not be executed.123
Prosecutors may request provisional arrest of a fugitive without waiting for the
final preparation of the documentation required for a formal extradition request, if
there is a risk of flight and if the treaty permits it. The Justice Department
encourages judicious use of provisional arrest because of the pressures that may
attend it.124 The Criminal Resource Manual contains the form for collection of the
information that must accompany either a federal or state prosecutor’s application for
a Justice Department request for provisional arrest.125
Although treaty requirements vary, the Justice Department suggests that
prosecutors supply formal documentation in the form of an original and four copies
of:
- a prosecutor’s affidavit describing the facts of the case, including dates, names,
docket numbers and citations, and preferably executed before a judge or
magistrate (particularly if extradition is sought from a civil law country)126
120 CRM §603[F].
121 United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Leaver, 358
F.Spp.2d 255, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); cf., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656-58
(1992).
122 CRM §603[F].
123 ABBELL at §6-2(25).
124 USAM §9-15.230 (“. . . Once the United States requests provisional arrest . . . [it] must
submit as formal request for extradition, supported by all necessary documents, duly
certified, authenticated and translated into the language of the country where the fugitive
was arrested, within a specified time (from 30 days to three months, pending on the treaty).
. . . Failure to follow through on an extradition request by submitting the requested
documents after a provisional arrest has been made will result in release of the fugitive,
strains on diplomatic relations, and possible liability for the prosecutor. The Office of
International Affairs (OIA) determines whether the facts meet the requirement of urgency
under the terms of the applicable treaty. If they do, OIA requests provisional arrest; if not,
the prosecutor assembles the documents for a formal request. The latter method is favored
when the defendant is unlikely to flee because the time pressures generated by a request for
provisional arrest often result in errors that can damage the case . . .”).
125 CRM §604; USAM §9-15.230.
126 USAM §9-15.240; CRM §605.

---

CRS-31
- copies of the statutes the fugitive is said to have violated, the statutes governing
the penalties that may be imposed upon conviction, and the applicable statute of
limitations127
- if the fugitive has been convicted and sentenced: identification evidence;
certified documentation of conviction, sentence, and the amount of time served
and remaining to be served; copies of the statutes of conviction; and a statement
that the service of the remaining sentence is not barred by a statute of
limitations128
- if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: certified copies of
the arrest warrant (preferably signed by the court or a magistrate) and of the
indictment or complaint129
- if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: evidence of the
identity of the individual sought (fingerprints/photographs) and of the evidence
upon which the charges are based and of the fugitive’s guilt in the form of
witness affidavits (preferable avoiding the use grand jury transcripts and,
particularly in the case of extradition from a common law country, the use of
hearsay).130
If the Justice Department approves the application for extradition, the request
and documentation are forwarded to the State Department, translated if necessary,
and with State Department approval forwarded through diplomatic channels to the
country from whom extradition is being sought.131

The treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition and the fugitive’s return to
this country is whether the fugitive was surrendered subject to any limitations such
as those posed by the doctrine of specialty.
Specialty.
Under the doctrine of specialty, sometimes called speciality, “a person who has
been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an
extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty,
and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition,
until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him after his release or trial
upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly
taken under those proceedings.”132 The limitation, expressly included in many
127 USAM §9-15.240; CRM §607.
128 USAM §9-15.240; CRM §609.
129 USAM §9-15.240; CRM §606.
130 USAM §9-15.240; CRM §608.
131 ABBELL at §7-1(8); USAM §9-15.250.
132 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992), quoting, United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886); see also, United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 671
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 577 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d

---

CRS-32
treaties,133 however, is designed to preclude prosecution for different substantive
offenses and does not bar prosecution for different or additional counts of the same
offense.134 And some courts have held that an offense whose prosecution would be
barred by the doctrine may nevertheless be considered for purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines,135 or for purposes of criminal forfeiture.136 At least where an
621, 626 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1998);
Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of United
States v. Rauscher, 34 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1993); Application
of Doctrine of Specialty to Federal Criminal Prosecution of Accused Extradited from
Foreign Country, 112 ALR FED. 473 (1993 & Oct. 2006 Supp.); BASSIOUNI at 511-69;
ABBELL & RISTAU at 331-35.
133 Although the wording varies, the content of these provisions roughly corresponds to
those in the Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XIV, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7,
1991)(“(1) A person extradited under this Treaty may only be detained, tried or punished
in the Requesting State for the offence for which extradition is granted, or (a) for a lesser
offence proved by the facts before the court of committal . . . (b) for an offence committed
after the extradition; or (c) for an offence in respect to which the executive authority of the
Requested State . . . consents to the person’s detention, trial or punishment. . . or (d) if the
person (i) having left the territory of the Requesting State after his extradition, voluntarily
returns to it; or (ii) being free to leave the territory of the Requesting State after his
extradition, does not so leave within forty-five (45) days . . . . (2) A person extradited under
this Treaty may not be extradited to a third State unless (a) the Requested State consents;
or (b) the circumstances are such that he could have been dealt with in the Requesting State
pursuant to sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph (1)”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Belize,
Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. March 21, 2001); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, S.
Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 13, 35
U.S.T. 3213-214 (1973); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff.
Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996);
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994);
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 16, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Costa
Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 16, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Italian
Extradition Treaty, Art XVI, 35 U.S.T. 3038 (1984).
134 Gallo-Chamorro, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000)(“Rather than mandating exact
uniformity between the charges set forth in the extradition request and the actual indictment,
what the doctrine of speciality requires is that the prosecution be based on the same facts
as those set forth in the request for extradition”); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895-
96 (D.C.Cir. 1989); United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998)(“the
appropriate test for a violation of specialty is whether the extraditing country would consider
the acts for which the defendant was prosecuted as independent form those for which he was
extradited”); United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 1994).
135 United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Lazsarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1998)(also noting that the doctrine of
specialty “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes” and there was no
evidence of a demand that the doctrine be applied).
136 United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 784 (1st Cir. 1995).

---

CRS-33
applicable treaty addresses the question, the rule is no bar to prosecution for crimes
committed after the individual is extradited.137
The doctrine may be of limited advantage to a given defendant because the
circuits are divided over whether a defendant has standing to claim its benefits.138
Regardless of their view of fugitive standing, they agree that the surrendering state
may subsequently consent to trial for crimes other than those for which extradition
was had.139
Alternatives to Extradition
The existence of an extradition treaty does not preclude the United States
acquiring personal jurisdiction over a fugitive by other means, unless the treaty
expressly provides otherwise.140
Waiver.
Waiver or “simplified” treaty provisions allow a fugitive to consent to
extradition without the benefit of an extradition hearing.141 Although not universal,
137 United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005).
138 United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995)(“The question of whether
a criminal defendant has standing to assert a violation of the doctrine of specialty has split
the federal circuit courts of appeals”), noting decisions in favor of defendant standing,
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thirion, 813
F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.
1986); and those holding to the contrary, United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir.
2005); United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
776 F.2d 571, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also, United States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714,
719-20 (9th Cir. 2001)(defendant has standing to object to substantive but not procedural
noncompliance with applicable treaty requirements); United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia,
109 F.3d 165, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1997); The Extra in Extradition: The Impact of State v. Pang
on Extraditee Standing and Implicit Waiver, 24 JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 111 (1998);
Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the
Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
REVIEW 1187 (1995); BASSIOUNI at 546-60.
The Ninth Circuit has held that convictions for an offense in violation of the principles
of dual criminality and/or specialty must be reversed, United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d
662, 671 (9th Cir. 2006).
139 United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d
1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995); ; United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-1 (3d Cir.
1991); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).
140 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v. Anderson, 472
F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 442-43 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d
487, 493-95 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212-213 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Matt-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995).
141 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991) (“If the person sought irrevocably agrees in writing to extradition after personally
being advised by the competent authority of his right to formal extradition proceedings and

---

CRS-34
the provisions constitute the least controversial of the alternatives to extradition.

Immigration Procedures.
Whether by a process similar to deportation or by simple expulsion, the United
States has had some success encouraging other countries to surrender fugitives other
than their own nationals without requiring recourse to extradition.142 Ordinarily,
American immigration procedures, on the other hand, have been less accommodating
and have been called into play only when extradition has been found wanting.143
They tend to be time consuming and usually can only be used in lieu of extradition
when the fugitive is an alien. Moreover, they frequently require the United States to
deposit the alien in a country other than one that seeks his or her extradition.144 Yet
in a few instances where an alien has been naturalized by deception or where the
procedures available against alien terrorists come into play, denaturalization or
deportation may be considered an attractive alternative or supplement to extradition
proceedings.145
the protection afforded by them, the Requested State may grant extradition without formal
extradition proceedings”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.17, S. Treaty Doc.
105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50
(eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct.
11, 1991); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995);
Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5; Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty,
Art. XIII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XVII,
35 U.S.T. 3039 (1984); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XV, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18
(eff. July 7, 1991); see generally, ABBELL & RISTAU at 143-46, 306-7.
142 United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rezaq, 134
F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C.Cir. 1998); BASSIOUNI, at 183-248; ABBELL & RISTAU §13-5-2(2) (“In
recent years, it has not been uncommon for foreign officials, particularly in lesser developed
countries, to put a person sought by the United States on an airplane bound for this country
in the custody of either United States law enforcement agents or their own law enforcement
agents. Such deportation takes place without the requested country resorting to its formal
administrative or judicial deportation procedures. It occurs most frequently in narcotics
cases, and generally takes place where there is a close working relationship between United
States law enforcement officers posted in that country and the police authorities of that
country . . . . In addition to informal deportation by airplane, there is a large volume of
informal deportations from Mexico to the United States. Most of these informal
deportations are based on informal arrangements among local United States and Mexican
law enforcement officials along the United States-Mexico border . . .”); see also, USAM
§§9-15.610, 9-15.640 noting the possibility of immigration exclusions and deportation as
an alternative to extradition and in the case of American fugitives the prospect of revoking
a fugitive’s U.S. passport in aid of such an alternative.
143 E.g., I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The
Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 317 (1992).
144 E.g., Kalejs v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993)(deportation to Australia of a member
of a German mobile killing unit in World War II who falsified immigration forms but who
came to this country by way of Australia).
145 The United States has denaturalized and deported former Nazi death camp guards who
gained entry into the United States and/or American citizenship by concealing their pasts,

---

CRS-35
Irregular Rendition/Abduction.
Although less frequently employed, American use of “irregular rendition” is a
familiar alternative to extradition.146 An alternative of last resort, it involves
kidnaping or deceit and generally has been reserved for terrorists, drug traffickers,
and the like.147 Kidnaping a defendant overseas and returning him to the United
States for trial does not deprive American courts of jurisdiction unless an applicable
extradition treaty explicitly calls for that result.148 Nor does it ordinarily expose the
United States to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act nor individuals involved
in the abduction to liability under the Alien Tort Statute.149 The individuals involved
in the abduction, however, may face foreign prosecution, or at least be the subject of
a foreign extradition request.150 Moreover, the effort may strain diplomatic relations
e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); United States v. Stelmokas, 110 F.3d 302
(3d Cir. 1997); see also, The Denaturalization and Extradition of Ivan the Terrible, 26
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 821 (1995); Bassiouni, at 183-232 (summarizing alternatives and
criticizing their use in some instances).
146 See generally, CRS Report RL32890, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on
Torture, by Michael Garcia.
147 United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d
1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States
v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
148 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v. Torres
Gonzalez, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 442-43
(D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006); Kasi v.
Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 493-500 (4th Cir. 2002); see also, United States v. Anderson, 472
F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2006)(“a court is deprived of jurisdiction over an extradited
defendant, if either (1) the transfer of the defendant violated the applicable extradition
treaty, or (2) the United States government engaged in ‘misconduct of the most shocking and
outrageous kind,’ to obtain his presence”).
149 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699-738 (2004). Yet if the abducted defendant
is an American, the individuals involved may face civil liability under Bivens, cf., Id. at 736-
37.
150 Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983); Extradition of Government Agents as a
Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored Kidnaping, 81 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1541
(1993); Transborder Abductions by American Bounty Hunters—The Jaffe Case and a New
Understanding Between the United States and Canada, 20 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 489 (1990).

---

CRS-36
with the country from which the fugitive is lured or abducted.151

Foreign Prosecution.
A final alternative when extradition for trial in the United States is not available,
is trial within the country of refuge. The alternative exists primarily when extradition
has been refused in because of the fugitive’s nationality and/or where the crime
occurred under circumstances that permit prosecution by either country for the same
misconduct.152 The alternative can be cumbersome and expensive and may be
contrary to U.S. policy objectives.153
151 USAM §9-15.620 (If the fugitive travels outside the country from which he or she is not
extraditable, it may be possible to request his or her extradition form another country. This
method is often used for fugitives who are citizens in their country of refuge. Some
countries, however, will not permit extradition if the defendant has been lured into their
territory. Such ruses may also cause foreign relations problems with both the countries form
which and to which the lure takes place”); USAM §9-15.630 (“A lure involves using a
subterfuge to entice a criminal defendant to leave a foreign country so that he or she can be
arrested in the United States, in international waters or airspace, or in a third country for
subsequent extradition, expulsion, or deportation to the United States. . . . As noted above,
some countries will not extradite a person to the United Stats if the person’s presence in that
country was obtained through the use of a lure or other ruse. In addition, some countries
may view a lure of a person form its territory as an infringement on its sovereignty. . .”).
152 See, e.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 3, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996) (“If extradition is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought,
the Requested State shall, at the request of the Requesting State, submit the case to its
authorities for prosecution”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-16
(eff. Sept. 14, 1999); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May
17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11,
1991); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. VII, ¶¶2, 3, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7,
1991)(but also requiring extradition if a fugitive is a national of both the Requesting and
Requested State).
153 USAM §9-15.650 (“If the fugitive has taken refuge in the country of which he or she is
a national, and is thereby not extraditable, it may be possible to ask that country to prosecute
the individual for the crime that was committed in the United States. This can be an
expansive and time consuming process and in some countries domestic prosecution is
limited to certain specified offenses. In addition, a request for domestic prosecution in a
particular case may conflict with U.S. law enforcement efforts to change the ‘non-
extradition of nations’ law or policy in the foreign country. . .”).

---

CRS-37
Bibliography
Books and Articles.
Abbell, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES (2001)
IV ABBELL & RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL ‚
EXTRADITION (1990)
Abramovsky, A Critical Evaluation of American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Policy,
1980 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 25
, Extraterritorial Abductions: America’s “Catch & Snatch” Policy Run Amok, 31
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1991)
1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 556-57 (1986)
Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (4th
ed. 2002)
, The “Political Offense Exception” Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and
U.K. — A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law and
Policy, 15 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 225 (1987)
, Reforming International Extradition: Lessons of the Past for a Radical New
Approach, 25 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
REVIEW 389 (2003)
Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH LAW REVIEW 685
, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DENVER
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 109 (1986)
, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United
States: A Brief History, 4 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW REVIEW 39 (1981)
, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
LIBERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE, ROLE, AND
IMPACT IN MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND EXTRADITION
(1992)
Clarke, Terrorism, Extradition, and the Death Penalty, 29 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW
REVIEW 783 (2003)
Dugard & Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition With Human Rights, 92 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1998)

---

CRS-38
Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law
of Extradition, 26 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW 65 (1964)
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (Supp. 1935)
Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM LAW
REVIEW 317 (1992)
Kennedy, et al., The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 5 (1990)
Kushen & Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United States to the War Crimes
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 510 (1996)
Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice &
Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHNS’ LAW REVIEW 551 (1993)
Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2002)
Phillips, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current
Extradition Scheme and Proposals for the Future, 15 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (1997)
Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37 TEXAS
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 277 (2002)
Rice & Luke, U.S. Courts, the Death Penalty, and the Doctrine of Specialty:
Enforcement in the Heart of Darkness, 42 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW 1061 (2002)
Sanders, In Search of an Alternative Remedy for Violations of Extradition Treaties,
34 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1 (2004)
Schachor-Landau, Extraterritorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition, 29
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 274 (1980)
Schuetz, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and International
Law; a Case of the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 499 (1988)
Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of
United States v. Rauscher, 34 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1993)
, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1198 (1991)

---

CRS-39
, The Rule of Non-Contradiction in International Extradition Proceedings: A
Proposed Approach to the Admission of Exculpatory Evidence, 23 FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1295 (2000)
Semmelman & Snell, Defending the International Extradition Case, CHAMPION 20
(June, 2006)
Sharfstein, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison Conditions,
67 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 719 (2002)
Sofaer, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism, 15 DENVER JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 125 (1986)
Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32 ALBANY LAW REVIEW 337
(1968)
United States House of Representatives, The Strange Case of Marc Rich:
Contracting With Tax Fugitives and at Large in the Alps: Hearings Before the
Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1992)
, Kidnaping Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
, Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
, Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
United States Senate, United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985)
Vagts, A Reply to “A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal
Sanctions Treaty”, 64 IOWA LAW REVIEW 325 (1979)
Weissbrodt & Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19
HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 123 (2006)
Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater
Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the
United States, 19 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 729 (1998)
Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 709 (1968)

---

CRS-40
Notes and Comments.
Collaring Drug Kingpins: International Extradition and Continuing Criminal
Enterprise in United State v. Levy, 16 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
& TRADE 127 (1992)
Comparative Application of the Non-Discrimination Clause in the U.S.-U.K.
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 5 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 493 (1993)
The Denaturalization and Extradition of Ivan the Terrible, 26 RUTGERS LAW
JOURNAL 821 (1995)
Extradition of Government Agents as a Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored
Kidnaping, 81 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1541 (1993)
The Extra in Extradition: The Impact of State v. Pang on Extraditee Standing and
Implicit Waiver, 24 JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 111 (1998)
The Hydraulic Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez Machain and the
Case for Justifiable Abduction, 43 DEPAUL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 449 (1994)
In re McMullen and the Supplementary Extradition Treaty: An Unconstitutional Bill
of Attainder?, 11 NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 139 (1998)
Innocence Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of International Extradition,
33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1997)
International and Domestic Approaches to Constitutional Protections of Individual
Rights: Reconciling the Soering and Kindler Decisions, 34 AMERICAN CRIMINAL
LAW REVIEW 225 (1996)
International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement,
1992 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 191
International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STANFORD JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (1998)
The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 351 (1965)
A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the Financial Strength
of International Terrorist Organizations, 78 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 177
(1998)
RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 1281 (1989)
Should the End Justify the Means? United States v. Matta-Ballesteros and the
Demise of the Supervisory Powers, 21 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE REGULATION 561 (1996)

---

CRS-41
Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the
Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW REVIEW 1187 (1995)
Transborder Abductions by American Bounty Hunters—The Jaffe Case and a New
Understanding Between the United States and Canada, 20 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 489 (1990)

---

CRS-42
Appendix
Countries with Whom the United States Has an Extradition
Treaty
Country
Citation
Albania
49 Stat. 3313.
Antigua and Barbuda
T.Doc. 104-19 (entered into force 7/1/99)
Argentina
2159 UNTS 129
Australia
27 UST 957.
1736 UNTS 344
Austria
T.Doc. 105-50 (entered into force 1/1/00)
Bahamas
T.Doc. 102-17 (entered into force 9/22/94)
Barbados
T.Doc. 105-20 (entered into force 3/3/00)
Belgium
2093 UNTS 263
Belize
T.Doc. 106-38 (entered into force 3/27/01)
Bolivia
T.Doc. 104-22 (entered into force 11/21/96)
Brazil
15 UST 2093.
15 UST 2112.

Bulgaria
43 Stat. 1886.
49 Stat. 3250.
Burma
47 Stat. 2122.
Canada
27 UST 983.
27 UST 1017.
1853 UNTS 407
T.Doc. 107-11
Chile
32 Stat. 1850.
Colombia
TIAS (entered into force 3/4/82)
Congo
37 Stat. 1526.
46 Stat. 2276.
50 Stat. 1117.
13 UST 2065.
Costa Rica
T.Doc. 98-17 (entered into force 10/11/91)
Cuba
33 Stat. 2265.
33 Stat. 2273.
44 Stat. 2392.
Cyprus
T.Doc. 105-16 (entered into force 9/14/99)
Czech Republic
44 Stat. 2367.
49 Stat. 3253.
Denmark
25 UST 1293.
Dominica
T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 5/25/00)

Dominican Republic
36 Stat. 2468.
Ecuador
18 Stat. 199.
55 Stat. 1196.
Egypt
19 Stat. 572.
El Salvador
37 Stat. 1516.

---

CRS-43
Estonia

43 Stat. 1849.
49 Stat. 3190.
Fiji
47 Stat. 2122.
24 UST 1965.
Finland
31 UST 944.
France
2179 UNTS 341
Gambia
47 Stat. 2122.
Germany,
32 UST 1485.
Federal Republic of
1909 UNTS 441
Ghana
47 Stat. 2122.
Greece
47 Stat. 2185.
51 Stat. 357.
Grenada
T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 9/14/99)
Guatemala
33 Stat. 2147.
55 Stat. 1097.
Guyana
47 Stat. 2122.
Haiti
34 Stat. 2858.
Honduras
37 Stat. 1616.
45 Stat. 2489.
Hong Kong
T.Doc. 105-3 (entered into force 1/21/98)
Hungary
T.Doc. 104-5 (entered into force 3/8/97)
Iceland
32 Stat. 1096.
34 Stat. 2887.
India
T.Doc. 105-30 (entered into force 7/21/99)
Iraq
49 Stat. 3380.
Ireland
TIAS 10813
Israel
14 UST 1707.
18 UST 382.
Italy
TIAS 10837.
Jamaica
47 Stat. 2122.
T.Doc. 98-18 (entered into force 7/7/91)
Japan
31 UST 892.
Jordan
T.Doc. 104-3 (entered into force:7/29/95)
Kenya
47 Stat. 2122.
16 UST 1866.
Kiribati
28 UST 227.
Korea
T.Doc. 106-2 (entered into force 12/20/99)
Latvia
43 Stat. 1738.
49 Stat. 3131.
Lesotho
47 Stat. 2122.
Liberia
54 Stat. 1733.
Liechtenstein
50 Stat. 1337.
Lithuania
43 Stat. 1835.
49 Stat. 3077.
Luxembourg
T.Doc. 105-10 (entered into force 2/1/02)
Malawi
47 Stat. 2122.
18 UST 1822.

---

CRS-44
Malaysia
T.Doc. 104-26 (entered into force 6/2/97).
Malta
47 Stat. 2122.
Mauritius
47 Stat. 2122.
Mexico
31 UST 5059.
T.Doc. 105-46 (entered into force 5/21/01)
Monaco
54 Stat. 1780.
Nauru
47 Stat. 2122.
Netherlands154
TIAS 10733.
New Zealand
22 UST 1.
Nicaragua
35 Stat. 1869.
Nigeria
47 Stat. 2122.
Norway
31 UST 5619.
Pakistan
47 Stat. 2122.
Panama
34 Stat. 2851.
Papua New Guinea
47 Stat. 2122.
Paraguay
T.Doc. 106-4 (entered into force 3/9/01)
Peru
31 Stat. 1921.
Philippines
1994 UNTS 279
Poland
T.Doc. 105-14 (entered into force 9/17/99)
Portugal
35 Stat. 2071.
Romania
44 Stat. 2020.
50 Stat. 1349.
Saint Kitts
and Nevis
T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 2/23/00)
Saint Lucia
T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 2/2/00)
Saint Vincent &
the Grenadines
T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 9/8/99)
San Marino
35 Stat. 1971.
49 Stat. 3198.
Seychelles
47 Stat. 2122.
Sierra Leone
47 Stat. 2122.
Singapore
47 Stat. 2122.
20 UST 2764.
Slovak Republic
44 Stat. 2367.
49 Stat. 3253.
Solomon Islands
28 UST 277.
South Africa
T.Doc. 106-24 (entered into force 6/25/01)
Spain
22 UST 737.
29 UST 2283
TIAS (entered into force 7/2/93)
TIAS (entered into force 7/25/99)
Sri Lanka
T.Doc. 106-34 (entered into force 1/12/01)
Suriname
26 Stat. 1481.
33 Stat. 2257.

Swaziland
47 Stat. 2122.
21 UST 1930.
154 Treaty entered into force for: Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and Netherlands Antilles.

---

CRS-45
Sweden
14 UST 1845.
TIAS 10812.
Switzerland
T.Doc. 104-9 (entered into force 9/10/97)
Tanzania
47 Stat. 2122.
16 UST 2066.
Thailand
43 Stat. 1749.
T.Doc. 98-16 (entered into force 5/17/91)
Tonga
47 Stat. 2122.
28 UST 5290.
Trinidad and Tobago
T.Doc. 105-21 (entered into force 11/29/99)
Turkey
32 UST 3111.
Tuvalu
28 UST 227.
32 UST 1310.
United Kingdom
28 UST 227.
TIAS 12050.
Uruguay
TIAS 10850.
Venezuela
43 Stat. 1698.
Zambia
47 Stat. 2122.
Zimbabwe
T.Doc. 105-33(entered into force 4/26/00)

---

CRS-46
Countries with Whom the United States Has
No Extradition Treaty
Afghanistan
Georgia
Qatar
Algeria
Guinea
Russian Federation
Andorra
Guinea-Bissau
Rwanda
Angola
Indonesia
Sao Tome & Principe
Armenia
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Senegal
Bahrain
Korea, North
Slovenia*
Bangladesh
Kuwait
Somalia
Belarus
Sudan
Benin
Kyrgyzstan
Syria
Laos
Taiwan
Bhutan
Lebanon
Bosnia
Libya
Tajikistan
and Herzegovina*
Macedonia*
Togo
Botswana
Tunisia
Brunei
Madagascar
Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso
Maldives
Uganda
Mali
Burundi
Marshall Islands**
Ukraine
Cambodia
Mauritania
United Arab Emirates
Cameroon
Uzbekistan
Cape Verde
Micronesia**
Vanuatu
Central African Republic
Moldova
Vatican City
Mongolia
Chad
Montenegro*
Vietnam
China
Morocco
Western Samoa
Comoros
Mozambique
Yemen, Republic of
Croatia*
Yugoslavia*
Ivory Coast (Cote D’Ivoire)
Namibia
Zaire
Nepal
Djibouti
Niger
Equatorial Guinea
Oman
Eritrea
Palau**
Ethiopia
* The United States had an extradition treaty with the former Yugoslavia prior to its breakup (32
Stat. 1890). Since then, it has recognized at least some of the countries which were once part of
Yugoslavia as successor nations, see e.g., Arambasic v. Ashcroft, 403 F.Supp.2d 951 (D.S.D. 2005)
(Croatia); Sacirbey v. Guccione, 2006 WL 2585561 (No. 05 Cv. 2949(BSJ)(FM))(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,
2006)(Bosnia and Herzogovina).
** Although not specifically identified in the State Department's TREATIES IN FORCE (1998), the
United States apparently has extradition agreements with the Republics of Palau, the Marshall Islands,
and Micronesia, cf., In re Extradition of Lin, 915 F.Supp. 206, 207 (D.Guam 1995); P.L. 99-239, 99 Stat.
1770 (1986); H.Rept. 99-188 (Pt.1) 192 (1985).

---