Order Code RL32022
Air Cargo Security
Updated July 30, 2007
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Security, Safety, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Air Cargo Security
Summary
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast
amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft.
The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots
to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal
activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by
persons with access to aircraft. Several procedural and technology initiative to
enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats have been put in
place or are under consideration. Procedural initiatives include industry-wide
consolidation of the “known shipper” program; increased cargo inspections;
increased physical security of air cargo facilities; increased oversight of air cargo
operations; security training for cargo workers; and stricter controls over access to
cargo aircraft and air cargo operations areas. Technology being considered to
improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging
and containers; explosive detection systems (EDS) and other cargo screening
technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers and aircraft hardening; and biometric
systems for worker identification and access control.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) contains
general provisions for cargo screening, inspection, and security measures. Cargo
carried in passenger airplanes must be screened or its security otherwise ensured. In
practice, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has relied heavily on
“known shipper” protocols to prevent shipments of cargo from unknown sources on
passenger aircraft. ATSA also mandated that a security plan for all-cargo operations
was to be put in place as soon as possible, but aviation security initiatives in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have primarily focused on passenger operations and full
implementation of the air cargo strategic plan has not been fully completed.
The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) included
provisions establishing a pilot program for evaluating the deployment of blast-
resistant cargo containers; promoting the research, development, and deployment of
enhanced air cargo security technology; evaluating international air cargo threats; and
finalizing operational regulations of air cargo security . Those regulations, finalized
by the TSA in 2006, require use of an industry-wide known shipper database,
background checks of air cargo workers, and enhanced security measures at air cargo
operations areas. In addition to these measures, the TSA has been provided with
appropriations to hire more cargo inspectors and canine teams to step up screening
and regulatory inspections of air cargo security. The TSA is also planning on
deploying a freight assessment system to evaluate cargo risk and target shipments for
detailed inspection.
In addition, appropriations legislation over the past three years has called for
continued increases to the amounts of air cargo that is physically screened. The
conference report on the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act
(H.R. 1, H.Rept. 110-259) would establish a system to physically screen 100% of all
air cargo within three years, with an interim requirement of screening 50% of air
cargo within 18 months of enactment. This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
Overview of the Air Cargo System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Air Cargo Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Explosives and Incendiary Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Hazardous Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cargo Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cargo Screening and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
“Known Shipper” Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Cargo Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Mail Carried on Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Physical Security of Air Cargo Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Cargo Security Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Increased Control over Access to Aircraft and Cargo Facilities . . . . . 21
Arming All-Cargo Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Technology For Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Cargo Screening Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Hardened Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Biometric Screening Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Funding for Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Potential Congressional Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Figures
Figure 1. Air Cargo Volume — Historic Data and Forecasts
(FY1999 - FY2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Distribution of Air Cargo Revenue Ton Miles by Type of
Operation (FY1999 - FY2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. Domestic Mail Carried on Scheduled Passenger Airlines . . . . . . . . . . 20
List of Tables
Table 1. Appropriations for Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Table 2. Potential Benefits and Possible Risks of Various
Congressional Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Air Cargo Security
Overview of the Air Cargo System
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network responsible for
moving a vast amount of freight, express packages, and mail carried aboard
passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system consists of a large, complex
distribution network linking manufacturers and shippers to freight forwarders to
airport sorting and cargo handling facilities where shipments are loaded and unloaded
from aircraft. Business and consumer demand for fast, efficient shipment of goods
has fueled the rapid growth of the air cargo industry over the past 25 years.
In FY2003, about 14.3 billion revenue ton miles1 (RTMs) of cargo2 were
shipped by air within the United States, and another 18.5 billion RTMs of cargo were
shipped by air on international flights to and from the United States. The volume of
air cargo operations since FY1999 and the forecast volume of air cargo through 2016
is shown in Figure 1.
It is estimated that air cargo shipments, expressed in terms of revenue ton
mileage (RTMs), will increase by 50% domestically, and by 110% internationally by
FY2016 compared to FY2003 levels.3 In 2002, air cargo comprised about 0.3% by
weight of all freight movement in the United States.4 While this percentage may
seem small, it is much greater than the 0.07% percent of freight that traveled by air
in 1965, indicating that not only is the volume of air cargo increasing significantly,
but so is the percent of total freight movements that travel by air. Also, cargo
shipments by air comprise a significant percent of the total value of cargo shipments.
In fact, in 2002, while air freight movements accounted for only about 0.3% of total
domestic freight shipments by weight, these shipments accounted for 4.3% of the
total value of freight shipped within the United States.
In terms of global trade, air cargo accounted for 26.2% of the value of goods
shipped to and from the United States, surpassed only by maritime shipping, which
accounted for 41.9% of the import/export value of cargo in 2002. This demonstrates
1 A revenue ton mile is equivalent to one ton of cargo being transported one mile.
2 Cargo, as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), includes freight, express
packages, and mail.
3 Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2005-2016.
4 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Pocket Guide to Transportation, 2006. Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.
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the importance of air cargo in the international trade of high-value goods.5 While the
downturn in the aviation industry between 2000 and 2002 temporarily slowed the
pace of growth in air cargo, shipments surpassed pre-9/11 levels in 2003. This
increased demand reflects the importance of addressing air cargo security needs as
the size and complexity of the air cargo system continues to expand.
Figure 1. Air Cargo Volume — Historic Data and Forecasts
(FY1999 - FY2017)
80,000.0
70,000.0
60,000.0
illions)
(M 50,000.0
iles 40,000.0
30,000.0
20,000.0
venue Ton M
e 10,000.0
R
0.0
1999
2001
2003
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Year
All Cargo: Domestic
All Cargo: International
Passenger: Domestic
Passenger: International
Source: Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years
2005-2016, and 2006-2017.
Given the sheer volume of cargo that must be expediently processed and loaded
on aircraft, it has been generally argued that full electronic screening of all air cargo,
as is now required of checked passenger baggage, is likely to present significant
logistic and operational challenges. In 2002, it was reported that TSA computer
models estimated that if full physical screening is implemented, only 4% of the daily
volume of freight at airports could be processed due to the time that would be
required to breakdown shipments, inspect them, and reassemble them for transport.6
Since that time, considerable progress has been made to increase the amount of cargo
placed on passenger airliners that is screened and advance screening technologies to
address concerns over the screening of cargo. What has resulted since is best
described as a slow evolution of increasing inspections and screening of air cargo
shipments placed on passenger aircraft since 2002. These inspections and screening
operations are conducted by the airlines and freight shippers under the oversight of
5 Ibid.
6 Greg Schneider. “Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets; 2 Reports List
Security Gaps.” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
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the TSA. While the TSA does not divulge the percentage of cargo that currently
undergoes physical inspection, language in the FY2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334) called for at least tripling the amount of cargo
placed on passenger aircraft that was inspected at that time. FY2006 appropriations
language (P.L. 109-90) directs the TSA to take all possible measures — including the
certification, procurement, and deployment of screening systems — to inspect and
screen air cargo on passenger aircraft and increase the percentage of cargo inspected
beyond the level mandated in the FY2005 appropriations measure. FY2007
appropriations language (P.L. 109-295) directs the TSA to work with industry
stakeholders to develop standards and protocols to increase the use of explosives
detection equipment for screening air cargo. Along similar lines, the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) require the TSA to pursue screening
technologies and enhance security procedures to improve the inspection, screening,
and tracking of air cargo on passenger aircraft as recommended by the 9/11
Commission.
In the 110th Congress, the “Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007” (H.R. 1) contains a provision that would require the
inspection of all air cargo placed on passenger aircraft in a manner that provides a
level of security equivalent to the screening of passenger checked baggage. The
provision would phase-in the percentage of cargo required to be screened, setting
these levels at 35% by the end of FY2007, 65% by the end of FY2008, and 100% by
the end of FY2009. The measure is opposed by various stakeholders in the air cargo
industry that believes its requirements are overly burdensome and costly.7 The
Aviation Security Improvement Act (S. 509), introduced by Senator Inouye on
February 6, 2007, instead calls for establishing a system for screening all cargo
carried on passenger aircraft within three years of enactment. However, S. 509
would not explicitly require all cargo placed on passenger aircraft to be physically
screened, because alternative screening methods and techniques, such as risk
assessment screening tools, have historically been considered as screening systems.
This language was included in the Improving America’s Security Act of 2007 (S. 4),
which was included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1.
The conference report on H.R. 1 (H.Rept. 110-259) includes alternative
language that more closely parallels the House-passed version of the legislation with
regard to screening air cargo. Specifically, the conference report would require the
TSA to establish a system for screening 100% of cargo placed on passenger aircraft
within three years, with an interim requirements of screening 50% of such cargo
within 18 months of enactment. The provision in the conference report (Sec. 1602)
specifically defines screening in this context to mean a physical examination or other
non-intrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation
security. The bill identifies specific methods of screening that would be acceptable
in meeting this requirement, including the use of x-ray systems, explosives detection
systems, explosives trace detection, TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams,
and physical searches conducted in conjunction with manifest verifications.
Additional methods may be approved by the TSA; however, the provision would
7 “House To Consider Bill Today Requiring Additional Cargo Screening,” Transportation
Weekly, January 9, 2007, p. 7.
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specifically prohibit the use of cargo documents and known shipper verification by
themselves as being acceptable screening methods. In other words, the provision
clarifies that the screening of cargo is to involve some sort of inspection process that
cannot be met solely by a records verification of shipment contents or shipper status.
The language does, however, leave open the possibility that the TSA could
implement some other non-intrusive methods for assessing whether cargo poses a
risk that would not necessarily involve the use of physical screening technologies.
However, it is, at this point, unclear what such methods may consist of. The TSA
would be required to promulgate regulations to meet these requirements and would
be required to provide justification for any exemptions to these air cargo screening
requirements it may grant. Also, the GAO would be required to assess the methods
used by the TSA in granting, modifying, or eliminating any exemptions to these
requirements.
While the primary policy focus of legislation has been on cargo carried aboard
passenger aircraft, air cargo security is also presents a challenge for all-cargo
operators. The largest all-cargo operators in the United States include FedEx
Express, UPS, Atlas Air, Polar Air Cargo, Kallita Air, ABX Air, Evergreen
International Airlines, Gemini Air Cargo, and World Airways.8 In addition, some
airlines with passenger service, such as Northwest Airlines and United, also have a
fleet of all-cargo aircraft. Figure 2 shows the distribution of air cargo operations
among passenger and all-cargo aircraft. International operations make up about half
of the total system-wide air cargo operations in the United States. Historically, about
27% of revenue ton miles (RTMs) of domestic air cargo travels aboard passenger
aircraft within the United States, while 40% of international cargo RTMs to and from
the United States is carried aboard passenger aircraft. The percentage of air cargo
carried on passenger aircraft has dropped since September 11, 2001, with an
estimated 19% of domestic RTMs and 36% of international air cargo RTMs carried
on passenger aircraft in 2003. This reduction in the distribution of air cargo to
passenger flights, which is much more pronounced in the domestic market, is
primarily attributable to a post-9/11 restriction on mail parcels weighing more than
16 ounces and a prohibition against carrying cargo from unknown shippers aboard
passenger aircraft. A post-9/11 reduction in passenger flights to certain locations has
also contributed to an increased reliance on all-cargo aircraft for cargo shipments.
Since September 11, 2001, a variety of air cargo security measures have been
put in place or are under consideration. The purpose of these security measures is to
mitigate: (1) the risks associated with placing cargo on passenger and all-cargo
aircraft; and (2) the high level of access to aircraft during cargo operations. This
report will examine the key security risks associated with air cargo operations and
options for mitigating these risks.
8 “The World’s Top 50 Cargo Airlines,” Air Cargo World, September 2006, pp. 22-26.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Air Cargo Revenue Ton Miles by Type of
Operation (FY1999 - FY2005)
All-Cargo:
Domestic
34%
Passenger:
Domestic
12%
Passenger:
International
22%
All Cargo:
International
32%
Source: Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years
2006-2017.
Air Cargo Security Risks
Potential risks associated with air cargo security include introduction of
explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; shipment of
undeclared or undetected hazardous materials aboard aircraft; cargo crime including
theft and smuggling; and aircraft hijackings and sabotage by individuals with access
to aircraft.
Explosives and Incendiary Devices. Undetected explosive or incendiary
devices placed in air cargo are potential threats to aircraft. Experts have warned that
air cargo may be a potential target for terrorists because screening and inspection of
air cargo is currently not as extensive as required screening of passengers and
checked baggage. Cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft may be at particular risk
since passenger aircraft are generally regarded as highly attractive targets to terrorists
and have been attacked in the past. It has been reported that TSA considers the
likelihood of a terrorist bombing of a passenger airplane to be between 35% and 65%
based on 2002 intelligence reports, and TSA believes that cargo is either likely to
become, or already is, the primary aviation target for terrorists in the short term.9
However, other terrorism experts regard placing explosives in air cargo as less
9 Greg Schneider. “Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets; 2 Reports List
Security Gaps.” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
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appealing to terrorists because typically a specific flight cannot be targeted without
the assistance of an individual with access to aircraft. Furthermore, experts generally
believe that all-cargo aircraft are less appealing targets to terrorists because an attack
against an all-cargo aircraft is not likely to generate the degree of public and media
attention that a bombing of a commercial passenger aircraft would have.
The December 22, 2001, attempted shoe bombing aboard a American Airlines
Boeing 767 on a trans-Atlantic Paris to Miami flight and the foiled plot to allegedly
bomb U.S.-bound airliners from the United Kingdom in August 2006 has heightened
concerns over possible terrorist bombings of passenger aircraft. Historically,
bombings of U.S. airliners have been rare and have mostly involved bombs placed
in either the aircraft passenger cabin or in checked passenger baggage. The most
catastrophic bombing of a U.S. airliner was the December 21, 1988 crash of Pan Am
flight 103, a Boeing 747, over Lockerbie, Scotland that was attributed to an explosive
device placed in a baggage container in the airplane’s forward hold.10 Investigation
of the deadliest bombing of a passenger aircraft, the June 23, 1985 downing of Air
India flight 182 off the coast of Ireland, similarly revealed evidence of an explosive
device that was most likely introduced in checked baggage and placed in the
aircraft’s forward cargo hold.11 The most notable event involving detonation of an
explosive device transported as cargo aboard an airliner in the United States was the
November 15, 1979 explosion aboard an American Airlines Boeing 727 that made
a successful emergency landing at Dulles Airport following the incident.
Investigation revealed that the device was contained in a parcel shipped by U.S. mail
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) linked to convicted “Unabomber,”
Theodore Kaczynski.12
While using cargo as a means to place explosive or incendiary devices aboard
aircraft has historically been rare, heightened screening of passengers, baggage, and
aircraft may make cargo a more attractive means for terrorists to place these devices
aboard aircraft, including all-cargo aircraft as well as passenger aircraft, in the future.
Investigations have suggested that al Qaeda terrorists had an interest in bombing all-
cargo aircraft prior to September 11, 2001, and were planning to bomb U.S.-bound
cargo flights in an operation run out of the Philippines.13 Given al Qaeda’s continued
interest in bombing aircraft and indications that they have already considered placing
bombs in cargo, the specific vulnerability of air cargo is an issue of particular
concern.
10 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Report on the accident to Boeing
747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988 (Aircraft
Accident Report No 2/90 (EW/C1094)), July 1990.
11 Canadian Aviation Bureau Safety Board. Aviation Occurrence, Air India Boeing
747-237B VT-EFO, Cork, Ireland 110 Miles West, June 23, 1985.
12 Affidavit of Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Terry D. Turchie, Before the U.S. District
Court, District of Montana, April 3, 1996.
13 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
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However, as previously noted, some terrorism experts believe that placing
explosives or incendiary devices in cargo may be less appealing because it would be
difficult to target specific flights without the cooperation of individuals with access
to aircraft such as cargo workers. Thus, increased efforts to perform background
checks of workers with access to aircraft and increased physical security around air
cargo operations may further mitigate the threat of explosives and incendiary devices.
Additionally, the use of hardened cargo containers capable of withstanding internal
bomb blasts are being evaluated and may also provide a means of mitigating the risks
of explosives and incendiary devices. The 9/11 Commission specifically
recommended the deployment of at least one hardened cargo container in each
passenger aircraft to mitigate the potentially catastrophic consequences of a bomb
carried in air cargo.14 The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
calls for establishing a pilot program to evaluate this concept.
Hazardous Materials.15 Despite increased Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and Department of Transportation (DOT) oversight and enforcement efforts,
undeclared and undetected shipments of hazardous materials continues to pose a
significant safety problem for air carriers. Most explosives and gases are prohibited
aboard aircraft, however many properly handled hazardous materials are permitted
aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft within specified quantity limitations.16
Risks are introduced when hazardous materials are not declared leading to the
potential transport of prohibited materials by air or improper handling of hazardous
goods during loading and while in transit. The dangers of undetected and improperly
handled hazardous materials in air cargo shipments were highlighted by the May 11,
1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that improperly carried oxygen
generators ignited an intense fire in one of the airplane’s cargo holds leading to the
crash and issued several safety recommendations for improving the handling and
tracking of hazardous materials to prevent improper carriage aboard passenger
aircraft.17
While safety concerns regarding hazardous cargo shipments aboard passenger
aircraft are of particular concern, preventing unauthorized shipments of hazardous
materials is a challenge for all-cargo aircraft operators as well. About 75% of
hazardous materials shipped by aircraft are carried aboard all-cargo aircraft, while the
14 Ibid.
15 Hazardous materials or dangerous goods include explosives; gases; flammable liquids and
solids; oxidizers and organic peroxides; toxic materials and infectious substances;
radioactive materials; corrosive materials; and other miscellaneous dangerous goods (e.g.
asbestos).
16 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of
Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. (GAO-03-22, January 2003).
17 National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report: In-Flight Fire and
Impact with Terrain, ValuJet Airlines, Flight 592, DC-9-32, N904VJ, Everglades, Near
Miami, Florida, May 11, 1996 (AAR-97/06).
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remaining 25% is shipped on passenger aircraft.18 Enhanced air cargo security
measures may also improve air cargo safety by increasing the detection of undeclared
hazardous materials.
Cargo Crime. Cargo crimes include theft of goods transported as cargo, and
shipment and smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods through the
cargo distribution network. It is estimated that direct losses due to cargo theft across
all transportation modes total between $10 and $25 billion annually in the United
States.19 The large range in this estimate reflects the fact that cargo theft has not been
a specific crime category and therefore reliable statistics on cargo theft are
unavailable. A provision in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act (P.L. 109-177), however, required the Department of Justice to establish a
separate category for cargo theft in the Uniform Crime Reporting System. The act
also refines relevant statutes and increases criminal penalties for cargo theft and
stowaways.
The large estimated level of cargo theft and other cargo crimes is indicative of
potential weaknesses in cargo security including air cargo security. Specific
weaknesses in air cargo security have been highlighted in several high profile
investigations of cargo theft. Major cargo and baggage theft rings have been
uncovered at JFK International Airport in New York, Logan International Airport in
Boston, and at Miami International Airport.20 In addition to theft, smuggling is a
problem for air cargo security. Smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated
goods undermines legal markets and reduces government tax and tariff revenues.
Smuggling operations are often linked to organized crime, and may provide support
for terrorist activities.21 A large portion of cargo crime is either committed by or with
the assistance of cargo workers. Therefore, increased security measures such as
conducting more stringent or more frequent background checks of cargo workers and
enhancing physical security of cargo operations areas are likely to reduce cargo
crimes and improve the capability to detect criminal activity in air cargo operations.
A review of transportation security needs for combating cargo crime identified six
key issues regarding cargo security:
! A lack of effective cargo theft reporting systems;
! Weaknesses in current transportation crime laws and prosecution;
! A lack of understanding regarding the nature of cargo crime by
governments and industry;
18 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of
Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22, January 2003.
19 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential
Improvements for the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-334, December, 2002. FIA International
Research, Ltd. Contraband, Organized Crime and the Threat to the Transportation and
Supply Chain Function. September 2001.
20 U. S. General Accounting Office. Ibid; Department of Transportation, Office of the
Inspector General. Press Release: Six MIA Airport Employees Indicted for Stealing from
Checked Passenger Bags. December 11, 2002.
21 FIA International Research, Ltd. Op. cit.
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! Inadequate support for cargo theft task forces;
! A need to improve local law enforcement expertise on cargo theft;
and
! The need for more effective cargo security technology including
cargo tracking systems, tamper-evident and tamper-resistant seals,
high-speed screening devices, and integration of security technology
into supply chain management systems.22
Addressing these issues specific to cargo crime may also improve overall cargo
security and could deter terrorist threats to cargo shipments. While these
recommendations are directed toward cargo crime issues in all modes of
transportation, they could be particularly applicable to air cargo security where other
security concerns such as explosive and incendiary device detection, hazardous
materials detection, and deterring hijackings and sabotage may also be addressed
through the implementation of tighter controls to deter cargo crime.
Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage. Individuals with access to aircraft may
pose a risk of potential hijackings and aircraft sabotage. Instances of hijackings by
individuals with access to aircraft have been extremely rare, but include two
examples of particularly violent incidents by disgruntled individuals who had access
to aircraft that facilitated their plots. A particularly dramatic hijacking attempt by an
individual with access to aircraft and cargo operations facilities occurred on April 7,
1994.23 An off-duty Federal Express flight engineer attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-
10 aircraft and crash it into the company’s Memphis, Tennessee headquarters. The
hijacker boarded the airplane in Memphis under the guise of seeking free
transportation to San Jose, California. His only luggage was a guitar case that
concealed hammers, mallets, a knife, and a spear gun. At the time there was no
requirement or company procedure to screen or inspect personnel with access to
cargo aircraft or their baggage. The flight crew thwarted the hijacker’s attempt to
take over the airplane by force and made a successful emergency landing in Memphis
despite serious injuries to all three flight crew members.
Individuals have also used their access to aircraft credentials to bypass existing
security measures. For example, on December 7, 1987, a PSA regional jet crashed
near San Luis Obispo, California killing all 43 people on board.24 Investigation
revealed that a disgruntled former USAir employee, recently fired for alleged theft,
used his employee identification, which had not been returned, to bypass airport
security with a loaded handgun. At altitude, he shot his former supervisor who was
a passenger on the airplane. He then entered the flight deck, shot the two pilots, and
then shot himself after putting the airplane into a crash dive. At the time, federal
regulations permitted airline employees to bypass airport security checkpoints.
22 Ed Badolato. “Cargo Security: High-Tech Protection, High-Tech Threats. TR News, 211,
November-December 2000, pp. 14-17.
23 Dave Hirschman. Hijacked: The True Story of the Heroes of Flight 705. (New York:
William Morrow & Co, 1997).
24 National Transportation Safety Board. Accident Brief, NTSB Identification:
DCA88MA008. Available at [http://www.ntsb.gov].
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Since these incidents, airport and air cargo security regulations have been
tightened to establish better controls over aircraft access including background
checks and physical screening of individuals with access to aircraft. Background
checks of workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft was mandated under
ATSA, and background checks of workers with unescorted access to air cargo are
under consideration as part of proposed regulations issued by the TSA in November
2004.25 However, without full screening of air cargo and airport personnel, the
potential still exists for persons with access to aircraft to pass weapons inside the
secured areas of airports. Under recently imposed regulations, all-cargo operators
must take steps to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing aircraft and to
ensure that crewmembers and individuals carried aboard large all-cargo aircraft are
prevented or deterred from carrying weapons, explosives, or other destructive items
on board aircraft.26
Heightened security measures on passenger aircraft since September 11, 2001
could make all-cargo aircraft more attractive to terrorists seeking to hijack large
airplanes. Currently, federal air marshals are not deployed on all-cargo aircraft, and
cargo airplanes are not required to have hardened cockpit doors so long as alterative
TSA-approved security measures are implemented to control access to the aircraft
and flight deck while the airplane is on the ground. Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176)
expanded the Federal Flight Deck Officer program to include pilots of all-cargo
aircraft. This program trains and deputizes pilots to carry firearms to protect the
flight deck against a terrorist attack. (see CRS Report RL31674, Arming Pilots
Against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program, by Bart Elias.)
Sabotage by individuals with access to aircraft is also a potential risk, although
generally not considered a significant threat because of the high level of knowledge
regarding aircraft systems needed to sabotage flight critical systems, the levels of
redundancy of flight critical systems on modern transport category airplanes27, and
the existing capabilities to detect sabotage attempts through aircraft systems checks
and pre-flight inspections. While numerous cases of sabotage by disgruntled
employees have been documented, these incidents of aircraft tampering have
typically been discovered during pre-flight inspections resulting in aircraft
groundings and delays and costly repairs, but have not resulted in catastrophes. Such
incidents have not been linked to terrorism.
25 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Air Cargo
Security Requirements; Proposed Rule.” Federal Register, (69) 217, 65258-65291.
26 See 49 CFR §1544.202.
27 Transport category airplanes include all jet-powered airplanes with 10 or more passenger
seats or weighing more than 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), and all
propeller-driven airplanes with 19 or more seats or weighing more than 19,000 pounds
MTOW.
CRS-11
Cargo Screening and Inspection
Screening and inspection of air cargo may be an effective means for detecting
explosives, incendiary devices, and hazardous materials in air cargo. The Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) requires the screening of all
property, including mail and cargo, carried aboard passenger aircraft in the United
States. In implementing the security procedures for cargo carried aboard passenger
airplanes, TSA has relied extensively on “known shipper” programs to prevent the
shipment of cargo from unknown sources aboard passenger aircraft. ATSA also
specifies that, as soon as practicable, a system must be implemented to screen,
inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo transported in all-cargo aircraft
using methods such as those outlined in this report. However, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the TSA lacked specific long-term goals and
performance targets for cargo security.28 In response, the TSA has developed an air
cargo security strategic plan and has proposed comprehensive regulations designed
to enhance air cargo security. The TSA’s strategy centers on risk-based assessments
and targeted physical screening of cargo based on risk as well as increased random
inspections of shipments.
Current aviation security regulations require that each passenger aircraft
operator and indirect air carrier29 develop a security program for acceptance and
screening of cargo to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or
incendiaries. However, the volume of air cargo handled and the distributed nature
of the air cargo system presents significant challenges for screening and inspecting
air cargo. Presently, in the United States, about 50 air carriers transport air cargo on
passenger aircraft handling cargo from nearly 2 million shippers per day.30 About
80% of these shippers use freight forwarders who operate about 10,000 facilities
across the country.31 Since many experts believe that 100% screening of all air cargo
is not a practical solution with currently available technology, security programs have
relied on pre-screening of cargo to identify shipments for physical screening and
inspection. The TSA notes that 100% physical screening of all cargo is not a viable
alternative as no single technology is currently available to effectively and
comprehensively screen all air cargo for various different types of explosives
threats.32 The TSA, therefore, has adopted a risk-based strategy that relies heavily
on the vetting of shippers through a known shipper process and on screening
28 U.S. General Accounting Office. Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Testimony Before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 1, 2003 (GAO-03-616T);
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to
Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, October 2005, GAO-06-76.
29 An indirect air carrier refers to an entity, such as a freight forwarder, that engages
indirectly in the air transportation of property on passenger aircraft (See Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Part 1544).
30 See S.Rept. 108-38.
31 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
32 Transportation Security Administration, TSA Takes Significant Steps to Strengthen Air
Cargo Security.
CRS-12
shipments against databases of known shippers. Ultimately, the TSA plans to include
other factors in its cargo risk assessment through the use of a freight assessment
system that is currently under development.
The TSA is currently working toward fully implementing its Air Cargo Strategic
Plan, which was released in November 2003.33 In keeping with the risk-based
approach of implementing air cargo security measures typified in the known shipper
concept, the core elements of this plan consist of: improving shipper and supply
chain security through improved vetting of shippers and freight forwarders;
enhancing cargo pre-screening processes; developing and deploying appropriate
screening technologies to conduct targeted air cargo inspections; and implementing
appropriate facility security measures. In addition to the known-shipper system, the
TSA is also developing a more comprehensive targeting tool for air cargo, known as
the “Freight Assessment System.” While few details of this systems have been
publicly disclosed, the TSA expects to fully deploy this system sometime in 2008.34
“Known Shipper” Programs. The principal means for pre-screening or
profiling cargo has been through the use of “known shipper” programs. In May
2006, the TSA issued a final rule establishing an industry-wide known shipper
database for vetting all shipments placed on passenger aircraft.35 Previously, some
air carriers and indirect air carriers had voluntarily participated in a system using a
central database of known shippers to vet cargo destined for passenger aircraft as
required under ATSA. Other air carriers and freight forwarders relied on internal
databases and security protocols approved by TSA for determining whether
shipments bound for a passenger airplane come from known sources and that
shippers have adequate security measures in place to protect the integrity of those
shipments. These protocols were collectively known as “known shipper” programs.
Known shipper programs were created to establish procedures for differentiating
trusted shippers, known to a freight forwarder or air carrier through prior business
dealings, from unknown shippers who have conducted limited or no prior business
with a freight forwarder or air carrier. Using this system, packages from unknown
shippers can then be identified for additional screening and inspection. Currently,
shipments from unknown sources are prohibited from passenger aircraft.
Additionally, air carriers and freight forwarders must refuse to transport any cargo
from shippers, including known shippers, that refuse to give consent for searching
and inspecting the cargo. ATSA provides for use of known shipper programs as an
alternate means for ensuring the security of cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. Air
Cargo Strategic Plan. November 13, 2003; Department of Homeland Security,
Transportation Security Administration, “Air Cargo Security Requirements, Final Rule,”
Federal Register, 71(102), May 26, 2006, pp. 30477-30517; 49 CFR 1544.239.
34 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget,
Program Assessment, Transportation Security Administration: Air Cargo Security
Programs. Washington, DC.
35 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Air Cargo
Security Requirements; Proposed Rule.” Federal Register, (69) 217, 65258-65291.
CRS-13
in lieu of screening of property by federal government employees prior to aircraft
boarding.
The development of known shipper programs was prompted by industry experts
and Congress in the mid-1990s who recognized that increased controls over air cargo
shipments were needed to better ensure air cargo safety and security. Key concerns
included the need for increased compliance with guidelines for the shipment of
hazardous materials and the need to deter terrorists from using cargo as a means to
place explosives or incendiary devices on aircraft. In addition, congressional
hearings on the 1996 Valujet accident concluded that air cargo safety could only be
achieved through a comprehensive inspection program encompassing all components
of the air cargo network.36
In December 1996, the FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)
Security Baseline Working Group issued a series of recommendations that formed
the basis for FAA’s effort to strengthen aviation security in response to this need.
Recommendations issued by the working group regarding air cargo security included
tightening the definition of a “known shipper”; using profiles to review the shipments
of known shippers and apply additional security measures; and exploring
technologies to develop a profile to be applied to cargo shipments. The White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, formed after the 1996 crash of TWA
Flight 800 and commonly referred to as the Gore Commission, urged the adoption
of the recommendations made by the FAA’s Baseline Working Group regarding the
profiling of “known” and “unknown”shippers.37 As part of FAA’s efforts in air cargo
safety and security, a “known shipper” program was subsequently established,
outlining procedures for freight forwarders and air carriers to review the security
practices of known frequent customers and establish a cargo security plan for
handling cargo from known and unknown shippers. With the passage of ATSA,
oversight of cargo security measures was transferred from the FAA to the TSA. The
TSA has continued to rely on known shipper programs as a principle means for pre-
screening air cargo.
A review of aviation security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by
the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General, drew
attention to the vulnerabilities of air cargo and questioned the overall effectiveness
of the known shipper program.38 In Congressional testimony following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, DOT Inspector General, Kenneth Mead, referenced
a 1998 report by the DOT Office of the Inspector General documenting a high rate
of non-compliance with hazardous materials regulations and cargo security
requirements across the air cargo industry and a lack of industry oversight to ensure
36 Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General. Aviation Security:
Federal Aviation Administration (Report No. AV-1998-134, May 27, 1998).
37 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Final Report to President
Clinton. Vice President Al Gore, Chairman. February 12, 1997. Washington, DC: The
White House.
38 Ken Leiser. “Gaps in air cargo security may offer terrorism openings.” AEROTECH News
and Review, June 21, 2002, p. B2.
CRS-14
that security procedures were carried out by cargo workers.39 In 1998, the DOT
Inspector General noted that FAA was making progress toward improving the
policies, procedures, and controls over air cargo safety and security.40 However,
Mead testified that a follow-up audit revealed continued weaknesses in FAA’s policy
for allowing cargo on passenger aircraft. Several loopholes have been noted,
including the relative ease of obtaining known shipper status, and the relative ease
with which someone could pose as a known shipper by falsifying or counterfeiting
shipping documents used to identify the source as a known shipper.41
Two central issues regarding the post-9/11 implementation of known shipper
programs have been the adequacy of procedures for auditing and monitoring known
shippers, and consideration of the potential need for a consolidated database of
known shippers, as has now been created. Critics of known shipper programs have
argued that relatively little investigation of known shippers is required to demonstrate
that these shippers are trustworthy and have adequate security measures in place to
ensure the integrity of their shipments.42 Freight forwarders and air carriers have also
questioned why extensive background checks and established relations with a
particular customer are required to establish that the customer is a known shipper
when that customer is already considered a known shipper to another air carrier or
freight forwarder. Therefore, some had suggested a need for a standardized,
centralized database of known shippers, as has now been created by the TSA. To
address these concerns, the TSA initially instituted an industry-wide pilot program
database of known shippers. This initiative poised the TSA to address Congressional
interest in establishing an industry-wide known shipper database that was included
in language passed by the Senate during the 108th Congress (see S. 165, S. 2845 as
passed by the Senate). The administration’s subsequent initiatives in taking
regulatory action to require an industry-wide known shipper database led Congress
to ultimately drop the Senate-passed provision in the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 (P.L. 108-458) that would have established a statutory requirement for
establishing a standardized industry-wide known shipper program and database.
Congress instead settled on including language calling for the TSA to finalize its
rulemaking on air cargo security, including the proposed establishment of the
industry-wide known shipper database, by September 2005. Those rules were not
finalized until May, 2006, but are now being implemented, including the provision
to establish an industry-wide known shipper database. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that it will cost about $10 million per year to maintain an
industry-wide database of known shippers.43
39 Statement of The Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General U.S. Department of
Transportation. “Action Needed to Improve Aviation Security.” Before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring and the District of Columbia, United States Senate, September 25, 2001.
40 Department Of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General. Aviation Security:
Federal Aviation Administration (Report No. AV-1998-134, May 27, 1998).
41 Greg Schneider. Op. cit.
42 Ken Leiser, Op. cit.
43 See S.Rept. 108-38. Air Cargo Security Improvement Act: Report of the Committee on
(continued...)
CRS-15
Cargo Inspection. Another issue for air cargo security is the adequacy of
cargo inspection procedures and oversight of cargo inspections at air carrier and
freight forwarder facilities. ATSA established requirements for screening and
inspection of all individuals, goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment entering
a secured area of a passenger airport that assures the same level of protection as
passenger and baggage screening.
ATSA, however, did not establish specific requirements for the physical
screening of air cargo. With regard to air cargo, current regulations specify that
aircraft operators must use the procedures, facilities, and equipment described in their
security program to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or
incendiaries in cargo onboard a passenger aircraft and inspect cargo shipments for
such devices before it is loaded onto passenger aircraft. With regard to all-cargo
aircraft, ATSA mandates that a system to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the
security of all-cargo aircraft is to be established as soon as practicable, but sets no
specific deadlines or time frame for compliance. Additionally, aircraft operators must
establish controls over cargo shipments, in accordance with their security program,
that prevent the carriage of unauthorized explosive or incendiary devices aboard
passenger aircraft and access by unauthorized individuals. Further, aircraft operators
must refuse to transport any cargo presented by a shipper that refuses to consent to
a search and inspection of their shipment.44
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-334) called for
tripling the amount of cargo placed on passenger airplanes that is screened or
inspected, however the absolute number or percentage of cargo subject to inspection
is considered security sensitive. FY2006 appropriations language (P.L. 109-90)
directed the TSA to take all possible measures — including the certification,
procurement, and deployment of screening systems — to inspect and screen air cargo
on passenger aircraft and increase the percentage of cargo inspected beyond the level
mandated in the FY2005 appropriations measure. Further, FY2007 appropriations
language (P.L. 109-295) directed the TSA to work with industry stakeholders to
develop standards and protocols to increase the use of explosives detection
equipment for screening air cargo.
While Congress has acted to increase physical inspections of cargo carried
aboard passenger aircraft, 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft
remains a particularly contentious issue. At the beginning of the 110th Congress, the
House passed H.R. 1, which includes a provision that would require 100% screening
of cargo placed on passenger aircraft by the end of FY2009. Specifically, the
provision would phase-in the percentage of cargo required to be screened, setting
these levels at 35% by the end of FY2007, 65% by the end of FY2008, and 100% by
the end of FY2009. Air cargo industry stakeholders have largely opposed this
approach, urging Congress instead to “...focus on realistic solutions based on a
framework that identifies and prioritizes risks, works methodically to apply effective
and practical security programs, and makes optimal use of federal and industry
43 (...continued)
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 165. United States Senate, April 11, 2003.
44 See Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Part 1544.205
CRS-16
resources.”45 They advocate for a risk-based screening system for cargo placed on
passenger airlines that incorporates threat assessment and targeting capabilities,
provides incentives for shippers to strengthen supply chain measures, and focuses
increased inspections on cargo determined to be of elevated risk through risk
assessment and targeting capabilities. This roughly parallels the TSA’s current
strategic plan for air cargo security, which focuses on risk-based targeted screening
of cargo, rather than 100% physical screening of cargo loaded on to passenger
aircraft. The industry has specifically recommended increased use of canine
explosives detection teams; enhanced supply chain security; enhanced targeting of
shipments based on the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) experience with its
Automated Targeting System (ATS); expanded use of explosive trace detection
(EDT) technology for targeted screening; and accelerated research and development
of technologies that can more efficiently inspect elevated risk cargo.46
A significant challenge regarding cargo inspection is the feasibility of
implementing inspection procedures that offer adequate assurances for security
without unduly affecting cargo shipment schedules and processes. In 1997, the Gore
Commission recommended that unaccompanied express packages shipped on
commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to examination by explosives
detection systems.47 However, many in the air cargo industry have expressed
continuing concerns that current technology does not offer a readily available,
affordable solution for scanning cargo containers or cargo unit loading devices
(ULDs) in an expeditious manner that would not unduly affect the schedule of air
cargo operations. Also, scanning or inspecting individual packages is considered
infeasible by many experts due to the volume of cargo handled and the schedule
demands of the air cargo business. Therefore, most experts agree that the most
practical solution, using available technology, is the application of physical screening
and inspections on selected shipments and the use of cargo profiling procedures such
as known shipper programs to identify shipments that may require additional
screening and inspection.
Since the ability to screen and inspect cargo may be limited by available
technology, flight schedules, and cargo processing demands, alternative measures for
screening and inspection at cargo handling facilities have been suggested. In
particular, the Gore Commission recommended a significant expansion of the use of
bomb-sniffing dogs. Former TSA head, Admiral James Loy, testified that increased
use of canine teams may be an effective means for increasing inspections of cargo
45 Air Carrier Association of America, Airforwarders Association, Air Transport
Association, Cargo Network Services Corporation (CNS), High Tech Shippers Coalition,
International Warehouse Logistics Association, National Air Carrier Association (NACA),
National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America, Inc., National Fisheries
Institute, Regional Airline Association, Society of American Florists, and the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Letter to The Honorable Daniel Inouye and The Honorable Ted Stevens,
January 8, 2007, p. 1.
46 Ibid.
47 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op. cit.
CRS-17
and mail.48 Canine teams may offer a viable alternative means for screening air cargo
at a relatively low cost. As previously noted, air cargo industry stakeholders are
presently advocating the increased use of explosives detection canine teams as an
integral part of a risk-based approach to air cargo targeting and screening.
However, some believe that adequate assurances regarding the security of cargo
placed upon passenger aircraft cannot be provided without 100% physical screening
predominantly relying on explosives detection technology, as is currently required
for all checked baggage. Despite considerable public policy discussion regarding the
physical screening of air cargo placed on passenger airliners, there is relatively
limited information regarding the estimated cost of carrying out proposals to conduct
physical screening of 100% of cargo carried on passenger aircraft. A statement
attributed to David Wirsing, Executive Director of the Airforwarders Association,
asserted that implementing this proposal would cost “over $700 million in the first
year alone.”49 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not publicly
disclosed a formal cost estimate for screening all cargo placed on passenger aircraft.
However, a statement attributed to TSA spokeswoman Andrea McCauley, indicated
that screening cargo placed on passenger aircraft “would cost an estimated $3.6
billion over 10 years.”50
A CRS analysis, based on costs incurred to meet the mandate for 100% baggage
screening and a comparison of the annual volume of cargo carried on passenger
aircraft to the estimated annual volume of checked baggage, yielded a ten-year
estimate of roughly $3.75 billion for meeting the proposed mandate to screen 100%
of cargo placed on passenger aircraft, roughly in line with the estimate attributed to
the TSA. However, additional complexities associated with air cargo, such as large
sized and irregular shaped shipments, that were not taken into account in this analysis
could further increase estimated costs by making the screening process more labor
intensive, or by requiring the additional deployment of alternative technologies for
screening. These and other factors may explain the larger anticipated initial year
costs estimated by the Airforwarders Association, reflected in their estimate of $700
million in the first year of 100% screening. While these factors have generally been
acknowledged by industry experts, it has not been fully determined how these unique
factors may affect the overall cost of screening cargo. On the other hand, through
leveraging technology development and applying operational efficiencies developed
from experience with baggage screening, the total cost of implementing cargo
screening may be reduced to some degree.
Regarding the costs for screening cargo, the potential for additional fees
imposed on air cargo is a particular concern for air cargo industry stakeholders.
While H.R. 1 proposes a mandate for 100% cargo screening, it does not include any
provisions to create any air cargo security fees to pay for this mandate. Further,
48 See Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, Op. cit.
49 Matthew Yglesias, “$1.27 Trillion: The Price is Wrong,” The American Prospect, 17(7),
July/August 2006, p. 28-32. See also, “Screening Air Cargo,” Air Safety Week, May 9,
2005.
50 Jeff Bliss, “Air-Cargo Screening ‘A Disaster Waiting to Happen,’ Critics Say,”
Bloomberg.com, November 29, 2005.
CRS-18
House majority leadership has indicated that it will not propose new deficit spending
to pay for this and other provisions in H.R. 1, and that “...airlines would be expected
to pay for air cargo inspections.”51 Under such a scheme, it would be most likely that
physical screening of air cargo would become an air carrier responsibility with TSA
oversight to insure regulatory compliance. Under such a scheme, airlines would
incur the direct costs for meeting the 100% screening requirements.
Besides the impact of direct costs for screening, passenger airlines may be
competitively disadvantaged compared to all-cargo airlines if these new mandates are
implemented. Industry stakeholders have expressed concerns that additional security
screening requirements could slow shipments on passenger aircraft, and certain
routes may no longer be profitable if cargo revenues are reduced or eliminated as a
result of new screening requirements.52 Given that profit margins for most passenger
airlines are relatively small, and most large passenger airlines have failed to achieve
any consistent profitability in recent years, the additional burden of both direct and
indirect costs associated with a mandate to screen all cargo placed on passenger
aircraft may present particular fiscal challenges to the airlines. While estimated
cargo revenues of about $4.7 billion53 annually make up only about 5% of total
industry-wide operating revenues among passenger air carriers, these additional
revenues can make the difference between profit or loss in an industry that has seen
net losses averaging 3.8% of total revenue over the past three years.54
U.S. Mail Carried on Aircraft. Canine teams, which have been advocated
by industry for increased use in screening and inspecting air freight, presently
provide the only means approved by the TSA for screening mail weighing more than
one pound that is put on passenger aircraft under a long-running pilot program in
place at 11 airports.55 Mail weighing more than one pound is otherwise prohibited
from carriage aboard passenger aircraft.
The transport of U.S. mail aboard aircraft introduces unique security challenges
to prevent illegal hazardous material shipments and the introduction of explosive and
incendiary devices. Inspecting first class, priority, and express mail prior to shipment
by air is difficult because the Postal Service regards these items as private materials
protected by the Fourth Amendment against search.56 The Postal Service has
implemented a screening process to prevent unauthorized shipments of hazardous
51 Chris Strohm, “Democrats Look To Industry To Pay for Cargo,” Government Executive
Daily Briefing, January 9, 2007.
52 Thomas Frank, “Bill Would Order All Air Cargo Screened,” USA Today, January 8, 2007.
53 Air Transport Association, ATA Issue Brief: Air Cargo Security — The Airlines View,
Washington, DC: Air Transport Association.
54 CRS analysis of airline industry economic data presented in: Air Transport Association,
Smart Skies: A Blueprint for the Future, 2006 Economic Report, Washington, DC: Air
Transport Association.
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “TSA
Canine Teams Screen U.S. Mail for Explosives - Pilot Program to Expand to Airports
Across the Country.” Press Release 03-34, May 29, 2003.
56 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
CRS-19
substances that relies on customer screening by postal clerks who are trained to
question individuals shipping packages weighing more than one pound by air. Items
weighing less than one pound, on the other hand, are not subject to any inquiry and
can be deposited in mailboxes thereby precluding any inquiry of the sender.
However, only a small percentage of this mail is shipped by air. About 5 to 7.5
percent of all domestic mail shipments, regardless of weight, are transported by either
passenger or all-cargo aircraft. Federal Express is the largest carrier of U.S. mail and
its all-cargo operations account for about half of the total volume of U.S. mail
shipments by air.57
In 1997, the Gore Commission recommended that the Postal Service obtain
authorization from customers shipping mail weighing more than one pound allowing
examination by explosive detection systems, and if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation to accomplish this.58 Since September 11, 2001, postal shipments
weighing more than one pound have been limited to all-cargo aircraft. Passenger air
carriers have been pushing to have these restrictions lifted because of a significant
loss of revenue from U.S. mail shipments. Items weighing less than one pound
shipped by U.S. mail are not subject to this restriction from carriage aboard passenger
airliners. As seen in Figure 3, there was a precipitous decline in mail shipments by
passenger airlines that resulted from this restriction. While all-cargo air carriers have
increased their mail carriage to some degree in response, most of the mail once
carried aboard passenger aircraft is now being transported by other modes.
Assuring the safety and security of U.S. mail transported by aircraft, and
preventing the introduction of explosives or incendiaries in mail shipped by aircraft
while maintaining privacy rights of postal patrons remains an important issue in the
debate over air cargo security. Following the events of September 11, 2001 and the
Postal Service anthrax incidents, the Technology Subcommittee of the President’s
Commission on the United States Postal Service recommended that the Postal
Service, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, should explore
technologies and procedures for utilizing unique sender identification on all mail.59
Such procedures may provide a means of pre-screening all mail shipped by air,
including packages weighing less than one pound.
57 “Northwest to drop U.S. mail; Canceled domestic routes to cost 250 ground jobs.” Detroit
Free Press, September 5, 2003.
58 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op. cit.
59 President’s Commission on the United States Postal Service. Final Recommendations of
the Technology Challenges and Opportunities Subcommittee. Washington, DC: United
States Department of the Treasury [http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/usps/].
CRS-20
Figure 3. Domestic Mail Carried on Scheduled Passenger Airlines
3500
3000
2500
2000
Tons
of
1500
illions
M 1000
500
0
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
Source: CRS analysis of Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air Carrier Statistics (Form
41 Traffic).
Physical Security of Air Cargo Facilities
Air cargo facilities present unique challenges for physical security. The large
physical size of these facilities and relatively continuous high-volume cargo
operations introduce numerous individuals, vehicles, and shipments into secured
access areas around aircraft. Key issues regarding physical security of these air cargo
facilities include the adequacy of:
! Inspections and oversight of air cargo facilities to ensure compliance
with aviation security regulations and procedures established in the
approved security programs of air carriers and freight forwarders;
! Training for air cargo personnel with regard to security procedures
and guidelines; and
! Access control requirements for personnel with access to air cargo
facilities and aircraft.
These issues are presently being addressed through newly implemented air cargo
security regulations issued by the TSA in May 2006 that are currently being phased-
in for air carrier and freight forwarder compliance.60 Congressional oversight of
60 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, “Air Cargo
Security Requirements, Final Rule,” Federal Register, 71(102), May 26, 2006, pp. 30477-
(continued...)
CRS-21
industry implementation and compliance with these regulations may, therefore, be
an issue of particular interest during the 110th Congress.
Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities. Current regulations
specify that all air carriers and freight forwarders must allow the TSA to conduct
inspections and to review and copy records in order to determine compliance with
applicable laws and regulations pertaining to aviation security. The Homeland
Security Appropriations Act for FY2005 provided the TSA with $40 million to hire
an additional 100 inspectors and carry out oversight and enforcement activities
related to air cargo security. The TSA has responded by launching focused
inspections of air cargo operations and conducting monthly “blitz” audits or “strikes”
of selected air cargo facilities. In FY2006, Congress again provided the TSA with a
$10 million set-aside to hire 100 more air cargo inspectors and for travel related to
carrying out regulatory oversight and inspections of air cargo shipping and handling
facilities, but the TSA has been slow to obligate funds for air cargo security. For
FY2007, appropriations report language directed the TSA to hire additional
permanent staff to enhance TSA’s analytic air cargo security capabilities.61
The ability to establish and maintain increased oversight of air cargo facilities
is likely to be highly dependent on the continued availability of resources and
funding. The effectiveness of this oversight will also likely be highly dependent on
the adequacy of available tools and procedures to track needed corrective actions and
ensure compliance among air carriers and freight forwarders. Therefore, the
adequacy of TSA’s oversight of air cargo security could be a significant area of focus
for congressional oversight during the 110th Congress.
Cargo Security Training. Currently, air cargo handlers are not required to
receive any specific or formal training on security procedures or identification of
suspicious activities. However, air cargo handlers may be considered the front line
in protecting against security threats by adhering to procedures that would mitigate
physical security breaches at cargo operations facilities, and by increasing their
awareness of suspicious activities and knowing the proper procedures for reporting
their observations. Security training for cargo workers may focus on security
procedures for ensuring cargo integrity, protecting facilities, reporting suspicious
activities, and so on. Under the newly imposed TSA’s regulations, workers for all-
cargo carriers and for indirect air carriers with security-related duties — such as
carrying out security inspections of shipments — are now required to receive
specific training on the company’s security program and their individual security-
related responsibilities under that program. Similar training is already required of
workers for passenger airlines that are assigned security-related duties.
Increased Control over Access to Aircraft and Cargo Facilities.
Under ATSA, TSA was directed to work with airport operators to strengthen access
control points in secured areas and was authorized to use biometric screening
procedures to positively identify individuals with access to secure airport areas.
60 (...continued)
30517; 49 CFR 1544.239.
61 See H.Rept. 109-699.
CRS-22
ATSA contains provisions for TSA oversight of secured-area access control to assess
and enforce compliance with access control requirements. These requirements
include screening and inspection of individuals, goods, property, vehicles and other
equipment seeking to access secure airport areas. Background checks for individuals
having access to passenger aircraft are required and vendors with direct access to
airfields where passenger operations take place are required to have a TSA-approved
security program in place. Presently, background checks and displayed identification
serve as the principal means for screening airport workers including cargo handlers.
There has been growing concern over the adequacy of these procedures for
screening and monitoring airport workers. One particular concern is the integrity of
airport worker credentials and the potential that unauthorized individuals could gain
access to secure areas of the airport using stolen or fraudulent identification. TSA
currently has ongoing contracts to conduct field tests of various technologies for
transportation worker identification, including biometric markers, in an effort to
develop a common and universally recognized Transportation Workers Identification
Credential (TWIC). Biometric technology has received considerable attention from
Congress as a means to authenticate individuals, particularly airport workers, and
improve access controls to secured areas of airports. These proposals are discussed
in further detail below in the section titled Biometric Screening Technology.
Another concern has been raised over the use of identification checks in lieu of
physical screening of airport workers, including cargo handlers. Representative Peter
DeFazio recently expressed concern over this practice noting that workers who
bypass physical screening could potentially carry threat objects into secured areas of
the airport or on board aircraft.62 Congress may consider whether existing security
procedures regarding airport worker access to secured airport areas meets the intent
of ATSA with regard to providing at least the same level of protection of secured
airport areas and passenger aircraft as screening passengers and their baggage.
In addition to ongoing concerns over access controls around passenger aircraft,
access control and monitoring of workers at all-cargo facilities remains a significant
challenge. Regulations promulgated in 2006 establish an all-cargo security program
detailing the physical security measures for air cargo operations areas, cargo placed
aboard all-cargo aircraft, and background checks and screening of individuals having
access to their aircraft on the ground or in flight. In addition, these new air cargo
security rules require airports to designate cargo operations areas, including areas
where all-cargo aircraft are loaded and unloaded, as security identification display
areas (SIDAs). This effectively elevates the required security measures for these
cargo handling areas and requires that workers with unescorted access to these areas
be vetted through fingerprint based criminal history records checks, as has been
required for workers having access to secured areas around passenger aircraft for
some time.
Arming All-Cargo Pilots. During the 108th Congress, proponents for arming
all-cargo pilots urged Congress to allow all-cargo pilots to join the ranks of passenger
62 National Public Radio. “Some Members of Congress Raising Concerns about Potential
Lapses at Airports,” Morning Edition, May 22, 2003.
CRS-23
airline pilots who can volunteer for selection and training in the Federal Flight Deck
Officers (FFDO) program. This program, established by the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), trains and deputizes qualified pilots to carry firearms and
use deadly force to protect the flight deck against terrorist attacks (see CRS Report
RL31674, Arming Pilots Against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program, by Bart Elias). While the plan was originally limited
to only pilots of passenger airliners, Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program
to allow all-cargo pilots and flight engineers to participate as well.
Proponents for including all-cargo pilots in the program point out that all-cargo
aircraft lack hardened cockpit doors, federal air marshals, and passengers that may
assist in thwarting a hijacking attempt.63 They also point out that physical security
and access control to cargo operations areas and all-cargo aircraft is lax compared to
the tight screening of passengers and baggage since September 11, 2001, and the
current lack of screening of individuals and property at these sites could offer the
opportunity for terrorists plotting to hijack an aircraft to board an all-cargo aircraft
as stowaways and seize the cockpit in flight. All-cargo aircraft include more than
1,000 transport category jet airplanes, of which about half are wide-body jets similar
to those used in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.64 Proponents for arming
all-cargo pilots contend that the provision in Vision 100 that includes cargo pilots in
the FFDO program will mitigate the risk of a hijacking aboard all-cargo aircraft.
They further argue that training for cargo pilots is needed expediently given the
limited measures currently in place to mitigate this risk.
Cargo airlines, on the other hand, had opposed allowing their pilots to join the
FFDO program. Air carriers, in general, have been hesitant about the program
because of liability concerns even though specific liability protections were extended
to the airlines and pilot participants when the FFDO program was established under
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). Proponents for the program and
the inclusion of cargo pilots in the program have voiced concerns that the manner in
which the program has been implemented and the remoteness of the training facilities
have limited the program’s overall effectiveness. The program, along with other
flight crew security training initiatives, received $27 million for FY2006 and $25
million in 2007. Few, if any, changes to the program are expected in the near term.
Nonetheless, Congress may address some lingering concerns over the program such
as the convenience of training and requalification sites, the carriage of firearms
outside the cockpit, which is presently highly restricted, and program liability
surrounding the role of the federal flight deck officer as both an airline pilot and a
deputized federal officer.
63 See Statement of Captain Duane Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International. The Status of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. Before the
Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives. Washington, DC: May 8, 2003.
64 Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2003-2014.
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Technology For Air Cargo Security
Because the capability of available technology is seen as a significant
constraining factor on the ability to screen, inspect, and track cargo, initiatives to
improve cargo screening technology have been a focus of recent legislation to
enhance air cargo security.
In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the TSA intensify its
efforts to identify, track, and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo, the
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) directs the TSA to develop
technologies for this purpose and authorizes $100 million annually in FY2005
through FY2007 for the research, development, and deployment of enhanced air
cargo security technology. The act also establishes a competitive grant program to
foster the development of advanced air cargo security technology.
Appropriations for research and development of technologies specifically
tailored for air cargo security had increased significantly, totaling $55 million in
FY2004 and $75 million for FY2005. In FY2006, TSA research and development
functions were realigned into the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and
Technology Directorate and research and development funding for air cargo was
scaled back to $30 million, and specifically designated for conducting three cargo
screening pilot programs testing different concepts of operation. In FY2007, the
aviation security research and development functions were realigned within the TSA
and appropriated a total of $92 million. The appropriations measure did not specify
what portion of this would be allocated to air cargo-related research and
development, but did urge the TSA to work with industry stakeholders to develop
standards and protocols to increase the use of explosives detection equipment for
screening air cargo.
Various technologies are under consideration for enhancing the security of air
cargo operations.65 Tamper-evident and tamper resistant packaging and container
seals may offer a relatively low cost means of protecting cargo integrity during
shipping and handling. Cargo screening technology using x-rays, chemical trace
detection systems, or possibly neutron beams or other techniques may offer means
to screen cargo prior to placement aboard aircraft. Additionally, canine teams may
be used to augment cargo screening technology or to screen cargo independently.
Hardened cargo container technology may be used to mitigate the threat of in-flight
explosions or incendiary fires aboard aircraft. Finally, biometric technologies are
being evaluated and may be useful in authenticating cargo worker identification and
improving access control to aircraft and cargo operations areas.
Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Seals. Various technologies
exist for sealing cargo shipments and cargo containers to prevent tampering.
Relatively low cost solutions such as tamper-evident tapes that provide visual
indications of tampering are readily available and could easily be implemented during
65 Technologies for enhancing the security of passenger flight operations are detailed in CRS
Report RL31151, Aviation Security Technologies and Procedures: Screening Passengers
and Baggage, by Daniel Morgan.
CRS-25
packaging. Such technology could be used in combination with “known shipper”
protocols to insure that known shippers provide sufficient security in their packaging
facilities and deter tampering during shipping and handling. Tamper-evident tape
can identify cargo during inspections processes for further screening and inspection
to safeguard against the introduction of explosives and incendiary devices. Tamper-
evident tape may also be an effective tool to deter cargo crime, including cargo theft
and the introduction of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods during shipment.
At cargo handling facilities, tamper evident seals and locks can be utilized on
cargo containers to prevent theft and the introduction of contraband or threat objects
into air cargo shipments. Electronic seals may serve as an additional deterrent to
terrorist and criminal activity by providing more immediate detection of tampering.
Electronic seals have alarms, some triggered by fiber optic cable loops, that activate
a transmitted signal when tampered with.66 Electronic seals cost about $2,500 per
unit, but are reusable. However, the utility of electronic seals in air cargo operations
has been questioned by some experts because currently available electronic seals
have a limited transmission range, which may make detecting and identifying seals
that have been tampered with difficult. In addition, there is some concern that they
may interfere with aircraft electronic systems.67
In addition to tamper-evident and tamper-resistant seals, technologies to better
track cargo shipments are being considered to maintain better control and tracking
of cargo shipments along the supply chain. Both global positioning system (GPS)
and radio-frequency identification (RFID) technologies are seen as emerging
technologies for improving the tracking of air cargo in the supply chain.
Cargo Screening Technology. Various technologies are available for
detecting explosives, incendiary devices, and the presence of various chemical and
biological agents and nuclear weapons in cargo. Key technologies under
consideration for screening air cargo for threat objects include x-ray screening, x-ray
based explosive detection systems, chemical trace detection systems, and
technologies based on neutron beams. In addition to these technological approaches,
several experts and TSA officials have been advocating and pursuing an increased
use of canine teams for screening cargo and mail. The main drawback to any of these
screening techniques is that the screening process takes time and may significantly
impact cargo delivery schedules. While the various technologies differ in their
capabilities and performance, in general, more detailed screening analyses require
more time and could affect cargo throughput. Another concern regarding these
technologies is the cost associated with acquisition, operation, and maintenance of
screening systems.
X-Ray Screening. The most common systems currently available for large-
scale screening of cargo shipments utilize x-ray technology. These systems rely on
well understood transmission and backscatter x-ray techniques to probe cargo
containers. Many of these systems utilize low-dose x-ray sources that emit narrow
x-ray beams thus virtually eliminating the need for shielding. These devices are
66 “Electronic cargo security seals” Frontline Solutions, 3(6), 42 (June 2002).
67 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
CRS-26
compact and light weight, thus allowing them to be mounted on moving platforms
that can scan over containers.68 X-ray devices are becoming more common at major
ports of entry, border crossings, and airports overseas as post-September 11th security
concerns are spurring increased development and deployment of these devices. The
systems are being utilized to screen for drugs and other contraband as well as
explosives in cargo shipments.
One of the most significant operational challenges in using x-ray screening
devices is the performance of the human operator. A variety of human factors
considerations contribute to the operator’s ability to detect threat objects when
viewing x-ray images. These include the monotony of the task, fatigue, time
pressure, the adequacy of training, and working conditions. These human factors are
important to consider in fielding x-ray screening systems to ensure high detection
rates of threat objects while minimizing false alarm rates that would unnecessarily
slow the cargo inspection and handling process. Technologies such as threat image
projection (TIP), that superimpose stored images of threat objects on x-ray scans can
help keep operators alert and may be effective tools for training and performance
monitoring. Additional technologies, such as computer algorithms for highlighting
potential threat objects, may also be considered to aid human observers.
Explosive Detection Systems. Currently, explosive detection systems
(EDS) are being used extensively in the aviation security environment, particularly
in response to the mandate in ATSA requiring screening of all checked passenger
baggage by EDS. These systems use x-ray computed tomography (CT) to scan
objects, and computational algorithms that assess the probability of threat object
detection based on object density characteristics. Certified EDS systems must meet
acceptable detection and false alarm rates for bulk explosives detection. While most
specific performance criteria of certified EDS systems are classified, EDS systems
used for passenger checked baggage must meet or exceed a throughput rate of 450
bags per hour.
In 1997, the Gore Commission specifically recommended that unaccompanied
express packages carried on passenger aircraft should be subject to EDS
examination,69 however to date this recommendation has not been acted upon by
regulatory agencies and has not been proposed in legislation. Undoubtedly, the TSA
has gained considerable experience with the large scale deployment and use of EDS
equipment to meet the mandate for full explosives detection screening of checked
passenger bags. Many of the lessons learned by TSA from this experience will be
useful for assessing the technical and operational challenges of applying large-scale
EDS screening initiatives for air cargo operations. Efforts are also underway at TSA
to improve the performance of EDS equipment and reduce its cost. However, air
cargo operations are likely to present some of their own unique challenges for
implementing large scale EDS screening of freight, express packages, and mail.
Some of the potential operational challenges associated with effectively fielding
existing EDS equipment for screening air cargo include:
68 David S. De Moulpied & David Waters. “Cargo Screening Techniques Become More
Widely Accepted.” Port Technology International, 10, pp. 127-129.
69 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op. cit.
CRS-27
! The limited size of objects that can be placed in EDS machines,
which would require objects to be screened before being placed in
containers or on pallets;
! The distributed nature of the air cargo system often involves loading
containers at remote sites, and EDS screening at these remote sites
may leave the system vulnerable to possible introduction of
explosives or incendiary devices at points along the supply chain
beyond the screening site;
! Reported high false alarm rates of current generation EDS systems
may lead to high levels of secondary screening and detailed
inspections that could impact the ability to meet the schedule
demands of cargo operations; and
! The processing rate of EDS equipment may require the purchase of
large numbers of EDS machines and investment in the research and
development of alternative technologies, thus increasing program
costs, to minimize the impact on cargo operations scheduling and
meet desired security program goals, although the throughput of
EDS equipment has markedly improved over the last few years.
Chemical Trace Detection Systems. Chemical trace detection systems,
referred to commonly as explosive trace detection (ETD) devices are being widely
used as secondary screening tools for passenger carry-on and checked baggage.
Items identified for closer scrutiny by initial screening methods or selected at random
may undergo further examination using these systems. These systems use a variety
of technical principles to analyze the chemical composition of sample residue wiped
from suspect articles. These systems compare the chemical composition of such a
sample to the signature of known explosive materials and signal an alarm to the
operator if the probability of a match exceeds a specified threshold.
The use of chemical trace detection systems is now common practice in the
screening of checked and carry-on bags. It has been reported that TSA is considering
expanding the use of chemical trace detection systems for screening cargo carried
aboard passenger aircraft.70 However, screening procedures using these systems is
very labor intensive and time consuming. Like the manner in which this technology
is used to perform secondary screening of checked and carry on bags, chemical trace
detection may be employed in air cargo operations to perform detailed screening of
suspicious packages identified through known shipper databases, or can be used for
detailed secondary screening in conjunction with primary screening performed by x-
ray and EDS systems similar to procedures currently in use for checked baggage
screening. Random screening of cargo using chemical trace detection systems as a
primary screening method is unlikely to be effective given the very low percentage
of cargo that could be screened using this technique without significantly impacting
cargo operations schedules.
Neutron Beam Technologies. Another potential class of technologies for
screening air cargo is based on neutron beams. These systems use a pulsed neutron
generator to probe an object, initiating several low energy nuclear reactions with the
70 Greg Schneider. Op. cit.
CRS-28
chemical elements comprising the object. Detectors can then measure the nuclear
signature of the transmitted neutrons and/or the gamma-rays emitted from the
reactions. Since neutrons and gamma-rays have the ability to penetrate through
various materials to large depths in a non-intrusive manner, neutron technologies
may have advantages for cargo screening, and some of these technologies are
currently being operationally evaluated for use in contraband and explosives
detection.71 However, the GAO noted that currently available neutron-based
technologies cost about $10 million per machine and require about one hour per
container for screening thus making this option very expensive and time
consuming.72
In addition to the cost and time factors associated with neutron beam
technologies, the National Research Council (NRC) has raised considerable doubts
about performance capabilities for screening the full spectrum of cargo containers or
pallets for explosives.73 The NRC also expressed potential safety concerns over the
use of radiation-producing particle accelerators, and expressed concerns over the
practicality of using this technology in the aviation environment because of the size
and weight of the equipment.
In 1999, the NRC advised the FAA against further funding for research,
development, and deployment of a neutron-based explosive detection system known
as pulsed fast/thermal neutron spectroscopy (PFTNS) for primary screening of
carry-on baggage, checked baggage, or cargo citing low current explosive threat
levels and inadequate performance. In 2002, the NRC concluded that another
neutron-based technique, pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), is not ready for airport
deployment or testing. However, the NRC conceded that PFNA has greater potential
for screening containerized cargo that any other technology currently under
consideration.74
Because the perceived threat of explosives has increased since September 11,
2001, neutron-based detection technology continues to be mentioned as a possible
means for screening air cargo. However, wide-scale deployment of this technology
for air cargo security in the near term seems unlikely.
Hardened Cargo Containers. In addition to cargo screening technology,
hardened cargo container technology is being considered as a means to mitigate the
threat of an explosion or fire caused by a bomb or incendiary device that makes its
way onto an aircraft undetected. The 9/11 Commission formally recommended the
deployment of at least one hardened cargo container on every passenger aircraft that
71 G. Vourvopoulos & P. C. Womble. “Pulsed Fast/Thermal Neutron Analysis: A Technique
for Explosives Detection.” TALANTA (54), pp. 459-468, 2001.
72 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
73 National Research Council. The Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron Transmission
Spectroscopy for Aviation Security. NMAB-482-6. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.
74 National Research Council. Assessment of the Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron
Analysis for Aviation Security. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002.
CRS-29
also hauls cargo to carry suspicious cargo.75 The National Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004 (P.L. 108-248) requires the TSA to establish a pilot program to explore the
feasibility of this concept and authorizes the use of incentives to airlines to offset
added fuel, maintenance, and other operational costs associated with using hardened
cargo containers in an effort to encourage voluntary participation in the pilot
program. The act authorized $2 million for the pilot program.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1) would require the TSA to
evaluate the results of the pilot program by January 1, 2008, and, based on this
evaluation, to develop a system for deploying hardened cargo containers on
commercial flights on a random or risk-based manner. A slightly modified version
of this provision is included in the conference bill. The conference substitute makes
clear that the program to acquire, maintain, and replace blast-resistant cargo
containers will be paid for by the federal government.
This concept of deploying hardened cargo containers has been a topic of
ongoing research for some time. Following the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the British Air Accident Investigation
Branch recommended that regulatory authorities and airplane manufacturers study
methods to mitigate the effects of in-flight explosions.76 The FAA has had a active
research program in blast-resistant containers for more than 10 years examining the
airworthiness, ground handling, and blast resistance of hardened containers, which
is now overseen by the TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory. These containers,
or hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs), are seen as a potential means for
mitigating the threat of explosives placed aboard passenger aircraft in either checked
baggage or cargo. These containers must withhold an explosive blast of a specified
magnitude without any rupturing or fragment penetration of the container wall or the
aircraft structure, and must contain and “self-extinguish” any post-blast fire in order
to meet the FAA-established test criteria.77
However, the increased weight of these containers could have significant
operational impacts on airlines by increasing fuel costs and decreasing payload
capacity for carrying revenue passengers and cargo. Challenges associated with
deploying hardened cargo containers include:
! Increased weight affecting aircraft range and payload capacity;
! Increased procurement cost for hardened containers;
75 Currently the TSA’s resource for vetting whether cargo is suspicious is the known shipper
program, and under ATSA all suspicious cargo from unknown sources must be prohibited
from passenger aircraft. The TSA envisions using additional risk-based screening tools in
the future to determine whether a shipment is suspicious. Under current law, such a tool
would likely be needed to implement the hardened cargo container concept offered by the
9/11 Commission.
76 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Op. cit.
77 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report. Publication NMAB-482-5. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.
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! Potentially higher maintenance costs for hardened container
materials;
! Potential reduction in cargo volume (in addition to reduced payload
weight) due to thicker container walls; and
! Possible design specifications, such as door hinging and positioning,
that are not compatible with current airline baggage and cargo
loading procedures and operations facilities.78
The National Research Council (NRC) estimated that the per unit cost for acquiring
hardened cargo containers would be $10,000, and recommended that the FAA
continue efforts to operationally test HULDs and establish more rigorous protocol for
certifying HULDs, but should not deploy them unless deemed to be a necessary
security measure based on the assessments of cost, operational, and deployment
studies by FAA and other stakeholders.
The NRC panel also recommended further economic assessment of their
proposed deployment plan for fielding one HULD per wide-body aircraft. The NRC
panel also noted that research and development on the use of HULDs on narrow-
body aircraft was lagging far behind the work done on wide-body aircraft, and
recommended an increased emphasis on research in this area to assess the operational
effectiveness of HULDs in narrow-body aircraft before any further recommendations
could be made. The NRC panel estimated that the cost of deploying enough HULDS
for airlines to carry at least one HULD per passenger flight would require an
industry-wide procurement cost of $125 million, and would create an annual
industry-wide economic impact of $11 million in increased fuel burn and reduced
payload revenue.79 Given the recent increase in aviation jet fuel costs, the economic
impact would likely be higher than the NRC originally estimated eight years ago.
The recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission calls for the deployment
of at least one hardened cargo container on every passenger aircraft for carrying any
suspect cargo.80 This recommendation implies that a cargo pre-screening or risk
evaluation process such as a known shipper program or the proposed freight
assessment system would be used to determine what cargo should be loaded into the
hardened container. Presently, ATSA requires shipments from unknown sources to
travel on all-cargo aircraft. The known-shipper program is the currently implemented
risk-based tool for determining what cargo must be kept off passenger flights. One
strategic objective of the TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan is to develop a means for
identifying elevated risk cargo through pre-screening.81 Such a tool would likely be
needed to assess risk and determine what cargo should be placed in a hardened
container. Besides the need for a pre-screening process, the use of hardened cargo
containers is likely to be opposed by the airline industry because of the direct costs
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report.
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. Air
Cargo Strategic Plan.
CRS-31
of acquiring these units as well as the increased operational cost associated with
increased fuel burn and lost payload capacity. The benefits of using hardened cargo
containers would likely be highly dependent on the security of the pre-screening
process and its ability to detect high risk cargo since the benefits of a hardened
container would largely be negated if the pre-screening process could be
circumvented by terrorists. A key policy issue that is likely to emerge as the
feasibility of hardened cargo containers is further evaluated is the potential
implications of allowing suspicious cargo to travel on passenger aircraft even if this
cargo is secured in hardened cargo containers. In other words, policymakers may
debate what the risks and benefits of loading suspicious cargo on passenger airplanes
in hardened cargo containers is as compared to the alternative of offloading this
suspicious cargo to all-cargo aircraft.
In any case, under a plan in which only one hardened cargo container is
deployed per aircraft, it is likely that only a relatively small fraction of available
cargo space will be reinforced. For example, a Boeing 747-400 passenger jet is
capable of holding up to 13 full-width, or 26 half-width containers.82 Thus, providing
just one full sized hardened cargo container for a 747-400 would provide
reinforcement for less than 10% of the available cargo storage area. While a greater
percentage of available cargo space on smaller jets could be protected by hardened
containers, any policy regarding the use of just one hardened container per aircraft
will likely need to carefully evaluate the criteria and methods for vetting cargo to
determine what cargo should be designated for carriage inside these hardened cargo
containers.
In addition to hardened cargo containers, the FAA recently proposed
rulemaking83 that would require newly certified aircraft type to have improved fire
suppression capabilities in their cargo holds to withstand and suppress a sudden
intensive fire from an explosive or incendiary device. Additionally, the proposed rule
would require each newly certified aircraft type to include a “least risk bomb
location,” an accessible location where crewmembers could place a suspected
explosive device to minimize the potential for catastrophic damage to the aircraft if
the item explodes. The proposal would also require aircraft designer to isolate flight
critical systems and maximize separation of systems, to minimize the chances that
a bomb detonation would render the aircraft unflyable. However, because these
proposals would only be applied to newly certified aircraft types, these changes
would not have a substantial operational impact on aviation safety and security for
several years.
Biometric Screening Technology. Provisions of ATSA give the TSA
authority to use biometric technology to verify the identity of employees entering the
secured areas of airports and directed the TSA to review the effectiveness of
biometrics systems currently used by airports such as San Francisco International
82 Boeing Commercial Airplanes. 747-400 Airplane Characteristics for Airport Handling.
D6-58326-1, December 2002.
83 Federal Aviation Administration, “Security Related Considerations in the Design and
Operation of Transport Category Airplanes; Proposed Rule,” Federal Register, January 5,
2007, pp. 630-639.
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Airport. Additionally, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
295) requires the issuance of biometric transportation security cards for identity
authentication of individuals with background checks for entry to any secured area
of a vessel or facility. The TSA’s approach to meet these various mandates is
through the establishment of a universal Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) to be used across all transportation modes for any personnel
requiring unescorted access to secure areas of the national transportation system.84
The proposed TWIC Program is currently under evaluation at two regional pilot sites:
the Philadelphia/Delaware River and Los Angeles/Long Beach ports. Available
biometric technologies such as fingerprint, retinal scan, and facial pattern recognition
are being evaluated in the current operational evaluation phase of the TWIC program.
It is likely that system-wide deployment of a common transportation worker
credentialing system will evolve from this program and could be applied to improve
access control to air cargo operations areas and cargo handling facilities.
The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) contains extensive
provisions requiring the TSA to develop specific guidance for the use of biometric
or other technologies for airport access control systems by March 31, 2005. The
guidance is to include comprehensive technical and operating system requirements
and performance standards for the use of biometric identifier technology in airport
access control systems; a list of products and vendors meeting these specifications;
and specific procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems; and a
discussion of best practices for incorporating biometric identifier technologies into
airport access control systems. The act also provides authorization for $20 million
for the research and development of advanced biometric technology applications for
aviation security. Given the proposed regulatory changes to enhance access controls
to all-cargo facilities and improve existing access controls around passenger aircraft,
it is likely that the implementation of biometric identifier technology will play an
increasingly important role in air cargo security policy.
Funding for Air Cargo Security
The cost of air cargo security options are significant to both the Federal
government and the air cargo industry. Furthermore, the indirect costs of air cargo
security on air cargo operations may pose significant long-term challenges. On the
other hand, the potential costs of a terrorist attack, both in terms of the loss of life and
property and the long term economic impacts may also be significant but are difficult
to predict and quantify. An ongoing debate tied to air cargo appropriations and
oversight of aviation security is the amount of physical screening and inspection of
air cargo that is needed and achievable and whether risk-based pre-screening tools
can provide an adequate means to ensure the security of air cargo by identifying at-
risk cargo for targeted physical inspections. Besides the logistic complexities of
inspecting large amounts or 100% of cargo on passenger flights, many are concerned
that the cost of doing may outweigh the potential benefit given the capabilities of
current screening systems and beliefs that comparable levels of security ma y be
achievable through risk-based targeting and selective screening of cargo shipments.
84 Transportation Security Administration. Credentialing: TSA TWIC Program. See
[http://www.tsa.gov/public/].
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While expenditures on air cargo security measures have been growing over the
past two years, these efforts are a relatively small element (about 2%) of TSA’s
overall operating budget for aviation security. While these expenditures are presently
a small component of the overall cost for aviation security, they could continue to
grow if additional technology and resources are devoted to the tracking and screening
of cargo shipments. In contrast to passenger and baggage screening, which are, with
few exceptions, the operational responsibility of the TSA, under the current scheme,
much of the cost of inspection and screening of cargo is borne by the airlines and
shippers, while TSA only maintains oversight responsibility. If 100% inspections of
air cargo were made mandatory as some have proposed, TSA estimates that this
could result in a cost of more than $650 million in the first year of implementation,
and would likely total $3.6 billion over 10 years.85 To address concerns over funding
such an initiative, some past legislative proposals calling for the TSA to physically
screen all cargo shipments bound for passenger aircraft incorporated a fee schedule
for shippers to cover costs associated with screening cargo transported in passenger
aircraft that is similar to the security service fee imposed on airline passengers (see
H.R. 2455 and H.R. 3798 introduced in the 108th Congress). Imposing a fee on air
cargo shipments for security could provide offsetting collections for security costs.
Regardless of how such a fee is collected — either through fees assessed to air
carriers or freight forwarders or through direct fees applied to each shipment — the
costs will ultimately be borne by shippers and ultimately passed on to the customers
of their products. The overall impact of fees on air cargo is dependent on the relative
cost of the fee. Since air cargo shipments tend to consist of relatively high value
goods, it is likely that the relative cost of a security fee in relation to the value of the
shipment will be low, which would minimize the economic impact of imposing such
a fee. However, if fees applied to air cargo carried on passenger aircraft are higher
than fees for transporting that same cargo on all-cargo aircraft, a significant impact
on passenger air carrier revenues from cargo may result. Equity in fee collections
will likely be an important consideration in assessing if and how air cargo security
fees should be collected. As previously noted, H.R. 1 does not include an aviation
security fee proposal in connection with its proposal to require 100% screening of
cargo placed on passenger aircraft by the end of FY2009. This leaves open funding
questions regarding who would be responsible for operationally carrying out the
screening, the federal government or the airlines, and how these screening functions
would be funded.
Another possible concern over the increased cost of cargo security and proposals
to impose fees on shippers is the potential to increase shipment costs related to
manufacturing, particularly the distribution of time-critical parts. If unit shipping
costs rise enough because of security-related costs and fees, it is possible that
domestic manufacturing and assembly costs will not be able to remain competitive
in a global market. For example, if the costs of shipping time-critical parts from Asia
for final assembly in the United States rise because of security-related fees, it may
become cost advantageous to manufacture the entire product overseas. In the long
term, this could result in a possible loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States.
85 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Air Cargo
Security Requirements; Proposed Rule;” and Jeff Bliss, “Air-Cargo Screening ‘A Disaster
Waiting to Happen,’ Critics Say,” Bloomberg.com, November 29, 2005.
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For this reason, the economic implications of any proposal to impose security-related
fees on air cargo will likely need to be carefully evaluated to avoid or minimize any
unintended impacts on manufacturers and their suppliers.
While Congress continues to debate the needed level of physical screening and
inspection of cargo, current appropriations figures are predicated on continuing and
expanding the risk-based approach of pre-screening cargo and conducting targeted
inspections of elevated-risk cargo and increasing random inspections of other
shipments. In FY2003, the TSA received $20 million for cargo screening
improvements. For FY2004, the TSA was appropriated $30 million for air cargo
security operations. Additionally, research and development related to air cargo
security was appropriated $55 million. For FY2005, the Administration
recommended flat funding for air cargo, while the House and the Senate agreed to
increases to both the air cargo operations and air cargo research and development
accounts totaling $115 million. In FY2006, there was a shift in funding with, for the
first time, a larger proportion being allocated to air cargo operations ($55 million) as
compared to research and development ($30 million) (see Table 1). Also, as
previously noted, the FY2006 air cargo research and development funding has been
more specifically directed to focus on three pilot projects. This may reflect a
maturation in the approach to air cargo screening and inspections in the near term
with technologies and approaches being migrated from purely a research activity to
an operational concept. In FY2007, appropriations for air cargo security operations
were again set at $55 million. A specific funding amount for air cargo security-
related research and development initiatives was not specified in the FY2007
appropriations. However, the TSA and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
are continuing their efforts to adopt EDS technologies to the air cargo environment,
and the TSA has been directed to work with industry stakeholders to develop
standards and protocols to increase the use of explosives detection equipment for
screening air cargo.
Table 1. Appropriations for Air Cargo Security
($ in millions)
Air cargo security
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Operations:
30.0
40.0
55.0
55.0
Research and Development:
55.0
75.0
30.0
—
Potential Congressional Approaches
Under ATSA, a mandate for screening or otherwise ensuring the security of all
cargo placed on passenger aircraft already exists. ATSA also mandated that a system
to screen, inspect, or otherwise insure the security of cargo carried aboard all-cargo
aircraft is put in place as soon as possible. The law gives the TSA broad authority
to carry out these requirements. Therefore, many of the proposed cargo security
initiatives could be accomplished under existing law as reflected in the TSA’s air
cargo strategic plan and the comprehensive proposed rulemaking to enhance air cargo
security for both passenger and all-cargo operations. While ATSA gives the
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administration flexibility in meeting the mandate to screen and inspect air cargo, it
is likely that TSA will continue to rely heavily on “known shipper” programs for air
cargo security for two key reasons. First, many of the proposed options for
increasing air cargo security, such as full cargo screening, are costly. Second, the
potential impacts on the air cargo industry are not fully understood but could be
significant. Therefore, any significant changes in air cargo security practices will
likely be dependent on Congressional action.
An appropriate course of action for air cargo security was debated extensively
since the 108th Congress and continues to be a significant issue for debate and
oversight in the 110th Congress. Initial proposals for immediate 100% screening of
all cargo shipments placed on passenger aircraft were seen by many as too complex
to implement given available technology and logistic challenges, but gave rise to
compromise language in the FY2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-334) calling for a tripling of physical inspections of cargo placed on passenger
aircraft and additional direction in the FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act (P.L. 109-90) requiring the TSA to increase air cargo screening and inspections
beyond this enhanced level. FY2007 appropriations (P.L. 109-295) directed the TSA
to work with industry stakeholders to develop standards and protocols to increase the
use of explosives detection equipment for screening air cargo.Similarly, a
recommendation by the 9/11 Commission calling for the TSA to intensify its efforts
to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo and deploy hardened cargo
containers led to the inclusion of numerous provisions to enhance air cargo security
technology in the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
Oversight of the implementation of these provisions as well as the recent regulatory
actions to enhance air cargo security are likely to remain issues of considerable
interest during the 110th Congress. Also, revisiting the issue of whether 100%
screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft is feasible and needed is likely to be
a central focus of policy debate during the 110th Congress spurred by the House
passage of H.R. 1 and its provision to achieve 100% screening of such cargo by the
end of FY2009.
A variety of options for implementing air cargo security measures may be
revisted during the 110th Congress. Some possible approaches and the potential
benefits and risks associated with implementing these approaches are provided in
Table 2. In general, for any of the listed approaches, there is a tradeoff between
program costs and potential impacts on the air cargo industry on the one hand and the
level of security that can be achieved by implementing the option on the other hand.
Currently, there are two main positions or views on air cargo security. One position
argues that full screening of air cargo and extensive security measures would be too
costly and too disruptive to the air cargo industry to successfully implement. The
alternative position argues that full screening and enhanced security measures are
needed to adequately mitigate the risks associated with air cargo to the maximum
extent possible and maintain public confidence in air travel. The focus of the
administration and Congress prior to the 110th Congress, as reflected in enacted
legislation, has been to intensify air cargo security using available risk-based
techniques and targeted screening, while investing in the research and development
of technology that can enhance the capability to identify, screen, and track cargo
shipments on passenger aircraft as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. In the
110th Congress, options for more extensive physical screening, such as proposals to
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conduct 100% screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft are being revisited and
have been proposed in the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Act of 2007 (H.R. 1).
Table 2. Potential Benefits and Possible Risks of Various
Congressional Approaches
Option
Potential benefits
Possible risks
Support the
• Relatively low cost
• Provides limited security
industry-wide
• Consistent with
that could be circumvented
known shipper
administration approach
• Possible over-reliance on
program for vetting
• Provides administration
known shipper programs
air cargo, refine
flexibility to meet changing
• Limited screening of cargo
this program as
threat levels with a relatively
may not adequately mitigate
needed, and deploy
small budget
the risk of explosives
a freight
• Limited funds to initiate
assessment system
targeted security in response
or similar targeting
to threats
tool for identifying
elevated-risk
shipments
Increase
• Could deter a variety of risks
• May be difficult and costly
requirements,
to cargo including cargo
to provide increased physical
funding and grants
crime, hijacking, and sabotage
security
for physical
• May not mitigate the risk of
security of air
explosives introduced in pre-
cargo facilities
packaged cargo
Mandate the use of
• Could deter terrorists from
• Low cost solutions may be
tamper resistant
attempting to place explosives
circumvented relatively easily
and tamper evident
in air cargo
• More sophisticated
packaging and
• Could mitigate cargo crime
solutions, such as fiber optic
containers
such as theft and contraband
loops, may be relatively costly
Mandate physical
• Ensure that workers with
• Relatively high cost
screening of all
access to aircraft meet the
• Would require additional
persons with
same level of security as
screeners and screening
access to air cargo
passengers
stations at air cargo facilities
facilities and
• Mitigate risk of weapons and
aircraft
explosives introduced by
cargo workers
Mandate increased
• Deter terrorists from
• Without full screening,
screening and
attempting to place explosives
explosives may not be
inspection of air
in air cargo
detected
cargo shipments
• Addresses the 9/11
• May impact air cargo
Commission recommendation
operations and schedules
to intensify efforts to identify,
track, and screen air cargo
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Option
Potential benefits
Possible risks
Mandate full
• Ensure that cargo placed on
• Relatively high cost
(100%) screening
passenger aircraft meets the
• May significantly impact air
of air cargo on
same level of security as
cargo schedules
passenger flights
passengers and their property
• May significantly impact air
carrier revenues from air
cargo if shipments are
diverted to all-cargo flights in
response to requirement
Increase funding
• May lead to new
• Numerous technical
for air cargo
technologies and procedures
challenges and uncertainty
security research
for improving air cargo
regarding the performance of
and development
security.
screening technologies
continue to exist
• Currently funded programs
may have operational
limitations that limit their
practical application
Deploy hardened
• May mitigate the effect of an
• Effectiveness is largely
cargo containers on
in-flight explosion
negated if the cargo pre-
passenger aircraft
• Congressionally mandated
screening process can be
as recommended
pilot program can help
circumvented by terrorists
by the 9/11
evaluate the feasibility of the
• Increased operational costs
Commission
concept with a relatively small
may prevent passenger airlines
investment
from being cost competitive
with all-cargo carriers