Order Code RL34051
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe
Updated July 25, 2007
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Carl Ek
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe
Summary
Successive U.S. administrations have urged the creation of an anti-missile
system to protect against threats from rogue states. The Bush Administration
believes that North Korea and Iran are strategic threats and questions whether they
can be deterred by conventional means. The Administration has built long-range
missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against North Korean
missiles. The system has been tested, with mixed results, and questions have been
raised about its effectiveness. The Administration has proposed deploying a
ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The
system would include 10 interceptors in Poland, and radar in the Czech Republic.
Deployment of the European GMD capability is scheduled to be completed by 2013
at a cost of $4.04 billion.
The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European
countries and beyond. Critics in Poland and the Czech Republic assert that neither
country currently faces a notable threat from Iran, but that if American GMD
facilities were installed, both countries might be targeted by missiles from rogue
states — and possibly from Russia. Some Europeans claim that GMD is another
manifestation of American unilateralism, and assert that the Bush Administration did
not consult sufficiently with NATO allies or with Russia, which the Administration
argues was not the case. Other European leaders, however, support the missile
defense project. NATO has also been deliberating long-range missile defense, and
has recently taken actions that have been interpreted as an endorsement of the
American GMD system.
The GMD plan has also affected U.S.-Russia relations. President Putin has
argued that the proposal would reignite the arms race and upset U.S.-Russian-
European security relations. U.S. officials dispute Russian objections, noting that
Moscow has known of this plan for years and that the interceptors are intended to
take out Iranian missiles aimed at Europe or the United States and could not possibly
act as a deterrent against Russia. Some argue that Russia has been attempting to
foment discord among NATO allies. In June and July 2007, however, Putin offered
to cooperate on missile defense, offering the use of a Russian leased radar in
Azerbaijan and suggesting that the program be expanded to include other countries,
but urging that U.S. missile defense facilities not be built in Poland and the Czech
Republic. President Bush welcomed the apparent policy shift in principle, but
insisted upon the need for the Eastern European sites. Whatever the final outcome,
some observers believe that the recent exchanges between Bush and Putin have
served to reduce tensions. Russian cooperation in missile defense could remove an
impediment to the program and dampen criticism by European leaders.
Congress has examined the proposed European GMD proposal. Both the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees made recommendations that would
significantly slow down the effort. This report will be updated periodically.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Czech Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Debate in Poland and the Czech Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
European Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Congressional Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense
in Europe
Introduction
The Bush Administration has requested funding to begin design, construction
and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe. According to the
Administration, the proposed GMD European capability would help defend U.S.
forces stationed in Europe, U.S. friends and allies in the region, as well as the United
States against long-range ballistic missile threats, namely from Iran. The proposed
system would include 10 silo-based interceptors to be deployed in Poland, a fixed
radar installation in the Czech Republic, and another transportable radar to be
deployed in a country closer to the Middle East. Deployment of the GMD European
capability is scheduled to be completed by 2013 at a cost of $4.04 billion. The
prospect of a GMD capability based in Europe raises a number of significant
international security and foreign policy questions. Central to the debate for many
is how the proposed U.S. system might affect U.S.-European-Russian relations. Thus,
Congress’ decision on whether to fund the initial program in the FY2008 defense bill
will likely revolve around its assessment of broader security policy issues, as well as
technical concerns related to the system.
The Threat
The Bush Administration argues that North Korea and Iran constitute major
strategic threats. North Korea claims to have tested a nuclear device and has a
ballistic missile program. The Administration maintains that Iran is developing a
nuclear weapons program as well as long-range ballistic missiles. The
Administration regards both countries as unpredictable and dangerous, and does not
believe they can be constrained by traditional forms of military deterrence,
diplomacy, or arms control.
According to unclassified U.S. intelligence assessments, Iran may be able to
develop an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) or long-range ballistic missile
capability by 2015. Some in Congress and elsewhere share this assessment, but
others in the larger international security policy and ballistic missile proliferation
community argue that evidence of an Iranian ICBM program is scant and
unconvincing. Additionally, the Iranian government reports (which cannot be
CRS-2
verified) that Iran has a limited missile capability with a range of about 1,200 miles1
and that it has stopped development of ICBM range missiles. Although Europeans
are concerned about Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program, some U.S. friends
and allies in Europe doubt the Administration’s assessment of Iran’s possible ICBM
capability. Hence, many question the need for a GMD element of the BMDS in
Europe.
The System
The U.S. Department of Defense began deploying long-range missile
interceptors in Alaska and California in late 2004 to address long-range missile
threats from North Korea. Currently, the U.S. GMD element of the BMDS includes
about 20 silo-based interceptors in Alaska and several in California. As part of an
integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capability, the United States
also has a number of ground-based radars in operation around the world, space-based
assets supporting the BMDS mission, command and control networks throughout the
United States and the Pacific, as well as ground-mobile and sea-based systems for
shorter-range BMD.
What remains necessary as part of the global BMDS, according to the
Administration, is an ability in the European theater to defend against intermediate-
to-long-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. The Department of Defense
(DOD) argues it is important to U.S. national security interests to deploy a GMD
capability in Europe to optimize defensive coverage of the United States and Europe
against such threats into Europe.
There have been relatively few flight tests of the deployed GMD element and
many experts continue to doubt its effectiveness based on test results to date. The
current GMD program began flight tests in 2002. This effort was built on several
earlier long-range BMD programs with decidedly mixed results themselves since the
early 1980s. Since 2002, a number of GMD flight tests have taken place. Six of
these flight tests offered intercept opportunities, with three successful intercepts.2 In
each of the flight tests most other flight test objectives were met. In 2002, the GMD
moved to the operational booster and interceptor. The interceptor system flew two
developmental tests in 2003 and 2004, and the GMD element of the BMDS was
1 There are reports that Iran is developing other medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges
greater than those now deployed, but short of what is considered ICBM range (i.e., more
than 5,500 kilometers).
2 Two tests in March and October 2002 using an older interceptor successfully intercepted
their intended targets. Three flight tests (IFT-10, IFT-13c and IFT-14) using the GBI in
planned intercept attempts failed in those attempts: 1) December 2002, the kill vehicle failed
to deploy; 2) December 2004, the GBI launch aborted due to a software error in the
interceptor; and 3) February 2005, the GBI did not launch due to problems with the test
facility launch equipment. In the May 2007 flight test, the target missile second stage
booster failed in flight, so the interceptor was not launched as planned. If one includes the
September 2006 intercept (i.e., an intercept was not planned as a primary objective) it would
give the current GMD program a record of three of six successful missile intercepts.
CRS-3
deployed in late 2004 in Alaska and California. Two planned intercept flight tests
of the new configuration for December 2004 and February 2005 were not successful.
After technical review, the interceptor successfully demonstrated a booster fly-out in
2005. In September 2006, a successful flight test exercise of the GMD element as
deployed took place. Although a missile intercept was not planned as a primary
objective of the data collection test, an intercept of a target warhead was achieved.
Additional flight tests of the deployed element whose primary objectives are
intercepts of long-range ballistic missile targets were originally scheduled for later
in 2006, but were postponed. Then a May 2007 intercept test was scrubbed when the
target missile failed to launch as planned; another attempt is scheduled for summer
2007. Because of this flight test record, some express doubts about the system’s
potential effectiveness and question whether additional deployment in Europe at this
time should be pursued without additional, successful flight testing. Supporters
counter that a significant number of non-flight tests and activities are conducted that
demonstrate with high confidence the ability of the GMD element to perform its
intended mission.3
What would the European element of the BMDS look like? The proposal is to
deploy up to 10 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) in silos at a former military base
in Poland. It should be noted that the proposed GBI for the European GMD
capability will not be identical to the GBI deployed now in Alaska and California.
Although there is significant commonality of hardware, there are some differences.
For example, the European GBI will consist of two rocket stages in contrast to the
three-stage GBI deployed today.4 This particular 2-stage configuration has not been
tested and is a basis for additional questions about the proposed system’s
effectiveness. Proponents of the system would argue that the 2-stage version is
fundamentally the same as the 3-stage system, however.5 In Europe, the GBI
reportedly will not need the third stage to achieve the range needed to intercept its
intended target.6 This issue has raised the question for some observers of whether
other U.S. systems designed for shorter or medium-range ballistic missile threats,
such as Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), or Aegis (sea-based
BMD) might be more appropriate for addressing the current and prospective Iranian
ballistic missile threat to Europe. DOD’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) believes
these systems would not be adequate to counter prospective Iranian ballistic missile
threats.
3 The Administration maintains that since 2002 it has fielded a long-range BMD capability
where none existed previously. Furthermore, the United States now has operationally
capable upgraded early warning radars, command, control and battle management systems,
Navy cruisers and destroyers capable of conducting long-range ballistic missile search and
track missions, and about 20 GBI fielded in Alaska and California. This element of the
BMDS was transitioned to alert in July 2006 when North Korea launched several ballistic
missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile.
4 Boost Vehicle Plus. Report to Congress. March 1, 2007. Missile Defense Agency. For
Official Use Only.
5 The Orbital Boost Vehicle 2 (OBV/2) is a modification of the existing, tested OBV/3
achieved by removing the 3rd stage from the existing missile.
6 More accurately, according to MDA, two stages provide the enhanced performance and
burnout velocity required for the mission.
CRS-4
Deployment of the silos and interceptors in Poland is scheduled to begin in 2011
with completion in 2013. A final decision will take into consideration a detailed site
and environmental analysis, as well as an overall security and support assessment.
The field of the 10 interceptors itself is likely to comprise an area somewhat larger
than a football field. The area of supporting infrastructure is likely to be similar to
a small military installation. In addition, an American X-Band radar (a narrow-beam,
midcourse tracking radar), currently being used in the Pacific missile test range,
would be refurbished and transported to a fixed site at a military training base in the
Czech Republic. The X-Band radar with its large, ball-shaped radome (radar dome)
is several stories in height. A second, transportable forward acquisition radar would
be deployed in a country to be determined, but closer to the Middle East. Some
European press accounts have mentioned the Caucasus region, but the
Administration has not publicly indicated where this radar might be located.
Additionally, the proposed GMD European capability would include a
communications network and support infrastructure (e.g., power generation, security
and force protection systems, etc.) A few hundred U.S. personnel would be engaged
in securing and operating both the interceptor and radar sites. The Administration
intends for the United States to have full command authority over the system.
The FY2008 request is $310.4 million for the proposed European GMD across
several program elements of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget. The total
estimated GMD costs for the European site are $4.04 billion (FY2007-FY2013),
including Operation and Support costs through 2013. Although relatively small in
U.S. defense budget terms, this year’s request represents a significant commitment
to the proposed European system.
Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees asked for studies of
alternatives to the Administration’s proposed European GMD deployment (see
section on congressional actions). Recently, some, such as Representative Tauscher,
have suggested the Administration consider instead a combination of sea-based
(Aegis SM-3) and land-based systems (PAC-3, THAAD). MDA Director Obering
has argued that most of the current Aegis fleet would be required to defend Europe,
and that the cost would be considerably greater than the current Bush proposal.7
Separately, the Center for Naval Analyses (a federally funded research center) is
conducting an analysis of alternatives for the Navy’s next big surface combatant
ship.8 That review reportedly includes recommendations about future naval BMD
requirements that might bear on any discussion of alternatives to the proposed
European GMD plan.
The Location
In 2002 the Bush Administration began informal talks with Poland and the
Czech Republic over the possibility of establishing missile defense facilities on their
7 See [http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1539/how-many-aegis-ships-to-defend-nato] .
8 “U.S. May Build 25,000-ton Cruiser, Analysis of Alternatives Sees Nuclear BMD Vessel,”
Defense News, July 23, 2007, by Christopher P. Cavas.
CRS-5
territory. Discussion of a more concrete plan — placing radar in the Czech Republic
and interceptor launchers in Poland — was reported in the summer of 2006. The
issue was increasingly debated in both countries. In January 2007, the U.S.
government requested that formal negotiations begin. If agreements are struck, and
if the Polish and Czech parliaments approve the projects, construction on the sites
would likely begin in 2008, with initial deployments expected in 2011. The two
governments have grappled with several issues as the debate has evolved.
Poland
Some analysts maintain that in Poland the notion of stationing American GMD
facilities was more or less accepted early on in the discussions and that the main
questions have revolved around what the United States might provide Warsaw in
return. Some Poles believe their country should receive additional security
guarantees in exchange for assuming a larger risk of being targeted by rogue state
missiles because of the presence of the U.S. launchers on their soil. In addition,
some Poles are concerned about Russia’s response. The Polish government
reportedly has been requesting that the United States provide batteries of Patriot
missiles to shield Poland against short- and medium-range missiles.9
Any future base agreement will require the approval of the Polish parliament.
As negotiations began, the leading opposition party had questions about the system
— particularly the command and control aspects — and urged the government to
ensure that it be integrated into a future NATO missile defense program. The former
ruling party supported deployment of the missiles, but also called for greater
transparency in the decision-making process. The smaller parties of the governing
coalition expressed some skepticism, mainly for reasons of sovereignty, and indicated
support for a public referendum.10 Polls in recent months have consistently indicated
that a majority of Poles disapprove of a missile defense base being established in
their country. Most objections were based upon concerns over sovereignty, as well
as over the belief that the presence of the system would diminish rather than increase
national security and might harm relations with neighboring states.
Czech Republic
In September 2002, the Czech defense minister, a member of the Social
Democratic Party (CSSD), announced that he had “offered the United States the
opportunity to deploy the missile defense system on Czech soil.”11 In June 2006,
9 U.S. Missiles in Poland — Risks and Benefits. Rzeczpospolita. In: BBC European
Monitoring. November 15, 2005. Sikorski Exit Is Bad For MD Bid. Oxford Analytica.
February 8, 2007.
10 Polish Politician Weighs Up Pros and Cons Of US Radar Plan. Gazeta Wyborcza,
February 5, 2007. In: BBC Monitoring European. February 6, 2007. See also: Don’t Take
Poland For Granted. Radek Sikorski [former Polish Defense Minister]. Washington Post.
March 21, 2007.
11 Czech Republic Seeks Joining Missile Defence Shield Project. BBC. September 17,
(continued...)
CRS-6
inconclusive elections toppled the CSSD government and replaced it with a shaky
coalition led by the center-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS). As with the outgoing
government, the new one voiced support for GMD. However, the CSSD, now in
opposition, began to backpedal on its support as polls showed increasing public
skepticism, and by mid-2006 only the ODS was unambiguously backing deployment.
When a relatively stable ODS-led government was finally formed in January 2007,
the ODS apparently persuaded its coalition partners to support GMD (the Greens
made agreement contingent upon NATO approval). In January 2007, it was
announced that the United States had requested that official negotiations be started,
and in March the Czech government formally agreed to launch talks.
Public opinion surveys have shown strong opposition to the plan among Czechs,
who share many of their Polish neighbors’ concerns. Some Czech officials believe
that public opposition may be the result of a lack of knowledge about the program,
and argue that the U.S. government has not provided sufficient information about the
planned facilities. The CSSD is calling for a public referendum on the issue.12 Any
eventual agreement will have to be ratified by the parliament. Approval is not a
foregone conclusion.
Policy Issues
U.S. proponents of the missile defense program note that the bases being
planned would be part of a limited defensive system, not an offensive one. The
missiles would not have explosive payloads, and would be launched only in the event
that the United States or its friends or allies were under actual attack. Critics respond
that Europe does not currently face a significant threat from Iran or its potential
surrogates, but that Polish and Czech participation in the European GMD element
would create such a threat. If American GMD facilities were installed, they argue,
both countries would likely be targeted by terrorists, as well as by missiles from
rogue states — and possibly from Russia — in the event of a future confrontation.
Debate in Poland and the Czech Republic
Some proponents of the proposed GMD European capability system assert that
cooperation would help consolidate bilateral relations with the United States. In
Poland in particular there is a sense, based in part on historical experience, that the
United States is the only major ally that can be relied upon. Therefore, some Poles
argue, it would be beneficial to strengthen the relationship by becoming an important
U.S. partner through joining the missile defense system. In addition, some Czechs
and Poles believe that the missile defense sites would become a prestigious symbol
of the two countries’ enhanced role in defending Europe. Some would argue that the
11 (...continued)
2002.
12 Paroubek Says U.S. Ambassador Told Him On His Govt Talks On Base. CTK Daily
News. July 8, 2007.
CRS-7
Czechs and the Poles see this formal U.S. military presence as an ultimate security
guarantee against Russia.
Opponents, however, contend that this is not a valid reason for accepting missile
defense facilities because the two countries, which joined NATO in 1999, already
enjoy a security guarantee through the alliance’s mutual defense clause. Polish
missile defense skeptics also maintain that their country does not need to improve its
bilateral security relationship with the United States because it has already shown its
loyalty through its significant contributions to the military operation in Iraq and the
global war on terrorism. Some Polish and Czech political leaders reason that the
United States will proceed with missile defense with or without them, so they may
as well be on board. However, the missile bases are unpopular among the Czech and
Polish public, and any government that agreed to host such facilities may lose
political support. Some Czechs and Poles may be speculating whether it would be
worthwhile to expend political capital on the GMD bases, as the issue may become
moot. If GMD proponents are voted out of office in the United States and the project
is discontinued, “Poland will become an international laughingstock.”13 A Czech
member of parliament noted that, if the U.S. Congress determines not to fund a
European arm of missile defense, “[t]he USA will thus solve the problem for us.”14
Some Czechs and Poles have argued that the extra-territorial status of the
proposed bases would impinge upon national sovereignty. However, the Czech
position is that the base “would be under the Czech Republic’s jurisdiction.”15 In
addition, some have raised questions over command and control — who would
decide when to push the launch button and what would the notification system be?
Polish and Czech government leaders reportedly acknowledge that the time between
the detection of the launch of a missile by a hostile regime and the need to fire off an
interceptor would be so brief as to preclude government-to-government
consultations.
Opponents have also cautioned that the interception of a nuclear-tipped missile
over Polish or Czech territory could result in a rain of deadly debris. Supporters
argue that an enemy missile would not be intercepted over Eastern Europe, and that
even if it were, the tremendous kinetic energy of impact would cause both projectiles
to be obliterated and any debris burnt upon atmospheric reentry. Skeptics note,
however, that testing of these systems is never performed over populated areas.
13 Polish Daily: US Missile Defence in Poland Means ‘Local Arms Race’ With Belarus.
BBC Monitoring European. November 18, 2005.
14 USA Wants To Deploy Missile Defence Radar On Czech Territory — Foreign Minister.
CTV [Czech news agency]. In: BBC Monitoring European. November 29, 2006.
15 That Missile Debate of Ours. Pravo. September 9, 2006. In: BBC Monitoring European.
September 12, 2006. Any US Missile Base On Czech Territory Subject To Czech Laws —
Czech Ministry. BBC Monitoring European. August 18, 2006. State Security Council
Okays US Radar. Pravo. In: BBC European Monitoring. January 26, 2006. Czech Premier
Reminds Opposition Its Cabinet Started Talks On US Radar Base. CTK Czech News
Agency. In: BBC European Monitoring. February 1, 2007.
CRS-8
European Response
The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European
countries and beyond. Some critics claim that the program is another manifestation
of American unilateralism and argue that, because of opposition by major European
partners, Polish and Czech participation in the GMD program could damage those
countries’ relations with fellow EU members.16 Supporters, however, counter that
the establishment of a missile defense system would protect Europe as well as the
United States.
Some European leaders have asserted that the Bush Administration did not
consult sufficiently with European allies or with Russia on its GMD plans. German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier faulted the Bush Administration for
failing to adequately discuss the proposal with affected countries. Former French
President Chirac cautioned against the creation of “new divisions in Europe.” Bush
Administration officials, however, maintain that these arguments are disingenuous,
as they have held wide-ranging discussions on GMD with European governments,
and with Russia, both bilaterally and in the framework of the NATO-Russia
Council.17 In addition, critics charge that establishing a European GMD base to
counter Iranian missiles implies a tacit assumption on the part of the Bush
Administration that diplomatic efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile
programs are doomed to failure, and that Iran’s future leaders will be undeterred by
the prospect of nuclear annihilation.
Europeans also have raised questions about the technical feasibility of the
program as well as its cost-effectiveness. According to a wire service report,
“Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn called the U.S. [missile defense]
plan an ‘incomprehensible’ waste of money ... .”18
Other European leaders, however, including those of Denmark and Britain, have
indicated that they support the missile defense project as a means to protect Europe
from threats from rogue states. In addition, some European allies do not appear to
be averse to the missile defense concept per se. Foreign Minister Steinmeier has
indicated that Germany and other countries are interested in building a comparable
system, but lack the technological know-how.19
16 Missile Shield: Poland’s Security Better Served By Supporting Ukraine’s Western
Ambitions Than By Building Another Maginot Line. Polish News Bulletin. December 22,
2005.
17 Where Does Germany Stand? Spiegel Online. March 26, 2007. US Build Pressure On
Europe Over Bases. Financial Times. February 21, 2007. France Calls For Dialogue on
US Anti-Missile System. Agence France Presse (AFP). February 21, 2007. U.S. Officials
Brief On Missile Defense. February 23, 2007. U.S. Embassy Warsaw.
18 NATO Stepping Up Talks On Missile Defense Amid Concerns Over US Plans. AP.
March 12, 2007.
19 Danish PM Supports US Anti-Missile Shield. AFP. March 7, 2007. Blair: We Need To
Look At Missile Options. Press Association National Newswire. February 28, 2007.
(continued...)
CRS-9
NATO has also been deliberating strategic missile defenses. A feasibility study
of such a program called for in the 2002 Prague Summit was completed in 2005. In
the final communique of their 2006 Riga summit, NATO leaders declared the
alliance study had concluded that long-range BMD is “technically feasible within the
limitations and assumptions of the study,” and called for “continued work on the
political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an
update on missile threat developments.” Supporters contend that the U.S. facilities
currently under negotiation in Eastern Europe are intended to be a good fit — and
therefore not inconsistent with — for part of any future NATO missile defense.
However, other policymakers have recommended that the establishment of any anti-
missile system in Europe should proceed solely under NATO auspices rather than on
a bilateral basis with just two NATO partners. U.S. officials maintain that “the more
NATO is involved in [GMD], the better.”20
Some observers suggested that the Bush Administration chose not to work
primarily through NATO because consensus agreement on the system was unlikely.
However, in mid-June 2007, alliance defense ministers did agree to conduct a study
of a complementary “bolt-on” anti-missile capability that would protect the
southeastern part of alliance territory that would not be covered by the planned U.S.
interceptors. American officials have interpreted the move as an implied
endorsement of the U.S. GMD plan and an adaptation of NATO plans to fit the
proposed U.S. system. In addition, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
stated “The roadmap on missile defense is now clear. ... It’s practical, and it’s agreed
by all.”21
European opponents of the proposed U.S. plan also contend that statements by
Russian officials are evidence that deployment of the U.S. system would damage
Western relations with Russia. At a February 2007 security conference in Munich,
President Putin strongly criticized GMD, maintaining that it would lead to “an
inevitable arms race.” Russia has threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated this class of U.S. and then-Soviet
missiles that were stationed in Europe. Putin also announced that Russia suspended
compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,22 and on another
occasion indicated Russia might now target Poland and the Czech Republic and
transfer medium-range ballistic missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
19 (...continued)
Europe Considers Missile Defense System: German Minister. AFP. February 19, 2007.
20 This program should be distinguished from the theater missile defense system intended
to protect deployed forces, which the alliance has already approved. See Riga Summit
Declaration. NATO web page. [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm] Missile
Defense and Europe. Foreign Press Briefing. U.S. Department of State. March 28, 2007.
21 NATO Considers Missile Defenses For Southeastern Flank In Tandem With U.S. Shield.
Associated Press. June 14, 2007. U.S. Wins NATO Backing On Missile Defense. New
York Times. June 15, 2007.
22 See CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and
Agreements, by Amy F. Woolf, Steve Bowman and Sharon Squassoni, section on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. NATO “Very Concerned” At Russia Treaty
Pullout. Reuters. July 16, 2007.
CRS-10
Some U.S. and European officials have dismissed Russian alleged concerns and have
noted that Moscow has known of this plan for years and has even been invited to
participate.23 GMD proponents maintain that the interceptors are intended to take out
launched Iranian missiles aimed at European or American targets and could not
possibly act as a deterrent against Russia, which has hundreds of missiles and
thousands of warheads. The chief of the Czech general staff has noted that “by
simple arithmetic, Russian generals can see that U.S. missile defenses cannot imperil
Moscow’s arsenal.” Some Russians contend, however, that the modest GMD
facilities planned for Eastern Europe are likely just the harbinger of a more ambitious
program.
Russian officials have also argued that North Korean or Iranian missiles would
not likely enter European airspace, and that the real reason for GMD is to emplace
U.S. radar in eastern Europe to monitor Russian missile sites and naval operations.
A Czech military officer dismissed the charge of electronic espionage as “absolute
nonsense,” arguing that “the radar monitors the already launched missiles, and it
cannot monitor what is going on on the ground” — a task that is already being
performed by U.S. surveillance satellites.24
Some argue that Russia has other motives for raising alarms about the U.S.
missile defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states, and to draw
attention away from Russia’s suppression of dissent and its nuclear technology
cooperation with Iran. Observers note that Russia blustered about NATO expansion,
too, and argue that Russia’s veiled threats may actually stiffen resolve in Prague and
Warsaw. Some observers note, however, that Russian acceptance of NATO
expansion was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military
expansion into the new member states would not occur. The European GMD in this
regard is seen as unacceptable to Russia.
On June 7, in a surprise move during the G-8 meeting in Germany, Putin offered
to partner with the United States on missile defense, and suggested that a Soviet-era
radar facility in Azerbaijan be used to help track and target hostile missiles that might
be launched from the Middle East. President Bush responded by calling the proposal
an “interesting suggestion,” and welcomed the apparent policy shift. The following
day, Putin suggested that GMD interceptors be “placed in the south, in U.S. NATO
allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq ... [or] on sea platforms.” Military and political
representatives from both countries have been meeting to discuss the proposal, but
some experts point out that Azerbaijan is technically not the ideal place to locate the
radar because it would be too close to potential Iranian launch sites; they also argue
that the radar is outmoded.
In the meantime, Putin urged the United States not to deploy elements of GMD
until his offer had been examined. One week later, however, U.S. Defense Secretary
23 Russia Sees Threat From US Plan For Missiles In Eastern Europe. AFP. January 22,
2007. Poland Government Leaders Meet On U.S. Missile Defense Proposal. Associated
Press. February 12, 2007.
24 U.S. Radar Not To Threaten Russia, China - Czech Chief Of Staff. CTK Daily News.
January 25, 2007.
CRS-11
Robert Gates stated that even if the United States were to accept Russia’s offer to
share use of the Azeri radar, that facility would be regarded as “an additional
capability” to complement the proposed GMD sites planned for Europe.25 In late July
2007, MDA Director Obering said the United States is looking at the proposal very
seriously. He said the Azeri radar could be useful for early detection of missile
launches, but that it does not have the tracking ability to guide an interceptor missile
to a target — which the proposed Czech radar would be able to do, he said.
At a July 1-2 meeting in Kennebunkport, Maine, Putin expanded on his
counterproposal by recommending that missile defense be coordinated through
offices in Brussels and Moscow. He also suggested the possible use of radar in south
Russia and said that cooperation could be expanded to other European countries
through the use of the NATO-Russia council — eliminating, he added, the need for
facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. President Bush responded positively to
Putin’s new proposal, but insisted on the need for the Eastern European sites.26
Whatever the final result, some observers believe that the recent exchanges
between Bush and Putin have served to reduce tensions. The exchange between the
two leaders already appears to have defused tensions somewhat, however. Russian
cooperation in missile defense could remove a significant impediment to the program
and could dampen criticism by European and other leaders. It also may have opened
the door to a more favorable attitude by NATO toward missile defense.
Congressional Actions
Congress has been examining the European basing proposal. In its report on the
FY2008 defense authorization bill, the House Armed Services Committee cited its
concern from last year (FY2007) that investment in the European BMD site was
premature.27 In part, the Committee’s concerns focus on the need to complete
scheduled integrated end-to-end testing of the system now deployed in Alaska and
California. Additionally, the Committee notes its reluctance to fund the European site
without formal agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic and without
knowing the terms under which the estimated $4 billion program costs would be
expended. Therefore, the Committee recommended that no funds be approved for
FY2008 for construction of the European GMD site.28 The Committee did, however,
25 Putin Wants Quick Answer On Alternative Antimissile Site. RFE/RL Newsline. June 11,
2007. Putin Surprises Bush With Plan On Missile Shield. New York Times. June 8, 2007.
US Says Russia Offer Cannot Replace Missile Shield. Reuters. June 14, 2007.
26 Putin Expands On His Missile Defense Plan. New York Times. July 3, 2007/ Putin
Proposes Broader Cooperation On Missile Defense. Washington Post. July 3, 2007.
27 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Report of the House Armed
Services Committee on H.R. 1585, May 11, 2007. House of Representatives. 110th Congress,
1st Session. H.Rept. 110-146, pp. 238-240.
28 To preserve the opportunity to move forward with the research and development
components of the European interceptor and radar site, the Committee recommended that
(continued...)
CRS-12
recommend $42.7 million to continue procurement of ten additional GMD
interceptors that could be deployed to the European site or for expanded inventory
at the GMD site in Alaska (as noted in MDA budget documents). Also, the
Committee expressed concern over the testing plan and risk reduction strategy for the
proposed two-stage GMD interceptor for Europe. The Committee further directed
that two studies be done: 1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State are
to submit a report to Congress by January 31, 2008, to include how the
Administration will obtain NATO’s support for the European GMD proposal, and
how other missile defense capabilities such as Aegis and THAAD (Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense) could contribute to the missile defense protection of Europe;
and 2) an independent assessment of European missile defense options should be
done in a timely manner.
In the Senate defense authorization bill, the Armed Services Committee
recommended limiting the availability of funding for the European GMD site until
two conditions have been met: 1) completion of bilateral agreements with Poland and
the Czech Republic; and 2) 45 days have elapsed following the receipt by Congress
of a report from an FFRDC (federally funded research and development center) to
conduct an independent assessment of options for missile defense of Europe.29 The
Committee recommends a reduction of $85 million for site activation and
construction activities for the proposed European GMD deployment. The Committee
also limits funding for acquisition or deployment of interceptor missiles for the
European system until the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the
proposed interceptor to be deployed has demonstrated, through successful,
operationally realistic flight testing, that it has a high probability of working in an
operationally effective manner. The Committee notes that the proposed 2-stage
version of the interceptor has not been developed and is not scheduled to be tested
until 2010.30 Therefore, the Committee notes, it could be several years before it is
known if the proposed interceptor will work in an operationally effective manner.
The Committee indicates that it would not limit site surveys, studies, analysis,
planning and design for the proposed European GMD site, but that construction and
deployment could not take place prior to ratification of formal bilateral agreements,
which MDA estimates would not take place before 2009. Finally, the Committee
notes there are a number of near-term missile defense options to provide defense of
Europe against short-range, medium-range and future intermediate-range ballistic
missiles, such as the Patriot PAC-3, the Aegis BMD system, and THAAD.
In floor debate, the Senate approved an amendment by Senator Sessions (90-5)
to the defense authorization bill stating that the policy of the United States is to
28 (...continued)
$150 million for FY2008 be available. Upon completion of bilateral agreements and if
further engagement with NATO on the proposed site can be demonstrated, the Committee
notes that the Department of Defense has the option of submitting a reprogramming request
to Congress in FY2008 to fund site preparation activities.
29 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee on S. 1547, June 5, 2007. Committee on Armed Services. U.S. Senate.
110th Congress, 1st Session. Report 110-77, pp. 140-142.
30 See footnote 5.
CRS-13
develop and deploy an effective defense system against the threat of an Iranian
nuclear missile attack against the United States and its European allies. Further
debate and passage of the defense authorization bill was postponed by the Majority
Leader after debate over the Iraq war. Most observers expect that the bill will be
taken up again sometime in September.