Order Code RL34039
Turkey’s 2007 Elections:
Crisis of Identity and Power
Updated July 11, 2007
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Turkey’s 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power
Summary
The effort of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to elect one
of its own to be president of the Republic provoked a crisis. The nominee, Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul, has roots in Turkey’s Islamist movement and his wife wears
a head scarf, which some secularists consider a symbol of both Islamism and
backwardness. Moreover, because AKP already controls the prime ministry and
parliament, some argued that the balance of political power would be disturbed if the
party also assumed the presidency.
The opposition boycotted the first round of the vote for president in parliament
and engaged in mass demonstrations against the possibility of an AKP president.
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) asked the Constitutional Court to annul the
vote, and the General Staff of the armed forces warned that the military is the
defender of secularism and would act if “needs be.” After the Court invalidated the
vote, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called early national elections and
proposed a package of constitutional amendments, including one for the direct
election of president. Current President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the amendments
and questioned their validity, but the Court ruled that they are valid. A national
referendum on the amendment package will be held on October 21.
In the meantime, a campaign is underway for national elections on July 22.
Opposition parties are maneuvering to better combat the very effective AKP political
operation. AKP and CHP may be attempting to move to the center, where most
Turkish voters reside. A few other parties also have the potential to win seats in
parliament. Turkey has been democratizing in recent years, yet none of the major
contending parties is consistently democratic. The outcome of the election is
uncertain. The constitutional amendments will not apply to the choice of the next
president and a compromise in the new parliament on the selection is probable.
The European Union and the United States have urged Turks to adhere to their
constitutional processes and warned the military not to intervene. Turkey is a
candidate for EU membership, which might give the EU some influence. Yet, that
influence is limited because some European countries and many Turks have lost their
enthusiasm for Turkey’s accession. The official U.S. reaction to events in Turkey
appeared to lag behind that of the EU. Early statements encouraged Turkey to follow
its constitutional processes, while later ones added a warning to the military.
Terrorism has emerged as the major issue in the campaign, which may exacerbate
tensions between Turkey and the United States over U.S. inaction against the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Turkish terrorist group harbored in northern Iraq.
The Turkish government and military may take U.S. warnings and domestic political
considerations into account in decision-making on a possible incursion into Iraq to
fight the PKK. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

Contents
The Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Military Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Constitutional Court Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Constitutional Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Parliamentary Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Contestants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The European Union Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Main Contending Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Basic Facts about Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Turkey’s 2007 Elections:
Crisis of Identity and Power
The Crisis
Introduction
The seven-year term of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was scheduled
to expire on May 16, 2007, and parliament (the Grand National Assembly) was
required to elect a successor by that date. Since November 2002, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots which claims a conservative
democratic orientation, controlled a comfortable majority in parliament, but its
numbers fell short of the two-thirds needed to elect a president in the first and second
rounds of a vote. Sezer, a former head of the Constitutional Court, is an ardent
secularist who often vetoed AKP-proposed laws and appointments on the grounds
that they conflicted with the founding nationalist and secularist principles of the state.
Both the AKP and its secularist opponents understood that much was at stake in the
choice of Sezer’s replacement.
On April 25, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan named Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to be the AKP’s candidate for president.
In doing so, Erdogan appears to have severely misjudged his opposition and
contributed to one of the worst political crises in recent Turkish history.

Identity
Gul is widely respected as an effective foreign minister who helped to secure the
opening of Turkey’s membership talks with the European Union (EU) in 2005 and
worked to smooth relations with the United States. He promised to act according to
secularist principles if elected president. Nonetheless, secularists considered him to
be a controversial candidate partly because of his prominent role in two past, banned,
Islamist parties and mainly because his wife wears a hijab (also called a turban in
Turkey) or head scarf. Turkish women are prohibited from wearing the head scarf in
public institutions, which President Sezer has interpreted to include the presidential
palace, Çankaya.1 Secularists view the head scarf as a symbol both of Islamism and
of retrogression to a time before Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern
Turkey, imposed Westernizing reforms on the country in the 1920s and 1930s. As
one of those reforms, Ataturk imported to Turkey the French concept of laicite, a
1 Sezer has refused to invite head scarf-wearing wives of AKP officials and Members of
Parliament to receptions at Çankaya.

CRS-2
stricter version of secularism than that practiced in the United States, to Turkey.2
Thus, because of Mrs. Gul’s head scarf, the choice of a president became an
emotional fight for the identity of the state.
Power
The opposition also argued that Erdogan’s insistence on an AKP president
threatened Turkey’s balance of powers.3 The AKP already controlled the prime
ministry and parliament, and the presidency would allow it to dominate other
branches of government because of the president’s role as commander-in-chief of the
military and his power to appoint Constitutional Court judges, the Higher Education
Board, and university rectors -- all still bastions of secularism. The President also
has substantial veto powers. President Sezer vetoed other high level government
appointments liberally to prevent the AKP from achieving control over more levers
of state power in the bureaucracy and vetoed some legislation, thereby delaying
AKP’s pursuit of both its reform and religion-favoring agendas.4
A counter-argument maintains that if AKP elected a president, then the voters
could have restored the balance of power by denying the party a mandate in national
elections scheduled to be held in November 2007. From this perspective, the
secularists did not need to provoke a crisis over the election of a president to preserve
the balance of power. They simply had to win the parliamentary elections.5 This
argument might lead to the conclusion that the opposition lacked confidence in its
ability to defeat AKP at the polls and chose other means.
To some extent, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is a party of
the armed forces, bureaucracy, legal system, and academe, fighting to retain their
powers and vying against AKP, a party seeking to expand its powers.
2 At Ataturk’s initiative, the assembly of the new Turkish Republic passed sweeping laicist
reforms in the name of modernization, including abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, whose
ruler held both temporal and religious power, closing of religious schools while establishing
a system of public education, outlawing of religious brotherhoods, replacing the Muslim
calendar with one beginning with the Christian era, supplanting Islamic law with a new civil
code based on Swiss law and a new penal code adapted from Italian law, among other
measures.
3 Point made by former True Path Party (DYP) politician Mehmet Ali Bayar, at “Filling
Ataturk’s Chair: Turkey Picks a President,” panel discussion at The Brookings Institution,
April 12, 2007.
4 However, some AKP appointees have served in “acting” capacities for extended periods
of time. According to the Turkish Constitution, a president can return laws to parliament
for reconsideration. If parliament passes the same law unchanged a second time, he cannot
veto it again but can refer the law to the Constitutional Court for a determination of its
validity. In some cases, AKP has passed a law unchanged. In other cases, it has retreated,
preferring to postpone its fight for another day.
5 Point made by Milliyet Washington correspondent Yasemin Congar on The Diane Rehm
Show, National Public Radio, May 1, 2007.

CRS-3
Opposition
The Republican People’s Party (CHP), Ataturk’s party, champion of secularism,
and the main opposition party in parliament, had called on Erdogan to choose a
“consensus” candidate for president and criticized him for not consulting before
nominating Gul. Yet, following traditional practice of allowing the majority party
to present a candidate, CHP never suggested a consensus candidate or named its own
candidate for the presidency.
Even before Erdogan’s nomination of Gul, CHP leader Deniz Baykal had urged
other parties in parliament to boycott the first round of the vote for president in order
to deprive the AKP of the votes required to elect its candidate and to force early
national elections. Secularist non-governmental organizations had begun mobilizing
with a mass protest in Ankara on April 14, then targeting a possible Erdogan
presidential candidacy. After the Gul nomination, unprecedentedly large
demonstrations followed in major cities and some other urban areas against what
participants viewed as a threat of AKP dominance.
On April 27, parliament convened for the first round of voting to elect a
president. Under the Constitution, two-thirds or 367 votes from 550 Members of
Parliament are required to elect a president in the first two rounds. A majority or 276
votes are required in a third and fourth round. Early parliamentary elections ensue if
the legislators cannot elect a president. AKP held 353 seats; Gul received 357 votes
with 361 deputies present. CHP argued that a quorum of 367 attendees was required
for the first round to be valid, as opposed to a normal legislative quorum of 184. The
opposition boycotted the vote in order to render it invalid, and CHP then petitioned
the Constitutional Court to nullify the vote.
Military Intervention

The Turkish military founded the modern Turkish Republic, views itself as the
protector of the Republic and its secular principles, and has been instrumental in the
ouster of four civilian governments since 1960. The armed forces oversaw the
drafting of the current constitution after a 1980 coup. The AKP government has
passed reforms to diminish the role of the military and to comply with European
Union (EU) demands for civilian control over the military. Yet, the military remains
the most respected institution in Turkey with considerable influence over non-
military matters. It has defined the major threats to the state as separatism and
“reactionism” or Islamic fundamentalism.
Many observers believed that the military would not silently permit the AKP,
with its Islamist origins, to elect one of its own as the next president. Some
secularists appeared to wish openly that the military would intervene in the process.
Chief of the General Staff General Yasar Buyukanit issued a clear warning to the
AKP on April 12, when he expressed hope that a new president would be committed
to secularism “not in words but in essence.”6
6 Text of Chief of Staff Buyukanit’s Press Conference, TRT 2 Television, April 12, 2007,
(continued...)

CRS-4
Then, shortly before midnight on April 27, after the first round of the
presidential election, the website of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff
carried a message entitled “On Reactionary Activities, Army’s Duty.”7 It stated, “it
must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces do take sides in this debate
(about secularism) and are the sure and certain defenders of secularism.... (T)hey
will make their position and stance perfectly clear as needs be. Let nobody have any
doubt about this.” The posting also described some local public events with
fundamentalist overtones that it called “an open challenge to the state, in the apparel
of religion.”
In the past, Turkish governments have resigned in response to such warnings.
The AKP did not. Instead, the government spokesman reacted strongly to what he
described as the “inappropriate” General Staff statement. He declared, “The General
Staff is an establishment under the Prime Minister’s Office. It would be
inconceivable if the General Staff in a democracy upholding the rule of law made a
statement critical of the government about any issue....” He also asserted that the
statement was an attempt to influence the Constitutional Court.8 A battle appeared
to have been joined.
Some suggest that the military’s intervention may not have ended with its April
27 message, noting that months passed after a similar demarche in 1979 led to a coup
in September 1980.9 Others consider the message itself to be an unacceptable “e-
mail coup.”10
Constitutional Court Ruling
On May 1, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential
election on the grounds that a required two-thirds quorum was not present.11
President Sezer had appointed many of the Court’s members and the Court is seen
as a voice of the secular establishment. It probably did not need the military’s
prompting to reach its decision, although the military was held responsible for the
result. The AKP and others viewed the decision as a political one; Erdogan described
6 (...continued)
Open Source Document GMP20070412734001.
7 Text of General Staff Statement “On Reactionary Activities, Army’s Duty,” Open Source
Center Document GMP20070428016005, April 28, 2007.
8 ”This Statement Has Been Perceived as a Stance Taken Against the Government,”
Anatolia, April 28, 2007, Open Source Center Document GMP20070428742001.
9 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Ongoing Political Crisis: Where Now?” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1230, May 9, 2007.
10 Omer Taspinar, “The E-Coup and Washington,” Zaman, June 4, 2007, Open Source
Center Document GMP20070604006005.
11 In its full ruling released on June 27, the Court stated that the Constitution intended to
encourage compromise among parties in the election of a president. If 367 deputies were
not required to be present, then parties with more than 276 deputies would have no incentive
to compromise and would simply wait for the third round of voting. “Top Court States Vote
was Annulled to Enable Compromise,” Turkish Daily News, June 28, 2007.

CRS-5
it as “a bullet aimed at democracy.”12 The government said, however, that it would
respect the decision. Some have compared the Court’s decision and the controversy
over it to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the 2000 presidential race.
Constitutional Amendments
After failing to attain the newly prescribed quorum in parliament for a replay of
the first round of the vote for president, Prime Minister Erdogan called for early
national elections. He also proposed constitutional amendments to provide for the
direct election of the president in two rounds, a five-year presidential term with the
possibility of a reelection (instead of the current single seven-year term), a reduction
in the term of parliament from five years to four, definition of the parliamentary
quorum at 184 for both sessions and elections, and a lowering of the age of eligibility
for Members of Parliament to 25. The last measure is intended to appeal to young
voters, who voted overwhelmingly for AKP in 2002.
Parliament endorsed the amendments on May 7. President Sezer vetoed them
on May 25, declaring that there was “no justification” for the direct election
amendment because a directly elected president would “create problems for the
regime.” He suggested that it would be better if the amendments were debated in
public and then discussed in parliament. As expected, however, parliament passed
the amendments again in the same form on June 1. On June 5, CHP petitioned the
Constitutional Court to annul the package of amendments, arguing that the one on
holding parliamentary elections every four years failed by one vote to meet the two-
thirds vote requirement and that the entire package must be invalid if one of its
components is invalid. AKP maintained that the vote on the package was valid. The
Constitution did not allow Sezer to veto the amendments a second time. On June 18,
he referred them for publication to be presented to a national referendum to be held
120 days thereafter; at the same time, he petitioned the Constitutional Court to
invalidate the amendment package. On July 5, the Court rejected the President’s
appeal, paving the way for a referendum on the amendments on October 21.
The amendments are likely to be approved in October. However, the first order
of business for the new parliament to be convened in August must be the election of
a president. Therefore, not until the following president might a direct election be
held. In the interim, parliament may then take up additional amendments to weaken
the power of the president.
Parliamentary Elections

Parliamentary elections will be held on July 22 instead of November 4, as
otherwise scheduled. Turkey has never before held national elections in the summer,
when the turnout is normally expected to be low due to voters’ vacations. Given the
crisis over the presidential election, however, expectations of a low voter turnout may
prove incorrect.
12 Turkish Daily News, May 2, 2007.

CRS-6
The Contestants
Some opposition parties have attempted to coalesce in anticipation of the
election to ensure that they obtain at least 10% of the vote needed to enter parliament
and to target the AKP. An agreement between the center-right True Path (DYP) and
the Motherland (ANAVATAN) parties to unite as the Democratic Party (DP),
however, was short-lived. DYP has kept the DP name, which is the same as the first
opposition party founded in Turkey in 1946. After the aborted merger, there was a
rush of resignations and defections from ANAVATAN to other parties.
ANAVATAN then decided to withdraw from the elections and support DP;
ANAVATAN’s political future is in doubt. The Republican People’s Party (CHP)
and the Social Democratic Party (DSP) have been more successful in agreeing to run
as an electoral coalition. DSP has 30 slots on CHP’s electoral list. This formulation
will permit DSP to keep its identity in the new parliament if the coalition, as is likely,
passes the threshold.
Table 1. Main Contending Parties
Party
Leader
Seatsa
Position
Justice and Development
Recep Tayyip Erdogan
351
Islamist origins,
Party (AKP)
Conservative
democrat
Republican People’s Party
Deniz Baykal/Zeki Sezer
149
Statist, Nationalist
(CHP)/Social Democratic
Party (DSP)
Democratic Party (DP)
Mehmet Agar
3
Center-right
Nationalist Action Party
Devlet Bacheli
0
Extreme
(MHP)
Nationalist, Right
Young Party (GP)
Cem Uzan
0
Extreme
Nationalist,
Populist
a. As of recess on June 3, 2007, Motherland, which is not contesting the election, held 20
seats, small parties, 3, independents, 15, and vacancies, 9, for a total of 550.
Standing alone, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) is considered capable of
passing the threshold as it was often represented in parliament before 2002 and may
return this time due to a rising tide of ultra-nationalism in the country. Its popular
appeal stems partly from its demand for cross-border military operations against the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq to combat terrorism at a time of
rising incidents. (The PKK is a Turkish Kurdish terrorist group that has taken safe
haven in northern Iraq.) MHP criticizes the AKP for subordinating Turkey’s national
interests to those of the United States and European Union, which have warned
Turkey against taking military actions that could destabilize Iraq.
Other, smaller parties also will compete but are less likely to pass the threshold.
The Young Party (GP) may cut into MHP’s vote because it attracts the same voters,

CRS-7
has a charismatic leader, and appears more energetic. The Kurdish Democratic
Society Party (DTP) and the Islamist/nationalist Grand Unity Party (BPP) have opted
not to run party lists, but will field independent candidates in order not to deal with
the 10% obstacle. A number of independents, especially from DTP, are expected to
win seats.
Electoral lists suggest to some that both of the main parties are attempting to
move to the center to appeal to voters. Lists are composed at the discretion of party
leaders and their closest advisers. Erdogan has not included 154 current AKP
Members of Parliament on his party’s lists for the election. Most of those excluded
are intraparty dissidents or unreformed adherents of the fundamentalist Milli Gorus
(National View) philosophy propounded by former Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan, leader of several earlier and banned Islamist parties, although other such
believers remain on the lists. Erdogan also has given slots to defectors from CHP
and the center-right as well as to some minority figures. Meanwhile, Baykal has
eliminated about half of CHP’s current deputies and placed several prominent former
ANAVATAN and DYP members, centrists, high on his lists.13
Campaign
Non-AKP parties are not known to have built up grass roots organizations
capable of competing with AKP’s well-oiled operations, do not control many local
governments to aid their electoral efforts, and have not provided social services
comparable to those AKP offers to potential voters. Yet, the political climate is more
fluid than before the presidential election crisis and has given opposition parties
greater hope.
The electoral crisis has coincided with a spike in the deaths of soldiers in PKK-
related violence in southeast Turkey, making terrorism the most salient issue in the
campaign. CHP, MHP, and GP appear to be using it to their advantage. CHP leader
Deniz Baykal is emphasizing the threat of terrorism, charging that “Prime Minister
Erdogan is the most important obstacle to Turkey’s fight against terrorism” because
of his reluctance to launch an incursion into northern Iraq.14 Baykal nationalistically
claims that terrorism “is a way for external powers to display their plans against
Turkey” and assails AKP for deferring to U.S. and European entreaties to stay out of
Iraq.15 His party is openly suspicious of the European Union and United States,
perceiving their demands for improvements in the human rights of ethnic and
religious minorities as threats to divide the country.16 MHP and GP voice similar
views.
13 For analyses of the lists, see Goksel Bozkurt, “Parties Fight to Conquer the ‘Center,’”
Turkish Daily News, June 6, 2007, and Rusen Cakir, “Erdogan has Played with AKP’s
Genes,” Vatan, Open Source Center Document GMP20070607742006.
14 “Opposition Outrage at PM’s Remarks,” Turkish Daily News, June 14, 2007.
15 “CHP Introduces Deputy Candidates to Public,” Anatolia, June 16, 2007, Open Source
Center Document GMP20070616737002.
16 Baykal claims to retain EU membership as an objective, but wants the EU to revise its
approach to Turkey.

CRS-8
CHP has little else on which to base its campaign. During its four and a half
years in opposition in parliament, CHP failed to present an alternative vision or
programs. Under Baykal’s leadership, the party had opposed AKP initiatives,
polarized the political climate, and fueled xenophobic nationalism. Although a
“leftist” or social democratic party, it proposed no programs to serve the lower
classes. In 2002, CHP ran what appeared to be a campaign against religion, thereby
offending many voters and limiting its electoral successes to the Aegean region.
Baykal had said that CHP’s 2007 campaign again would be a “battle to defend
secularism,” but he has emphasized what he considers the AKP’s failure to counter
terrorism instead.

DP has the potential to attract voters that the center-right lost to AKP in 2002.
Many analysts believe that the core AKP “Islamist” vote is not more than 20 to 25%
and that it was able to garner 34% in 2002 mainly because of popular disenchantment
with parties of the center-right, whose leaders then were widely viewed as corrupt
and responsible for a severe financial crisis. According to this analysis, DP could
diminish AKP’s hold on centrist voters and leave it with its core. Yet, DP had
problems filling out its electoral lists, which weakens its competitiveness. DP also
gave slots on its lists to some discredited politicians which may lessen its appeal to
voters. Moreover, the emphasis on terrorism may be working more to the benefit of
nationalist parties on the right and left than to the center. Meanwhile, AKP is
working to retain the centrist voters in its choice of candidates and in its campaign
themes, which also could affect DP’s prospects.
Given the deficiencies of the CHP and DP, they may have to rely for their
success mainly on the not inconsiderable hope that voters will vote against AKP in
order to lessen tensions in the country.
The AKP is campaigning on its economic record and on being a unifying force
as opposed to its polarizing opponents. Since the AKP took office in 2002, the
Turkish economy has experienced an average annual growth rate of 7.5%, a drop in
the rate of inflation from 60% to about 9%, almost a doubling of per capita income,
and unprecedentedly high foreign investment (more than $20 billion in 2006). AKP
hopes to repeat its 2002 election successes in the Anatolian heartland and in most
major cities. Yet its campaign does not have some of the other aids of 2002.
Opposition party leaders who had been responsible for a severe financial crisis in the
years immediately preceding the 2002 election and were considered corrupt are no
longer active or prominent and, therefore, do not provide easy targets. Instead, Prime
Minister Erdogan has emphasized the ineptitude of earlier coalition governments
compared to AKP’s single-party rule. Erdogan has not adequately countered
accusations of ineffectiveness against PKK terrorism, which is probably AKP’s main
weakness. His stump speeches stress that national unity is the best way to fight
terrorism, which may not rouse the masses. On June 12, he adopted a somewhat
unpopular stance against an incursion into northern Iraq, arguing that Turkey should
target terrorists at home first. Finally, the AKP cannot openly run against the
military, which most people respect. It can only argue that the fear of a state ruled
by seriat (shariah/Islamic law) is irrational and unsupported by AKP’s record in
office.

CRS-9
Assessment
The electoral contest is not a simple one between Islamists and secularists,
between democrats and republicans, or between the AKP and the military; it is
simultaneously all of these. While Turkey has been democratizing and improving its
overall human rights record in recent years, the democratic credentials of the major
contenders are deficient. AKP won only 34% of the vote in 2002, but it governed as
if it had won a majority and did not reach out to the opposition. It has indeed passed
a series of unquestionably revolutionary reforms to enable Turkey to meet the
European Union’s political and economic criteria for membership17 and calls for
even more democratic advances so that religious women can freely wear their chosen
attire in public institutions. Yet, the AKP has failed to provide equal treatment for
non-Sunni Muslim religious adherents, such as the large Alevi Muslim minority, or
successfully pushed reforms to end mistreatment of non-Muslims.18 It increased
educational and broadcast rights for Turkish Kurds, but never fulfilled an August
2005 promise to provide answers to the Kurdish problem with “more democracy.”
Instead, Prime Minister Erdogan appears to have abandoned this rhetoric and adopted
the less controversial military approach. An upsurge in PKK violence may account
for some of AKP’s reticence to launch innovative policies, but resistence from the
military and nationalists is probably even more responsible for the government’s
inertia.
In addition, AKP has not revised the notorious Penal Code Article 301, which
criminalizes speech that “insults Turkishness,” produced judicial prosecutions of
literary luminaries such as Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, and perhaps provoked
the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. Finally, AKP has not
attempted to lower the 10% of the vote threshold to enter parliament, which
effectively deprives many voters of their franchise and right to be represented in the
government. A lower threshold would likely allow the Democratic Society Party
(DTP), a Kurdish group, to enter parliament and provide “more democracy.” Yet the
military and nationalists oppose a lower threshold precisely because it would allow
DTP with its focus on ethnic as opposed to national identity to join the legislature.
Some observers believe that Prime Minister Erdogan himself has the same
autocratic tendencies that have been characteristic of past Turkish party and
government leaders. According to such observers, his personal litigiousness against
journalists and others reveals a lack of understanding of freedom of expression. His
failure to consult widely regarding the nomination of a president is troubling even if
it is his prerogative. His rush to amend the Constitution, without parliamentary or
public debate, is equally disturbing. There is a perception that the Prime Minister is
seeking to change the rules simply because he could not get his way under the old
17 The Copenhagen criteria for EU membership include stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.
18 Alevis practice a heterodox faith based on Shi’ite Islam, Sufism, and other elements. The
AKP does not recognize them as adherents of a different faith than Sunni Islam.

CRS-10
ones and not to improve Turkey’s democracy. Furthermore, the package of
amendments contains a potentially undemocratic and controversial provision. The
amendment to lower the quorum to 184 out of 550 for all legislative matters and
elections would allow a small minority of legislators to decide consequential issues
for the entire country. By contrast, the U.S. Constitution defines a working
congressional quorum as a majority.
While not seeking a seriat (shariah) state as its opponents claim, AKP has taken
actions to favor Sunni believers over others and proposed programs with religious
overtones. The Directorate for Religious Affairs has appointed about 25,000 new
imams since the AKP came to power, an unusually large number without much
justification, while refusing to fund Alevi institutions. The party pushed legislation
to enable graduates of imam-hatip (religious or imam training) schools to enter
universities on an equal footing with graduates of state schools who have had liberal
educations. Erdogan called for adultery to be criminalized until European officials
shouted him down and he questioned the right of the European Court of Human
Rights, whose jurisdiction Turkey accepts, instead of religious scholars (ulema) to
judge the head scarf issue.
For its part, the CHP argues that democracy is impossible without secularism.
Yet, its belief in democratic principles may be circumscribed, as the party and its
followers appeared desirous of military intervention from which they could benefit
politically. Moreover, the CHP views the granting of rights to Kurds and non-
Muslim religious minorities as threats to the territorial integrity of the state, often
citing as evidence the unratified post-World War I Treaty of Sevres, according to
which the great powers would have carved up Anatolia for Greeks, Armenians, and
Kurds. The party’s unwillingness even to open the head scarf issue to discussion
reveals an underlying strain of intolerance toward the majority of Turkish women
who wear head coverings. Women make up only 10% of CHP’s electoral lists. CHP
also has not taken up the issue of lowering 10% of the vote threshold to enter
parliament in order to expand participation in the political system. Moreover, some
argue that CHP has overblown an unreal threat of a seriat (shariah) state for political
gain and wantonly exacerbated divisions in the country. Finally, many observers note
that Deniz Baykal shares with Erdogan the tendency of Turkish leaders to lead his
party in an autocratic style.

Outlook
The election results are difficult to predict as many voters remain undecided.
The 10% of the vote threshold for parties to enter parliament endures. The barrier
allowed the AKP to obtain its large majority in parliament in 2002 with only 34% of
the vote because only one other party (CHP) passed the threshold. Some 48% of the
electorate voted for parties which did not win 10% and were thereby disenfranchised,
with their votes redistributed to AKP and CHP. Most analysts believe that AKP will
again come in first in the July 2007 election, with three to five parties possibly
gaining seats in parliament. MHP is the most likely third party. If more than two
parties enter parliament, the number of AKP seats could be diminished even if its
vote total is more than in 2002. This is because more than two parties would share
the redistributed votes and the seats they would have earned. Should AKP gain a
plurality but not a majority of seats with three or more parties represented in the

CRS-11
legislature, the President could bypass AKP and designate the second place party to
form a coalition government. This possibility should not be discounted given
President Sezer’s antipathy to AKP and historic precedent for the action.

Parliament will reconvene five days after the Higher Election Board announces
the final results of the July 22 election. Its first order of business will be to elect a
president. If AKP comes in first in the parliamentary elections with less than 367
seats in the new body as now required for a quorum to elect a president, it would
have to shelve Gul’s candidacy in favor of a compromise candidate less offensive to
the secular opposition and the military. Prime Minister Erdogan has tried to provide
assurances that, in any eventuality, he will seek a consensus with the opposition on
a candidate for head of state by providing a list of alternative candidates.19 He
appears to recognize that a crisis atmosphere could be revived if AKP achieves a
two-thirds majority and proceeds with Gul’s election and wants to avert it.
The European Union Factor
The prospect of EU membership may have limited influence over the electoral
crisis in Turkey. Over the past several years, the AKP has led Turkey’s march
toward EU membership, overseeing passage of laws and constitutional amendments
to conform to EU political and economic standards. The AKP views the path to EU
membership as a way to advance Turkey’s democracy and claims that it would
proceed with the reforms required for membership for the good of the country – even
if membership were not achieved. More cynical commentators suggest that the AKP,
as the current incarnation of Islamist parties closed as a result of military interference
in the political process, is pursuing EU membership mainly in order to restrict the
role of armed forces in Turkey.
In December 2004, the EU agreed to begin accession talks with Turkey, with
conditions that had not been applied to other candidate countries. Despite Turkey’s
failure to meet a commitment to open its ports to the internationally recognized
Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus, the talks have proceeded with
only the relatively mild EU discipline of suspending negotiations on eight chapters
of the acquis (EU rules and regulations) because of the Cyprus issue, but permitting
other negotiations to proceed. There are 34 chapters in all. Neither the EU nor
Turkey apparently or officially wants to derail the process. Turkey is not expected
to be eligible for membership before 2014, at the earliest.
Turks are far less enthusiastic about the EU than they were several years ago,
with support falling drastically.20 They are scornful of EU and European officials’
repeated threats that the path to accession could be blocked if Turkey does not
recognize an Armenian genocide that occurred in the early 20th century, make
19 “Turkish PM Makes Surprise Statement on Election of Next President,” NTV, July 9,
2007, citing an interview with the Aksam newspaper.
20 A Pew Global Attitudes Project public opinion survey, released on June 27, 2007,
indicates that of 58%Turks have unfavorable views of the European Union, while only 27%
hold favorable views. See, [http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256].

CRS-12
concessions to the (Greek) Cypriots, or act on a variety of other matters. Turkish
military commanders are particularly dismissive of the EU. They charge that
Europeans aid the PKK even though the PKK is on the EU’s list of terrorist groups,
and that EU demands to improve the rights of Kurds and religious minorities are a
conspiracy to divide Turkey. Many Turks agree with these views. Moreover, the EU
demand that Turkey improve civilian control over the military threatens the military’s
prerogatives.
Turks know that their chances of obtaining EU membership have diminished
markedly. A unanimous vote of all EU member states is required for admittance to
the Union. Some EU countries now have leaders firmly opposed to Turkey’s
membership for cultural (religious) reasons.21 German Chancellor Angela Merkel
prefers granting Turkey a “privileged partnership,” but has not pushed the issue out
of deference to her domestic coalition partner which supports Turkey’s membership.
She also has not defined privileged partnership so as to distinguish it from Turkey’s
existing customs union with the EU and to make it an attractive option. New French
President Nicholas Sarkozy made his opposition to Turkey’s membership a campaign
issue and is bound by a French parliament decision to allow a national referendum
to decide the membership question. Most observers expect the French to vote against
Turkey’s accession. Sarkozy has proposed a Mediterranean Union of states of the
Mediterranean littoral, including Turkey, but Turkish officials reject the idea if it is
a substitute for EU membership. Because there are other issues on Sarkozy’s EU
agenda, he apparently has agreed to allow the EU’s negotiations with Turkey to
proceed for the near term without changing his policy of opposition to membership.
Germany and France are arguably the most powerful and influential members of the
EU, but other members, such as Austria and Denmark, also oppose Turkey’s
membership. Some analysts also suggest that Turkey’s EU prospects have declined
amid growing European public unease over further EU enlargement.

European opposition has fed reciprocal feelings in Turkey. Many in Turkey
ignored EU criticism even as the EU commented repeatedly on the evolving election
crisis. After the Turkish military’s April 27 statement, EU Enlargement
Commissioner Olli Rehn said, “The military should be aware that it should not
interfere in the democratic process in a country which desires to become an EU
member.”22 On April 30, the European Commission urged the Turkish military to
allow the Constitutional Court to act “in full independence from any undue
influence.” Then, on May 2, the Commission elaborated, “The European Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the supremacy of democratic
civilian power over the military. If a country wants to become a member of the
Union it needs to respect these principles.”23 The Commission welcomed an early
21 Some suggest that the AKP did not mobilize demonstrations to counter those of the
opposition because the image of masses of its hijab-wearing, bearded supporters would
reinforce the Europeans’ views.
22 Rehn on General Staff’s Statement, Anatolia, April 28, 2007, Open Source Center
Document GMP20070428734008.
23 “European Commission Warns Turkish Army Against Defending Secularism,” Agence
(continued...)

CRS-13
election as a way to ensure Turkey’s political stability and democratic development.
On June 4, in meetings with Foreign Minister Gul and State Minister Ali Babayan,
Turkey’s EU negotiator, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,
representing the EU Presidency, voiced concern about the military’s April 27
message, while emphasizing the need to maintain “democratic secularism” in Turkey.
He thereby sent a message that balanced impressions that earlier EU statements may
have been perceived as too supportive of AKP.
U.S. Policy
During the AKP era, the Bush Administration has continued to consider Turkey
to be an important ally. This is despite the failure of the AKP-led Turkish parliament
to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces on Turkish territory to open a northern
front against Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The Administration values relations
with Turkey because it is a critical transit hub for the resupply of forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan, participates in (and twice led) the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as well as in peacekeeping forces in the Balkans and in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) after Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006. Turkey also is seen
as a critical transportation and energy corridor linking the Caucasus and Central Asia
to Europe by routes independent of Russia at a time of increasingly concern about
Russia’s energy dominance over Europe. AKP’s criticism of U.S. policies in Iraq,
its warm relations with Syria and Iran, and its outreach to the Palestinian Hamas
group have not noticeably altered the official U.S. assessment of Turkey’s
significance. It may, however, have contributed to a conclusion that the United
States has no side to back in the Turkish election contest. Some of AKP’s policies
have been unpredictable, while the opposition has fueled the anti-Americanism that
had already grown due to the war in Iraq and U.S. inaction against the PKK.24
As the electoral crisis unfolded in Turkey, U.S. government officials made
increasingly critical statements. Early statements redundantly emphasized the need
for Turkey to follow its constitution, while later statements contained clearer
warnings to the military to stay out of the political process. After the Turkish
military intervention via website message, the U.S. State Department spokesman
Sean McCormick said on April 30, “We have real confidence in Turkey’s democracy
and we have confidence in their constitutional processes and that all the parties
involved in the election of the new president will abide by those constitutional
processes.”25 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Daniel Fried averred, “We hope and expect that the Turks will work out these
political issues in their own way, in a way that’s consistent with their secular
23 (...continued)
France Presse, May 2, 2007.
24 The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, released on June 27, 2007, indicates that 83%
of Turks have unfavorable views of the United States, while only 9% hold favorable views.
See [http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256].
25 U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, April 30, 2007, [http://www.state.gov/r/pa
/prs/dpb/2007/apr/83993.htm].

CRS-14
democracy and constitutional provisions.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
declared, “The United States fully supports Turkish democracy and its constitutional
processes, and that means that the election, electoral system, and the results of the
electoral system, and the results of the constitutional process have to be upheld.”26
In response to a question, she agreed with the EU call for the military to stay out of
the dispute. Later, State Department Tom Casey spokesman directly warned the
Turkish armed forces, “we don’t want the military or anyone else interfering in the
constitutional process or doing anything in an extra-constitutional way.”27
Given the low standing of the United States in Turkish public opinion, U.S.
support for any side may be viewed as counterproductive and none of the domestic
actors seeks it. All appear to have expressed displeasure with the official U.S. views.
Aside from the domestic political crisis in Turkey, U.S. policy makers are
concerned about possible spillover of the campaign into Turkey’s policy toward Iraq.
Tensions between the United States and Turkey over Iraq could worsen during the
election period. Turkish civilian and military officials have repeatedly expressed
disappointment in the failure of U.S. and Iraqi forces to act against the PKK. In the
absence of such action, the Turks have claimed a right to act with or without U.S.
approval. They appear to be ratcheting up the rhetoric partly for political gain, but
also because the PKK continues to attack within Turkey and to inflict casualties
almost daily. Until now, the Turkish military has mainly launched short-lived, “hot
pursuit” incursions into northern Iraq and larger scale actions in the largely Kurdish
southeast Turkey. Recently, it has massed troops along the border and stepped up
anti-PKK operations within Turkey. The Turkish parliament must approve a major
military offensive against a foreign country. Because it is in recess, parliament
cannot grant approval unless called back for a special session. On July 9, Prime
Minister Erdogan said, “The possibility of getting parliamentary approval for an
operation is not on our agenda right now” before the elections.28
U.S. officials have responded to Turkish saber-rattling with calls for restraint
and concern about the destabilizing effects of Turkish military action on the situation
in Iraq. On June 3, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a stern warning
against such action. Impatient with the lack of U.S. response to repeated entreaties,
however, the Turkish military may decide to abandon its restraint and ignore U.S.
admonitions. Yet, the military’s calculus also may take the election into account and
refrain from launching an offensive until after the election because voters might
credit such an action to the AKP government and give the party a boost. Meanwhile,
the military states that it is awaiting government direction, thereby intimating that the
government is to blame for inaction. The government responds that it is waiting for
a request from the military for an invasion. However, if yet another major terrorist
attack occurs, like the bombing at a crowded Ankara shopping center on May 22
which killed 7 and injured about 100, the military may not continue to hold off even
26 Christopher Torchia, “U.S., EU Warn Turkish Military to Avoid Politics,” Chicago
Tribune
, May 3, 2007.
27 Quote in “White House Says Turkish Democracy Continues to Function,” Turkish Daily
News
, May 9, 2007.
28 “Cross-border Operation Delayed Until After Elections,” Zaman, July 11, 2007.

CRS-15
if it has unpleasant consequences for the election or for relations with the United
States.
Table 2. Basic Facts about Turkey
Population
71 million (July 2007 est.)
Ethnic Groups
Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20% (est.)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth
5.3% (2006 est.)
Rate
GDP Per Capita
$9,000 (2006 est.)
Unemployment Rate
10.2% (2006 est.)
Inflation
9.8% (2006 est.)
Public Debt
64.7% GDP (2006 est.)
External Debt
$193.6 billion (June 2006 est.)
Exports
apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal
manufactures
Export Partners
Germany, UK, Italy, U.S., France, Spain
Imports
machinery, chemicals, semi-finished
goods, fuels
Import Partners
Germany, Russia, Italy, China, France,
U.S.
Military Expenditures
5.3% GDP (2005 est.)
Active Military
514,850
Army
402,000
Navy
52,750
Air Force
60,100
Paramilitary
102,200
Reserve
378,700
Sources: For all except military strength, CIA World Factbook, June 19, 2007. For
military strength figures, The Military Balance, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2007.