Order Code RL33546
Jordan: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues
Updated June 22, 2007
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Jeremy M. Sharp
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in
U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief overview of Jordan’s government and
economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S.
policy objectives in the Middle East. This report will be updated regularly.
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by
Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan.
These include the stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic reform under way in
Jordan, the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s role in
stabilizing Iraq, and U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
The United States has markedly increased aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to
help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain domestic stability, and pursue
normalization of its relations with Israel. For FY2008, the Bush Administration has
requested $263.5 million in economic aid and $200 million in military aid to Jordan.
H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign operations, and related programs
Appropriations bill would fully fund the President’s request for Jordan, in addition
to providing $2.5 million ( $1,000,000 above the request) in International Counter-
Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds.
In May 2007, Congress approved H.R. 2206, the FY2007 U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, which
contained $85.3 million in supplemental assistance to Jordan. Of that total,
appropriators set aside $10 million to assist Jordanian communities which have
experienced a large influx of Iraqi refugees. The rest of the assistance was designated
for military and counter-terrorism aid.

Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Domestic Politics and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Hashemite Royal Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The 1993 Election Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Professional Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Military and Security Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Water Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Promoting Peace in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Opposition to Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Arab Peace Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Countering the Influence of Hamas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Jordan’s Perspective and Influence in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Jordan’s Role in Iraqi Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorism and the Sunni Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Iraqi Refugees in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Allegations of Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Economic Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Military Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FY2007 Supplemental Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Millennium Challenge Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Free Trade Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Qualifying Industrial Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Sweat Shop Allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Military Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Joint Exercises and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Other Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

List of Figures
Figure 1. Country Map of Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Jordan: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues
Overview
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of Saddam
Hussein.


CRS-2
Figure 1. Country Map of Jordan
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of
desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people
of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel brought large
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small
Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River. The original “East Bank” Jordanians,
though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s
political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the
Jordanian monarchy. Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the
population, in some cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and others
are at most lukewarm in their support for the Jordanian regime.1
1 A commentator recently estimated that 67% of the population is of Palestinian descent.
Tom Pepper, “Building a Safe Haven,” Middle East Economic Digest, July 22-28, 2005.

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The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitu-
Jordan in Brief
tional monarchy under the presti-
gious Hashemite family, which
Population
6,053,193 est.
(July 2007):
claims descent from the Prophet
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
Muhammad. King Abdullah II has
slightly smaller than Indiana)
ruled the country since 1999, when
Ethnic
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
he succeeded to the throne upon the
Groups:
Armenians 1%
death of his father, the late King
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
Hussein, upon the latter’s death
small Muslim sects 2% (2001
after a 47-year reign. Educated
est.)
largely in Britain and the United
Literacy
91% (male 96%, female 86%)
States, King Abdullah had earlier
(2003):
pursued a military career, ultimately
GDP (2006): $12.5 billion; real growth 6.3%
serving as commander of Jordan’s
Inflation
6.3%
Special Operations Forces with the
(2006):
rank of Major General. There is
Unemploy-
15.4% (official estimate); ca. 30%
currently no designated Crown
ment (2006): according to some unofficial
Prince; however, under Article 28
estimates
of the Jordanian constitution, the
Armed
personnel 100,500; tanks 952;
Forces
King’s 11-year-old son Prince
combat aircraft 101
(2004):
Hussein is next in line of succession
External
to the throne. King Abdullah (age
$7.3 billion
Debt (2006):
45) has won approval for his ener-
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State; Central Bank of Jordan;
getic and hands-on style of govern-
other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;
ing; however, some Jordanians,
The Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
notably Palestinians and Islamic
fundamentalists, are opposed to his
policies of cooperating with the United States on issues such as Iraq and the Arab-
Israeli peace process. In a recent Los Angeles Times article, one Jordanian cabinet
official was quoted as saying that “He [King Abdullah] talks about information
technology and foreign investment, but he doesn’t really know his own people.”2
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of
Ministers (cabinet). Typically, Jordanian governments last about 1.5 years before
they are dissolved by royal decree. This is done in order to bolster the king’s reform
credentials and to dispense patronage to various elites. The king also appoints all
judges and is commander of the armed forces.
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections
Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower
house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Building on his father’s legacy,
King Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically
curtailing dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations
with Israel. The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62
2 “Jordan’s King Risks Shah’s Fate, Critics Warn,” Los Angeles Times, October 1, 2006.

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seats in the 110-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies
of King Abdullah. However, the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front
(IAF), which had boycotted the previous elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote,
thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six sympathizers. Six seats in the
lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a member of the IAF. The
IAF also participated in elections for the capital city of Amman, held on July 26-27,
2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest against what IAF
spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures. The next parliamentary
elections in Jordan are scheduled for November 2007.
The Jordanian Parliament has limited power. In theory, it can override the veto
authority of the king with a two-thirds majority in both the upper and lower houses.
A two-thirds majority of the lower house can also dissolve the cabinet with a “no
confidence” vote. However, since both houses have solid pro-government majorities,
such actions are rarely attempted (once in April 1963). The Jordanian Constitution
enables the king to dissolve parliament and postpone lower house elections for two
years.3
Overall, political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the IAF is the only
well organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are
composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe. There
are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan, consisting of a total of only 4,100 total
members. A new political parties law raised from 50 to 500 the number of members
necessary for officially registering a party and increased the number of districts from
which parties must draw their members. According to Jordanian scholar Samer Abu
Libdeh, the new law legally forces parties to reach out nationally rather than appeal
to their local constituencies.4
The 1993 Election Law. Political opposition figures in Jordan routinely
criticize the law governing Jordan’s election system. After Islamists made gains in
the 1989 parliamentary elections, the government changed the election rules to a “one
man, one vote” system that gives citizens one vote regardless of how many
parliamentary seats represent their district. When forced to choose just one
representative, voters have typically chosen candidates based on familial or tribal ties
and not on ideology. The main Islamist opposition party, the Islamic Action Front
(IAF), would like to see a mixed election system that provides for some proportional
representation and allows parties to field lists of candidates. In addition, many
reformers have called for changes to Jordan’s electoral map, asserting that the
3 The king also is allowed to declare martial law and suspend the provisions of the
constitution. See United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Programme on
Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), Historical Background of Jordan’s Constitution,
available online at [http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=7].
4 Samer Abu Libdeh, “Jordan Looks Inward: The Hashemite Kingdom in the Wake of
Zarqawi and the Hamas-Israel Clash,” PolicyWatch #1120, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, July 7, 2006.

CRS-5
government essentially gerrymandered districts in favor of rural-tribal areas over
cities where Islamists typically have more support.5
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has long been integrated into the political
mainstream due to its acceptance of the legitimacy of Hashemite monarchy, although
relations between the Brotherhood and the Palace have fluctuated over the years. The
Brotherhood presence in Jordan dates back to the 1930s, as it has been tacitly
recognized first as a charitable organization and later as a quasi-political
organization, which has openly fielded candidates in parliamentary elections albeit
under a different name (Islamic Action Front, IAF). The relationship between the
Brotherhood and the Palace has been mutually beneficial over the years. Successive
Jordanian monarchs have found that the Brotherhood has been more useful politically
as an ally than as an opponent (as opposed to the Brotherhood in Egypt), as it secured
Islamist support in countering Arab nationalist interference during the 1950’s and
1960’s and secular Palestinian nationalism in the 1970s. The Brotherhood’s
educational, social, and health services have grown so extensive over the years that
some experts believe that the Brotherhood’s budget for services rivals that of the
Jordanian government.
With violence unabated in neighboring Iraq and Hamas6 in control of the Gaza
Strip, the Jordanian authorities have grown more cautious of the Brotherhood’s
political and charitable activities. In June 2006, just days after the death of the
terrorist mastermind Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, four IAF parliamentarians were
arrested after making statements praising the Al Qaeda leader. One IAF deputy
reportedly remarked that Zarqawi was a “martyr” and a holy warrior. The government
charged that such remarks were in violation of Article 150 of Jordan’s Penal Code,
which bans all writing or speech that is “intended to, or results in, stirring up
sectarian or racial tension or strife among different elements of the nation.”7 Several
weeks later, the Jordanian government dissolved the administration of the Islamic
Centre Charity Society, the Brotherhood’s main vehicle for dispensing social welfare
to its supporters. Some estimate that the charity controls over $1 billion in assets.
The Jordanian Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) appointed a seven-member
ad hoc board to run the charity.
5 According to one study of Jordan’s election law, “It is no coincidence that under-
represented urban governorates have a large population of Palestinian origin, and that over-
represented largely rural governorates are considered mainstays of support for the regime.
See, David M. DeBartolo, “Jordan: Attention Turns to Electoral Law,” Arab Reform
Bulletin
, Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Volume 5, Issue
3, April 2007.
6 On April 20, 2006, the press reported that Jordan cancelled a planned visit by former
Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, who is also a high-level Hamas official,
on the grounds that Hamas had hidden weapons and explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas
had been expelled from Jordan in 1999, shortly after the ascension of King Abdullah II to
the throne.
7 “Jordan: Rise in Arrests Restricting Free Speech,” Human Rights Watch, June 17, 2006.

CRS-6
After the four Brotherhood parliamentarians were arrested, one was released and
the remaining three stood trial before a state security court. During the trial, several
journalists testified that two of the three parliamentarians called Zarqawi a martyr.
At the sentencing, one member was acquitted for lack of evidence and the two others
received sentences of two years and one and a half years respectively, though their
sentences were reduced to 13 months shortly thereafter. The case did not draw a great
deal of international attention. According to Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the
Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, “Expressing
condolences to the family of a dead man, however murderous he might be, is not a
crime.... And it shouldn’t be grounds for prosecution.”
Professional Associations
Jordan’s 14 professional associations, consisting of approximately 130,000
members, have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and nationalist groups
opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S. policies on
Iraq. The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these
associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations.
The Military and Security Establishment
Many tribal east bank Jordanians or their descendants form the backbone of
Jordan’s armed forces and internal security establishment. Most observers agree that
with the possible exception of Syria, Jordan faces few conventional threats from its
neighbors and that the greatest threats to its security are internal and asymmetrical.
In general, counter-terrorism and homeland security policies are carried out by a
number of institutions, most notably the security services under direct palace control,
the military, and the Interior Ministry. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
reports directly to King Abdullah II and is responsible for both covert operations
abroad and internal security. The military’s elite special forces units also are directly
involved in countering threats to internal security and were reportedly used to thwart
a chemical weapons plot in April 2004. The Interior Ministry controls all civilian
police forces and civil defense units through a branch agency known as the Public
Security Directorate (PSD).
Reform
The reform process in Jordan largely comes from the top down, as King
Abdullah II has worked hard at cultivating a progressive image for both himself and
the government. Nevertheless, the pace of reforms, particularly democratic reform,
remains slow by Western standards, as for every step forward on issues such as
women’s rights, economic liberalization, and education, there are steps back on press
freedoms and institutional reforms. Jordanian officials have been adamant in insisting
that they be allowed to institute social changes at their own pace, asserting that
Jordanian society has changed dramatically over the past century from a desert tribal
society into a modern nation state. The Jordanian government believes that some
portions of its population are suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region and that local
leaders would consider some U.S. democratic reform proposals to be antithetical to
Jordan’s conservative Islamic and tribal social culture.

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The Economy
Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has an economy
which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker
remittances, and the service sector. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces
are corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally
around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.8 Corruption,
common in most developing nations, is particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of
intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”(connections), is widespread, and
many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic
mobility that corruption engenders. Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad
in search of better jobs and opportunities.
In recent years, Jordan has experienced solid economic growth, though
inflationary pressures (6.26% in 2006), budget deficits, and population growth have
worked to minimize some of its benefits. The London-based Economic Intelligence
Unit forecasts GDP growth to be close to 5.4% in 2007. High oil prices have
impacted the Jordanian economy in different ways. On the one hand, oil booms
benefit the families of Jordanians employed in oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf,
as these guest workers have more income to send back home or invest in Jordanian
real estate. On the other hand, higher oil prices put enormous pressure on the national
budget, since the government subsidizes gas and home heating oil. In 2005, the
government enacted several cuts to the fuel subsidy, effectively raising the price of
gas in increments ranging from 8% to 59%.9 Although in the past, deep cuts to
certain subsidies have led to social unrest, there has been no such reaction from the
public thus far. Nevertheless, the government is keenly aware of growing
dissatisfaction from rising prices.
The situation in Iraq has had a noticeable impact on Jordan’s economy. Since
2003, many observers have dubbed Jordan as the “gateway to Iraq,” as thousands of
contractors, businessmen, and foreign officials have used Jordan as a base for their
Iraq operations. An estimated 700,000 Iraqis have moved to Jordan since 2003,
infusing its economy with new investment, particularly in the real estate sector. In the
capital of Amman, new construction is evident and land prices have skyrocketed.
8 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma
attached to menial labor jobs. Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal
traditions look down on certain types of employment such as construction. In fact, the
government estimates that there are approximately 300-400 thousand foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks.
9 Prior to the Iraq War in 2003, Jordan had received oil from Iraq at deeply reduced prices.
After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan received some oil
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a temporary basis at
discounted rates. In the spring of 2006, Jordan stopped receiving oil discounts from its
neighbors forcing it to purchase all of its oil needs (100,000 barrels per day) at international
market prices.

CRS-8
Water Shortages. Jordan is one of the ten most water deprived countries in
the world and is in constant search of new water resources. The Dead Sea, which
abuts both Jordan and Israel, is losing water at an estimated three feet per year, and
some scientists suggest that without significant action it will be gone by 2050. Jordan
has been exploring new water development projects, including the feasibility of
pumping water from the Red Sea, desalinating it, and then transferring it down to the
Dead Sea. This project, referred to as the Red-Dead Canal, is being studied by the
government and international lenders.
Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations
Promoting Peace in the Middle East
Finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the utmost
priority of the Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab
states in a series of military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late
King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999) ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in
Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s conventional military superiority, the
development of an independent Palestinian national movement that threatened both
Jordanian and Israeli security, and Jordan’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first
Gulf War which isolated it from the West. Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel
signed a peace treaty10, and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial
official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western
governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for
external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the continuation of conflict continues to be a major obstacle to
Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the
population, as more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West
Bank or the pre-1967 borders of Israel. There are an estimated 1.7 million United
Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard
their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a
symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope
of being included in any future settlement. Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the
royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and rely politically on the
support of East Bank tribal families, finding a solution to the conflict is considered
10 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries
exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near
the Rift Valley to Jordan; the Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with
Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and
1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was
partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement
under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea
of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).

CRS-9
a matter of political survival since the government cannot afford to ignore an issue
of critical importance to a majority of its citizens.
Opposition to Normalization. King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize
relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly
among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and
influential trade and professional organizations (see above). Among many
mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not
brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far. Opponents of normalization
have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists
among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies
that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists,
but courts have upheld their right to publish them.
The Arab Peace Initiative. In 2007, King Abdullah II has revived his efforts
to jumpstart negotiations and has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and
Congress to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and
Palestinians. King Abdullah II is a strong supporter of a Saudi initiative, dubbed the
“Arab Peace Initiative,” which calls for Israel's full withdrawal from all occupied
territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in exchange for full normalization of relations with all Arab states in the region.
In a March 2007 address to a joint session of Congress, King Abdullah II pleaded for
U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the “core issue in the Middle
East.” He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a collective
peace treaty. Reportedly, King Abdullah II had planned to visit Israel to address the
Knesset (parliament) on the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative, though no date
was ever set. (Abdullah II first visited Israel in March 2004). Some analysts believe
that the King has hinted in his conversations with Israeli and Western officials that
the Arab plan, which officially endorses the repatriation of Palestinian refugees to
Israel, is in fact more flexible and that many Arab leaders would support settling the
refugee issue through compensation.
In May 2007, King Abdullah II met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in
Aqaba, Jordan. The king reportedly reiterated the Arab League’s offer of peace, but
also called on Israel to take meaningful measures to improve Palestinians’ livelihood,
such as halting Israeli settlement construction. In late June 2007, King Abdullah II
is scheduled to attend a “peace summit” in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in order to
expedite regional support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas following the
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
Countering the Influence of Hamas.11 With the recent ouster of Fatah, the
Palestinian faction loyal to moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, from
the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian government is determined to stabilize Fatah forces in
11 On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces closed offices used by the fundamentalist
Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late King Hussein had tolerated to some degree,
on the grounds that the offices were registered as businesses but were conducting illegal
political activity. In November 1999, authorities announced that the Hamas offices would
be closed permanently.

CRS-10
the West Bank and prevent Hamas12 from consolidating power there. Since the 2006
Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority legislative elections, the Jordanian
government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of its citizenry (with
perhaps more than half of Palestinian origin) sympathizes with Hamas, and Jordan's
own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) reportedly maintains close ties to
Hamas. The IAF has been careful to downplay these ties. According to one recent
IAF statement, “Abbas is the legitimate Palestinian president and Hamas's battle
should be with the Zionist enemy, not other Palestinians, so we ask them to return to
a policy of dialogue and to restore the institutions in Gaza.”13
Iraq
Jordan’s Perspective and Influence in Iraq. Jordan’s relations with Iraq
during the Saddam Hussein era were strong. In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed
military action against Iraq, but it informally and quietly provided logistical support
to the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Jordanians have
repeatedly criticized what they perceive to be the political marginalization of Iraq’s
Sunni Arab population. Unlike Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan has a limited ability
to intervene in Iraq’s affairs at present, and, since 2003, Jordanian leaders have been
far more concerned with Iraq’s influence on the kingdom’s own politics, trade, and
internal security.
In August 2006, Jordanian diplomat Ahmed al Lozi became the first accredited
Arab ambassador to serve in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Iraq reciprocated by
announcing shortly thereafter its intention to re-establish direct oil shipments to
oil-deprived Jordan at preferential market prices.14 Some of Iraq’s new Shiite leaders
view with suspicion Jordan’s former close ties to the Saddam Hussein regime and
continuing strong relations with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Frictions between Jordan and
Iraq continue over the future status of Saddam Hussein’s relatives and former Baath
Party officials residing in Jordan as guests of the government.15 Jordan has hosted
12 Some U.S.-Jordanian tension arose in early 2005 over restrictions imposed by the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the New York offices of the Jordan-based
Arab Bank, which allegedly allowed diversion of funds to families of Palestinians involved
in attacks against Israelis. See, Glenn R. Simpson, “U.S. Crackdown On Arab Bank Tangles
Policy,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2005. Jordanian officials have stressed that in
2006, banks in Jordan are complying with U.S. regulations to ban all financial transactions
with Hamas-controlled accounts.
13 “Egypt and Jordan quietly back Abbas, too,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2007.
14 Reportedly, Jordan will receive approximately 10,000-30,000 barrels of oil per day
(roughly 10%-30% of their daily consumption) from Iraq, at a price of $10 per barrel. This
quantity would increase to 50,000 barrels at a later stage, based on the memorandum of
understanding signed between the two countries.
15 King Abdullah granted Saddam’s eldest daughter, Raghdad, and her sister, Rana, asylum
on humanitarian grounds after the start of U.S. military operations in 2003. The Iraqi
government has placed Raghdad on a list of its 41 most wanted persons and demanded that
Raghad be extradited to Iraq to stand trial. Iraqi officials have alleged that members of
Saddam Hussein’s family and inner circle currently in Jordan are providing financial and
(continued...)

CRS-11
and facilitated meetings between U.S. officials and Iraqi leaders aimed at resolving
these and other political disputes, including the highly publicized summit in Amman
between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in December 2006.
Recent reports also suggest that Jordan has facilitated meetings between members of
the Sunni Arab-led insurgency and U.S. representatives at the Iraqi Embassy in
Amman.16
Looking forward, Jordan would prefer the emergence of a stable Iraq under
Sunni Arab control. As this scenario appears unlikely given current circumstances,
Jordan seems committed both to supporting the continued presence of U.S. troops in
Iraq and the fledgling Iraqi government so long as the latter makes an effort to
reintegrate Sunni Arab Iraqis into the military and government and does not become
a vehicle for destabilizing Iranian initiatives. Over the long term, the Jordanian
government has serious concerns regarding Iraq’s future and the potential deleterious
consequences that may arise from wider sectarian warfare within Iraq.
As a country with a limited ability to project political or military power in Iraq,
it is doubtful that Jordan alone could bring about a compromise solution to Iraq’s
sectarian violence and insurgency. Nevertheless, should the Administration heed the
main recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report and pursue an all out
push for Iraqi national reconciliation, Jordan could be useful in serving as one of
several symbolic bridges to Iraq’s Sunni community. The ISG report argues that
Jordan has the professional capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security
forces, and Iraqi-Jordanian tribal ties may facilitate this process should more Sunni
Iraqis join Iraq’s army.
Under the more grave scenario of a nationwide civil war that draws Iraq’s
neighbors into the ongoing conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the Jordanian
government would provide support to Sunni militias with possible ties to Al Qaeda.
On the other hand, it is plausible that Jordan, along with neighboring Saudi Arabia
and other states, could provide financing and materiel support to other elements of
Iraq’s Sunni Arab population, including tribally-led and -organized groups or, more
controversially, to Iraqis formerly associated with the military, intelligence, or
security services of the Saddam Hussein regime. In the event of continuing or
widened conflict in Iraq, Jordan also could move to seal its border with Iraq or
establish a security zone inside western Iraq in order to insulate itself from any
spillover of violence or destabilizing refugee flows.
Jordan’s Role in Iraqi Reconstruction. Since mid-2003, Jordan has made
modest contributions to Iraq’s stability that have been widely interpreted as symbolic
15 (...continued)
media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize the Baath Party in Iraq.
16 According to Saad al Hayani, Iraq’s Ambassador to Jordan, “Two large meetings
happened here in the embassy.... They included leaders from the last government, the
Baathists, and the old Army. They were offered the opportunity to participate in the political
situation if their hands were clean. The meetings were successful and necessary and
beneficial.” See “Quiet U.S. Bid to Talk to Iraqi Insurgents,”Christian Science Monitor,
December 7, 2006.

CRS-12
attempts to cooperate with U.S. rebuilding efforts and to minimize the negative
consequences for Jordan of instability in Iraq. The centerpiece of Jordan’s
stabilization efforts remains the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)
located outside of the capital city of Amman, which has prepared more than 50,000
Iraqi cadets since 2003 with the support of approximately $100 million in annual
U.S. funding. According to allied coalition officials, Jordan also has donated military
and police equipment to support the new Iraqi security forces.17 Jordan also operates
a field hospital in Fallujah, in Anbar province.
Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorism and the Sunni Insurgency. As violence
continues unabated in Iraq, Jordan continues to be both a source of foreign fighters
joining the Sunni insurgency and a target of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist groups. The
industrial town of Zarqa, several miles northeast of Amman, has been well
documented as a source of Sunni militancy, as dozens of its young men have traveled
to Iraq to die as suicide bombers. According to one Islamist community leader in
Zarqa, “Most of the young people here in Zarqa are very religious.... And when they
see the news and what is going on in the Islamic countries, they themselves feel that
they have to go to fight jihad. Today, you don’t need anyone to tell the young men
that they should go to jihad. They themselves want to be martyrs.”18
Potential threats from transnational terrorism also dominates Jordan’s Iraq
policy agenda. Despite the killing of Jordanian terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al
Zarqawi in June 2006 by U.S. and Iraqi forces (reportedly with assistance from
Jordanian intelligence), the threat of Al Qaeda-affiliated or inspired terrorists using
Iraq’s predominately Sunni Al Anbar Province as a launching pad to destabilize
Jordan remains high. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three
Western-owned hotels in Amman killed 58 persons and seriously wounded
approximately 100 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks. In
late 2006, Jordanian intelligence authorities thwarted a potential bomb attack against
foreign tourists traveling through Queen Alia Airport in Amman. Several of the
convicted conspirators were Iraqis, and one of the ringleaders of the plot reportedly
had sought to place a bomb in a sports bag using the explosive PE-4A which is used
by insurgents in Iraq.19
Iraqi Refugees in Jordan. Iraqis have perceived Jordan as an escape from
violence, as some foreign officials estimate that 800,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan
over the last three years.20 For a small, relatively poor country such as Jordan, this
population influx is creating profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society.
Jordan’s banking and real estate sectors are soaring with the increased demand for
housing and the influx of capital from middle class expatriate Iraqis. On the other
17 Jordanian supplied equipment reportedly includes 250 Ukranian-built BTR-94 armored
personnel carriers (APCs), 100 British Spartan APCs, and U.S. M113A1 APCs, along with
2 C-130BHercules transport aircraft and 16 UH-1H utility helicopters.
18 “In Jihadist Haven, a Goal: To Kill and Die in Iraq,” New York Times, May 4, 2007.
19 “Militants Widen Reach as Terror Seeps Out of Iraq,” New York Times, May 28, 2007.
20 The Jordanian government contracted with a Norwegian organization (the Applied
Science Institute) to carry out a census of Iraqis living in Jordan.

CRS-13
hand, inflation is rapidly rising, and there have been anecdotal reports of increased
tension between Jordanian citizens and Iraqi refugees due to the strains placed on
social services by a near 20% increase in the country’s population in a short period
of time. Some reports indicate that Sunni-Shiite tensions may be simmering below
the surface in Jordan, an overwhelming Sunni Arab state whose East Bank
inhabitants have strong tribal ties to Sunni Iraqis. At this time, it is unclear whether
displaced Iraqis will become a permanent fixture in Jordan or will return to Iraq if,
or when, violence subsides. According to a U.S. State Department-conducted survey
of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, “Nearly all [Iraqi] participants say they would return to
Iraq if the security situation alone improved — even with continued problems in
basic services or lack of job opportunities.”21 Other Iraqis may be using Jordan as a
gateway for obtaining residency/asylum in the West.
The Jordanian government classifies displaced Iraqis living in Jordan as
“visitors” or “guests,” not refugees, as Jordan does not have a domestic refugee law,
nor is it a party to the 1951 UN refugees’ convention.22 Iraqis who are able to deposit
$150,000 in Amman banks are granted residency almost instantly,23 while the vast
majority of Iraqis in Jordan have become illegal aliens due to the expiration of their
visitor visas.24 According to a recent Human Rights Watch report on Iraqi refugees
in Jordan, “Jordan has not enforced immigration laws against overstayers in a
consistent manner. Yet, none of the Iraqis interviewed complained of police
irregularities, and many Iraqis even praised the police as treating them humanely and
without discrimination even though they are working and residing illegally.”25
In February 2007, Jordan tightened its immigration laws, requiring that all Iraqis
entering Jordan possess the newly-issued G-Series passports, a costly and difficult
item to obtain from the Iraqi government. Most Iraqis possess older passports and
many entered Jordan after obtaining forged documents. In May 2007, Jordanian
government officials said that border authorities will continue to accept old Iraqi S-
series passports until the end of 2007.
21 “Iraqi Refugees in Jordan Await Stability before Returning,” Office of Research, Opinion
Analysis
, U.S. Department of State, February 28, 2007.
22 According to the UNHCR’s representative in Jordan, Robert Breen, “The term ‘refugee’
has political implications for the government and Iraqis because of the Palestinian
question.... Most Iraqis, who represent a very diverse group here, don’t view themselves as
refugees.” See, “Uncertain Future for Jordan’s ‘Guests,’” Financial Times, March 12, 2007.
23 One foreign official noted that, “The impression of many Jordanians is that the Iraqis here
are all wealthy ... and that they are the cause of the inflation and the rising cost of prices in
Jordan.” See “Iraqi Refugees Spill into Jordan, Driving Up Prices,” Christian Science
Monitor
, November 29, 2006.
24 Many Iraqis in Jordan lack valid residency permits or visas altogether. “Uneasy Havens
Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, December 8, 2006.
25 “‘The Silent Treatment,’ Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan,” Human Rights Watch,
Volume 18, No.10 (E), November 2006.

CRS-14
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its
main intelligence organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is
considered one of the most effective organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist
networks. Jordanian intelligence reportedly played a role in assisting U.S. forces in
killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist mastermind who
headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it vulnerable
to terrorist attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On
November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in
Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously
wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq,
formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act. Many Jordanians,
even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East
policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and
denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at
ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned,
were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, 2005, Jordan’s Minister of the
Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from
operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify
authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners. An
official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun drafting new and
tougher anti-terrorism laws which are currently under debate in parliament.
Other recent terrorist activity in Jordan include the following:
! On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program
in Jordan, was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was
leaving for work. A Jordanian military court convicted and
sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and
presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two
others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant. Six of the eight
sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and
two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
! In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by
a terrorist cell linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical
attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman. According to press
reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited
Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from
Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled
by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of
operations in Amman.
! On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S.
amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba
narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and

CRS-15
another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport
at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was
killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of
responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with bin
Laden or his (now deceased) associate, Zarqawi.
! On September 4, 2006, a lone gunman opened fire on a group of
Western tourists visiting the historic Roman amphitheater in
downtown Amman, killing a British man and wounding six others,
including a Jordanian policeman. The assailant was a 38-year old
Jordanian named Nabeel Jaoura, who claimed his attack was in
retaliation for the murder of his two brothers in 1982 at the hands of
Israeli soldiers during the war in southern Lebanon. According to the
New York Times, Jaoura had worked in Israel, where he was arrested
two years ago for overstaying his visa. Jordanian security officials
believe his incarceration may have further radicalized him.26
Allegations of Torture. In July 2006, the human rights group Amnesty
International accused the Jordanian security establishment of torturing terrorist
suspects on behalf of the United States government. Amnesty International identified
10 suspected cases of men subjected to rendition from U.S. custody to interrogation
centers in Jordan.27 A second report, released by Human Rights Watch in September
2006, claimed that Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) carries out
arbitrary arrests and abuses suspects in its own detention facility. The report studied
the cases of 16 men whom the GID had arrested and found that in 14 of the 16 cases,
detainees were tortured or ill-treated. In response, the GID denied any wrongdoing.
Finally, in a January 2007 report, Manfred Nowak, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment concluded that “the practice of torture persists in Jordan because of a
lack of awareness of the problem, and because of institutionalized impunity.”
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to
Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2006 amounted to
approximately $9.5 billion. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to
threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or
worldwide curbs on aid funding. The United States has markedly increased its aid
to Jordan since the mid-1990s to help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain
domestic stability, and pursue normalization with Israel. Between FY1998 and
FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to Jordan were approximately
26 “Typical of a New Terror Threat: Anger of a Gunman in Jordan,” New York Times,
September 6, 2006.
27 “Group: Jordan Tortures Suspects for U.S.,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006.

CRS-16
$150 million and $75 million, respectively. However, after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, aid to Jordan increased significantly. Further increases in U.S. aid
to Jordan began in FY2003, in view of Jordan’s support for the war against terrorism
and U.S. operations in Iraq. Since FY2003, Jordan’s total assistance package has
averaged over $762 million per fiscal year. This higher figure is due in part to large
allocations for Jordan in subsequent supplemental appropriations acts (a total of $1.4
billion since FY2003). In addition to the preceding funds specifically earmarked for
Jordan, three recent emergency supplemental bills have contained funds to reimburse
Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation states for logistical expenses in support
of U.S. military operations. Table 2 shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance to Jordan
since 1990.
H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign operations, and related programs
Appropriations bill would fully fund the President’s request for Jordan, in addition
to providing $2.5 million ( $1,000,000 above the request) in International Counter-
Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds.
Economic Assistance. For FY2008, the Administration has requested $263
million in ESF for Jordan, a slight increase from previous levels. The United States
provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID programs in
Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.
Approximately 45% of Jordan’s ESF allotment each year goes towards the cash
transfer. USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including
democracy assistance, water preservation, and education. In 2007, U.S. democracy
funds are being expended on technical assistance programs for upcoming municipal
and national parliamentary elections. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic
assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as
Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently
subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian
cities of Amman, Aqaba, and Irbid. In the education sector, USAID is proposing to
spend $45 million in ESF in FY2008, up from $12 million in FY2006.
Military Assistance. The FY2008 budget request includes $200 million for
the Jordanian military, close to the same amount it has received over the past several
fiscal years. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward upgrading Jordan’s
air force, as recent purchases include upgrades to U.S.-made F-16 fighters, air-to-air
missiles, and radar systems. FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase
of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and
counter-terror capability. Jordan is eligible in FY2008 to receive U.S. Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
FY2007 Supplemental Assistance. In May 2007, Congress approved H.R.
2206, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007. This bill mirrored an earlier supplemental
package which was vetoed by the President (H.R. 1591). It contained $80 million in
supplemental assistance to Jordan. Of that total, appropriators set aside $10 million
to assist Jordanian communities which have experienced a large influx of Iraqi
refugees. The rest of the assistance was designated for military and counter-terrorism
aid.

CRS-17
Millennium Challenge Account. In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a threshold country in the lower
middle-income bracket. Although this designation does not qualify Jordan for
immediate assistance, as a threshold country, Jordan could receive small grants to
help it improve underperforming areas so that Jordan would be more competitive for
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) funding in future years. The MCC evaluated
the Jordanian government’s reform efforts before deciding whether it qualifies for
MCC threshold assistance. If the MCC were to conclude that Jordanian democratic
reforms have been sufficient, Jordan could then receive threshold assistance in
FY2007. These funds may be used to accelerate domestic reforms to allow Jordan to
qualify for the MCC’s larger Compact funding program. MCC Compact grants may
be as large as several hundred million dollars.
On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s Board of Directors approved up to $25
million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. The MCC funds will be used to
support Jordan’s reform efforts in increasing government transparency and
accountability and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of customs
administration. According to the MCC, the Jordan Threshold Program will, among
other things, provide technical assistance and training to increase participation in
local elections and institute programs to improve relations and collaboration among
municipalities, citizens, and the private sector in 9 of Jordan’s 99 municipalities.28
USAID is the main U.S. government agency charged with implementing the Jordan
Threshold Program.
Trade
Jordan ranked 70th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the
United States in 2005, about the same as its ranking of 69th in 2004. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from
$317 million to $643 million between 2000 and 2005, and Jordan’s exports to the
United States increased even more notably from $73 million to $1,267 million during
the same period. Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of
aircraft parts, machinery and appliances, vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main
exports to the United States included clothing and accessories, precious stones, and
precious metals. Two recent measures, in particular, have helped expand U.S.-
Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S. investment in
Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement. On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and
King Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement,
which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and
services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released on September
26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or
exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two
28 See MCC Jordan Fact Sheet, “Jordan and Millennium Challenge Corporation:
Strengthening Democratic Institutions,” September 12, 2006. Available at
[http://www.mca.gov/public_affairs/fact_sheets/Jordan_tp_fact_sheet.shtml].

CRS-18
countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental
protection. On January 6, 2001, then-President Clinton transmitted to the 107th
Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S.
Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher
exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve
disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters
were designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the
possible use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty.
President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on
September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the
September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS Report RL30652,
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones. An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace
treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which
goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the
United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act amended
previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel
free trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between
Israel and Egypt. QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to
serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan and Israel.
Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.-Jordanian trade, there has been only
a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 11-13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 55,000
people (working 8 hour days/6 days a week), 69% of whom are foreign workers from
South East Asian nations like Pakistan, India, Banghladesh, and Sri Lanka. In
general, foreign laborers are generally viewed as more skilled and productive than
local Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to recruit local Jordanians
since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant to separate from their
families, though in some areas local Jordanians are provided with free transportation
to the QIZs.
Sweat Shop Allegations. On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee
(NLC), a New York-based human rights advocacy group, issued a 161-page report
alleging sweatshop-like conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ)
plants in Jordan. Jordan’s trade minister Sharif Zu’bi subsequently acknowledged
that the government had failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and
has taken action since to close down factories in violation of the law. The NLC has
recognized the government’s recent actions, though it has suggested that violations
of worker rights may continue in smaller factories. Foreign companies with
operations inside QIZs must provide food and housing for workers. Conditions in
worker dormitories are reportedly inspected by retail garment buyers, and the
Jordanian government provides medical clinics and security for the zones. For
additional information, see CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in
Jordan: A Model for Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East?
, by Mary
Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp.

CRS-19
Military Cooperation
Military Sales. The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed
forces, which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian
military forces, though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned
by each of Jordan’s neighboring forces. In recent years, Jordan has used U.S. military
assistance grants to purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, upgrades
for its fleet of F-16 fighters (approximately 70-80), and BlackHawk helicopters. The
United States also delivered three Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early
2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations in Iraq.
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime
Contractor

FY2006
National Command & Control
$450 million
Northrop
System
Grumman
Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and
General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million
BAE Company
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
Joint Exercises and Training. A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military
Commission has functioned since 1974. More than 300 Jordanian military personnel
study in the United States each year.Combined training exercises by U.S. and
Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan ( dubbed “Early Victor”),
at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often. The above-mentioned courses
conducted by Jordan for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the
United States under a program called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.29 In
addition, the United Stas has supported the construction of the King Abdullah II
Center for Special Operations Training. The Center, which has been partially
financed by the United States including with $99 million in appropriations from the
FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13), will serve as a regional
headquarters for counter-terrorism training. In 2003, Jordan built a Special
Operations Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-
terrorism capabilities within the military.
Other Activities. Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, then President Clinton designated Jordan as a
major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on November 13, 1996.
According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan eligible for
priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already
appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases,
the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium
munitions.”
29 Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army — in Jordan,” Defense News, February 9,
2004, p.8.

CRS-20
According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military
hospitals to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health
care professionals to the two facilities. Both facilities provide critical health care to
numerous patients, including civilians. The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more
than 650 patients a day, having treated more than 500,000 since it was first deployed
in December 2001. The one in Iraq has treated more than four million people, and
surgeons have performed 1,638 operations. Jordan also regularly contributes
peacekeeping forces to United Nations missions abroad. In November 2006, a
Jordanian United Nations peacekeeping patrol in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince,
was killed while on patrol. Jordan has about 1,500 troops in the Brazilian-led U.N.
force, which includes more than 8,000 soldiers and police supported by some 1,000
civilian personnel. Two other Jordanian soldiers were killed in January 2006.
Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
FY2005, bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing
the ICC from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned.
This act contains waiver authority in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies
of the United States. A similar provision is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-
102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006. Jordan signed such an
agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004; however, the Jordanian
lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special session of
parliament on July 14, 2005. Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush
issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to
Jordan for six months. (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on
February 10, 2005, though PD-2005-20.) On January 8, 2006, however, the lower
house reversed its July 2005 vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from
ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel and U.S. employees working in Jordan. The bill
had already been endorsed by the upper house, paving the way for the King’s
signature.

CRS-21
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Totals
Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF*
IMET**
1991
35.0a
0
0
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
1992
30.0b
20.0
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
1993c
5.0
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
1994d
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f
150.0
0
0
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1.6
223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004
250.0
0
0
2.3
206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005
250.0
0
0
1.6
206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006
247.5
0
0
1.6
207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007i
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.3j
Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining
assistance. Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in
FY2001 (never acted upon by Congress).
*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program
a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF
under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100
million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace
and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i. Administration’s request.
j. Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25
million in NADR funds
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