Order Code RL30588 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated June 21, 2007 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005, but since 2006 insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s government have escalated to the point that some experts question the prospects for stabilizing Afghanistan. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and parliament leaders. The insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime escalated in 2006, after four years of minor Taliban militant activity. Contributing to the resurgence was popular frustration with lack of economic development, official corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government authority into rural areas. Narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures and funding insurgent activity. The Afghan government and some U.S. officials blame Pakistan for failing to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan, beyond the reach of U.S./NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. U.S. and NATO commanders anticipated a Taliban 2007 “spring offensive” and moved to preempt it with an increase in force levels and accelerated reconstruction efforts, possibly contributing to a lower level – and changing texture – of violence than expected, thus far. U.S. and NATO forces have also killed a few key Taliban battlefield leaders in 2007. U.S. and partner stabilization measures include strengthening the central government and its security forces. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army, deploying a 38,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 27,000 U.S. troops are in Afghanistan, of which all but about 12,000 are under NATO/ISAF command, and, in March 2007, President Bush approved an additional 3,500 U.S. forces to deploy there mainly to help train the ANA and other security forces. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States has given Afghanistan about $20 billion over the past five years, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the several tables at the end of this paper. Pending legislation, H.R. 2446, would reauthorize the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Contents Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Northern Alliance Congeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Political Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Human Rights and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) . . . . . . . . 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Afghan Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Afghan National Police/Justice Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 U.S. Security Forces Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 40 Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 FY2007 and FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 List of Tables Table 1. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan . . 25 Table 2. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request/Action . . . . . . . . . 52 Table 11. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Table 12. Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Table 13. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Background to Recent Developments Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal. Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s InterService Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulderfired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. CRS-2 On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.1 With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.2 1 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377. 2 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them. CRS-3 Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics Population: Ethnic Groups: 31 million (July 2006 est.) Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4% Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1% Literacy Rate: 28% of population over 15 years of age GDP: $21.5 billion (purchasing power parity) GDP Per Capita: $800 (purchasing power parity) GDP Real Growth: 11% (2007 Afghan gov’t estimate) Unemployment Rate: 40% Children in School 5 million (March 2007), of which 1.8 million are girls. Up from 900,000 in school during Taliban era Afghans With Access 80% (March 2007), compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality to Health Coverage has dropped 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built with U.S. funds since Taliban era. Roads Built Since 4,000 miles, with another 1,000 miles to be completed in 2007. Taliban Era Access to Electricity 10% of the population Revenues: $715 million for 2007 (Afghan gov’t. est.); $550 million 2006 Expenditures $1.2 billion for 2007 (est.); 900 million in 2006 External Debt: $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt to U.S. in 2006 Foreign Exchange $2 billion Reserves: Foreign Investment $1 billion est. for 2007; about $1 billion for 2006 Major Exports: fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium Oil Production: negligible Oil Proven Reserves: 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to Afghan government on March 15, 2006 Major Imports: food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles Imports: Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%; Turkey 4.1%; Turkmenistan 4.1% Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2007, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.; Afghan Finance Minister statements (April 2007), President Bush speech on February 15, 2007. CRS-4 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April - May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”), formed the Taliban movement. They practiced an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,” akin to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. They viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, under protection there, and then hanged them. Taliban Rule The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 61 years old. The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large CRS-5 Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they represented un-Islamic idolatry. The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women. The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not at any of the camps at the time. Some observers assert that the Administration missed several purported opportunities to strike bin Laden. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with direct U.S. military force because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values. The Northern Alliance Congeals. The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Among them were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in the table at the end of this paper (Table 13). ! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, although Dostam had earlier contributed to efforts to oust Rabbani. ! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups). CRS-6 ! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance. The September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials wanted to assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces. Other covert options might have been under consideration as well.3 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues. Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority. September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:4 all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons. 3 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. 4 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002. CRS-7 Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai brothers. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said “major combat operations” had ended. Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction5 The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government; the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated ceasefires between warring factions always broke down, and non-U.N. initiatives fared no better, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts, including one from the Karzai clan and one centered on Zahir Shah. Political Transition Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999). 5 More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth Katzman. CRS-8 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations gathered major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany. Bonn Agreement. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”6 It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement included the following provisions: ! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004). Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration, weighted toward the Northern Alliance (17 out of 30 positions, including Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior). In the interim, the constitution of 1964 applied.7 ! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. The agreement also referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter narcotics, crime, and terrorism. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) formally authorized the international peacekeeping force. Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a representative imprimatur on the transition. It was attended by former King Zahir Shah, joining 1,550 delegates (of which about 200 were women) from 381 districts of Afghanistan. At the gathering, Zahir Shah and Rabbani yielded to Karzai to remain leader until presidential elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. However, major powers were given to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president. 6 7 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm]. The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate. CRS-9 Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai, about 51, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a credible Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate corruption, resulting in a slower than expected pace of reform and professionalization of government. From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Hamid Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other antiTaliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have lived in the Baltimore area of the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election. Karzai said in August 2006 that he might not run for a second term in 2009 presidential elections. National Elections. The October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were postponed. No date is set for these elections. Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. There are 90 registered political parties, but the voting was conducted for individuals running in each province, and groups in parliament are not organized as parties but rather as blocs of like-minded allies. When it convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, engineered selection of former Karzai presidential election rival Qanooni for speaker of the lower house. In April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani organized this opposition bloc, along with ex-Communists and some royal family members, into a party called the “National Front” that wants increased parliamentary powers and direct elections for the provincial governors. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). The leader of that body is Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in a bombing of his convoy in March 2006. Governance Issues With a permanent national government now fully assembled, Karzai and the parliament – relations between which are often contentious – are attempting to CRS-10 improve and expand governance throughout the country. The new parliament has asserted itself on several occasions, for example in the process of confirming a postelection cabinet. Modernizers in the parliament also succeeded in forcing Karzai to oust several major conservatives from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence, and it has established itself in oversight of the national budget. In mid-2007, the parliament enacted a law granting amnesty to commanders who fought in the various Afghan wars since the Soviet invasion – some of whom are now members of parliament – in an attempt to put past schisms to rest in building a new Afghanistan. The law initially was vetoed by Karzai and was rewritten to give victims the ability to bring accusations of past abuses forward. One of the most vocal parliamentary critics of the so-called “warlords” is female deputy Malalai Joya, who was suspended in May 2007 for that outspoken criticism. Also in May 2007, the parliament voted no confidence against Foreign Minister Rangeen Spanta and Minister for Refugee Affairs Akbar Akbar for failing to prevent Iran from expelling 50,000 Afghan refugees over a one-month period. Karzai accepted the dismissal of Akbar but referred Spanta’s dismissal because refugee affairs are not his ministry’s prime jurisdiction. Parliamentary unrest also emerged in May 2007 over the high number of civilian casualties caused by U.S./NATO combat operations; the upper house voted to require international forces to consult with Afghan authorities prior to combat operations and for negotiations with Taliban fighters. This revived memories of one of parliament’s first actions, which was to pass a resolution requiring international forces to dismantle the large security barriers erected around Kabul. Even though the central government structure has filled out, it still suffers from lack of capacity and the slow expansion of its writ in outlying regions of most provinces. Some press reports say that confidence in Karzai on the part of some major donor countries has waned because of government corruption, as well as compromises with local factions that have the effect of slowing modernization and reform. A reported CIA assessment in November 2006 found that increasing numbers of Afghans view the government as weak and corrupt.8 U.S. officials say they maintain confidence in Karzai, and continue to work to build the capacity of the central government. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of high-level visits, including several by Vice President Cheney and one by President Bush (March 1, 2006). During 2006, then commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Carl Eikenberry (he departed Afghanistan in January 2007), worked to extend Afghan government authority by conducting visits to all provinces along with Afghan ministers to determine local needs and heighten the profile of the central government. In a February 2007 CNN interview, Eikenberry said the amount of “governed space” in Afghanistan is increasing, a viewed echoed by then U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann in a March 13, 2007, New York Times interview, and by several other senior U.S. officials. 8 Rohde, David and James Risen. CIA Review Highlights Afghan Leader’s Woes. New York Times, November 5, 2006. CRS-11 Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias. To strengthen the central government, the United States has supported efforts by Karzai to curb key regional strongmen and local militias. Karzai has cited these actors as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of justice and generation of popular resentment through their demands for bribes and other favors. Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains local militias. In June 2006, Karzai authorized arming some local tribal militias (arbokai) to help in local policing, saying that these militias would provide security and be loyal to the nation and central government and that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below. Several of these local militias are now operating. Although smaller militias persist, Karzai has marginalized most of the largest regional leaders - so called “warlords.” ! Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed in September 2004 and was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, Khan was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after SunniShiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes that some believe were stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his continued influence in Herat. ! Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. However, in May 2007 Dostam’s followers in the north were again restive (conducting large demonstrations) in attempting to force out the anti-Dostam governor of Jowzjan Province. ! Another key figure, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January 2005 (including four Scud missiles). ! In July 2004, Karzai moved charismatic Northern Alliance commander Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazare-Sharif area to governor of Balkh province, although he reportedly remains resistant to central government control. ! Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat Ali was subsequently elected to parliament. Karzai has tried to use his power to appoint provincial governors to extend government authority and its efficiency. In 2005 and 2006, he appointed some relatively younger technocrats in key governorships instead of local strongmen; examples include Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, Helmand governor Asadullah Wafa, and Paktia CRS-12 governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. (Taniwal was killed in a suicide bombing on September 10, 2006.) However, some Afghans accuse some of these governors, such as Qandahar’s Khalid, of complicity with narcotics traffickers. DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism was a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (reducing the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, producing a more broad-based ministry leadership. The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later reduced by Afghan officials to just over 60,000. According to UNAMA, a total of 63,380 militia fighters were disarmed by the end of the program. Of those, 55,800 exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options, although U.N. officials say about 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. The total cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors, including the United States. Some studies criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its partners.9 Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were collected. Figures for collected weapons are contained in the table below. Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called “DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. The program seeks to disarm, by December 2007, a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. Under the DIAG, no payments are available to fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. The program is not operating in most of the south because armed groups, fearing the Taliban, refuse to disarm voluntarily, and UNAMA officials told CRS in March 2007 that the program was not making progress overall. DIAG has not been as well funded as is DDR: thus far, the program has received $11 million in operating funds. 9 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf]. CRS-13 As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors are making available $35 million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. U.S. Embassy Operations. A key component of U.S. efforts to strengthen the Afghan government has been maintaining a large and active diplomatic presence. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, was ambassador during December 2003-August 2005; he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government decisions.10 The current ambassador is William Wood. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs. As part of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly focused on helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop private industries. The U.S. embassy, now housed in a newly constructed building, has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities, and the State Department wants to build an additional housing complex. The tables at the end of this paper discuss U.S. funding for Embassy operations, USAID operations, and Karzai protection, which is now led by Afghan forces but with continuing U.S. advice. Human Rights and Democracy. The Administration and Afghan government claim some progress in building a democratic Afghanistan that adheres to international standards of human rights practices. It is hoped that progress would convince the population that the Afghan government deserves its support. The State Department report on human rights practices for 2006 (released March 6, 2007)11 generally praises the Afghan government for providing human rights training to its police force and taking action to remove corrupt officials, but adds that resource limitations prevent more sweeping efforts to curb abuses. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders. Some observers were disappointed by Karzai’s August 2006 decision, apparently prompted by religious hardliners, to consider reconstituting a “Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” although Karzai has not issued the decree needed to revive the body, suggesting the idea has been dropped. Another issue has arisen in 2007 in the form of a draft press law that some activists said would increase government control over private media. Since the Taliban era, more than 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350 independent newspapers have opened. The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2006 (released September 15, 2006) indicates progress on religious freedom but says there continues to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities 10 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide. 11 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78868.htm]. CRS-14 such as Sikhs and Hindus. On the other hand, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom said in a report released in May 2006 that there is rising religious persecution, a judgment that is consistent with observations of other experts. Some observers have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law. Other accounts say that alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores. A major religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan constitution’s commitment to international standards of human rights protections, President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case that demonstrated judicial conservatism on religious matters was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. The replacement of the chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative, might prevent a repeat of similar incidents in the future. An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has been formed to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar. The House-passed Afghan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) reauthorization bill (H.R. 2446) would authorize $10 million per year for this Commission until FY2010. The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build democratic traditions at the local level. At the local level, an Afghan government “National Solidarity Program,” largely funded by international donors, seeks to create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been women.12 Funding Issues. According to USAID, figures provided on April 17, 2007, USAID has spent the following amounts on democracy and rule of law programs for Afghanistan: FY2002 - $25 million; FY2003 - $42 million; FY2004 - $153 million; FY2005 - $103 million; FY2006 - $23 million; and FY2007 - $68 million (est). The figures for FY2004 and FY2005 were elevated due to spending to assist the Afghan 12 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004. CRS-15 presidential and parliamentary elections. The funding also includes support for civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, and local governance. Advancement of Women. According to State Department report, the Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s powers and influence are limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai nominated only one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the cabinet that followed the parliamentary elections, and she was voted down by opposition from Islamist conservatives in parliament, leaving no women in the cabinet. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women. More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls’ schools have increased, and on September 25, 2006, the chief of the Women’s Affairs Ministry branch in Qandahar, Safia Amajan, was assassinated. The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs. Funding Issues. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The House-passed AFSA reauthorization (H.R. 2446) would authorize $5 million per year for this Ministry. Appropriations for programs for CRS-16 women and girls, when specified, are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. Combating Narcotics Trafficking.13 Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan, generating funds to sustain the Taliban and criminal groups. Narcotics account for an estimated $2.7 billion in value — about 27% of Afghanistan’s GDP, according to the Finance Minister in April 2007. Production in 2006 was 6,100 tons, and Afghanistan is the source of about 93% of the world’s illicit opium supply; production in the restive provinces of Helmand and Uruzgan increased 132% in 2006. A U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report released March 5, 2007, said that the opium harvest could be even larger in 2007 than it was in 2006 because planting of poppy crop has increased in 15 provinces. In response to congressional calls for an increased U.S. focus on the drug problem, in March 2007 the Administration created a post of coordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan, naming Thomas Schweich of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to that post. The Afghan government wants to focus on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing and on targeting key traffickers, but it is, in partnership with the United States, undertaking efforts to eradicate poppy fields. Those who praise Afghan cooperation against narcotics note the December 2006 appointment of Asadullah Wafa as governor of poppy-rich Helmand Province (as well as a new deputy governor), replacing officials less amenable to countering the narcotics trade. On the other hand, reflecting Afghan opposition to some eradication methods, on January 25, 2007, the cabinet voted down a U.S. proposal to allow ground-based chemical spraying of poppy fields, saying that the chemicals would threaten plants and animals. UNODC head Antonio Maria Costa wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post on April 25, 2007, speculating that major Afghan traffickers are stockpiling opium supplies and that a fruitful new strategy should focus on finding and arresting major traffickers. To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome its initial reluctance to expand its mission and is playing a greater role in counternarcotics, but it still does not conduct military attacks on poppy fields. It is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The Department of Defense is also playing the major role in training and equipping specialized Afghan counter-narcotics police, in developing an Afghan intelligence fusion cell, and training Afghan border police, as well as assisting an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the country. The U.S. military is reportedly resisting calls by the DEA and other agencies to move to active attacks on drug bazaars and other narcotics-related targets.14 NATO commanders, who have taken over security responsibilities throughout Afghanistan, say they are providing information to Afghan counternarcotics officials to help them target their efforts and increasingly target operations 13 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. 14 Meyer, Josh. “Pentagon Resists Pleas For Help in Afghan Opium Fight.” Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2006. CRS-17 against large drug traffickers. The Bush Administration has taken some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers;15 in April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. The United States is funding a new Counternarcotics Justice Center (estimated cost, $8 million) in Kabul to prosecute and incarcerate suspected traffickers.16 The Bush Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.17 The Administration has exercised waiver provisions to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed to provide more than $225 million in recent U.S. economic assistance appropriations for Afghanistan. A similar certification requirement (to provide amounts over $225 million) is contained in the House version of the FY2008 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 2764). Other provisions on counter-narcotics, such as recommending a pilot crop substitution program and cutting U.S. aid to any Afghan province whose officials are determined complicit in drug trafficking, are contained in the AFSA reauthorization bill (H.R. 2446). Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which purportedly dramatically decreased cultivation.18 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed. International investors are returning, and there is substantial new construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005 and a $25 million new Coca Cola bottling factory that opened in Kabul on September 11, 2006. Several Afghan companies are growing as well, including Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell phone service), and Tolo Television. On the other hand, the 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load. Some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). 15 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004. 16 Risen, James. “Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War.” New York Times, May 16, 2007. 17 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking. 18 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7, 2001. CRS-18 The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not begun to date. Another concept has been to develop joint Afghan-Pakistan industrial zones, goods produced in which would receive duty free treatment upon entry into the United States. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its neighbors. Afghan officials are said to be optimistic for increased trade with Central Asia when a new bridge opens later this year over the Panj River, dividing Afghanistan from Tajikistan. The bridge is being built with U.S. assistance. Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.19 The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Turkmenistan’s new leadership is likely to favor the project as well because it is following the policies of the late President Niyazov. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. The five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan restates that the sectors discussed below are priorities. Some statistics on what has 19 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3. CRS-19 been accomplished are shown in the table earlier in this paper. Later in this paper are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, including some detail on funds earmarked for categories of civilian reconstruction, and discussing the February 5, 2007, Administration request for FY2007 supplemental and FY2008 funds. ! Roads. Despite progress on road building, many villages remain isolated by poor and non-existent roads and former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. Eikenberry said “where the roads end, the Taliban begin.” Among projects completed: the KabulQandahar roadway project; the Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, completed by 2006; and a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in late 2005. A U.S.-funded ($16 million) road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul has been built. U.S. funds are also building a Khost-Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province. On October 19, 2006, $94 million in Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds were allocated to build 200 miles of new roads in Qandahar, Uruzgan, Nuristan, Kunar, Paktika, and Ghazni provinces. ! Education and Health. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. About $152 million in U.S. funds were programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif. ! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past five years. Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation. ! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010. Press reports say that there are severe power shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to nearly 4 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power. The Afghan government, with help from international donors, plans to import electricity from Central Asian and other neighbors beginning in 2009 to help address the shortages. CRS-20 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) continuing combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has been increasing U.S. forces over the past year in response to the 2006 upsurge of Taliban attacks. (The increase in force levels in Afghanistan has been achieved, in part, by extending the tour of part of the 10th Mountain Division.) As of October 5, 2006, NATO/ISAF has led peacekeeping operations, including combat in the restive areas. About 60% of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (numbers are in the security indicators table below) are under NATO command, and the remainder are under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), conducting combat against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant formations primarily in eastern Afghanistan. The NATO/ISAF force is headed as of February 2007 by U.S. Gen. Dan McNeil, taking over from U.K. General David Richards. U.S. OEF combat operations are directed by Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, head of Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82), headquartered at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be running about $1.5 billion per month. For information on U.S. military costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. Prior to the transfer to NATO command, nineteen coalition countries — primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy — were contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF, but almost all of these have now been “re-badged” to the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. Some foreign contingents remain part of OEF only, and not NATO/ISAF – these include South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base and a small unit of soldiers from the United Arab Emirates (one of whom was captured in action in June 2007). In December 2006, France withdrew its 200 Special Forces that were performing counter-terrorism missions near Jalalabad, a decision that will not affect the other French forces serving under NATO/ISAF. French aircraft continue to fly strikes from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar as part of the “Combined Air Operations Center.” In part to compensate, France provided two additional helicopters to OEF and offered to train Afghan special forces. Among other coalition efforts, Japan provides naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. Also, the U.S. leads a naval interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea (headquartered in Bahrain) intended to prevent the movement of terrorists from Afghanistan/Pakistan across those waters. CRS-21 Prior to 2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had believed that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, had weakened the insurgency to the point of virtual irrelevance. The Taliban Resurgence. In the upsurge of violence since mid-2006, Taliban insurgents, sometimes adapting suicide and roadside bombing characteristic of the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for on July 31, 2006. The Taliban resilience led to U.S. military comments that the Taliban was “growing in influence” in the south, and there has been debate among experts whether the resurgence was driven by popular frustration with the widely perceived corruption within the Karzai government and the slow pace of economic reconstruction. Some believe that Afghans in the restive areas have been intimidated by the Taliban into providing food and shelter, while others believe that some villages welcome any form of justice, even if administered by the Taliban. Taliban attacks on schools, teachers, and other civilian infrastructure have reportedly caused popular anger against the movement, but others say they appreciate the Taliban’s reputation for avoiding corruption. The Afghan government asserts that the increase in the insurgency is because Pakistan is not denying the Taliban a safe haven there. Fighting was intense between May and August 2006, as NATO forces fought large (300-person) Taliban formations in those provinces. In mid-2006, the U.S. and NATO forces launched “Operation Mountain Lion” and “Operation Mountain Thrust,” intended to clear areas of the restive southern and eastern provinces in advance of the NATO assumption of responsibility. Another offensive, led by NATO, was conducted in August 2006 (Operation Medusa), which was considered a success in ousting Taliban fighters from the Panjwai district near Qandahar. That operation also demonstrated that NATO would conduct intensive combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of that operation, British forces entered into an agreement with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they would secure the main town of the district without an active NATO presence. On February 2, 2007, Taliban insurgents overran and held Musa Qala town, demonstrating that the tribes were unable to secure the district without NATO forces. Subsequently, NATO aircraft killed several Taliban commanders who had led the attack, but the town remains in Taliban hands amid reports that Taliban fighters are arresting and abusing civilians remaining in the town. NATO operations have not tried to retake Musa Qala to date. Following the 2006 operations, U.S. and NATO commanders expressed optimism that the offensives had suppressed the new Taliban challenge, and Taliban commanders admitted they were conducting a “tactical retreat” from the southern provinces, and began to operate in provinces more north and west, including Ghazni and Farah. During the 2006-2007 winter months, Taliban formations attacked CRS-22 NATO positions in these areas, although at a relatively lower frequency than in mid2006. On February 27, 2007, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing inside the first of several security perimeters around of Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul, where visiting Vice President Cheney was staying. U.S. military spokespersons said Cheney was far from the bomb site. In early 2007, U.S. and NATO commanders sought to pre-empt an anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” by an estimated 8,000 Taliban fighters. The effort depended on added NATO forces, including about 3,200 U.S. troops and another 3,800 pledged by other NATO countries, discussed below. In a pre-emptive move against Taliban preparations, on March 6, 2007, about 4,500 NATO troops and 1,000 Afghan soldiers began “Operation Achilles” to combat militants massing in the Sangin district of northern Helmand Province. One purpose of the operation was to pacify the area around a key dam that needs additional construction work; when completed, it will supply electricity to the surrounding areas. Another objective was to carve out and expands islands of stability and reconstruction to attract popular support in the restive areas. To date, the “offensive” has not materialized, and U.S. and NATO commanders said in May and June 2007 that their efforts are achieving their objectives, depriving the Taliban of the ability to control substantial swaths of territory. In June 2007, an outgoing Dutch commander (Maj. Gen. Ton van Loon) went so far as to say the Taliban had “lost the war.” However, the Taliban and related militants appear to be shifting tactics to suicide bombings against NATO, U.S., and Afghan targets in an effort to disrupt reconstruction and sew instability. The NATO operations, and a related offensive in late April 2007 (Operation Silicon), had a major success on May 12, 2007, when the purportedly ruthless leader of the Taliban insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was tracked by U.S. and NATO forces and killed in Helmand Province. A U.S. airstrike in late December 2006 killed another prominent commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani. Still, the Taliban has shown substantial resilience with such actions as a suicide bombing in Kabul on June 17, 2007, which killed about 35 Afghan police recruits on a bus. Also in mid-June 2007, Taliban and Al Qaeda allies reportedly gathered in the Chowreh district of Uruzgan province and took over several police posts until they were ousted by coalition counter-action. Despite recent losses, the Taliban command structure remains mostly intact and believed to be working with Al Qaeda leaders still at large; some are able to give interviews to Pakistani (Geo television) and other media stations. In addition to Mullah Umar, Jalaludin Haqqani remains at large, leading an insurgent faction operating around Khost. Haqqani is believed to have contact with Al Qaeda leaders in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. Dadullah has been replaced by his brother, Dadullah Mansoor. (Mansoor was one of five Taliban leaders released in March 2007 in exchange for the freedom of kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo.) The Taliban has several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” and publishes videos. Some Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. Karzai prompted some Northern Alliance criticism in April 2007 with an admission that he himself had met some Taliban CRS-23 militants in an effort to bring them over to the government side. However, such overtures have been going on for years; according to press reports, about 50-60 senior militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the reconciliation process since 2004. Another Taliban figure, its former ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty. The Taliban official who was governor of Bamiyan Province when the Buddha statues there were blown up, Mohammad Islam Mohammedi — and who was later elected to the post-Taliban parliament from Samangan Province — was assassinated in Kabul in January 2007. Despite the apparent progress against the Taliban, the Afghan government – including Karzai and the Afghan parliament – has become increasingly critical of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. and NATO operations. In a joint meeting on May 21, 2007, President Bush and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that U.S. and NATO operations were seeking to avoid civilian casualties but that such results were sometimes inevitable in the course of fighting the Taliban. Whereabouts of Bin Laden and Other Militants. Complicating the U.S. mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value targets” of Al Qaeda: leaders believed to be in Pakistan but who are believed able to direct Al Qaeda fighters to assist the Taliban. The two most notable are Osama bin Laden himself and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. They reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.20 A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.21 Several press reports in February and March 2007 say that Al Qaeda is regrouping and strengthening in the tribal areas of Pakistan, although this is considered outside the reach of U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan. Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. His fighters are operating in Kunar Province, east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have been searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was shot down, killing the 16 aboard. In March 2007, Hikmatyar injected some optimism into the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by telling the Associated Press that 20 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman. 21 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. New York Times, November 10, 2006. CRS-24 he had ended cooperation with the Taliban and was open to negotiating with Karzai an end to his faction’s fight. U.S. Military Presence/Use of Facilities. Even if the Taliban insurgency is completely defeated, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan, although U.S. officials have not committed to that outcome. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. Delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai the requested greater control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in the table. CRS-25 Table 1. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan Facility Use Bagram Air Base 50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-82. At least 500 U.S. military personnel are based there, assisted by about 175 South Korean troops. Handles many of the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital under construction, one of the first permanent structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $20 million for military construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Qandahar Air Field Just outside Qandahar, bases about 500 U.S. military personnel. Major staging area for U.S./NATO operations in southern Afghanistan. Shindand Air Base In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose militia forces controlled the facility. Peter Ganci Base: Manas, Kyrgyzstan Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, Bakiyev demanded a large increase in the $2 million per year U.S. contribution for use of the base. Dispute resolved in July 2006 with U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan $150 million in assistance and base use payments. But, Kyrgyz parliament voted in May 2007 to ask U.S. to leave the base, an issue discussed by Defense Sec. Gates in Bishkek in June 2007. Incirlik Air Base, Turkey About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey. Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 appropriated $1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra. Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses CENTCOM forward headquarters. Strike and support missions flown into Iraq and Afghanistan, according to observers. Naval Support Facility, Bahrain U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there. KarsiKhanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan Not used by U.S. since September 2005 following U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. CRS-26 The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)22 As discussed above, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF, consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus 11 partner countries) now commands peacekeeping operations. (Table 11 lists each contributing country to ISAF and the approximate number of forces contributed.) ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001),23 initially limited to Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF in August 2003 paved the way for an expansion of its scope, and NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively).24 The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan, was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of command, the United States put U.S. troops operating in eastern Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF command; they form the bulk of “Regional Command East” (RC-E). The current commander, who took over in February 2007, is U.S. Army General Dan McNeil; he heads “ISAF 10.” In order to avoid the impression that foreign forces are “occupying” Afghanistan, NATO said on August 15, 2006, that it would negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15 initiatives to secure Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces. Differences between the United States and other NATO countries on the Afghan mission remain over the size of European contributions to the mission, although disputes appear to have lessened as contributions and commitment to combat have increased. Subsequent to a February 2007 NATO meeting in Seville, Spain, NATO and other ISAF members agreed to deploy 3,800 troops that U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan determined was needed to blunt the anticipated Taliban spring offensive. Of those, about 1,000 are from Poland, and Britain is adding about 1,400. Another additional 75 came from the Czech Republic, and Norway is contributing another 150, mostly special forces. Australia, which is not a member of NATO but has contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Uruzgan, has sent almost 22 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF. 23 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006). 24 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. CRS-27 500 additional forces. Lithuania is contributing special forces, and Turkey and Bulgaria are contributing additional forces. In April 2007, NATO ministers also decided to send about 3,200 trainers for Afghan security forces - a pledge sought because the Defense Department has had difficulty finding U.S. trainers for that role – although Defense Secretary Gates emphasized at a NATO meeting in Brussels on June 14, 2007 that the pledge had not yet been fulfilled. He also sought commitment of about 3,000 additional NATO/ISAF combat troops. The NATO assumption of command represents a quieting of the initial opposition of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related peacekeeping with anti-insurgent combat. Some in the Dutch parliament opposed their country’s deployment to the south, but the parliament voted on February 3, 2006, to permit the move. On April 24, 2007, despite recent deaths of 54 Canadian forces in Afghanistan to date, Canada’s House of Commons narrowly voted to keep Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan until at least 2009. On the basis of that domestic opposition in the NATO countries, Afghan and some U.S. officials privately questioned the resolve of NATO nations to combat the Taliban resurgence, although the intensity of combat in 2006 might have assuaged Afghan concerns. Press reports in March 2007 said Italy’s Prime Minister Romano Prodi faced domestic pressure to withdraw Italy’s forces from Afghanistan, but the Italian parliament approved an extension of the mission in March 2007. Some progress has been made in persuading other NATO countries to adopted flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the combat conducted by the U.S.led OEF forces. Still, some NATO countries maintain so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations. There have been about 50 such “caveats” that U.S. commanders said were limiting operational flexibility. Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example, refuse to deploy ground troops in the south where the mission is mostly combat, although German transport aircraft reportedly have been helping with airlift to southern Afghanistan. Others have refused to conduct night-time combat. Still others have refused to carry Afghan National Army or other Afghan personnel on their helicopters. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and attendant casualties. There has been some criticism of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan, which focuses heavily on building relationships with tribal leaders and identifying reconstruction priorities, and not on actively combating Taliban formations. Some believe this approach allows Taliban fighters to group and expand their influence, although the Netherlands says this approach is key to a longterm pacification of the south. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia during November 28-29, 2006, some NATO countries, particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove some of these caveats, and all agreed that their forces would come to each others’ defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan. Another point of contention has been NATO’s chronic personnel and equipment shortages (particularly helicopters) for the Afghanistan mission. In December 2003, NATO made available 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. In connection with their increased responsibilities as of July 2006, Britain has brought in additional equipment, CRS-28 including Apache attack helicopters, and the Netherlands is deploying additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces in the south. Italy has sent “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.25 Additional pledges of helicopters and equipment, including from France, were made at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006. At the NATO meeting in February 2007 in Seville, Germany pledged an additional eight combat aircraft for use in Afghanistan (which are enroute to Afghanistan as of April 5, 2007), and in February 2007, Italy has agreed to send additional aircraft to the mission and Iceland agreed to provide additional airlift assets. Still, the helicopter shortage persists, as discussed between the United States and other NATO countries in Brussels on June 14, 2007. NATO/ISAF also coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located). Provincial Reconstruction Teams NATO/ISAF expansion in Afghanistan builds on a December 2002 U.S. initiative to establish “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs, and most of the PRTs in southern Afghanistan, focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.26 However, other relief groups do not want to associate with military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. There are 25 PRTs in operation, with plans to establish PRTs in almost all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United States turned over several PRTs to partner countries, and virtually all the PRTs are now under ISAF control, but with varying lead nations. The list of the existing PRTs, including lead country, is shown in Table 12. Each PRT operated by the United States is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects, as shown in the tables at the report’s end. In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command South, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands 25 Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19, 2006. 26 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003. CRS-29 took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province. Germany (with Turkey and France) took over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain and the Netherlands when those countries deployed to the south. Representing evolution of the PRT concept, Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that region. U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over the lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. Afghan Security Forces U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are training the new Afghan National Army (ANA). The table below shows its current strength and target levels, as well as that of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The target ANA size, 70,000, was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006, although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Defense Minister says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he said in January 2007 that the ANA is growing by about 2,000 per month. The United States has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-eSharif). President Bush announced on February 15, 2007, that Denmark, Greece, Norway, and Slovakia would provide additional funding for the ANA and ANP. The Indian press reported on April 24, 2007 that a team from the Indian Army would go to Afghanistan to help train the ANA.27 The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about ten to twenty per battalion). Some U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength operations, according to U.S. officers. In June 2007, the ANA (and ANP) led “Operation Maiwand” in Ghazni province, intended to open schools and deliver humanitarian aid to people throughout the province. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. President Bush said on February 15, 2007, that, to boost ANA capabilities, the United States would help the ANA add a commando battalion and combat support units. Fully trained 27 Indian television news channel NDTV. April 24, 2007. CRS-30 recruits are paid about $100 per month; generals receive about $530 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) requires that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. Other officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. President Bush said on February 15, 2007, that a helicopter unit would be added to provide additional airlift capability. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or armor. In July 2006, the Administration announced it would be drawing down about $2 billion worth of equipment for transfer to the ANA over the next 12 to 18 months. As part of this draw-down, on February 2, 2007, in the largest weapons transfer to date, the United States delivered 213 Humvees to the Afghan National Army (ANA), as well as 12,000 light weapons. This was the first installment of a planned transfer of over 800 various armored vehicles to the ANA. The Administration is allowed to draw down from existing stocks – without being reimbursed by appropriated funds – to a total ceiling value of $550 million. Draw-downs over that amount would have to be reimbursed by appropriated funds. The AFSA reauthorization bill (H.R. 2446) would raise this un-reimbursed value to $300 million in value per year. Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. International donors (primarily East bloc nations), Defense Ministry weapons stocks, 28 and the DDR program discussed above have previously furnished most of 28 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July (continued...) CRS-31 the ANA weaponry. International donors have also furnished $120 million in cash for the Afghan National Police. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. Egypt has made two major shipments of weapons to the ANA containing 17,000 small arms. The Czech Republic is said to be considering providing up to 10 refurbished helicopters to the ANA. Afghan National Police/Justice Sector. U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. All accounts say that the police force and justice sector are key weaknesses because of corruption, including reputed growing of poppy crop at some police locations. The United States and Germany (41 trainers) are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force, and, to try to accelerate training, the European Union announced on February 12, 2007, that its countries would send an additional 160 police trainers and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. Some will be from Romania. As noted above, the United States and NATO are trying to provide an additional 3,200 trainers for the ANP, but with mixed success identifying personnel available to date. The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. There are currently seven police training centers around Afghanistan. To address the widely cited continuing inadequacy of ANP presence around Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition began a program in August 2006 to hire 11,200 “auxiliary police” to serve in the restive south. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1, passed by the House on January 9, 2007, recommends a major increase in U.S. and international training of the Afghan police. Police figures are provided in Table 2. To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A is providing about 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. A report by the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Department, circulated to Congress in December 2006, found that most ANP units have less than 50% of their authorized equipment,29 among its significant criticisms. Many experts believe that comprehensive police and justice sector reform is vital to Afghan governance. Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses. However, some governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of 86 total) 28 (...continued) 22, 2003. 29 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and of Defense. Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. November 2006. Department of State report No. ISP-IQ0-07-07. CRS-32 who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform committee. The ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. Another problem is widespread corruption, because ANP officers only receive salaries of about $70 per month, and they reputedly encourage bribery to supplement these earnings, causing popular resentment. Some outside experts recommend raising police salaries as a means of reducing the incentive to engage in corruption. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces (which are included in the police figures cited). U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform. The United States has trained over 750 judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, according to President Bush on February 15, 2007, and built 40 judicial facilities. USAID also trains court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. On February 15, 2007, President Bush also praised Karzai’s formation of a Criminal Justice Task Force that is trying to crack down on official corruption, and the United States, Britain, and Norway are providing mentors to the Afghan judicial officials involved in that effort. U.S. Security Forces Funding. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the State Department. CRS-33 Table 2. Major Security-Related Indicators Force Current Level Total U.S. Forces in Afghanistan 27,000, up from about 19,000 in 2005. Rising to 30,000 with March 2007 announcement of additional 3,500 to train ANA/ANP U.S. Forces Not Under ISAF Command 12,000 for OEF combat, primarily in east. A few thousand training Afghan security forces or are attached to PRTs. OEF Partner Forces not under NATO/ISAF under 1,000. Has decreased as NATO/ISAF has taken over nationwide peacekeeping as of October 5, 2006 Number of U.S. airstrikes flown in support of operations 2,000 (May - November 2006) U.S. Casualties 337 killed, of which 216 by hostile action. Additional 62 U.S. deaths in other theaters of OEF, including the Phillipines and parts of Africa (OEF-Trans Sahara). Partner Country Casualties 90 in 2007 (a/o June 2007) Afghan Civilian Casualties 900 in 2006, of which 230 were from coalition attacks. About 380 thus far in 2007, of which 51 killed by coalition. NATO/ISAF Peacekeeping About 38,000 (incl. 15,000 U.S. now formally under ISAF command). Compares to 12,000 ISAF in 2005; and 6,000 in 2003. Will be about 39,500 when all new NATO force contributions are in place. NATO Sectors (Regional Commands-south, east, north, west, and capital/Kabul) RC-S - 11,500 RC-E - 13,500 RC-N - 3,000 RC-W - 2,100 RC-Kabul - 5,000 national contingent commands - 1,650 Afghan National Army (ANA) 36,000 current, with 70,000 official goal by 2010 Afghan National Police (ANP) 70,000 on duty, of which 50,000 are both trained and equipped. 375 U.S. advisors, mostly contractors. Goal is 82,000. Counter-Narcotics Police 2,600 Legally Armed Fighters disarmed by DDR 63,380; all of the pool identified for the program Weapons Collected by DDR 36,000 medium and light; 12,250 heavy Armed Groups disbanded by DIAG Commanders in areas of the following provinces have disarmed: Badakhshan, Takhar, Kapisa, Laghman, Paktia, Baghlan, Ghazni. Goal is to disband 1,800 groups, of which several hundred are “significant” (five or more fighters). Weapons Collected by DIAG 22,000 Number of Suicide Bombings 138 in 2006, compared to 21 in 2005. About 50 thus far in 2007. Number of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) 1,693 found or exploded in 2006, double the number of 2005. Afghans Killed by Landmines 700 in 2006 vs. 1,700 in 2002 Number of insurgents killed in 4,000 in 2006, including 2,000 killed September-December operations CRS-34 Regional Context Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below. Pakistan Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (one of only three countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some Afghan leaders, still views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an Afghanistan sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. The efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations have not recovered from a setback in March 2006, when Afghan leaders stepped up accusations that Pakistan was allowing Taliban remnants from operating there. Some progress was made during a September 6, 2006, visit by President Musharraf to Kabul where he pledged to seek out and destroy the Pakistan-based command structure of the Taliban. Despite continuing mutual accusations during visits by Karzai and Musharraf to Washington, D.C. in late September, further progress was made at a joint dinner for Karzai and Musharraf hosted by President Bush on September 28, 2006. At that session, the two leaders agreed to gather tribal elders on both sides of their border to persuade them not to host Taliban militants. Reflecting continuing differences, in October 2006 Karzai said that Mullah Umar is hiding in the Pakistani city of Quetta, an allegation denied by Pakistan. In a New York Times interview published April 1, 2007, Karzai accused Pakistani security forces of sheltering Umar, saying Afghanistan had “solid, clear information indicating this.” In a press interview on February 2, 2007, President Musharraf tacitly acknowledged that some senior Taliban leaders might be able to operate from Pakistan but strongly denied that any Pakistani intelligence agencies were deliberately assisting the Taliban. There have also been questions about the wisdom of a September 5, 2006, agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this region to exchange an end to Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas for a promise by the tribal elders to expel militants from the border area. Some say that “Pakistani Taliban” have continued to gain influence over the villages in these regions. In a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Kabul in January 2007, Karzai strongly CRS-35 criticized a Pakistani plan to mine and fence their common border in an effort to prevent infiltration of militants to Afghanistan. Even though the move was a Pakistani attempt to increase its efforts to help Afghanistan, Karzai said the move would separate tribes and families that straddle the border. He said there was still an “increasing lack of trust” between the countries. Pakistan subsequently dropped the idea of mining the border, but is beginning to build some fencing. On May 1, 2007, Musharraf and Karzai reached agreement on a bilateral intelligence sharing plan to undermine extremists on both sides of the border, and U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani military officers have been meeting on either side of the border to coordinate efforts against extremists. After one such meeting in May 2007, an unknown assailant killed a U.S. soldier on the Pakistani side of the border. On May 17, 2007, about 1,000 Afghans demonstrated at the Pakistan embassy in Kabul to protest recent clashes between Afghan and Pakistani border guards. Particularly following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President Musharraf, Pakistan has exerted substantial efforts against Al Qaeda. Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the PakistanAfghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. The U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.30 This activity represents a continuation of Pakistan’s support against Al Qaeda after the September 11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). In late February 2007, U.S. and Afghan concerns about Pakistan were heightened by reports that Pakistan has been faltering in its previous efforts, which had been praised by the Administration, to facilitate the capture of Al Qaeda figures in the border regions. The New York Times reported on February 19, 2007, that Al Qaeda leaders, possibly including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, had reestablished some small Al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the Afghan border. At the same time, U.S. forces in Afghanistan acknowledged that they are now shelling purported Taliban positions inside the Pakistani side of the border, and even doing some “hot pursuit” a few kilometers over the border into Pakistan. Suggesting that it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on July 19, 2005, Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi. On August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced 30 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April 27, 2005. CRS-36 the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta. On March 1, 2007, Pakistani officials confirmed they had arrested in Quetta Mullah Ubaydallah Akhund, a top aide to Mullah Umar and who had served as defense minister in the Taliban regime. However, he was later reported released. Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). It is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be re-negotiated. As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back into Afghanistan in the near future. Iran Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about $205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of Iranian “meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized in the government. However, on April 17, 2007, U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan captured a shipment of Iranian weapons that purportedly was bound for Taliban fighters. On June 6, 2007, NATO officers said they caught Iran “redhanded” shipping heavy arms, C4 explosives, and advanced roadside bombs (“explosively-forced projectiles, EFPs, such as those found in Iraq) to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Because such shipments would appear to conflict with Iran’s support for Karzai and for non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan, U.S. military officers did not attribute the shipments to a deliberate Iranian government decision to arm the Taliban. However, some U.S. officials say the shipments are large enough that the Iranian government would have to have known about them. In attempting to explain the shipments, some experts believe Iran’s policy might be shifting somewhat to gain leverage against the United States in Afghanistan (and on other issues) by causing U.S. combat deaths. For his part, Karzai, who has visited Iran on several occasions — and who met with hardline Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tajikistan on July 26, 2006 — says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan as Herat governor in September 2004, CRS-37 although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.31 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan. Even though Iran’s influence in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,32 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. India The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence. India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is cofinancing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. Pakistan is likely to take particular exception to the reported training by India of the ANA, as discussed above. 31 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2004. 32 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15, 1997. CRS-38 Russia, Central Asian States, and China Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF. Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.33 Russia, which still feels humiliated by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, views Northern Alliance figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.34 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s. These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban; Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that Alliance. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan. 33 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998. 34 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000. CRS-39 Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, who died in December 2006, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see above). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have been based in Turkmenistan. China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China. Saudi Arabia During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, a majority of whose citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam also practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized. CRS-40 U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction would do more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat. Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; a provision of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585) would set up a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan reconstruction, modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985-1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001. Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2003 and including funds already appropriated for FY2007, the United States has provided about $14 billion in reconstruction assistance, including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP and counter-narcotics-related assistance. These securityrelated categories account for about $7 billion of the totals for the period, or about half. These amounts do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Table 4 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover aid since FY2003. Table 3 is a history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999.35 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The total authorization, for all categories for FY2003-FY2006), is over $3.7 billion. 35 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund. CRS-41 For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has been funded by contributing nations. It authorized the following: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005); $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003FY2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan); $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place. A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction, an amendment to the report required in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives. Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would reauthorize AFSA through FY2010. The following are the major provisions of the bill: ! ! ! A total of about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid (including draw-downs of equipment) per fiscal year would be authorized. a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation is authorized. Afghan officials support this provision as furthering their goal of combatting narcotics by promoting alternative livelihoods. enhanced anti-corruption and legal reform programs would be provided. CRS-42 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! a mandated cutoff of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration reports that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking. This provision has drawn some criticism from observers who say that the most needy in Afghanistan might be deprived of aid based on allegations that are difficult to judge precisely. $45 million per year for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and programs for women and girls is authorized. $75 million per year is authorized specifically for enhanced power generation, a key need in Afghanistan. a coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is mandated. military drawdowns for the ANA and ANP valued at $300 million per year (un-reimbursed) are authorized (versus the aggregate $550 million allowed currently). authorizes appointment of a special U.S. envoy to promote greater Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. reauthorizes “Radio Free Afghanistan.” establishes a U.S. policy to encourage Pakistan to permit shipments by India of equipment and material to Afghanistan. FY2007 and FY2008. The tables below show funds appropriated thus far for FY2007, as well as the FY2007 supplemental request and related legislation, and the request for FY2008. An FY2007 supplemental (H.R. 1591) was vetoed by President Bush; a another bill making that appropriation (H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28) appropriates approximately the same totals as H.R. 1591. When the supplemental request is factored in, the requests for both years appear to be somewhat higher than the amounts pledged in a December 2, 2005, U.S.-Afghan agreement under which the United States said it would provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in civilian economic aid over the next five years ($1.1 billion per year). The U.S. aid plan is reportedly programmed for education, health care, and economic and democratic development. Based on H.R. 5522, which appears to be a reasonable estimated of the country allocation for FY2007 thus far, the funds thus far appropriated for FY2007 (regular appropriation) are slightly lower than the Administration request for regular FY2007 funds for Afghanistan, which totaled about $1.1 billion. Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Another $20 million in overflight fees withheld by U.N. sanctions on the Taliban were provided as well. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment credits of $100 million. World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced CRS-43 a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system. International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. Including U.S. pledges, about $30 billion has been pledged at donors conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London conference (February 2006), and since then. Of that, about half are non-U.S. contributions. However, not all nonU.S. amounts pledged have been received, although implementation appears to have improved over the past few years (amounts received had been running below half of what was pledged). The London conference also leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor community. Only about $3.8 billion of funds disbursed have been channeled through the Afghan government, according to the Finance Minister in April 2007. The Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and effectively. Residual Issues From Past Conflicts A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication. Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.36 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold 36 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001. CRS-44 to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.37 In late January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.38 In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.39 It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002. Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 4), the U.S. demining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%. 37 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002. 38 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005. 39 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999. CRS-45 Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ($ in millions) Fiscal Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Devel. Assist. 4.989 3.074 — — — — — 3.369 — 17.8 22.5 22.5 35.0 30.0 25.0 10.0 3.4 1.8 — — — Econ. Other Supp. P.L. 480 (Incl. Regional (ESF) (Title I and II) Military Refugee Aid) — 5.742 0.269 0.789 — 7.195 — 0.347 (Soviet invasion - December 1979) — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 8.9 — — 12.1 2.6 — — 22.5 29.9 — — 22.5 32.6 — — 35.0 18.1 — — 30.0 20.1 — — 25.0 31.4 — — 10.0 18.0 — 30.2 2.0 9.0 — 27.9 — 12.4 — 31.6 — 16.1 — 26.4 — 18.0 — 31.9a — 3.6 — 49.14b Total 11.789 10.616 — — — — — 3.369 8.9 32.5 74.9 77.6 88.1 80.1 81.4 68.2 42.3 45.8 42.5 49.9 52.74 Source: Department of State. a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics. b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics. CRS-46 Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 ($ in millions) U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP) State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program) Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs) FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program.) 16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation 7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan 68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief) 131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b)) 198.12 (for food commodities) 14.03 for the same purposes 22.03 for similar purposes 136.54 (to U.N. agencies) 6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs 3.0 18.934 for similar programs 113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs) 2.8 7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining 2.615 5.44 (2.789 for health, training Afghan females in Pakistan) 6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes Counter-Narcotics USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives Dept. of Defense 5.31 for similar purposes 1.50 0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan) Foreign Military Financing Anti-Terrorism Economic Support Funds (E.S.F) Peacekeeping Totals FY2002 (Final) 76.6 113.2 182.6 63.0 24.35 for broadcasting/ media 50.9 ( 2.4 million rations) 57.0 (for Afghan national army) 36.4 105.2 24.0 815.9 CRS-47 Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 ($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 4) FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) Development/Health 90 P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid) 47 Peacekeeping 10 Disaster Relief 94 ESF 50 Non-Proliferation, Demining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR) 5 Refugee Relief 55 Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF) 21 Total from this law: 372 FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road) 100 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF) 10 Afghan government support (ESF) 57 ANA train and equip (FMF) Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR, some for Karzai protection) 170 28 Total from this law: 365 Total for FY2003 737 CRS-48 Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 ($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables) FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF) 30 Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection 70 Elections/democracy and governance (ESF) 69 Roads (ESF) 181 Schools/Education (ESF) 95 Health Services/Clinics (ESF) 49 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 58 Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation 95 Water Projects 23 Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE) Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations Afghan National Army (FMF) 170 73 287 Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR) 35 U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations 92 Total from this law: (of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls) 1,327 FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199) Development/Health 171 Disaster Relief 35 Refugee Relief 72 Afghan women (ESF) 5 Judicial reform commission (ESF) 2 Reforestation (ESF) 2 Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF) 2 Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by USAID for PRT-related reconstruction = $56.4 million) 64 ANA train and equip (FMF) 50 Total from this law: 403 Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid .085 Total for FY2004 1,727 CRS-49 Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 ($ in millions) FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447) Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF) 225 Train and Equip ANA (FMF) 400 Assistance to benefit women and girls Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-building 50 300 Reforestation 2 Child and maternal health 6 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 2 Total from this law 985 Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13) Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture, alternative livelihoods, government capacity building, training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs (ESF). (Total FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-led reconstruction = $87.89 million.) Aid to displaced persons (ESF) Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF) Women-led NGOs (ESF) DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces. Of the funds, $34 million may go to Afghan security elements for that purpose. Also, $290 million of the funds is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated for this purpose. 1,073.5 5 2.5 5 1,285 DOD counter-narcotics support operations 242 Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 220 Training of Afghan police (INCLE) 400 Karzi protection (NADR funds) 17.1 DEA operations in Afghanistan 7.7 Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul 60 Total from this law 3,317 Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid 56.95 Total 4,359 CRS-50 Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 ($ in millions) FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102) ESF (ESF over $225 million subject to certification that Afghanistan is cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics) 430 (Mostly for reconstruction, governance, and democracy-building; Includes $20 million for PRTs) Peacekeeping (ANA salaries) Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 18 235 (Includes $60 million to train ANP) Karzai protection (NADR funds) 18 Child Survival and Health (CSH) 43 Reforestation 3 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 2 Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations 2 Programs to benefit women and girls 50 Development Assistance 130.4 Total from this law: 931.4 FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 109-234) Security Forces Fund ESF 1,908 43 (Includes $11 million for debt relief costs, $5 million for agriculture development, and $27 million for Northeast Transmission electricity project) Embassy operations 50.1 DOD Counter-narcotics operations 103 Migration and Refugee aid 3.4 DEA counter-narcotics operations 9.2 Total from this law: Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid Total for FY2006: 2,116.7 60 3,108.1 CRS-51 Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 ($ in millions) ESF Regular Appropriation (H.R. 5522 Levels, under Continuing Appropriation P.L. 110-5) 510.77 (USAID plans $42 million for PRTs) Counternarcotics (INCLE) 235 Child Survival and Health (CSH) 42.8 Development Assistance (DA) 150 IMET 1.2 DOD Appropriation (P.L. 109-289) Security Forces train and equip 1,500 DOD Counternarcotics support 100 Total Appropriated for FY2007 to date 2,539.77 FY2007 Supplemental (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28) ESF P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid U.S. Embassy security $653 million request/$737 in final law (of which in law: 174 for PRTs; 314 for roads; 40 for power; 155 for rural development; 19 for agriculture (latter two are alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation); 25 for governance; and 10 for the “civilian assistance program” 30 million also provides $16 million in Migration and Refugee aid for displaced persons near Kabul, and $16 million International Disaster and Famine Assistance 47.2 million requested/79 in final version Security Forces train and equip 5.900 billion requested/5.9064 in final version (includes 3.2 billion for equipment and transportation; 624 million for ANP training; 415 for ANA training; 106 for commanders emergency response, CERP; plus other funds ) INCLE no request/47 million in agreement; plus 60 million in DoD aid to counter-narcotics forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, plus 12 million DEA FY2007 supp. 6.87 billion in final version CRS-52 Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request/Action ($ in millions) Regular Appropriation Request/FY2008 appropriation (H.R. 2764) ESF INCLE P.L. 480 Title II IMET Child Survival and Health (CSH) NADR (Karzai protection) Radio Free Afghanistan 693 (H.R. 2764 provides 543 million, but adds 150 in related DA). H.R. 2764 has $225 million limit subject to counternarcotics cooperation certification 274.8 (same as request) 10 1.7 65.9 21.65 H.R. 2764 provides $3.98 million Total regular request 1,067.05 FY2008 Supplemental Request (Global War on Terrorism) ESF USAID operations Security Forces equip and train 339 16 2,700 Total FY2008 supplemental request 3,055 Total FY2008 request (regular and supp.) 4,122.05 CRS-53 Table 11. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations (Numbers approximate, as of May 2007) NATO Countries Non-NATO Partner Nations Belgium 300 Albania 30 Bulgaria 150 Austria 5 Canada 2,500 Australia 950 Czech Republic 100 Azerbaijan 20 Denmark 640 Croatia 120 Estonia 90 Finland 100 France 1,000 Ireland 10 Germany 2,750 Macedonia 120 Greece 180 New Zealand 100 Hungary 200 Sweden 350 Iceland 15 Italy Latvia Lithuania 35 Netherlands 2,100 530 1,200 Portugal 180 Romania 750 Slovakia 60 Slovenia 50 Spain 625 Turkey 475 United Kingdom United States Total ISAF force 38,090 135 10 Poland 5 1,800 Luxemburg Norway Switzerland 5,200 15,000 Note: See NATO’s Afghanistan page at [http://www.nato.int/issues/ afghanistan]. CRS-54 Table 12. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (RC=Regional Command) Location (City) Province/Command U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner) Gardez Paktia (RC-East, E) Ghazni Ghazni (RC-E) Bagram A.B. Parwan (RC-C, Central). Assisted by 175 troops from South Korea Jalalabad Nangarhar (RC-E) Khost Khost (RC-E) Qalat Zabol (RC-South, S) with Romania) Asadabad Kunar (RC-E) Sharana Paktika (RC-E) Mehtarlam Jabal o-Saraj Laghman (RC-E) Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead Nuristan Nuristan (RC-E) Farah Farah (RC-W) Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner) PRT Location Province Lead Force/Other forces Qandahar Qandahar (RC-S) Canada Lashkar Gah Helmand (RC-S) Britain (with Denmark and Estonia) Tarin Kowt Uruzgan (RC-S) Netherlands (with Australia) Herat Herat (RC-W) Italy Qalah-ye Now Badghis (RC-W) Spain Mazar-e-Sharif Balkh (RC-N) Sweden Konduz Konduz (RC-N) Germany Faizabad Badakhshan (RC-N) Germany Meymaneh Faryab (RC-N) Norway Chaghcharan Ghowr (RC-W) Lithuania Pol-e-Khomri Baghlan (RC-N) Hungary (as of October 1, 2006) Bamiyan Bamiyan (RC-C) New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF) Maidan Shahr Wardak (RC-C) Turkey CRS-55 Table 13. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan Party/ Leader Leader Ideology/ Ethnicity Regional Base Taliban Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan)/Jalaludin Haqqani. ultraorthodox Islamic, Pashtun Insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east, and in Pakistan Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”) Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (elected to lower house)/Muhammad Fahim (in upper house)/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik Much of northern and w e s t e r n Afghanistan, including Kabul National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March 1992 secular, break with Najibullah that precipitated his overthrow. Uzbek Subsequently fought Rabbani government (19921995), but later joined Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces that captured his region by August 1998. During OEF, impressed U.S. commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, now Karzai’s chief “security adviser.” Mazar-eSharif, Shebergan, and environs Hizb-eWahdat Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Shiite, Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election and Hazara parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of tribes Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city. Bamiyan province Pashtun Leaders Various regional governors; central government led by Hamid Karzai. Moderate Islamic, Pashtun Dominant in southern, eastern Afghanistan Hizb-eIslam Gulbuddin (HIG) Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Lost orthodox Islamic, power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in Pashtun 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul, but may be open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006. Small groups around Jalalabad, Nuristan and in southeast Islamic Union Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, orthodox leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived Islamic, many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, Pashtun which shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During antiSoviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Paghman (west of Kabul) CRS-56 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted. ! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464]. ! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 9672; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. ! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan. ! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush. ! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. ! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, CRS-57 reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. ! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Talibancontrolled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.) ! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban. ! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.) CRS-58 Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan