Order Code 98-379
Updated June 21, 2007
Statutory Offices of Inspector General:
Past and Present
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Statutory offices of inspector general (OIG) consolidate responsibility for audits
and investigations within a federal agency. Established by public law as permanent,
nonpartisan, independent offices, they now exist in more than 60 establishments and
entities, including all departments and largest agencies, along with numerous boards and
commissions. Under two major enactments — the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
its amendments of 1988 — inspectors general are granted substantial independence and
powers to carry out their mandate to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.1 Recent laws have
added offices, funding for special operations, and law enforcement powers to OIGs in
establishments. Recent initiatives have set up mechanisms to oversee the Gulf
Recovery Program, while various legislative proposals in the 110th Congress are
designed to strengthen the IGs’ independence and establish new posts, among other
matters.
Responsibilities. The IGs’ three principal responsibilities are:
! conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the establishment;
! providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies for
activities designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
1 5 U.S.C. Appendix covers all but six of the statutory OIGs. See U.S. President’s Council on
Integrity and Efficiency, A Strategic Framework, 2005-2010 [http://www.ignet.gov]; Frederick
Kaiser, “The Watchers’ Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General,” International Journal of
Intelligence (1989); Paul Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for
Accountability (1993); Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General: Office
Consolidation and Related Issues, GAO-02-575, and Highlights of the Comptroller General’s
Panel on Federal Oversight and the Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP; U.S. House
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 25th Anniversary of the Inspector General Act, and
Improving IG Functionality and Independence, hearings (2003 and 2004); U.S. House
Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, Inspectors
General: Independence and Accountability, hearing (2007); and Peter Stone, “The Watchdogs,”
National Journal, May 12, 2007, pp. 30-35.

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of such programs and operations, and preventing and detecting waste,
fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations; and
! providing a means for keeping the establishment head and Congress fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to such
programs and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Authority and Duties. To carry out these purposes, IGs have been granted broad
authority to: conduct audits and investigations; access directly all records and information
of the agency; request assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies;
subpoena information and documents; administer oaths when taking testimony; hire staff
and manage their own resources; and receive and respond to complaints from agency
employees, whose confidentiality is to be protected. In addition, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 gave law enforcement powers to criminal investigators in offices headed by
presidential appointees. IGs, moreover, implement the cash incentive award program in
their agency for employee disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse (5 U.S.C. 4511).
Notwithstanding these powers and duties, IGs are not specifically authorized to take
corrective action themselves. Along with this, the Inspector General Act prohibits the
transfer of “program operating responsibilities” to an IG. The rationale here is that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for IGs to audit or investigate programs and
operations impartially and objectively if they were directly involved in carrying them out.
Reporting Requirements. IGs have reporting obligations regarding their
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. These include reporting (1) suspected
violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the Attorney General; (2)
semiannually to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (along with his or her
comments) to Congress within 30 days; and (3) “particularly serious or flagrant problems”
immediately to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (with comments) to
Congress within seven days. The CIA IG must also report to the Intelligence Committees
if the Director or Acting Director is the focus of an investigation or audit. By means of
these reports and “otherwise,” IGs are to keep the agency head and Congress fully and
currently informed. Other means of communication include testifying at congressional
hearings; meeting with Members and staff of Congress; and responding to congressional
requests for information and reports.
Independence. In addition to having their own powers (e.g., to hire staff and issue
subpoenas), IG independent status is reinforced in other ways: protection of their budgets
in the larger establishments, qualifications on their appointment and removal, prohibitions
on interference with their activities and operations, a proscription on operating
responsibilities, and fixing the priorities and projects for their office without outside
direction. One exception to the IGs’ rule occurs when a review is ordered in statute, while
another is the contrary: in the few instances when an establishment head prevents or halts
an audit or investigation. IGs, of course, may voluntarily conduct a review requested by
the agency head, President, or congressional offices.
Supervision. IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head,
reporting exclusively to the head or to the officer next in rank if such authority is
delegated. With but a few specified exceptions, neither the agency head nor the officer
next in line “shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out,
or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena....” Under the IG

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Act, the heads of only six agencies — the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S. Postal Service and Federal Reserve Board — may
prevent the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or
issuing a subpoena, and then only for specified reasons: to preserve national security
interests or protect ongoing criminal investigations, among others. When exercising this
power, the agency head must transmit an explanatory statement for such action within 30
days to the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee, the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and other appropriate congressional
panels. The CIA IG Act similarly allows the agency head to prohibit the inspector general
from conducting investigations, audits, or inspections; but the director must then notify
the House and Senate intelligence panels of his reasons, within seven days.
Appropriations. Presidentially appointed IGs in the larger federal agencies — but
not in designated federal entities (DFEs) — are granted a separate appropriations account
(a separate budget account in the case of the CIA) for their offices. This restricts agency
administrators from transferring or reducing IG funding once it has been specified in law.
Appointment and Removal. Under the Inspector General Act, IGs are to be
selected without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial and management analysis, law,
public administration, or investigations. The CIA IG, who operates under a different
statute, is to be selected under these criteria as well as prior experience in the field of
foreign intelligence and in compliance with the security standards of the agency.
Presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed IGs can be removed only by the President.
When so doing, he must communicate the reasons to Congress.
However, IGs in the (usually) smaller DFEs are appointed by can be removed by the
agency head, who must notify Congress in writing when exercising the power. In the
Postal Service, by comparison, the governors appoint the inspector general, one of only
two IGs with a set term (seven years) specified in law. The USPS IG, moreover, is the
only one with qualified removal: only “for cause” and then with the written concurrence
of at least seven of the nine governors. The other is in the Capitol Police (five years), who
is appointed by and can be removed by the Capitol Police Board. Indirectly, the IG in the
Peace Corps also faces an effective limited tenure, because all positions in the entity are
restricted to a certain period (from five to 8½ years).
Coordination and Controls. Several presidential orders govern coordination
among the IGs and investigating charges of wrongdoing by the IGs themselves and other
top echelon officers. Two councils, now governed by E.O. 12993, are the President’s
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), established in 1981, and a parallel Executive
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE), in 1992. Chaired by the Deputy Director of
the OMB, each is composed of the relevant statutory IGs plus officials from other
agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Special Counsel.
Investigations of alleged wrongdoing by IGs or other high-ranking OIG officials (under
the IG act) are governed by a special Integrity Committee, composed of PCIE and ECIE
members and chaired by the FBI representative (E.O. 12993), with investigations referred
to an appropriate executive agency or to an IG unit. An Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum — a coordinative body of the inspectors general from the IC
agencies along with observers from the FBI and several defense units — also exists.

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Establishment. Statutory offices of inspector general been authorized in 64
current federal establishments and entities, including all 15 cabinet departments; major
executive branch agencies; independent regulatory commissions; various government
corporations and boards; and three legislative branch agencies. All but six of the OIGs
— in GPO, LOC, Capitol Police, CIA, ODNI, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) — are directly and explicitly under the 1978 Inspector General
Act. Each office is headed by an inspector general, who is appointed in one of two ways:
(1) 30 are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in the federal
establishments, including all departments and the larger agencies under the IG
act specifically, plus the CIA under its separate statutory authority (Table 1).
(2) 34 are appointed by the head of the entity in the 28 designated federal entities
— usually smaller boards and commissions — and in five other units, where the
IGs operate under separate but parallel authority: SIGIR, ONDI, and three
legislative agencies (i.e., GPO, LOC, and U.S. Capitol Police) (Table 2).
Table 1. Statutes Authorizing Inspectors General Nominated by the
President and Confirmed by the Senate, 1976-Present
(current offices are in bold)a
Year
Statute
Establishment
1976
P.L. 94-505
Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services)
1977
P.L. 95-91
Energy
1978
P.L. 95-452
Agriculture, Commerce, Community Services Administration,b
Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor,
Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, General
Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Small Business Administration, Veterans
Administration (now the Veterans Affairs Department)
1979
P.L. 96-88
Education
1980
P.L. 96-294
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporationb
1980
P.L. 96-465
Statec
1981
P.L. 97-113
Agency for International Developmentd
1982
P.L. 97-252
Defense
1983
P.L. 98-76
Railroad Retirement Board
1986
P.L. 99-399
U.S. Information Agencyb,c
1987
P.L. 100-213
Arms Control and Disarmament Agencyb,c
1988
P.L. 100-504
Justice,e Treasury, Federal Emergency Management Administration,b,f
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management
1989
P.L. 101-73
Resolution Trust Corporationb
1989
P.L. 101-193
Central Intelligence Agencya
1993
P.L. 103-82
Corporation for National and Community Service
1993
P.L. 103-204
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1994
P.L. 103-296
Social Security Administration
1994
P.L. 103-325
Community Development Financial Institutions Fundb
1998
P.L. 105-206
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administrationg
2000
P.L. 106-422
Tennessee Valley Authorityh
2002
P.L. 107-189
Export-Import Bank
2002
P.L. 107-296
Homeland Securityf
a. All except the CIA IG are directly under the 1978 Inspector General Act, as amended.
b. CSA, Synfuels Corporation, USIA, ACDA, RTC, CDFIF, and FEMA have been abolished or transferred.

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c. The State Department IG had also served as the IG for ACDA. In 1998, P.L. 105-277 transferred the
functions of ACDA and USIA to the State Department and placed the Broadcasting Board of
Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau under the jurisdiction of the State IG.
d. The Inspector General in AID may also conduct reviews, investigations, and inspections of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (22 U.S.C. 2199(e)).
e. In 2002, P.L. 107-273 expanded the jurisdiction of the Justice OIG to cover all department components.
f. P.L. 107-296, which established the Department of Homeland Security, transferred FEMA’s functions
to it and also granted law enforcement powers to OIG criminal investigators in establishments.
g. The OIG for Tax Administration in Treasury is the only case where a separate IG, under the 1978 IG Act,
exists within an establishment or entity that is otherwise covered by its own statutory IG.
h. P.L. 106-422, which re-designated TVA as an establishment, also created, in the Treasury Department,
a Criminal Investigator Academy to train IG staff and an Inspector General Forensic Laboratory.
Table 2. Designated Federal Entities and Other Agencies with
Statutory IGs Appointed by the Head of the Entity or Agency
(current offices are in bold)a
ACTIONb
Interstate Commerce Commissionf
Amtrak
Government Printing Officea
Appalachian Regional Commission
Legal Services Corporation
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
Library of Congressa
Board for International Broadcastingc
National Archives and Records
Administration
Coalition Provisional Authority (in Iraq)a
National Credit Union Administration
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
National Endowment for the Arts
Consumer Product Safety Commission
National Endowment for the Humanities
Denali Commissionm
National Labor Relations Board
Corporation for Public Broadcasting
National Science Foundation
Election Assistance Commissionl
Office of Director of National Intelligenceak
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Panama Canal Commissiong
Farm Credit Administration
Peace Corps
Federal Communications Commission
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationd
Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Election Commission
Smithsonian Institution
Federal Home Loan Bank Boarde
Special IG for Iraq Reconstructiona
Federal Housing Finance Boarde
Tennessee Valley Authorityh
Federal Labor Relations Authority
U.S. Capitol Policeaj
Federal Maritime Commission
U.S. International Trade Commission
Federal Trade Commission
U.S. Postal Servicei
a. All these agencies — except SIGIR, ODNI, GPO, LOC, and Capitol Police — are considered “designated
federal entities” and placed directly under the 1978 IG Act by the 1988 Amendments and subsequent
acts. The CPA was dissolved in mid-2004 and its IG was converted to SIGIR.
b. In 1993, P.L. 103-82 merged ACTION into the new Corporation for National and Community Service.
c. The BIB was abolished by P.L. 103-236 and its functions transferred to the International Broadcasting
Bureau within USIA, which was later abolished and its functions transferred to the State Department.
d. In 1993, P.L. 103-204 made the IG in FDIC a presidential appointee, subject to Senate confirmation.
e. In 1989, P.L. 101-73 abolished the FHLBB and placed the new FHFB under the 1988 IG Act.
f. The ICC was abolished in 1995 by P.L. 104-88.
g. The Panama Canal Commission, replaced by the Panama Canal Commission Transition Authority, was
phased out with the transfer of the Canal to the Republic of Panama (22 U.S.C. 3611).
h. P.L. 106-422 re-designated TVA as a federal establishment.
i. In 1996, the U.S. Postal Service Inspector General post was separated from the Chief Postal Inspector.
The separated IG is appointed by, and can be removed only by, the governors.

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j. The Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, FY2006 (P.L. 109-55) added IGs to LOC, following the IG
Act of 1978 closely, and the Capitol Police, whose IG has specialized responsibilities.
k. P.L. 108-458 grants the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) full discretion to create and construct an
OIG in his Office (based on provisions in the IG Act). This occurred in 2006. ODNI, Report on the
Progress of the DNI in Implementing “the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004,” May 2006; and House
Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2007 (H.Rept. 109-411).
l. P.L. 107-252, the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
m. P.L. 105-277 (42 U.S.C. 3121), Denali Commission Act of 1998, as amended.
Table 3. Tabulation of Existing Federal Establishments,
Entities, or Agencies with IGs Authorized in Law
Controlling
IGs nominated by President
IGs appointed by head
Total
statute
and confirmed by Senate
of entity or agency
1978 IG Act,
29
29
58
as amended
Other statutes
1a
5b
6
Total
30
34
64
a. CIA Inspector General.
b. SIGIR, GPO, LOC, U.S. Capitol Police, and ODNI inspectors general.
Recent Initiatives. Initiatives in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes
arose to increase OIG capacity and capabilities in overseeing the unprecedented recovery
and rebuilding efforts: an initial coordinating team of IGs or deputies from affected
agencies has evolved into the Homeland Security Roundtable, chaired by the IG in DHS;
a Hurricane Katrina Contract Fraud Task Force, established by the Justice Department,
includes relevant inspectors general; an official in the DHS office has been designated to
direct its effort here; and an additional $15 million for the OIG in Homeland Security was
approved (P.L. 109-62). Other proposals included setting up a long-term task force or
coordinative mechanism of IGs from relevant agencies (H.R. 3737 and 3810, 109th
Cong.), while another would have established an IG post in the office of the Architect of
the Capitol (H.R. 5521, 109th Cong.). Other initiatives have called for consolidating DFE
OIGs under one or more new presidentially appointed IGs or under a related
establishment office (GAO-02-575) and granting law enforcement authority to DFE IGs.
Separate recommendations have arisen in the 110th Congress. H.R. 785 and S. 461
would establish an inspector general for the Judicial Branch, appointed by and removable
by the Chief Justice for a renewable four-year term. H.R. 401 would create an IG in the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, while H.R. 2771, Legislative Branch
Appropriations Act, 2008, would do so in the Architect of the Capitol office. A far-
reaching proposal (H.R. 928), advanced to increase the IGs’ independence and powers,
calls for sending initial OIG budget estimates to Congress and OMB for later comparison
with the final amount in the President’s budget submission, removing an IG only for
“cause,” setting a term of office for IGs (seven years with possible reappointment),
establishing a Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency in statute (thus,
replacing the PCIE and ECIE), revising the pay structure for IGs, allowing for IG
subpoena power “in any medium,” and granting law enforcement powers to qualified IGs
in designated federal entities. Another proposal (S. 680) would increase the pay level for
presidentially appointed IGs, prohibit cash awards or bonuses for them, set qualifications
for the appointment and removal of IGs in designated federal entities, and grant IGs
subpoena power in any medium.

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