Order Code RS22674
June 8, 2007
National Continuity Policy: A Brief Overview
R. Eric Petersen
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Summary
On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 20, on National Continuity Policy. The directive updates
longstanding continuity directives designed to assure that governing entities are able to
recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Executive branch
efforts to assure essential operations are similar to those that are broadly integrated into
many private sector industries. Government continuity planning also incorporates
efforts to maintain and preserve constitutional government, based on the assumption that
certain essential activities typically provided by government must be carried out with
little or no interruption under all circumstances.
On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 20 (NSPD 51/HSPD 20), on National Continuity Policy.1 NSPD
51/HSPD 20 updates longstanding continuity policy expressed in various directives issued
by previous administrations2 to assure that governing entities are able to recover from a
1 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security and Homeland Security
P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e
, M a y 9 , 2 0 0 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070509-12.html]. The press release
provides the text of the directive. Quotes in this report are taken from NSPD 51/HSPD 20, unless
an alternate source is identified.
2 NSPD 51/HSPD 20 revokes Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67, Enduring Constitutional
Government and Continuity of Government Operations
, which was issued by the Clinton
Administration on October 21, 1998. PDD 67 replaced National Security Directive (NSD) 69,
“Enduring Constitutional Government,” issued by President George H. W. Bush, June 2, 1992,
which in turn succeeded NSD 37, “Enduring Constitutional Government,” issued April 18, 1990.
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 47, “Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,”
issued July 22, 1982, and NSDD 55, “Enduring National Leadership,” issued September 14,
1982, by President Ronald Reagan, included consideration of continued government operations
planning. See Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush
Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991

(continued...)

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wide range of potential operational interruptions. Interruptions for which contingency
plans might be activated include localized acts of nature, accidents, technological
emergencies, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents.
Continuity planning is not unique to government; efforts to assure essential
operations are broadly integrated into many private sector industries.3 As with the private
sector, government continuity planning is regarded by some observers as a “good business
practice,” and part of the fundamental mission of agencies as responsible and reliable
public institutions.4 In the public and private sectors, continuity planning may be viewed
as a process that incorporates preparedness capacities ranging from basic emergency
preparedness5 to recovery plans and the resumption of normal operations. Unlike the
private sector, however, federal continuity planning also incorporates efforts to maintain
and preserve constitutional government, on the assumption that certain essential activities
typically provided by government must be carried out with little or no interruption under
all circumstances. Examples of those activities include the maintenance of civil authority,
support for individuals and firms affected by an incident, infrastructure repair, or other
action in support of recovery. Such a response presumes the existence of an ongoing,
functional government to fund, support, and oversee recovery efforts.
To support the provision of essential government activities, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 sets
out a policy “to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed
2 (...continued)
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 59, 71, 102-104, and 158-178. Earlier national security
directives relating to continuity of government include Presidential Directive (PD) 58,
“Continuity of Government,”issued June 30, 1980, by President Jimmy Carter; two National
Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) issued by President Richard Nixon, NSDM 201,
“Contingency Planning,” issued January 5, 1973, and NSDM 8, “Crisis Anticipation and
Management,” issued March 21, 1969; and two National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM)
issued by President John F. Kennedy, NSAM 166, “Report on Emergency Plans and Continuity
of the Government,” issued June 25, 1962, and NSAM 127, “Emergency Planning for Continuity
of Government,” issued February 14, 1962. The initial national security document establishing
continuity programs appears to be NSC 5521, “NSC Relocation Plan,” issued during 1955, by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
3 See for example, CRS Report RL31873, Banking and Financial Infrastructure Continuity, by
N. Eric Weiss; Cole Emerson, Planning for Manufacturing Operations, Disaster Resource.com
website, at [http://www.disaster-resource.com/cgi-bin/article_search.cgi?id=%27146%27]; Buffy
Rojas, “Constellation Energy Exemplifies Panning Excellence,” Continuity Insights,
September/October 2006, pp.13-16; Buffy Rojas, “Wal-Mart: Looking Beyond BCP Basics,”
Continuity Insights, March/April 2006, pp. 10-13. Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA) website, Business Continuity Planning Rules, available at
[http://www.sifma.org/services/business_continuity/html/rules.html]; and AXA UK website,
B u s i n e s s C o n t i n u i t y G u i d e f o r S m a l l B u s i n e s s e s , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.axa4business.co.uk/resources/files/BizContinuityGuideT1404.pdf]
4 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of National
Security Coordination, Federal Preparedness Circular 65, “Federal Executive Branch Continuity
of Operations (COOP),” June 15, 2004, available at [https://www.fema.org/txt/government/
coop/fpc65_0604.txt].
5 Basic emergency preparedness might include agency evacuation or sheltering plans, employee
training, or alert and notification protocols.

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of continuity of operations6 and continuity of government7 programs in order to ensure the
preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing
performance of national essential functions (NEF) under all conditions.” The directive
identifies eight NEFs that “are the foundation for all continuity programs and capabilities
and represent the overarching responsibilities of the federal government to lead and
sustain the Nation during a crisis.” These are as follows:
! “Ensuring the continued functioning of government under the
Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of
government;8
! “Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and
maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people;
! “Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the
United States or its people, property, or interests;
! “Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations;
! “Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice
perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the United States or its people,
property, or interests;
! “Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the
domestic consequences of an attack or other incident;
! “Protecting and stabilizing the Nation’s economy and ensuring public
confidence in its financial systems; and
6 NSPD 51/HSPD 20 identifies continuity of operations (COOP) as “an effort within individual
executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue
to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents,
and technological or attack-related emergencies.”
7 NSPD 51/HSPD 20 identifies continuity of government (COG) as “a coordinated effort within
the federal government’s executive branch to ensure that national essential functions continue
to be performed during a catastrophic emergency.” A catastrophic emergency is defined as “any
incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage,
or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or
government functions.”
8 The directive notes “that each branch of the federal government is responsible for its own
continuity programs,” and requires an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President
to “ensure that the executive branch’s COOP and COG policies ... are appropriately coordinated
with those of the legislative and judicial branches in order to ensure interoperability and allocate
national assets efficiently to maintain a functioning federal government.” The legislative branch
and the federal judiciary maintain continuity programs consonant with their positions as coequal
branches of government. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 does not specify the nature of appropriate
coordination with continuity planners in the legislative and judicial branch.

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! “Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the
national health, safety, and welfare needs of the United States.”
Since operations may be interrupted without warning, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 requires
that continuity planning be incorporated into the daily operations of all executive
departments and agencies. Executive branch continuity planning emphasizes “geographic
dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure to alternate facilities to increase
survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government Functions.” The directive requires
the application of risk management principles “to ensure that appropriate operational
readiness decisions are based on the probability of an attack or other incident and its
consequences.” By mandating planning based on risk analysis, incorporating continuity
activities in day-to-day operations, and mandating the utilization of alternate facilities and
staffing, the directive appears to incorporate planning assumptions and approaches used
widely in the private sector.9
Managing National Continuity Policy
NSPD 51/HSPD 20 designates the President to lead the activities of the federal
government for ensuring constitutional government, and designates the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism as the National Continuity
Coordinator (NCC). In coordination with the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, and without exercising directive authority, the NCC coordinates the
development and implementation of continuity policy for executive branch departments
and agencies. In consultation with the heads of appropriate executive departments and
agencies, the NCC is required to lead the development of a National Continuity
Implementation Plan for submission to the President before August 10, 2007. NSPD
51/HSPD 20 does not explicitly specify the appropriate departments and agencies.
The directive specifies a “Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC),
chaired by a Senior Director from the Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff” appointed
by the NCC, and designated as the main day-to-day forum for continuity policy
coordination, but also indicates that the NCC will coordinate with the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. The directive designates the Secretary of
Homeland Security “as the President’s lead agent for coordinating overall continuity
operations and activities of executive departments and agencies.” Other than explicitly
denying the NCC the capacity to exercise directive authority, the extent to which any
official charged with continuity coordinating responsibilities can enjoin executive branch
agencies to comply with their guidance or recommendations is unclear.10
9 See The Business Continuity Institute, Good Practice Guidelines (2005): A Framework for
B u s i n e s s C o n t i n u i t y M a n a g e m e n t
, a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.thebci.org/goodpracticeguidetoBCM.pdf], pp. 21-28, and 30-34; and Disaster
Recovery Journal and DRI International, Generally Accepted Practices For Business Continuity
Practitioners
, available at [http://www.drj.com/GAP/gap.pdf], pp. 15-53. This document is
identified as a draft, dated January 2007, subject to practitioner comment and revision.
10 In addition to to NSPD 51/HSPD 20, Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, Assignment of Emergency
Preparedness Responsibilities
, which was issued November 18, 1988, by President Ronald
Reagan (53 FR 47491; November 23, 1988), assigns national security emergency preparedness
(continued...)

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NSPD 51/HSPD 20 provides that federal executive branch departments and agencies
are “assigned to a category in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national
security roles and responsibilities in support” of the NEFs. Agency leaders are required
to execute their respective department or agency COOP plans in response to emergencies
that affect their operations. In addition, each agency head is required to appoint a senior
accountable official, at the assistant secretary level, as the continuity coordinator for the
department or agency; identify and submit to the NCC agency mission essential functions
and “develop continuity plans in support of the NEFs and the continuation of essential
functions under all conditions;” plan, program, and budget for continuity capabilities;
plan, conduct, and support annual tests and training, to evaluate program readiness and
ensure the adequacy and viability of continuity plans and communications systems; and
support other continuity requirements, “in accordance with the nature and characteristics
of the agency’s national security roles and responsibilities.”
In addition to efforts within the federal executive branch, NSPD 51/HSPD 20
requires the integration of continuity planning with the “emergency plans and capabilities
of state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators
of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and to
prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of authority,” and requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security to coordinate that integration “to provide for the delivery of essential
services during an emergency.”
10 (...continued)
responsibilities to federal departments and agencies. E.O.12656 defines a national security
emergency as “any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological
emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national
security of the United States.” E.O. 12656, which appears to remain in force and binding on
executive branch departments and agencies, requires agencies to have capabilities to meet
essential defense and civilian needs in the event of a national security emergency. Section 202
of E.O. 12656 requires the head of each federal department and agency to “ensure the continuity
of essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for: succession to office
and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of
essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating
capabilities.” Subsequent sections require each department to carry out specific contingency
planning activities in its areas of policy responsibility.