Order Code RL30588
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated June 1, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

---

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening of a
parliament in December 2005, but in 2006 insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s
government escalated to the point that some experts questioned the success of U.S.
stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in
January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and
parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has
become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to
debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal
freedoms forbidden by the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and
political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and parliament leaders.
The insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime escalated in
2006, after four years of minor Taliban militant activity. Contributing to the
resurgence was popular frustration with lack of economic development, official
corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government authority into rural areas
and provinces. In addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures and
funding insurgent activity. The Afghan government and some U.S. officials
blamed Pakistan for failing to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from
Pakistan, beyond the reach of U.S./NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. U.S. and
NATO commanders anticipated a Taliban 2007 “spring offensive” and moved to try
to preempt it with an increase in force levels and accelerated reconstruction efforts,
possibly contributing to a lower level of violence than expected, thus far. U.S. and
NATO forces have also killed a few key Taliban battlefield leaders in 2007.
U.S. and partner stabilization measures include strengthening the central
government and its security forces. The United States and other countries are
building an Afghan National Army, deploying a 38,000 troop NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping
throughout Afghanistan, and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction
(Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 27,000 U.S. troops are
in Afghanistan, of which all but about 12,000 are under NATO/ISAF command, and,
on March 10, 2007, President Bush approved an additional 3,500 U.S. forces to
deploy there mainly to help train the ANA and other security forces.
To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States has
given Afghanistan about $14 billion over the past five years, including funds to
equip and train Afghan security forces. About another $11 billion was requested for
additional FY2007 funds and for FY2008. Breakdowns are shown in the several
tables at the end of this paper. Pending legislation, H.R. 2446, would reauthorize
the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.
This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance, by
Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

---

Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Northern Alliance Congeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Political Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Implementing Democracy and Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations, and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) . . . . . . . . 25
Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Afghan Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Afghan National Police/Justice Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
U.S. Security Forces Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 39
Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
FY2007 and FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

---

International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
List of Tables
Table 1. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for Operations in Afghanistan . . 24
Table 2. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 11. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 12. Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table 13. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

---

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Background to Recent Developments
Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani,
Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to
neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929)
launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won
complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi
(August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a
government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King
Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and
promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and
hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist
factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms
purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically
opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving
medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control
over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction.
They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by
Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the
country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-
Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against
Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of
natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s
losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the
reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the
director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.

---

CRS-2
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva
Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed
its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its
pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991
collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting
communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and
Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid
program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per
year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of
Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.1
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed
to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern
Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of
the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud
had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan.
Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.2
1 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300
million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half
of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
2 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul
until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

---

CRS-3
Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics
Population:
31 million (July 2006 est.)
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen
3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
Literacy Rate:
28% of population over 15 years of age
GDP:
$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP Per Capita:
$800 (purchasing power parity)
GDP Real Growth:
11% (2007 Afghan gov’t estimate)
Unemployment Rate: 40%
Children in School
5 million (March 2007), of which 1.8 million are girls. Up from 900,000
in school during Taliban era
Afghans With Access 80% (March 2007), compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality
to Health Coverage
has dropped 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics
built with U.S. funds since Taliban era.
Roads Built Since
4,000 miles, with another 1,000 miles to be completed in 2007.
Taliban Era
Access to Electricity
10% of the population
Revenues:
$715 million for 2007 (Afghan gov’t. est.); $550 million 2006
Expenditures (2006): $900 million
External Debt:
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108
million in debt to U.S. in 2006
Foreign Exchange
$2 billion
Reserves:
Foreign Investment
$1 billion est. for 2007; about $1 billion for 2006
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production:
negligible
Oil Proven Reserves: 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to
Afghan government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports:
food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Imports:
Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%; Turkey 4.1%;
Turkmenistan 4.1%
Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2007, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.; Afghan
Finance Minister statements (April 2007), President Bush speech on February 15, 2007.

---

CRS-4
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties.
The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic
scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April - May 1992. Under
an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with
agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that
time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor.
Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of
nominal “prime minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party)
had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four
years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a
movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun
origin, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with
continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study
in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”), formed the Taliban movement. They practiced
an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,” akin to that practiced in Saudi Arabia.
They viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for
civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern
city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of
Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September
1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its
governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and
took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the
withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most
of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah,
his brother, and aides, under protection there, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in
the anti-Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic
Party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the
Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely
appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 61 years old.
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed
strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh
punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to
enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what
many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two

---

CRS-5
large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they
represented un-Islamic idolatry.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took
power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition
of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no
faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition,
the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the
Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C.,
closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998)
and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against
women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration
not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a
resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan
government that discriminates against women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton
Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the
Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al
Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton
Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S.
sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. On
August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training
camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not at any of the camps at the time.
Some observers assert that the Administration missed several purported
opportunities to strike bin Laden. Clinton Administration officials say that they did
not try to oust the Taliban from power with direct U.S. military force because
domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents
were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.
The Northern Alliance Congeals. The Taliban’s policies caused many
different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the
Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.”
Among them were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in
the table at the end of this paper (Table 13).
! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the
Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, although Dostam
had earlier contributed to efforts to oust Rabbani.
! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims,
are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are
always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic
factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight
smaller groups).

---

CRS-6
! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now
a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated
mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the
Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the
Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure
short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration
did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance. The September
11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials wanted to
assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces. Other covert options might have been under
consideration as well.3 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end
support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333,
in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban
representative office in New York, although the Taliban representative continued to
operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban
foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.
Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support,
the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in
1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75%
of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a
major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks,
when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers
posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad
Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a
friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces
could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the
Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:4
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or
persons.
3 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles
Times, May 18, 2002.
4 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL,
providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002.

---

CRS-7
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on
October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S.
special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance
and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines)
moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the
fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S.
and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan
opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces
in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November
9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially
promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on
November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south
and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban
regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered
Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by
Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai brothers. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces
conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia
Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al
Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, then Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld said “major combat operations” had ended.
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction5
The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a
broad-based Afghan government; the United Nations was viewed as a credible
mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated
many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a
traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated ceasefires between
warring factions always broke down, and non-U.N. initiatives fared no better,
particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran,
China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other efforts included
a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts,
including one from the Karzai clan and one centered on Zahir Shah.
Political Transition
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar
Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999).
5 More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth Katzman.

---

CRS-8
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling
for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration
and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid
delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations gathered
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the
former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany.
Bonn Agreement. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn
Agreement.”6 It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December
6, 2001). The agreement included the following provisions:
! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the
holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would
choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is
approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004).
Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration,
weighted toward the Northern Alliance (17 out of 30 positions,
including Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior). In the interim,
the constitution of 1964 applied.7
! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security
in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw
from the capital. The agreement also referred to the need to
cooperate with the international community on counter narcotics,
crime, and terrorism. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December
20, 2001) formally authorized the international peacekeeping force.
Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a
representative imprimatur on the transition. It was attended by former King Zahir
Shah, joining 1,550 delegates (of which about 200 were women) from 381 districts
of Afghanistan. At the gathering, Zahir Shah and Rabbani yielded to Karzai to
remain leader until presidential elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the
assembly approved a new cabinet. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional
commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and
unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run
caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January
4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval
of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly,
members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in
measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship.
However, major powers were given to an elected parliament, such as the power to
veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president.
6 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm].
7 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a
constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that
gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

---

CRS-9
Hamid Karzai
Hamid Karzai, about 51, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a credible
Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation through armed
force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to compromise with
rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate corruption,
resulting in a slower than expected pace of reform and professionalization of
government. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan.
Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s
government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as
a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and
forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai
entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the
Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after
Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S.
support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have
lived in the Baltimore area of the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a
parliament seat in the September 2005 election. Karzai said in August 2006 that he might
not run for a second term in 2009 presidential elections.
National Elections. The October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly
and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner
(55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a
runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May
2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in
confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for
the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were
postponed. No date is set for these elections.
Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the
need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. There are 90 registered political parties,
but the voting was conducted for individuals running in each province, and groups
in parliament are not organized as parties but rather as blocs of like-minded allies.
When it convened on December 18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by
others, engineered selection of former Karzai presidential election rival Qanooni for
speaker of the lower house. In April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance political
leader Rabbani organized this opposition bloc, along with ex-Communists and some
royal family members, into a party called the “National Front” that wants increased
parliamentary powers and direct elections for the provincial governors. The 102-seat
upper house, selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older,
well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as
provided for in the constitution). The leader of that body is Mojadeddi, who was
slightly injured in a bombing of his convoy in March 2006.
The new parliament has asserted itself on several occasions. In the process of
confirming a post-election cabinet, it decided to confirm each nominee individually.
Modernizers in the parliament also succeeded in forcing Karzai to oust several major
conservatives from the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in
modern jurisprudence, and it has established itself in oversight of the national

---

CRS-10
budget. More recently, the parliament passed legislation granting amnesty to
commanders who fought in the various Afghan wars since the Soviet invasion,
although Karzai returned a modified draft giving victims of these commanders the
right to seek justice for any abuses. A measure passed by both parliamentary
chambers in May 2007 awaits his signature. Later in May, the parliament voted no
confidence against Foreign Minister Rangeen Spanta and Minister for Refugee
Affairs Akbar Akbar for failing to prevent Iran from expelling 50,000 Afghan
refugees over a one-month period. Karzai accepted the dismissal of Akbar but
referred Spanta’s dismissal because refugee affairs are not his ministry’s prime
jurisdiction. Parliamentary unrest also emerged in May 2007 over the high number
of civilian casualties caused by U.S./NATO combat operations; the upper house
voted to require international forces to consult with Afghan authorities prior to
combat operations and for negotiations with Taliban fighters. On the other hand,
some traditionalists in parliament have opposed newly emerging independents suchas
outspoken female deputy Malalai Joya; she was suspended in May 2007 for
criticizing “warlords” (faction leaders from past civil wars) in parliament.
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition
The political transition has proceeded, but Karzai’s government suffers from
lack of capacity and the slow expansion of its writ in outlying regions of most
provinces. Some press reports say that confidence in Karzai on the part of some
major donor countries has waned because of government corruption, as well as
compromises with local factions that have the effect of slowing modernization and
reform. A reported CIA assessment in November 2006 found that increasing
numbers of Afghans view the government as weak and corrupt.8 Secretary of State
Rice has said the United States maintains confidence in his leadership, and other
officials have pointed to recent Karzai moves against corruption and to appointments
of competent officials rather than local faction leaders as provincial governors.
Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization
effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government. During 2006, then
commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Carl Eikenberry (he departed
Afghanistan in January 2007), worked to extend Afghan government authority by
conducting visits to all provinces along with Afghan ministers to determine local
needs and heighten the profile of the central government. In a February 2007 CNN
interview, Eikenberry said the amount of “governed space” in Afghanistan is
increasing, a viewed echoed by outgoing U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann in a
March 13, 2007, New York Times interview. As a demonstration of high-level U.S.
support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of high-level visits,
including by Vice President Cheney and one by President Bush (March 1, 2006).
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build
democratic traditions at the local level. At the local level, an Afghan government
“National Solidarity Program,” largely funded by international donors, seeks to
create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local reconstruction
8 Rohde, David and James Risen. CIA Review Highlights Afghan Leader’s Woes. New
York Times, November 5, 2006.

---

CRS-11
projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and
almost 40% of those elected have been women.9
U.S. Embassy Operations. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan
origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, was ambassador during
December 2003-August 2005; he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan
government decisions.10 The current ambassador is William Wood. To assist the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the
State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs. As part of a 2003 U.S.
push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed a 15-person
Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to
serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly focused on
helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop private industries. The
U.S. embassy, now housed in a newly constructed building, has progressively
expanded its personnel and facilities, and the State Department wants to build an
additional housing complex. The tables at the end of this paper discuss U.S. funding
for Embassy operations, USAID operations, and Karzai protection, which is now led
by Afghan forces but with continuing U.S. advice.
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias. Karzai, as well as numerous
private studies and U.S. official statements, have cited regional and factional militias
as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of
justice and generation of popular resentment through their demands for bribes and
other favors. Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional
autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and manpower, funded by
narcotics trafficking, sustains local militias. In June 2006, Karzai authorized arming
some local tribal militias (arbokai) to help in local policing, saying that these
militias would provide security and be loyal to the nation and central government
and that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed
below. Several of these local militias are now operating.
Although smaller militias persist, Karzai has marginalized most of the largest
regional leaders - so called “warlords.”
! Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed in September 2004 and
was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other
hand, Khan was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-
Shiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes that some believe were
stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his continued influence in
Herat.
! Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April
2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. However,
9 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.
10 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times,
April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly
a Karzai aide.

---

CRS-12
in May 2007 Dostam’s followers in the north were again restive
(conducting large demonstrations) in attempting to force out the
anti-Dostam governor of Jowzjan Province.
! Another key figure, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed
by Karzai to the upper house of parliament. The move gives him a
stake in the political process and reduces his potential to activate
Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also turned almost all
of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January
2005 (including four Scud missiles).
! In July 2004, Karzai moved charismatic Northern Alliance
commander Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the
Mazar-e-Sharif area to governor of Balkh province, although he
reportedly remains resistant to central government control.
! Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan
Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief
posts; Hazrat Ali was subsequently elected to parliament.
Karzai has tried to use his power to appoint provincial governors to extend
government authority and its efficiency. In 2005 and 2006, he appointed some
relatively younger technocrats in key governorships instead of local strongmen;
examples include Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor
Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, Helmand governor Asadullah Wafa, and Paktia
governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. (Taniwal was killed in a suicide bombing on
September 10, 2006.)
DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism
was a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
(UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias.
The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program:
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in
partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States.
The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not
enact mandated reforms (reducing the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions) by
the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajik
Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, producing a more
broad-based ministry leadership.
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters,
although that figure was later reduced by Afghan officials to just over 60,000.
According to UNAMA, a total of 63,380 militia fighters were disarmed by the end
of the program. Of those, 55,800 exercised reintegration options provided by the
program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options, although U.N.
officials say about 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs.
The total cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors,
including the United States. Some studies criticized the DDR program for failing to
prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and

---

CRS-13
for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its
partners.11 Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia
weapons. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were
collected. Figures for collected weapons are contained in the table below.
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program
called “DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan
Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. The
program seeks to disarm, by December 2007, a pool of as many as 150,000 members
of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized
local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls of the
Defense Ministry.
Under the DIAG, no payments are available to fighters, and the program
depends on persuasion rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. The
program is not operating in most of the south because armed groups, fearing the
Taliban, refuse to disarm voluntarily, and UNAMA officials told CRS in March
2007 that the program was not making progress overall. DIAG has not been as well
funded as is DDR: thus far, the program has received $11 million in operating funds.
As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors are making available $35
million for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded.
Combating Narcotics Trafficking.12 Narcotics trafficking is regarded by
some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan, generating funds to sustain
the Taliban and criminal groups. Narcotics account for an estimated $2.7 billion in
value — about 27% of Afghanistan’s GDP, according to the Finance Minister in
April 2007. Production in 2006 was 6,100 tons, and Afghanistan is the source of
about 93% of the world’s illicit opium supply; production in the restive provinces of
Helmand and Uruzgan increased 132% in 2006. A U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) report released March 5, 2007, said that the opium harvest could be even
larger in 2007 than it was in 2006 because planting of poppy crop has increased in
15 provinces. In response to congressional calls for an increased U.S. focus on the
drug problem, in March 2007 the Administration created a post of coordinator for
counter-narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan, naming Thomas Schweich of the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to that post.
The Afghan government wants to focus on funding alternative livelihoods that
will dissuade Afghans from growing and on targeting key traffickers, but it is, in
partnership with the United States, undertaking efforts to eradicate poppy fields.
Those who praise Afghan cooperation against narcotics note the December 2006
appointment of Asadullah Wafa as governor of poppy-rich Helmand Province (as
well as a new deputy governor), replacing officials less amenable to countering the
narcotics trade. On the other hand, reflecting Afghan opposition to some eradication
11 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization
and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament
%20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf].
12 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

---

CRS-14
methods, on January 25, 2007, the cabinet voted down a U.S. proposal to allow
ground-based chemical spraying of poppy fields, saying that the chemicals would
threaten plants and animals. UNODC head Antonio Maria Costa wrote an op-ed in
the Washington Post on April 25, 2007, speculating that major Afghan traffickers are
stockpiling opium supplies and that a fruitful new strategy should focus on finding
and arresting major traffickers.
To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome
its initial reluctance to expand its mission and is playing a greater role in counter-
narcotics, but it still does not conduct military attacks on poppy fields. It is flying
Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on
missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug
operations. The Department of Defense is also playing the major role in training
and equipping specialized Afghan counter-narcotics police, in developing an Afghan
intelligence fusion cell, and training Afghan border police, as well as assisting an
Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the
country. The U.S. military is reportedly resisting calls by the DEA and other
agencies to move to active attacks on drug bazaars and other narcotics-related
targets.13 NATO commanders, who have taken over security responsibilities
throughout Afghanistan, say they are providing information to Afghan counter-
narcotics officials to help them target their efforts and increasingly target operations
against large drug traffickers. The Bush Administration has taken some legal steps
against suspected Afghan drug traffickers;14 in April 2005, a DEA operation
successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir
Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. The United States is funding a
new Counternarcotics Justice Center (estimated cost, $8 million) in Kabul to
prosecute and incarcerate suspected traffickers.15
The Bush Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of
countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to
international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics
measures set forth in U.S. law.16 In May 2006, the Administration exercised a waiver
provision to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed to
provide more than $225 million in FY2006 U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. Narcotics
trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much
of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy
13 Meyer, Josh. “Pentagon Resists Pleas For Help in Afghan Opium Fight.” Los Angeles
Times, December 5, 2006.
14 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters,
November 2, 2004.
15 Risen, James. “Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War.” New York
Times, May 16, 2007.
16 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every
year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug
trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

---

CRS-15
cultivation, which purportedly dramatically decreased cultivation.17 The Northern
Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan
officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy
ravaged by war and lack of investment. Efforts to build the legitimate economy are
showing some results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed.
International investors are returning, and there is substantial new construction, such
as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005 and a $25 million new
Coca Cola bottling factory that opened in Kabul on September 11, 2006. Several
Afghan companies are growing as well, including Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell
phone service), and Tolo Television. On the other hand, the 52-year-old national
airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption that has
affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load. Some
Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially
lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone
used in jewelry).
The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic
rebound. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral
trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally
seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but
negotiations on an FTA have not begun to date. Another concept has been to
develop joint Afghan-Pakistan industrial zones, goods produced in which would
receive duty free treatment upon entry into the United States. On December 13,
2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership
talks with Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in
March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of
gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan
relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its
neighbors.
Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998,
the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion
Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to
construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.18 The deterioration in
17 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times, February 7, 2001.
18 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

---

CRS-16
U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while
the Taliban was in power.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all
three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their
oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Turkmenistan’s new
leadership is likely to favor the project as well because it is following the policies of
the late President Niyazov. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior
alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
The five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact”
adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan re-
states that the sectors discussed below are priorities. Some statistics on what has
been accomplished are shown in the table earlier in this paper. Later in this paper are
tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, including some
detail on funds earmarked for categories of civilian reconstruction, and discussing the
February 5, 2007, Administration request for FY2007 supplemental and FY2008
funds.
! Roads. Despite progress on road building, many villages remain
isolated by poor and non-existent roads and former commander of
U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. Eikenberry said “where the roads
end, the Taliban begin.” Among projects completed: the Kabul-
Qandahar roadway project; the Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by
the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, completed by 2006; and
a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S.
military personnel, inaugurated in late 2005. A U.S.-funded ($16
million) road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul has been built.
U.S. funds are also building a Khost-Gardez road and roads in
Badakhshan Province. On October 19, 2006, $94 million in
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds were
allocated to build 200 miles of new roads in Qandahar, Uruzgan,
Nuristan, Kunar, Paktika, and Ghazni provinces.
! Education and Health. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan
children in school since the Taliban era (see statistics above),
setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools,
causing some to close. About $152 million in U.S. funds were
programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005. In
addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity,
Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that
instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in
Mazar-e-Sharif.
! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at
U.S. Embassy Kabul, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its

---

CRS-17
agricultural output over the past five years. Afghan officials say
agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority
as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation.
! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in
rural areas by 2010. Press reports say that there are severe power
shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to
nearly 4 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in
power. The Afghan government, with help from international
donors, plans to import electricity from Central Asian and other
neighbors beginning in 2009 to help address the shortages.
Implementing Democracy and Rule of Law. The State Department
report on human rights practices for 2006 (released March 6, 2007)19 generally
praises the Afghan government for providing human rights training to its police
force and taking action to remove corrupt officials, but adds that resource limitations
prevent more sweeping efforts to curb abuses. Virtually all observers agree that
Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and
Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there
are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary
implementation of justice by local leaders. Some observers were disappointed by
Karzai’s August 2006 decision, apparently prompted by religious hardliners, to
consider reconstituting a “Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the
Suppression of Vice,” although Karzai has not issued the decree needed to revive the
body, suggesting the idea has been dropped. Another issue has arisen in 2007 in the
form of a draft press law that some activists said would increase government control
over private media. Since the Taliban era, more than 40 private radio stations, seven
television networks, and 350 independent newspapers have opened.
The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2006 (released
September 15, 2006) indicates progress on religious freedom but says there continues
to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities
such as Sikhs and Hindus. On the other hand, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom said in a report released in May 2006 that there is rising religious
persecution, a judgment that is consistent with observations of other experts. Some
observers have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions
that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated
in Islamic law. Other accounts say that alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in
restaurants and stores.
A major religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006.
An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago
while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a
potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam.
Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan
19 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78868.htm].

---

CRS-18
constitution’s commitment to international standards of human rights protections,
President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on
March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release
came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government
to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case that demonstrated
judicial conservatism on religious matters was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme
Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s
Rights” magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for
articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he
was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. The replacement of the chief justice
of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative, might
prevent a repeat of similar incidents in the future.
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed
to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department
reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s
Affairs minister Sima Samar. About $2 million per year in U.S. funds is used to
assist this organization.
Funding Issues. According to USAID, figures provided on April 17, 2007,
USAID has spent the following amounts on democracy and rule of law programs for
Afghanistan: FY2002 - $25 million; FY2003 - $42 million; FY2004 - $153 million;
FY2005 - $103 million; FY2006 - $23 million; and FY2007 - $68 million (est). The
figures for FY2004 and FY2005 were elevated due to spending to assist the Afghan
presidential and parliamentary elections. The funding also includes support for civil
society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, and local governance.
Advancement of Women. According to State Department report, the
Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses,
such as denial of educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily
because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first major development in
post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs
dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the
ministry’s powers and influence are limited. It promotes the involvement of women
in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of the Quran that favor
participation of women in national affairs.
Three female ministers were in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential
candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for
Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai
nominated only one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the cabinet
that followed the parliamentary elections, and she was voted down by opposition
from Islamist conservatives in parliament, leaving no women in the cabinet. In
March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba
Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted,
the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of
parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament,
including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women.

---

CRS-19
More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work,
that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996,
including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly
learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it
than was the case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has
made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls’ schools have increased,
and on September 25, 2006, the chief of the Women’s Affairs Ministry branch in
Qandahar, Safia Amajan, was assassinated.
The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the
treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in
persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government
took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s
visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United
States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women,
including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.
Funding Issues. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs. Recent appropriations have required that about $50 million per year, from
various accounts, be used specifically to support programs and organizations that
benefit Afghan women and girls. Appropriations for programs for women and girls
are contained in the tables at the end of this paper.
Post-War Security Operations and
Force Capacity Building
The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda
and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S.
security effort are (1) continuing combat operations by U.S. and other coalition
forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial
reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force.
The Combat Environment, U.S. Operations, and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF)
The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has been
increasing U.S. forces over the past year in response to the 2006 upsurge of Taliban
attacks. (The increase in force levels in Afghanistan has been achieved, in part, by
extending the tour of part of the 10th Mountain Division.) As of October 5, 2006,
NATO/ISAF is now leading peacekeeping operations, which includes combat in the
restive areas. About 60% of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (numbers are in the security

---

CRS-20
indicators table below) are under NATO command, and the remainder are under
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), conducting combat against Al Qaeda, Taliban,
and other militant formations primarily in eastern Afghanistan. The NATO/ISAF
force is headed as of February 2007 by U.S. Gen. Dan McNeil, taking over from U.K.
General David Richards. U.S. OEF combat operations are directed by Maj. Gen.
David Rodriguez, head of Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82), headquartered
at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in
Afghanistan appear to be running about $1.5 billion per month. For information on
U.S. military costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
Prior to the transfer to NATO command, nineteen coalition countries —
primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy — were contributing approximately
4,000 combat troops to OEF, but almost all of these have now been “re-badged” to
the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. As part of the U.S.-led combat, French
aircraft have been flying strikes (after a hiatus during November 2005-May 2006)
from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar as part of the “Combined
Air Operations Center.” However, in December 2006, France announced it would
withdraw its 200 Special Forces that were performing counter-terrorism missions
near Jalalabad, a decision that will not affect the other French forces serving under
NATO/ISAF. In part to compensate, France provided two additional helicopters to
OEF and offered to train Afghan special forces. Among other coalition efforts,
Japan provides naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. Also, the U.S. leads
a naval interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea (headquartered in
Bahrain) intended to prevent the movement of terrorists from Afghanistan/Pakistan
across those waters.
Prior to 2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of
Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted
“Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December
2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in
and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning
Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar
Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had
believed that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction,
had weakened the insurgency to the point of virtual irrelevance.
The Taliban Resurgence. In the upsurge of violence since mid-2006,
Taliban insurgents, sometimes adapting suicide and roadside bombing characteristic
of the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan, particularly
in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that NATO/ISAF
assumed responsibility for on July 31, 2006. The Taliban resilience led to U.S.
military comments that the Taliban is “growing in influence” in the south, and there
has been debate among experts whether the Taliban resurgence has been driven by
popular frustration with the widely perceived corruption within the Karzai
government and the slow pace of economic reconstruction. Some believe that
Afghans in the restive areas have been intimidated by the Taliban into providing food
and shelter, while others believe that some villages welcome any form of justice,
even if administered by the Taliban. Taliban attacks on schools, teachers, and other
civilian infrastructure have caused popular anger against the movement, but others

---

CRS-21
say they appreciate the Taliban’s reputation for avoiding corruption. The Afghan
government asserts that the increase in the insurgency is because Pakistan is not
denying the Taliban a safe haven there.
Fighting was intense between May and August 2006, as NATO forces fought
large (300-person) Taliban formations in those provinces. In mid-2006, the U.S. and
NATO forces launched “Operation Mountain Lion” and “Operation Mountain
Thrust,” intended to clear areas of the restive southern and eastern provinces in
advance of the NATO assumption of responsibility. Another offensive, led by
NATO, was conducted in August 2006 (Operation Medusa), which was considered
a success in ousting Taliban fighters from the Panjwai district near Qandahar. That
operation also demonstrated that NATO would conduct intensive combat in
Afghanistan. In the aftermath of that operation, British forces entered into an
agreement with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under
which they would secure the main town of the district without an active NATO
presence. On February 2, 2007, Taliban insurgents overran and held Musa Qala
town, demonstrating that the tribes were unable to secure the district without NATO
forces. Subsequently, NATO aircraft killed several Taliban commanders who had
led the attack, but the town remains in Taliban hands amid reports that Taliban
fighters are arresting and abusing civilians remaining in the town. NATO operations
have not tried to retake Musa Qala to date.
Following the 2006 operations, U.S. and NATO commanders expressed
optimism that the offensives had suppressed the new Taliban challenge, and Taliban
commanders admitted they were conducting a “tactical retreat” from the southern
provinces, and began to operate in provinces more north and west, including Ghazni
and Farah. During the 2006-2007 winter months, Taliban formations attacked
NATO positions in these areas, although at a relatively lower frequency than in mid-
2006. On February 27, 2007, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide
bombing inside the first of several security perimeters around of Bagram Air Base,
north of Kabul, where visiting Vice President Cheney was staying. U.S. military
spokespersons said Cheney was far from the bomb site.
In mid-2007, U.S. and NATO commanders have sought to pre-empt an
anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” by an estimated 8,000 Taliban fighters. The
effort depended on added NATO forces, including about 3,200 U.S. troops and
another 3,800 pledged by other NATO countries, discussed below. In a pre-emptive
move against Taliban preparations, on March 6, 2007, about 4,500 NATO troops and
1,000 Afghan soldiers began “Operation Achilles” to combat militants massing in the
Sangin district of northern Helmand Province, a province whose governor says now
has four districts under virtual Taliban control. One purposed of the operation is to
pacify the area around a key dam that needs additional construction work; when
completed, it will supply electricity to the surrounding areas. Another objective of
the operation is to carve out and expands islands of stability and reconstruction to
attract popular support in the restive areas. To date, the “offensive” has not
materialized, and U.S. and NATO commanders said in May 2007 that their efforts
are achieving their objectives, depriving the Taliban of the ability to control
substantial swaths of territory. However, the Taliban and related militants appear
to be shifting tactics to suicide bombings against NATO, U.S., and Afghan targets
in an effort to disrupt reconstruction and sew instability. The NATO operations,

---

CRS-22
and a related offensive launched in late April 2007 called Operation Silicon, had a
major success on May 12, 2007, when the purportedly ruthless leader of the Taliban
insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was tracked by U.S. and NATO forces and
killed in Helmand Province. A U.S. airstrike in late December 2006 killed another
prominent commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani.
The rest of the Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still mostly
intact and believed to be working with Al Qaeda leaders still at large. In addition to
Mullah Umar, Jalaludin Haqqani remains at large, leading an insurgent faction
operating around Khost. Haqqani is believed to have contact with Al Qaeda leaders
in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. Dadullah has been replaced by
his brother, Dadullah Mansoor, according to press reports in May 2007. (Mansoor
was one of five Taliban leaders released in March 2007 in exchange for the freedom
of kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo.) The Taliban still also has
an official spokesman, Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, and it operates a clandestine radio
station, “Voice of Shariat.”
Some Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political
process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. Karzai prompted some Northern Alliance
criticism in April 2007 with an admission that he himself had met some Taliban
militants in an effort to bring them over to the government side. However, such
overtures have been going on for years; according to press reports, about 50-60 senior
militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the
reconciliation process since 2004. Another Taliban figure, its former ambassador
to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted above, several
Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the
parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership
would not be eligible for amnesty. The Taliban official who was governor of
Bamiyan Province when the Buddha statues there were blown up, Mohammad Islam
Mohammedi — and who was later elected to the post-Taliban parliament from
Samangan Province — was assassinated in Kabul in January 2007.
Despite the apparent progress against the Taliban, the Afghan government –
including Karzai and the Afghan parliament – has become increasingly critical of
civilian casualties resulting from U.S. and NATO operations. In a joint meeting on
May 21, 2007, President Bush and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
said that U.S. and NATO operations were seeking to avoid civilian casualties but that
such results were sometimes inevitable in the course of fighting the Taliban.
Whereabouts of Bin Laden and Other Militants. Complicating the U.S.
mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value targets” of Al Qaeda:
leaders believed to be in Pakistan but who are believed able to direct Al Qaeda
fighters to assist the Taliban. The two most notable are bin Laden himself and his
close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan
offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in
December 2001.20 A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few
20 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report
(continued...)

---

CRS-23
hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the
United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.21 Mullah
Umar told media in early January 2007 that he had not seen bin Laden since the
Taliban’s fall from power, but other commanders allied with Umar reportedly are
coordinating with Al Qaeda to an extent. Several press reports in February and
March 2007 say that Al Qaeda is regrouping and strengthening in the tribal areas of
Pakistan, although this is considered outside the reach of U.S. forces fighting in
Afghanistan.

Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar
faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents.
His fighters are operating in Kunar Province, east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003,
the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated
Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to
financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign
Terrorist Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups”
in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April
2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005
might have been searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team
was shot down, killing the 16 aboard. In March 2007, Hikmatyar injected some
optimism into the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by telling the Associated Press that
he had ended cooperation with the Taliban and was open to negotiating with Karzai
an end to his faction’s fight.
U.S. Military Presence/Use of Facilities. Even if the Taliban insurgency
is completely defeated, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain
a long-term presence in Afghanistan, although U.S. officials have not committed to
that outcome. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a
consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. Delegates
reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain
security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and
President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access
to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international
terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give
Karzai his requested greater control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S.
operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and
near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in the table.
20 (...continued)
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
21 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. New York
Times, November 10, 2006.

---

CRS-24
Table 1. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. At
Base
least 500 U.S. military personnel are based there, assisted by about 175 South
Korean troops. Handles many of the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters)
in country. Hospital under construction, one of the first permanent structures
there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for
various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and
an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-
234) provides $20 million for military construction there. NATO also using
the base and sharing operational costs.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, bases about 500 U.S. military personnel.
Field
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces
Base
and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat
governor Ismail Khan, whose militia forces controlled the facility.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft.
Base: Manas,
Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against
Kyrgyzstan
President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly received
assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from his successor, Kurmanbek
Bakiyev. However, Bakiyev demanded a large increase in the $2 million per
year U.S. contribution for use of the base. Dispute resolved in July 2006 with
U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan $150 million in assistance and base use
payments.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces
Base, Turkey
in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals
by Turkey.
Al Dhafra,
Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces
UAE
and related transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 appropriated
$1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 10,000 U.S. personnel in
Base, Qatar
Qatar. Houses CENTCOM forward headquarters. Strike and support
missions flown into Iraq and Afghanistan, according to observers.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and
Facility,
anti-proliferation naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil
Bahrain
platform protection) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S.
military personnel there.
Karsi-
Not used by U.S. since September 2005 following U.S.-Uzbek dispute over
Khanabad Air
May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750
Base,
U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply
Uzbekistan
missions to Afghanistan.

---

CRS-25
The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF)22
As discussed above, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force”
(ISAF, consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus 11 partner countries) now
commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan. (Table 11 lists each contributing
country to ISAF and the approximate number of forces contributed.) ISAF was
created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386
(December 20, 2001),23 initially limited to Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command
of ISAF in August 2003 paved the way for an expansion of its scope, and
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s
assumption of security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage
1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command West, in
2005, respectively).24
The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this
“Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was
formed. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in
fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan, was completed on October 5, 2006. As
part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of command, the United States
put U.S. troops operating in eastern Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF command; they
form the bulk of “Regional Command East” (RC-E). The current commander, who
took over in February 2007, is U.S. Army General Dan McNeil; he heads “ISAF 10.”
He is perceived as emphasizing combat to a greater degree than his predecessor,
British Gen. David Richards, who argued that reconstruction activities are vital and
that the solution to the Taliban insurgency is not purely military. In order to avoid
the impression that foreign forces are “occupying” Afghanistan, NATO said on
August 15, 2006, that it would negotiate an agreement with Afghanistan to formalize
the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15 initiatives to secure Afghanistan
and rebuild its security forces.
At the same time, at and subsequent to a February 2007 NATO meeting in
Seville, Spain, NATO and other ISAF members agreed to deploy 3,800 troops that
U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan determined was needed to blunt the
anticipated Taliban spring offensive. Of those, about 1,000 are from Poland, and
Britain announced an increase of about 1,400 on February 26, 2007. Another
additional 75 came from the Czech Republic, and Norway is contributing another
22 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to
OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.
23 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution
1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12,
2006).
24 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities,
contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after
Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the
city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003)
formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul.

---

CRS-26
150, mostly special forces. Australia, which is not a member of NATO but has
contributed troops to the ISAF mission in Uruzgan, has sent almost 500 additional
forces. President Bush said on February 15, 2007, that Lithuania would also
contribute special forces, and that Turkey and Bulgaria would contribute additional
forces. In April 2007, NATO ministers also decided to send about 3,200 trainers for
Afghan security forces.
The NATO assumption of command represents a quieting of the initial
opposition of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related
peacekeeping with anti-insurgent combat. Some in the Dutch parliament opposed
their country’s deployment to the south, but the parliament voted on February 3,
2006, to permit the move. On April 24, 2007, despite recent deaths of 54 Canadian
forces in Afghanistan to date, Canada’s House of Commons narrowly voted to keep
Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan until at least 2009. On the basis of that domestic
opposition in the NATO countries, Afghan and some U.S. officials privately
questioned the resolve of NATO nations to combat the Taliban resurgence, although
the intensity of combat in 2006 might have assuaged Afghan concerns. Press reports
in March 2007 said Italy’s Prime Minister Romano Prodi faced domestic pressure
to withdraw Italy’s forces from Afghanistan, but the Italian parliament approved an
extension of the mission in March 2007.
In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that allow NATO/ISAF
forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the
combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. Still, most NATO countries have so-
called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that NATO leaders are trying to
reduce. There reportedly are about 50 such “caveats” that NATO commanders say
limit operational flexibility. Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example, refuse to deploy
ground troops in the south where the mission is mostly combat, although German
transport aircraft reportedly have been helping with airlift to southern Afghanistan.
Others have refused to conduct night-time combat. Still others have refused to carry
Afghan National Army or other Afghan personnel on their helicopters. These caveats
were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as
Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and attendant casualties.
There has been some criticism of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan, which focuses
heavily on building relationships with tribal leaders and identifying reconstruction
priorities, and not on actively combating Taliban formations;. Some believe this
approach allows Taliban fighters to group and expand their influence, although the
Netherlands says this approach is key to a long-term pacification of the south. At the
NATO summit in Riga, Latvia during November 28-29, 2006, some NATO
countries, particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove
some of these caveats, and all agreed that their forces would come to each others’
defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan.
One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that
NATO has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages (particularly helicopters)
for the Afghanistan mission. In December 2003, NATO made available 12
helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry
from various nations. In connection with their increased responsibilities as of July
2006, Britain has brought in additional equipment, including Apache attack
helicopters, and the Netherlands is deploying additional Apache helicopter and F-16

---

CRS-27
aircraft to help protect its forces in the south. Italy is reportedly sending “Predator”
unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.25
Additional pledges of helicopters and equipment, including from France, were made
at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006. At the NATO meeting in February
2007 in Seville, Germany pledged an additional eight combat aircraft for use in
Afghanistan (which are enroute to Afghanistan as of April 5, 2007), and President
Bush said on February 15, 2007, that Italy has agreed to send additional aircraft to the
mission and that Iceland had agreed to provide additional airlift assets. NATO/ISAF
also coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it
assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul
International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located).
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
NATO/ISAF expansion in Afghanistan builds on a December 2002 U.S.
initiative to establish “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) — military-run
enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with
reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can
range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects,
although the U.S.-run PRTs, and most of the PRTs in southern Afghanistan, focus
mostly on counter-insurgency. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure
since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT
operations.26 However, other relief groups do not want to associate with military
force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. There are 25 PRTs in
operation, with plans to establish PRTs in almost all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.
In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United States
turned over several PRTs to partner countries, and virtually all the PRTs are now
under ISAF control, but with varying lead nations. The list of the existing PRTs,
including lead country, is shown in Table 12.
Each PRT operated by the United States is composed of U.S. forces (50-100
U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives
of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior
Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have
personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are
“co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. U.S.
funds support PRT reconstruction projects, as shown in the tables at the report’s end.
In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command
South, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain
took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands
took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province. Germany
(with Turkey and France) took over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north
from Britain and the Netherlands when those countries deployed to the south.
25 Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19,
2006.
26 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times,
April 11, 2003.

---

CRS-28
Representing evolution of the PRT concept, Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak
Province, on November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police
training, and agricultural alternatives in that region. U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS
in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over the lead in the PRTs to civilians
rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials.
That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run
PRT in the Panjshir Valley.
Afghan Security Forces
U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in
partnership with French, British, and other forces, are training the new Afghan
National Army (ANA). The table below shows its current strength and target levels,
as well as that of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The target ANA size, 70,000,
was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006,
although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of
the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Defense Minister
says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be
at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he
said in January 2007 that the ANA is growing by about 2,000 per month. As noted
above, in March 2007 President Bush announced a deployment of an additional
3,500 U.S. forces whose main task will be to accelerate building the ANA and ANP,
and at their meeting in Quebec in April 2007, NATO ministers tentatively agreed to
send an additional 3,200 NATO trainers for the ANA and ANP. The United States
has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif).
President Bush announced on February 15, 2007, that Denmark, Greece, Norway,
and Slovakia would provide additional funding for the ANA and ANP. The Indian
press reported on April 24, 2007 that a team from the Indian Army would go to
Afghanistan to help train the ANA.27
The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about
ten to twenty per battalion). Some U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is
becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA
deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to
Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city.
It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005
Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength
operations, according to U.S. officers. Coalition officers are conducting heavy
weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-
Charki, east of Kabul. President Bush said on February 15, 2007, that, to boost ANA
capabilities, the United States would help the ANA add a commando battalion and
combat support units. Fully trained recruits are paid about $100 per month; generals
receive about $530 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447)
requires that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights
violations, and drug trafficking.
27 Indian television news channel NDTV. April 24, 2007.

---

CRS-29
Other officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill
discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time
the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures
reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base.
Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S.
officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better
pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically
integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense
Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in
that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen.
Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in
Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds
to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others,
according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns.
An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior
to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has
about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. President
Bush said on February 15, 2007, that a helicopter unit would be added to provide
additional airlift capability. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the
equipment is difficult to maintain. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base.
Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were
flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan.
ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue
to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or
armor. In July 2006, the Administration announced it would be drawing down about
$2 billion worth of equipment for transfer to the ANA over the next 12 to 18 months.
The United States is also providing surplus weaponry to the Afghan security forces.
On February 2, 2007, in the largest weapons transfer to date, the United States
delivered 213 Humvees to the Afghan National Army (ANA), as well as 12,000 light
weapons. This was the first installment of a planned transfer of over 800 various
armored vehicles to the ANA. Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
International donors (primarily East bloc nations), Defense Ministry weapons
stocks, 28 and the DDR program discussed above have previously furnished most of
the ANA weaponry. International donors have also furnished $120 million in cash
for the Afghan National Police. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give
the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has
already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Egypt has made two major shipments of weapons to the ANA containing 17,000
small arms. The Czech Republic is said to be considering providing up to 10
refurbished helicopters to the ANA.
28 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July
22, 2003.

---

CRS-30
Afghan National Police/Justice Sector. U.S. and Afghan officials believe
that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important
to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. All accounts say that the
police force and justice sector are key weaknesses because of corruption, including
reputed growing of poppy crop at some police locations. The United States and
Germany (41 trainers) are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force, and, to
try to accelerate training, the European Union announced on February 12, 2007, that
its countries would send an additional 160 police trainers and 60 other experts to help
train the ANP. Some will be from Romania. The U.S. effort was first led by State
Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense
Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. There are currently
seven police training centers around Afghanistan. To address the widely cited
continuing inadequacy of ANP presence around Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition
began a program in August 2006 to hire 11,200 “auxiliary police” to serve in the
restive south. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1, passed by the House on January 9, 2007,
recommends a major increase in U.S. and international training of the Afghan police.
Police figures are provided in Table 2.
To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A is providing about 8,000 new
vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. A report by the Inspectors
General of the State and Defense Department, circulated to Congress in December
2006, found that most ANP units have less than 50% of their authorized equipment,29
among its significant criticisms.
Many experts believe that comprehensive police and justice sector reform is
vital to Afghan governance. Police training now includes instruction in human rights
principles and democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights
report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the government and outside observers
are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent abuses. However, some
governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006 when he
approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of 86 total)
who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to satisfy
faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform committee.
The ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local
factional or ethnic disputes. Another problem is widespread corruption, because
ANP officers only receive salaries of about $70 per month, and they reputedly
encourage bribery to supplement these earnings, causing popular resentment. Some
outside experts recommend raising police salaries as a means of reducing the
incentive to engage in corruption.
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry
to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. U.S.
trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces (which are
included in the police figures cited).
29 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and of Defense. Interagency Assessment
of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. November 2006. Department Of State
report No. ISP-IQ0-07-07.

---

CRS-31
U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial
system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are
conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial
reform. The United States has trained over 750 judges, lawyers, and prosecutors,
according to President Bush on February 15, 2007, and built 40 judicial facilities.
USAID also trains court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the
Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. On February 15, 2007, President Bush
also praised Karzai’s formation of a Criminal Justice Task Force that is trying to
crack down on official corruption, and the United States, Britain, and Norway are
providing mentors to the Afghan judicial officials involved in that effort.
U.S. Security Forces Funding. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for
the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in
the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance
funds controlled by the State Department.

---

CRS-32
Table 2. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force
Current Level
Total U.S. Forces in
27,000, up from about 19,000 in 2005. Rising to 30,000 with
Afghanistan
March 2007 announcement of additional 3,500 to train ANA/ANP
U.S. Forces Not Under ISAF
12,000 for OEF combat, primarily in east. A few thousand
Command
training Afghan security forces or are attached to PRTs.
OEF Partner Forces (now Op.
under 1,000. Has decreased as NATO/ISAF has taken over
Active Endeavor) not under
nationwide peacekeeping as of October 5, 2006
NATO/ISAF
Number of U.S. airstrikes
2,000 (May - November 2006)
flown in support of operations
U.S. Casualties
330 killed, of which 208 by hostile action. Additional 62 U.S.
deaths in other theaters of OEF, including the Phillipines and
parts of Africa (OEF-Trans Sahara).
Afghan Civilian Casualties
900 in 2006, of which 230 were from coalition attacks. About
380 thus far in 2007, of which 51 killed by coalition.
NATO/ISAF Peacekeeping
About 38,000 (incl. 15,000 U.S. now formally under ISAF
command). Compares to 12,000 ISAF in 2005; and 6,000 in
2003. Will be about 39,500 when all new NATO force
contributions are in place.
NATO Sectors
RC-S - 11,500
(Regional Commands-south,
RC-E - 13,500
east, north, west, and
RC-N - 3,000
capital/Kabul)
RC-W - 2,100
RC-Kabul - 5,000
national contingent commands - 1,650
Afghan National Army (ANA)
36,000 current, with 70,000 official goal by 2010
Afghan National Police (ANP) 70,000 on duty, of which 50,000 are both trained and equipped.
375 U.S. advisors, mostly contractors. Goal is 82,000.
Counter-Narcotics Police
2,600
Legally Armed Fighters
63,380; all of the pool identified for the program
disarmed by DDR
Weapons Collected by DDR
36,000 medium and light; 12,250 heavy
Armed Groups disbanded by
Commanders in areas of the following provinces have disarmed:
DIAG
Badakhshan, Takhar, Kapisa, Laghman, Paktia, Baghlan,
Ghazni. Goal is to disband 1,800 groups, of which several
hundred are “significant” (five or more fighters).
Weapons Collected by DIAG
22,000
Number of Suicide Bombings
138 in 2006, compared to 21 in 2005. About 50 thus far in 2007.
Number of Improvised
1,693 found or exploded in 2006, double the number of 2005.
Explosive Devices (IED’s)
Afghans Killed by Landmines
700 in 2006 vs. 1,700 in 2002
Number of insurgents killed in
4,000 in 2006, including 2,000 killed September-December
operations

---

CRS-33
Regional Context
Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban
has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments
are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though
six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration)
on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below.
Pakistan
Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public
defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (one of only three countries
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are the others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some
Afghan leaders, still views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an
Afghanistan sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth
against rival India. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the
September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan
government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its
diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents.
The efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations have
not recovered from a setback in March 2006, when Afghan leaders stepped up
accusations that Pakistan was allowing Taliban remnants from operating there.
Some progress was made during a September 6, 2006, visit by President Musharraf
to Kabul where he pledged to seek out and destroy the Pakistan-based command
structure of the Taliban. Despite continuing mutual accusations during visits by
Karzai and Musharraf to Washington, D.C. in late September, further progress was
made at a joint dinner for Karzai and Musharraf hosted by President Bush on
September 28, 2006. At that session, the two leaders agreed to gather tribal elders
on both sides of their border to persuade them not to host Taliban militants.
Reflecting continuing differences, in October 2006 Karzai said that Mullah
Umar is hiding in the Pakistani city of Quetta, an allegation denied by Pakistan. In
a New York Times interview published April 1, 2007, Karzai accused Pakistani
security forces of sheltering Umar, saying Afghanistan had “solid, clear information
indicating this.” In a press interview on February 2, 2007, President Musharraf
tacitly acknowledged that some senior Taliban leaders might be able to operate from
Pakistan but strongly denied that any Pakistani intelligence agencies were
deliberately assisting the Taliban.
There have also been questions about the wisdom of a September 5, 2006,
agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this region to exchange an end to
Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas for a promise by the tribal elders to
expel militants from the border area. Some say that “Pakistani Taliban” have
continued to gain influence over the villages in these regions. In a meeting with
Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Kabul in January 2007, Karzai strongly

---

CRS-34
criticized a Pakistani plan to mine and fence their common border in an effort to
prevent infiltration of militants to Afghanistan. Even though the move was a
Pakistani attempt to increase its efforts to help Afghanistan, Karzai said the move
would separate tribes and families that straddle the border. He said there was still an
“increasing lack of trust” between the countries. Pakistan subsequently dropped the
idea of mining the border, but is beginning to build some fencing. On May 1, 2007,
Musharraf and Karzai reached agreement on a bilateral intelligence sharing plan to
undermine extremists on both sides of the border, and U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani
military officers have been meeting on either side of the border to coordinate efforts
against extremists. After one such meeting in May 2007, an unknown assailant killed
a U.S. soldier on the Pakistani side of the border. On May 17, 2007, about 1,000
Afghans demonstrated at the Pakistan embassy in Kabul to protest recent clashes
between Afghan and Pakistani border guards.
Particularly following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against
President Musharraf, Pakistan has exerted substantial efforts against Al Qaeda.
Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are
suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces
began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the
Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other
indirect support. The U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training
Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.30 This activity
represents a continuation of Pakistan’s support against Al Qaeda after the September
11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace,
some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al
Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United
States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah
(captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September
11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top
planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
In late February 2007, U.S. and Afghan concerns about Pakistan were
heightened by reports that Pakistan has been faltering in its previous efforts, which
had been praised by the Administration, to facilitate the capture of Al Qaeda figures
in the border regions. The New York Times reported on February 19, 2007, that Al
Qaeda leaders, possibly including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, had re-
established some small Al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the
Afghan border. At the same time, U.S. forces in Afghanistan acknowledged that
they are now shelling purported Taliban positions inside the Pakistani side of the
border, and even doing some “hot pursuit” a few kilometers over the border into
Pakistan.
Suggesting that it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on July 19,
2005, Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to
Mullah Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to
30 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April
27, 2005.

---

CRS-35
Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi. On August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced
the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta. On
March 1, 2007, Pakistani officials confirmed they had arrested in Quetta Mullah
Ubaydallah Akhund, a top aide to Mullah Umar and who had served as defense
minister in the Taliban regime. However, he was later reported released.
Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the
“Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893,
separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan
after the 1947 partition). It is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan
continues to indicate that the border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes
and should be re-negotiated. As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan
refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but as many as 3 million
might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back into
Afghanistan in the near future.
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional
influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to
Afghanistan has totaled about $205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to
build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and
villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President
Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S.
criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
but it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of Iranian
“meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized
in the government. However, on April 17, 2007, U.S. military personnel in
Afghanistan captured a shipment of Iranian weapons that purportedly was bound for
Taliban fighters. Because such a shipment would appear to conflict with Iran’s
policy in Afghanistan, U.S. military officers did not attribute the shipment to a
deliberate Iranian government decision to arm the Taliban. However, some experts
believe Iran’s policy might be shifting somewhat to gain leverage against the United
States in Afghanistan (and on other issues) by causing U.S. combat deaths.
For his part, Karzai, who again visited Iran in May 2006 — and who met with
hardline Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tajikistan on July 26, 2006 —
says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose
Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan as Herat governor in September 2004,
although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.31 Iran
is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border.
About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but
about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted
in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan.
31 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall
Street Journal, October 18, 2004.

---

CRS-36
Even though Iran’s influence in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still
greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its
interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western
province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer
to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and
ammunition,32 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian
and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of
its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the
crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene
on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan
during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse
of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in
Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the
mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use
one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India
saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al
Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to
ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have
committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of
using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.
India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-
financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in
northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s
struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi
and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and
committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house
for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects
are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development
Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity
from Central Asia to Afghanistan. Pakistan is likely to take particular exception to
the reported training by India of the ANA, as discussed above.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan
stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.
Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt
32 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997.

---

CRS-37
Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.33 Russia, which still feels humiliated
by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, views Northern Alliance figures as
instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. Although
Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out
of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to
reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism
emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a
Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a
militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one
in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters
fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian
leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous
February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.34 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed
while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas
transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban;
Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that
Alliance. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China
into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the
Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the
region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of
the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending
its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their
pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French
combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In
July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train
some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose
to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly
viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical
Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov,
who died in December 2006, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a
natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see above). The
September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda
33 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.
34 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.

---

CRS-38
guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have
been based in Turkmenistan.
China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China
has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor”
(see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al
Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing
China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met
with Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action
against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup
nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India,
a rival of China.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi
Arabia, a majority of whose citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam also
practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran,
but Iranian-Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed
as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence
ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to
persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia
apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic
radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to
destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi
and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and
Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that
Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his
homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not
publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September
2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of
U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch
strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to
allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.

---

CRS-39
U.S. and International Aid
to Afghanistan
Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction
would do more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat.
Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left
about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than
3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number
remain outside Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the
international donor community by establishing a transparent budget and planning
process. Some in Congress want to increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to
Afghanistan; a provision of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585) would
set up a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan reconstruction, modeled on a
similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,”
SIGIR).
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of
assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to
that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between
1985-1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan,
implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of
administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2003 and
including funds already appropriated for FY2007, the United States has provided
about $14 billion in reconstruction assistance, including military “train and equip”
for the ANA and ANP and counter-narcotics-related assistance. These security-
related categories account for about $7 billion of the totals for the period, or about
half. These amounts do not include costs for U.S. combat operations. Table 4
breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover aid since
FY2003. Table 3 is a history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999.35
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key
post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
(AFSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid.
The total authorization, for all categories for FY2003-FY2006), is over $3.7 billion.
35 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured.
The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds
were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency
Response Fund.

---

CRS-40
For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance
targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations.
However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has
been funded by contributing nations. It authorized the following:
! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $30 million in assistance for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for
FY2003-FY2005);
! $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights
oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-
FY2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
! $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for
Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for
$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by
P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
! $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand
ISAF if such an expansion takes place.
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the
appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional
Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and
progress of reconstruction, an amendment to the report required in the original law;
(2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other
countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense
Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also
contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR
activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Re-Authorization. In the 110th Congress,
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 23, 2007 reported out H.R. 2446,
which would reauthorize AFSA through FY2010. The following are the major
provisions of the bill:
! A total of about $1.6 billion in U.S. aid per fiscal year would be
authorized.
! a pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation is authorized.
! enhanced anti-corruption and legal reform programs would be
provided.
! $45 million per year for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and programs for
women and girls is authorized.

---

CRS-41
! $75 million per year is authorized for enhanced power generation.
! a coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is mandated.
! military drawdowns for the ANA and ANP valued at $300 million
per year (un-reimbursed) are authorized (versus the aggregate $550
million allowed currently).
! authorizes appointment of a special U.S. envoy to promote greater
Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation.
! re-authorizes “Radio Free Afghanistan.”
! establishes a U.S. policy to encourage Pakistan to permit shipments
by India of equipment and material to Afghanistan.
FY2007 and FY2008. The tables below show funds appropriated thus far for
FY2007, as well as the FY2007 supplemental request and related legislation, and the
request for FY2008. An FY2007 supplemental (H.R. 1591) was vetoed by President
Bush; a another bill making that appropriation (H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28) appropriates
approximately the same totals as H.R. 1591. When the supplemental request is
factored in, the requests for both years appear to be somewhat higher than the
amounts pledged in a December 2, 2005, U.S.-Afghan agreement under which the
United States said it would provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in civilian
economic aid over the next five years ($1.1 billion per year). The U.S. aid plan is
reportedly programmed for education, health care, and economic and democratic
development. Based on H.R. 5522, which appears to be a reasonable estimated of
the country allocation for FY2007 thus far, the funds thus far appropriated for
FY2007 (regular appropriation) are slightly lower than the Administration request for
regular FY2007 funds for Afghanistan, which totaled about $1.1 billion.
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the
Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC)
has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking
entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and
another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for
currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States
to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Another $20 million in overflight fees withheld
by U.N. sanctions on the Taliban were provided as well. Together with its allies,
over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment
credits of $100 million.
World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank
reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced
a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World
Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the
telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in
Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in
project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned
Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance,
and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90
million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy
sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from

---

CRS-42
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a
project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. In December 2004, the
Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections
of the road system.
International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that
Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. Including U.S.
pledges, about $30 billion has been pledged at donors conferences in 2002 (Tokyo),
Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London conference (February 2006),
and since then. Of that, about half are non-U.S. contributions. However, not all non-
U.S. amounts pledged have been received, although implementation appears to have
improved over the past few years (amounts received had been running below half of
what was pledged.) The London conference also leaned toward the view of Afghan
leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan
government rather than directly by the donor community. Only about $3.8 billion of
funds disbursed have been channeled through the Afghan government, according to
the Finance Minister in April 2007. The Afghan government is promising greater
financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that
international contributions are used wisely and effectively.
Residual Issues From Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such
as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the
Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft
missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300
Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below
100.36 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when
U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the
war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are
likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose
less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold
to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan
government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.37 In late
January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at
a reported cost of $150,000 each.38
36 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
37 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
38 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.

---

CRS-43
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the
United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a
premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported
on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was
competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA
would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On
March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a
fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran
bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some
reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a
Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in
Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.39 It was
a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by
Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their
targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute
one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that
5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates
are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on
de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around
Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 4), the U.S. de-
mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the
amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds
have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program
for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006
states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan
contaminated by mines by 70%.
39 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

---

CRS-44
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
Supp.
P.L. 480
(Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
(Title I and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978
4.989
—
5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074
—
7.195
—
0.347
10.616
1980
—
(Soviet invasion - December 1979)
—
—
1981
—
—
—
—
—
—
1982
—
—
—
—
—
—
1983
—
—
—
—
—
—
1984
—
—
—
—
—
—
1985
3.369
—
—
—
—
3.369
1986
—
—
8.9
—
—
8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6
—
—
32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9
—
—
74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6
—
—
77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1
—
—
88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1
—
—
80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4
—
—
81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0
—
30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0
—
27.9
42.3
1995
1.8
—
12.4
—
31.6
45.8
1996
—
—
16.1
—
26.4
42.5
1997
—
—
18.0
—
31.9a
49.9
1998
—
—
3.6
—
49.14b
52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.

---

CRS-45
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for
131.0
198.12 (for
Agriculture (DOA)
wheat
165,000 metric
(300,000
food
and USAID Food For
(100,000
tons. (60,000
metric tons
commodities)
Peace (FFP), via
metric tons
tons for May
under P.L.480,
World Food
under
2000 drought
Title II, and
Program(WFP)
“416(b)”
relief)
416(b))
program.)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for
14.03 for the
22.03 for
136.54 (to
Population, Refugees
Afghan
same purposes
similar
U.N. agencies)
and Migration (PRM)
refugees in
purposes
via UNHCR and
Pakistan and
ICRC
Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for
18.934 for
113.36 (to
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
drought relief
similar
various U.N.
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
and health,
programs
agencies and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
water, and
NGOs)
sanitation
programs
State
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust/other
(Humanitarian
demining
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
5.44 (2.789
6.169, of
5.31 for
Refugees in Pakistan
for health,
which $3.82
similar
(through various
training -
went to similar
purposes
NGOs)
Afghan
purposes
females in
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics
1.50
63.0
USAID/
0.45 (Afghan
24.35 for
Office of Transition
women in
broadcasting/
Initiatives
Pakistan)
media
Dept. of Defense
50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Foreign Military
57.0 (for
Financing
Afghan
national army)
Anti-Terrorism 36.4
Economic Support
105.2
Funds (E.S.F)
Peacekeeping
24.0
Totals
76.6 113.2 182.6
815.9

---

CRS-46
Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 4)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health
90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)
47
Peacekeeping
10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, Demining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
5
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)
21
Total from this law:
372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737

---

CRS-47
Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)
Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF)
30
Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection
70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF)
69
Roads (ESF)
181
Schools/Education (ESF)
95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF)
49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation
95
Water Projects
23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE)
170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations
73
Afghan National Army (FMF)
287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR)
35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations
92
Total from this law:
1,327
(of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls)
FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)
Development/Health
171
Disaster Relief
35
Refugee Relief
72
Afghan women (ESF)
5
Judicial reform commission (ESF)
2
Reforestation (ESF)
2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF)
2
Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by
64
USAID for PRT-related reconstruction = $56.4 million)
ANA train and equip (FMF)
50
Total from this law:
403
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid
.085
Total for FY2004
1,727

---

CRS-48
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)
Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF)
225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF)
400
Assistance to benefit women and girls
50
Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary
education, reproductive health, and democracy-building
300
Reforestation
2
Child and maternal health
6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Total from this law
985
Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture,
alternative livelihoods, government capacity building, training
for parliamentarians, rule of law programs (ESF). (Total
1,073.5
FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-led reconstruction =
$87.89 million.)
Aid to displaced persons (ESF)
5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF)
2.5
Women-led NGOs (ESF)
5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces. Of the
funds, $34 million may go to Afghan security elements for that
1,285
purpose. Also, $290 million of the funds is to reimburse the
U.S. Army for funds already obligated for this purpose.
DOD counter-narcotics support operations
242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)
220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE)
400
Karzi protection (NADR funds)
17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan
7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul
60
Total from this law
3,317
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid
56.95
Total 4,359

---

CRS-49
Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102)
ESF
430
(ESF over $225 million subject to
(Mostly for reconstruction, governance,
certification that Afghanistan is
and democracy-building;
cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics)
Includes $20 million for PRTs)
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries)
18
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)
235
(Includes $60 million to train ANP)
Karzai protection (NADR funds)
18
Child Survival and Health (CSH)
43
Reforestation
3
Afghan Independent Human Rights
2
Commission
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat
2
operations
Programs to benefit women and girls
50
Development Assistance
130.4
Total from this law:
931.4
FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 109-234)
Security Forces Fund
1,908
ESF 43
(Includes $11 million for debt relief
costs,$5 million for agriculture
development, and $27 million for
Northeast Transmission electricity
project)
Embassy operations
50.1
DOD Counter-narcotics operations
103
Migration and Refugee aid
3.4
DEA counter-narcotics operations
9.2
Total from this law:
2,116.7
Other: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid
60
Total for FY2006:
3,108.1

---

CRS-50
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007
($ in millions)
Regular Appropriation
(H.R. 5522 Levels, under Continuing Appropriation P.L. 110-5)
510.77
ESF
(USAID plans $42 million for PRTs)
Counter-narcotics
235
(INCLE)
Child Survival and
42.8
Health (CSH)
Development
150
Assistance (DA)
IMET
1.2
DOD Appropriation (P.L. 109-289)
Security Forces
1,500
train and equip
DOD Counter-
100
narcotics support
Total Appropriated
2,539.77
for FY2007 to date
FY2007 Supplemental (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28)
$653 million request/$737 in final law
(of which: 174 for PRTs; 314 for roads; 40 for power; 155 for rural
ESF
development; 19 for agriculture (latter two are alternative livelihoods to
poppy cultivation); 25 for governance; and 10 for the “civilian assistance
program”
30 million
also provides 16 million in Migration and Refugee aid for
P.L. 480 Title II
displaced persons near Kabul,and $16 million International
Food Aid
Disaster and Famine Assistance
U.S. Embassy
47.2 requested/79 in final version
security
5.900 billion requested/5.9064 in final version
Security Forces
(includes 3.2 billion for equipment and transportation; 624
train and equip
million for ANP training; 415 for ANA training; 106 for
commanders emergency response, CERP; plus other funds )
no request/47 million in agreement;
INCLE
plus 60 million in DoD aid to counter-narcotics forces in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, plus 12 million DEA
FY2007 supp.
6.87 billion in final version

---

CRS-51
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 Request
Regular Appropriation Request
ESF
693
INCLE
274.8
P.L. 480 Title II
10
IMET
1.7
Child Survival and Health (CSH)
65.9
NADR (Karzai protection)
21.65
Total regular request
1,067.05
FY2008 Supplemental Request (Global War on Terrorism)
ESF
339
USAID operations
16
Security Forces equip and train
2,700
Total FY2008 supplemental request
3,055
Total FY2008 request (regular and supp.)
4,122.05

---

CRS-52
Table 11. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(Numbers approximate, as of May 2007)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partner Nations
Belgium
300
Albania
30
Bulgaria
150
Austria
5
Canada
2,500
Australia
950
Czech Republic
100
Azerbaijan
20
Denmark
640
Croatia
120
Estonia
90
Finland
100
France
1,000
Ireland
10
Germany
2,750
Macedonia
120
Greece
180
New Zealand
100
Hungary
200
Sweden
350
Iceland
15
Switzerland
5
Italy
1,800
Total ISAF force
38,090
Latvia
35
Lithuania
135
Note: See NATO’s
Luxemburg
10
Afghanistan page at
Netherlands 2,100
[http://www.nato.int/issues/
afghanistan].
Norway
530
Poland
1,200
Portugal
180
Romania
750
Slovakia
60
Slovenia
50
Spain
625
Turkey
475
United Kingdom
5,200
United States
15,000

---

CRS-53
Table 12. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(RC=Regional Command)
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
Gardez
Paktia (RC-East, E)
Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E)
Bagram A.B.
Parwan (RC-C, Central). Assisted by 175 troops from South
Korea
Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
Khost
Khost (RC-E)
Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S) with Romania)
Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
Sharana
Paktika (RC-E)
Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
Nuristan
Nuristan (RC-E)
Farah
Farah (RC-W)
Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada
Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain (with Denmark and Estonia)
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Netherlands (with Australia)
Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy
Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany
Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany
Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway
Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania
Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary (as of October 1, 2006)
Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-C)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF)
Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey

---

CRS-54
Table 13. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/
Regional
Leader
Leader
Ethnicity
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at
ultra-
I n s u r g e n t
large possibly in Afghanistan)/Jalaludin Haqqani.
orthodox
groups, mostly
Islamic,
in the south
Pashtun
and east, and
in Pakistan
Islamic
Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (elected to moderate
M u c h o f
Society
lower house)/Muhammad Fahim (in upper house)/Dr. Islamic,
northern and
(leader of
Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). mostly
w e s t e r n
“Northern
Ismail Khan heads faction of the grouping in Herat Tajik
Afghanistan,
Alliance”)
area.
i n c l u d i n g
Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March 1992 secular,
Mazar-e-
Islamic
break with Najibullah that precipitated his overthrow. Uzbek
Sharif,
Movement
Subsequently fought Rabbani government (1992-
Shebergan,
of
1995), but later joined Northern Alliance.
and environs
Afghanistan
Commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat
aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but was unable to
hold off Taliban forces that captured his region by
August 1998. During OEF, impressed U.S.
commanders with horse-mounted assaults on
Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of
Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city
and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Karzai
rival in October 2004 presidential election, now
Karzai’s chief “security adviser.”
Hizb-e-
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad
Shiite,
Bamiyan
Wahdat
Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election and Hazara
province
parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of
tribes
Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city.
Pashtun
Various regional governors; central government
Moderate
Dominant in
Leaders
led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
southern,
Pashtun
eastern
Afghanistan
Hizb-e-
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Lost orthodox
Small groups
Islam
power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
Islamic,
around
Gulbuddin
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in
Pashtun
Jalalabad,
(HIG)
2002. Still allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Nuristan and
operations east of Kabul, but may be open to ending
in southeast
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam
faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar,
died July 2006.
Islamic
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative,
orthodox
Paghman
Union
leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived
Islamic,
(west of
many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, Pashtun
Kabul)
which shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During anti-
Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a
principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the
U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait.

---

CRS-55
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed
during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been
lifted.
! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making
Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products.
Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive
Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of
Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of
agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls
were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the
Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-
72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This
opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President
Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided
for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and
suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of
negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a
non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the
United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United
States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the
Taliban, by President Bush.
! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986
proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437)
that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for
Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations
for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan.
! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government,

---

CRS-56
reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had
also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had
been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999,
declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton
determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked
Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade
with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these
sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana
assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S.
citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-
controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when
the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no
territory within Afghanistan.
! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October
15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution
1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267
banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana),
and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.
Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice
to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of
Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel
by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors
in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was
provided to the Taliban.
! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright,
completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to
restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had
issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer
a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not
implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition,
Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because
the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize
for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
crsphpgw

---