Order Code RL32665
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated May 18, 2007
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
In February 2006, the Navy proposed a future ship force structure of 313 ships,
including, among other things, 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 11 (and
eventually 12) aircraft carriers, 48 attack submarines (SSNs), 88 cruisers and
destroyers, 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 31 amphibious ships, and a Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron with 12 new-construction
amphibious and sealift-type ships. In February 2007, the Navy submitted a 6-year
(FY2008-FY2013) shipbuilding plan and a 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) shipbuilding
plan.
The final report on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review supported a fleet of
more than 281 ships, including 11 carriers, but did not explicitly endorse a 313-ship
fleet including the numbers that the Navy has outlined for other types of ships.
Within the 313-ship proposal, some observers have questioned the Navy’s
planned figures for SSNs and amphibious ships, and have suggested that a fleet with
55 or more SSNs and 33 amphibious ships would be more appropriate.
The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough ships to fully
support all elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run. Deficiencies
in the 30-year shipbuilding plan relative to the 313-ship fleet include 1 amphibious
ship, 4 cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), 8 SSNs, and 10 cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy says that for its shipbuilding plans to be affordable and executable,
the Navy needs to be funded at a certain overall level, control certain non-
shipbuilding expenditures, and build ships within estimated costs. Some observers
have questioned the Navy’s ability to do these things. The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that shipbuilding costs will be about 34% higher than the Navy
estimates. If the Navy cannot meet its goals regarding its overall level funding, non-
shipbuilding expenditures, and shipbuilding costs, the Navy’s shipbuilding plans may
become difficult or impossible to execute, particularly after FY2011. This report will
be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Introduction and Issue for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Navy’s Proposed 313-Ship Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Potential for Changing 313-Ship Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Amphibious and MPF(F) Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SSBNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Modified Description of Required Number of Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . 4
Navy Shipbuilding Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FY2008-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
30-Year (FY2008-FY2037) Shipbuilding Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Oversight Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
OSD Support for 313-Ship Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appropriateness of 313-Ship Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Number of Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Number of Attack Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Number of Amphibious Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plans for Maintaining 313 Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Total Number of Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
By Specific Ship Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Affordability and Executibility of Shipbuilding Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plans for Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Larger Ships in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Cruisers and Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
LPD-17 Class Ships Amphibious Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FY2008 Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Additional Discussion on Appropriateness of 313-Ship Fleet . . . 20
Historical Fleet Size and Previous Force Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Current Force-Planning Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Size of Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Navy FY2008-FY2013 Ship-Procurement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2008-FY2037) Shipbuilding Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 5. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 6. CBO Estimate of Potential Fleet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 7. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected, FY1982-FY2013 . . . . . . . . 25

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction and Issue for Congress
In February 2006, the Navy proposed a future ship force structure of 313 ships,
including, among other things, 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 11 (and
eventually 12) aircraft carriers, 48 attack submarines (SSNs), 88 cruisers and
destroyers, 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 31 amphibious ships, and a Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron with 12 new-construction
amphibious and sealift-type ships. In February 2007, the Navy submitted a 6-year
(FY2008-FY2013) shipbuilding plan and a 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) shipbuilding
plan.
The issue for Congress is how to respond to the Navy’s 313-ship proposal and
associated shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force
structure and shipbuilding programs could significantly affect future U.S. military
capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the Navy shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
Navy’s Proposed 313-Ship Fleet
What types of ships are included in the 313-ship proposal, and how does
this proposal compare to previous Navy ship force structure proposals?
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s 313-ship proposal and compares
it to other recent Navy force structure proposals. The 313-ship proposal can be
viewed as roughly consistent with other recent Navy ship force-structure proposals.

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Table 1. Recent Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals
Early-2005 Navy
2002-
proposal for fleet of
2004
2001
2006 Navy
260-325 ships
Navy
QDR
proposal
Ship type
proposal
plan for
for 313-
ship fleet
for 375-
310-ship
260-ships 325-ships
ship
Navy
Navya
Ballistic missile
submarines
14
14
14
14
14
(SSBNs)
Cruise missile
submarines
4
4
4
4
2 or 4b
(SSGNs)
Attack submarines
48
37
41
55
55
(SSNs)
Aircraft carriers
11/12c
10
11
12
12
Cruisers,
88
67
92
104
116
destroyers, frigates
Littoral Combat
55
63
82
56
0
Ships (LCSs)
Amphibious ships
31
17
24
37
36
MPF(F) shipsd
12d
14d
20d
0d
0d
Combat logistics
30
24
26
42
34
(resupply) ships
Dedicated mine
0
0
0
26e
16
warfare ships
Otherf
20
10
11
25
25
Total battle force
310 or
313/314
260
325
375
ships
312
Sources: 2001 QDR report, U.S. Navy data, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2007, and the analogous report to Congress for FY2008.
a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.
b. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s
proposed FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available
Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in
marking up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c. 11 carriers, and eventually 12 carriers.
d. Today’s 16 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine
Corps operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy
battle force ships. The Navy’s planned MPF (Future) ships, however, may be capable of
contributing to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations).
For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted here as battle force ships.
e. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced
mobilization status called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily
deployable and thus do not count as battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied
transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness status.
f. Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.

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Potential for Changing 313-Ship Proposal
Could the Navy change the 313-ship proposal at some point?
The Navy in 2006 stated in general that it may change the 313-ship proposal at
some point. The Navy in 2007 has suggested more specifically that it may change
the planned numbers of amphibious ships, MPF(F) ships, and SSBNs.
In General. A May 2006 Navy planning document stated that the
Navy will continue to refine capability and capacity requirements in POM-08
[the Program Objective Memorandum for the FY2008 budget] by reviewing the
force mix against emerging and evolving threats. [The] Navy will conduct an
analytic review and analysis of potential alternative capacity and capability
mixes that will support Joint Force requirements and enable stable shipbuilding
and procurement accounts.1
Amphibious and MPF(F) Ships. The Navy’s February 2007 report on the
30-year (FY2008-FY2037) shipbuilding plan stated:
Future combat operations may require us to revisit many of the decisions
reflected in this report, including those associated with amphibious lift. As the
Navy embarks on production of the Maritime Prepositioning Force in this FYDP,
the Navy will continue to analyze the utility of these ships in terms of their
contribution to, and ability to substitute for, the assault echelon forces in the
Navy’s future battle-force inventory. The current force represents the best
balance between these forces available today. However, changing world events
and resulting operational risk associated with the various force structure elements
that make up these two components of overall lift will be analyzed to ensure the
Navy is not taking excessive risk in lift capability and capacity. While there
needs to be a balance between expeditionary and prepositioning ships for
meeting the overall lift requirement, future reports may adjust the level of
support in one or both of these solutions. Any adjustments made in these
capabilities will have to be accommodated in light of the resources available and
could require the Navy to commit additional funding to this effort in order to
support the overall balance of our shipbuilding program.2
SSBNs. The Navy testified in March 2007 that the next class of ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) will be fueled with a nuclear fuel core sufficient for the
ships’ entire expected service lives. Consequently, the Navy stated, these SSBNs
will not need a mid-life nuclear refueling. As a result, the Navy testified, the Navy
in the future may be able to meet its requirements for SSBN deployments with a
force of 12 SSBNs rather than 14.3 This suggests that the Navy, in future
1 U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Strategic Plan In Support of Program Objective
Memorandum 08, May 2006, p. 11.
2 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2008, p. 5.
3 Navy testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 29, 2007 (transcript of hearing).

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CRS-4
presentations of the 313-ship proposal, may change the required number of SSBNs
from 14 to 12.
Modified Description of Required Number of Aircraft Carriers
Has the Navy recently modified its description of the number of aircraft carriers
in the 313-ship proposal?
In late-March 2007, the Navy modified its description of the number of aircraft
carriers in the 313-ship proposal. From February 2006 through early-March 2007,
the Navy described the 313-ship proposal as one centered on, among other things, 11
aircraft carriers.4 In late-March 2007, the Navy modified its description of the 313-
ship proposal to one centered on, among other things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft
carriers.5
The Navy’s modification of its description of the number of aircraft carriers in
the 313-ship proposal occurred about a week after the decommissioning of the
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67), which occurred on March 23, 2007. The
decommissioning of the Kennedy reduced the Navy’s carrier force from 12 ships to
11. The Navy had proposed decommissioning the Kennedy in its FY2006 and
FY2007 budgets, and opponents of the Kennedy’s retirement had resisted the
proposal. If the Navy, prior to the Kennedy’s decommissioning, had described the
313-ship fleet as one centered on, among other things, 11, and eventually 12, aircraft
carriers, opponents of the Kennedy’s decommissioning might have cited the
“eventually 12” part as evidence that the Navy really requires 12 carriers, not just 11.6
Navy Shipbuilding Plans
What ships are proposed for procurement in the Navy’s shipbuilding
plans?
FY2008-FY2013 Shipbuilding Plan. Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2008-
FY2013 ship-procurement plan.
4 See, for example, Navy testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on march
1, 2007 (transcript of hearing).
5 See, for example, Navy testimony before the Defense subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee on March 28, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 29, 2007 (transcripts of hearings).
6 For additional discussion of the debate over the Kennedy’s retirement, see CRS Report
RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Retirement of USS John F. Kennedy — Issues and
Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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Table 2. Navy FY2008-FY2013 Ship-Procurement Plan
(Ships funded in FY2007 shown for reference)
Total
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY08-
FY13
CVN-21
1 1
2
SSN-774
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
8
CG(X)
1
1
2
DDG-1000
2a
0a
1
1
1
1
1
5
LCS
2b
3b
6b
6
6
6
5
32b
LPD-17
1 1
LHA(R)
1 0
TAKE
1 1
1
MPF(F) TAKE
1 1
1
3
MPF(F) LHA(R)
1
1
2
MPF(F) LMSR
1
1
1
3
MPF(F) MLP
1 1
1
3
TATF
1
1
JCC(X)
1
1
JHSV
1 1
1
3
Total
7b
7b
11b
12
13
12
12
67b
Subtotal larger
ships (i.e., ships
5
4
5
6
7
6
7
35
other than LCSs)
Source: Navy FY2008 budget submission.
Key: CVN-21 = Ford (CVN-21) class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. SSN-774 = Virginia (SSN-
774) class nuclear-powered attack submarine. CG(X) = CG(X) class cruiser. DDG-1000 = Zumwalt
(DDG-1000) class destroyer. CG(X) = CG(X) class cruiser. LCS = Littoral Combat Ship. LPD-17
= San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. LHA(R) = LHA(R) class amphibious assault ship.
TAKE =Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class resupply ship. TAKE-MPF(F) = Modified TAKE intended
for MPF(F) squadron. MPF(F) LHR(A) (also called MPF(F) Aviation) = Modified LHA(R)
intended for MPF(F) squadron. LMSR-MPF(F) = Modified large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off
(LMSR) sealift ship intended for MPF(F) squadron. MLP-MPF(F) = Mobile Landing Platform ship
intended for MPF(F) squadron. TATF = oceangoing fleet tug. JCC(X) = Joint command and control
ship. JHSV = Joint High-Speed Vessel.
a. DDG-1000s procured in FY2007 using split-funding (i.e., incrementally funding) in FY2007 and
FY2008.
b. In March 2008, after the Navy submitted its FY2008 budget to Congress, the Navy announced a
proposed plan for restructuring the LCS program that would change the numbers of LCSs in FY2007,
FY2008, and FY2009 from 2, 3, and 6, respectively, to 0, 2, and 3, respectively. This proposal, if
implemented, would alter the figures for the LCS program in those years, as well as the totals in the
table that include these figures.
30-Year (FY2008-FY2037) Shipbuilding Plan. Table 3 below shows the
Navy’s 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) ship-procurement plan.

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Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2008-FY2037) Shipbuilding Plan
(including FY2008-FY2013 FYDP)
F
Ship type (see key below)
Y
C
S
L
S
S
S
E
C
M
M
S
T
V
C
C
S
S
S
W
L
I
P
u
O
N
S
N
G
B
S
F
W
F
p
T
N
N
(F)
t
A
L
08
1
0a
3b
1
1
1
7
09
1
6b
1
2
1
11
10
1
6
1
3
1
12
11
2
6
1
3
1
13
12
1
1
6
2
1
1
12
13
2
5
2
2
1
12
14
1
6
2
1
10
15
2
6
2
2
12
16
1
2
5
2
1
11
17
2
2
1
1
6
18
2
2
1
1
6
19
2
2
1
5
20
2
2
1
2
2
9
21
1
2
2
1
2
8
22
2
2
1
1
2
2
10
23
1
2
2
2
3
10
24
2
2
1
1
2
2
10
25
1
3
2
1
1
2
1
11
26
3
2
1
2
2
10
27
3
2
1
1
7
28
3
2
1
1
7
29
1
3
1
1
2
1
9
30
3
1
2
1
1
1
9
31
3
2
1
1
1
1
9
32
3
3
2
1
1
10
33
3
4
1
1
9
34
1
3
6
2
1
13
35
3
6
1
1
1
12
36
3
6
2
11
37
3
6
1
10
Source: Report to Congress on 1Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2008, p. 6.
a Two ships procured in FY2007 using split-funding (i.e., incremental funding) in FY2007 and
FY2008.
b In March 2008, after the Navy submitted its FY2008 budget to Congress, the Navy announced a
proposed plan for restructuring the LCS program that would change the numbers of LCSs in FY2007,
FY2008, and FY2009 from 2, 3, and 6, respectively, to 0, 2, and 3, respectively. This proposal, if
implemented, would alter the figures for the LCS program in those years. The Navy has stated that
it still plans to procure a total of 55 LCSs, suggesting that if the Navy’s restructuring proposal is
approved, the LCSs eliminated from FY2007-FY2009 wold be added back in other years.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and
destroyers); LCS = Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile
submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; EWS = expeditionary warfare (i.e., amphibious)
ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MIW = mine warfare ships; MPF(F) =
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.

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CRS-7
Oversight Issues for Congress
OSD Support for 313-Ship Proposal
Does the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) support the 313-ship
proposal?
The final report on DOD’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released
on February 3, 2006, suggests that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
supports a Navy with 11 carrier strike groups and more than 281 ships, but not
necessarily the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, including the Navy’s proposed
subtotals for ship types other than aircraft carriers. Specifically, the report states that
DOD will “Build a larger fleet that includes 11 Carrier Strike Groups....”7 The Navy
as of early-February 2006 included 281 ships. The report specifically mentions
force-structure goals for several parts of DOD,8 but does not mention the Navy’s 313-
ship proposal or force-level goals for any ships other than aircraft carriers.9
7 U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006.
(February 6, 2006) p. 48.
8 The report mentions specific force-structure goals for Army brigades (page 43), Army end
strength (page 43), Marine Corps end strength (page 43), special force battalions (page 44;
these are to be increased by one-third); psychological operations and civil affairs units
(page45; these are to be increased by 3,500 personnel); the Air Force B-52 bomber force
(page 46); Air Force combat wings (page 47); Air Force Minuteman III ballistic missiles
(page 50); and Air Force inter-theater airlift aircraft (page 54).
9 The report also states that based on a series of analyses, DOD
concluded that the size of today’s forces — both the Active and Reserve
Components across all four Military Departments — is appropriate to meet
current and projected operational demands. At the same time, these analyses
highlighted the need to continue re-balancing the mix of joint capabilities and
forces.
(Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op cit, p. 41.)
Regarding the reference to “today’s forces,” the Navy, as mentioned earlier, included a total
of 281 ships as of early-February 2006.
The QDR report also states that
policy decisions, such as mobilization policies and war aims, may change over
time and have implications for the shape and size of U.S. forces. Finally, as part
of a process of continuous reassessment and improvement, this wartime construct
will be further developed over time to differentiate among the Military
Departments as to how they should best size and shape their unique force
structures, for use by the Combatant Commanders, since all parts of the construct
do not apply equally to all capability portfolios.
(Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op cit, pp. 38-39.)

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CRS-8
Appropriateness of 313-Ship Proposal
Does the 313-ship proposal include appropriate numbers of ships?
Number of Aircraft Carriers. Some observers have questioned whether the
Navy’s proposed total of 11 aircraft carriers through FY2018 will be sufficient,
particularly in light of past Navy plans that have called for 12 carriers, the Navy’s
statements since late-March 2007 that the 313-ship proposal includes a requirement
for an eventual total of 12 carriers, and Navy plans to increase the carrier force back
to 12 ships in 2019 and maintain it at that level thereafter. The latter two points, they
argue, suggest that the Navy would actually prefer to have 12 carriers between now
and FY2019, rather than 11.
Observers have also expressed concern that the current carrier force of 11 ships
will temporarily decline further, to 10 ships, during the 33-month period between the
scheduled retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and
scheduled the entry into service of its replacement, the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-
78), in September 2015. Even if an 11-carrier force is adequate, these observers
argue, a 10-carrier force might not be, even if only for a 33-month period.
10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least
11 operational ships. The Navy for FY2008 is requesting a legislative waiver from
Congress that would permit the Navy to reduce the carrier force to 10 operational
ships for the 33-month between the retirement of the Enterprise and the entry into
service of the Ford.
Number of Attack Submarines. Some observers have questioned whether
the Navy’s proposed total of 48 attack submarines will be sufficient, and have
suggested that a total of 55 or more would be more appropriate, particularly in light
of requests for forward-deployed attack submarines from U.S. regional military
commanders, and the modernization of China’s naval forces, including its submarine
force. The issue is discussed in more detail other CRS reports.10
Number of Amphibious Ships. Some observers have questioned whether
the Navy’s proposed total of 31 amphibious ships will be sufficient. The Marine
Corps in 2007 has suggested in testimony that a total of 33 would be more
appropriate, on the grounds that 33 are needed meet the Marine Corps’ requirement
for having 30 operationally available amphibious ships (i.e., ships not in overhaul)
at any one time, and since the requirement for 30 operational ships itself represents
a reduction from a desired Marine Corps total of 34 operational ships. The issue is
discussed in more detail in another CRS report.11
10 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
11 CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning
Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

---

CRS-9
For additional discussion of the appropriateness of the total number of ships
(313) being proposed by the Navy, see Appendix A.
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plans for Maintaining 313 Ships
Do the Navy’s shipbuilding plans adequately support the 313-ship proposal?
The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough ships to fully
support all elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run.
Total Number of Ships. The Navy projects that its 30-year (FY2008-
FY2037) shipbuilding plan, if fully implemented, would be sufficient to achieve and
maintain a fleet of at least 313 ships between FY2016 and FY2025, but would not
be sufficient to maintain a fleet of at least 313 ships in FY2026 and subsequent years.
Table 4 shows the Navy’s projection of future force levels that would result
from fully implementing the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. As can be seen in the
table, the Navy projects that the fleet would increase to 314 ships in FY2016, peak
at 329 ships in FY2018-FY2019, and then decline to less than 313 ships in FY2026
and subsequent years, reaching a minimum of 294 ships in FY2031-FY2032.
By Specific Ship Type.
Summary. Long-term insufficiencies in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan
relative to the proposed 313-ship fleet include one LPD-17, four SSGNs, eight SSNs,
10 cruisers and destroyers, and the timing of some of the replacement SSBNs.
Aircraft Carriers. As mentioned earlier, the Navy projects that the carrier
force will drop from the current figure of 11 ships to 10 ships for a 33-month period
between the scheduled retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November
2012 and scheduled the entry into service of its replacement, the carrier Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78), in September 2015. The Navy projects that the force will increase
to 12 carriers starting in FY2019, when CVN-79 is commissioned. The Navy could
keep the carrier force at 11 ships in FY2019 and subsequent years by accelerating the
retirement of an existing carrier.
As mentioned earlier, 10 USC §5062 requires the Navy to maintain an aircraft
carrier force of at least 11 operational ships, and the Navy for FY2008 is requesting
a legislative waiver from Congress that would permit the Navy to reduce the carrier
force to 10 operational ships for the 33-month between the retirement of the
Enterprise and the entry into service of the Ford.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). The 313-ship plan calls for a total
of 14 SSBNs, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 14 replacement
SSBNs procured between FY2019 and FY2035. The 14 replacement ships, however,
are not procured on a schedule that would permit a timely one-for-one replacement
for some of the 14 existing SSBNs. As a result, the Navy projects that the SSBN
force will drop to 13 ships in FY2027, and to 12 ships in 2030. The Navy projects
that the force would remain at 12 ships through FY2037. Accelerating the
procurement of some of the SSBNs to earlier years would permit the SSBN force to

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CRS-10
remain at a steady level of 14 ships while existing ships were replaced by new ones.
As discussed earlier, the Navy has suggested that the required number of SSBNs may
be reduced from 14 to 12.
Table 4. Navy Projection of Future Force Levels
(resulting from implementation of 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3)
F
Ship type (see key below)
Y
C
S
L
S
S
S
E
C
M
M
S
T
V
C
C
S
S
S
W
L
I
P
u
O
N
S
N
G
B
S
F
W
F
p
T
N
N
(F)
t
A
L
08
11
107
4
52
4
14
32
31
14
0
17
286
09
11
109
6
53
4
14
31
30
14
0
17
289
10
11
111
9
52
4
14
31
30
14
0
17
293
11
11
113
15
52
4
14
32
30
14
0
17
302
12
11
112
21
53
4
14
33
29
14
1
18
310
13
10
106
27
54
4
14
32
29
14
2
19
311
14
10
99
33
51
4
14
31
30
14
3
18
307
15
11
93
38
51
4
14
30
30
14
8
18
311
16
11
91
44
49
4
14
30
30
14
9
18
314
17
11
92
50
49
4
14
30
30
13
10
19
322
18
11
93
55
48
4
14
30
30
13
11
20
329
19
12
93
55
49
4
14
30
30
11
11
20
329
20
12
94
55
47
4
14
30
30
10
11
21
328
21
12
95
55
47
4
14
30
30
7
11
21
326
22
12
94
55
46
4
14
30
30
6
12
21
324
23
12
94
55
46
4
14
30
30
2
12
22
321
24
12
94
55
45
4
14
30
30
1
12
22
319
25
12
93
55
44
4
14
30
30
0
12
20
314
26
12
90
55
43
2
14
30
30
0
12
20
306
27
12
90
55
42
1
13
30
30
0
12
21
306
28
12
87
55
40
0
13
30
30
0
12
21
300
29
12
85
55
40
0
13
30
30
0
12
21
298
30
12
83
55
41
0
12
30
30
0
12
21
296
31
12
80
55
43
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
294
32
12
79
55
44
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
294
33
12
79
55
46
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
296
34
12
78
55
48
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
297
35
12
79
56
49
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
300
36
12
80
56
51
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
303
37
12
79
56
52
0
12
30
30
0
12
20
303
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2007.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and
destroyers); LCS = Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile
submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; EWS = expeditionary warfare (i.e., amphibious)
ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MIW = mine warfare ships; MPF(F) =
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.

---

CRS-11
Converted Trident Submarines (SSGNs). Although the 313-ship plan
calls for a total of four SSGNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes no
replacements for the four current SSGNs, which the Navy projects will reach
retirement age and leave service in FY2026-FY2028.
Attack Submarines (SSNs). Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of
48 SSNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough SSNs to maintain
a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run. The Navy projects that the SSN
force will drop below 48 boats in 2020, reach a minimum of 40 boats (17% less than
the required figure of 48) in FY2028 and FY2029, and remain below 48 boats
through 2033. The Navy has completed a study on various options for mitigating the
projected SSN shortfall. One of these options is to procure one or more additional
SSNs in the period FY2008-FY2011. Some Members have expressed support for
this option. The issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.12
Cruisers and Destroyers. Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of 88
cruisers and destroyers, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough
cruisers and destroyers to maintain a force of 88 ships consistently over the long run.
The Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer force will drop below 88 ships in
FY2028, reach a minimum of 78 ships (11% less than the required figure of 88) in
FY2034, and remain below 88 through FY2037. Maintaining a force of 88 cruisers
and destroyers consistently over the long run would require adding 10 cruisers and
destroyers to the 30-year shipbuilding plan by about FY2029.
Amphibious Ships. Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of 31
amphibious ships, the Navy projects that the force will drop to 30 ships in FY2015,
and remain there through FY2037. Although the requirement for 31 amphibious
ships includes a total of 10 LPD-17s, the FY2008-FY2013 shipbuilding plan ends
procurement of LPD-17s with the procurement of a ninth ship in FY2008. A tenth
LPD-17 is the top item on the Navy’s FY2008 unfunded programs list (also called
the unfunded requirements list) — the list of items the Navy would like to fund in
FY2008 if funding were added to the Navy’s FY2008 budget.
Affordability and Executibility of Shipbuilding Plans
Are the Navy’s shipbuilding plans affordable and executable?
The Navy says that for its shipbuilding plans to be affordable and executable,
five things need to happen:
! The Navy’s overall budget needs to remain more or less flat (not
decline) in real (inflation-adjusted) terms;
! Navy Operation and Maintenance (O&M) spending needs to remain
flat (not grow) in real terms;
12 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

---

CRS-12
! Navy Military Personnel (MilPer) spending needs to remain flat (not
grow) in real terms;
! Navy research and development (R&D) spending needs to decrease
from recent levels and remain at the decreased level over the long
run; and
! Navy ships need to be built at the Navy’s currently estimated prices.
The Navy says the first four things are needed for the Navy to be able to increase
the shipbuilding budget from an average in FY2002-FY2007 of about $9.6 billion per
year in constant FY2008 dollars to a long-term average of about $15.4 billion per
year in constant FY2008 dollars — an increase of about 60% in real terms.13
Some observers have questioned whether all five of the above things will
happen, arguing the following:
! The need in coming years to fund an increase in Army and Marine
end strength could, within an overall DOD budget that remains more
or less flat in real terms, require funding to be transferred from the
Air Force and Navy budgets to the Army and Marine Corps budgets,
which could, for a time at least, lead to a real decline in the Air
Force and Navy budgets.
! DOD in the past has not been fully successful in meeting its goals
for controlling O&M costs.
! The Navy does not have full control over its MilPer costs — they
can be affected, for example, by decisions that Congress makes on
pay and benefits.
! While Navy may be able to decrease R&D spending in coming years
as a number of new systems shift from development to procurement,
it may be difficult for the Navy to keep R&D spending at that
reduced level over the long run, because the Navy at some point will
likely want to start development of other new systems.
! Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant
cost growth in recent years, and CBO estimates that Navy ships will
cost substantially more to build than the Navy estimates.
If one or more of the five required things listed above does not happen, it might
become difficult or impossible to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans. The risk
13 Source: CBO telephone conversation with CRS, May 31, 2006. See also Statement of J.
Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director, and Eric J. Labs, Principal Analyst, [On] Potential
Costs of the Navy’s 2006 Shipbuilding Plan, [Testimony] before the Subcommittee on
Projection Forces Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, March 30,
2006.

---

CRS-13
of the plan becoming unexecutable may become particularly acute after FY2011,
when the Navy plans to increase annual procurement from 1 destroyer and 1
submarine per year to more than 1 cruiser and destroyer and 2 submarines per year.
Regarding the fifth item on the list above, CBO estimates, as shown in Table
5, that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan could cost an average of about $20.6 billion per
year in constant FY2008 dollars to execute — about 34% more than the Navy
estimates. If aircraft carrier refueling overhauls are also included in the calculation,
CBO’s estimated cost ($21.7 billion per year in constant FY2008 dollars) is about
32% higher than the Navy’s estimate ($16.5 billion in constant FY2008 dollars). The
table also shows that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan is augmented to include the
extra ships needed to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run
(see discussion in previous section), CBO estimates the average annual cost at $21.9
billion per year excluding carrier refueling overhauls, and $22.9 billion per year
including carrier refueling overhauls, both figures in constant FY2008 dollars.
Table 5. Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs
(Billions of constant FY2008 dollars per year)
New-
New-construction
construction
ships + carrier
ships only
refueling overhauls
Navy shipbuilding budget in FY2002-FY2007
9.6
11.4
Navy estimate of cost of 30-year plan
15.4
16.5
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan
20.6
21.7
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan plus
21.9
22.9
additional ships needed to fully support all
elements of 313-ship fleet consistently over
the long run
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2008
Shipbuilding Plan, March 23, 2007, Table 2 on p. 8.
As shown in Table 6, CBO in 2006 estimated that if the Navy in coming years
does not receive or cannot devote more budgetary resources to ship construction, and
if the Navy retains roughly the same proportionate mix of ship types as called for in
the 313-ship proposal, the fleet could eventually be reduced to a total of 211 ships,
or about 33% fewer than called for in the 313-ship proposal.

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CRS-14
Table 6. CBO Estimate of Potential Fleet Size
Proposed 313-ship
Ship type
CBO Estimate
fleet
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
14
10
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)
4
0
Attack submarines (SSNs)
48
35
Aircraft carriers
11
7
Cruisers, destroyers, frigates
88
54
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs)
55
40
Amphibious ships
31
15
MPF(F) ships
12
12
Combat logistics and support ships
50
38
Total battle force ships
313
211
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet, May 2006, pp. xviii-xx.
Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plans for Industrial Base
Do the Navy’s shipbuilding plans adequately support the shipbuilding
industrial base?
Larger Ships in General. Although the total number of ships to be procured
under the Navy’s FY2008-FY2013 shipbuilding plan increases from 7 ships per year
in FY2008 to 11 ships in FY2009 and 12 or 13 ships per year in FY2010-FYFY2013,
much of this increase is due the planned increase in the number of LCSs procured
each year. When the LCSs are set aside, the total number of larger ships to be
procured grows from four in FY2008 to five in FY2009 and six or seven per year in
FY2010-FY2013.
As shown in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2007-FY2011 plan includes a total of 35
larger ships (i.e., ships other than LCSs), or an average of about 5.8 larger ships per
year. This average rate, if implemented, would be similar to rate of procurement that
has been maintained for larger ships since the early 1990s (see Appendix B).
Consequently, for the six yards that build the Navy’s larger ships, the Navy’s
FY2007-FY2011 shipbuilding plan would, if implemented, result in a continuation,
more or less, of the relatively low workloads and employment levels these yards have
experienced in recent years.
Submarines.
Submarine Construction. The Navy is planning to increase the SSN
procurement rate from the current one ship per year to two ships per year starting in
FY2012. The submarine industrial base could execute an increase to two ships per
year by an earlier date, although the construction times for the additional boat or
boats procured might be somewhat longer than usual.
Submarine Design and Engineering. Navy and industry officials are
concerned about the future of the submarine design and engineering base, which

---

CRS-15
currently faces the prospect, for the first time in about 50 years, of not having a new
submarine design project on which to work. Since many of the design and
engineering skills needed for submarines are not exercised fully, or at all, through the
design of surface ships, attempting to maintain the submarine design and engineering
base by giving it surface-ship design work is viewed by Navy and industry officials
as a risky approach. This view has been reinforced by the recent experience of the
United Kingdom, which attempted unsuccessfully to maintain its submarine design
and engineering base by giving it surface-ship design work. The UK later
experienced substantial difficulties in its subsequent Astute-class SSN design and
engineering effort. These difficulties were substantial enough that employees from
GD/EB’s design and engineering staff were used to help overcome problems in the
Astute-class effort.
Options for additional work for the submarine design and engineering base over
the next few years include the following:
! Expanded Virginia-class modification effort. The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target. The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications. An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
! New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production. Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production. This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
! Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan. In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric
submarines.14 Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
14 For more on the proposed arms sales package, including the diesel-electric submarines,
see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.

---

CRS-16
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose. This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas. Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base. Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them. Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged. In addition, this project might raise concerns
regarding the potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S.
submarine technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in
the past for not supporting the idea of designing and building diesel-
electric submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.15
! New SSN design. Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years. The Navy in the past has
estimated that the cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to
the procurement cost of three SSNs. The House version of the
FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea,
but the idea was not supported by the Navy, in large part because of
its cost, and the conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
! Accelerated start of next SSBN design. Given the ages of the
Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a replacement SSBN design
would normally not need to start for several years. The start of this
project, however, could be accelerated to FY2008. The project
could then be carried out as a steady-state effort over several years,
rather than as a more-concentrated effort starting several years from
now. This option could provide a significant amount of submarine
design and engineering work for several years, and could engage all
submarine design and engineering skills. The total cost of this effort
would be comparable to that of the previous option of designing a
new SSN, but this option would accelerate a cost that the Navy
already plans to incur, whereas the option for designing a new SSN
would be an additional cost.
The Navy has acknowledged the need to devise a strategy to preserve the
submarine design and engineering base, and asked the RAND Corporation to study
the issue. The RAND report states that, based on RAND’s analysis,
15 An additional issue that some observers believe might be behind Navy resistance to the
idea of designing and building diesel-electric submarines in the United States for sale to
foreign buyers, but which these observers believe the Navy is unwilling to state publicly, is
a purported fear among Navy officials that the establishment of a U.S. production line for
such boats would lead to political pressure for the Navy to accept the procurement of such
boats for its own use, perhaps in lieu of nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy argues that
non-nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for U.S. submarine operations, which
typically involve long, stealthy transits to the operating area, long submerged periods in the
operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.

---

CRS-17
we reach the following recommendations:
—
Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009,
to run 20 years, taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages
involved.
If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a
gap in submarine design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken. If that
alternative is judged too risky, we recommend the following:
—
Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the
spiral development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be
able to substitute for new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to
retain their skills.
If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on
balance to offer clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy
should take the following actions:
— Request sufficient funding to sustain excess design workforces at the
shipyards large enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later.
—
Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue
efforts to determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the
sustained design core.
—
Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors to the shipyards to determine
which require intervention to preserve critical skills.
— Invest $30 million to $35 million annually in the NSWC’s Carderock
Division submarine design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to
sustain skills that might otherwise be lost.16
Cruisers and Destroyers. The 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for procuring
an average of about 1.5 DDG-1000s/CG(X)s over the next 17 years. The light-ship
displacement of the DDG-1000 (about 12,435 tons) is about 79% greater than that
of the DDG-51 Flight IIA design (about 6,950 tons). If shipyard construction work
for these two ship classes is roughly proportional to their light-ship displacements,
and if the CG(X) is about the same size as the DDG-1000, then procuring an average
of 1.5 DDG-1000s/CG(X)s per year might provide an amount of shipyard work
equivalent to procuring about 2.7 DDG-51s per year. Splitting this work evenly
between the two yards that build larger surface combatants — General Dynamics’s
Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula,
MS, that forms parts of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS) — might thus
provide each yard with the work equivalent of about 1.35 DDG-51s per year.
16 John F. Schank, et al, Sustaining U.S. Submarine Design Capabilities, RAND, Santa
Monica (CA), 2007. pp. xxvii-xxviii. (Prepublication copy posted on the Internet by
RAND, accessed on May 9, 2007, at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2007/RAND_MG608.pdf].)

---

CRS-18
Supporters of these two yards argued in the 1990s that a total of 3 DDG-51s per
year (i.e., an average of 1.5 DDG-51s per year for each yard), in conjunction with
other work being performed at the two yards (particularly Ingalls), was the minimum
rate needed to maintain the financial health of the two yards.17 Navy officials in
recent years have questioned whether this figure is still valid. Building the
equivalent of about 2.7 DDG-51s per year equates to about 90% of this rate.
If GD/BIW were to build the second and fourth DDG-1000s, then the rather
lengthy interval between GD/BIW’s first ship (to be procured in FY2007) and its
second ship (to be procured in FY2010) could reduce GD/BIW’s ability to efficiently
shift production from one ship to the next.
If affordability considerations limit DDG-1000/CG(X) procurement to one ship
per year in FY2011 and subsequent years, the workload for the cruiser-destroyer
industrial base in those years would be reduced substantially from levels that would
be achieved under the Navy’s 30-year plan. Procuring one DDG-1000/CG(X) per
year might provide an amount of shipyard work equivalent to procuring about 1.8
DDG-51s per year, and splitting this work evenly between GD/BIW and Ingalls
might provide each yard with the work equivalent of about 0.9 DDG-51s per year,
which would be equivalent to 60% of the rate cited in the 1990s by supporters of the
two shipyards as the minimum needed to maintain the financial health of the two
yards.
LPD-17 Class Ships Amphibious Ships. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding
plan shows a 10-year gap between the ninth LPD-17, to be procured in FY2008, and
the first ship in the LSD(X) class (a broadly similar type of amphibious ship) in
FY2018. LPD- and LSD-type ships in recent years have been built primarily at the
Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, LA, that forms part of Northrop Grumman
Ship Systems (NGSS).
FY2008 Legislative Activity
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585)
House. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146
of May 11, 2007) on the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585),
recommended funding for procuring an additional LPD-17 amphibious ship and an
additional TAKE-1 class dry cargo ship. The report also recommended advance
procurement funding for long-leadtime components for a Virginia-class attack
submarine, to facilitate the option of procuring an additional Virginia-class boat prior
to FY2012. The committee’s report states that “The committee took steps to reverse
the decline in the Navy’s fleet by adding funding for construction of three ships.”
(Page 17) The report also states:
17 See, for example, CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, April 1994, pp. 59-62 (out of print,
available from author).

---

CRS-19
The proposed 55 ship class [of Littoral Combat Ships] represents a significant
portion of the Chief of Naval Operations plan for a 313 ship Navy. If the
Secretary cannot maintain affordability in this vital program, the 313 ship fleet
cannot be realized. The committee believes it is imperative that the Navy pursue
all reasonable means to control costs in the LCS program. (Page 78)
The report also states:
The committee is aware of the Navy requirement for a force of 48 fast
attack submarines, and that the Navy will fall short of that number after the year
2020 under the current shipbuilding plan. The committee is committed to
increasing the procurement of Virginia class submarines to two per year prior to
the Navy’s current plan of increased procurement in fiscal year 2012. The
[committee’s recommended] addition of advance procurement for construction
of long-lead items such as reactor plant and main propulsion components allows
the committee the flexibility to increase the procurement rate of submarines in
the coming years. (Page 80)
The report also states:
Premature retirement of Navy vessels
The committee remains concerned that vessels of the U.S. Navy are being
retired prior to the end of useful service life. The committee understands that
over the past two decades a significant percentage of the capital ships of the
Navy have been retired based on cost avoidance decisions for modernization of
surface combatants or refueling of submarines.
The committee notes that those decisions have resulted in a current fleet of
less than 280 capital ships. The committee strongly believes that future Navy
ship classes should be designed and constructed to allow for cost effective
upgrades to the ships sensors, communications, and weapons systems as new
technologies become available.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees by October 1, 2007, detailing the vessels that
the Navy expects to retire between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2012,
which will not have reached the end of useful service life. This report shall
specify why it is in the best interest of the nation to retire any such vessel prior
to the end of its useful service life. For the purposes of this report, “useful
service life” shall be defined as the projected hull life of the ship class.
Additionally, this report shall include the Navy’s strategy for future design and
construction to ensure that capital ships can be upgraded economically, and are
not retired prematurely. (Page 79)

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CRS-20
Appendix A. Additional Discussion on
Appropriateness of 313-Ship Fleet
Historical Fleet Size and Previous Force Plans. One possible method
for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being proposed by the
Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size. Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical
figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available
to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships
at the end of FY1987,18 and as of May 22, 2005 had declined to a total of 282 battle
force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission
requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential
multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the February 2006 fleet is intended
to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing
events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential
regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In
addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the February 2006 fleet in
areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.19
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible
example, a greater emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime
military capabilities.20 In addition, the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have
changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned
vehicles.
18 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated
that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is
the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of
battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has
been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships,
while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of
battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case
overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule
to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy
over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
19 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
20 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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CRS-21
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing
its stated missions; the 281-ship fleet of February 2006 may or nor may not be
capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain
number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given
changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however,
these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are
not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not
necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is
decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time
that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than
offset reductions in total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might
provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure
plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships
for performing missions, and other force-planning factors suggest that some caution
should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if
those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan
for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis
for planning the Navy today.21
21 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era
600-ship plan of the 1980s, the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the
final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the
Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base
Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table
below summarizes some key features of these plans.
Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan
600-ship
Base Force
1993 BUR
1997 QDR
Total ships
~600
~450/416a
346
~305/310b
Attack submarines
100
80/~55c
45-55
50/55d
Aircraft carriers
15f
12
11+1g
11+1g
Surface combatants
242/228h
~150
~124
116
Amphibious ships
~75i
51j
36j
36j
Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of
FY1999.
b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number
of attack submarines to 55 from 50.
(continued...)

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CRS-22
Current Force-Planning Issues. Current force-planning issues that
Congress may consider in assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s 313-ship
proposal include the following:
! naval requirements for what the administration refers to as the global
war on terrorism (GWOT) and for irregular conflicts such as
insurgencies;
! naval requirements for countering improved Chinese maritime
military forces;
! new technologies that may affect U.S. Navy ship capabilities;
! additional forward homeporting and the Sea Swap concept;
! DOD’s increased emphasis on achieving full jointness in U.S.
military plans and operations; and
! potential tradeoffs between funding Navy requirements and funding
competing defense requirements.
Each of these is discussed briefly below.
Global War on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. The potential effects
of the GWOT and irregular conflicts such as insurgencies on requirements for U.S.
ground forces have received much attention in recent months. The potential effects
of these factors on requirements for U.S. naval forces has received somewhat less
attention. In terms of ships, possible effects on requirements for U.S. naval forces
include an increased emphasis on one or more of the following:
! ships (such as attack submarines, surface combatants, or aircraft
carriers) that can conduct offshore surveillance of suspected
terrorists and irregular military forces using either built-in sensors or
embarked unmanned vehicles;
! ships (such as surface combatants, particularly smaller ones like the
LCS) and smaller surface craft for conducting coastal patrol and
intercept operations, including countering small boats and craft and
countering pirate-like operations;22
21 (...continued)
c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e. Plus two or four additional converted Trident cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) for the
2001 QDR plan and four additional SSGNs for the 375-ship proposal.
f. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
g. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
h. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus
one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).
j. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet
this goal changed from Base Force plan to the BUR plan — a result of new, larger
amphibious ship designs.
22 Coast Guard cutters may also be well suited for such operations.

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CRS-23
! ships (such as attack submarines) for covertly inserting and
recovering Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs;23
! ships (such as amphibious ships) for supporting smaller-scale
Marine Corps operations ashore; and
! ships (such as aircraft carriers or large-deck amphibious assault
ships) that can launch strike-fighters armed with smaller-scale
precision guided weapons.
Although the primary stated missions of the LCS relate to defeating littoral anti-
access forces of opposing countries rather than to countering terrorists, some
observers view the inclusion of 55 LCSs in the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet as
evidence that the proposal is aimed in part at meeting operational demands associated
with the Navy’s role in the GWOT. Supporters of the Navy’s planned MPF(F)
squadron argue that this squadron could be valuable in sea-based counter-terrorist
operations. In addition, the Navy in recent months has taken some actions that reflect
a stated specific interest in increasing the Navy’s role in the GWOT. Among these
are the establishment of a Navy riverine force that is to consist of three squadrons of
12 boats each, and a total of about 700 personnel. These boats, as small craft, are not
included in the Navy’s proposed total of 313 ships.24
Chinese Maritime Military Forces. China’s naval modernization has
potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for
a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military
influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile
submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium
on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating
China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment
that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons.
China’s naval modernization raises potential issues concerning the size of the
Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in
the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable
platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and
EMP hardening of Navy systems. Aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, and
attack submarines are viewed by some observers as ships that might be particularly
appropriate for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces.25
23 SEAL stands for Sea, Air, and Land.
24 For further discussion of the Navy’s role in the GWOT, see CRS Report RS22373, Navy
Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) — Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O’Rourke.
25 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

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CRS-24
New Technologies. New technologies that will likely affect the capabilities of
Navy ships in coming years, and consequently the number of ships that may be needed
to perform a given set of missions, include improved radars and other sensors (including
miniaturized sensors); improved computers and networking systems; unmanned vehicles;
reduced-size, precision-guided, air-delivered weapons; electromagnetic rail guns;
directed-energy weapons (such as lasers); and integrated electric-drive propulsion
technology, to name just a few. Historically, the effect of improving technology
historically has often been to increase the capability of individual Navy ships and thereby
permit a reduction in the number of Navy ships needed to perform a stated set of
missions. However, some analysts believe that networking technology and reduced-sized
sensors may argue in favor of a more distributed force structure that includes a larger
number of smaller ships such as the LCS.
Forward Homeporting and Sea Swap. The Navy is considering transferring
an aircraft carrier from the continental United States to either Hawaii or Guam and
increasing the number of attack submarines homeported at Hawaii or Guam. The Navy
has also experimented with the concept of deploying a Navy ship for an extended period
of time (e.g., 12, 18, or 24 months, rather than the traditional deployment period of 6
months) and rotating successive crews out the ship every 6 months — a concept the
Navy calls Sea Swap. Other things held equal, homeporting additional Navy ships in
forward locations such as Guam and Hawaii, and applying the Sea Swap concept to a
significant portion of the fleet, could reduce, perhaps substantially, the total number of
Navy ships needed to maintain a certain number of Navy ships in overseas operating
areas on a day-to-day basis. For some types of ships, additional forward homeporting
and use of Sea Swap might reduce the number of ships needed for maintaining day-to-
day forward deployments below the number needed for fighting conflicts. In such cases,
fully implementing the force-level economies suggested by forward homeporting and Sea
Swap could leave the Navy with inadequate forces for fighting conflicts.26
Jointness. DOD’s increased emphasis on achieving increased jointness (i.e.,
coordination and integration of the military services) in U.S. military plans and
operations could lead to reassessments of requirements for Navy capabilities that
were originally determined in a less-joint setting. Areas where U.S. Navy capabilities
overlap with the those of the Air Force or Army, and where total U.S. capabilities
across the services exceed DOD requirements, might be viewed as candidates for
such reassessments, while capabilities that are unique to the Navy might be viewed
as less suitable for such reassessments. An example of a broad area shared by the
Navy, Air Force, and Army is tactical aviation, while an example of an area that is
usually regarded as unique to the Navy is antisubmarine warfare.
Competing Defense Priorities. A final issue to consider are the funding
needs of other defense programs. In a situation of finite defense resources, funding
certain Navy requirements may require not funding certain other defense priorities.
If so, then the issue could become how to allocate finite resources so as to limit
operational risk over the various missions involving both Navy and non-Navy
mission requirements.
26 For additional discussion of Sea Swap, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments:
New Approaches — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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CRS-25
Appendix B. Size of Navy and
Navy Shipbuilding Rate
The total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak
of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.27 The Navy fell below
300 battle force ships in August 2003 and included 276 battle force ships as of April
10, 2007.
Table 7 below shows past (FY1982-FY2007) and projected (FY2008-FY2013)
rates of Navy ship procurement.
Table 7. Battle Force Ships Procured or Projected, FY1982-
FY2013
(Procured FY1982-FY2007; projected FY2008-FY2013)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
17
14
16
19
20
17
15
19
15
11
11
7
4
4
5
4
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
5
5
6
6
6
5
7
8
6
7a
7a
11a
12
13
12
12
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation
committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that
do not count toward the 313-ship goal, such as sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the
Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
a. Totals shown for FY2007-FY2009 do not reflect the Navy’s march 2007 proposal to reduce the
number of LCSs in FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 from 2, 3, and 6, respectively, to 0, 2, and 3,
respectively.
crsphpgw
27 Some publications, such as some of those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have
stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure,
however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total
number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has
been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships,
while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of
battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case
overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule
to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy
over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.

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