Order Code RL33999
Defense: FY2008 Authorization
and Appropriations
May 11, 2007
Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
The annual consideration of appropriations bills (regular, continuing, and supplemental) by
Congress is part of a complex set of budget processes that also encompasses the
consideration of budget resolutions, revenue and debt-limit legislation, other spending
measures, and reconciliation bills. In addition, the operation of programs and the spending
of appropriated funds are subject to constraints established in authorizing statutes.
Congressional action on the budget for a fiscal year usually begins following the submission
of the President’s budget at the beginning of each annual session of Congress.
Congressional practices governing the consideration of appropriations and other budgetary
measures are rooted in the Constitution, the standing rules of the House and Senate, and
statutes, such as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each
year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense. For both defense authorization and
appropriations, this report summarizes the status of the bills, their scope, major issues,
funding levels, and related congressional activity. This report is updated as events warrant
and lists the key CRS staff relevant to the issues covered as well as related CRS products.
NOTE: A Web version of this document with active links is
available to congressional staff at [http://apps.crs.gov/cli/cli.aspx?
PRDS_CLI_ITEM_ID=221&from=3&fromId=73].
Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations
Summary
The House Armed Services Committee marked up its version of the FY2008
defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, on Wednesday, May 9. Floor action on the bill
is expected the week of May 14. The Senate Armed Services Committee plans to
mark up its version of the FY2008 authorization, unnumbered as yet, on May 23. On
February 5, 2007, the White House formally released to Congress its FY2008 federal
budget request, which included $647.2 billion in new budget authority for national
defense. In addition to $483.2 billion for the regular operations of the Department of
Defense (DOD), the request includes $141.7 billion for continued military operations,
primarily to fund the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the
nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy,
and $5.2 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies.
The requested “base” budget for DOD — that is, the request for regular
operations excluding the cost of ongoing combat activity — is $483.2 billion, which
is $46.8 billion higher than the agency’s base budget for FY2007, an increase of 11%
in nominal terms and, by DOD’s reckoning, an increase in real purchasing power of
8.0%, taking into account the cost of inflation.
In requesting an additional $141.7 billion to cover the anticipated cost for all
of FY2008 of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration has
complied with Congress’ insistence that it be given time to subject that funding to the
regular oversight and legislative process. Nevertheless, since the Administration has
requested that these funds be designated as “emergency” appropriations, they would
be over and above restrictive caps on discretionary spending, even though this
FY2008 combat operations funding request (at $141.7 billion) is 29% as large as the
regular FY2008 DOD base request ($483.2 billion).
The FY2008 base request would continue a permanent increase in active-duty
end-strength for the Army and Marine Corps, as many members of Congress have
recommended for years, with a goal of adding 92,000 active duty troops to the two
services by FY2012, compared with pre-Iraq War levels. The request also
incorporates a proposal to increase retiree medical fees and copays, which Congress
rejected in its action on the FY2007 defense budget and which the House Armed
Services Committee rejected again in drafting H.R. 1585.
The budget request includes few new initiatives regarding major weapons, but
the House Armed Services Committee has challenged many administration proposals
regarding chronically contentious acquisition issues. For instance, the committee’s
bill would add to the request funds to continue production of the C-17 cargo plane
and development of a second-engine to compete for installation in the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter, programs the Administration proposed to end in FY2008, as it had
done in FY2007, when it was overridden by Congress. In addition, reflecting
longstanding congressional concern that the Navy’s budgets have been too small, the
House Armed Services Committee added $2.7 billion to the Administration’s $13.7
billion shipbuilding request. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Telephone
E-Mail
Acquisition
Valerie Grasso
7-7617
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov
Aviation Forces
Christopher Bolkcom
7-2577
cbolkcom@crs.loc.gov
Arms Control
Amy Woolf
7-2379
awoolf@crs.loc.gov
Arms Sales
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
David Lockwood
7-7621
dlockwood@crs.loc.gov
Base Closure
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Pat Towell
7-2122
ptowell@crs.loc.gov
Defense Budget
Stephen Daggett
7-7642
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Gary Pagliano
7-1750
gpagliano@crs.loc.gov
Defense Industry
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Michael Davey
7-7074
mdavey@crs.loc.gov
Defense R&D
John Moteff
7-1435
jmoteff@crs.loc.gov
Edward Bruner
7-2775
ebruner@crs.loc.gov
Ground Forces
Steven Bowman
7-7613
sbowman@crs.loc.gov
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Health Care; Military
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Intelligence
Al Cumming
7-7739
acumming@crs.loc.gov
Military Construction
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Military Personnel
David Burrelli
7-8033
dburrelli@crs.loc.gov
Military Personnel;
Charles Henning
7-8866
chenning@crs.loc.gov
Reserves
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
Steven Hildreth
7-7635
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
Missile Defense
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Naval Forces
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Nuclear Weapons
Jonathan Medalia
7-7632
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov
Peace Operations
Nina Serafino
7-7667
nserafino@crs.loc.gov
Readiness
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Space, Military
Patricia Figliola
7-2508
pfigliola@crs.loc.gov
War Powers
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Status of Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Facts and Figures: Congressional Action on the FY2008 Defense
Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
FY2008 Defense Budget Request and Outyear Plans: Questions of
Affordability and Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Potential Issues in FY2008 Global War on Terror Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
FY2008 GWOT Request: Assumptions Similar to FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Broad Definition of Reconstitution or Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Force Protection Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Questions Likely About Funding For Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Oversight Concerns About Cost to Train and Equip Afghan and
Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response Program . . . . . 18
Military Construction Overseas and Permanent Basing Concerns . . . . . . . 18
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential issues in the FY2008 Base Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
FY2008 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the House
Armed Services Committee Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Other FY2008 Defense Budget Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Overall Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Military Operations: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. Military Personnel and Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Defense Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Defense Program Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
List of Tables
Table 1A. Status of FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 1585 . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 1B. Status of FY2007 Defense Appropriations Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. FY2008 National Defense Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 3. Congressional Budget Resolution, Recommended National
Defense Budget Function (050) Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 4. FY2008 National Defense Authorization, House and Senate
Action by Title, H.R. 1585 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 5. FY2008 Department of Defense and Military Construction
Appropriations, House and Senate Action by Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 6. DOD’s Global War on Terror, FY2006-FY2008 by Function . . . . . . . 13
Defense: FY2008 Authorization
and Appropriations
Most Recent Developments
The House Armed Services Committee completed full committee markup of its
version of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585, in a session
that began May 9. Floor action is expected in the House the week of May 14. The
Senate Armed Services Committee plans to mark up its version of the FY2008
authorization on May 23. House and Senate Appropriations Committee markup of
defense and military construction appropriations bills has not been scheduled,
although House leaders have said the defense bill will be one of the last
appropriations bills to be taken up.
The House committee authorization bill requires the top U.S. military
commander in Iraq and the U.S. ambassador to provide a detailed assessment of the
situation in Iraq, including evaluations of the progress of the U.S. campaign plan,
national reconciliation efforts by the Iraqi government, and the effectiveness of Iraqi
security forces. Based on that report, the Secretary of Defense is required to report
on plans for U.S. troop levels and missions in the following six months.
Iraq policy may later become a more contentious issue in action on the FY2008
authorization and appropriations bills, however, depending on the outcome of action
on FY2007 supplemental appropriations. On May 2, the President vetoed Congress’
initial version of an FY2007 supplemental funding bill, H.R. 1591, citing provisions
that would set a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq. The House failed
to override the veto in a floor vote on May 3. On May 10, the House passed a second
version of the supplemental funding bill, which Administration officials said also
would be vetoed because of Iraq-related provisions. (for a full discussion, see CRS
Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign
Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett et al.)
Overview of the Administration Request
On February 5, 2007, the White House formally released to Congress its
FY2008 federal budget request, which included $647.2 billion in new budget
authority for national defense. In addition to $483.2 billion for the regular operations
of the Department of Defense (DOD), the request includes $141.7 billion for
continued military operations abroad, primarily to fund the campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related
programs of the Department of Energy, and $5.2 billion for defense-related activities
of other agencies. (Note: The total of $647.2 billion for national defense includes an
CRS-2
adjustment of -$275 million for OMB scorekeeping. DOD figures for the base
budget do not add to the formal request in OMB budget documents).
The requested “base” budget of $483.2 billion for DOD — excluding the cost
of ongoing combat operations — is $46.8 billion higher than the agency’s base
budget for FY2007, an increase of 11% in nominal terms and, by DOD’s reckoning,
an increase in real purchasing power of 7.9%, taking into account the cost of
inflation.
In requesting an additional $141.7 billion to cover the anticipated cost for all
of FY2008 of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration has
complied with Congress’ insistence that it be given time to subject that funding to the
regular oversight and legislative process. Nevertheless, since the Administration has
requested that these funds be designated as “emergency” appropriations, they would
be over and above restrictive caps on discretionary spending, even though the
FY2008 combat operations funding request of $141.7 billion is 29% as large as the
regular FY2008 DOD request.
Status of Legislation
Congress has begun action on the annual defense authorization bill soon with
the House Armed Services Committee approving its version of the bill (H.R. 1585)
in a session that began May 9, with House floor action likely the week of May 13.
Table 1A. Status of FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 1585
Full Committee
Conference
Markup
Report Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House
Senate
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House
Senate
Law
5/9/07
Table 1B. Status of FY2007 Defense Appropriations Bill
Subcommittee
Conference Report
Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House
Senate
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House
Senate
Law
CRS-3
Facts and Figures: Congressional Action on the
FY2008 Defense Budget Request
The following tables provide a quick reference to congressional action on
defense budget totals. Additional details will be added as congressional action on the
FY2008 defense funding bills proceeds.
! Table 2 shows the Administration’s FY2008 national defense
budget request by budget subfunction and, for the Department of
Defense, by appropriations title. The total for FY2007 shows the
amount if Congress approves FY2007 supplemental appropriations
of $93.4 billion as requested. The vetoed conference agreement on
H.R. 1591 provided $7.0 billion more than that.
! Table 3 shows the recommendations on defense budget authority
and outlays in the House and Senate versions of the annual budget
resolution, H Con Res 99 and S Con Res 21. These amounts are not
binding on the Armed Services or Appropriations committees.
! Table 4 shows congressional action on the FY2008 defense
authorization bill by title. Except for a some mandatory programs,
the authorization bill does not provide funds but rather authorizes
their appropriation.
! Table 5 shows congressional action on the FY2008 defense and
military construction appropriations bills. The table does not show
funding for defense-related activities of agencies other than the
Defense Department, except for about $1.0 billion for the
intelligence community. In particular, it does not include the $17.4
billion requested for defense-related nuclear energy programs
(nuclear weapons and warship propulsion) of the Energy
Department.
CRS-4
Table 2. FY2008 National Defense Budget Request
(billions of dollars)
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
Supp
Total
FY2008
Enacted
Request with Supp
Request
Department of Defense
Base Budget
Military Personnel
111.1
—
111.1
118.9
Operation and Maintenance
127.7
—
127.7
143.5
Procurement
81.1
—
81.1
100.2
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
75.7
—
75.7
75.1
Military Construction
8.8
—
8.8
18.2
Family Housing
4.0
—
4.0
2.9
Revolving & Management Funds
2.4
—
2.4
2.5
Other Defense Programs*
23.7
—
23.7
23.3
Offsetting Receipts/Interfund Transactions
-1.8
-1.8
-1.4
General Provisions/Allowances
3.6
—
3.6
-0.3
Subtotal — DOD Base Budget
436.4
—
436.4
483.2
War-Related Funding
Military Personnel
5.4
12.1
17.5
17.1
Operation and Maintenance
39.1
37.5
76.6
73.1
Procurement
19.8
25.3
45.2
36.0
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
0.4
1.4
1.9
2.9
Military Construction
—
1.9
1.9
0.9
Family Housing
—
—
—
0.0
Revolving & Management Funds
—
1.3
1.3
1.7
Other Defense Programs*
0.1
1.3
1.4
1.3
Intelligence Community Management
0.0
0.1
0.1
—
Iraqi Freedom Fund
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.1
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
1.5
5.9
7.4
2.7
Iraq Security Forces Fund
1.7
3.8
5.5
2.0
Joint IED Defeat Fund*
1.9
2.4
4.4
4.0
Subtotal — DOD War-Related
70.0
93.4
163.4
141.7
OMB vs DOD Scorekeeping Adjustment
—
—
—
-0.3
Total DOD (Base and War-Related)
506.4
93.4
599.8
624.6
Department of Energy Defense Related
17.0
—
17.0
17.4
Department of Energy
15.8
—
15.8
15.9
Formerly utilized sites remedial action
0.1
—
0.1
0.1
Defense nuclear facilities safety board
0.0
—
0.0
0.0
Energy employees occupational illness comp.
1.1
—
1.1
1.4
Other Defense Related
5.2
—
5.2
5.2
FBI Counter-Intelligence
2.5
—
2.5
2.5
Intelligence Community Management
0.9
—
0.9
1.0
Homeland Security
1.5
—
1.5
1.4
Other
0.3
—
0.3
0.3
Total National Defense
528.6
93.4
622.0
647.2
Sources: FY2007 enacted calculated by CRS based on congressional conference reports and
Department of Defense data; FY2007 supplemental from Department of Defense; FY2008 request
from Department of Defense and Office of Management and Budget. DOD Base and War-Related
Total and National Defense Total reflect OMB figures that differ slightly from DOD estimates.
CRS-5
Table 3. Congressional Budget Resolution, Recommended
National Defense Budget Function (050) Totals
(billions of dollars)
FY2007 FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Administration Projection
Budget Authority
622.4
647.2
584.7
545.0
551.5
560.7
Outlays
571.9
606.5
601.8
565.3
556.4
549.5
House-Passed (H.Con.Res. 99)
National Defense Base Budget (Function 050)
Budget Authority
525.8
507.0
534.7
545.2
550.9
559.8
Outlays
534.3
514.4
524.4
536.4
547.6
548.2
Allowance for Overseas Operations and Related Activities (Function 970)
Budget Authority
124.3
145.2
50.0
—
—
—
Outlays
31.5
114.9
109.4
42.3
13.6
4.5
Senate-Passed (S.Con.Res. 21)
Budget Authority
619.4
648.8
584.8
545.3
551.1
559.9
Outlays
560.5
617.8
627.0
572.9
558.4
551.8
Sources: CRS from H.Con.Res. 99; S.Con.Res. 21; Office of Management and Budget.
CRS-6
Table 4. FY2008 National Defense Authorization,
House and Senate Action by Title, H.R. 1585
(budget authority in millions of dollars)
Request
House
Senate
Conference
Base Budget
Military Personnel
118,920.4
—
—
—
Operation and Maintenance
165,343.7
—
—
—
Procurement
101,678.7
—
—
—
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
75,117.2
—
—
—
Military Construction
18,232.7
—
—
—
Family Housing
2,932.5
—
—
—
Revolving & Management Funds
2,453.8
—
—
—
Offsetting Receipts/Interfund Transactions
-1,430.6
—
—
—
Subtotal — Base Budget
483,248.4
—
—
—
War-Related Funding
Military Personnel
17,070.3
—
—
—
Operation and Maintenance
73,099.1
—
—
—
Procurement
35,956.6
—
—
—
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
2,857.4
—
—
—
Military Construction
907.9
—
—
—
Family Housing
11.8
—
—
—
Revolving & Management Funds
1,681.4
—
—
—
Defense Health Program
1,022.8
—
—
—
Drug Interdiction
257.6
—
—
—
Intelligence Community Management
—
—
—
—
Iraqi Freedom Fund
107.5
—
—
—
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
2,700.0
—
—
—
Iraq Security Forces Fund
2,000.0
—
—
—
Joint IED Defeat Fund
4,000.0
—
—
—
Adjustment
-7.4
—
—
—
Subtotal — War-Related
141,664.9
—
—
—
Total Base and War-Related
624,949.3
—
—
—
Sources: Base budget from Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year
2008, March 2007, Table 3-1; war-related funding from Department of Defense, FY2008 Global War
on Terror Request: Exhibits for FY2008, February 2007, adjusted by CRS because subtotals in the
exhibits do not add to the requested total.
CRS-7
Table 5. FY2008 Department of Defense and Military Construction
Appropriations, House and Senate Action by Title
(budget authority in millions of dollars)
Request
House
Senate
Conference
Base Budget
Military Personnel
118,920.4
—
—
—
Operation and Maintenance
164,686.0
—
—
—
Procurement
101,678.7
—
—
—
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
75,117.2
—
—
—
Military Construction
18,232.7
—
—
—
Family Housing
2,932.5
—
—
—
Revolving & Management Funds
2,453.8
—
—
—
Subtotal — Base Budget
484,021.3
—
—
—
War-Related Funding
Military Personnel
17,070.3
—
—
—
Operation and Maintenance
73,099.1
—
—
—
Procurement
35,956.6
—
—
—
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
2,857.4
—
—
—
Military Construction
907.9
—
—
—
Family Housing
11.8
—
—
—
Revolving & Management Funds
1,681.4
—
—
—
Defense Health Program
1,022.8
—
—
—
Drug Interdiction
257.6
—
—
—
Intelligence Community Management
—
—
—
—
Iraqi Freedom Fund
107.5
—
—
—
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
2,700.0
—
—
—
Iraq Security Forces Fund
2,000.0
—
—
—
Joint IED Defeat Fund
4,000.0
—
—
—
Adjustment
-7.4
—
—
—
Subtotal — War-Related
141,664.9
—
—
—
Total Base and War-Related
625,686.2
—
—
—
Sources: Base budget from Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year
2008, March 2007, Table 3-1; war-related funding from Department of Defense, FY2008 Global War
on Terror Request: Exhibits for FY2008, February 2007, adjusted by CRS because subtotals in the
exhibits do not add to the requested total.
CRS-8
FY2008 Defense Budget Request and Outyear
Plans: Questions of Affordability and Balance
Several aspects of the Department’s FY2008 budget request and its projected
budgets through FY2013 raise questions about the affordability of DOD’s plan as a
whole and about the balance of spending among major elements of the defense
budget.
(1) DOD’s funding plan for FY2008-13, excluding the cost of military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, projects that the department’s base budget will
increase in real purchasing power, after adjusting for inflation, by 8.0% between
FY2007 and FY2008 and by another 3.5% in FY2009 before declining slightly over
each of the following four years. But the tightening fiscal squeeze on the federal
government may put strong downward pressure on the defense budget; and the
unbudgeted funds needed for ongoing military operations abroad may compound the
problem. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) agree that the
current mix of federal programs is fiscally unsustainable for the long term.1 The
nation’s aging population combined with rising health costs are driving an increase
in spending for federal entitlement programs which, in turn, will fuel rising deficits
compounded by a steadily increasing interest on the national debt. The upshot is that,
if total federal outlays continue to account for about 20% of the GDP and federal
revenues remain at about their current level, total federal spending on discretionary
programs, in terms of real purchasing power, would have to be sharply reduced to
meet the goal of a balanced federal budget by 2012 and then to cover the rising costs
of Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security resulting partly from the retirement of
baby boomers.
To protect DOD from this fiscal vise, some have recommended that the defense
budget (excluding the cost of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) be
sustained at 4% of GDP — a share of the national wealth that DOD last claimed in
FY1994.2 But that proposal would have to overcome the thus far intractable political
challenges of increasing federal revenues, reducing discretionary non-defense
spending, and/or restraining the growth of entitlement costs.
(2) Although the Administration has submitted a budget proposal to cover the
cost of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2008 that is separate from
its “base” budget request for the year, it may be difficult, as a practical matter, for
Congress to subject the request for cost-of-war appropriations to the same oversight
it applies to regular, annual defense spending requests. If the congressional defense
1 See CRS Report RL33915, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, by Philip D. Winters. See
also OMB, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2008, February 2007,
pp. 16-21; CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008-2017, January
2007, pp. 10-11; GAO, The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2007 Update,
GAO-07-510R.
2 Baker Spring, “Defense FY2008 Budget Analysis: Four Percent for Freedom,” The
Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder no. 2012, March 5, 2007.
CRS-9
committees mark up the FY2008 defense funding bills on their usual schedules, as
the House and Senate Armed Services committees are doing with respect to the
annual defense authorization bill, they will have had to review in less than four
months both the President’s $482 billion request for the base DOD budget and the
additional $142 billion requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The burden
may be compounded by the fact that the congressional defense committees may not
have time-tested analytical tools with which to scrutinize the request for ongoing
combat operations, as they do for reviewing the base budget. Moreover, for most of
that four month period, members of Congress, and the defense funding committees
in particular, have been deeply preoccupied with debate over the Administration’s
FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill (H.R. 1591) to pay for combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, legislation that has become the vehicle for
congressional efforts to reduce the involvement of U.S. troops in Iraq.
In addition, since DOD does not include the forecast cost of ongoing operations
in its projections of defense budget requests in future years, except for a $50 billion
placeholder for FY2009 included in the FY2008 request, Congress has not been
given a clear sense of how severely the federal government’s overall fiscal squeeze
may constrain future defense budgets.
(3) DOD projects that its total budget will remain approximately constant, in
real terms, from FY2009 through FY2013. But for years, most of the major
components of the defense budget have shown a steady cost growth, in excess of the
cost of inflation. Thus, the relatively flat defense budgets planned would have to
accommodate other types of costs that also seem to be escalating almost
uncontrollably, notably including (1) the rising cost of health care for personnel still
on active service, retirees and their dependents, (2) operations and maintenance costs
that have been increasing since the Korean War at an average of 2.5% per year above
the cost of inflation, and (3) new weapons that are expected to dramatically enhance
the effectiveness of U.S. forces, but which carry high price tags to begin with and
then, all too often, substantially overrun their initial cost-estimates.3
(4) One of the most powerful drivers of DOD’s internal cost squeeze, the steady
increase in the cost of military personnel, would be compounded by the President’s
recommendation — in line with congressional proposals — to increase active-duty
Army and Marine Corps end-strength. Between FY1999 and FY2005, the cost of
active-duty military personnel, measured per-service-member, grew by 33% above
inflation, largely because of congressional initiatives to increase pay and benefits. A
large fraction of the increased cost is due to increases in retired pay and greatly
expanded medical benefits for military retirees.
3 In a review of 64 major weapons programs, the GAO found that their total cost had grown
by more than 4.9% annually, in real terms. The total estimated cost of the 64 programs in
FY2007 was $165 billion more (in FY2007 dollars) than had been projected in FY2004. See
GAO-07-406SP, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs, March
2007, p. 8. According to the GAO analysis, a major reason for that unbudgeted cost increase
was that many programs depend on technologies that promise transformative combat
effectiveness, but which have not been adequately developed before they are incorporated
into the design of a new weapon. Ibid., p. 9.
CRS-10
This year, the Administration has proposed (and the congressional defense
committees have urged for years) an increase in active-duty end-strength that would
add 92,000 soldiers and Marines to the rolls, thus increasing the services’ fixed costs
by at least $12 billion annually (once the start-up costs of the policy have been
absorbed). At the same time, the Navy and Air Force are cutting personnel levels to
safeguard funds for weapons programs. The Air Force is cutting about 40,000 full-
time equivalent positions and the Navy about 30,000. One issue is whether these cuts
will be used, directly or indirectly, not to pay for Air Force and Navy weapons
programs, but for Army and Marine Corps end-strength increases.
(5) The Navy’s ability to sustain a fleet of the current size within realistically
foreseeable budgets may especially problematic. After years of criticism from
members of Congress who contended that the Navy was buying too few ships to
replace vessels being retired, the service released in February a long-range
shipbuilding plan that would fall just short of the Navy’s current goal of maintaining
a fleet of 313 ships. But the plan assumes that the Defense Department, which bought
seven ships in FY2007 and is requesting the same number in FY2008, would buy
between 11 and 13 ships in each of the following five years. The plan assumes that
amount appropriated for new ship construction would rise from a requested $12.5
billion in FY2008 to $17.5 billion in FY2013 (in current-year dollars).4
Considering the fiscal demands likely to put downward pressure on future
defense budgets, funding the Navy’s plan may be challenging. But even if the Navy
got the annual shipbuilding budgets it plans to request, it might not be able to buy all
the ships it plans as quickly as it plans to do so, because of escalating costs and
delays in some of the new types of ships slated to comprise the future fleet. In the
past, Navy cost and schedule forecasts later proven to be overly optimistic have led
to long-range shipbuilding plans that promised increases in shipbuilding budgets in
the “out-years” that have not been realized. Unachievable shipbuilding plans may
discourage the Navy and Congress from weighing potential tradeoffs between, on the
one hand, construction of promising new designs and, on the other hand, building
additional ships of types already in service and upgrading existing vessels.
(6) The services’ plans to modernize their tactical air forces suffer from the type
of excessive budgetary and technological optimism that also afflicts the shipbuilding
plan. Roughly midway through a 40-year, $400 million effort to replace the post-
Vietnam generation of Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fighter planes with
versions of the Air Force’s F-22A, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F, and the tri-service F-35
(or Joint Strike Fighter), the services’ plans have been buffeted by escalating costs,
slipping schedules and external budget pressures. In the case of the F-22A, this
produced a current budget plan that will buy only 183 planes rather than the 381 the
Air Force says it needs. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps have reduced the total
number of F-35s they plan to buy from 1,089 to 680.
4 Although most Defense Department shipbuilding is funded in the “Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy” (SCN) appropriation, certain types of non-combatant vessels are funded
in other appropriation accounts, particularly the National Defense Sealift Fund, which is
under Revolving and Management Funds.
CRS-11
Adjustments like this are easier to make with aircraft budgets that fund dozens
of units annually costing tens of millions of dollars apiece than it is with shipbuilding
budgets that fund a handful of units each year, many of which cost upwards of a
billion dollars apiece. But while it may be easier for the services to deal with the
consequences of optimistic tactical aircraft recapitalization plans than it is for the
Navy to manage the shipbuilding program, there is a similar underlying problem. If
the services’ long-range plans assume budgets, costs, technical breakthroughs and
production schedules that will not be realized, a service may delay and, ultimately,
increase the cost of upgrades to planes already in service that will have to be kept
combat-ready until the new craft are fielded:
The military services accord new systems higher funding priority, and the legacy
systems tend to get whatever funding is remaining after the new systems’ budget
needs are met. If new aircraft consume more of the investment dollars than
planned, the buying power and budgets for legacy systems are further reduced
to remain within DOD budget limits. However, as quantities of new systems have
been cut and deliveries to the warfighter delayed, more legacy aircraft are
required to stay in the inventory and for longer periods of time than planned,
requiring more dollars to modernize and maintain aging aircraft.5
Potential Issues in FY2008
Global War on Terror Request6
In the seventh year of war operations since the 9/11 attacks, DOD is requesting
$141.7 billion, 29% of the amount it is requesting for all routine DOD activity in
FY2008. For the first time since the 9/11 attacks, the Administration has submitted
a request for war funding for the full year to meet a new requirement levied in the
FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-702).7 Since FY2003,
Congress has funded war costs in two bills, typically a bridge fund included in the
regular DOD Appropriations Act to cover the first part of the fiscal year and a
supplemental enacted after the fiscal year has begun.8
The Administration’s FY2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) request of $141.7
billion is similar to its FY2007 funding request for FY2007 war costs with certain
exceptions: funds are not included to support the higher troop levels announced by
the president in January 2007, lesser amounts are requested to train Afghan and Iraqi
5 Government Accountability Office, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated
Investment Strategy, GAO-07-415, April 2007, p. 13.
6 Prepared by Amy Belasco, Specialist in the U.S. Defense Budget.
7 Section 1008, P.L. 109-364.
8 See Table A1 in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco; in FY2003, war funds were
provided in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) as well as the FY2003
Supplemental see also CRS Report RS22455, Military Operations: Precedents for Funding
Contingency Operations in Regular or in Supplemental Appropriations Bills, by Stephen
Daggett.
CRS-12
security forces and no funds are requested to increase the size of the Army and Navy
(see Table 6, below). In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates characterized the
FY2008 GWOT request as “a straightline projection for forces of 140,000 in Iraq”
because funding for the surge is only included through September 30, 2007, the end
of FY2007.9 This could prove to be an issue if the Administration decides to extend
the current troop increase of about 36,000 past this fall.
According to DOD, the FY2008 war request includes $109.7 billion for Iraq and
$26.0 billion for Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations.10 If Congress
approves both the FY2007 and the FY2008 Supplemental requests, funding would
reach $564 billion for Iraq and $155 billion for Afghanistan. The conference version
of the FY2007 Supplemental recently vetoed by the president would provide amounts
similar to the request.11 According to DOD, the request supports a total of 320,000
deployed personnel including 140,000 in Iraq and 20,000 in Afghanistan. DOD does
not explain the difference between the 160,000 military personnel deployed in Iraq
and in Afghanistan and the additional 160,000 deployed elsewhere supporting those
missions.12
FY2008 GWOT Request: Assumptions Similar to FY2007
DOD’s justification language and funding levels for the FY2008 GWOT request
are almost identical to those included in its FY2007 Supplemental request in several
categories such as military operations and reconstitution of war-worn equipment,
citing the same force levels and the same examples. DOD’s request for $70.6 billion
in FY2008 funds special pays, benefits, subsistence, the cost of activating reservists,
and the cost of conducting operations and providing support for about 320,000
deployed military personnel serving in and around Iraq and Afghanistan assuming
the same operating tempo as in FY2007.13 In addition, the FY2008 GWOT request
does not include the $5.6 billion additional cost for the 36,000 increase in force
levels or “surge” announced by the president on January 10, 2007 that is currently
underway.
9 Senate Appropriations Committee, Hearing on Supplemental War Funding, February 27,
2007, transcript, p. 11.
10 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, p. 74. [http://www.dod.mil/
comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_
Request.pdf].
11 CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
12 DOD, FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global war on Terror, February
2007, pp. 15-16, pp. 76-80; [http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_
supplemental/FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf]; DOD,
FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, pp. 15-16, and pp. 63-67;
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Glob
al_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf]
13 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, pp. 15 and 17; online at
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Glob
al_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf].
CRS-13
Table 6. DOD’s Global War on Terror,
FY2006-FY2008 by Function
( billions of dollars)
Type of Expense
FY2006 FY2007 FY2007 FY2007 FY2007 FY2008
FY2008
Enacted Bridge
Supp.
Total
Total
Req.
Req. vs.
Enacted
Req.
with
Req. vs
FY2007
Req.
FY06
Total w/
Req.
Incremental Pay and
67.2
30.5
39.2
69.8
2.6
70.6
0.8
Benefits and operating and
support Costs
Temporary Troop Plus-up
0.0
0.0
5.6
5.6
5.6
0.0
-5.6
and Increased Naval
Presence
Reconstitution or Reset
19.2
23.6
13.9
37.5
18.4
37.6
0.0
Force Protection
5.4
3.4
8.0
11.3
6.0
11.2
-0.1
Joint Improvised
3.3
1.9
2.4
4.4
1.0
4.0
-0.4
Explosive Device Defeat
Fund
Accelerating Modularity
5.0
0.0
3.6
3.6
-1.4
1.6
-2.1
Infrastructure & equipment
0.0
0.0
1.7
1.7
1.7
0.0
-1.7
for Perm. Inc. in Size of
Army and MC
Equip and Train Afghan
4.9
3.2
9.7
12.9
8.0
4.7
-8.2
and Iraq Security Forces
Coalition Support
1.2
0.9
1.0
1.9
0.7
1.7
-0.2
Commanders Emergency
0.9
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.1
1.0
0.0
Response Fd
Military Construction
0.2
0.0
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.7
-0.4
Overseas in Iraq and
Afghanistan
Military Intelligence
1.5
0.8
2.7
3.5
2.0
2.7
-0.8
Non-DOD Classified and
5.6
5.1
3.6
8.8
3.2
5.9
-2.8
Non-GWOT
Regional War on Terror
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.0
-0.3
GRAND TOTAL
114.4
70.0
93.4
163.4
49.0
141.7
-21.7
Sources: DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, Table 2, p. 75, online at
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_O
n_Terror_Request.pdf]. Table 2 does not reflect FY2007 Supplemental amended Administration’s
request submitted on March 9, 2007.
Assuming no plus-up cost in FY2008 could become an issue should it become
clear that the higher force levels will persist into the Fall and the new fiscal year as
appears to be expected by commanders in the field according to recent press reports.14
An estimate by the Congressional Budget Office projected that the President’s surge
proposal could cost between $11 billion and $15 billion in FY2008 if the higher
troop levels were sustained for 12 months — about half way through FY2008 — and
14 “Commanders In Iraq See ‘Surge’ into 08,” Washington Post, May 9, 2007.
CRS-14
if more support troops were required than the several thousand that DOD is
anticipating.15 On the other hand, should force levels begin to decline, additional
funds would not be necessary.
Broad Definition of Reconstitution or Reset
As in FY2007, DOD is requesting $37.6 billion for reconstitution which appears
to encompass a broader set of requirements than the standard definition of reset —
the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment when troops and equipment are
re-deployed or rotated.16 Within reconstitution, DOD includes not only equipment
repair and replacement of battle losses and munitions, but also replacement of
“stressed” equipment, upgrading of equipment with new models, additional
modifications, and new or upgraded equipment as well an expansion of the supply
inventory ($900 million) that assumes that currently high stock levels will need to be
continued.
Of the $37.6 billion reconstitution request, $8.9 billion is for equipment repair
including $7.8 billion for the Army $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps, amounts
similar to DOD’s request in FY2007 and fairly similar to earlier DOD projections.17
The remaining $28.7 billion is for procurement. In a report to Congress in September
2006, DOD estimated that equipment replacement in FY2008 would be about $5.0
billion for the Army and about $500 million for the Marine Corps, levels
substantially below the $28.7 billion requested for FY2008.
This three-fold increase in the Army’s reconstitution requirement in FY2008
may reflect both an expanded definition of what constitutes war-related equipment
replacement and a DOD decision to request more than one year’s requirement in
FY2008 as in the FY2007 Supplemental where requirements were front loaded
15 CBO, Cost Estimate for Troop Increase Proposed by the president, 2-1-07, p. 4; online
at [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7778/TroopIncrease.pdf].
16 For DOD definition, see DOD, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter
23, pp. 23-21; [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf]; CBO defines
reset as the repair or replacement of war-worn equipment; see CBO, Letter to Rep. Skelton,
“The Potential Costs Resulting from Increased Usage of Military Equipment from Ongoing
Operations,” March 18, 2005; available online at [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/61xx/doc
6160/03-18-WornEquip.pdf].
17 In a September 2006 report to Congress, DOD estimated repair requirements at $8.0
billion for the Army and $830 million for the Marine Corps in FY2008, see Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs: Report to the Congress,
September 2006, pp. 24-25; DOD, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Global War on Terror Request,
Exhibits for FY2008, all appropriations, Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance,
Construction, Revolving and Management Funds, Procurement, Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation, February 2007; [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/FY_2008_GW
OT_Request_-_Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf] Department of the Army,
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Emergency Supplemental, Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT)/Regional War on Terrorism (RWOT), Exhibit O-1, pp. 2 and 7.
CRS-15
according to OMB Director, Ron Portman.18 With the exception of force protection
equipment, DOD appears to characterize all of its procurement request as
reconstitution.
With over $8 billion in war-related procurement funds from previous years still
to be put on contract, Congress could choose to delay some of the items requested by
DOD, as was the case in Congressional action on the FY2007 where some requests
were deemed “premature” or not emergencies.19 The FY2008 war request may also
reflect concerns raised by Service witnesses in testimony over the last year or two
that Congress would need to appropriate funds for equipment replacement for two
years after forces are withdrawn.
In both FY2007 and FY2008, the services request includes replacement for
various aircraft and helicopters — both battle losses and anticipated replacements for
“stressed” aircraft. Under DOD’s standard budget guidance, the services are only to
request new major weapon systems for combat losses that have already been
experienced unless they get specific approval for an exception, which appears to be
the case for both the FY2007 and the FY2008 requests where the services have
requested replacements for “stressed” aircraft rather than combat losses. In the case
of the FY2008 request, particularly, DOD would not have information about combat
losses. In action on the FY2007 Supplemental (H.R. 1591), Congress showed some
scepticism about providing funds to replace anticipated losses rejecting requests for
six new EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft and two JSF aircraft.
Another issue is whether replacing older aircraft no longer in production with
new aircraft just entering or scheduled to enter production is a legitimate emergency
requirement since systems would not be available for several years. Under their
expanded definition, DOD’s request includes replacement of MH-53 and H-46
helicopters with the new V-22 tilt rotor aircraft, replacement of an F-16 with the new
F-35 JSF, and replacement of older helicopters with the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter, a troubled program not yet in production which the Army is considering
terminating.20 In addition, the FY2008 request includes replacement of stressed
aircraft with 17 new C-130Js, modification upgrades to C-130 aircraft, F-18 aircraft,
AH-1W and CH-46 helicopters.
Force Protection Funding
DOD’s FY2008 request includes about $11 billion in funding for force
protection in both FY2007 and FY2008 primarily for body armor, armored vehicles,
18 Testimony of OMB Director Ronald Portman before the House Budget Committee,
Hearing on the FY2008 DOD Budget, February 6, 2007,p. 41 of transcript.
19 CRS calculation based on BA appropriated and Defense Finance Accounting Service,
Supplemental & Cost of War Execution reports as of February 28, 2007; see CRS Report
RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other
Purposes, by Stephen Daggett et al.
20 House Armed Services Committee, Air Land Subcommittee, “Opening Statement at
Markup by Chair Neil Abercrombie, May 2, 2007.
CRS-16
protecting operating bases and surveillance operations. The FY2008 request is
almost identical to FY2007 and includes:
! $3.5 billion to purchase an additional 320,000 body armor sets
reaching a cumulative total of 1.7 million original and upgraded sets
meeting 100% of total requirements as well as the new Advanced
Combat helmet, earplugs, gloves and other protective gear;
! $7.0 billion for protection equipment and activities including
munitions clearance, fire-retardant NOMEX uniforms, unmanned
aerial vehicles, aircraft survivability modifications, route clearance
vehicles; and
! funding for more uparmored HMMWVs ($1.3 billion), armored
security ($301 million) and mine protection vehicles ($174
million).21
There has been considerable controversy in Congress about whether DOD has
provided adequate force protection in a timely fashion with Congress typically
adding funds for more body armor, more uparmored HMWWVs, and other force
protection gear. In the FY2007 Supplemental, Congress added $874 million in
funding for the Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicle (MRAP), an armored truck with a
V-shaped hull that has proven effective in withstanding Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs).22 That controversy may re-surface in consideration of the FY2008
Supplemental request where only the Army requested $174 million, well below the
FY2007 level judged to match production capacity.23
Congressional Action. At the Air Land subcommittee markup of the House
Armed Services Committee, $2 billion in additional funds was proposed for Mine
Resistant Ambush Vehicles (MRAPs) in FY2008 war funding.
21 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, pp. 21-24; available at
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Glob
al_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf]; see also FY2008, Exhibit P-1 for listing of individual
items; DOD, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Global War on Terror Request, Exhibits for FY2008,
all appropriations, Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance, Construction,
Revolving and Management Funds, Procurement, Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation, February 2007; [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/
fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/FY_2008_GWOT_Req
uest_-_Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf].
22 CRS calculation based on H.Rept. 110-107, conference report on H.R. 1591, April 24,
2007; see Congressional Record, April 24, 2007.
23 See Other Procurement accounts of each service and Defensewide and Procurement,
Marine Corps in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global War on
Terror Request, Exhibits for FY2008, Exhibit P-1, Procurement, February 2007;
[http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY200
8 _ G l o b a l _ W a r _ O n _ T e r r o r _ R e q u e s t / F Y _ 2 0 0 8 _ G W O T _ R e q u e s t _ -
_Funding_Summary_(All_Appropriations).pdf].
CRS-17
Questions Likely About Funding For Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Fund
In FY2008, DOD is requesting an additional $4.0 billion for the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund, similar to the FY2007 level, for a special
new transfer account set up in recent years to coordinate research, production and
training of ways to combat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), the chief threat to
U.S. forces. With the funding approved in the conference report on the H.R. 1591,
FY2007 Supplemental (H.Rept. 110-107) recently vetoed by the president, Joint IED
Defeat Fund would receive a total of $9.1 billion.24 If the FY2008 request is
approved, the total would reach $13.1 billion.
Although Congress has been supportive of this area and endorsed DOD’s
request in the FY2007 Supplemental, both houses have raised concerns about the
management practices of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) including its financial practices, its lack of a spending plan, service
requests that duplicate JIEDDO work, and its inability to provide specific
information to Congress. The FY2007 Supplemental conference report notes that the
“conferees will be hard-pressed to fully fund future budget requests unless the
JIEDDO improves its financial management practices and its responses” suggesting
that the FY2008 request could be met with some scepticism.25 The FY2008 GWOT
justification is almost identical to that for the FY2007 Supplemental.
Oversight Concerns About Cost to Train and Equip Afghan
and Iraqi Security Forces
For training and equipping, the FY2008 GWOT request includes an additional
$2.7 billion to expand Afghanistan’s 31,000 man Army and 60,000 man police force
and an additional $2.0 billion for more equipment and training for Iraq’s 136,000
man Army and 192,000 man police force. Including the funds in H.R. 1591, the
FY2007 Supplemental would bring the total to $19.2 billion for Iraq and $10.6
billion for Afghanistan.
Although the FY2008 GWOT requests are considerably lower than the amounts
requested for FY2007 — $2 billion vs. $5.5 billion for Iraq and $2.7 billion vs. $7.4
billion for Afghanistan — Congress has voiced concerns about the progress and the
total cost to complete this training. While the FY2007 conference report dropped a
House-proposal to set a 50% limit on obligations until various reports were
submitted, the conferees require that OMB submit reports every 90 days on the use
of funds and an estimate of the total cost to train Iraq and Afghan Security forces
within 120 days of enactment. The conference report also requires that an
24 This includes $1.5 billion in FY2005, $3.3 billion in FY2006, and $4.3 billion in FY2007
including the FY2007 Supplemental; see DOD, FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Request
for the Global war on Terror, February 2007, p. 28.
25 H.Rept. 110-107, p. 133; H.Rept. 110-60, p. 106; S.Rept. 110-37, pp. 25-27.
CRS-18
independent organization assess the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces to bring
“greater security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the next 12 -18 months....” 26
Coalition Support and Commanders Emergency Response
Program
In FY2008, DOD requests $1.7 billion for coalition support for U.S. allies like
Pakistan and Jordan which conduct border counter-terror operations, and for the U.S.
to provide lift to its allies. DOD also requests $1 billion for the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP) where individual commanders can fund
small-scale development projects, in both cases funding levels similar to FY2007.
While Congress has consistently supported the CERP program, it has voiced
scepticism about the amounts requested for coalition support. In FY2007, for
example, Congress has proposed cutting the Administration’s request for $950
million to $500 million on the grounds that DOD has not defined the use of these
funds for a new “Global train and equip” program authorized in FY2006.27
Military Construction Overseas and Permanent Basing
Concerns
For war-related military construction and family housing, DOD requests $908
million in FY2008 compared to $1.8 billion in FY2007. Although the funding level
is lower than the previous year, the same concerns about permanent basing in Iraq are
likely to arise. Some of the FY2008 projects have been requested previously — such
as building bypass roads, power plants and wastewater treatment plants in Iraq and
providing relocatable barracks to replace temporary housing and constructing fuel
storage facilities to replace temporary fuel bladders.28
Although Congress approved most of the projects requested in the FY2007
supplemental, Sec. 1311 of the conference version of H.R. 1591 includes a
prohibition on obligating or expending any funds for permanent stationing of U.S.
forces in Iraq. In the past, Congress has rejected projects similar to those requested
in FY2008 as insufficiently justified or as implying some kind of permanency.
Congressional Action. In its subcommittee markup, the House Armed
Services Committee reduced the FY2008 GWOT request for military construction
by $212 million, rejecting utility projects such as power plants and wastewater
collection facilities perceived as indicating a permanent presence.29
26 H.Rept. 110-107, Sec. 1313 and Sec. 1320 of H.R. 1591 and H.Rept. 110-60, p. 101.
27 H.Rept. 110-107, p. 126; see also H.Rept. 110-37, p. 22.
28 DOD, FY2008 Global War on Terror Request, February 2007, p. 58-60; available at
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Glob
al_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf].
29 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, “Opening Statement of
(continued...)
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Potential issues in the
FY2008 Base Budget Request
Following is a very brief summary or some of the other issues that may emerge
during congressional action on the FY2008 defense authorization and appropriations
bills, based on congressional action on the FY2007 funding bills and early debate
surrounding the President’s FY2008 budget request.
! Military Pay Raise. The budget request would give military
personnel a 3% pay raise effective January 1, 2008, thus keeping
pace with the average increase in private-sector wages as measured
by the Department of Labor’s Employment Cost Index (ECI). Some,
contending that military pay increases have lagged civilian pay hikes
by a cumulative total of 4% over the past two decades or so, have
called for a 3.5% raise to close that so-called pay-gap. Defense
Department officials deny any such pay-gap exists, maintaining that
their proposed 3% increase would sustain their policy of keeping
military pay at about the 70th percentile of pay for civilians of
comparable education and experience. Congress mandated military
pay-raises of ECI plus ½% in FY2000-2006. But for FY2007, the
Administration requested an increase of 2.2%, equivalent to ECI,
and Congress ultimately approved it, rejecting a House-passed
increase to 2.7%.
! Army and Marine Corps End-Strength Increases. The budget
request includes $12.1 billion in the FY2008 base budget and an
additional $4.9 billion in the FY2008 war-fighting budget toward the
Administration’s $112.3 billion plan to increase active-duty end-
strength by 65,000 Army personnel and 27,000 Marines by 2013.
Most of the additional personnel are slated for assignment to newly
created combat brigades and regiments, which would expand the
pool of units that could be rotated through overseas deployments,
thus making it easier for the services to sustain overseas roughly the
number of troops currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
recommendation marks a new departure for the Administration,
which has resisted for several years calls by the congressional
defense committees for such an increase in troop-strength. On the
other hand, the proposal might be challenged by members who
wonder how the services, in a time of tightening budgets, will afford
the roughly $13 billion annual cost of the additional troops. The
proposal also might be opposed by members skeptical of future
extended deployments on the scale of the current missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
29 (...continued)
Chair Ortiz at Subcommittee Markup,” May 8, 2007; [http://www.house.gov/hasc/
statements_all.shtml].
CRS-20
! Tricare Fees and Co-pays. For the second year in a row, the
Administration’s budget proposes to increase fees, co-payments and
deductibles charged retirees under the age of 65 by Tricare, the
Defense Department’s medical insurance program for active and
retired service members and their dependents. The increases are
intended to restrain the rapid increase in the annual cost of the
Defense Health Program, which is projected to reach $64 billion by
FY2015. The budget request also reduces the health program budget
by $1.9 billion, the amount the higher fees are expected to generate.
The administration contends that these one-time increases would
compensate for the fact that the fees have not be adjusted since they
were set in 1995. The Administration also is requesting a provision
of law that would index future increases in Tricare fees to the
average rate of increase in health care premiums nationwide. As was
the case last year, the Administration proposal is vehemently
opposed by organizations representing service members and retirees,
which contend that the Defense Department has failed to adequately
consider other cost-saving moves and that retiree medical care on
favorable terms is appropriate, considering the unique burdens that
have been borne by career soldiers and their dependents. Any future
Tricare fee increases, some groups contend, should be indexed to
increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rather than to the much
more rapid rise in health insurance premiums. Last year, Congress
blocked the proposed fee increases for one year and established a
study group to consider alternative solutions to the problem of rising
defense health costs. That panel is slated to issue interim
recommendations in May, 2007.30
! National Guard Representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A
number of National Guard units have been stripped of equipment
needed for other units deploying to Iraq, leaving the units at home
ill-prepared either to train for their military mission or to execute
their domestic emergency role as the agent of their state governor.
Some members of Congress and organizations that speak for the
Guard contend that this situation reflects the regular forces’
dismissive attitude toward Guard units, which should be
counterbalanced by making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and elevating him to highest
military rank — general (4 stars) — from his current rank of
lieutenant general (3 stars). Congress has rejected these proposals
before, but in March a congressionally chartered commission
studying National Guard and reserve component issues endorsed the
higher rank, while opposing the Joint Chiefs membership.
! National Guard Stryker Brigades. Governors, members of
Congress and National Guard officials from several states have
30 See CRS Report RS22402, Increases in Tricare Fees: Background and Options for
Congress, by Richard A. Best, Jr.
CRS-21
called on Congress to equip additional Guard combat units with the
Stryker armored combat vehicle, which currently equips five active-
duty Army brigades and one National Guard brigade (based in
Pennsylvania). Stryker brigades deployed in Iraq report the eight-
wheeled armored cars to be rugged under fire and agile; and because
they move on oversize tires rather than metal caterpillar tracks like
the big M-1 tanks and Bradley troop carriers that equip some Guard
units, Strykers would be more versatile in domestic disaster-
response missions, since they could travel on streets and roads
without tearing them up. Perhaps as important as the Stryker units’
vehicular capability is the surveillance and information network that
is part of a Stryker brigade. It cost about $1.2 billion to equip the
Pennsylvania Guard unit as a Stryker brigade.
! Future Combat Systems. The FY2008 budget request contains
$3.7 billion to continue development of the Army’s Future Combat
System (FCS), a $164 billion program to develop a new generation
of networked combat vehicles and sensors that GAO and other
critics repeatedly have cited as technologically risky. That critique
may account for the fact that, last year, Congress cut $326 million
from the Administration’s $3.7 billion FY2007 request for the
program. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also highlight
the concern of some that FCS will be a more efficient way to fight
the kind of armored warfare at which U.S. forces already excel while
offering no clear advantage in fighting the sort of counter-
insurgency operations that may be a major focus of U.S. ground
operations for some time to come.31 Particularly because the FY2008
request includes the first installment of procurement money for FCS
($100 million), critics may try once again to slow the project’s pace,
at least for the more technologically exotic components not slated
for deployment within the next five years.
! Nuclear Power for Warships. Congress may use the FY2008 bills
to continue pressing the Navy to resume the construction of nuclear-
powered surface warships. All U.S. subs commissioned since 1959
have had nuclear-powerplants because they give subs the extremely
useful ability to remain submerged, and thus hard to detect, for
weeks at a time. All aircraft carriers commissioned since 1967 also
have been nuclear-powered ships. But because nuclear-powered
surface ships cost significantly more to build and operate than oil-
powered ships of comparable size, the Navy has built no nuclear-
powered surface vessels since 1980, and has had none in
commission since 1999. Proponents of nuclear power long have
contended that this focus on construction costs has unwisely
discounted the operational advantages of surface combatants that
could steam at high speed for long distances, without having to
31 See CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS-22
worry about fuel consumption. In recent years, they have cited rising
oil prices to argue that nuclear-powered ships may not be much more
expensive to operate than oil-fueled vessels. In 2006, a Navy study
mandated by the FY2006 defense authorization bill (P.L. 109-163,
Section 130) concluded that nuclear power would add about $600
million to $700 million to the cost of a medium-sized warship, like
the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser, and that such a ship’s operating
cost would be only 0-10% higher than an oil-powered counterpart,
provided crude oil costs $74.15 or more, per barrel (as it did a
various times during 2006).32 Congress might add to the FY2008
bills provisions that would require certain kinds of warships to be
nuclear-powered in the future. Alternatively, it might require the
Navy to design both oil-powered and nuclear-powered versions of
the CG(X), the first of which is slated for funding in the FY2011
budget.
! Littoral Combat Ships. Congress will closely scrutinize the
Navy’s most recent restructuring of its plan to bulk up the fleet with
a large number of small, fast Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) intended
to use modular packages of weapons and equipment to perform
various missions. In FY2005-07, Navy budgets funded six LCSs
being built to two different designs by two contractors, Lockheed
and Northrop Grumman. The Navy plans to select one of the two
designs which would account for all the LCSs built beginning in
FY2010. But in March 2007, responding to escalating costs in the
first few LCS ships under construction, the Navy restructured the
program, cancelling contracts for three of the ships already funded
and reducing the number of LCS ships requested in the FY2008
budget from three to two. In the FY2008 defense bills, Congress
might endorse the Navy’s action, add funds for additional ships in
FY2008, or take additional steps to ensure that LCS construction
costs are under control before additional ships are funded.33
! Virginia-Class Submarines. Members may try to accelerate the
Navy’s plan to begin in FY2012 stepping up the production rate of
Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from one ship per
year to two. Because of the scheduled retirement after 30 years of
service of the large number of Los Angeles-class subs commissioned
in the 1980 and 1990s, the Navy’s sub fleet will fall short of the
desired 48 ships (out of a total fleet of 313 Navy vessels) from 2020
until 2033. In addition to approving the Navy’s FY2008 request for
$1.8 billion to build a sub for which nuclear reactors and other
components were funded in earlier years and $703 million for
reactors and components that would be used in subs slated for
32 See CRS Report RL33946, Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
33 See CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Oversight Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-23
funding in future budgets, Congress may add more so-called “long
lead” funding for an additional sub for which most of the funding
would come in FY2009 or FY2010. The Navy says it would need an
additional $400 million down payment in FY2008 to make it
feasible to fund an additional sub in FY2010.34 But Navy officials
also argue that buying an additional sub before 2012 could throw
future Navy budgets out of balance.
! F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter). Congress may reject the
Administration’s proposal to drop development of the General
Electric F-136 jet engine being developed as a potential alternative
to the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine slated to power the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter. Congress has backed development of an alternate
engine for the F-35 since 1996 and last year rejected the
Administration’s proposal to terminate the program, adding $340
million to the FY2007 defense funding bills to continue the alternate
engine program.35 Defense Department officials, noting that they
would save $1.8 billion by ending the alternate engine program,
contend that because of improvements in the process of designing
and developing jet engines, it would not be imprudent to rely on a
single type of engine to power what likely will be the only U.S.
fighter plane in production after about 2015. Many members are
skeptical of that argument, citing the poor reliability demonstrated
in the late 1970s by the Pratt & Whitney F-100 engine that powered
both the F-15 and F-16, a problem the caused Congress to mandate
development of an alternative (GE-built) engine. Supporters of the
dual engine approach also contend that competition between the two
engine manufacturers produced significant savings in F-15 and F-16
engine costs, a claim disputed by some analyses.
! C-17 Production and C-5 Upgrades. There appears to be strong
support in Congress for fielding a larger fleet of long-range cargo
jets big enough to heavy Army combat gear than Defense
Department plans would fund. As in past years, the result may be a
combination of congressional actions that would (1) restrict the
ability of the Air Force to retire older C-5A planes and (2) fund
additional C-17 planes, beyond the 190 the Air Force plans to buy.
In March 2006, the Defense Department’s first “post 9/11” review
of its long-range transportation needs concluded that the services’
long-range airlift needs could be met, with acceptable risk, by the
Air Force’s plan to upgrade fleet of 109 C-5s (divided between “A”
and newer “B” models) and to buy a total of 180 C-17s. Rejecting
the department’s analysis on several grounds, Congress barred
retirement of any C-5s and added 10 C-17s to the FY2007 defense
34 See CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement
Rate: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
35 See CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136
Alternate Engine, by Christopher Bolkcom.
CRS-24
funding bills. The most conspicuous change in this issue since then
has been the Administration’s decision to enlarge the Army and
Marine Corps, a move which, arguably, requires a larger airlift
fleet.36
! Air Force Tanker Procurement. The $315 million requested in
FY2008 to develop a new mid-air refueling tanker to replace the Air
Force KC-135s well into their fifth decade of service may become
a vehicle for congressional action intended to bolster the position of
either Boeing or the team of Northrop Grumman and Airbus, who
are competing for the contract in a contest scheduled to be decided
late in 2007. Immediately at issue is a contract for 179 refueling
planes. But follow-on contracts may bring the number of planes
ultimately purchased to 540. 37
! New Nuclear Warhead. Differences over the future role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. national security planning may crystalize into a
debate over the $119 million requested in the FY2008 national
defense budget to continue development of a so-called Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW), which is intended to replace
warheads that were built in the 1970s and 1980s and have been kept
in service longer than initially planned. That total includes $89
million for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the
Department of Energy and $30 million for the Navy. The new
warhead is intended to be easier to maintain than aging types now in
service and to be deployable without breaking the moratorium on
nuclear test explosions the U.S. government has observed since
1992. Supporters argue that RRW is needed because of concerns that
maintenance of currently deployed warheads may prove increasingly
difficult in the long term. On the other hand, critics of the RRW
program contend that fielding new warheads of an untested type
might build political pressure to resume testing eventually.
Moreover, they contend, that the program to extend the service life
of existing warheads without testing has proven successful for more
than a decade and should become even more reliable because of
advances in understanding of the physics of current weapons. Since
the funds requested in FY2008 would allow the RRW program to
cross a critical threshold, from design and cost analysis to the start
of detailed development work, members who want to rein in the
program have a strong incentive to use the FY2008 funding bills to
do it.38
36 See CRS Report RS20915, Strategic Airlift Modernization, by Christopher Bolkcom.
37 See CRS Report RS20941, Air Force Aerial Refueling, by Christopher Bolkcom.
38 See CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background
and Current Developments, and CRS Report RL33748, Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable
Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program, both by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS-25
! Non-Nuclear Trident Missile Warhead. Months after Congress
denied most of the $127 million requested in FY2007 to develop a
non-nuclear warhead for the Trident long-range, submarine-launched
ballistic missile, the administration has requested $175 million for
the program in FY2008. The argument in favor of the program is
that it would allow U.S. forces to quickly strike urgent or mobile
targets anywhere in the world, even if no U.S. forces were located
nearby. On the other hand, some skeptics of the program argue that
the system would require precise, virtually real-time intelligence
about targets that may not be available and that other countries —
including some like Russia and China that are armed with long-
range, nuclear-armed missiles — might misinterpret the launch of
a conventionally-armed U.S. missile as an indication that they were
under nuclear attack. Some members may try to slow the program,
as Congress did last year.39
! Missile Defense Budget. If only because it is the largest acquisition
program in the budget, the $8.9 billion requested in FY2008 for the
Missile Defense Agency would draw close scrutiny because of the
stringent budget limits within which the defense committees are
working. But there also may be some efforts to cut that request that
are rooted in the long-running debate that continues over how soon
missile defense would be needed, and over the relative effectiveness
of the many anti-missile systems under development. Efforts are
likely to reduce funding for some of the more technologically
challenging programs, such as the Airborne Laser (ABL), which has
encountered several delays and for which the Administration has
requested $549 million in FY2008.40 Another possible target for
congressional cuts is the $300 million requested to begin work on a
third anti-missile site in Eastern Europe. Touted by the
Administration as a defense against a possible threat from Iran, the
proposal to field anti-missile interceptors in the Czech Republic has
been denounced by Russia.
! Revisiting BRAC. Because of well-publicized cases of inadequate
care received by some Iraq War veterans at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, which is slated for realignment as one of the
recommendations made by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission, and approved by President George W. Bush,
critics of some other BRAC actions may be encouraged to try to
slow or reverse those decisions. If successful, such efforts might
unravel the entire base closure process, which was designed to
prevent members from politicking to save any one particular base
from closure. Since 1989, the requirement that Congress and the
39 See CRS Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
40 See CRS Report RL32123, Airborne Laser (ABL): Issue for Congress, by Christopher
Bolkcom and Stephen A. Hildreth.
CRS-26
President deal with each of the four sets of recommended closures
as a package, on a “take it or leave it” basis, has highlighted the
potential savings of the entire package of closures while preventing
supporters of any one base from rounding up support for saving their
site from closure on the grounds that, considered in isolation, closing
it would save very little. But since the furor over Walter Reed has at
least prompted some public calls for reconsidering that particular
BRAC decision, critics of other closures may argue that changes in
circumstance since 2005 require a re-look at other parts of the
BRAC package. In addition, jurisdictions anticipating a large
population influx as they acquire organizations formerly housed at
installations being closed, may seek impact assistance to expand
their overstretched transportation, utility, housing and education
infrastructures.
! Contract Oversight. Because of several recent cases in which high
profile weapons acquisition programs have been hobbled by
escalating costs and technical shortcomings, members may want to
review the management of individual programs and the evolution
over the past decade or so of the Defense Department’s acquisition
management process with an eye toward using the FY2008 funding
bills to strengthen the government’s hand in dealing with industry.
Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. Michael G. Mullen have declared that the Navy
intends to reclaim some of the authority over ship design it has
ceded to industry and members may look for ways to jump-start that
effort as they deal with, for instance, the troubled Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) program. Similarly, members intent on imposing
congressional priorities on the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)
may question the amount of managerial discretion the Army has
vested in the Lead System Integrator: a private entity — in this case,
a team of Boeing and SAID — hired to manage a large, complex
program that consists of more than a dozen vehicles and sensors
linked by a computer network. One rationale for the outsourcing to
industry of management roles previously filled by Pentagon
acquisition managers is that the Defense Department no longer has
the in-house expertise needed to manage such complicated
acquisitions. Some members may want the Defense Department to
come up with a long-term plan to restore enough in-house expertise
to make the government a smarter customer.41
41 See CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LEIS)
— Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
CRS-27
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of
Congressional Action to Date
Congressional Budget Resolution
Congress has begun, but has not completed, work on the annual congressional
budget resolution, which includes recommended ceilings for FY2008 and the
following four fiscal years on budget authority and outlays for national defense and
other broad categories (or “functions”) of the federal government. These functional
ceilings are not binding on the Appropriations committees nor do they formally
constrain the authorizing committees in any way. But the budget resolution’s ceiling
on the so-called “050 function” — the budget accounts funding the military activities
of DOD and the defense-related activities of the Department of Energy and other
agencies — may indicate the general level of support in each chamber for the
President’s overall defense budget proposal.
The House version of the budget resolution (H Con Res 99), adopted March 29,
2007 by a vote of 216-210 that broke basically along party lines, recommends for
FY2008 an overall ceiling on defense budget authority of $652 billion, essentially the
amount the President requested. The House budget resolution also includes non-
binding policy recommendations that (1) oppose the Administration’s request to
increase retirees’ medical fees and (2) call for a reduction in the administration’s $9.8
billion budget request for missile defense.
The Senate version of the budget resolution (S Con Res 21), adopted March 23
by a vote of 52-47 that basically followed party lines, recommends for FY2008 a
defense budget ceiling of $649 billion, slightly less than was requested. During
debate on the resolution, the Senate rejected by a vote of 47-51 an amendment that
would have created a “firewall” between defense spending and domestic spending,
making it impossible to use for domestic programs discretionary budget authority
under an overall spending ceiling that had been earmarked for defense.
FY2008 Defense Authorization:
Highlights of the House Armed Services Committee Bill42
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Although the effort of some members of Congress to force a withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Iraq is one of the most contentious issues on the country’s political
agenda, the version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill reported May 9 by the
House Armed Services Committee includes no provisions relating to any deadline
for ending U.S. deployments in Iraq. However, the bill would require several reports
on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
42 This section is based on the House Armed Services Committee’s summary of its action,
released May 9, 2009. It will be revised as soon as the committee report on H.R. 1585
becomes available.
CRS-28
The bill would require the top U.S. military commander in Iraq and the U.S.
ambassador to provide Congress with a detailed assessment of the situation in that
country covering various issues, including an assessment of Iraqi security forces and
a review of trends in attacks by insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters on U.S. and allied
forces.
The bill also includes several provisions focused on operations in Afghanistan,
including a requirement the Secretary of Defense send Congress a detailed plan for
achieving sustained, long-term stability in that country. The bill also would require
creation of a special inspector general to oversee U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts
in Afghanistan, paralleling the office that has uncovered instances of waste and fraud
in Iraqi reconstruction efforts.
In addition, the bill would require the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
to review the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization, created to coordinate
efforts to neutralize roadside bombs and car bombs, which have been responsible for
more U.S. troop fatalities in Iraq than any other factor. The bill also would cut from
the military construction request $212 million for facilities such as powerplants and
wastewater treatment plants which, the committee said, implied an intention to
continue U.S. deployments for a prolonged period.
Other FY2008 Defense Budget Issues. Some of the hundreds of changes
the House Armed Services Committee made to the President’s FY2008 defense
request in the committee’s version of H.R. 1585 reflect broader themes, some of
which the committee has struck in its action on earlier defense budget requests:
The Committee bill would fund the proposed expansion of the active-duty Army
and Marine Corps and would compensate the troops more generously. After years
of rejecting the committee’s recommendations to increase the number of ground
troops, the administration has launched a plan to increase the permanent end-strength
of the Army and Marine Corps by a total of 92,000 troops by 2012. In addition to
funding that end-strength increase, the committee bill would increase military pay
by 3.5%, instead of the 3.0 increase requested, and would bar for the second year in
a row a proposed increase in medical care fees for retirees.
It would mandate several actions intended to improve the quality of military
medical care, particularly for service members in outpatient status. The bill
incorporates the text of H.R. 1538, the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007,
passed by the House March 28, 2007, among the provisions of which are (1)
requirements for more proactive management of outpatient service members, (2)
requirements for regular inspections of housing facilities occupied by recovering
service members and reports on other aspects of military medical care, and (3) a one-
year ban on the privatization of jobs at any military medical facility.
It would shore up current combat capabilities, in part with funds diverted from
the budget request for technologically advanced weapons programs that promise
increased military capability in the future. It would add funds to the requests for
anti-missile systems designed to protect forces in the field from the sort of short-
range and medium-range missiles deployed (or nearly deployed) by potential
adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. At the same time, it would slice funding
CRS-29
from the amounts requested for the Airborne Laser and for development of space-
based anti-missile weapons, more innovative weapons intended for use against long-
range missiles that those adversaries have not yet fielded. Similarly, it would cut
several hundred million from the request for the Army’s Future Combat System
program, targeting some of its more exotic elements, while adding funds to expand
production of Stryker armored combat vehicles and “mine-resistant, ambush-
protected” (MRAP) troop carriers. It also would extend production of the C-17, long-
range, wide-body cargo jet, adding funds for 10 more airplanes.
The committee would slow some acquisition programs to allow a more orderly
process of setting their requirements and testing their effectiveness. For instance, the
bill would require an operationally realistic test of the communications and sensor
network that is essential to the Army’s FCS program before the system goes into
production. It also would defer production of a medium-range cargo plan, the Joint
Cargo Aircraft, until the Pentagon completes a study of its requirement for aircraft
of that type. In addition, the bill would slow development of a new troop carrier,
slated to replace the High-Mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV),
until some of the technologies used in the vehicles are more mature.
The committee would slow some programs that might draw adverse
international reactions. It would reduce funding for development of a new Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) and for construction of a new production facility for
plutonium to be used in nuclear warheads, programs some have said would
complicate U.S. efforts to bar the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also would
eliminate funding to deploy anti-missile interceptors in Europe, a plan to which
Russia has objected. In addition, the bill would reduce funding for development of
a non-nuclear warhead for Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the launch
of which — some critics warn — might be mistakenly interpreted as the launch of
a nuclear attack.
Some other highlights of committee action include the following:
! Tricare Fee Freeze. As the FY2007 authorization bill did, this bill
would bar for one year proposed increases in Tricare fees (including
pharmacy fees). The committee noted that a commission appointed
to study alternative Tricare cost controls is not scheduled to
complete its work until the end of the year. The bill also would
authorize an increase in Tricare funding by $1.9 billion, the amount
by which Pentagon officials reduced the Tricare budget request in
anticipation of the higher fees.
! Health Care Improvements. The bill would create an initiative to
improve care of service members suffering traumatic brain injury,
which is a relatively frequent result of roadside bomb attacks on U.S.
vehicles in Iraq. It also would allow the Navy to reduce its number
of medical personnel by only 410, rather than the reduction of 900
the budget assumed. The bill also incorporates the provisions of
H.R. 1538, the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007, passed by
the House March 28 which, among many other provisions, would do
the following: mandate the assignment of case managers to
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outpatient service members and require regular reviews of their
cases; create toll-free hotlines on which service members and their
families can report deficiencies in military-support facilities;
establish standardized training programs for Defense Department
personnel engaged in evaluating wounded service members for
possible discharge on grounds of disability; establishment of a
separate fund to support the treatment of wounded or injured service
members and their return to service or their transition to civilian life;
mandates development of policies to reduce the likelihood that
personnel in combat will experience post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) or other stress-related illnesses; require regular inspections
of all living quarters occupied by service members recovering from
wounds; and prohibit for one year any effort to convert jobs at a
military medical facility from military to civilian positions.
! National Guard Issues. The bill would elevate the chief of the
Guard Bureau, a position that currently carries with it the rank of
lieutenant general, to the rank of general, and would designate that
officer as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. However, the bill would not make the Guard
Bureau chief a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as some
advocates for the National Guard have advocated. The bill also
would authorize an addition of $500 million to the budget in order
to fill National Guard equipment shortages, the total cost of which
the current chief of the National Guard Bureau said totaled $2
billion. In addition, it would authorize the addition of $30 million to
upgrade the engines on F-16s flown by National Guard squadrons.
The bill also would require the Secretary of Defense to send
Congress quarterly reports on the readiness of National Guard units
to perform both their wartime mission and the domestic missions the
would be called on in response to a natural disaster or domestic
disturbance.
! Training. The bill would authorize an additional $250 million for
training not covered by the budget request. The committee warned
that the readiness of ground combat forces in particular was
suffering because their training was focused heavily on the type of
mission they would perform in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than on
the full spectrum of missions they might have to execute.
! Maintenance and Readiness. The bill would add to the budget
request $165 million for additional major overhauls of ships, planes,
vehicles and electronic equipment beyond what the budget would
cover. It also would create a $1 billion Strategic Readiness Fund to
allow the services to address equipment shortages that resulted in
critical readiness shortfalls. To better focus attention on readiness
problems, the bill would create a Defense Readiness Production
Board to identify shortages of equipment or supplies anticipated to
last for two years or longer. It also requires DOD to report the
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current readiness of ground forces and prioritize the steps that will
be taken to improve the state of readiness.
! Special Forces Priorities. Several provisions of the bill reflect a
concern by some committee members that the services’ special
operations forces have been emphasizing “direct action” (efforts to
kill or capture terrorists) at the expense of “indirect action” ( training
other countries’ security forces and developing working
relationships with them to help set conditions that inhibit the spread
of terrorism). The bill would require the Special Operations
Command to send Congress an annual report on its plan to meet its
requirements for indirect action. It also would authorize additional
funds for “irregular warfare support” research aimed at better
understanding radical Islamist strategies and the cultures in which
terrorists seek a foothold.
! Civilian Employees. The bill would change the rules governing cost
competitions to determine whether functions currently performed by
federal employees should be contracted out to private companies.
The committee said that the changes, which would tend to advantage
federal employees in such a contest, were needed to ensure a fair and
balanced cost comparison. It also would require a recently created
personnel system for civilian DOD employees to provide additional
rights of collective bargaining and appeal rights, and would impose
limits on the new system’s “pay for performance” compensation
rules.
! Armored Troop Carriers. The bill would increase by $4.1 billion
— to $4.6 billion, the amount authorized to equip Army, Marine
Corps and Special Operations units with Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles, shaped and armored to better protect
troops from roadside bombs. It approved the requests for $2.3 billion
to buy armored HMMWV vehicles and $1.1 billion for add-on
armor to protect personnel in other vehicles from roadside bombs.
! Ground Combat Vehicles. The bill would cut $857 million from
the $3.56 billion requested to continue developing the Army’s
Future Combat System (FCS), a networked set of ground vehicles,
unmanned aircraft and sensors that would make up the next
generation of ground combat equipment. FCS supporters contended
that the cut would cripple the program; but a proponents of the
committee action contended that the cuts had been aimed at more
exotic components not slated to enter service for years, sparing
elements of FCS that would be available sooner. The bill also
approved the request for $4 billion to upgrade M-1 tanks and
Bradley armored troops carriers currently in service. It would
authorize $88 million of the $288 million requested for the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a Marine Corps effort to develop a
new amphibious combat vehicle, work on which has been suspended
pending a DOD review.
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! Communication Programs Slowed. The bill would cut $2.1 billion
from the $2.6 billion requested for the Joint Network Node (JNN),
an effort to develop for ground troops an internet-based mobile
voice, video and data link that would be used pending development
of a more ambitious communications network system designated
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). Committee
members contended that JNN could not usefully absorb the amount
requested. Moreover, the committee insisted that JNN, which had
been launched as an interim system start managed under relatively
informal procedures, begin to operate under the more demanding
procedures applied to major systems purchases and that the
procurement of future lots of the system by competed. The bill also
would cut $102 million from the $222 million requested to develop
the follow-on communication system, WIN-T. On the other hand,
the bill authorized the $964 million requested to develop a
satellite-based, long-range communications network linked by
lasers.
! Combat Jets. The bill would authorize production 11 of the 12 F-35
tri-service fighters requested. It would use the $230 million thus
saved from the $2.7 billion F-35 procurement request plus $250
million diverted from the $3.5 billion R&D request to continue
development of an alternative jet engine, a project the budget would
terminate. The bill also would authorize the amounts requested for
20 Air Force F-22 fighters ($3.2 billion, plus $744 million for R&D)
and 18 EA-18Gs, which are electronic-jamming versions of the
Navy’s F/A-18E/F fighter ($1.3 billion, plus $273 million for R&D).
It would authorize 33 of the 36 F/A-18E/Fs requested ($2.6 billion,
a $182 million reduction from the request).
! Long-Range Cargo Jets. The bill would add to the budget $2.4
billion for 10 additional C-17 wide-body, long-range cargo jets.
DOD’s budget would have ended production of the planes, as would
its FY2007 budget, which Congress also overrode to keep the C-17
production line running. In addition, the bill would repeal existing
law that bars DOD from retiring any of its C-5 cargo jets. The bill
would allow the Air Force to begin retiring older C-5s once the
production of C-17s, plus remaining C-5s comprised a total
long-range cargo fleet of 299 planes.
! Shipbuilding. The bill included a provision requiring that all new
classes of cruisers, submarines and aircraft carriers be
nuclear-powered, although the requirement could be waived in any
case in which the Secretary of Defense determined it not to be in the
national interest. The bill added to the budget request $1.7 billion for
a San Antonio-class amphibious landing transport (in addition to the
$1.4 billion requested for one of the ships), $400 million for a
T-AKE class supply ship (in addition to the $456 million requested
for one), and $588 million to buy the nuclear power plant and other
components of an additional Virginia-class submarine, for which the
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bulk of the funds would have to be provided in a future budget (in
addition to the $1.8 billion approved as requested for one sub and
the $703 million requested for another set of long-leadtime sub
components). The bill also authorized $7ll million for two smaller
warships, designated LCS, which is what the Navy wanted after it
dropped from its FY2008 budget request funding for a third ship of
the class because of escalating costs in construction of earlier ships
of the type. The committee also directed the Navy to report on the
underlying causes of the LCS cost-overruns and on steps that were
being taken to prevent their recurrence. The bill also authorized the
amounts requested to begin work on a nuclear-powered carrier ($2.7
billion), to complete two DDG-1000-class destroyers that were
partly funded in the FY2007 budget and to buy components for use
in future ships of this type ($2.8 billion), and to complete a
helicopter carrier designed to support amphibious landings, some
funds for which were provided in the FY2007 budget ($1.4 billion).
! Missile Defense. The bill would cut a total of $764 million from the
$8.8 billion requested for the Missile Defense Agency. The largest
cut in a single missile defense program was $250 million cut from
the $548 million requested to continue development of an airborne
laser (ABL). The bill also would cut $160 million from the $300
million requested to field in Eastern Europe a third cluster of
anti-missile interceptor rockets, of the type already deployed in
Alaska and California to intercept intercontinental range missiles.
The cut would block construction of the planned launch silos in the
Czech Republic. The bill also would authorize a total of $2.5 billion,
slightly more than was requested, for Patriot and Aegis systems
designed to protect U.S. forces and allies against short-range and
medium-range missiles currently deployed by North Korea, Iran and
many other countries. It would deny $10 million requested to begin
development of space-based anti-missile interceptor missiles.
! Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation. The bill would cut $45
million from the $119 million requested to develop a new nuclear
warhead — the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) — to replace
aging warheads current deployed. The committee said it wanted to
slow development of the new weapon pending a report on future
U.S. nuclear weapons deployments, which the bill would create a
blue-ribbon panel to prepare. The bill also would authorize $142
million of the $175 million requested to develop a non-nuclear
warhead for the Trident submarine-launched missile. The committee
wanted to defer production of the weapon pending study of how it
would be used and how the risk could be minimized that launch of
a conventionally-armed Trident would be misinterpreted as nuclear
attack.
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For Additional Reading
Overall Defense Budget
CRS Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills:
FY1970-FY2007, by Thomas Coipuram Jr.
FY2008 Defense Budget: Issues for Congress - Seminar Slides, by Stephen Daggett,
Ronald O’Rourke, David F. Burrelli, and Amy Belasco. February 12, 2007,
MM70099, [http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/MM70099.shtml].
CRS Report RL33405, Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations, by
Stephen Daggett.
CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign
Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett et al.
CRS Report RL33427, Military Construction, Military Quality of Life and Veterans
Affairs: FY2007 Appropriations, by Daniel H. Else, Christine Scott, and Sidath
Viranga Panangala.
Military Operations: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere
CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority To Limit U.S. Military Operations
in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas J. Nicola.
CRS Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding
Approaches, by Amy Belasco, Hannah Fischer, Lynn J. Cunningham, and Larry
A. Niksch.
CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving
U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, by Richard F. Grimmett.
CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on
Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
CRS Report RL33298, FY2006 Supplemental Appropriations: Iraq and Other
International Activities; Additional Hurricane Katrina Relief, by Paul M. Irwin
and Larry Nowels.
CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798-2006, by Richard F. Grimmett.
CRS Report RL33532, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, by
Richard F. Grimmett.
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U.S. Military Personnel and Compensation
CRS Report RL33571, The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected
Military Personnel Policy Issues, by Charles A. Henning, David F. Burrelli,
Lawrence Kapp, and Richard A. Best Jr.
CRS Report RL33537, Military Medical Care: Questions and Answers, by Richard
A. Best Jr.
CRS Report RL33446, Military Pay and Benefits: Key Questions and Answers, by
Charles A. Henning.
CRS Report RL33449, Military Retirement, Concurrent Receipt, and Related Major
Legislative Issues, by Charles A. Henning.
CRS Report RL31334, Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi
Freedom: Questions and Answers About U.S. Military Personnel,
Compensation, and Force Structure, by Lawrence Kapp.
Defense Policy Issues
CRS Report RS22443, Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations
and Restrictions, by Stephen R. Vina.
CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy - Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
CRS Report RS22149, Exemptions from Environmental Law for the Department of
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by David M. Bearden.
CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United
States?, by Edward F. Bruner.
CRS Report RS22266, The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal
Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
Defense Program Issues
CRS Report RL32123, Airborne Laser (ABL): Issues for Congress, by Christopher
Bolkcom and Steven A. Hildreth.
CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RS22120, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview, by Steven A.
Hildreth.
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CRS Report RL32347, “Bunker Busters”: Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues,
FY2005-FY2007, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report RL31673, F-22A Raptor, by Christopher Bolkcom.
CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status
Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.
CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement
Rate: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 (DD(X)) and CG(X) Ship Acquisition
Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies
of 2005 - Background for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class (CVN-21) Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Oversight Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S.
Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report RL32572, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background
and Current Developments, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RL33745, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense - Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, by
Christopher Bolkcom.
CRS-37
CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by
Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments,
and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.