Order Code RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security
Updated May 10, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but much of
Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency,
compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that a January 2007 national intelligence
estimate (NIE) says has key elements of a “civil war.” Mounting U.S. casualties and
financial costs — without clear overall improvements in levels of violence — have
intensified a debate within the United States over whether to wind down U.S.
involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals.
President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 consisting of
deployment of at an additional 21,500 U.S. combat forces to help stabilize Baghdad
and restive Anbar Province, as well as other measures to create jobs and promote
political reconciliation. He and other officials have asserted that the new security
plan would build on important successes: two elections (January and December
2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government; a
referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005); progress in
building Iraq’s security forces; and economic growth. The strategy is intended to
provide security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key
reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as “benchmarks” of political progress.
Movement on the reconciliation initiatives has been halting but has not ceased, and
the Administration is putting increasing pressure on the Iraqi government to
accelerate progress. Senior U.S. military leaders say the 2007 Baghdad security plan
has reduced sectarian violence and allowed for an increase in commerce and ease of
movement around Baghdad, but it has not, to date, not reduced violence Iraq-wide.
Some in Congress — as well as the Iraq Study Group — believe that the United
States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. Both chambers
adopted a conference report on a FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591) that would set a March 31, 2008,
deadline for U.S. combat withdrawal — or three months sooner, if the President does
not certify Iraqi progress on the “benchmarks.” President Bush vetoed it on May 1,
2007. New versions (H.R. 2206) retaining requirements for progress on the
benchmarks are under consideration, although the Administration opposes provisions
that would penalize the Iraqi government or hold up U.S. military funding if the
benchmarks are not met. Other bills support the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation
for intensified regional diplomacy to enlist help from neighboring states to calm their
protege factions in Iraq. This is a step the Administration has begun to take by
participating in a March 10 meeting in Baghdad and a follow-up in Egypt (May 3-4)
involving Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria.
This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff;
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS
Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by
Christopher Blanchard.

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Contents
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq
National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . 4
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Early Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 12
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.N. Backing of Sovereign Government/Coalition Military
Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Elections in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Maliki Government and “Benchmarks” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote
Iraq Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Democracy-Building and Local Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Oil Revenues and Hydrocarbons Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Al Qaeda in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Iranian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 35
Baghdad Security Plan and Troop “Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

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President’s January 10 Initiative, Iraq Study Group Report, Legislation,
and Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Altering Troop Levels or Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Troop Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
International and Regional Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Reorganize the Power Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Decentralization and Break-Up Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Negotiating With Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Economic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Shiite, Kurdish, and Secular Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that
is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British
forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in
1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but
were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni
Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance,
facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941,
during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of
Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence
of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was
killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was
only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-
Sa’id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of
Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a
Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in
Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during
Saddam’s rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian
philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was
to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring

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CRS-2
Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by
Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to try to do so
militarily because (1) the United Nations had approved only liberating Kuwait; (2)
Arab states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad; and (3) the
Administration feared becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.1
Within days of the war’s end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq
and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S.
support, rebelled. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni
Muslim Republican Guard forces were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S.
forces and were intact to suppress the rebellion. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the
United States for not intervening on their behalf. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a
U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of
northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
Subsequent to the war, the thrust of U.S. policy was containment, consisting of
U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international economic
embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and southern
Iraq.2 However, President George H.W. Bush did pursue regime change as well, to
some extent, including reportedly sending Congress an intelligence finding that the
United States would try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The
Administration apparently believed that a coup from within the regime could
produce a favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July
1992 coup failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite,
and other oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3 The United
States did not undertake any military action specifically on behalf of these groups.
The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions
During the Clinton Administration, the United States built ties to and
progressively increased support for several of the secular and religious opposition
factions discussed below. Some of these factions have provided major figures in
1 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
2 The implementation of these policies is discussed in CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former
Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.

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CRS-3
post-Saddam politics, while also fielding militias that are allegedly conducting acts
of sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups had
authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim, to run the INC on a daily basis. (A table on U.S.
appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).4
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).5 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi. The INA enjoyed Clinton Administration support in 1996 after squabbling
among other opposition groups reduced their viability,6 but the INA was penetrated
by Iraq’s intelligence services, which arrested or executed over 100 INA activists in
June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The
incursion enabled Baghdad to rout INC and INA agents in the north.
The Kurds. The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. Historically fearful of persecution
by the Arab majority, the Kurds want a high degree of autonomy. The Kurds, both
through legal procedures as well as population movements, are trying to secure the
mixed city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds covet as a source of oil that would ensure
their autonomy or eventual independence. The Kurds achieved insertion of language
in the permanent constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk
might formally join the Kurdish administered region. (The Iraq Study Group report,
released December 6, 2006, in Recommendation 30 believes that this referendum
should be delayed.)7 For now, both major Kurdish factions — the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
led by Masud Barzani — are participating in Iraqi politics, the PUK more so than the
KDP. Talabani is Iraq’s president; Barzani, on June 12, 2005, was named “president
4 Chalabi’s father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the
1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American
University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran
afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In April 1992, he was convicted
in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of $400 million.
5 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
6 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
7 The report can be obtained at [http://www.usip.org].

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CRS-4
of Kurdistan” by the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly (elected January 30, 2005).8
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have become dominant in post-Saddam politics;
Shiites constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented in all pre-
2003 governments. Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime change
efforts of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States. The
undisputed Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, remained in Iraq,
albeit with a low profile, during Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he was not involved
in U.S.-backed regime change efforts during the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid”
(source of emulation) and the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.9 He has a network of agents (wakils) throughout Iraq
and among Shiites outside Iraq.
About 85 years old, Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, was Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-
Khoi, was head of the Hawza until his death in 1992. Like Khoi, Sistani generally
opposes a direct role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision
of political leaders. He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and favors modest
dress for women, and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and
entertainment.10 He was treated for heart trouble in Britain in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI
considers itself the largest party within the “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA) of Shiite
political groupings. SCIRI’s influence is bolstered by the fielding of a militia force,
the “Badr Brigades.” SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown
in 1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to
overthrow him. During Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978), he was
hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim brothers (including
current leader Abd al-Aziz) that founded SCIRI. The Ayatollah was then head of the
Hawza. SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic
republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and other
aid from Iran. Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SCIRI
refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts with the United States.
Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Da’wa (Islamic Call)
Party, which did not directly join the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein
during the 1990s, is both an ally and sometime rival of SCIRI. Its leader is Ibrahim
al-Jafari, a Da’wa activist since 1966 who fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s
crackdown, later going to London. He was transitional Prime Minister during April
8 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
9 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
10 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

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CRS-5
2005-April 2006. His successor as Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, is the number two
Da’wa leader. Although there is no public evidence that Jafari or Maliki were
involved in any terrorist activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly
committed a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the
December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. (It was
reported in February 2007 that a UIA/Da’wa parliamentarian, Jamal al-Ibrahimi, was
convicted by Kuwait for the 1983 attacks.) Lebanese Hezbollah was founded by
Lebanese clerics loyal to Da’wa founder Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr and
Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and ideological linkages between
Lebanese Hezbollah and Da’wa (as well as with SCIRI). Hezbollah attempted to
link release of the Americans they held hostage in Lebanon in the 1980s to the
release of 17 Da’wa prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction. Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as a major — some
believe the most powerful — figure in Iraq. Immediately after the fall of Saddam
Hussein, he was viewed as a young firebrand who lacked religious and political
weight, but the more established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats, are
building ties to him because of his large following. He is now perceived as more
clever and more capable than originally perceived. His support is strongest among
poor Shiites who identify with other “oppressed Muslims” and who oppose virtually
any U.S. presence in the Middle East. This might explain why he repeatedly
denounces the “U.S. occupation” but yet has cooperated with the U.S.-led political
transition process. By fully participating in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr
appeared to distance himself from his uprisings in 2003 and 2004, although
tensions have flared again since 2006 as his militia forces have become active,
particularly against British forces in southern Iraq, as well as against rival Shiite
factions and Iraqi security forces. Pro-Sadr candidates also won pluralities in several
southern Iraqi provinces in the elections held in January 2005. (In Recommendation
35, the Iraq Study Group recommended that the United States try to talk to Sadr, as
well as Sistani, as well as with other parties except Al Qaeda-Iraq.)

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CRS-6
Table 1. Major Shiite, Kurdish, and Secular Factions
Iraq National
The INA leads the main secular bloc in parliament. Allawi, about 60 years old
Accord
(born 1946 in Baghdad), a former Baathist who helped Saddam silence Iraqi
(INA)/Iyad al-
dissidents in Europe in the mid-1970s. Subsequently fell out with Saddam,
Allawi
became a neurologist, and presided over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe.
Survived an alleged regime assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a
secular Shiite, but many INA members are Sunni ex-Baathists and ex-military
officers. Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-April 2005). Won 40
seats in January 2005 election but only 25 in December 2005. Allawi spends
most of his time outside Iraq but reportedly may be trying to organize a non-
sectarian parliamentary coalition.
Iraqi National
Chalabi, who is about 66 years old, educated in the United States
Congress
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. One of the
(INC)/Ahmad
rotating presidents of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). U.S.-backed Iraqi
Chalabi
police raided INC headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing
documents as part of an investigation of various allegations, including
provision of U.S. intelligence to Iran. Case later dropped. Since 2004, has
allied with and fallen out with Shiite Islamist factions; was one of three deputy
prime ministers in the 2005 transition government. With no INC seats in
parliament, now spends substantial time at his home in London, but remains
chair of the Higher National De-Baathification Commission. Recently assigned
as liaison between Baghdad neighborhood committees and the government in
2007 Baghdad security plan.
Kurds/KDP and
Together, the main factions run a legally-constituted “Kurdistan Regional
PUK
Government (KRG)” with its own executive headed by “president” Masud
Barzani and a legislature. PUK leader Talabani became president of Iraq after
January 2005 and remains so, despite March 2007 health problems that
required treatment in Jordan. Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s base in the
Kurdish north and has distanced himself from national politics. Many Kurds
are more supportive of outright Kurdish independence than are these leaders.
Kurds field up to 100,000 peshmerga militia. Their joint slate won 75 seats in
January 2005 national election but only 53 in December. Grudgingly support
draft oil law sent to parliament, but might want further modifications to increase
Kurdish ability to sign contracts with oil firms and strongly oppose annexes
subsequently drafted that the Kurds say would “centralize” Iraq’s oil industry.
Both factions intent on securing control of Kirkuk.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position in
Ayatollah Ali
government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become instrumental
al-Sistani
in major political questions. Helped forge UIA and brokered compromise over
the selection of a Prime Minister nominee in April 2006. Strongly criticized
Israel’s July 2006 offensive against Lebanese Hezbollah. However,
acknowledges that his influence is waning and that calls for Shiite restraint are
unheeded as Shiites look to armed parties and militias for defense in sectarian
warfare. Does not meet with U.S. officials.
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party. It was established
Council for the
in 1982 by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq. First leader,
Islamic
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, killed by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Current
Revolution in
leader is his younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite
Iraq (SCIRI)
cleric and a member of parliament (UIA slate), but he holds no government
position. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance Minister, and
another, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is a deputy president. Controls “Badr Brigades”
militia. As part of UIA, SCIRI has about 30 of its members in parliament.
Supports formation of Shiite “region” composed of nine southern provinces.
Generally aligned with Da’wa Party because of common ideology and heritage.
Supports draft oil law.

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CRS-7
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active against Saddam
Call) Party
Hussein in early 1980s. Its founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, uncle of
Moqtada Al Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by
Saddam regime in 1980. Da’wa members tend to follow senior Lebanese Shiite
cleric Mohammad Hossein Fadlallah rather than Iranian clerics, and Da’wa is
not as close to Tehran as is SCIRI. Has no organized militia and a lower
proportion of clerics than does SCIRI. Part of UIA, controls about 28 seats in
parliament. Supports draft oil law.
Moqtada Al-
Young (about 31), the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah Mohammed
Sadr Faction
Sadiq al-Sadr (killed, along with his other two sons, by regime security forces
in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam). Inherited father’s political
base in “Sadr City,” a large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad,
but also strong in Diwaniyah, Basra, Amarah, and other major Shiite cities.
Mercurial, has both challenged and tacitly worked with U.S. forces in Iraq.
Still clouded by allegations of involvement in the April 10, 2003, killing in Iraq
of Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi and head of his
London-based Khoi Foundation. Formed “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003,
although some militia elements now believed beyond Sadr’s control. Now part
of UIA, controls 32 seats in new parliament and ministries of health,
transportation, and agriculture (plus one organization of ministerial rank) and
supports Prime Minister Maliki. However, those parliamentarians boycotted
parliament for three months following the late November 2006 meeting
between Bush and Maliki. Opposes large Shiite “region” in the south, and
generally opposed to draft oil law.
Fadilah Party
Fadilah (Virtue) won 15 seats parliament as part of the UIA coalition but
publicly broke from the UIA on March 6, 2007, possibly to negotiate a new
coalition with Allawi. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, who was a
leader of the Sadr movement after the death of Moqtada’s father in 1999 but
was later removed by Moqtada and subsequently broke with the Sadr faction.
Holds seats on several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces and
dominates Basra provincial council, whose governor is a party member. Also
controls protection force for oil installations in Basra, and is popular among
oil workers in Basra. Opposes draft oil law.
Hezbollah Iraq
Headed by ex-guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC and now in parliament. Party’s power base is southern marsh areas around
Amara (Maysan Province), north of Basra. Party militiamen play role in
policing areas of the province.
Tharallah
Led by Sayyid Yusuf al-Musawi. Little known armed Shiite faction operating
in southern Iraq.
Islamic Amal
A relatively small faction, Islamic Amal (Action) Organization is headed by
Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a moderate cleric. Power base is in
Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against Saddam regime in the 1980s.
Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s
and 1990s. One member in the cabinet (Minister of Civil Society Affairs).
Ayatollah
Another Karbala-based faction, loyal to Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hassani, who
Hassani Faction
also was a Sadrist leader later removed by Moqtada. His armed followers
clashed with local Iraqi security forces in Karbala in mid-August 2006.
Hassani, along with Fadilah, are considered opponents of Iran because of Iran’s
support for SCIRI and Da’wa Party.

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CRS-8
Iraq Liberation Act. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to
overthrow Saddam, beginning with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations act (P.L.
105-174). The sentiment was expressed more strongly in the “Iraq Liberation Act”
(ILA, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). Signed by President Clinton despite doubts
about opposition capabilities, it was viewed as an expression of congressional
support for the concept of promoting an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air power. The
Bush Administration has cited the ILA as evidence of a bipartisan consensus that
Saddam should be toppled. The ILA stated that it should be the policy of the United
States to “support efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In
mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was
a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8 states that the act should not be
construed as authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
The ILA did not specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from
power. Section 7 provides for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups
with “democratic goals.” The law also gave the President authority to provide up to
$97 million worth of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in
broadcasting funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton made seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S.
military assistance under the ILA (P.D. 99-13): INC; INA; SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);11 and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM). In May 1999, the Clinton Administration provided $5 million
worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles under the ILA. About 150
oppositionists underwent Defense Department-run training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida on how to administer a post-Saddam Iraq. However, the Administration
judged that the opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat
training. These trainees were not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the
Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq.
11 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally de-listed.

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CRS-9
Post-September 11, 2001:
Regime Change and War
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been advocates of a
regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy led the Bush
Administration initially to continue its predecessor’s emphasis on containment.12
Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to
confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During its first year, the
Administration tried to prevent an asserted erosion of containment of Iraq by
achieving U.N. Security Council adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a
“smart sanctions” plan. The plan relaxed U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to
Iraq of purely civilian equipment13 in exchange for renewed international
commitment to enforce the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.
Bush Administration policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002, given as major combat in the U.S.-led war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as
Iraq, that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East
in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the Arab leaders visited urged greater U.S.
attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed war with Iraq.
Some accounts, including the books Plan of Attack and State of Denial by Bob
Woodward (published in April 2004 and September 2006, respectively), say that
then Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential
consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a
democracy after major hostilities ended. Other accounts include reported memoranda
(the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence officials, based on
conversations with U.S. officials. That memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the
Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and that it sought to
develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President Bush and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the House passed
H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons
inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
12 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.
13 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Christopher Blanchard and Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-10
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. A “comprehensive”
September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the
“Duelfer report,”14 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The formal U.S.-led
WMD search ended December 2004,15 although U.S. forces have
found some chemical weapons caches left over from the Iran-Iraq
war.16 The UNMOVIC work remains formally active.17
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.18 In press interviews related to the release of his book
“Center of the Storm” in May 2007, former CIA Director George
Tenet indicated that the CIA view was that contacts between
Saddam’s regime and Al Qaeda were likely for the purpose of taking
the measure of each other rather than collaborating.
14 Duelfer report text is at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
15 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
16 Pincus, Walter. “Munitions Found in Iraq Renew Debate.” Washington Post, July 1, 2006.
17 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].
18 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.

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CRS-11
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
As major combat in Afghanistan wound down in mid-2002, the Administration
began ordering a force to Kuwait (the only Gulf country that agreed to host a major
U.S. ground combat force) that, by early 2003, gave the President an active option
to invade Iraq. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and broaden the Iraqi
opposition and, according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002), authorizing
stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces against
Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments jointly
invited six major opposition groups to Washington, D.C., and the Administration
expanded its ties to several groups, particularly those composed of ex-military
officers. The Administration also began training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist
U.S. forces,19 although reportedly only about 70 completed training at Taszar air base
in Hungary, eventually serving as translators during the war. At the same time, the
Administration opposed a move by the major factions to declare a provisional
government, believing that doing so would prevent the emergence of secular, pro-
democracy groups.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002) that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration then gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with all applicable
Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection. Iraq reluctantly
accepted it. In January and February 2003, UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei
briefed the Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002.
Although they were not denied access to suspect sites, they criticized Iraq for failing
to actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions, but also noted progress and
said that Iraq might not have retained any WMD.
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and
“to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq.” It passed the
House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and the Senate the following day (77-23). It was
signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely, and no U.N. resolution authorizing
force was adopted. At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that Iraq was not
complying with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively revealing
19 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, October 19, 2002.

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CRS-12
information, and that diplomatic options had failed. The following day, President
Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave
Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country20 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles. Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.
Some post-major combat evaluations (for example, “Cobra Two,” by Michael
Gordon and Bernard Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should
have focused more on combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on
armored forces. No WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic
missiles into Kuwait; it is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges
(greater than 150 km). The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although
Saddam Hussein appeared with supporters that day in Baghdad’s mostly Sunni
Adhamiya district. (Saddam was captured in December 2003, and subsequently tried
in Iraq and, on November 5, 2006, convicted for “willful killing” of Shiite civilians
in Dujail in 1982. He was hanged on December 30, 2006.)
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance
According to recent statements by President Bush, U.S. goals are for an Iraq that
can sustain, govern, and defend itself and is a partner in the global war on terrorism.
Administration officials have, for the most part, dropped an earlier stated goal that
Iraq serve as a model of democratic reform in the Middle East.
Early Transition Process
The formal political transition has advanced, but has not achieved the level of
political reconciliation needed to cause an end to or reduction in levels of violence.
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly
grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and
not produce democracy. The Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner
(ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S. government personnel to administer
Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003. He headed the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of
Defense, created by a January 20, 2003, executive order. The Administration did not
make use of the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year
20 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. See Washington Post, March 27, 2003, p. A19.

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CRS-13
before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.21
Garner, along with then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, tried to establish a
representative successor regime by organizing a meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15,
2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and ethnicities. A subsequent meeting of
over 250 notables was held in Baghdad (April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold
a broader meeting one month later to name an interim administration.
In May 2003, the Administration, reportedly preferring what they perceived as
stronger leadership in Iraq, named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace Garner by
heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed ORHA. The
CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). Bremer discontinued Garner’s political transition process and
instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body: the 25-
member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). In September 2003, the IGC selected a
25-member “cabinet” to run the ministries, with roughly the same factional and
ethnic balance of the IGC (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). Although there were
some Sunni figures in the CPA-led political structure, many Sunnis resented the U.S.
invasion and perceived the IGC as an arm of U.S. decision-making. Adding to
Sunni resentment were some of the CPA’s most controversial decisions, including
to pursue “de-Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 Iraqis
at four top ranks of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and not to recall members of the
armed forces to service (CPA Order 2). (Recommendation 27 of the Iraq Study
Group says that the United States should encourage reintegration of ex-Baathists.)
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The Bush Administration
initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent on the completion of a new
constitution and the holding of national elections for a new government, tasks
expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah Sistani and others
agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty and direct elections. In November 2003, the
United States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and
that national elections would be held by the end of 2005. That decision was
incorporated into an interim constitution — the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), signed on March 8, 2004.22 Drafted by the major anti-Saddam factions, it
provided a roadmap for political transition, including (1) elections by January 31,
2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; (2) drafting of a permanent
constitution by August 15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15,
2005; and (3) national elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005. The new
government would take office by December 31, 2005. Under the TAL, any three
provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds majority. If that happened, a
new draft would be written and voted on by October 15, 2006. The Kurds
maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional Government,” and their
peshmerga militia were allowed to operate.
21 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/]. The project cost
$5 million and had 15 working groups on major issues.
22 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website at [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].

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CRS-14
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.” After considering several other options,
the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to select a government.23
Dominated by senior faction leaders, it was named and began work on June 1, 2004.
The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the
advertised June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. There was a president (Ghazi
al-Yawar), and Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, heading
a cabinet of 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was
roughly the same as in the IGC. The defense and interior ministers were Sunnis.
U.N. Backing of Sovereign Government/Coalition Military Mandate.
The Administration asserts that it has consistently sought and obtained U.N. and
partner country involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution 1483 (cited above) provided
for a U.N. special representative to Iraq, and “called on” governments to contribute
forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established U.N.
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).24 The size of UNAMI in Iraq, headed by
former Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, is now about 55 in Iraq, with at
least an equal number “offshore” in Jordan. It is focused on promoting political
reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring human rights practices and
humanitarian affairs. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Baghdad in
March 2007 and later said that UNAMI would expand its presence in Iraq and
perhaps take on additional duties to promote political reconciliation. In an attempt
to satisfy the requirements of several nations for greater U.N. backing of the
coalition force presence, the United States achieved adoption of Resolution 1511
(October 16, 2003), authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.]
command.” (In Recommendations 7 and 26 and several others the Iraq Study Group
calls for increased U.N. participation in promoting reconciliation in Iraq.)
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq,
as well as authorizing a coalition component force to protect U.N. personnel and
facilities. The Resolution contained the following provisions:
! It “authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for security. Iraqi
forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and the
relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The
U.S.-led coalition retained the ability to take prisoners.
23 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post,
April 15, 2004.
24 Its mandate has been renewed each year since, most recently by Resolution 1700 (August
10, 2006).

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CRS-15
! It stipulated that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.” Resolution 1637 (November 11, 2005) and Resolution
1723 (November 28, 2006) each extended the coalition military
mandate for an additional year (now lasting until at least December
31, 2007), unless earlier “requested by the Iraqi government.” The
renewal resolutions also required review of the mandate on June 15,
2006 and June 15, 2007, respectively.
! Resolution 1546 deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces
(Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi
government. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in July 2005 that
U.S. military lawyers were working with the Iraqis on a SOFA, but
no such agreement has been signed to date, and U.S. forces operate
in Iraq and use its facilities under temporary memoranda of
understanding. Major facilities include Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad
air bases, as well as the arms depot at Taji; all are being built up with
U.S. military construction funds in various appropriations.
! In subsequent related developments, the Defense Appropriation for
FY2007 (P.L. 109-289) contained a provision, first passed in the
House version of the measure, prohibiting use of U.S. funds to
establish permanent military installations or bases in Iraq. That law
also contains a provision that the Defense Department not agree to
allow U.S. forces in Iraq to be subject to Iraqi law. (In
Recommendation 22, the Iraq Study Group recommends that the
President should state that the United States does not seek
permanent military bases in Iraq.)
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The sovereignty handover was
accompanied by steps to lower the U.S. profile in Iraq. As of the June 28, 2004,
handover, the state of occupation ceased, and a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte)
established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991. A
U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with about 1,100 U.S.
personnel.25 Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, and he was succeeded in April 2007 by Ryan Crocker, formerly
Ambassador to Pakistan. The large new embassy complex, with 21 buildings on 104
acres, is under construction. An FY2005 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13,
provided $592 million of $658 million requested to construct a new embassy in
Baghdad and to fund embassy operations; an FY2006 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 109-234) provided $1.327 billion for U.S. embassy operations and security. The
FY2007 supplemental conference report (H.R. 1591) would have provided $750
million more for embassy operations and security. (In Recommendations 73-76, the
Iraq Study Group report lays out several initiatives that could be taken “to ensure that
25 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.

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CRS-16
[the United States] has personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq.”) In
conjunction with the handover:
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). (Resolution 1723 of November 28, 2006, extends
the IAMB monitoring of the DFI until December 31, 2007, subject
to review by June 15, 2007.) Resolution 1546 also gave Iraq
responsibility for close-out of the “oil-for-food program;”26
Resolution 1483 ended that program as of November 21, 2003. (In
Recommendation 23, the Iraq Study Group says the President should
restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.)
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by the State Department through the U.S. Embassy and
a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office
(IRMO).” IRMO, headed since June 2006 by Ambassador Joseph
Saloom, has about 150 U.S. civilian personnel working outside
Baghdad at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, which
are increasing in number, as discussed further below. A separate
“Project Contracting Office (PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William
McCoy (now under the Persian Gulf division of the Army Corps of
Engineers), funds large infrastructure projects such as roads, power
plants, and school renovations.
Elections in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq focused on three
national votes held in 2005. On January 30, 2005, elections were held for a
transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and the Kurdish regional
assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, mostly boycotted, and no major
Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA to win a slim majority (140 of the
275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate the government formed
subsequently, as well as virtually all the provincial councils, including those in
Sunni-inhabited areas. PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named president; Ibrahim al-
Jafari became Prime Minister. Although it had a Sunni Arab as Assembly speaker;
deputy president; deputy prime minister; Defense Minister; and five other ministers,
it did not inspire Sunni reconciliation with the new power structure. (See CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Government Formation and Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman.)
Permanent Constitution. Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution
drafted by a committee appointed by the elected transition government was approved
on October 15, 2005. Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in two
provinces, but not in the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni
26 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-17
opposition was the provision for a weak central government (“federalism”): it
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with
their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in
controlling revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this
concept because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites,
has thus far lacked significant proven oil reserves and they depend on the central
government for revenues, although some new substantial oil fields have recently been
reported to lie in Anbar Province. It contained an article (137) that promises a
special constitutional review, intended to mollify Sunnis on key contentious points.
(In Recommendation 26, the Iraq Study Group recommends that this review be
conducted on an urgent basis. Recommendation 28 says that all oil revenues should
accrue to the central government, not regions.)
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some harder line Sunnis,
seeking to strengthen their position to amend the constitution, moved into the
political arena: the Sunni “Consensus Front” and Iraqi Front for National Dialogue
put forward major slates. With the UIA alone well short of the two-thirds majority
needed to unilaterally form a government, Sunnis, the Sadr faction, secular
groupings, and the Kurds demanded Jafari be replaced; they subsequently accepted
as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (April 22, 2006). Talabani was selected to
continue as president, with two deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi of SCIRI and Tariq al-
Hashimi of the Consensus Front. (The former has lost one and the latter has lost
three siblings to sectarian violence in 2006; Abd al-Mahdi was nearly assassinated
in a March 2007 bombing.) A COR leadership team was selected as well, with
hardline U.S. critic Mahmoud Mashadani of the National Dialogue Front as speaker.
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won approval of a 36-
member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Among
his permanent selections were Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam
al-Zubaie as deputy prime ministers. (Zubaie was seriously wounded in an
assassination attempt purportedly orchestrated by one of his aides on March 22,
2007.) Four ministers (environment, human rights, housing, and women’s affairs)
are women. Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts named, a total of seven are
Sunnis; seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one is Christian (minister of
human rights, Ms. Wijdan Mikha’il). Sadr loyalists were named to the ministries of
agriculture, health, and transportation, and three “minister of state” cabinet positions.
Maliki did not immediately name permanent figures for the major posts of Interior,
Defense, and Ministry of State for National Security because major factions could
not agree on nominees. But, on June 8, 2006, he achieved COR confirmation of
compromise candidates for those posts.

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CRS-18
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968. Fled Iraq in 1980 after
Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran, but then to Syria when he refused Iran’s orders
that he join Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Headed Da’wa
offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party newspaper. Reputed advocate of
aggressive purge of ex-Baathists as member of the Higher National De-Baathification
Commission after Saddam’s fall. Elected to National Assembly (UIA list) in January
2005 and chaired its “security committee.” Publicly supported Hezbollah (which shares
a background with his Da’wa Party) during July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict,
prompting congressional criticism during July 2006 visit to Washington DC. Believed
sympathetic to Kurds’ efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish region. Has tense
relations with SCIRI, whose activists accuse him of surrounding himself with Da’wa
members. Believed to be politically dependent on Sadr’s support and had, prior to 2007,
repeatedly shielded Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia from U.S. military sweeps. In October
2006, said he is a U.S. ally but “not America’s man in Iraq.” Following Bush-Maliki
meeting in Jordan (November 30, 2006), President Bush reiterated that Maliki is “the
right guy for Iraq.”
Maliki Government and “Benchmarks”
According to the Administration, the Iraqi government has committed to several
steps (“benchmarks”) to achieve national reconciliation, but progress has been
sufficiently halting that Administration officials, including Vice President Cheney
(May 9, 2007) have visited Iraq to urge accelerated efforts. The benchmarks include
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution
under the special amendment process promised; approval of a law to implement
formation of regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law for
the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The law on regions
(adopted October 12, 2006) proved controversial because of Sunni opposition,
and in an effort to defuse tensions, the major factions agreed to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months. The IHEC law was passed on
January 23, 2007 but the eight independent commissioners have not been named,
to date. An investment law was approved in October 2006. The constitutional
review committee has been formed;
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would
presumably lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils; the 51-seat Baghdad city
council has only one Sunni Arab, for example); and approval of a new oil law.
No progress has been reported on the provincial election law. In work on the oil
law, on February 20, 2007, Iraq’s cabinet approved the draft oil law and
submitted it for parliamentary consideration (after first passing through a formal
legal drafting process by a “Shura Council”). A related law on the sharing of oil
revenues, and annexes discussing how contracts with foreign investors would
be evaluated, and how Iraq’s oil industry would be operated, are in the process
of being drafted and are expected to be considered en bloc. The Kurds
provisionally accepted the main draft, even though it would limit their rights to
sign energy exploration deals with foreign firms. The draft sets up a powerful
“Federal Oil and Gas Council,” almost certain to be dominated by Shiites and
Kurds, and would include representatives of foreign energy companies. The
Kurds have expressed strong opposition to the oil industry annex, however,

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CRS-19
saying the preliminary draft would “centralize” Iraq’s oil industry by allowing
a new Iraqi National Oil Company to control 93% of known oil fields. Factions
supported by poorer Shiites oppose the draft as a relinquishing of Iraq’s
sovereignty of its most valuable resource and likely to result in foreign
domination of Iraq’s energy sector, potentially weakening the bargaining power
of Iraqi oil laborers;
(3) By November 2006, approval of a de-Baathification reform law; and
approval of a flag and national anthem law. The De-Baathification reform law
reportedly remains stalled; members of the Supreme National De-Baathification
Commission opposed as to generous to ex-Baathists a draft reform law agreed
to in late March 2007 by President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki. The
draft would have allowed all but members of the three highest Baath Party levels
return to their jobs or obtain pensions. However, on April 7, 2007, Maliki
ordered pensions be given to senior officers in the Saddam-era military and
permission for return to service of lower ranking soldiers;
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias; and to offer amnesty
to insurgent supporter. No movement is evident on these laws;
(5) By January 2007, completion of the special constitutional amendments.
Members of the constitution review commission say they expect to produce a
draft by May 15, 2007;
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee
governance;
(7) By March 2007, holding of a referendum on the special amendments to the
constitution;
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military;
(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections;
(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Several Iraqi
Army divisions are now under Iraqi control and the Iraq Security Forces now
have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, and
Maysan; and
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
As noted above, to date only a few of the milestones have been completely met,
but Iraqi factions continue to negotiate to implement the remaining goals.
Complicating movement on lawmaking has been the failure to achieve a quorum in
parliament on most days since November 2006, although the return to parliament
of the Sadr bloc in January 2007 has improved attendance somewhat. Parliament
members are scheduled to take a two-month recess beginning July 1, 2007, but some
Iraqi officials say they are working to limit its duration, partly in response to U.S.
frustration at the slow progress.
In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly entertained the idea of forging a
new parliamentary coalition among mainstream Shiites, Sunnis, and secular blocs
that would exclude Sadr. The Administration’s interest in doing so was indicated

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CRS-20
in comments by Defense Secretary Gates and U.S. commander in Iraq David Petraeus
in late April 2007, saying that his government has not yet been effective in achieving
the benchmarks discussed above. Some take the view that, should Maliki fail to
achieve the benchmarks by early fall 2007, the United States might try to engineer
his replacement, possibly by a coalition led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi.
His bloc in parliament is relatively small (25 seats), but he is viewed as less sectarian
than many other possible Maliki replacements. Further undermining Maliki was the
mid-April 2007 resignation of the Sadr faction’s six cabinet ministers because Maliki
would not set a timetable for a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The main Sunni bloc
(Consensus Front) is threatening to pull its five ministers out of the cabinet by mid-
May 2007 if the constitutional amendments (see above) are not completed.
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq
Stability. The Iraqi government has received diplomatic support, even though most
of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the regime.
There are about 50 foreign missions in Iraq, including most European and Arab
countries. Jordan has appointed an ambassador and Kuwait has pledged to do so.
Iran upgraded its representation to Ambassador in May 2006. On the other hand,
some countries, such as Portugal in March 2007, have closed their embassies because
of security concerns. There were attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco, and Russia in 2005 and 2006.
Iraq continued its appeal for regional support an the Iraq-sponsored regional
conference of its neighbors and major regional and outside powers (the United States,
the Gulf monarchy states, Egypt, the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council) in Baghdad on March 10, 2007. Iran and Syria attended, as did the
United States, with most participants terming the discussions “constructive,” and a
follow-on meeting in Egypt was held May 3 and 4, 2007, resulting in some additional
pledges of aid for Iraq. Regional working groups on Iraq’s security, fuel supplies,
and Iraqi refugees are being established under this new diplomatic framework.

At the same time, Turkey is complaining that Iraq’s Kurds are harboring the
anti-Turkey PKK guerrilla group in northern Iraq, and Turkey’s top military leader
called on April 12, 2007, for a military operation into northern Iraq to quash the
group. That call came several days after Masud Barzani, in comments to journalists,
claimed that Iraqi Kurds were capable of stirring unrest among Turkish Kurds if
Turkey interferes in northern Iraq. Previously, less direct threats by Turkey had
prompted the U.S. naming of an envoy to Turkey on this issue in August 2006 (Gen.
Joseph Ralston (ret.), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). On
February 8, 2007, Turkish Foreign Minister warned against proceeding with the
December 31, 2007, referendum on Kirkuk’s affiliation with the Kurdish region,
reflecting broader concerns that the referendum could set off additional sectarian
violence and pave the way for Kurdish independence. Justice Minister Hashim al-
Shibly (a secular Sunni/Allawi list) resigned on April 1, 2007, partly in protest of a
government decision to begin offering compensation to Arabs who want to leave
Kirkuk. Their doing so would pave the way for additional Kurds to be resettled there
and increase the Kurdish population to virtually ensure that the province votes to
affiliate with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

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CRS-21
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Iraqi Consensus Front
Front led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by Tariq al-
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Hashimi, now a deputy president. IIP withdrew from the
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
January 2005 election but led the Sunni “Consensus Front”
coalition in December 2005 elections, winning 44 seats in
COR. Front, critical but accepting of U.S. presence, also
includes Iraqi General People’s Council of the hardline
Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the Sunni Endowment. Hashimi
visited the United States in December 2006 and met with
President Bush. Believed amenable to forming a new
governing coalition. Opposes draft oil law.
Iraqi Front for National
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis on the
Dialogue
new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the outcome and
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
now advocates major revisions. Harder line than the
Consensus Front, it holds 11 seats. COR Speaker Mahmoud
Mashadani, a hardliner, is a senior member; in July 2006, he
called the U.S. invasion “the work of butchers.” Opposes
draft oil law.
Muslim Scholars
Hardline Sunni Islamist group, has boycotted all post-
Association
Saddam elections. Believed to have ties to/influence over
(MSA, Harith al-Dhari
insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S. withdrawal from
and Abd al-Salam al-
Iraq. Iraqi government issued a warrant for Dhari’s arrest in
Qubaysi)
November 2006 for suspected ties to the Sunni insurgency,
causing Dhari to remain outside Iraq. Opposes draft oil law.
Sunni Tribes
Not an organized faction per se, but one group, the National
Salvation movement of Shaykh Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi, is
credited by U.S. commanders as a source of anti-insurgent,
anti-Al Qaeda support that is helping calm Anbar Province.
Some large tribal confederations include Dulaym, and Jabburi
(mixed Sunni-Shiite tribe). (See CRS Report RS22626, Iraq:
Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, by Hussein
Hassan.)
Iraqi Insurgents/Islamic
Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although an
State in Iraq (ISI)
eight group “Mujahedin Shura” was formed in early 2006, led
by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, aka Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi). Proclaimed an “Islamic State of Iraq” led by
Baghdadi (October 2006), and many insurgent groups now
fight under that name. Some groups led by ex-Saddam regime
leaders, others by Islamic extremists. Major Iraqi factions
include Islamic Army of Iraq, New Baath Party, Muhammad’s
Army, and the 1920 Revolution Brigades.
Al Qaeda in
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq from many nations, including Egypt
Iraq/Foreign Fighters
and Saudi Arabia, but increasingly subordinate to Iraqi Sunni
insurgents under ISI banner. Were led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, until his death in U.S. airstrike
June 7, 2006. Succeeded by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.
Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite civilians to spark civil war.
Related foreign fighter faction, which includes some Iraqis, is
Ansar al-Sunna.

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CRS-22
Democracy-Building and Local Governance. The United States and its
coalition partners have tried to build civil society and democracy at the local level.
The State Department’s report on human rights for 2006, released March 6, 2007,
appears to place the blame for much of the human suffering in Iraq on the overall
security environment and not on the Maliki government’s performance or intentions.
It says that “widespread violence seriously compromised the government’s ability to
protect human rights.” U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past
30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically. A State Department
report to Congress in October 2006 details how the FY2004 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) is being
spent (“2207 Report”):
! About $1.014 billion for “Democracy Building;”
! About $71 million for related “Rule of Law” programs;
! About $159 million to build and secure courts and train legal
personnel;
! About $128 million for “Investigations of Crimes Against
Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses;
! $10 million for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil society/
conflict resolution activities;
! $10 million for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime); and
! $15 million to promote human rights and human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! Several projects that attempt to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives. About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), local enclaves to
provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as discussed in the
section on security, below. The conference report on an FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) designated $50 million

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CRS-23
in ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP operating. That level
of aid is expected in FY2007 under provisions of a continuing
resolution (P.L. 109-383). The FY2007 supplemental conference
report contained $95 million for the CAP.
! Programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote independent media.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul. In August 2006,
another $130 million in U.S. funds (and $500 million in Iraqi funds)
were allocated to assist Baghdad neighborhoods swept by U.S. and
Iraqi forces in “Operation Together Forward.”
! As noted above, according to Iraq’s national timetable, a law on
elections for provincial councils was to be drafted by the end of
October 2006 and provincial elections to be held by June 2007,
although it this timetable has not been met. (Recommendation 29
of the Iraq Study Group report says provincial elections “should be
held at the earliest possible date.”)
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report on P.L. 109-102) incorporated a Senate amendment
(S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each to the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-
234) provided another $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy promotion, allocated
to various organizations performing democracy work there (U.S. Institute of Peace,
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, National
Endowment for Democracy, and others). A female American staffer for NDI was
killed in an ambush in Baghdad on January 17, 2006. The FY2007 supplemental
conference report (H.R. 1591) contained $250 million for Iraq democracy building;
plus $90 million for local governance.
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. As discussed
in recent reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR),
the difficult security environment has slowed reconstruction,27 although the SIGIR
told Congress in March 2007 that he now has some optimism that coordination with
27 The defense authorization bill for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) set October 1, 2007, for
termination of oversight by the SIGIR. However, P.L. 109-440 extends that term until 10
months after 80% of the IRRF have been expended but includes FY2006 reconstruction
funds for Iraq in the definition of the IRRF. The SIGIR’s mandate is therefore expected to
extend until some time in 2008. Further extensions are contained in H.R. 1591 conference
agreement.

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CRS-24
and among the Iraqis has improved. For more detail, see CRS Report RL31833,
Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
A total of about $34 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funding
(including security forces), of which $20.917 billion has been appropriated for the
“Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) in two supplemental appropriations:
FY2003 supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the
FY2004 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.42
billion. Of the IRRF funds, about $19.996 billion has been obligated, and, of that,
about $17.759 billion has been disbursed. According to State Department reports,
the sector allocations for the IRRF are as follows:
! $5.03 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.014 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.724 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $469 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $746 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental/FY2007/FY2008. To continue reconstruction, an
FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.485 billion for Iraq
reconstruction. Foreign Operations programs for FY2007 are currently operating
under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 109-383, as amended)
that provides funding at the FY2006 level or the House-passed FY2007 level
($305.8 million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction, $254 million for counter-narcotics;
and $18 million for anti-terrorism). The FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-
289) provides another $1.7 billion for the Iraqi security forces (discussed further
below) and $500 million in additional funds for the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP) under which U.S. military can expend funds for small
construction projects intended to build good will with the Iraqi population. (In
Recommendation 64, the Iraq Study Group says that U.S. economic assistance to Iraq
should be increased to $5 billion per year rather than be “permitted to decline.”
Recommendation 67 calls on the President to appoint a Senior Advisor for Economic
Reconstruction in Iraq.)
On February 5, 2007, the Administration requested additional FY2007 funds
and regular and supplemental 2008 funds. For FY2007 supplemental: $3.84 billion
for the security forces; $2.072 billion in ESF; $200 million for counter-narcotics and
law enforcement; and $7 million for non-proliferation and anti-terrorism. Amounts
contained in the conference report (H.R. 1591) that was vetoed differed slightly from
the request, providing $3.842 billion for the security forces; $1.574 billion in ESF

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CRS-25
plus $355.6 million for related purposes in an “Iraq Freedom Fund”; $50 million for
counter-narcotics; and $456.4 million in CERP funds (includes for Afghanistan as
well).
For FY2008 (regular): $2 billion for the security forces; $298 million in ESF;
and $75.8 million for counter-narcotics and law enforcement. For FY2008
(supplemental): $772 million in ESF; $159 million in counter-narcotics and law
enforcement; and $35 million for Iraq refugees. The FY2008 request asks for $1
billion in CERP funds (DOD funds).
Iraq provides some additional funds for reconstruction. In 2006, and again in
2007, the Iraqi government allocated $2 billion in Iraqi revenues for development
activities. Iraq’s 2007 budget, adopted February 8, 2007, allocates $10.5 billion in
unspent funds for reconstruction under President Bush’s January 10 plan, discussed
further below.
Oil Revenues and Hydrocarbons Law. The oil industry is the driver of
Iraq’s economy, and rebuilding this industry has received substantial U.S. and Iraqi
attention, as encapsulated in the draft oil law and annexes now before the COR.
Before the war, it was widely asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil
reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all,
reconstruction costs. The oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the
U.S.-led invasion (only about nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a
target of insurgents and smugglers. Insurgents have focused their attacks on
pipelines in northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at
Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total pipeline system is over 4,300
miles long.) Recent political unrest in Basra among oil workers threatens to reduce
oil exports from the south as well. These factors have kept production and exports
below expected levels, although high world oil prices have compensated for the
output shortfall. The northern export route is now operating. The Iraqi government
needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining capacity. (In
Recommendation 62, the Iraq Study Group says that the Iraqi government should
accelerate oil well refurbishment and that the U.S. military should play a greater role
in protecting oil infrastructure.)
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Some are concerned that the draft oil law, when implemented, will
favor U.S. firms because the draft does not give preference to development contracts
signed during the Saddam era, such as those signed with Russian and Chinese firms.
Even before the hydrocarbons law has been enacted, some investors are entering
Iraq’s energy market, primarily in the Kurdish north. South Korea and Iraq signed
a preliminary agreement on April 12, 2007, to invest in Iraq’s industrial
reconstruction and, potentially, its energy sector as well. Poland reportedly is
negotiating with Iraq for possible investments in Iraq’s energy sector. Several small
companies, such as Norway’s DNO, Turkey’s Genel; Canada’s Western Zagros;
Turkish-American PetPrime; and Turkey/U.S.’s A and T Energy have already
contracted with the Kurdistan Regional Government to explore for oil (potential
output of 100,000 barrels per day) near the northern city of Zakho. The Kurds’
position is that these deals will go forward even though they were signed before a

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CRS-26
formal hydrocarbons law has been enacted. (In Recommendation 63, the Iraq Study
Group says the United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector and
assist in eliminating contracting corruption in that sector.)
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Oil Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2007 to
(weekly avg.)
(pre-war)
war)
(2005)
(2006)
date)
2.19 million
$23.5
$31.3
$9.5
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.5 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War Load
Current
(hrs. per
Served (MWh)
Load Served
day)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
100,000
5.6
10.9
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 estimate by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.9 billion (2002)
$33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
U.S. oil imports from Iraq
approx. 660,000 bpd
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
May 2, 2007. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. In an effort to encourage private U.S. investment in
Iraq, the Bush Administration has lifted most U.S. sanctions on Iraq, beginning with
Presidential Determinations issued under authorities provided by P.L. 108-7
(appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.

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CRS-27
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.28
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime,
with mixed success. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not including
reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. In 2004, the “Paris Club” of 19
industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes them.
The Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have resisted
writing off Iraq’s approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar). In mid-April 2007, Saudi Arabia
agreed to write off 80% of the $15 billion Iraq owes it, but no new debt relief
commitments by the UAE ($4 billion in Iraq debt) or Kuwait ($15 billion) were
reported at the May 3-4, 2007, meetings on Iraq in Egypt. On December 17, 2004,
the United States signed an agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1
billion debt to the United States; that debt consisted of principal and interest from
about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi agricultural credits from the 1980s.29 On
December 13, 2004, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession
talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States has employed a multi-
faceted approach to stabilizing Iraq. However, the January 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate (unclassified key judgments) said: “... in the coming 12 to 18
months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at
rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.”30 The Iraq Study Group said in its
28 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
29 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss.
30 Text of key judgments at [http://www.dni.gov].

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CRS-28
December 6, 2006, report that the “situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.”31
President Bush, in his January 10, 2007, speech on Iraq, said, “The situation in Iraq
is unacceptable to the American people and it is unacceptable to me.” The
deterioration in security is, at least partly, the result of continuing sectarian violence
superimposed on a tenacious Sunni-led insurgency.
Congress has mandated two major periodic Administration reports on progress
in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department quarterly report, which DOD has titled
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” was required by an FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13), and renewed by the FY2007 Defense Appropriation
(P.L. 109-289). The latest version was issued in March 2007 and provides some of
the information below. Another report (“1227 Report”), is required by Section 1227
of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency
The duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab-led insurgency has defied many
expectations. Many Sunni insurgents are motivated by opposition to perceived
U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance; others want to
return the Baath Party to power, while others would accept a larger Sunni political
role without the Baath. Still others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi,
that want to defeat the United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region.
The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated within cities and
provinces, although many factions, purportedly including Al Qaeda in Iraq, are now
grouped under a banner calling itself “The Islamic State of Iraq.”
The insurgency failed to derail the political transition,32 but it has caused high
levels of sectarian violence and debate in the United States over the continuing U.S.
commitment in Iraq. Sunni insurgent groups continue to conduct large-scale, well-
coordinated attacks on police stations and other fixed positions, suicide attacks on
markets frequented by Shiites, and occasional mass kidnappings of 50 or more
people at a time from fixed locations. One attack in April 2007 in Diyala Province
was directed at a U.S. base and killed 9 U.S. soldiers. Since January 2007, insurgent
groups have, on about eight occasions, exploded chlorine trucks to cause widespread
civilian injury or panic. Targets of insurgent grenades, IEDs (improvised explosive
devices), mortars, and direct weapons fire are U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and
security forces, as well as Iraqi civilians of rival sects, Iraqis working for U.S.
authorities, foreign contractors and aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution
facilities, and water, power, and other facilities. A New York Times report of
December 19, 2006, said that Sunni insurgents had succeeded in destroying many of
the power stations that feed electricity to Baghdad. The April 12, 2007, bombing of
the Iraqi parliament, coming amid increasing mortar and other attacks on the heavily
31 See p. xiii of the Executive Summary of the Iraq Study Group Report. December 6, 2006.
32 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, April 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, December 2005.

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CRS-29
fortified International Zone, appear to demonstrate the ability of the insurgency to
continue to operate in Baghdad.
Whole Sunni-dominated neighborhoods of Baghdad, including Amiriya,
Adhamiya, Fadhil (scene of a nine-hour battle with U.S. forces on April 9, 2007),
Jihad, Amal, and Dora (once a mostly Christian neighborhood) apparently serve as
Sunni insurgent bases. Sunni insurgents have also made substantial inroads into the
mixed province of Diyala thus far in 2007, pushing out Shiite inhabitants and
necessitating a move by the commander of Multi-National Division-North, Benjamin
Mixon, to deploy 2,000 additional U.S. forces to Diyala.
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency
in Resolution 1618 (August 4, 2005), condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers and foreign
diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.3 million
in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Al Qaeda in Iraq.33 A numerically small but politically significant component
of the insurgency is non-Iraqi, mostly in a faction called Al Qaeda-Iraq (AQ-I). The
faction was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Arab who reputedly
fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan alongside other Arab
volunteers.34 He was killed in a June 7, 2006, U.S. airstrike and has been succeeded
by an Egyptian, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri). AQ-I
has been a U.S. focus from very early on in the war because, according to U.S.
commanders in April 2007, it is responsible for about 90% of the suicide bombings
against both combatant and civilian targets. This trend began with major suicide
bombings in 2003, beginning with one against U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
in Baghdad (August 19, 2003),35 followed by the August 29, 2003, bombing in Najaf
that killed SCIRI leader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The faction, and related
factions, have also kidnapped over 250 foreigner workers, killing at least 40 of those.
Zarqawi’s strategy was to spark Sunni-Shiite civil war, an outcome that
President Bush has said largely succeeded. In actions intended to spread its
activities outside Iraq, AQ-I reputedly committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket
attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there, as well
as the November 10, 2005, bombing of Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan.
33 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
34 Zarqawi went to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates, after escaping
the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, settling in northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and
Saddam-controlled Iraq. He took refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-
Islam near the town of Khurmal. After the Ansar enclave was destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi
went to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the Association of Unity and Jihad.
He then formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a reputed exchange of letters) and
changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia (Iraq).” It is named as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that designation from the earlier Unity and
Jihad title, which was designated as an FTO in October 2004.
35 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.

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CRS-30
Under Muhajir, however, the organization appears to be more integrated with Sunni
Iraqi factions in operations. In some parts of Anbar Province, Sunni tribes are trying
to limit Al Qaeda’s influence, which they believe is detrimental to Iraq’s interests,
by cooperating with U.S. counter-insurgency efforts.
Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said
that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and
weapons),36 although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not
decisive. Largely because of this outside support, the first 17 recommendations of
the Iraq Study Group report call for intensified regional diplomacy, including multi-
lateral diplomacy with Syria and Iran, in an effort to persuade outside parties not to
stoke the violence in Iraq by aiding protege factions in Iraq.
In September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of
allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going
into Iraq. These reports led to U.S. warnings, imposition of additional U.S.
sanctions against Syria, and U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some
suspected insurgent financiers. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by moves such as
the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi
authorities. The latest DOD “Measuring Stability” report says that Syria provides
help to Sunni insurgents, mainly Baathist factions, and remains a foreign fighter
gateway into Iraq. However, some U.S. commanders said in May 2007 that they had
recently observed some Syrian tightening of the border.
Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,37 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Press reports say that Saudi officials told visiting Vice President Cheney in
November 2006 that the Saudis might be compelled to assist Iraq’s Sunnis if the
United States withdraws from Iraq.
36 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 21, 2004.
37 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, October 22, 2004.

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CRS-31
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators
Indicator
Previous Level
Current Level
Number of U.S. forces
160,000 (most of
approximately 150,000. Includes about 18,000 of
in Iraq
2005 during election announced “surge” of 28,500 U.S. forces
periods)
(including support troops) that are now in place.
Almost all 10,000 extra ISF are in place. Surge to
be fully in place by June 2007, will bring U.S.
levels to about 160,000, and last possibly into 2008,
according to senior commanders in May 2007. Full
surge will see about 90,000 total U.S. and Iraqi
forces in Baghdad.
U.S./Other Casualties
3,372 U.S. forces; about 250 coalition (including
148 British). Of U.S. deaths, 3,226 since end to
“major combat operations” declared May 1, 2003.
2,751 by hostile action. 300 U.S. contractors.
U.S. Casualties by
“Explosively-Forced
170+
Projectiles”
Partner forces in Iraq
28,000 (2005)
12,200 from 25 other countries
Number of Iraqi
—
25,000 U.S. estimates; Iraqi estimates run to
Insurgents
40,000, plus 150,000 supporters
AQ-I fighters
—
1,300 - 3,500
Number of Iranian
150+
Qods Forces in Iraq
Number of all
120/day (mid-2006)
150/day
Attacks/day
Attacks on
13/day (2004)
1.5/day in 2006 but increasing in 2007
Infrastructure
Sectarian murders/day
40 - 50 pre-“surge”
10-30
Iraqi Police Killed
12,000 +
since 2004
Number of Shiite
20,000 (2003)
80,000 (60,000 Mahdi, 15,000 Badr, 5,000 other)
militiamen
Internally Displaced
300,000 (Aug.
1.8 million
Persons
2006)
Iraqis Leaving Iraq
—
2 million (incl. 700,000 to Jordan, 600,000 to
since fall of Saddam
Syria)
Iraq Civilian Deaths
38/day (end 2005)
34,000 total: 94/day (all 2006); no overall
nationwide change produced by “surge.”
Iraqi Army Battalions
104 (Nov. 06)
129
in operations
Total ISF Equipped
333,100, with new goal of 362,000
and Trained
Iraqi Army Battalions
57 (May 2006)
92
in the Lead or Fully

Independent
National Police
6 (May 2006)
6
Battalions in the Lead
Number of Provinces
0 (end 2005)
4 (Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, and Maysan).
Under ISF Control
Basra to be handed over in summer 2007
Sources: Information provided by a variety of sources, including U.S. government reports on Iraq, Iraqi
statements, the Iraq Study Group report, U.N. figures, and press reports. See Tables 5 and 6 for additional
figures on total numbers of Iraqi security forces, by force component.

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CRS-32
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War?
The security environment in Iraq became more complex in 2006 as Sunni-
Shiite sectarian violence increased. Top U.S. officials said in late 2006 that
sectarian-motivated violence — manifestations of an all-out struggle for political and
economic power in Iraq — had displaced the Sunni-led insurgency as the primary
security challenge. According to the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate,
“... the term ‘civil war’ does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in
Iraq, [but] the term ‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi
conflict....”
U.S. officials date the escalation of sectarian violence to the February 22, 2006,
Al Qaeda-Iraq bombing of the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The attack set off
a wave of purported Shiite militia attacks on Sunni mosques and civilians in the first
days after the mosque bombing. Since then, Shiite militias have retaliated through
attacks on Sunni insurgents and Sunni civilians, intended in part to drive Sunnis out
of mixed neighborhoods. Press accounts say the attacks have largely converting
mixed Sunni-Shiite districts of Baghdad, such as Hurriya, into predominantly Shiite
districts and that the Sunnis have largely “lost” the “battle for Baghdad.” Many of
those abducted turn up bound and gagged, dumped in about nine reported sites
around Baghdad, including in strainer devices in the Tigris River. Sunnis are
accusing the Shiites of using their preponderant presence in the emerging security
forces, as well as their party-based militias, to commit the atrocities, but many
Shiites, for their part, blame Sunni insurgents for the instigation.
An additional Shiite threat came unexpectedly in January 2007 from a
previously little known faction called the “Soldiers of Heaven.” The group massed
several hundred fighters outside Karbala in a purported plot to attack Shiite pilgrims
and senior clerics there during the Shiite celebration of Ashura. Some Iraqi officials
said the group sought to carry out wanton destruction to prepare for the return of the
“Hidden Imam” — the twelfth Imam of Shiite Islam whose return would supposedly
usher in a new era of purification. Many of the group’s members, and its leader,
were killed or captured in a one-day battle on January 27, 2007, by Iraqi forces
backed by U.S. air power and ground operations.
Iraqi Christians and their churches have become major targets of Shiite and
Sunni armed factions, viewing them as allies of the United States. Since the fall of
Saddam Hussein, as many as 100,000 Christians might have left Iraq, leaving the
current size of the community in Iraq at about 600,000 - 800,000. The two most
prominent Christian sects in Iraq are the Chaldean Catholics and the Assyrian
Christians.
Discussed below are the three major organized militias in Iraq: the Kurdish
Peshmerga, the Badr Brigades, and the Mahdi Army.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of which are
providing security in the Kurdish regional area (Dahuk,
Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil Provinces). Some are in the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and deployed in such cities as Mosul, Tal Affar, and

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CRS-33
Baghdad (as part of the 2007 Baghdad security plan). Peshmerga
units have sometimes fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and
the PUK clashed with each other over territory, customs revenues,
and control over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil.
Peshmerga do not appear to be involved in the Sunni Arab-Shiite
Arab sectarian violence gripping Iraq.
! Badr Brigades. This militia is led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of
parliament). The Badr Brigades were recruited, trained, and
equipped by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, aligned with Iran’s
hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas
conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party
officials. Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi
prisoners of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed
SCIRI as an Iranian puppet and Badr operations in southern Iraq
during the 1980s and 1990s did not shake Saddam’s grip on power.
The Badr “Organization” is under the UIA as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent. Many Badr militiamen have
now folded into the ISF, as discussed further later in this paper.
! Mahdi Army. Recent “Measuring Stability” reports say this militia
“has replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of
potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq.” It is
purportedly the main perpetrator of the killings of Sunni civilians.
This U.S. assessment is evolving as the Mahdi Army has largely
ceased patrolling since the U.S. “troop surge” began in mid-February
2007. Still, Mahdi assertiveness is evident in southern Iraq and
might increase its activity there as Britain reduces its forces during
2007. At least 40 British soldiers have died in suspected Mahdi
attacks in southern Iraq since mid-2006, including a British
helicopter shot down in May 2006, and Mahdi forces also shelled a
British base near Amarah in August 2006, contributing to a British
decision to leave the base. The militia is possibly responsible for the
11 British deaths in southern Iraq in April 2007 alone. The militia
took over Amarah briefly for a few days in late October 2006.
Since mid-2006, there have been some U.S. casualties in Sadr
strongholds, including Sadr City. Some experts, citing independent-
minded Mahdi commanders such as one named Abu Deraa, believe
Sadr himself has tried to rein in Mahdi violence but no longer has
full control of his armed following.
Iranian Support. U.S. officials, most recently in a February 11, 2007, U.S.
defense briefing in Baghdad, have repeatedly accused Iran of aiding Shiite militias.
More specifically, they assert that the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard is providing armed Iraqi Shiite factions (most likely Sadr’s Mahdi forces)
with explosives and weapons, including the highly lethal “explosively forced
projectiles” (EFPs). A new development came on April 11, 2007, when U.S. military
officials said they had found evidence that Iran might also be supplying Sunni
insurgent factions, presumably in an attempt to cause U.S. casualties and promote the
view that U.S. policy in Iraq is failing.

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CRS-34
Iran’s support for Shiite militias contributed to a U.S. announcement in March
2006 that it would conduct direct talks with Iran on the issue of stabilizing Iraq, but
Iran subsequently said the talks were not needed because Iraq had a new government.
The December 2006 Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 9, 10, and 11) said that the
United States should engage Iran multilaterally to enlist its assistance on Iraq. The
Administration initially rejected that recommendation — the President’s January 10,
2007, Baghdad security initiative included announcement of an additional aircraft
carrier group and additional Patriot anti-missile systems to the Gulf, moves clearly
directed against Iran. He also said in that speech that U.S. forces would work to
dismantle Iranian (and Syrian) networks that are aiding armed elements in Iraq, and
a Washington Post report of January 26, 2007, said that the Administration has
altered its policy to allow for U.S. forces to combat Iranian agents in Iraq directly if
they are observed actively assisting Iraqi armed factions. Also in December 2006 and
January 2007, U.S. forces arrested alleged Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Forces
agents — two at a SCIRI compound in Baghdad and five more at a compound in
Irbil. The Iraqi government compelled the release of the first two arrested; the others
are still held. However, in an apparent shift, the Administration supported and
participated in the March 10, 2007, regional conference in Baghdad as noted above.
Secretary of State Rice said she would be open to direct bilateral talks with Iran on
the Iraq issue during the follow-up regional conference held in Egypt on May 3 and
4, 2007, but no extensive U.S.-Iran discussions were held there, according to both
sides. (For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq,
and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, both by
Kenneth Katzman.)
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
For the nearly four years since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Administration
has tried to refine its stabilization strategy, with increasing focus on curbing sectarian
violence. Options for further alterations are discussed later in this paper. The
Administration position is that the U.S. stabilization mission requires continued
combat operations. U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task
Force-7, CJTF-7) is a multi-national headquarters “Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-
I,” now headed by four-star U.S. Gen. David Petraeus, who previously led U.S.
troops in the Mosul area and the training and equipping program for the ISF. As of
December 2006, the head of Multinational Corps-Iraq is Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno.
For the past three years, a major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat has
been Anbar Province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi (provincial
capital), the latter of which is the most restive of all Iraqi cities and which is assessed
to have virtually no functioning governance. Prior to the “troop surge,” there were
about 40,000 U.S. troops in Anbar conducting combat primarily in and around
Ramadi. In the run-up to the December 15, 2005, elections, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces
conducted several major operations (for example Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear,
Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear contingents of foreign
fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the Euphrates River. None of
these operations succeeded permanently, causing the Administration to examine
other options.

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CRS-35
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
In its November 2005 “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the Administration
publicly articulated a strategy called “clear, hold, and build,” intended to create and
expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction
experts in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy, based partly on an idea advanced
by Andrew Krepinevich in the September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,38
stipulates that the United States should devote substantial resources to preventing
insurgent re-infiltration and promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating
these areas as a model that could eventually expand throughout Iraq. The strategy
formed the basis of Operation Together Forward (I and II) as well as the President’s
January 10, 2007, Baghdad security plan.
In conjunction with the U.S. strategy, the Administration has formed Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used extensively in Afghanistan. Each
PRT is civilian led, composed of about 100 U.S. State Department and USAID
officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as
the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the
Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry representatives. The concept ran into
some U.S. military objections to taking on expanded missions, but the debate was
resolved with an agreement by DOD to provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs. Thus
far, ten PRTs have been inaugurated, of which the following seven are run by the
United States: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad, Anbar Province, two in Salah ad-Din
Province, and Baquba. Of the partner-run PRTs, Britain has formed a PRT in Basra,
Italy has formed one in Dhi Qar province, and South Korea runs one in Irbil. In
conjunction with the President’s January 10, 2007, strategy announcement, plans are
to open an additional twelve PRTs, including six more in Baghdad and three more
in Anbar. These plans will necessitate adding 400 diplomats and contractors to staff
the new PRTs, although the State Department has asked that about half of these new
positions be filled with military personnel at least temporarily.
PRT Funding. An FY2006 supplemental request asked for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs, of which the enacted version, P.L. 109-234, provides
$229 million. The requested $675 million for development grants to be distributed
by the PRTs is fully funded through the ESF appropriation for Iraq in this law. The
conference report on the FY2007 supplemental (H.R. 1591) would have provided a
total of about $720 million for PRT security, operations, and PRT-funded
reconstruction projects.
Baghdad Security Plan and Troop “Surge.” Acknowledging that the
initiatives above had not brought security or stability, the President’s January 10,
2007, Baghdad security initiative is intended primarily to bring security to Baghdad
and create conditions under which Iraq’s communities can reconcile. The plan,
which in many ways reflects recommendations in a January 2007 report by the
American Enterprise Institute entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in
38 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.

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Iraq,”39 was announced as formally under way on February 7, 2007, and includes the
following components:
! the infusion of an additional 28,700 U.S. forces to Baghdad and
4,000 Marines to Anbar Province, an increase of 7,200 over “surge”
force levels announced January 10, 2007. The increase includes
support troops and 2,200 military police requested by Petraeus. The
plan envisions that these forces, along with additional Iraqi forces,
will be able to secure and hold neighborhoods and areas cleared of
insurgents and thereby cause the population not to depend on
militias or other armed elements for security. The forces are being
based, along with Iraqi soldiers, in about 100 fixed locations around
Baghdad, of which about 33 are so-called “Joint Security Stations.”
! cooperation from the Iraqi government, such as progress on the
reconciliation steps discussed earlier, and the commitment of the
Iraqi forces discussed previously 3 brigades (about 6,000 soldiers),
plus about 4,000 police commandos and regular police.
! provision of at least $1.2 billion in new U.S. aid, including funds for
job creation and CERP projects, in part to revive long-dormant state-
owned factories.
In an apparent attempt to demonstrate cooperation with President Bush’s
security plan, Maliki reportedly communicated to Sadr that Maliki would not stand
in the way of operations against the Mahdi forces, and Maliki announced that about
600 Mahdi fighters had been arrested in several prior months. This is a contrast with
2006, when U.S. commanders expressed frustration with Maliki for forcing them to
release suspected Mahdi militia commanders and to dismantle U.S. checkpoints in
Sadr City, set up to try to prevent Shiite sectarian militiamen from operating. U.S.
officers blamed these restrictions, in part, for the failure of “Operation Together
Forward,” a Baghdad security operation involving about 4,000 additional U.S. troops
deployed in Baghdad (supplementing the 9,000 U.S. forces there previously), focused
on such violent districts as Doura, Amiriyah, Rashid, Ghaziliyah, and Mansour. Also
apparently contributing to the failure was Iraq’s deployment of only two out of the
six Iraqi battalions committed to the operation, which was only 1,500 soldiers out of
4,000 pledged.
Perhaps suggesting new ability to operate against Shiite elements, U.S. forces
arrested the deputy Health Minister on February 8, 2007, for allegedly funneling
money to Mahdi Army forces engaged in sectarian killings. As the Baghdad security
plan began to operate on February 14, 2007, U.S. forces began to pressure Mahdi
forces and to patrol Sadr City, and there are numerous reports that Sadr told his
commanders not to resist U.S. forces but instead to cease active patrols and
operations, for now. Other reports say Sadr himself fled, or at least visited, Iran as
the U.S.-Iraqi plan began, perhaps fearing that he would be a U.S. target, even though
39 The two principal authors of the report are Frederick W. Kagan and Jack Keane (General,
U.S. Army, ret.).

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CRS-37
he is based in Kufa (near Najaf), not Baghdad. On the other hand, U.S. forces
released a senior Sadr aide in March 2007, purportedly at Maliki’s behest, and other
reports say the Mahdi Army is reviving somewhat in concert with Sadr’s April 2007
call for the ISF and militias to join hands to combat U.S. “occupation” forces (but not
Iraqis). Some fighting between the U.S. forces and the Mahdi Army took place in
Diwaniyah in early April 2007.
In briefings in Washington D.C. on April 25-26, 2007, and since, General
Petraeus and Secretary of Defense Gates have assessed the security plan thus far,
presenting a mixed but positive picture, including
! a substantial reduction in the number of sectarian murders per day;
! the reopening and revival of some open-air markets and shopping
patterns;
! the return of some displaced families to their Baghdad homes;
! no overall, Iraq-wide reduction in the civilian deaths per day;
! continuing setbacks to progress produced by AQ-I and other car and
suicide bombs that cause mass casualties; and
! substantial progress in Anbar Province that Petraeus has called
almost “breathtaking,” including a substantial reduction of violence.
There is no clear deadline for the surge to end, nor a consensus on what might
happen if, after a September 2007 assessment by Petraeus, it is judged not successful
to that time. Some U.S. commanders, including Gen. Odierno, say the surge might
have to continue into 2008 in order to give it an adequate chance of success. As
noted previously, U.S. commanders, including Petraeus and commander of Multi-
National Division-North Benjamin Mixon, are expressing increasing concern about
violence in Diyala Province and in the towns in “belts” around Baghdad where
insurgents have moved to in order to regroup and try to thwart the “surge.”
Additional U.S. forces, some intended for the Baghdad surge, are apparently being
sent to these areas, potentially diluting the effect of the Baghdad surge. In April 2007,
U.S. commanders announced the “surge” policy would be extended to Mosul
(Nineveh Province) as well. Gen. Petraeus continues to reiterate comments from
other military leaders that there is no purely military solution to Iraq’s security
situation.
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)40
A major pillar of U.S. policy has been to equip and train Iraqi security forces
(ISF) that could secure Iraq by themselves, although the 2007 Baghdad security plan
moves away from reliance on this strategy. President Bush stated in a June 28, 2005
speech, “Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down.”41 However, the President’s Baghdad security plan relies more heavily
on combat by U.S. forces than on transferring security responsibilities to the ISF.
40 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
41 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].

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CRS-38
The commander of the ISF training mission, the Multinational Transition Security
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), is Gen. Martin Dempsey.
Still, Iraqi leaders are holding to proposed timetables for Iraqi security control:
by April 2007, Iraq was to assume full control of its military. The degrees to which
the Iraqi government has assumed operational ISF control, and of ISF security control
over territory, are shown in the security indicators table. A map showing areas under
Iraqi control and ISF lead can be found in the Iraq Weekly Status Report of the State
Department, available online at [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/c3212.htm].
However, areas under ISF control or leadership are not necessarily pacified or stable.
The Iraq Study Group recommends that the training and equipping of the ISF be
completed by the first quarter of 2008 (Recommendation 42.)
With the total ISF goal of 325,000 reached in early 2007, the target level of the
ISF was increased to 362,000 to try to compensate for the forces’ weaknesses. As
noted in reports by the Defense Department, as much as one-third of ISF members
are absent-without-leave or might have deserted at any given time, significantly
reducing the actual fielded forces. In addition, the Defense Department plans to
increase the number of U.S. forces embedded with or mentoring the ISF from 4,000
to well over 10,000, a plan endorsed by the Iraq Study Group report
(Recommendations 43 and 44). However, other accounts say that the emphasis on
mentoring and training the ISF has faded with the start of the new security plan,
which appears to depend heavily on U.S. combat ability and not the ISF.
The most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report reiterates previously
reported criticisms of the ISF, including that the ISF continue to lack an effective
command structure or independent initiative, and that there continues to be a culture
of corruption throughout the ISF structure. On the other hand, some U.S.
commanders praised their performance in the January 27, 2007, Najaf battle for
detecting and then confronting the large, armed formation, and U.S. officials say that
the Iraqi units that are showing up for the new Baghdad security plan are at an
average of 80% strength.
A major issue is that of ethnic balance and related militia/insurgent penetration
and involvement in sectarian violence, particularly among the police forces. U.S.
commanders have consistently acknowledged difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into
the ISF. Most of the ISF, particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish units
mainly deployed in the north. There are few units of mixed ethnicity, and, as
discussed above, many Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments
of repression and responsible for sectarian killings. Widely reported is that many ISF
members view themselves as loyal to their former militias or party leaders, and not
to a national force. One controversial element of the January 10, 2007, new Baghdad
security plan is its apparent reliance on several mostly Kurdish brigades, a
deployment reportedly resented by both Shiite and Sunni Arabs in the capital. In late
2005, U.S. forces uncovered militia-run detention facilities (“Site 4”) and arrested
those (Badr Brigade and related Iraqi police) running them.
U.S. officials have praised Interior Minister Jawad Bolani for trying to remove
militiamen and death squad participants from the ISF; in October 2006, he fired
3,000 Ministry employees for alleged sectarian links, along with two commanders

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CRS-39
of National Police components. That same month, an entire brigade of National
Police were taken out of duty status for retraining for alleged toleration of sectarian
killings in Baghdad.
Another positive trend noted by U.S. officials, even before the surge, is what
they say is increasing tribal cooperation in Anbar Province, particularly from the
National Salvation movement of an anti-Al Qaeda tribal leader, Abd al Sattar al-
Rishawi. According to press reports, he has persuaded 13,000 men (almost all
Sunni) to join police forces in the province, and these forces are participating in
securing the border with Syria as well as helping secure Ramadi and other parts of
Anbar, particularly against AQ-I.
The police forces are widely judged to be more corrupt and sectarian than the
military forces. In 2005, U.S. officials stated that 2006 would be the “year of the
police,” but little progress was noted. The Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 50-
61) contain several suggestions for reforming and improving the police, including
assigning the lead role in advising and training the anti-crime portions of the police
forces to the U.S. Department of Justice, and transferring those police forces that are
involved in anti-insurgency operations to the Ministry of Defense from their current
organizational structure under the Ministry of Interior.
Weaponry. Most observers say the ISF are severely underequipped, dependent
primarily on donations of surplus equipment by coalition members. The Iraqi Army
is using mostly East bloc equipment, including 77 T-72 tanks donated by Poland, but
has now received about 2,500 up-armored Humvees from the United States. The
October 2006 report of the SIGIR ([http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/
default.aspx]) notes problems with tracking Iraqi weapons; of the approximately
370,000 weapons turned over to Iraq by the United States since Saddam’s fall, only
12,000 serial numbers were properly recorded. Some fear that some of these
weapons might have fallen into the hands of insurgents or sectarian militias, although
it is also possible the weapons are still in Defense and Interior Ministry stocks but are
not catalogued. (In Recommendation 45, the Iraq Study Group said the United States
should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales
requests for U.S. arms and that departing U.S. combat units should leave behind
some of their equipment for use by the ISF.)
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. The Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this
training and equipping mission:
! According to the State Department, a total of $5.036 billion in IRRF
funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for,
and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, as of
September 20, 2006, about $4.938 billion has been obligated and
$4.621 billion of that has been disbursed.
! An FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be
controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.

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CRS-40
Of that amount, about $4.7 billion has been obligated. Therefore,
the total obligated (spent) for the ISF to date is about $9.6 billion.
! The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provided another $3
billion for the ISF but withholds the remaining ISF facilities
construction funding.
! The FY2007 Defense appropriations law (P.L. 109-289) provides an
additional $1.7 billion to train and equip the ISF. The FY2007
supplemental request asks an additional $3.84 billion for this
purpose, and the FY2008 request is for $2 billion. The conference
report on H.R. 1591 appropriated the requested levels for FY2007
supplemental funding, but it was vetoed.

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CRS-41
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
131,800 total. Forces in units are in 112
$1.097 billion for
battalions (about 80,000 personnel), with new
facilities; $707
goal of 132 battalions. Remainder not in
million for
formed units. Trained for eight weeks, paid
equipment; $656
$60/month.
million for training,
personnel, and
operations
Special
About 1,600 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Operations
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando
Forces
Battalion. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in
Jordan.
Strategic
About 2,900 personnel in seven battalions to
Infrastructure
protect oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure.
Battalions
The goal is 11 battalions.
Mechanized
About 1,500. Recently transferred from
Police
Ministry of Interior control.
Brigade
Air Force
About 900, its target size. Has 9 helicopters,
$28 million allocated
3 C-130s; 14 observation aircraft. Trained for
for air fields (from
six months. UAE and Jordan to provide other
funds for Iraqi
aircraft and helos.
Army, above)
Navy
About 1,100, the target size. Has a Patrol Boat
Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment.
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at
Umm Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya
oil terminals. Some training by Australian
Navy.
Totals
139,800
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units (10 per
Trainers
battalion), involves about 4,000 U.S. forces (increasing to 10,000),
run by Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-
I). Training at Taji, north of Baghdad; Kirkush, near Iranian border;
and Numaniya, south of Baghdad. All 26 NATO nations at NATO
Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at Rustamiyah (300 trainers).
Others trained at NATO bases in Norway and Italy. Jordan,
Germany, and Egypt also have done training.

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CRS-42
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces
Force/Entity
Size/Strength
IRRF Funds
Allocated
Ministry of Interior
Total size unknown. 3,000 employees dismissed
in October for corruption/sectarianism.
Iraqi Police Service
135,000, including 1,300 person Highway Patrol. $ 1.806
(IPS)
(About the target size.) Gets eight weeks of
billion
training, paid $60 per month. Not organized as
battalions.
Dignitary Protection About 500 personnel
National Police
About 25,400. Comprises “Police Commandos,”
Public Order Police,” and “Mechanized Police.”
Organized into 28 battalions. Overwhelmingly
Shiite. Gets four weeks of counter-insurgency
training. Iraq Study Group (Recommendation 50)
proposes transfer to MOD control.
Emergency
About 300, able to lead operations. Hostage
Response Unit
rescue.
Border Enforcement 32,100. Controls 258 border forts built or under
$437 million
Department
construction. Has Riverine Police component to
(incl. $3
secure water crossings. Iraq Study Group
million for
(Recommendation 51) proposes transfer to MOD
stipends to
control.
150 former
WMD
workers.
Totals (all forces)
193,300
Training
Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel (DOD-lead) as embeds and
partners. Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International
Police Training Center; Baghdad Police College and seven
academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Iraq Study Group
(Recommendation 57) proposes U.S. training at local police
station level. Countries doing training aside from U.S.: Canada,
Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria,
Finland, Czech Republic, Germany (now suspended), Hungary,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Growing allegations that some of the 145,000
$53 million
Service (FPS)
members of the FPS, which are attached to
allocated for
individual ministries, are involved in sectarian
this service
violence. U.S. and Iraq began trying to rein in the thus far.
force in May 2006 by placing it under some
Ministry of Interior guidance, including issuing
badges and supervising what types of weapons it
uses. (In Recommendation 54, the Iraq Study
Group says the Ministry of Interior should
identify, register, and otherwise control FPS.)

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CRS-43
Coalition-Building and Maintenance42
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military contributions.
The Administration view is that partner drawdowns reflect a stabilizing security
environment in the areas those forces are serving. A list of contributing countries,
although not force levels, can be found in the Department of State’s “Iraq Weekly
Status Report” referenced earlier. Britain continues to lead a multinational division
in southern Iraq, based in Basra, but Prime Minister Tony Blair said on February 21,
2007, that British forces would be reduced from 7,100 currently to about 5,500 by
mid-2007, and possibly to below 5,000 by the end of 2007, and that Basra Province
would be turned over to ISF control. A Poland-led force (Polish forces number 900,
down from a high of 2,600 in 2005) has been based near Diwaniyah and includes
forces from the following foreign countries: Armenia, Slovakia, Denmark, El
Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.
The coalition shrinkage began with Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300
troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings
and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war
effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua followed Spain’s
withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in July 2004 after
one of its citizens was taken hostage. On the other hand, many nations are replacing
their contingents with trainers for the ISF or financial contributions or other
assistance to Iraq. Among other changes are the following.
! Ukraine, which lost eight soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent attack,
withdrew most of its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 2005
elections. However, in March 2006 it sent in a 150-person force to
take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where
Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000
in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil
in Kurdish-controlled Iraq). The deployment has been extended
until the end of 2007, but a Foreign Ministry official said on April
13, 2007, that it is putting together a “mission termination plan” to
be put to parliament in June 2007.
! Japan completed its withdrawal of its 600-person military
reconstruction contingent in Samawah on July 17, 2006. The
Australian forces protecting the Japanese contingent (450 out of the
42 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-44
total Australian deployment in Iraq of 1,350) moved to other areas,
and security in Muthanna was handed over to ISF control.
! Italy completed its withdrawal in December 2006 after turning over
Dhi Qar Province over to ISF control.
! Romanian leaders are debating whether to withdraw or reduce their
890 forces.
! On February 21, 2007, the same day as the British drawdown
announcement, Denmark said it will likely withdraw its 460 troops
from the Basra area by August 2007, and Lithuania said it is
“seriously considering” withdrawing its 53 troops from Iraq. On the
other hand, Georgia said on March 10, 2007, that it would greatly
increase its current Iraq force of 850 to about 2,000 to assist the
policing the Iran-Iraq border, a move that Georgian officials said was
linked to its efforts to obtain NATO membership.
NATO/EU/Other Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO countries
have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to contribute funds
or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to also train civilian
personnel. In addition to the security training offers discussed above, European
Union (EU) leaders have offered to help train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges
outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005 Brussels conference discussed above, the EU
pledged a $130 million package to help Iraq write its permanent constitution and
reform government ministries. The FY2005 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-
13) provided $99 million to set up a regional counter-terrorism center in Jordan to
train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
President’s January 10 Initiative, Iraq Study Group
Report, Legislation, and Other Options
In formulating the new Baghdad security initiative announced on January 10,
2007, President Bush said he weighed the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq
Study Group, as well as input from several other reviews, including one directed by
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace and another under direction of the
National Security Council. In the time surrounding the speech, a number of senior
personnel shifts were announced: U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad’s replacement by
Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker, Gen. Abizaid’s replacement by CENTCOM
Commander by Admiral William Fallon; Gen. Casey’s replacement as head of
MNF-I by General David Petraeus. Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as
Defense Secretary in December 2006.
The President’s Baghdad security plan appeared to deviate from many aspects
of the Iraq Study Group report, although the differences have narrowed since January.
The Administration has noted that the Study Group report said the Group might
support a temporary surge along the lines proposed by the President. The Iraq Study
Group itself was launched in March 2006; chosen by mutual agreement among its

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CRS-45
congressional organizers to co-chair were former Secretary of State James Baker and
former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee Lee Hamilton.
The eight other members of the Group are from both parties and have held high
positions in government. The group was funded by the conference report on P.L.
109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of
Peace for operations of the group.43 Some of the specific recommendations have
been discussed throughout this paper and, among the major themes of the 79
recommendations, along with comparable or contrasting features of the President’s
plan, are the following.
! Foremost, transition from U.S.-led combat to Iraqi security self-
reliance by early 2008 (Recommendations 40-45), with continued
U.S. combat against AQ-I and force protection, in addition to
training and equipping the ISF. The Administration has rejected any
timetable for winding down U.S. combat.
! Heightened regional and international diplomacy, including with
Iran and Syria, and including the holding of a major international
conference in Baghdad (Recommendations 1-12). As noted above,
the President’s January 10 initiative initially rejected multilateral
talks with Iran and Syria, but the Administration later backed the
series of regional conferences on Iraq.
! As part of an international approach, renewed commitment to Arab-
Israeli peace (Recommendations 13-17). This was not a major
feature of the President’s plan, although he has authorized stepped
up U.S. diplomacy by Secretary of State Rice on this issue.
! Additional economic, political, and military support for the
stabilization of Afghanistan (Recommendation 18). This was not
specified in the President’s January 10 plan, although, separately,
there have been increases in U.S. troops and aid for Afghanistan.
! Setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to achieve political
reconciliation, security, and governance, including possibly
withholding some U.S. support if the Iraqi government refuses or
fails to do so (Recommendations 19-37). The President opposes
threatening to reduce support for the Iraqi government if it fails to
uphold its commitments.
! Giving greater control over police and police commando units to the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which is considered less sectarian than the
Ministry of Interior that now controls some of these forces, and
reforming the Ministry of Interior (Recommendations 50-58). The
President’s plan, according to a White House fact sheet released on
January 10, requires reform of the Ministry of Interior.
43 Full text at [http://www.usip.org].

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CRS-46
! Securing and expanding Iraq’s oil sector (Recommendations 62-63).
The President’s plan expects Iraq to pass a pending oil law, which
would, in part, encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector.
! Increasing economic aid to Iraq and enlisting more international
donations of assistance (Recommendations 64-67). The President’s
plan includes increases in aid, as discussed above.
! Ensuring that the United States has the right skills serving in Iraq
and has sufficient intelligence on developments there
(Recommendations 73-79). This is not specifically addressed in the
President’s plan.
Congressional reaction to the President’s Baghdad security plan was negative,
and appears to remain so, judging from congressional votes since the plan was
announced. In House action, on February 16, 2007, the House passed (246-182) a
non-binding resolution (H.Con.Res. 63) expressing opposition to the sending of
additional forces to Iraq. However, on February 17, 2007, the Senate did not vote to
close off debate and did not vote on a version of that resolution (S. 574). Earlier, a
Senate resolution opposing the troop increase (S.Con.Res. 2) was reported out of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 24 (12-9 vote). A cloture motion
on this measure failed on February 1, 2007. After these actions, the Senate
leadership introduced S.J.Res. 9, a measure that would require the president to
redeploy U.S. combat forces by March 31, 2008, for all except the same functions as
recommended by the Iraq Study Group.
The House leadership subsequently inserted a binding provision of FY2007
supplemental appropriations legislation (H.R. 1591) that would require the president,
as a condition of maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq, to certify (by July 1, 2007) that Iraq
had made progress toward several political reconciliation benchmarks. Even if he
certifies by October 1, 2007, that the benchmarks have been met, the provision
amendment would require the start of a redeployment from Iraq by March 1, 2008,
and to be completed by September 1, 2008. The whole bill passed the House on
March 23, 2007. In the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1591, a provision would set
a non-binding goal for U.S. withdrawal of March 1, 2008, in line with S.J.Res. 9
cited above. The conference report adopted elements of both bills, retaining the
benchmark certification requirement and the same dates for the start of a withdrawal
but making the completion of any withdrawal (by March 31, 2008, not September 1,
2008) a goal rather than a firm deadline. President Bush vetoed the conference report
on May 1, 2007, and the veto was sustained. The House version of a revised FY2007
supplemental (H.R. 2206) would withhold more than half the appropriated funds
until July 2007, at which, on the basis of a presidential report on Iraq’s progress on
the “benchmarks,” Congress would vote on releasing remaining funds.
Other resolutions have been introduced that oppose the increase in U.S. forces,
including H.R. 353, H.R. 438, H.Con.Res. 23, H.Res. 41, S.Con.Res. 4, and
S.Con.Res. 7. Another Senate resolution, S. 233, would prohibit the expenditure of
U.S. funds for a troop increase, and another, S. 308, would require congressional
authorization for an increase in forces. On the other hand, S.Res. 70 says that U.S.
forces in Iraq should have all the resources they require and that Iraq must make

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CRS-47
progress on the milestones it has submitted to the Administration. H.R. 511 states
a sense of Congress not to cut off any funds for OIF.44
The sections below discuss options that have been under discussion even before
the report of the Iraq Study Group. Some of the ideas discussed may be similar to
some of the recommendations of the Study Group as well as the President’s plan.
Altering Troop Levels or Mission
President Bush has repeatedly opposed major reductions in troop levels or
changes to their mission, stating that the United States must uphold its
“commitment” to the Iraqi government and maintaining that the Iraqi government
would collapse upon an immediate pullout. Other consequences, according to the
Administration, would be full-scale civil war, safehaven for AQ-I emboldening of Al
Qaeda more generally, and increased involvement of regional powers in the fighting
in Iraq. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 861 stated that “... it is not in the national
security interest of the United States to set an arbitrary date for the withdrawal or
redeployment” of U.S. forces from Iraq; the resolution passed the House on June 16
by a vote of 256-153, with 5 voting “present.”
Troop Increase. Some observers have said that the United States should
increase troops levels in Iraq even further to tamp down sectarian violence and
prevent Sunni insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by U.S. operations. The
American Enterprise Institute paper mentioned above recommends that at least
20,000 additional U.S. forces would be required to secure Baghdad, a number
roughly in line with the President’s plan. However, the AEI report’s authors say that
a troop “surge” needs to be relatively sustained, lasting at least 18 months, to have
the desired effect.45
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw immediately, maintaining that the decision to invade Iraq was a
mistake in light of the failure to locate WMD, that the large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Other Members argue that U.S.
forces are now policing a civil war rather than fighting an insurgency. Those who
take these positions include most of the approximately 70 Members of the “Out of
Iraq Congressional Caucus,” formed in June 2005. In the 110th Congress, some have
introduced legislation (H.R. 508 and H.R. 413) that would repeal the original
authorization for the Iraq war.
In the 109th Congress, Representative John Murtha, ranking member (now
chairman) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, introduced a resolution
44 For a description of all legislation on Iraq in the 110th Congress, go to the related CRS web
page at [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/officialsources/WS00004.shtml]. CRS has
a similar compilation of bills from the 109th Congress at [http://www.crs.gov/products/
browse/officialsources/WS00002.shtml].
45 Keane, Jack and Frederick Kagan. “The Right Type of Surge,” Washington Post op-ed,
December 27, 2006.

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CRS-48
(H.J.Res. 73) calling for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable date” and the
maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence, mostly in Kuwait (some say
U.S. troops could be based in the Kurdish north) from which U.S. forces could
continue to battle AQ-I. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative
Duncan Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the
sense “that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;” it
failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005. Representative Murtha has introduced a similar
bill in the 110th Congress (H.J.Res. 18); a Senate bill (S. 121) as well as a few other
House bills (H.R. 663, H.R. 455, and H.R. 645) contain similar provisions.
Withdrawal Timetable. The Iraq Study Group suggests a winding down of
the U.S. combat mission by early 2008 but does not recommend a firm timetable.
FY2007 supplemental legislation containing binding or non-binding timetables is
discussed above. Also in the 110th Congress, Senator Obama has introduced S. 433,
setting a deadline for withdrawing combat troops by March 31, 2008.
In the 109th Congress, the timetable issue was debated extensively. In
November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs to
force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an
amendment to S. 1042 (FY2006 defense authorization bill) to compel the
Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal during 2006. Reportedly, on
November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee John
Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that stopped short of setting
a timetable for withdrawal but requires an Administration report on a “schedule for
meeting conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal. That measure, which also
states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of significant transition to full
Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing 79-19. It was incorporated,
with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the conference report on the
bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). On June 22, 2006, the Senate debated two
Iraq-related amendments to an FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766). One,
offered by Senator Kerry, setting a July 1, 2007, deadline for U.S. redeployment from
Iraq, was defeated 86-13. Another amendment, sponsored by Senator Levin, called
on the Administration to begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006, but with
no deadline for full withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39.
Troop Reduction. Depending on the results of the “troop surge,” there might
later be debate on a possible troop reduction. U.S. officials have said that success of
the surge might pave the way for an eventual U.S. force reduction, although some
envision a reduction even if the plan does not succeed. During his tour as senior
U.S. commander in Iraq, General Casey presented to President Bush options for a
substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, dependent on security progress, to about
120,000, with a subsequent reduction to about 100,000. The plan faded, as have all
previous such reduction plans, when the security situation did not calm.
International and Regional Diplomacy
As noted above, many of the Iraq Study Group recommendations propose
increased regional, multi-lateral, and international diplomacy, beyond steps already
taken by the Administration, such as attending the March 10 regional conference
discussed above. One idea, included in the Study Group report, is to form a “contact

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group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on Iraq’s factions to
compromise. In the 110th Congress, a few bills (H.R. 744, H.Con.Res. 43, and
H.Con.Res. 45) support the Iraq Study Group recommendation for an international
conference on Iraq. In the 109th Congress, these ideas were included in several
resolutions, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although
several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal.
Other ideas involve recruitment of new force donors. In July 2004, then-
Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider a Saudi proposal for
a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq,
reportedly under separate command. Some Iraqi leaders believed that such
peacekeepers would come from Sunni Muslim states and would inevitably favor
Sunni factions within Iraq. On the other hand, several experts believe that the lack
of progress in stabilizing Iraq is caused by internal Iraqi disputes and processes and
that new regional or international steps would yield minimal results. For more
information, see CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
Another idea is to identify a high-level international mediator to negotiate with
Iraq’s major factions. Some Members of Congress wrote to President Bush in
November 2006 asking that he name a special envoy to Iraq to follow up on some of
the Administration’s efforts to promote political reconciliation in Iraq.
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization
Some proposals focus on the need for a “political solution,” a requirement
acknowledged by Petraeus and senior U.S. officials. These proposals involve
differing methods for altering Iraq’s power structure so that no major community
feels excluded or has incentive to back violence.
Reorganize the Power Structure. Some experts believe that adjusting U.S.
troop levels would not address the underlying causes of violence in Iraq. Those
who want to build a unified and strong central government, including the Bush
Administration, have identified the need to assuage Sunni Arab grievances through
the political process, and several of the benchmarks required of the Iraqi government
are intended to achieve that objective. Others believe that more sweeping political
reconciliation efforts are needed, but there is little agreement on what additional or
alternative package of incentives, if any, would persuade most Sunnis leaders — and
their constituents — to support the government. Some believe that Sunnis might be
satisfied by a wholesale cabinet/governmental reshuffle that gives several leading
positions, such as that of President, to a Sunni Arab, although many Kurds might
resent such a move because a Kurd now holds that post. Others oppose major
governmental change because doing so might necessitate the voiding of the 2005
elections, a move that would appear un-democratic.
Decentralization and Break-Up Options. Some commentators maintain
that Iraq cannot be stabilized as one country and should be broken up into three
separate countries: one Kurdish, one Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab. Another
version of this idea, propounded by Senator Biden and Council on Foreign Relations
expert Leslie Gelb (May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed) is to form three

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autonomous regions, dominated by each of the major communities. A former U.S.
Ambassador and an adviser to the Kurds, Peter Galbraith, also advocates this option.
According to this view, decentralizing Iraq into autonomous zones would ensure that
Iraq’s territorial integrity is preserved while ensuring that these communities do not
enter all-out civil war with each other. Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns
about equitable distribution of oil revenues, an international organization should be
tapped to distribute Iraq’s oil revenues.
Critics of both forms of this idea believe that any segregation of Iraq, legal or
de-facto, would cause parts of Iraq to fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful
neighbors. Others believe that the act of dividing Iraq’s communities in any way
would cause widespread violence, particularly in areas of mixed ethnicity, as each
community struggles to maximize its territory and its financial prospects. This
recommendation was rejected by the Iraq Study Group as potentially too violent.
Negotiating With Insurgents. A related idea is to negotiate with insurgents.
The Iraq Study Group report welcomes contact with almost all parties in Iraq, with
the exception of AQ-I (Recommendations 34-35). The Administration — and the
Iraqi government — appears to have previously adopted this recommendation to
some extent, and General Petraeus, in his March 7, 2007, news conference, appeared
to suggest that any solution to Iraq would require some agreement with insurgent
groups. In an interview before leaving Iraq, outgoing Ambassador Khalilzad said in
late March 2007 that he had had talks with some insurgents in Jordan who are
believed open to reconciliation.
The U.S. talks reportedly have been intended to promote splits between Iraqi
Sunni insurgents and factions loyal to Al Qaeda. However, no major insurgent
faction has lain down arms in response to any talks with U.S. personnel or Iraqi
officials. The insurgents who have attended such talks reportedly want an increased
role for Sunnis in government, a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and a withdrawal of
the Shiite-dominated ISF from Sunni regions. Some U.S. officials believe that
talking directly with insurgents increases insurgent leverage and emboldens them.
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option. As discussed above, another option
began receiving discussion in October 2006 as Iraqi elites began to sense a growing
rift between the Administration and Maliki. Some Iraqis believe the United States
might try to use its influence among Iraqis to force Maliki to resign and replace him
with a military strongman or some other figure who would crack down on sectarian
militias. Some say former Prime Minister Allawi might be trying to position himself
as such an alternative figure. However, experts in the United States see no concrete
signs that such an option might be under consideration by the Administration.
Forcing out Maliki would, in the view of many, conflict with the U.S. goal of
promoting democracy and rule of law in Iraq.
Economic Measures
Some believe that the key to calming Iraq is to accelerate economic
reconstruction, and they see the draft oil law as drawing in the foreign investment to
Iraq’s key energy sector that is needed to drive economic development. According
to this view, accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating

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employment, improving public services, and creating confidence in the government.
This idea was incorporated into the President’s January 10 initiative, in part by
attempting to revive state-owned factories that can employ substantial numbers of
Iraqis. (The conference report on H.R. 1591 would have provided $50 million to
revive state-owned factories.) Prior to that, this concept was reflected in the decision
to form PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone
will produce major political results because the differences among Iraq’s major
communities are fundamental and resistant to economic solutions.
Another idea has been to set up an Iraqi fund, or trust, that would ensure that all
Iraqis share equitably in Iraq’s oil wealth. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal
(December 18, 2006) Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator John Ensign
supported the idea of an “Iraq Oil Trust” modeled on the Alaska Permanent Fund.

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Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
INC
War crimes Broadcasting
opposition
Total
activities
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio
Free Iraq”)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-
(about 14.5
FY2003
million of this
went to INC)
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, April 2004.

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Figure 1. Map of Iraq

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