Order Code RL30294
Central Asia’s Security:
Issues and Implications
for U.S. Interests
Updated April 26, 2007
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Central Asia’s Security:
Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan) face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism,
and faltering commitments to economic and democratic reforms. However,
cooperation among them remains halting, so security in the region is likely in the
near term to vary by country. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s futures are most clouded
by ethnic and territorial tensions, and corruption in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
could spoil benefits from the development of their ample energy resources.
Authoritarianism and poverty in Uzbekistan could contribute to a succession crisis.
On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan’s growing but still fragile civil society might help the
relatively small nation safeguard its independence. Uzbekistan might become a
regional power able to take the lead on policy issues common to Central Asia and to
resist undue influence from more powerful outside powers, because of its large
territory and population (55 million) and energy and other resources.
Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have
a large impact on Central Asian security. These developments include a more
authoritarian and globalist Russia, ethnic and political instability in China and Iran,
and re-surging drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the
Administration has established bases and other military access in the region for U.S.-
led coalition actions in Afghanistan, and it has stressed that the United States will
remain interested in the long-term security and stability of the region. U.S. interests
in Central Asia include fostering democratization, human rights, free markets, and
trade; assisting the development of oil and other resources; and combating terrorism,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and drug production and trafficking.
The United States seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the illicit transfer
of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies,
materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to
regional independence by Iran. Some critics counter that the United States has
historically had few interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts
undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They also
argue that the region’s energy resources may not measurably enhance U.S. energy
security.
Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and
reforms in Central Asia. The 106th Congress authorized a “Silk Road” initiative for
greater policy attention and aid for democratization, market reforms, humanitarian
needs, conflict resolution, transport infrastructure (including energy pipelines), and
border controls. The 108th and 109th Congresses imposed conditions on foreign
assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, based on their human rights records. The
110th Congress is likely to continue to raise questions about what should be the
appropriate level and scope of U.S. interest and involvement in the region.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Central Asia’s External Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Security Problems and Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Islamic Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Terrorist Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Attacks in Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Attacks in Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Civil War in Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Border Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Crime and Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Economic and Defense Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Energy and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Implications for U.S. Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Designations of Terrorist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
U.S. Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Counter-Narcotics Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Safety of U.S. Citizens and Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Embassy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Should the United States Play a Prominent Role in Central Asia? . . . . . . . 37
What Are U.S. Interests in Central Asia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
What Roles Should Outside Powers Play in the Region? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
How Significant Are Regional Energy Resources to U.S. Interests? . . . . . . 40
What U.S. Security Involvement is Appropriate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Should the United States Try to Foster Democratization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix 1:
Selected Outside Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The South Caucasus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

List of Tables
Table 1. Central Asia: Basic Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 2. U.S. Government FY1992-FY2005 Budgeted Security Assistance
to Central Asia, FREEDOM Support Act, and Agency Budgets . . . . . . . . 52

Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Introduction
The strategic Central Asian region — bordering regional powers Russia, China,
and Iran — is an age-old east-west and north-south trade and transport crossroads.1
After many of the former Soviet Union’s republics had declared their independence
by late 1991, the five republics of Central Asia followed suit. Since this beginning
of independence, surprising to most of the region’s population, the Central Asian
countries have taken some uneven steps in building defense and other security
structures and ties. In some respects, the states have viewed their exposure to outside
influences as a mixed blessing. While welcoming new trade and aid, the leaders of
Central Asia have been less receptive to calls to democratize and respect human
rights.
This report discusses the internal and external security concerns of the Central
Asian states. Security concerns faced by the states include mixes of social disorder,
crime, corruption, Islamic extremism, terrorism, ethnic and civil conflict, border
tensions, water and transport disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and illegal narcotics. The Central Asian states have tried with
varying success to bolster their security forces and regional cooperation to deal with
these threats. The United States has provided assistance for these efforts and
boosted such aid and involvement after the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, but questions remain about what should be the appropriate level
and scope of U.S. interest and presence in the region.
Central Asia’s External Security Context
Central Asia’s states have slowly consolidated and extended their relations with
neighboring and other countries and international organizations that seek to play
influential roles in Central Asia or otherwise affect regional security. These include
the bordering or close-by countries of Russia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Turkey, and
the South Caucasus states (see below, Appendix 1), and others such as the United
States, Germany, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Ukraine.
In terms of ties with close-by states, Turkmenistan may be concerned more about
bordering Iran and Afghanistan than with non-bordering China, while Kazakhstan
1 Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS
Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055,
Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan, all by Jim Nichol.

CRS-2
may be concerned more about bordering Russia than with non-bordering
Afghanistan. While soliciting and managing ties with these states, the Central Asian
countries also seek assistance from international organizations, including the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Economic Community Organization
(ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the European Union (EU), the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and NATO.
Outside powers, while sometimes competing among themselves for influence
in Central Asia, also have some common interests. After September 11, 2001,
Russia, China, and the United States cooperated somewhat in combating terrorism
in the region. This cooperation has appeared to ebb in recent years, but if the terrorist
threat from Afghanistan re-surges, cooperation too might improve. Cooperation is
also needed to combat drug, arms, and human trafficking, manage water resources,
develop and deliver energy, and tackle infectious diseases. Iran and Russia
collaborated during the latter 1990s to keep the United States and Turkey from
becoming involved in developing Caspian Sea oil and natural gas resources. Though
this collaboration has ebbed, Russia and Iran continue in varying ways to oppose
such involvement. Some observers warn that increasing cooperation or similarity of
interests among Russia, Iran, and China in countering the West and in attempting to
increase their own influence could heighten threats to the sovereignty and
independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount such threats, stressing the
ultimately diverging goals of the three states.
Security Problems and Progress
The problems of authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, terrorism, and ethnic
and civil strife and tensions jeopardize the security and independence of all the new
states of Central Asia, though to varying degrees. Kazakhstan has faced the potential
of separatism in northern Kazakhstan where ethnic Russians are dominant, although
this threat appears to have diminished in recent years with the emigration of hundreds
of thousands of ethnic Russians. Tajikistan faces the still-fragile peace that ended
its civil war and the possibility of separatism, particularly by its northern Soghd
(formerly Leninabad) region. Kyrgyzstan has faced increasing demands by its
southern regions for greater influence in the central government. Turkmenistan faces
clan and provincial tensions and widespread poverty that could contribute to
instability in the transition period after the December 2006 death of long-time
president Saparamurad Niyazov. Uzbekistan faces escalating civil discontent and
violence from those whom President Islam Karimov labels as Islamic extremists,
from a large ethnic Tajik population, and from an impoverished citizenry. Ethnic
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz clashed in 1990 in the Fergana Valley. This fertile valley is
divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and contains about one-fifth
of Central Asia’s population. All the states are harmed by drug and human
trafficking and associated corruption and health problems.
Despite these problems, Turkmenistan’s oil and gas wealth could contribute to
its long-term stability. Also, its location at a locus of Silk Road trade routes
potentially could increase its economic security. Uzbekistan’s large population and
many resources, including oil, natural gas, and gold, could provide a basis for its

CRS-3
stable development and security. Kyrgyzstan’s emerging civil society could facilitate
entrepreneurial activity and good governance, which eventually might permit the
country to increase its budgetary expenditures for defense and security.
It would seem that affinities among the current regional elites would facilitate
cooperative ties. Many of the officials in the states learned a common language
(Russian) and were Communist Party members. In actuality, however, regional
cooperation is minimal.
The vast majority of the people in the Central Asian states suffered steep
declines in their quality of life in the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. The gap widened between the rich and poor, accentuating social tensions
and potential instability. Social services such as health and education, inadequate
during the Soviet period, declined further. In the new century, however, negative
trends in poverty and health have been reversed in much of Central Asia, according
to one World Bank report, although the quality of life remains far below that of
Western countries. Defining poverty as income levels of less than $2.15 per day, the
World Bank report found that the poverty rate in 2003 was 21% in Kazakhstan, 70%
in Kyrgyzstan, 74% in Tajikistan, and 47% in Uzbekistan (data for Turkmenistan
were not available). There are large income differentials and disparities between the
social services available in capital cities and those available to rural citizens.2
Lingering poverty could exacerbate social tensions, separatism, and extremism,
although large percentages of the states’ populations remain employed in the
agricultural sector where economic gyrations have been somewhat buffered. This
sector has a surfeit of manpower, however, and cannot readily absorb new workers
as the populations continue to increase. Out-migration by many workers to Russia
and the return of remittances to relatives in Central Asia have somewhat eased
poverty and tension. Russia’s restrictions on such guest workers in 2007 could
contribute to economic distress and social tension in the Central Asian states.3
Islamic Extremism
Calls for government to be based on Sharia (Islamic law) and the Koran are
supported by small but increasing minorities in most of Central Asia. Most of
Central Asia’s Muslims appear to support the concept of secular government and do
not have a deep knowledge of Islam, but interest in greater observance is growing.4
Tajikistan’s civil conflict, where the issue of Islam in political life contributed to
strife, has been pointed to by several other Central Asian states to justify crackdowns.
2 Asad Alam, Mamta Murthi, Ruslan Yemtsov, Edmundo Murrugarra, Nora Dudwick, Ellen
Hamilton, and Erwin Tiongson, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union
, The World Bank, 2005.
3 Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security
Cooperation in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006. pp.
131-151.
4 Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the
Hanafi school of interpretation. Islamic Sufi influences have been significant, as have pre-
Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.

CRS-4
They also point to Russia’s conflict with its breakaway Chechnya region as evidence
of the growing threat. In many cases, government crackdowns ostensibly aimed
against Islamic extremism have masked clan, political, and religious repression. In
some regions of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana Valley,
some Uzbeks kept Islamic practices alive throughout the repressive Soviet period,
and some now oppose the secular-oriented Uzbek government. Islamic extremist
threats to the regimes may well increase as economic distress continues. Heavy
unemployment and poverty rates among youth in the Fergana Valley are widely cited
by observers as making youth more vulnerable to recruitment into religious extremist
organizations.5
Although much of the attraction of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is
generated by factors such as poverty and discontent, it is facilitated by groups in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere that provide funding, education,
training, and manpower to the region. Some of these ties were at least partially
disrupted by the U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan and the U.S. call for
worldwide cooperation in combating terrorism.
The Central Asian states impose several controls over religious freedom. All
except Tajikistan forbid religious parties such as the Islamic Renewal Party
(Tajikistan’s civil war settlement included the IRP’s legalization), and maintain
Soviet-era religious oversight bodies, official Muftiates, and approved clergy. The
governments censor religious literature and sermons. According to some analysts,
the close government religious control may leave a spiritual gulf that underground
radical Islamic groups seek to fill.
Officials in Uzbekistan believe that the country is increasingly vulnerable to
Islamic extremism, and they have been at the forefront in Central Asia in combating
this threat. Reportedly, thousands of alleged Islamic extremists have been
imprisoned and many mosques have been closed. Restrictions were tightened when
the legislature in 1998 passed a law on “freedom of worship” banning all
unregistered faiths, censoring religious writings, and making it a crime to teach
religion without a license. The Uzbek legislature also approved amendments to the
criminal code increasing punishments for setting up, leading, or participating in
religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist, or other illegal groups. Public
expressions of religiosity are discouraged. Women who wear the hijab and young
men who wear beards are faced with government harassment and intimidation. As
recommended by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF), Secretary Rice in November 2006 designated Uzbekistan a “country of
particular concern” (CPC), where severe religious and human rights violations could
lead to U.S. sanctions. Since 2000, USCIRF also has recommended that
Turkmenistan be designated as a CPC.6
5 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University
Press, 2002; T. Jeremy Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali,
Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz Niyazi, Religion, State & Society,
March 1998, pp. 39-50.
6 U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15,
(continued...)

CRS-5
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have arrested many members of Hizb
ut-Tahrir (HT; Liberation Party, a politically oriented Islamic movement calling for
the establishment of Sharia rule), sentencing them to lengthy prison terms or even
death for pamphleteering, but HT reportedly continues to gain adherents. Uzbekistan
argues that HT not only advocates terrorism and the killing of apostates but is
carrying out such acts.7 Some Kyrgyz authorities emphasize the anti-American and
antisemitic nature of several HT statements and agree with the Uzbek government
that some elements of the group are moving away from nonviolence, but others in
Kyrgyzstan argue that the group is largely pacific and should not be harassed.8
Terrorist Activities
Terrorist actions aimed at overthrowing regimes have been of growing concern
in all the Central Asian states and are often linked to Islamic extremism. Some
analysts caution that many activities the regimes label as terrorist — such as
hijacking, kidnaping, robbery, assault, and murder — are often carried out by
individuals or groups for economic benefit or for revenge, rather than for political
purposes. Also, so-called counter-terrorism may mask repressive actions against
religious or political opponents of the regime.
Terrorist activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and similar
groups in the region appeared to have been at least temporarily disrupted by U.S.-led
coalition actions in Afghanistan, where several of the groups were based or
harbored.9 Many observers, however, assert that terrorist cells are re-forming in
6 (...continued)
2006; Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John V. Hanford III on
the Release of the State Department’s 2006 Designations of Countries of Particular
Concern for Severe Violations of Religious Freedom
, November 13, 2006. U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 2, 2005, and Annual Report, May
3, 2006. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 Annual
Report
.
7 Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and
rely much less on Islamic principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has
adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a political party,” that the Islamic world is
the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against Western interests
are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir — Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.
8 HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of
the coalition’s Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104;
CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.
9 Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have
helped disrupt Al Qaeda plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist
training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it planned to use in part as launching pads
for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense Intelligence
[Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD
, Judicial Watch,
Press Office, November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated
October 1998.

CRS-6
Central Asia and that surviving elements of the IMU, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist
groups are infiltrating from Afghanistan and elsewhere.10
Attacks in Uzbekistan. Several explosions outside government buildings
in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, were variously reported to have killed 13-28 and
wounded 100-351 individuals. Uzbek officials detained hundreds or thousands of
suspects, including political oppositionists and HT members. The first trial of 22
suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. Karimov in April
1999 alleged that Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head
of the banned Erk Party) was the mastermind of the plot, and had received support
from the Taliban and Uzbek Islamic extremist Tohir Yuldash. The 22 suspects were
described in court proceedings as receiving training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban),
Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by Al Qaeda terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and as
led by Solikh and Yuldash and his ally Jama Namanganiy, the latter two the heads
of the IMU. Testimony alleged that Solikh had made common cause with Yuldash
and Namanganiy in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldash, Namanganiy, and others had
agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldash defense minister after Karimov
was overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek media report in
early July 1999, the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by
Namanganiy and other Tajik rebels transiting through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see
below
).
Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of
Solikh or members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years.
In November 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism,
nine of whom were tried in absentia. The absent Yuldash and Namangoniy were
given death sentences, and the absent Solikh 15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials
criticized the apparent lack of due process during the trial. Solikh has rejected
accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in the IMU. Yuldsash
too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings, but warned that more might occur
if Karimov does not step down.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks
were launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. President Karimov asserted on
March 29 that the violence was aimed against his government, in order to “cause
panic among our people, to make them lose their trust in the policies being carried
out.” An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-
Islami
, reportedly an alias of the IMU or a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed
responsibility for the violence. After the attacks, media censorship intensified.
Although some observers alleged that there were wide-scale detentions, the human
rights organization Freedom House reported in July 2004 that detentions like those
of 1999 “did not materialize” and that local trials of suspects appeared to respect the
rights of defendants. (Human Rights Watch, however, claimed that virtually all the
10 CEDR, March 6, 2003, Doc. No. 217. In testimony in October 2003, then-Assistant
Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones stated that “there is a resurgence of the ability of the IMU
to operate” in Central Asia and that it “represents a serious threat to the region and therefore
to our interests.” U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee. Subcommittee
on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, October 29, 2003.

CRS-7
defendants were tortured.) The defendants in several of these trials were accused of
being members of the IJG or HT and of attempting to overthrow the government.
The first national trial of fifteen suspects ended in late August 2004. They all
confessed their guilt and received sentences of 11-16 years in prison. Some of the
defendants testified that they belonged to the IJG and were trained by Arabs and
others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU member
Najmiddin Jalolov (one of those convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of the
IJG and linked him to Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu
Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. Over 100 individuals reportedly were convicted
in various trials.
Suicide bombings occurred in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on July 30, 2004, at the
U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office. Three Uzbek
guards reportedly were killed and about a dozen people were injured. All U.S. and
Israeli diplomatic personnel were safe. The next day, then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell condemned the “terrorist attacks.” The IMU and the IJG claimed
responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against the Uzbek and other
“apostate” governments (see also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in
Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol).
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13,
2005, after Uzbek troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The
protestors had gathered to demand the end of a trial of 23 prominent local
businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist group. The night before,
a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released hundreds of
inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained
foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the
accused. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Islam Karimov flew to the city to direct operations and reportedly had
restored order by late on May 13. The United States and others in the international
community have called for an international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has
rejected (see also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and
Implications
, by Jim Nichol).
Attacks in Kyrgyzstan. In recent years there have been sporadic suicide
bombings and other attacks seemingly aimed against the government. One took
place at the Oberon market in Bishkek in December 2002, one at a currency exchange
outlet in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan in May 2003, and one in Bishkek that targeted
policemen in November 2004. The explosion at the Oberon market killed seven
Kyrgyz citizens and injured over 20 people. One person was killed in Osh. Five
people, including three Uzbeks, a Uighur citizen of China, and a Kyrgyz, were
charged in July 2003 with involvement in the first two bombings. Kyrgyz security
officials claimed that they were IMU members trained in Chechnya (by Al Qaeda’s
Khattab) and Afghanistan and that they had also planned to bomb the U.S. Embassy
in Bishkek but were foiled by tight security around the embassy.11 In contrast to
11 CEDR, February 16, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-237; June 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-178; and
(continued...)

CRS-8
these terrorist incidents, the U.S. Administration has regarded the March 2005 ouster
of Akayev as a popular uprising.
Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Several hundred Islamic
extremists and others who fled repression in Uzbekistan and settled in Tajikistan
(some of whom were being forced out at Uzbekistan’s behest), and rogue groups
from Tajikistan that refused to disarm as part of the Tajik peace settlement, entered
Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group.
The guerrillas seized hostages, including four Japanese geologists, and occupied
several Kyrgyz villages, stating that they would cease hostilities if Kyrgyzstan
provided harborage and would release hostages if Uzbekistan released jailed
extremists. The guerrillas were variously rumored to be seeking to create an Islamic
state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan’s
defense minister on October 18, 1999, announced success in forcing virtually all
guerrillas out of the southwestern mountains into Tajikistan (some critics argued that
the onset of winter weather played an important part in the guerrilla retreat). Uzbek
aircraft targeted several alleged guerrilla hideouts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
eliciting protests from these states of violating airspace. Uzbek President Islam
Karimov heavily criticized Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Askar Akayev for supposed
laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. In November 1999, the Tajik government, which
had mercurial relations with Uzbekistan, incensed it by allowing the guerrillas to
enter Afghanistan rather than wiping them out (some Tajik opposition elements had
ties to Namanganiy).
According to many observers, the incursion indicated both links among
terrorism in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia (Chechnya and
Dagestan) and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces in combating threats to
its independence. Observers were split on whether this terrorism was related more
to Islamic extremism, or to efforts to control narcotics resources and routes.
Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
in August 2000, in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of
Kyrgyz fleeing the area. Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz
forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000,
reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops. In Uzbekistan, the insurgents launched
attacks near Tashkent and in the southeast, leading to thousands of Uzbeks fleeing
the areas and the loss of 24 Uzbek troops in putting down the insurgency. Limited
engagements by Kyrgyz border troops with alleged insurgents or drug traffickers
were reported in late July 2001. According to some reports, the IMU did not engage
in major attacks in 2001 because of its increasing attention to bin Laden’s agenda,
particularly after September 11, 2001, when IMU forces fought alongside bin Laden
and the Taliban against the U.S.-led coalition. The activities of the IMU appeared
to have been dealt a blow by the U.S.-led coalition.
Civil War in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics
least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up.
11 (...continued)
May 14, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-443.

CRS-9
In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties
and movements — largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites
who had long been excluded from political power — tried to take over. Kulyabi and
Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful
counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and
up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to
Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan. These
forces consisted of Russia’s 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-
1999).
Terrorist actions were carried out by both sides, and international terrorist
groups provided some support to the Tajik opposition. Reportedly, these groups
included the IMU, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and Al Qaeda.12 As the civil war
wound down in the late 1990s, most of these forces left Tajikistan.
After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September
1994, the UNSC established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
(UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later
expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of Tajik
opposition fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice
for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of
government and opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomali
Rakhmanov and opposition leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive
peace agreement
, under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of
ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process
were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces,
legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC
disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping
mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing
agreement. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile. An unsuccessful insurrection in
northern Tajikistan in late 1998 highlights concerns by some observers about
secessionist tendencies in the Soghd (formerly Leninabad) region and about ethnic
tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan.
Border Tensions
Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated
by 1936, based partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly
on the exigencies of Soviet control over the region. The resulting borders are ill-
defined in mountainous areas and extremely convoluted in the fertile Fergana Valley,
parts of which belong to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Over a dozen tiny
enclaves add to the complicated situation. Some in Central Asia have demanded that
borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics, or otherwise dispute
12 Osama bin Laden in mid-1991 began dispatching mujahidin to assist in overthrowing the
then-communist regime in Tajikistan. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004, pp. 58, 64.

CRS-10
the location of borders. Caspian Sea borders have not been fully agreed upon, mainly
because of Iranian intransigence, but Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on
delineation to clear the way for exploiting their seabed oil resources. In early 2007,
the new Turkmen government indicated some willingness to negotiate with
Azerbaijan to resolve ownership of underseas oil and gas resources.
China has largely settled border delineation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, reportedly involving “splitting the difference” on many of the disputed
territories, which are usually in unpopulated areas. Popular passions were aroused
in Kyrgyzstan after a 1999 China-Kyrgyzstan border agreement ceded about 9,000
hectares of mountainous Kyrgyz terrain. Kyrgyz legislators in 2001 opened a hearing
and even threatened to try to impeach then-President Akayev. He arrested the leader
of the impeachment effort, leading to violent demonstrations in 2002 calling for his
ouster and the reversal of the “traitorous” border agreement. Dissident legislators
appealed the border agreement to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2003 that
it was legal.13
The problem of ambiguous borders has been an important source of concern to
Russia and Kazakhstan. During most of the 1990s, neither Russia nor Kazakhstan
wished to push border delineation, Russia because of concerns that it would be
conceding that Kazakhstan’s heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of
Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because of concerns that delineation might inflame
separatism. In 1998, Russia established border patrols along its 4,200 mile border
with Kazakhstan for security reasons, and determined to delineate the border. By
late 2004, most of the Russian-Kazakh border had been delimited. To head off
separatist proclivities in the north, Kazakhstan reorganized administrative borders in
northern regions to dilute the influence of ethnic Russians, established a strongly
centralized government to limit local rule, and moved its capital northward. These
and other moves apparently contributed to political resignation among many ethnic
Russians, and many emigrated to Russia.
Uzbekistan has had contentious border talks with all the other Central Asian
states. As of early 2007, reportedly about one-third of Uzbekistan’s 680-mile border
with Kyrgyzstan still had not been formally agreed upon after six years of border
talks.14 Legislators and others in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 vehemently protested a border
delineation agreement with Uzbekistan reached by the two prime ministers that ceded
a swath of the Kyrgyz Batken region, ostensibly to improve Uzbek access to its Sokh
enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Faced with this protest, the Kyrgyz government sent a
demarche to Uzbekistan repudiating any intention to cede territory. Similarly, in late
2004 Kyrgyz legislators demanded that Uzbekistan’s Shohimardon enclave in
Kyrgyzstan (ceded in the 1930s) be returned.15
Uzbekistan’s unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with
Kazakhstan in the late 1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the
13 CEDR, February 28, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-284; March 9, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-27.
14 CEDR, February 17, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.
15 CEDR, November 6, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-130.

CRS-11
Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced that delineation of their 1,400 mile border
was complete, and some people in previously disputed border villages began to
relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their “homeland.”
However, many people continued to ignore the new border or were uncertain of its
location, leading to several shootings of Kazakh citizens by Uzbek border troops.
The Uzbek and Tajik presidents signed an accord in October 2002 delimiting
most of their 720-mile joint border. Contention has continued over about 15-20% of
the border. In October 2006, the head of the Tajik border guard service complained
that demarcation was being hindered by Uzbekistan’s peremptory placement of
border markers, barbed wire and fences.16
Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open
or closed. Open borders within the Central Asian states after the breakup of the
Soviet Union were widely viewed as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband
and free migration, so border controls have been tightened in all the states. During
2001, Kazakhstan joined Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in imposing a visa regime on
cross-border travel, while Kyrgyzstan has loosened its visa requirements on U.S. and
Western European travelers. In early 2007, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed on
visa-free cross-border travel.
Uzbekistan mined its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999, intending
to protect it against terrorist incursions, but in fact leading to many civilian Kyrgyz
and Tajik casualties. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that Uzbekistan clear mines it has
sown along the borders, including some allegedly sown on Kyrgyz territory, but
Uzbekistan has asserted that it will maintain the minefields to combat terrorism.
(Kyrgyzstan too has raised tensions by sowing mines and blowing up mountain
passes along its borders with Tajikistan.) Border tensions between Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan also flared in late 2002, after Turkmenistan accused Uzbek officials
of complicity in the coup attempt. Uzbekistan’s economic problems led it in mid-
2002 to impose heavy duties on imports and at the beginning of 2003 to close its
borders to “suitcase trading” (small-scale, unregulated trading), heightening tensions
with bordering states. Sharp disagreements remain between Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan on mine clearing, Uzbek restrictions on Tajik transportation, clashes
between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, and the Uzbek visa regime with Tajikistan.17
Iran and Turkmenistan are the major impediment to wider agreement on Caspian
Sea border delineation and resource use and access, contributing to tensions and the
build-up of naval forces. Iran’s intransigence led Russia in August 2002 to conduct
the largest naval maneuvers in its history in the northern Caspian. Kazakhstan
announced its intent to form a navy in early 2003, leading to protests from the
16 CEDR, October 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950282. In the case of contention between the
residents of the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan and the bordering Soghd region in
northern Tajikistan, the U.N. Development Program has implemented initiatives to create
mutual trust and the sharing of trans-border resources such as water. Border delimitation
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has not been completed. CEDR, March 20, 2007, Doc.
No. CEP-950134; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950045.
17 CEDR, January 24, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.

CRS-12
Russian Foreign Ministry, but Kazakh military officials emphasized their
determination to proceed with plans to protect their offshore oil fields and maritime
borders.
Crime and Corruption
Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the
states. The increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of
foreign oil and natural gas investments, the low pay of most government bureaucrats,
and inadequate laws and norms are conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps
most important, the weakness of the rule of law permits the Soviet-era political
patronage and spoils system to continue.18 Organized crime networks have expanded
in all the Central Asian states, and have established ties with crime groups worldwide
that are involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan serve as origin, transit, or destination states for human trafficking. Crime
groups collude with local border and other officials to transport people to the Middle
East or other destinations for forced labor or prostitution.19
Sizeable revenues from oil and gas exports have exacerbated corruption in
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The Turkmen president controls a “presidential
fund,” that receives 50% of gas revenues and is ostensibly used for economic
development, though budgetary transparency is lacking on how the fund is used.20
Perhaps the most sensational allegations of corruption have involved signing bonuses
and other payments by U.S. energy companies operating in Kazakhstan (or by their
proxies) that allegedly were funneled into Swiss bank accounts linked to Kazakh
officials, reportedly including Nazarbayev. U.S. officials concurred with a Swiss
decision to freeze the funds and open investigations in 1999-2000. The New York
Times
reported that Nazarbayev unsuccessfully raised the issue of unfreezing some
of these accounts during his visit with President Bush in December 2001.21 A U.S.
federal trial of U.S. businessman James Giffen on the bribery charges reportedly may
begin in early 2007. Another case investigated by the U.S. Security and Exchange
18 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online at [http://www.trans
parency.org/].
19 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2005.
20 The non-governmental organization Global Witness alleged in 2006 that the late Turkmen
President Niyazov personally controlled a vast portion of this gas wealth. The NGO raised
concerns that organized crime groups were involved in these exports and urged the
European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan. Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny
Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade
, April 2006.
21 New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A16; Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 5, 2003;
Washington Post, June 10, 2002, p. A12; Financial Times (London), April 16, 2002, p. 12;
Agence France Presse, September 24, 2001; PR Newswire, January 10, 2001; Washington
Post
, September 25, 2000, p. A1. A National Fund was created in early 2001 by the Kazakh
National Bank for receipt of oil revenues, and operates under strict accounting standards.

CRS-13
Commission (SEC) — involving bribes to Kazakh officials by the Swedish-Swiss
firm ABB — was settled in mid-2004.22
Economic and Defense Security
The Central Asian states have worked to bolster their economic and defense
capabilities by seeking assistance from individual Western donors such as the United
States, by trying to cooperate with each other, and by joining myriad international
organizations.23 Regional cooperation has faced challenges from differential
economic development and hence divergent interests among the states, and from
more nationalistic postures. Cooperation also is undermined by what the states view
as Uzbekistan’s overbearing impulses. Regional cooperation problems are
potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as
the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CST; see below), NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia, the United States, and China,
although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem to provide
motivation for cooperation.
All of the Central Asian states have been faced with creating adequate military
and border forces and have had vexing problems with military financing and training.
At first dependent on the contract service of Russian troops and officers in their
nascent militaries, the states now rely little on such manpower, but continue to
depend on training and equipment ties with Russia. After September 11, 2001, the
states have benefitted from boosted U.S. military training and equipment aid.
The capabilities of the military, border, and other security forces are limited,
compared to those of neighboring states such as Russia, China, or Iran. Military
forces range in manpower from about 7,600 in Tajikistan (excluding Russians) to
65,800 in Kazakhstan (see Table 1). The states have variously solicited training and
technical assistance from the United States, Turkey, China, and other countries, have
forged security ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
NATO’s PFP, and cooperated in regional bodies such as SCO and GUAM.
Economic cooperation among the Central Asian states began to develop by the
mid 1990s, leading to several initiatives, but by 2007 showed few real results.
Cooperation was stymied by Uzbekistan’s price controls and restrictions on currency
convertibility, tariffs levied by the states on Kyrgyzstan because of its membership
in the World Trade Organization, and border restrictions that stifled trade.24 A
customs union formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in January 1994
22 Eurasianet, September 17, 2004; New York Law Journal, July 7, 2004, p. 1; Financial
Times (London)
, July 7, 2004, p. 27; Dow Jones News Service, October 27, 2005.
23 GUAM is named after members Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Uzbekistan
was a member, but it dropped out.
24 Analyst Martin Spechler argues that the Central Asian region lacks the impetus to
cooperation provided by a perceived outside threat. Problems of Post-Communism,
November/December 2002, p. 46.

CRS-14
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined later) achieved some modest early success as a
regional forum. It was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in
July 1998. Criticizing its scant achievements, Karimov in early 2001 proposed that
it become a forum for “wide-ranging” policy discussions, and it was renamed the
Central Asian Cooperation Organization in late 2001 (CACO). CACO suffered a
serious blow in September 2003 when Kazakhstan joined Belarus, Russia, and
Ukraine in proclaiming the building of a “common economic space.” In October
2004, CACO abandoned its focus on creating a regional identity separate from Russia
by admitting Russia as a member. Finally, in October 2005, CACO announced that
its membership would be “integrated” into the Eurasian Economic Community (a
Russia-led economic cooperation group consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Tajikistan).25
Another attempted area of regional cooperation involves securing energy
transport and supply that is outside Russian control. Formed in 1997, GUAM
admitted Uzbekistan as a member in April 1999 (becoming GUUAM) while leaders
and officials were attending the Washington NATO Summit. Karimov stated that
Uzbekistan joined the group to facilitate the delivery of its oil and gas resources to
Western markets.26 Ukraine and some other East European states are interested in
Caspian region energy resources both as supplies and as means to lessen vulnerability
to Russian sources. In 2001, GUUAM appeared riven by Moldova’s election of a
communist government that was seeking closer ties to Russia, and differences of
view about where Caspian resources should go (since 2003, however, Moldova has
moved closer to the West). Uzbekistan retracted an announcement in June 2002 that
it was withdrawing from GUUAM because it had proven ineffective, but
“suspended” much of its active participation. Uzbekistan formally withdrew from
GUUAM in December 2005.27
The Central Asian states generally have criticized the CIS as both ineffective
and dominated by Russia. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
joined Russia and Belarus in reaffirming the CST when it came up for renewal in
1999.28 Turkmenistan did not sign the treaty, citing its neutral status. Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participate in CIS (in actuality, Russian) air defense and
air force programs and exercises. Uzbekistan withdrew from the CST in 1999 but
was formally re-admitted in August 2006. Uzbekistan held a special forces exercise
with Russia in September 2006, and the two sides concluded an accord permitting
each other access to military facilities. These moves appeared to mark Russia’s
increasing military influence throughout Central Asia, according to some observers.
25 Farkhad Tolipov, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, December 1, 2004; CEDR, November
2, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-379002; November 9, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27030.
26 CEDR, May 3, 1999, Doc. No. FTS-662.
27 CEDR, December 28, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27003; December 30, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-
18002.
28 The CST calls for signatories to abjure force against each other and to assist one another
in case of outside acts of aggression. See CEDR-SOV-92-101, May 26, 1992, pp. 8-9.

CRS-15
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai
Treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual
borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,000 mile
former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central
Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in
China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In
2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO). In an interview explaining why Uzbekistan joined, President Karimov
seemed to indicate that the primary motive was to protect Uzbekistan’s interests
against any possible moves by the SCO. He appeared to stress the possible military
aid the SCO might provide to beef up the Uzbek armed forces and help it combat
terrorism, and to dismiss the capability of the SCO engaging in effective joint action.
He also indicated that Uzbekistan wished to forge closer relations with China.29
Although Karimov had criticized the SCO as ineffective, in August 2003 he
insisted that Uzbekistan host the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS).
Appearing to return to his earlier assessment, in April 2004 he criticized the SCO for
failing to aid Uzbekistan during the March-April 2004 attacks and concluded that
Uzbekistan should “rely on its own power.” Some observers argued that these
vacillations reflected a policy of playing off the major powers to maximize aid. This
policy appeared to pay dividends at the June 2004 SCO summit, when China
reportedly proffered up to $1.25 billion in grants and loans to Karimov and Russia
up to $2.5 billion in investment.
Indicating Uzbekistan’s closer ties after the 2005 events in Andijon (see below)
with both Russia and China, Karimov traveled to Shanghai in June 2006 to attend the
SCO summit and endorsed a communique criticizing U.S. foreign policy. In a
speech just before leaving for the summit, Karimov urged “joint action” by the SCO
members to combat terrorism (seemingly contradicting his 2001 speech; see above),
rather than mere diplomatic statements.30 In September 2006, the first deputy head
of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) became the leader of RATS, perhaps
indicating Russia’s growing role in the SCO. According to some reports, however,
the Uzbek security service closely oversees the work of RATS, reflecting Karimov’s
distrust of Russia despite the closer Russian-Uzbek security ties since the events in
Andijon. Also in September 2006, China and Tajikistan held a joint anti-terrorist
drill on each other’s territories.
Water Resources. Growing demand for limited water resources may
threaten the stability of the region and hinder economic development (although more
efficient water use would be ameliorative). The main sources of water for
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and part of Kazakhstan are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya
Rivers that flow from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since these latter two states are
poor in oil and gas, the Central Asian states agreed in 1998 to exchange oil and gas
for water. However, the agreement has foundered, in part because no oversight body
was created, and relations between the upstream and downstream states have
suffered. Profligate wasting of water because of ill-designed and deteriorating
29 The Times of Central Asia, June 17, 2001.
30 CEDR, June 18, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950084.

CRS-16
irrigation canals, lack of water meters, and efforts to boost cotton production have
drained the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers so that little or no water reaches the Aral Sea
bordering Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Also, Kyrgyzstan has endeavored to
maximize its hydro-electricity generation, which contributes to downstream water
shortages in the summer and floods in the winter. Population growth in downstream
countries is a looming problem. The shrinking of the Aral Sea has exacerbated
region-wide environmental problems.31
The lack of regional cooperation is illustrated by Tajikistan’s plans to create a
large reservoir on the Zarafshan River for hydro-electricity production and to store
water for its own use. Uzbekistan vehemently opposes this project because it
allegedly will greatly reduce the flow of water to its agricultural Samarkand, Navoi,
and Buxoro regions. Uzbekistan also opposes Turkmenistan’s planned diversion of
water from the Amu Darya to create a new 150 billion cubic meter lake (currently
under construction), which may threaten Uzbek cotton production. In 2003,
Uzbekistan seized a part of the Karshinskiy Canal in Turkmenistan, the only source
of water for Uzbekistan’s Kashkardarya oblast, after bilateral water-sharing talks
broke down. The need for even wider discussion of water resources is illustrated by
China’s efforts to divert Irtysh River water to its Xinjiang region, reducing such
resources for Russia and Kazakhstan (the latter two states also vie over this water),
and disputes between Russia and Kazakhstan over whether the former can sell trans-
border water under international law.32
Energy and Transport. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
the Caspian region is emerging as a significant source of oil and gas for world
markets. Oil resources, DOE reports, may be comparable to those of Qatar (a
conservative estimate) or Libya (a high-end estimate). Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kazakhstan rank among the top countries in terms of proven and probable gas
reserves, comparable in terms of proven reserves with Nigeria. Kazakhstan possesses
the Caspian region’s largest proven oil reserves at 9-17.6 billion barrels, according
to DOE, and also possesses 65 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. The Tengiz oil
field began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and Kazakhstan in a consortium
during 1993 (U.S. Exxon-Mobil and Russia’s LUKoil later joined). The
Karachaganak onshore field is being developed by British Petroleum, Italy’s Eni,
U.S. Chevron-Texaco, and LUKoil, who estimate reserves of more than 2.4 billion
barrels of oil and 16 tcf of gas. In 2002, another consortium led by Eni reported that
the Kashagan offshore field had between 7-9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves,
comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about one
million barrels per day (bpd). Private foreign investors have become discouraged in
recent months by harsher government terms, taxes, and fines.
Turkmenistan possesses about 101tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE,
among the largest in the world. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s
31 Central Asia Monitor (Almaty), March 2, 2007. This Kazakh publication calls for
Uzbekistan “to stop making claims of [regional] leadership and applying economic pressure,
and to adopt the language of mutually beneficial proposals and respect” for the interests of
other states of the region. Translated in CEDR, March 7, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-311003.
32 CEDR, February 27, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-462002; October 29, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-338.

CRS-17
fourth largest natural gas producer. Uzbekistan produced about 2.1tcf of gas in 2005,
making it among the top ten producers in the world. Currently, most of this gas is
used domestically, but some is exported to its neighbors and to Russia. (See also
CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, by Bernard
A. Gelb).
The land-locked Central Asian region must rely on the uncertain benevolence
and stability of its surrounding neighbors to reach outside markets. Regional
transport links include the railway from Druzhba in Kazakhstan to Urumchi in China,
opened in 1992. A railway link between Iran and Turkmenistan opened in 1996. The
“Friendship Bridge” linking Uzbekistan and Afghanistan was closed by Uzbekistan
in 1997 as a result of drug and arms trafficking and terrorist threats. It was re-opened
in 2002 with U.S. assistance following the ouster of the Taliban. A bridge linking
Tajikistan and Afghanistan was opened in 2002 (funded by the Aga Khan) and
another is scheduled for completion in August 2007 (U.S.-funded).
The EU-sponsored Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia
(TRACECA) program started in 1993, aimed at the re-creation of the “silk road”
linking East and West. The transport routes would bypass Russia and enhance the
independence of the Central Asian states. TRACECA has funded the refurbishment
of rail lines and roads, and is supporting the building of a rail line from Uzbekistan
through Kyrgyzstan to China. Another EU program, INOGATE (Interstate Oil and
Gas Transport to Europe), focuses on rehabilitation, modernization, and extension
of oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian region to the West. Some in Central Asia
have criticized the EU or regional states for tardy implementation.33
To a significant degree, Central Asia’s energy security is dependent on stability
in the South Caucasus and beyond. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s oil pipeline
from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk (see below) is
vulnerable to instability in Russia’s North Caucasus area. An oil pipeline was
constructed from Baku through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan
(termed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline; it receives some oil shipped by
tanker from Kazakhstan), and an associated gas pipeline from Baku to Turkey face
problems of instability in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Whereas terrorists such
as Kurdish groups in Turkey are usually able to only temporarily disable pipelines,
political and ethnic instability and separatism in the North and South Caucasus may
pose greater problems.
The Central Asian states face pressures from Russia’s energy firms and
government to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia and to limit ties with
Western firms. These efforts include some free-market moves such as building
pipelines and obtaining shares in Central Asian consortiums, but Russia’s state-
controlled firms and government sometimes pursue negative measures such as trying
to block Western investment and Central Asian exports.
Turkmenistan is currently largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993,
Russia had halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines,
33 CEDR, March 23, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-384.

CRS-18
diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian states that had trouble paying for the gas.
In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other
problems. In 1998 and intermittently thereafter, Turkmenistan has tried to get higher
prices for its gas from Russia’s natural gas firm Gazprom. Putin’s talks in January,
2002 with Niyazov on long-term gas supplies were unproductive because Niyazov
balked at the low prices offered. Appearing resigned to getting less than the world
market price, Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in April 2003 on supplying
Russia about 200 billion cubic feet of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising
up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) from 2009 to 2028, perhaps then tying up most if
not all of Turkmenistan’s future production.
Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an attempt
to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
In early 2006, Turkmenistan again requested higher gas prices from Russia, because
Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom gas firm had raised the price it charged for
customers receiving the gas that it had purchased from Turkmenistan. In June 2006,
Turkmenistan threatened to cut off gas shipments at the end of July unless Gazprom
agreed to a price increase from $65 per 35.314 thousand cubic feet to $100 for the
rest of 2006. On July 25, Gazprom shut off one major pipeline from Turkmenistan
for eight days of “repairs.” In early September 2006, Gazprom agreed to pay $100
per 35.314 thousand cubic feet from 2007 to the end of 2009, and Turkmenistan
pledged to supply 1.483 tcf in 2006, 1.765 tcf in 2007-2008, and up to 2.83 tcf from
2009-2028.
Seeking alternatives, Turkmenistan in late 1997 opened a 125-mile gas pipeline
from a Turkmen gas field to the Iranian pipeline system for use in northern Iran.
Plans for substantial shipments to Iran remain unrealized, however. A 1998
framework agreement and a May 1999 gas supply agreement between Turkey and
Turkmenistan envisaged Turkmen gas flows to Turkey when a pipeline either
traversing Iran or a trans-Caspian route through Azerbaijan and Georgia were built.34
In September 1999, Turkmenistan also joined Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in
signing a declaration on a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Plans for a trans-Caspian gas
pipeline, however, were derailed in 2000 by a clash between Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan over how much gas each nation could ship through the Baku-Turkey leg
of the prospective gas pipeline, and by Turkmenistan’s rejection of proposals from
the PSG consortium formed to build the trans-Caspian leg of the pipeline.
Turkmenistan’s efforts to interest investors in building a gas pipeline through
Afghanistan to Pakistan have been unsuccessful because of the Afghan government’s
uncertain control over its territory and questions about Turkmenistan’s stability.

According to some analysts, Kazakhstan’s development of multiple oil export
routes that no one transit country controls is enhancing its energy independence and
security. In the early 1990s, Russia placed strict quotas on oil shipments through its
pipelines to pressure Kazakhstan to yield shares in energy projects. Russia’s
restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the
consortium admitted LUKoil and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium.
34 The gas pipeline from Tabriz to Ankara began operations in December 2001, but Turkmen
gas is not yet being sold to Turkey through this pipeline.

CRS-19
Russian shareholders have a controlling interest, 44%, in the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium, which in 2001 completed building a 930-mile oil pipeline from
Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, the region’s first new
pipeline capable of carrying 560,000 bpd. The completion of the pipeline provided
a major boost to Russia’s economic leverage in the Caspian region, since it controls
the pipeline route and terminus, although Kazakhstan in theory also gained some say-
so as an partner in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.
Perhaps marking dissatisfaction with Moscow’s use of pipeline pressure to
extract economic concessions, in December 1997, Kazakh President Nazarbayev,
Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze
agreed to explore building an oil pipeline under the Caspian Sea to link up with the
proposed BTC pipeline. In October 1998, these leaders were joined by Uzbek
President Karimov and the Turkish president in signing an “Ankara Declaration”
endorsing the BTC route with a possible trans-Caspian extension. Turkmenistan
later endorsed this route. On November 18, 1999, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Turkey also signed an “Istanbul Protocol” on construction of the BTC pipeline.
The pipeline was completed in 2006. The pipeline has a capacity of one million
barrels per day but at least initially will operate below capacity. In June 2006,
Kazakhstan agreed to barge 150,000-200,000 barrels of oil per day to the BTC
pipeline.
In 2003, China and Kazakhstan completed an oil pipeline from Atasu in
northwestern Kazakhstan to the Caspian seaport at Aktau, and in late 2005 another
oil pipeline was completed linking Atasu to China’s Xinjiang region. This is the
second major pipeline exiting the Caspian Sea region that does not transit Russian
territory (the first is the BTC oil pipeline). This pipeline has an initial capacity of
about 200,000 bpd. To assuage Russia that it is not in competition for Asian
markets, Kazakhstan has invited Russia to send some oil through the Xinjiang
pipeline.
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
International concerns over the proliferation risks posed by Central Asia’s
nuclear research and power reactors, uranium mines, milling facilities, and associated
personnel have been heightened by increasing Western, Russian, and Central Asian
media reports of attempted diversions of nuclear materials to terrorist states or
criminal groups. Nuclear fuel cycle facilities are often only minimally secured, and
personnel may be poorly paid, creating targets of opportunity. Kazakhstan is reported
to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of yellow cake (low enriched
uranium).35 Major customers for Kazakhstan’s yellow cake have included the United
States and Europe. Kazakhstan’s Ulba fuel fabrication facility provides nuclear fuel
pellets to Russia and other NIS. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at its Caspian
port of Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. Decommissioned in
35 After the Soviet breakup, independent Kazakhstan was on paper one of the world’s major
nuclear weapons powers, but in reality these weapons were controlled by Russia. On April
21, 1995, the last nuclear warheads were transferred to Russia.

CRS-20
April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent
fuel in ill-kept storage pools. Uzbek’s Navoi mining and milling facility exports
yellow cake through the U.S. firm Nukem. Kyrgyzstan’s Kara Balta milling facility
ships low-enriched uranium to Ulba and to Russia. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also
hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era,
raising major concerns about possible proliferation dangers posed by remaining
materials and personnel.
Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking
The increasing trafficking and use of illegal narcotics in Central Asia endanger
the security, independence, and development of the states by stunting economic and
political reforms and exacerbating crime, corruption, and health problems. As a
conduit, the region receives increasing attention from criminal groups smuggling
narcotics from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere to markets in Russia and
Europe. Afghanistan has been the main producer of drugs. The U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the percentage of opiates produced in
Afghanistan that are trafficked through Central Asia has decreased in 2006, in part
because of some crop control efforts in areas of northern Afghanistan bordering
Central Asia.36 However, production elsewhere in Afghanistan increased in 2006.
Most of the Central Asian states reported more heroin seizures in 2006 than in 2005,
perhaps indicative of improved border guard and police interdiction.37 Most of the
opiates still grown in northern Afghanistan end up in Tajikistan, a short distance
away, and then are transported elsewhere.
Organized crime groups based in producer countries have been able to expand
their influence in Central Asia because of poorly patrolled borders, lack of
cooperation among the states, lawlessness, and corruption among officials, police,
and border guards. Also, problems with traditional export routes for Asian drugs
have encouraged the use of Central Asia as a transhipment route. Nigerian organized
crime groups reportedly tranship some Pakistani heroin through Central Asia to
Russian markets, and sell some in Central Asia. Even Latin American crime groups
have reportedly smuggled drugs into Central Asia destined for Russia, such as
cocaine from Brazil. These and other international organized crime groups are
integrating Central Asian crime groups into their operations.38 Organized crime
groups also have worked closely with Islamic terrorist groups such as the Taliban and
36 UNODC has estimated that about 21% of Afghan-produced morphine and heroin transited
Central Asia in 2006. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, October 2006. See also UNODC.
2006 World Drug Report, Vol. 1, June 2006. UNODC estimated in 2002 that up to 7% of
the GDP of the region was derived from drug trafficking and that about 1% (365,000-
432,000) of Central Asia’s population was addicted to drugs, with the percentage addicted
to opiates being higher than that in Europe. Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions
Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of the ODCC
, October 2002, pp. 25.
37 UNODC. Regional Office for Central Asia. Milestones, February 2007, pp. 10-11.
38 Irina Adinayeva, “International Drug Trafficking and Central Asia,” in Building a
Common Future
, ed. by P. Stobdan, New Delhi, 1999; Justine Walker, “Beyond Terrorism:
the Real Impact of Afghan Drugs Trafficking on Northern Neighbors,” Drugs and Alcohol
Today
, November 2005. pp. 39-41.

CRS-21
the IMU in drug trafficking and dealing. According to some observers, the IMU has
been a major smuggler of heroin through Central Asia, although U.S.-led coalition
operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 at least temporarily disrupted their
trafficking.39 Some Tajik border troops along the Tajik-Afghan border allegedly gain
revenues from bribes from drug smugglers from Afghanistan. In Kazakhstan, some
police and security personnel reportedly vie to offer their services to drug
traffickers.40
Counter-narcotics agencies in the Central Asian states are hampered by
inadequate budgets, personnel training, and equipment, but most have registered ever
greater drug seizures. According to the State Department, the Kazakh government’s
“DEA-like” Committee on Combating and Controlling Narcotics within the Ministry
of the Interior, established in 2004, contributed to “considerable progress” by
Kazakhstan in counter-narcotics efforts, including drug seizures and tightening drug
trafficking penalties. Kazakh security agents reportedly discovered two new drug
trafficking routes from Afghanistan through Kazakhstan to end-users in Australia and
Japan. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan remains an “important transit country, especially for
drugs coming out of Afghanistan.” In Kyrgyzstan, a Drug Control Agency formed
in 2004 was “fighting a losing battle against drug trafficking,” although there were
some signs in 2005 that “perhaps the tide [was] beginning to turn” in combating
drugs. According to the State Department, “the city of Osh, in particular, is ... a
primary transfer point for narcotics into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and on to
markets in Russia, Western Europe, and to a minor extent, the United States.”
Tajikistan claimed to seize more illicit drugs in 2006 than the previous year, but the
amounts smuggled also had increased.41
Turkmenistan is centrally located for smuggling opiates from Afghanistan and
Iran northward and westward, but its somewhat successful efforts to control
smuggling may have persuaded some smugglers to use the Tajik route instead.
However, large-scale smugglers may use bribes and links to Turkmen officials to
facilitate trafficking through Turkmenistan. Heroin use is widespread in smoked
form, increasing the need for anti-drug education and drug treatment. In Uzbekistan,
the National Center for Drug Control attempts to coordinate anti-drug efforts carried
out by the police, security, and customs agencies, with mixed results. According to
39 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime.
Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Subdirectorate for Crimes Against Persons
and Property, Interpol
, December 13, 2000; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant
Islam in Central Asia
. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 229; Svante
Cornell and Niklas Swanström, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional
Security,” Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 2006, pp. 10-27. According to
analyst Jacob Townsend, the IMU is mostly involved in drug dealing, and organized crime
groups are involved in trafficking. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1, 2006,
pp. 69-91.
40 Martha Olcott, Kazakhstan, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2002, pp. 219-220.
41 U.S. State Department. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report — 2005, March 2006; CEDR, December
4, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27056; December 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950171.

CRS-22
the State Department, drug smuggling into Uzbekistan involves families or small
groups rather than national rings.42
Implications for U.S. Interests
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on three inter-
related activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy
development.43 The September 11, 2001, attacks led the Administration to realize
that “it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly
enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from
becoming harbors for terrorism, according to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June 2002. According to this thinking, the
instability that is characteristic of “failed states” — where central institutions of
governance and security are unable to function throughout a state’s territory — can
make these states attractive to terrorist groups as bases to threaten U.S. interests.
Although then-U.S. Caspian emissary Elizabeth Jones (she later became
Assistant Secretary of State) in April 2001 carefully elucidated that the United States
would not intervene militarily to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into Central
Asia, this stance was effectively reversed after September 11, 2001. U.S.-led
counter-terrorism efforts were undertaken in Afghanistan, including against terrorists
harbored in Afghanistan who aimed to overthrow Central Asian governments and
who were assisting the Taliban in fighting against the coalition. Added security
training and equipment were provided to the Central Asian states, supplemented by
more aid to promote democratization, human rights, and economic reforms, because
the latter aid addressed “root causes of terrorism,” according to Jones in testimony
in December 2001. She averred that “we rely on [Central Asian] governments for
the security and well-being of our troops, and for vital intelligence,” and that the
United States “will not abandon Central Asia” after peace is achieved in Afghanistan.
In October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary Jones in testimony stressed that “our
big strategic interests [in Central Asia] are not temporary” and that the United States
and its international partners have no alternative but to “be a force for change in the
region.” Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld similarly stressed in February
2004 that “it is Caspian security ... that is important for [the United States] and it is
important to the world that security be assured in that area.”
The 2004 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (The 9/11 Commission) and the President’s 2003 National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism
call for the United States to work with Central Asian and
42 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report — 2005. See also CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
43 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
the Middle East and Central Asia. Hearing: U.S. Policy in Central Asia. Testimony by
Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs
, April
26, 2006.

CRS-23
other countries to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists. The Report
and Strategy also call for assisting the states to democratize, respect human rights,
and develop free markets to reduce underlying vulnerabilities that terrorists seek to
exploit.44
Stressing the ramifications of terrorism in Central Asia to U.S. strategic
interests, then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte testified to
Congress in January 2007 that the “repression, leadership stasis, and corruption that
tend to characterize [Central Asian] regimes provide fertile soil for the development
of radical Islamic sentiment and movements, and raise questions about the Central
Asian states’ reliability as energy and counter-terrorism partners.... In the worst, but
not implausible case, central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate
... opening the door to a dramatic expansion of terrorist and criminal activity along
the lines of a failed state.”45
Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq. U.S. ties to the Central
Asian states appeared generally sound in the immediate wake of U.S.-led coalition
operations in Iraq in March-April 2003 to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. Initial responses in the region ranged from support by
Uzbekistan to some expressions of concern by Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. U.S.
and Iraqi government efforts to contain the escalation of sectarian and insurgent
violence in Iraq, however, have been criticized by some Islamic groups and others in
Central Asia.46
! Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state to join the “coalition of
the willing” that supported upcoming operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan
joined later). Uzbek President Islam Karimov on March 6, 2003,
stated that the Iraq operation was a continuation of “efforts to break
the back of terrorism.” On May 8, his National Security Council
endorsed sending medical and other humanitarian and rebuilding aid
to Iraq, but on August 30, Karimov indicated that plans to send
medics to Iraq had been dropped. He has argued for greater U.S.
attention to terrorist actions in Afghanistan that threaten stability in
Central Asia.
! The Kazakh foreign minister on March 28, 2003, voiced general
support for disarming Iraq but not for military action. However, on
April 24 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that
Saddam’s removal in Iraq enhanced Central Asian and world
security. Reportedly after a U.S. appeal, Nazarbayev proposed and
the legislature in late May approved sending military personnel to
44 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23,
2004; The White House. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 14, 2003.
45 U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Testimony by Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte
, January 11, 2007.
46 CEDR, January 1, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950051; January 6, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950089;
December 29, 2006, Doc. No CEP-950214.

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Iraq. Twenty-seven Kazakh combat engineers arrived in Iraq in late
August 2003 and have served with Polish and Ukrainian units.
! Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhmanov reportedly on March 13,
2003, refused Russia’s request to denounce coalition actions in Iraq.
Tajik political analyst Suhrob Sharipov stated on April 3 that
Tajikistan was neutral regarding U.S.-led coalition actions in Iraq
because Tajikistan had benefitted from U.S. aid to rebuild the
country and from the improved security climate following U.S.-led
actions against terrorism in Afghanistan.
! The Kyrgyz foreign minister on March 20, 2003, expressed “deep
regret” that diplomacy had failed to resolve the Iraq dispute, raised
concerns that an Iraq conflict could destabilize Central Asia, and
proclaimed that the Ganci airbase could not be used for Iraq
operations. During a June 2003 U.S. visit, however, he reportedly
told Vice President Cheney that Kyrgyzstan was ready to send
peacekeepers to Iraq (and Afghanistan). The Kyrgyz defense
minister in April 2004 announced that Kyrgyzstan would not send
troops to Iraq, because of the increased violence there.
! Turkmenistan’s late President Saparmurad Niyazov on March 12,
2003, stated that he was against military action in Iraq and, on April
11, called for the U.N. to head up the creation of a democratic Iraq
and for aid for ethnic Turkmen in Iraq displaced by the fighting.
Designations of Terrorist Organizations. The U.S. government has
moved to classify various groups in the region as terrorist organizations, making
them subject to various sanctions. In September 2000, the State Department
designated the IMU, led by Yuldash, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that
the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American
citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in
Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in
1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by terrorist bin
Laden, according to the State Department, and it stressed that the “United States
supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity
from the violent actions of the IMU.” At the same time, the United States has
stressed that efforts to combat terrorism cannot include widespread human rights
violations. The designation made it illegal for U.S. entities to provide funds or
resources to the IMU; made it possible to deport IMU representatives from, or to
forbid their admission to, the United States; and permitted the seizure of its U.S.
assets. It also permitted the United States to increase intelligence sharing and other
security assistance to Uzbekistan.
On September 20, 2001, President Bush in his address to a Joint Session of
Congress stressed that the IMU was linked to Al Qaeda and demanded that the
Taliban hand over all such terrorists, or they would be targeted by U.S.-led military
forces. According to most observers, the President was stressing that Uzbekistan
should actively support the United States in the Afghan operation.

CRS-25
Among other terrorist groups, CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate
Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, that the IJG “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.” On May 25, 2005, the State
Department designated IJG as a global terrorist group, and on June 1, 2005, the U.N.
Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.
In August 2002, the United States announced that it was freezing any U.S. assets
of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur group operating in
Central Asia, since the group had committed numerous terrorist acts in China and
elsewhere and posed a threat to Americans and U.S. interests. In September 2002,
the United States, China, and other nations asked the U.N. to add ETIM to its
terrorism list. China reported that its military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in
November 2002 were aimed at helping Kyrgyzstan to eliminate the group.
On the other hand, the United States has not yet classified Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)
as a terrorist group. According to the State Department’s Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2001
, “despite [Eurasian] regional governments’ claims, the United States
has not found clear links between Hizb ut-Tahrir and terrorist activities.”47
Reflecting this view, U.S. officials have criticized Central Asian governments for
imprisoning HT members who are not proven to be actively engaged in terrorist
activities, and for imprisoning other political and religious dissidents under false
accusations that they are HT members. According to a November 2002 State
Department factsheet, HT has not advocated the violent overthrow of Central Asian
governments, so the United States has not designated it a Foreign Terrorist
Organization.
The State Department is monitoring HT because it has “clearly incite[d]
violence” since September 11, 2001, such as praising Palestinian suicide attacks
against Israel, denouncing the basing of U.S.-led coalition forces in Central Asia, and
calling for jihad against the United States and the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the
State Department has urged the Central Asian governments to “prosecute their
citizens for illegal acts, not for their beliefs.” Reflecting concerns about violence by
HT, however, German authorities in January 2003 outlawed HT activities in
Germany, declaring that it was a terrorist organization that advocates violence against
Israel and Jews. After the start of coalition operations in Iraq in mid-March 2003,
HT leaflets in Kyrgyzstan allegedly called for Muslims to fight against U.S.
“infidels.”48
U.S. Security Assistance
Besides humanitarian and reform aid, the Administration bolstered its U.S.
security assistance to Central Asia after September 11, 2001. Such aid amounted to
$994 million in cumulative budgeted funds through FY2005, of which the largest
quantity went to Kazakhstan for Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) programs
47 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002. According to
Rashid, the U.S. government debated the status of HT in 2000 but declined to classify it as
a terrorist group. Jihad, pp. 132-135.
48 Washington Post, December 27, 2004, p. A4.

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(see Tables 1 and 2, below). U.S. security assistance to the region has declined
somewhat in absolute terms after FY2002, but in percentage terms has become an
increasingly prominent aid sector. Budgeted security and law enforcement aid to
Central Asia was $187.6 million in FY2002 (all programs and agencies), which was
32% of all aid to the region. Budgeted security and law enforcement assistance
declined to $111.2 million in FY2006 (all programs and agencies), but the percentage
increased to 46% of all aid to the region.
U.S. foreign operations assistance (Function 150 aid, which excludes Defense
and Energy Department and food aid) requested for FY2008 for security assistance
programs increased for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and decreased for the other three
regional states. The total security assistance requested for the region was $35
million, which represented 32% of all Function 150 assistance for Central Asia. The
largest increased request was for Tajikistan, from $6.853 million in FY2006 to a
requested $14.94 million in FY2008. A large part of the boosted aid was requested
for training and equipment for border guards to enhance their counter-terrorism and
counter-proliferation capabilities.
Nonproliferation. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. fears of
nuclear proliferation were focused on nuclear-armed Kazakhstan, and it has received
the bulk of regional CTR and Department of Energy (DOE) aid for de-nuclearization,
enhancing the “chain of custody,” and demilitarization. Some CTR and DOE aid
also has gone to Uzbekistan. Prominent activities in Uzbekistan include the transfer
of eleven kilograms of enriched uranium fuel, including highly enriched uranium, to
Russia in September 2004 with U.S. assistance. Material physical protection aid
provided to Kazakhstan’s Ulba Metallurgical Plant includes alarms, computers for
inventory control, and hardening of doors.49 Aid was provided to help decommission
and secure Kazakhstan’s Aktau reactor.
Agreements were signed at the November 1997 meeting of the U.S.-Kazakh
Joint Commission to study how to safely and securely store over 300 metric tons of
highly-enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel from the Aktau reactor, some of
which had become inundated by the rising Caspian Sea and was highly vulnerable
to theft. Enhanced aid for export controls and customs and border security for
Kazakhstan following reports of conventional arms smuggling, including a 1999
attempted shipment of Soviet-era Migs to North Korea.50 Kazakhstan has received
CTR funds for dismantling equipment and for environmental monitoring at several
Soviet-era chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities.
At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides
signed a CTR Implementation Agreement on securing, dismantling, and de-
contaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid helped
49 Previous U.S. assistance has included removing about 600 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium from an inadequately safeguarded warehouse in Kazakhstan, and shipping it to the
United States (the operation was codenamed “Project Sapphire”). In 1995, the U.S.
Defense Department assisted Kazakhstan in sealing tunnels at the Semipalitinsk former
nuclear test site, to secure nuclear wastes.
50 CEDR, February 17, 2001, Doc. No. CEP-120.

CRS-27
keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. On June 5, 2001,
then-Secretary of State Powell signed his first international agreement, extending
new CTR assistance to Uzbekistan. The United States assisted in cleaning up a
Soviet-era CBW testing site and dump on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where Western media in June 1999 had reported the
alarming discovery of live anthrax spores.51
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 1306)
provided for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in Sec.
1203 of P.L. 103-160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certified that the
waiver was necessary for national security and submitted a report outlining why the
waiver was necessary and how he planned to promote future compliance with the
restrictions on CTR aid.52 Although Russian arms control compliance appeared to
be the main reason for the restrictions, on December 30, 2003 (for FY2004), and on
December 14, 2004 (for FY2005), the President explained that Uzbekistan’s human
rights problems necessitated a waiver. The waiver authority under this act,
exercisable each fiscal year, expired at the end of FY2005, but the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163; Sec. 1303) amended the language to
eliminate an expiration date for the exercise of yearly waivers. In the 110th Congress,
Senator Sam Nunn introduced S. 198 on September 8, 2007, to amend P.L.103-160
to eliminate the restrictions on CTR aid, including respect for human rights.
Although waivers can be and are exercised when the conditions are not met, he
stated, the lengthy process of making determinations and exercising waivers threatens
the primary U.S. national security goal of combating WMD.53
Counter-Narcotics Aid. According to the State Department and U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), drugs produced in or transiting Central Asia have not
yet reached the United States in major quantities. However, there is rising U.S.
concern, since Latin American and other international organized groups have become
involved in the Central Asian drug trade, and European governments have begun to
focus on combating drug trafficking through this new route. U.S. policy also
emphasizes the threat of rising terrorism, crime, corruption, and instability posed by
illegal narcotics production, use, and trafficking in Central Asia. The FBI, DEA, and
Customs have given training in counter-narcotics to police, customs, and border
control personnel in Central Asia as part of the Anti-Crime Training and Technical
Assistance Program sponsored by the State Department’s Bureau of International
51 Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan YeleukeNovember Former
Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan,
Center for Non-Proliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999; CEDR, November 20, 2002, Doc.
No. CEP-139.
52 The six restrictions in P.L. 103-160 call for CTR recipients to be committed to
dismantling WMD if they have so pledged, foregoing excessive military buildups,
eschewing re-use in new nuclear weapons of components of destroyed weapons, facilitating
verification of weapons destruction, complying with arms control agreements, and observing
internationally recognized human rights.
53 Congressional Record, January 8, 2007, pp. S237-S238. Language similar to S. 198 was
included in S. 328, Ensuring Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report Act,
introduced on January 17, 2007.

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Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Some Central Asian drug officials also
have received training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest
and by the U.S. Coast Guard. Other U.S. aid is provided through the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC).54
Since the bulk of opiates enter Central Asia from Afghanistan, where they are
produced, U.S. assistance for drug control efforts in Afghanistan can have an effect
on trafficking in Central Asia. Among programs undertaken in Central Asia, an
agreement went into force with Kazakhstan in 2003 to provide counter-narcotics
training and equipment for police and border guards. In 2004, the State Department
sponsored two British Customs agents who provided training on drug profiling and
search techniques to police and border guards. The State Department also provided
equipment to the National Forensics Laboratory and the Statistics Committee of the
Prosecutor’s Office, which targets drug trafficking organizations, and provided
training to nearly 700 personnel of the Prosecutor’s Office on investigative
techniques.
With U.S. assistance, Kyrgyzstan in 2004 set up a Drug Control Agency, and
the United States and UNODC have provided guidance for hiring police and staff.
In Tajikistan, DEA plans to open an office in Dushanbe in 2007. In Uzbekistan, U.S.
assistance was provided under the aegis of a 2001 U.S.-Uzbek Agreement on
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance. Training was provided to
facilitate investigating and prosecuting narcotics trafficking cases. The DEA
sponsored a Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) that was set up in the Interior
Ministry. The SIU conducted several undercover and international operations and
contributed to dramatic increases in drug seizures. In FY2004-FY2005, the Defense
Department provided some counter-narcotics training and equipment, including two
patrol boats delivered to border guards on the Afghan border. A Resident U.S. Legal
Advisor helped Uzbekistan draft counter-drug legislation. No U.S. assistance for
counter-narcotics was provided to Uzbekistan in FY2006, according to the State
Department, but the Administration has requested some drug demand reduction
assistance for Uzbekistan for FY2008.
To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, the emergency
supplemental for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provided $242 million for Central Asia and
Afghanistan. The emergency supplemental for FY2006 (P.L. 109-234) provided
$150 million for Central Asia and Afghanistan (of which about $30 million was
recommended for Central Asia).
Military Cooperation. The United States and the Central Asian states signed
defense cooperation accords prior to September 11, 2001, that provided frameworks
for aid and joint staff and working group contacts and facilitated enhanced
cooperation after September 11, 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission, such pre-
September 11, 2001, ties included Uzbek permission for U.S. clandestine efforts
54 U.S. State Department. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1, 2007;
U.S. Department of State. U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with
Eurasia
, FY2005 Annual Report, March 7, 2006.

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against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.55 According to Assistant Secretary of Defense
Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central
Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.”
Kyrgyzstan, he relates, is a “critical regional partner” in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF; military actions in Afghanistan), providing basing for combat and combat
support units at Manas Airport (at the U.S.-designated Ganci airbase) for U.S. and
other coalition forces.
Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad and a base
for German units at Termez, and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid
via the Friendship Bridge at Termez. It also leased to the coalition IL-76 transport
airlift for forces and equipment. Kazakhstan provided overflight rights and expedited
rail transhipment of supplies. Turkmenistan permitted blanket overflight and
refueling privileges for humanitarian flights in support of OEF. Tajikistan permitted
use of its international airport in Dushanbe for U.S., British, and French refueling and
basing. While the Administration has rejected the idea of permanent military bases
in these states, Crouch stated in June 2002 that “for the foreseeable future, U.S.
defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to
deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian
control.
According to a late November 2002 State Department fact sheet, the United
States does not intend to establish permanent military bases in Central Asia but does
seek long-term security ties and access to military facilities in the region for the
foreseeable future to deter or defeat terrorist threats. The fact sheet also emphasizes
that the U.S. military presence in the region likely will remain as long as operations
continue in Afghanistan. In mid-2004, tents at the Ganci airbase reportedly were
being replaced with metal buildings. U.S. officers allegedly denied that the buildings
were permanent but averred that there was no end yet in sight for operations in
Afghanistan.
The Overseas Basing Commission (OBC), in its May 2005 Report, concurred
with the Administration that existing bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been
useful for supporting OEF. The OBC considered that there could be some possible
merit in establishing cooperative security locations in the region but urged Congress
to seek further inter-agency vetting of “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area
that would require [a] long-term U.S. presence.”56
Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States fostered military-to-military
cooperation through NATO’s PFP, which all the Central Asian states except
Tajikistan had joined by mid-1994. With encouragement from the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM), Tajikistan indicated in mid-2001 that it would join PFP,
and it signed accords on admission in February 2002. At the signing, a NATO press
release hailed Tajikistan’s support to the coalition as “of key importance” to
55 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11
Commission). Final Report, July 23, 2004, p. 197.
56 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.
Interim Report, May 9, 2005.

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combating international terrorism. Central Asian officers and troops have
participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have
participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997. Many in Central Asia viewed
these exercises as “sending a message” to Islamic extremists and others in
Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering regional instability. Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan appeared to vie to gain services from NATO.
U.S. security accords were concluded with several Central Asian states after
September 11, 2001. These include a U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic
Partnership signed on March 12, 2002, that included a nonspecific security guarantee.
The United States affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external
threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent
basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military cooperation,
including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan. Similarly, visiting
Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and President Bush issued a joint statement on
September 23, 2002, pledging to deepen the strategic partnership, including
cooperation in counter-terrorism, and the United States highlighted its aid for
Kyrgyzstan’s border security and military capabilities.
All the states except Tajikistan became eligible in FY1997 to receive non-lethal
defense articles and services (Presidential Determination No. 97-19), including FMF
grants through the PFP program. Tajikistan became eligible in FY2002 (Presidential
Determination No. 2002-15). FMF aid supports military interoperability with NATO
and participation in PFP exercises, and has included communications equipment,
computers, medical items, and English language and NCO training. In February
2000, the United States transferred sixteen military transport vehicles to the Uzbek
military to enhance interoperability with NATO forces, the first sizeable military
equipment to be provided under the FMF program to Central Asia.
The principal components of foreign military assistance to Central Asia are
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), the Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the
Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS), and transfers of Excess Defense
Articles (EDA). The states received about $6.9 million in FMF aid in FY2001,
which was boosted after September 11, 2001, to $55.7 million in FY2002 (over $36
million of which went to Uzbekistan). FMF aid dropped to $16.1 million in FY2003
and continued to decline. The Administration requested $4.2 million in FMF for
FY2008. Some of this reduction since FY2004 is due to conditions placed on
assistance to Uzbekistan (see below). For FY2006, the conferees on H.R. 3057 (P.L.
109-102; Foreign Operations Appropriations; H.Rept. 109-265) directed that no FMF
funds be provided to Uzbekistan. The states also are eligible to receive Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis, to enhance interoperability with NATO
(P.L. 109-102 directs that EDA are to be included in aid to Uzbekistan subject to
conditionality).
The IMET program supports PFP by providing English language training to
military officers and exposure to democratic civil-military relations and respect for
human rights. The CTFP, a Defense Department program, complements IMET but
focuses on special operations training for officers. Central Asian officers also receive
training at the Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany to enhance

CRS-31
security, foster bilateral and multilateral partnerships, improve defense-related
decision-making, and strengthen cooperation, according to the Defense Department.
The State and Defense Departments reported that 784 personnel from Central Asia
received IMET, CTFP, RCSS, or other training in FY2004 and 1,118 personnel in
FY2005. For IMET, funding for Central Asia increased in FY2006, and the
Administration has requested an increase for Central Asia for FY2008, indicating
the continuing importance the Administration attaches to this program.57
USCENTCOM in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement
activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia (the region was previously under
the aegis of European Command). It states that its peacetime strategy focuses on
PFP, RCSS, and IMET programs to promote ties between the regional military forces
and U.S. and NATO forces, and to foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable
of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs” in the region.
USCENTCOM Commanders visited the region regularly, setting the stage for more
extensive military ties post-September 11, 2001. Besides these continuing visits by
USCENTCOM Commanders, other U.S. military officials, including former Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld, regularly have toured the region.
A U.S.-Uzbek Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed on October 7,
2001, and the air campaign against Afghanistan began an hour later.58 The SOFA
provided for use of Uzbek airspace and for up to 1,500 U.S. troops to use a Soviet-
era airbase (termed Karshi-Khanabad or K2) 90 miles north of the Afghan border
near the towns of Karshi and Khanabad. In exchange, the United States provided
security guarantees and agreed that terrorists belonging to the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) who were fighting alongside Taliban and Al Qaeda forces would
be targeted. According to some reports, the problems in negotiating the U.S.-Uzbek
SOFA further spurred the United States to seek airfield access at the Manas
International Airport in Kyrgyztan, which in early 2002 became the primary hub for
operations in Afghanistan.59 U.S. military engineers upgraded runways at the Manas
airfield and built an encampment next to the airport, naming it the Peter J. Ganci
airbase, in honor of a U.S. fireman killed in New York on September 11, 2001.
Besides these airbases, Uzbekistan also has provided a base for about 300
German troops at Termez and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via
the Friendship Bridge at Termez. Over 100 French troops have used the Dushanbe
57 U.S. Departments of Defense and State. Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to
Congress, FY2005-FY2006
, September 2006; Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to
Congress, FY2004-FY2005
, April 2005.
58 The State Department. Fact Sheet, November 27, 2002; Supporting Air and Space
Expeditionary Forces
, RAND, 2005. Some classified US-Uzbek cooperation against the
Taliban and Al Qaeda had been carried out before September 11, 2001.
59 Deborah E. Klepp. The U.S. Needs a Base Where? How the U.S. Established an Air Base
in the Kyrgyz Republic
, National Defense University, 2004. Perhaps in contrast to the more
visible air operations, Uzbekistan more readily accommodated less visible special
operations. See Senate Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats.
Statement by General Charles R. Holland, Commander, Special Operations Command,
March 12, 2002.

CRS-32
airport in Tajikistan for refueling and humanitarian shipments. Kazakhstan has
allowed overflight and transhipment rights, and U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed
in 2002 on the emergency use of Kazakhstan’s Almaty airport and on military-to-
military relations. Turkmenistan, which has sought to remain neutral, allowed the
use of its bases for refueling and humanitarian trans-shipments. Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have sent several military liaison officers to
USCENTCOM.
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7; signed into law
on February 20, 2003) forbade FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the government
of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Uzbekistan
was making substantial progress in meeting its commitments to democratize and
respect human rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbade assistance to the government of
Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly
had improved its human rights record during the preceding six months. Unlike the
case with Uzbekistan, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive the
requirement on national security grounds. The Secretary reported in May 2003 that
Uzbekistan was making such progress and in July 2003 that Kazakhstan was making
progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress.
These conditions were retained in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004,
including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199), while clarifying that the prohibition
covered assistance to the central government of Uzbekistan and specifying that
conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a “genuine” multi-party
system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and media.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005, including Foreign Operations (P.L.
108-447, Section 578) and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L.
109-102) retained the conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
On July 13, 2004, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced
that, despite some “encouraging progress” in respecting human rights, up to $18
million in military and economic aid would be withheld because of “lack of progress
on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners on the ground.”
Some affected programs were retained through use of “notwithstanding” authority
(after consultation with Congress) and some aid was reprogrammed, so about $7
million was actually cut. IMET and FMF programs, which are conditioned on
respect for human rights, reportedly were among those affected. The then-Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, during a visit to Uzbekistan in
August 2004, criticized the cutoff of programs as “shortsighted” and not
“productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence. Reportedly, he stated that
Defense Department nonproliferation aid would amount to $21 million in FY2004
and pointed out that fourteen patrol boats worth $2.9 million were being transferred,
perhaps to reassure the Uzbeks of U.S. interest in their security.60
60 According to Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, FY2004-FY2005, 99
Uzbek officers received training through the IMET program in FY2004. The report also
lists a FY2004 FMF training “activity” for the Uzbek armed forces funded at $288,700.

CRS-33
For FY2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reported to Congress in May
2005 that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but
that she had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds. The Secretary of
State in FY2005 did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was
making significant progress in respecting human rights, so Section 578 aid
restrictions remained in place.61 The State Department reported that it used
notwithstanding authority to allocate $4.16 million in aid to Uzbekistan for reforming
health care, promoting better treatment of detainees, combating HIV/AIDS,
combating trafficking in drugs and persons, and supporting World Trade
Organization accession.
For FY2006, Secretary of State Rice reported to Congress in May 2006 that
Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but that she
had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds. She did not determine and
report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting
human rights, so Section 586 restrictions remained in place. According to the State
Department, notwithstanding authority was used to allocate some of the aid.
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
signed a declaration at an SCO summit that stated that “as large-scale military
operations against terrorism have come to an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member
states maintain that the relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition should set a
deadline for the temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the SCO member
states and for their military presence in these countries.”62 Despite this declaration,
none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for closing the coalition bases.
However, after the United States and others interceded so that refugees who fled
from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded
that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the
United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps
indicative of the reversal of U.S. military-to-military and other ties, former pro-U.S.
defense minister Qodir Gulomov was convicted of treason and received seven years
in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase in
Kyrgyzstan.63 In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that
lease payments for use of the Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million
per year and at the same time re-affirmed Russia’s free use of its nearby base.64
61 According to Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, FY2005-FY2006,
FMF funding was used in Uzbekistan in FY2005 to train 112 students in non-commissioned
officer leadership. No funding for IMET is reported in FY2005.
62 CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.
63 According to a mid-2006 report, nine million pounds of fuel were being off-loaded and
4,000 tons of cargo and 13,500 people were being transported each month through Manas
to Afghanistan. USAFE/CC Revisits Manas, Impressed with Improvements, US Fed News,
July 10, 2006.
64 For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at
(continued...)

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Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in June 2006 unfavorably compared U.S.
foreign policy to Russia’s policy toward the other Soviet successor states (particularly
toward Uzbekistan). He stated that Russia had “careful” relations with them since
they were still “weak and vulnerable” instead of trying to “impose standards” on
them. He argued that “I understand the dissatisfaction of the United States with the
fact that Uzbekistan has closed [K2]. But if they didn’t behave there like a bull in a
china shop, maybe the base would not have been closed.” Outgoing U.S.
Ambassador to Tajikistan Richard Hoagland strongly responded that “to assume that
these nations are subject to orders from ... Europe or North America ... is
embarrassingly simplistic, offensively paternalistic, and ... does not correspond to
reality. To call these republics fragile is equally paternalistic.... Some clear-eyed
leaders in [Central Asia] desire strongly to build their nation’s independence and
sovereignty. Some others are willing to sell their state and even their own soul to the
highest bidder for their own and their family’s short-term personal and political
gain.... It would most definitely not be to [the advantage of Central Asian states] to
become the Junior Partners in a new Warsaw Pact or Tashkent Pact.... We have no
intention to create a new bloc to exercise control.... [All countries] need to work to
integrate Central Asia into the world community.”65
Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as
setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and Chinese
influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided
continuing influence and that U.S. criticism of human rights abuses might pay future
dividends among regional populations.66
On July 14, 2006, the United States and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement that
the two sides had resolved the issue of the continued U.S. use of airbase facilities at
Manas. Although not specifically mentioning U.S. basing payments, it was
announced that the United States would provide $150 million in “total assistance and
compensation over the next year,” subject to congressional approval (some reports
indicated that the “rent” portion of this amount would be $17-$20 million). Kyrgyz
Security Council Secretary Miroslav Niyazov and U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense
Secretary James MacDougall also signed a Protocol of Intentions affirming that the
United States would compensate the Kyrgyz government and businesses for goods,
services, and support of coalition operations. Some observers suggested that
increased terrorist activities in Afghanistan and a May 2006 terrorist incursion from
Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan may have contributed to a Kyrgyz evaluation that the U.S.
coalition presence was still necessary. Visiting Central Asia in late July 2006,
USCENTCOM’s then-head Gen. John Abizaid stated that the United States probably
64 (...continued)
Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
65 “Putin Supports Uzbek President to Avoid Afghan Scenario,” Interfax, June 16, 2006;
U.S. Embassy, Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Richard E. Hoagland. Sovereign States Make Their
Own Decisions,
June 19, 2006.
66 On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency,
Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” China and
Eurasia Forum Quarterly
, May 2006.

CRS-35
would eventually reduce its military presence in the region while increasing its
military-to-military cooperation.67
Following the shooting death of a civilian by a U.S. serviceman at the U.S.-
leased Ganci airbase in Kyrgyzstan on December 6, 2006, President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev the next day reportedly ordered his foreign ministry to re-examine
provisions of a late 2001 status of forces agreement precluding U.S. soldiers serving
in Kyrgyzstan from prosecution in local courts. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that the
soldier not leave Kyrgyzstan until the completion of its investigation. In late March
2007, the chairman of the Defense Committee of the legislature called for the closure
of the Ganci airbase, but President Bakiyev in early April 2007 argued that the
airbase benefitted Kyrgyzstan.68
Safety of U.S. Citizens and Investments
The U.S. State Department advises U.S. citizens and firms that there are dangers
of terrorism in the region, including from ETIM, IMU, and Al Qaeda. Groups such
as Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) also foment anti-Americanism. The Peace Corps pulled
personnel out of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan after September 11,
2001, but in a policy aimed at fostering pro-U.S. views among Islamic peoples,
personnel were re-deployed by mid-2002 (Uzbekistan declined Peace Corps services
in 2005). U.S. military personnel in the region mostly stay on base, and travel in
groups off base to maximize their safety.
In the wake of the November 2002 coup attempt in Turkmenistan, the State
Department advised U.S. citizens to carefully consider travel to Turkmenistan
because of the heightened security tensions. One U.S. citizen was held for several
weeks in connection with the coup attempt. Uzbekistan had no known incidents of
damage to Western firms or politically-motivated violence against U.S. personnel
until the bombing of the U.S. embassy in July 2004. The risks of political violence
and kidnaping are high in Tajikistan, and the State Department advises U.S. citizens
to avoid travel to areas near the Afghan and Kyrgyz borders and in the Karategin
Valley and Tavildara region. In June 2001, members of an international humanitarian
group that included one U.S. citizen were taken hostage in Tajikistan, but were soon
released. Kazakhstan, though viewed as low risk for political violence, including
insurrections, has had economic protests that potentially could involve Western
firms. Some observers have suggested that U.S. policies regarded with disfavor by
many Muslims in the region, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and subsequent
problems in Iraq, could harm the U.S. image and perhaps increase dangers to the
safety of U.S. citizens and property.
Among reported plots against U.S. military targets, an Uzbek court in November
2004 sentenced sixteen people to 12-17 years in prison for planning to bomb the U.S.
coalition airbase at Karshi-Khanabad. Kyrgyz officials announced in November
2003 that individuals trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan had been arrested for
67 Associated Press, July 24, 2006.
68 CEDR, March 23, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950167; April 7, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950139.

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planning to bomb the U.S. Ganci airbase.69 Kyrgyz media reported in July 2004 that
the outgoing U.S. Ganci base commander thanked Kyrgyz authorities for helping to
thwart three planned terrorist attacks on the base.
In all the Central Asian states, widespread corruption is an obstacle to U.S. firms
seeking to invest. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, U.S. firms have reported that
corruption is pervasive throughout the central and regional governments and most
sectors of the economy, and is an obstacle to U.S. investment. Corruption allegedly
is rampant in the Uzbek government, with bureaucrats seeking bribes as business
“consultants.” Some officials have been prosecuted for corruption. In Tajikistan,
there is little effort to combat corruption and anti-corruption laws are inadequate. In
terms of crime, the State Department warns that Western investment property and
personnel are not safe in Tajikistan, and that crime rates are increasing in all the
states (though rates are lower than in many other countries).70
Embassy Security. Immediately after September 11, 2001, U.S. embassies
in the region were placed on heightened alert because of the danger of terrorism.
They have remained on alert because of the ongoing threat of terrorism in the region.
The IMU explained that the suicide bombing of the U.S. embassy in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, in July 2004 was motivated by U.S. support for Karimov and U.S.
opposition to Islam. No embassy personnel were injured. Embassy personnel also
may have faced greater danger to their personal safety after Uzbek officials accused
the embassy of orchestrating and financing the May 2005 uprising in Andijon. Since
late 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan has restricted official travel to areas south
and west of Osh because of the threat of terrorism and presence of land mines along
the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border and in the Batken region. During the Tajik civil war, U.S.
personnel faced various threats and some embassy personnel were evacuated during
flare-ups of fighting. Two U.S. Embassy guards were killed in Dushanbe in February
1997 while off-site but in uniform.
After the bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998,
and intense fighting in Dushanbe, U.S. embassy facilities in Dushanbe were deemed
to be vulnerable and diplomatic staff were moved to Almaty in Kazakhstan. Some
operations were resumed in 2000 and more were resumed in the wake of September
11, 2001. U.S. government personnel in Tajikistan often must travel in the
embassy’s armored cars with bodyguards, and are occasionally restricted from travel
to certain areas because of safety concerns. U.S. officials have judged the embassy
to be highly vulnerable to terrorism, including threats from the IMU and Al Qaeda.71
The 2007 Crime and Safety Report warns that U.S. commercial interests could
69 CEDR, November 6, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-185; April 22, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-77; and
July 7, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-164.
70 U.S. Department of State. Kazakhstan 2007 Crime & Safety Report, February 8, 2007.
71 Rashid, p. 166. U.S. Embassy Dushanbe. Warden’s Report, July 17, 2005; Warden
Message
, December 17, 2005.

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become potential targets of opportunity in Tajikistan, in part because the U.S.
embassy in Tajikistan had become more secure (see below).72
Pakistani police in June 2002 reported the apprehension of three Uighurs with
photographs and plans of U.S. embassies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The U.S.
Embassy in Beijing accused ETIM of working with Al Qaeda to plan the attack
against the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.73 In July 2005, the U.S. Embassy in
Kyrgyzstan issued a Warden Message announcing that it had bolstered its security
posture, and in October 2005 the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs
warned that there continued to be indications that terrorist groups might be planning
possible future attacks against U.S. interests in Kyrgyzstan, so the U.S. Embassy in
Bishkek continued to maintain a heightened security posture. In September 2006, a
U.S. military officer serving at the Ganci airbase in Kyrgyzstan allegedly was
kidnaped but was eventually released. The 2007 Crime and Safety Report for
Kazakhstan warns that increasing numbers of U.S. diplomats and other official
personnel, including several Peace Corps volunteers, have been victims of crime.
Conferees on H.R. 4775 (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002;
P.L.107-206) approved $20.3 million for opening and securing diplomatic posts in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan and Kabul, Afghanistan. Among other diplomatic premises in
the region, Congress approved State Department requests for FY2002 and for
FY2003 for designing and building secure embassy facilities in Tashkent, Uzbekistan
and in Kazakhstan’s new capital of Astana. The new embassy compound in
Tashkent opened in February 2006 and that in Astana was dedicated in November
2006.
Issues for Congress
Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and
reforms in Central Asia and other NIS. Attention has included several hearings and
legislation, the latter including earmarks at times for aid for Kyrgyzstan, sense of
Congress provisions on U.S. policy toward Central Asia, statements and resolutions
concerning violations of human rights in the region, and endorsements of aid for
energy development. (For details, see CRS Report RL32866, U.S. Assistance to the
Former Soviet Union
, by Curt Tarnoff.)
Should the United States Play a Prominent Role
in Central Asia?

The Administration and others have argued that the United States should
emphasize ties with the Central Asian states. They maintain that U.S. interests do not
perfectly coincide with those of its coalition partners and friends, that Turkey and
other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the
strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for
human rights in these new states. They stress that U.S. leadership in world efforts
72 U.S. Department of State. Tajikistan 2007 Crime & Safety Report, January 17, 2007.
73 TASS, June 30, 2002; ABC World News Tonight, June 14, 2002.

CRS-38
to provide humanitarian and economic reform aid will help alleviate the high levels
of social distress that are exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups seeking
new members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a
democratizing Russia in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and
investment strengthen the independence of the states and their openness to the West
and forestall Russian or Chinese attempts to (re-)subjugate the region.
Those who object to a more forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia argue that
the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and that as peace
is established in Afghanistan, the region again will be less important to U.S. interests.
They advocate limited U.S. involvement undertaken along with Turkey and other
friends and coalition partners to ensure general U.S. goals of preventing strife,
fostering democratization and regional cooperation, and improving human rights and
the quality of life. Some objections to a forward U.S. policy might appear less salient
given September 11, 2001, and other recent developments. For instance, it no longer
seems possible to argue that anti-Western Islamic extremism will never threaten
secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests.
What Are U.S. Interests in Central Asia?
Although a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and
others on the general desirability of fostering such objectives in Central Asia as
democratization, the creation of free markets, trade and investment, integration with
the West, and responsible security policies, there are varying views on the levels and
types of U.S. involvement. Uzbekistan’s decision in mid-2005 to ask the United
States to vacate K2 has spurred the debate over what role the United States should
play in the region. Some analysts argue that the region is “strategically tangential”
to U.S. concerns for the stability of Afghanistan, Russia, China, Turkey, and the
Persian Gulf, and for combating global human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation,
and drug trafficking.74 They point to the dangers of civil and ethnic conflict and
terrorism in the region as reasons for the United States to eschew major involvement
that might place U.S. personnel and citizens at risk. These analysts call for
withdrawing U.S. military personnel from the region and depending on U.S. rapid
deployments from other bases outside the region.75
Many of those who endorse continued or enhanced U.S. support for Central
Asia argue that the United States has a vital interest in preventing the region from
becoming an Afghanistan-like hotbed of terrorism aimed against U.S. interests.76
They argue that political instability in Central Asia can produce spillover effects in
important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey. They also
assert that the United States has a major interest in preventing outside terrorist
regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials and
74 Amy Jaffe, in Gennadiy Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 150.
75 Wishnick, p. 35.
76 Charles Fairbanks, The National Interest, Summer 2002, pp. 45-53.

CRS-39
technology from the region. They also advocate the greater diversification of world
energy supplies as a U.S. national security interest (see below, Energy Resources).
Calling for greater U.S. policy attention to Central Asia and South Caucusus,
Senator Sam Brownback introduced “Silk Road” legislation in the 105th and 106th
Congresses. Similar legislation was sponsored in the House by Representative
Benjamin Gilman (105th) and Representative Doug Bereuter (106th).77 In introducing
the Silk Road Act in the 106th Congress, Senator Brownback pointed out that the
Central Asian and South Caucasian states are “caught between world global forces
that seek to have them under their control.” To counter such forces, he argued, the
United States should emphasize democratization, the creation of free markets, and
the development of energy and trade with the region to bolster its independence and
pro-Western orientations. The Silk Road language was eventually enacted by
reference in H.R. 3194 (Istook), Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000, and
signed into law on November 29, 1999 (P.L. 106-113). The Silk Road language calls
for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs,
economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications,
border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian
and Central Asian states.
Other congressional initiatives include the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L.
106-280; signed into law on October 6, 2000), which authorizes aid to combat
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and conventional weapons proliferation
in the New Independent States. It authorized $45.5 million in FY2001-FY2002 to
assist GUAM to carry out provisions of the Silk Road Act to strengthen national
control of borders and to promote independence and territorial sovereignty.
What Roles Should Outside Powers Play in the Region?
Although many U.S. policymakers argue that a democratizing Russia could play
a positive role in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and
investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts
to dominate the region. Some observers warn that a more authoritarian Russia might
soon seek to reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire. Others, however, discount
such plans by a Russia facing immense internal economic, political, ethnic, and
military disorder, but nonetheless endorse close monitoring of Russian activities that
might infringe on the independence of the Soviet successor states. Some appear to
acquiesce to Russia’s argument of historic rights to a “sphere of influence” in Central
Asia that provides a reduced scope for U.S. involvement. Russia’s intentions in the
region have become more murky since it has faltered in democratizing, according to
many observers.
According to some observers, Administration policy should focus more clearly
on refereeing Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence in the region, since these states
77 The Silk Road language amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding a chapter
12. The chapter supercedes or draws authority from the Freedom Support Act (P.L. 102-
511), which constitutes chapter 11 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and adds
otherwise to the authority of the Freedom Support Act.

CRS-40
are bound to play roles in the region, with the aim of maximizing the independence
of the Central Asian states and protecting U.S. interests. U.S. interests may
correspond to other outside states’ interests in political and economic stability and
improved transport in the region, so that the coordination of some activities in the
region becomes possible.78 Alternatively, U.S. interests might conflict with those of
Russia, Iran, or China, leading to compromises, tradeoffs, or deadlock. The U.S.
interest in restricting Iran’s financial ability to sponsor international terrorism, for
instance, may conflict with desires by Central Asian states to build pipelines through
Iran. U.S.-Iranian rapprochement might contribute to a less hostile Iranian attitude
toward U.S. regional investment. Poor U.S.-Iranian relations and questions about
Russia’s role contributed to U.S. support for the BTC pipeline. While the
Administration has supported a role for Turkey in the region, others argue that its
disagreements in 2003 with U.S. policy toward Iraq indicate that it may not serve
optimally as a proxy for U.S. interests in Central Asia.
The United States and Russia agreed to set up a working group on Afghanistan
in June 2000 that assumed greater importance in the Bush Administration,
particularly after September 11, 2001. Headed on the U.S. side by then-First Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage and on the Russian side by Vyacheslav
Trubnikov, it was central to obtaining Russian acquiescence to the U.S. use of
military facilities in Central Asia, with Armitage visiting Moscow just days after
September 11, 2001. In May 2002, the group’s mandate reportedly was expanded to
more broadly cover counter-terrorism in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and South
Asia. At the meeting in January 2003, Armitage reportedly reiterated that the United
States would pull its troops out of Central Asia at the end of the anti-terrorism
campaign in Afghanistan. At meetings in December 2005 and September 2006, the
two sides proclaimed that they were cooperating on countering terrorism in
Afghanistan.
How Significant Are Regional Energy Resources
to U.S. Interests?

The Bush Administration’s national energy policy report, released in May 2001,
posited that the exploitation of Caspian energy resources could not only benefit the
economies of the region, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions, a
major U.S. security goal. It recommended that the President direct U.S. agencies to
support building the BTC pipeline, facilitate oil companies operating in Kazakhstan
to use the pipeline, support constructing a Baku-Turkey natural gas pipeline to export
Azerbaijani gas, and otherwise encourage the Caspian regional states to provide a
stable and inviting business climate for energy and infrastructure development. It
averred that the building of the pipelines will enhance energy supply diversification,
78 U.S. Policy Priorities in Central Asia: Report of an Atlantic Council Delegation Visit, The
Atlantic Council, 1998, p. 2; Lena Jonson, Central Asia & Caucasus Newsletter, No. 1,
2003. On U.S. cooperation in a “regional concert,” see Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick
Staar, C. Richard Nelson, and Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Asia,
The Atlantic Council and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, January 2001. See also
Stephen Blank, The Future of Transcaspian Security, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College,
August 2002, pp. 30-31.

CRS-41
including for Georgia and Turkey.79 Caspian regional oil exports from Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan might have constituted about 1% of world oil exports,
and gas exports might have constituted about 2% in 2004, according to the U.S.
Energy Department.80 Oil and gas exports are projected to increase in coming years,
making these countries of incremental significance as world suppliers, according to
this view.
Critics of Administration policy question the economic viability of BTC and
trans-Caspian pipeline routes given uncertainties about regional stability, ownership
of Caspian Sea fields, world oil and gas prices, and the size of regional reserves.
They question whether the oil and other natural resources in these new states are vital
to U.S. security and point out that they are, in any event, unlikely to be fully available
to Western markets for many years. Analyst Amy Jaffe argues that Caspian energy
“hardly seems worth the risks” of an enhanced U.S. presence.81
Some of those who oppose U.S. policy also juxtapose an emphasis on energy
development in these states to what they term the neglect of broader-based economic
reforms that they argue would better serve the population of the region. Other critics
argue that the Administration’s policy against energy routes and projects involving
Iran makes it more likely that the Central Asian states will have to rely for several
more years on Russia’s willingness to export their oil and gas.
What U.S. Security Involvement is Appropriate?
The events of September 11, 2001, transformed the U.S. security relationship
with Central Asia, as the region actively supported U.S.-led coalition anti-terrorism
efforts in Afghanistan. These efforts were a top U.S. national security concern, but
a major question is how the region may be regarded if Afghanistan becomes more
stable. Some observers advocate maintaining the U.S. security relationship even if
Afghanistan becomes more stable and the threat of Al Qaeda and other terrorism
based in the area recedes. They stress that Central Asia was host to Soviet-era
weapons of mass destruction and associated research and development facilities, and
79 Among Congressional action, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1998
(P.L. 105-118) stated that the Central Asian and South Caucasian states are a major East-
West transport route and contain substantial oil and gas reserves that will increase the
diversity of supplies to the United States. Congress urged targeting policy and aid to
support independence, friendly relations, conflict resolution, democracy, free markets,
integration with the West, and U.S. business and investment in these states. The conferees
on Omnibus Appropriations for FY1999 (including foreign operations; P.L. 105-277)
recommended that up to $10 million be made available to promote Turkmen energy
development, and endorsed an east-west energy corridor that would exclude building
pipelines through Iran.
80 Percentages derived from data on production, consumption, and exports by the Energy
Department, Energy Information Administration, [http://www.eia.doe.gov/]. See also CRS
Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, by Bernard A. Gelb.
81 Jaffe, pp. 145, 150. See also Kazakhstan Unlikely to Be Major Source of Oil for the
United States
, GAO, March 1994, pp. 2-3; Bulent Aliriza, Caspian Energy Update, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, August 24, 2000.

CRS-42
that residual technologies, materials, and personnel might fall prey to terrorist states
or groups. They view military education and training programs as fostering the
creation of a professional, Western-style military and democratic civil-military
relations, and reducing chances of military coups. Training that these militaries
receive through PFP is multinational in scope, involving cooperation among regional
militaries, with the purpose of spurring these states to continue to work together.
They also argue that as Iran increases its military capabilities, including missiles and
possibly nuclear weapons, the Central Asian states may necessarily seek closer
countervailing ties with the United States. They argue that a major dilemma of
current policy is that while the United States proclaims vital interests in the region,
it also states that military basing arrangements are temporary. This makes the U.S.
commitment appear uncertain, spurring the Central Asian states to continue their
search for security ties with other outside powers, these analysts warn.
The question of who the United States should partner with in Central Asia is
also topical. Before Uzbekistan requested in mid-2005 that the United States vacate
K2, it seemed that some in the Administration emphasized the strategic importance
of building ties with Uzbekistan. Others emphasized ties with Kazakhstan. In the
case of Uzbekistan, its central location in the region and sizeable population and
other resources (including energy) were stressed. Energy and other resources were
also stressed in the case of Kazakhstan, as well as its huge territory and lengthy
borders. Some observers argued that Uzbekistan was more likely to become unstable
because of its more authoritarian government, so was a less suitable U.S. strategic
partner. Recently, it appears that the Administration is emphasizing security ties
with Kazakhstan. Some observers argue that Kazakhstan’s long border with Russia
makes it likely to continue close security ties with Russia.82
Critics of greater U.S. security involvement in the region argue that the United
States should primarily seek to encourage regional demilitarization. They oppose
providing formal security guarantees to regional states and urge the pullout of U.S.
bases once the Taliban threat has abated and Al Qaeda largely rousted from
Afghanistan. Some analysts warn that increased U.S. engagement in the region,
including military basing, is unlikely to soon turn the countries into free market
democracies, and will link the United States to the regimes in the eyes of the local
populations. This may exacerbate anti-American Islamic extremism, place U.S.
personnel in danger, stretch U.S. military capabilities, and antagonize China and
Russia. Long-term U.S. basing in the region could in particular harm U.S.-Russia
ties, by giving Russian hardliners ammunition in their efforts to encourage President
Putin to take a harder line against the United States.83
Should the United States Try to Foster Democratization?
Although Central Asia’s leaders have appeared to counterpose stability to
democratization and opted for stability (except perhaps in Kyrgyzstan), the Bush
Administration and other observers generally have viewed the two concepts as
82 Jacquelyn Davis and Michael Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational
Planning
, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 2004, p. vi.
83 Andrew J. Bacevich, The National Interest, Summer 2002, pp. 45-53.

CRS-43
complementary, particularly in the long term. In recent years, the Bush
Administration has appeared to place greater diplomatic emphasis on
democratization in the region, in parallel with policy toward Iraq and the wider
Middle East. To some degree, this emphasis has tracked with increased
congressional concerns over human rights conditions in Central Asia. According to
some critics, the Administration’s protests over human rights abuses at Andijon
contributed to the loss of U.S. military access to K2 and other security ties with
Uzbekistan. These critics suggest that simultaneous emphases on democratization
and security ties proved corrosive to both goals, and that the United States instead
should carefully engage with the Central Asian states to maintain important security
relationships and cautiously encourage them to eventually emulate the positive
features of Turkish or other Islamic democracies.84
Supporters of the Administration’s reaction to the events at Andijon and other
observers have argued that a policy stress on gradual political change connotes
support for the stability of the current authoritarian leaders in the region. They have
warned that the populations of these states would come to view the United States as
propping up these leaders and that such authoritarianism encourages the
countervailing rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent.
Some of these observers have supported reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive
governments that widely violate human rights and have rejected arguments that U.S.
interests in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation, trade, and
investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights. These
observers urge greater U.S. assistance to grass-roots democracy and human rights
organizations in Central Asia and more educational exchanges.85
84 Stephen Blank, U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them, US Army War
College, March 2007. Some observers assert that Uzbekistan’s disappointment with U.S.
economic and military assistance played a greater role in the deterioration of U.S.-Uzbek
relations than U.S. complaints about democratization and human rights.
85 Some proponents of this view had criticized the engagement policies of the Clinton and
early Bush Administrations. Wishnick, p. 29; Christian Caryl, Collateral Victory,
Washington Monthly, November 1, 2002, pp. 21-27; Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and
Operational Planning
, pp. iii-iv.

CRS-44
Appendix 1:
Selected Outside Players
Russia. For the Central Asian states, the challenge is to maintain useful ties
with Russia without allowing it undue influence. This concern is most evident in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, because of its shared 4,200 mile border
with Russia and its relatively large ethnic Russian population, is highly vulnerable
to Russian influence. Uzbekistan is interested in asserting its own regional power.
Alternatively, Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov has relied to some extent on
Russian security assistance to stay in power.
Russia’s behavior in Central Asia partly depends on alternative futures of
Russian domestic politics, though regardless of scenario, Russia will retain some
economic and other influence in the region as a legacy of the political and transport
links developed during Tsarist and Soviet times. The long-term impact of September
11, 2001, on Russia’s influence over the Central Asian states depends on the duration
and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countervailing
polices, and the fate of Afghanistan.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Putin Administration had tried to strengthen
Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the growth of U.S. and other
influence. After September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan reaffirmed its more assertive policy
of lessening its security dependence on Russia by granting conditional overflight
rights and other support to the U.S.-led coalition, nudging a reluctant Putin regime
to accede to a coalition presence in the region in keeping with Russia’s own support
to the Northern Alliance to combat the Taliban. Russia’s other reasons for permitting
the increased coalition presence included its interests in boosting some economic and
other ties to the West and its hope of regaining influence in a post-Taliban
Afghanistan. On September 19, 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
indicated that the nature of support given by the Central Asian states to the U.S.-led
coalition was up to each state, and President Putin reiterated this point on September
24, 2001, giving Russia’s accedence to cooperation between these states and the
United States. Russia cooperated with Central Asia in supporting U.S. and coalition
efforts, including by quickly sending military equipment and advisors to assist the
Northern Alliance in attacks on the Taliban.
Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic
ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic
concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role
as a buffer to Islamic extremism. Russia’s economic decline in the 1990s and
demands by Central Asia caused Russia to reduce its security presence. President
Putin may have reversed this trend, although the picture is mixed. About 11,000
Russian Border Troops (mostly ethnic Tajiks under Russian command) formerly
defended “CIS borders” in Tajikistan. Russia announced on June 14, 2005, that it
had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik troops.
Russian border forces were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In late 1999,
the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew
from the CST, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. Russia justified a 1999
military base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.

CRS-45
In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in
January 2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept”
that termed foreign efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security
threat. In April 2000, Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the
creation of rapid reaction forces, including in Central Asia, to combat terrorism
emanating from Afghanistan. Russian officials suggested that such a force might
launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases.
A May 2001 CST summit approved the creation of a Central Asian Rapid
Deployment Force composed (at least on paper) of nine Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
and Tajik country-based battalions of 4,000 troops and a headquarters in Bishkek.
This initiative seemed in part aimed to protect Russian regional influence in the face
of nascent U.S. and NATO anti-terrorism moves in the region. A regional branch of
the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, composed of intelligence agencies, opened in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in January 2002 (this organization reportedly has proven
ineffective in sharing intelligence data). Russia’s threats of pre-emptive strikes
against the Taliban prompted them in May 2000 to warn the Central Asian states of
reprisals if they permitted Russia to use their bases for strikes. At the June 2000
U.S.-Russia summit, the two presidents agreed to set up a working group to examine
Afghan-related terrorism, and the group held two meetings prior to September 11,
2001. These events prior to September 11, 2001, helped to ease the way for Russian
and Central Asian assistance to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
Soon after September 11, 2001, Russia seemed to reverse the policy of drawing
down its military presence in Central Asia by increasing its troop presence in
Tajikistan by a reported 1,500. In mid-June 2002, Russia also signed military accords
with Kyrgyzstan extending leases on military facilities to fifteen years (including,
amazingly, a naval test base), opening shuttered Kyrgyz defense industries, and
training Kyrgyz troops. Most significantly, Kyrgyzstan also agreed that its Kant
airfield outside its capital of Bishkek could be used as a base for the Central Asian
rapid reaction forces, marking a major re-deployment of Russian forces into the
country. In signing the accords, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov declared
that they marked Russia’s help — along with the U.S.-led coalition and China — in
combating terrorism, were necessary for Russia to monitor the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and marked Russia’s intention to maintain a military
presence in the region. Attack jets, transports, jet trainers, helicopters, and Russian
personnel began to be deployed at Kant at the end of 2002.
Russia’s military deployments at Kant appeared at least partially intended to
check and monitor U.S. regional military influence, and these intentions also were
reflected in support for the 2005 SCO communique calling for the closure of U.S.-led
coalition bases in Central Asia. Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations
with many Western countries, Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with
Uzbekistan in November 2005 that contains provisions similar to those in the CST
that call for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party. In
2006, Uzbekistan rejoined the CST. Evidence that Russia may seek to minimize, but
not immediately eliminate, U.S. influence was indicated by a statement by Deputy
Foreign Minister Aleksandr Alekseyev, who proclaimed in December 2006 that

CRS-46
“Russia is interested in continued operation of [the Ganci] airbase for a certain
period, until the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan is eliminated.”86
Russian economic policy in Central Asia has been contradictory, involving
pressures to both cooperate with and to oppose US and Western interests. Russia has
cut off economic subsidies to Central Asia and presses demands for the repayment
of energy and other debts the states owe Russia. Russia increasingly has swapped
this debt for equity in strategic and profitable energy and military industries
throughout Central Asia. Its opposition to U.S. and Western private investment in
the region initially led it to demand that Caspian Sea oil and gas resources be shared
in common among littoral states and to insist that oil pipeline routes transit Russian
territory to Russian Black Sea ports. Russia’s oil discoveries in the Caspian Sea,
however, contributed to its decision to sign accords with Kazakhstan in 1998 and
with Azerbaijan in 2001 on seabed borders.
Russian energy firms have become partners with U.S. and Western firms in
several regional oil and gas development consortiums. Nonetheless, Russia
continues to lobby for pipeline routes through its territory. President Putin has called
for the Central Asian states to form a Eurasian Gas Alliance to “export through a
single channel,” which Russian media have speculated means that Putin wants to
counter U.S. energy influence in the region. Instead of opposing U.S. and Western
private investment and business in the region, some Russians argue that enhanced
cooperation would best serve Russian national interests and its oil and other
companies. Russia has been wary of growing Chinese economic influence in the
region.
The region’s continuing economic ties with Russia are encouraged by the
existence of myriad Moscow-bound transport routes, the difficulty of trade through
war-torn Afghanistan, and U.S. opposition to ties with Iran. Also, there are still
many inter-enterprise and equipment supply links between Russia and these states.
While seeking ties with Russia to provide for some security and economic needs, at
least in the short term, the Central Asian states have tried with varying success to
resist or modify various Russian policies viewed as diluting their sovereignty, such
as Russian calls for dual citizenship and closer CIS economic and security ties.
Karimov and Nazarbayev have been harsh critics of what they have viewed as
Russian tendencies to treat Central Asia as an “unequal partner.”
The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has
in practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating
the “reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” Ethnic Russians residing in Central
Asia have had rising concerns about employment, language, and other policies or
practices they deem discriminatory and many have emigrated, contributing to their
decline from 20 million in 1989 to 6.6 million in 2001. They now constitute 12% of
the population of Central Asia, according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Remaining
Russians tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again
become a majority.
86 CEDR, December 11, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-9005.

CRS-47
Afghanistan. The stability of Afghanistan is of central concern to Central
Asia, China, and Russia. Particular concerns of Central Asia in recent years have
focused on the export of drugs and Islamic extremism from Afghanistan. Historical
trade routes facilitate the smuggling of drugs and other contraband through the region
to Russian and European markets. Central Asia’s leaders do not want Islamic
extremists to use bases in Afghanistan, as the Tajik opposition once did. They
objected to the refuge the Taliban provided for the IMU and for terrorist Osama Bin
Laden, who allegedly contributed financing and training for Islamic extremists
throughout Central Asia who endeavored to overthrow governments in that region.
Several Central Asian ethnic groups reside in northern Afghanistan, raising
concerns in Central Asia about their fates. Tajikistan has been concerned about the
fate of 6.2 million ethnic Tajiks residing in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, likewise, has
concerns about 1.5 million ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan. Karimov has supported
ethnic Uzbek paramilitary leader Abdul-ul-Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan. Dostum
lost to Taliban forces in August 1998 and exited Afghanistan, but returned to help
lead Northern Alliance forces to victory post-September 11, 2001. Iran and
Tajikistan supported ethnic Tajik Ahmad Shah Masood, who was killed on
September 9, 2001, allegedly by Al Qaeda operatives. Iran’s massing of troops on
the Afghan border in August 1998 in response to the Taliban’s takeover of Mazar-e-
Sharif and killing of Iranian diplomats and Shiite civilians also gave support to
Masood. Turkmenistan’s concerns about the status of half a million ethnic Turkmen
residing in Afghanistan, and its hopes for possible energy pipelines through
Afghanistan, led it to stress workable relations with both the Taliban and the
successor government.
Tajikistan was especially challenged by the Taliban’s growing power. A
Taliban victory in Afghanistan threatened to present it with regimes in both the north
(Uzbekistan) and south (Afghanistan) that pressed for undue influence. Iran and
Uzbekistan backed different sides in the Tajik civil war, but both opposed the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Tajik opposition ties with Iran provided friction with the
Taliban. Tajikistan’s instability and regional concerns caused the Rakhmanov
government to rely more on Russia and, by granting formal basing rights to Russia,
antagonized Uzbekistan and the Taliban.
As Afghanistan stabilizes, Central Asian states will be able to establish more
trade ties, including with Pakistan. Hopes for the construction of a gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan to Pakistan were evidenced by the signing of a framework agreement
in December 2002 by the late President Niyazov, Afghan President Hamed Karzai,
and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan. The problems of drug
production in Afghanistan and trafficking through Central Asia have increased,
however, in part because the Afghan government remains weak despite the hopeful
success of the 2004 presidential and 2005 legislative elections.87 Interest in regional
stability led Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China, Iran, and
Pakistan to sign a “Declaration of Good Neighborly Relations” in Kabul in December
2002 pledging mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia’s
attempts to influence developments in Afghanistan are facilitated by its basing
87 S. Frederick Starr, The National Interest, Winter 2004/2005.

CRS-48
arrangement with Tajikistan, but its favored warlords were largely excluded in
December 2004 from the new Karzai government. (See also CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.)
China. China’s objectives in Central Asia include ensuring border security,
non-belligerent neighbors, and access to trade and natural resources. In April 1996,
the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan traveled to
Shanghai to sign a treaty with Chinese President Jiang Zemin pledging the sanctity
and substantial demilitarization of borders. They signed protocols that they would
not harbor or support separatists, aimed at China’s efforts to quash separatism in its
Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang Province, which borders Central Asia.
According to the U.S. State Department, China continues to commit human rights
abuses against the Uighurs, an Islamic and Turkic people.88 In April 1997, the five
presidents met again in Moscow to sign a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,000
mile former Soviet border with China. In May 2001, the parties admitted Uzbekistan
as a member and formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and agreed
to pursue common antiterrorist actions through a center established in the region. In
theory, China could send troops into Central Asia at the request of one of the states.89
The states signed a Shanghai Convention on joint fighting against terrorism,
extremism and separatism, viewed by some observers as Russia’s and China’s effort
to gain greater support by the Central Asian states for combat against extremists and
regime opponents of the two major powers. China’s goals in the SCO echo its
general regional goals noted above, as well as containing U.S. influence.
After September 11, 2001, SCO members did not respond collectively to U.S.
overtures but mainly as individual states. China encouraged Pakistan to cooperate
with the United States. China benefitted from the U.S.-led coalition actions in
Afghanistan against the IMU and the Taliban, since these groups had been providing
training and sustenance to Uighur extremists. Nonetheless, the U.S. presence in
Central Asia poses a challenge to China’s aspirations to become the dominant Asian
power.
Most analysts do not anticipate Chinese territorial expansion into Central Asia,
though China is seeking greater economic influence. China is a major trading partner
for the Central Asian states and may become the dominant economic influence in the
region. In comparison, Turkey’s trade with the region is much less than China’s.
Central Asia’s China trade exceeded $1 billion annually by the late 1990s.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been deft in building relations with China.
They have cooperated with China in delineating borders, building roads, and
increasing trade ties. The construction of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China’s
Xinjiang region marks China’s growing economic influence in the region (see
88 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 6, 2007.
89 China and Kyrgyzstan held joint border exercises in October 2002, the first under SCO
auspices and the first by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on foreign soil. CEDR,
September 19, 2002, Doc. No. CPP-031.

CRS-49
below). However, officials in these states also have been concerned about Chinese
intentions and the spillover effects of tensions in Xinjiang. Some have raised
concerns about growing numbers of Chinese “suitcase” traders and immigrants, and
there are tensions over issues like water resources. China’s crackdown on dissidence
in Xinjiang creates particular concern in Kazakhstan, because over one million ethnic
Kazakhs reside in Xinjiang and many Uighurs reside in Kazakhstan. Some ethnic
Kyrgyz also reside in Xinjiang. On the other hand, Kazakhstan fears that Uighur
separatism in Xinjiang could spread among Uighurs residing in Kazakhstan, who
may demand an alteration of Kazakh borders to create a unified Uighur “East
Turkestan.” China’s relations with Tajikistan improved with the signing of a major
agreement in May 2002 delineating a final section of borders in the Pamir Mountains
shared by the two states.
In 1993, China abandoned its policy of energy self-sufficiency, making Central
Asia’s energy resources attractive. In September 1997, Kazakhstan granted China’s
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) production rights to develop major oil
fields, including the Aktyubinsk Region of northwestern Kazakhstan. China pledged
to build a 1,900 mile trans-Kazakh pipeline to Xinjiang within five years (and a
shorter pipeline to the Turkmen border). It appeared that China’s attention flagged
in the late 1990s, and Kazakhstan threatened to cancel some energy investment
accords. More recently, China’s booming economy has increased its need for energy
imports, and hence its need to diversify suppliers to safeguard its energy security,
causing renewed attention to joint energy projects with Kazakhstan. In 2005, CNPC
purchased the Canadian-based company PetroKazakhstan, giving it ownership of
refineries and control over production licenses for twelve oilfields and exploration
licenses for five blocks. Kazakhstan and China completed construction in mid-2006
of an oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China.
Initial capacity is 146.6 million barrels per year. At Atasu, it links to another pipeline
from Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan, and will eventually link to Atyrau on
Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast. In late 2006, the state-owned China International
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) purchased the Canadian-based Nations
Energy’s Karazhanbas oil and gas field in Kazakhstan with proved reserves in excess
of 340 million barrels of oil and current production of over 50,000 barrels of oil per
day.
Iran. Iran has pursued limited economic interests in Central Asia and has not
fomented the violent overthrow of the region’s secular regimes. Its economic
problems and technological backwardness have prevented it from playing a major
investment role in the region. Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban placed it on the same side as most of the Central Asian states and Russia.
Iran has had good ties with Turkmenistan, having established rail and pipeline links.
Iran’s relations with other Central Asian states are more problematic. Kazakhstan’s
ties with Iran have improved in recent years with a visit by Iran’s then-president
Mohammad Khatami to Astana in April 2002, during which a declaration on friendly
relations was signed. Nazarbayav continues to urge Iran to agree to a median-line
delineation of Caspian Sea borders rather than demand territorial concessions
(Kazakhstan claims the largest area of seabed), and dangles prospects for energy
pipelines through Iran and enhanced trade as incentives. Uzbek-Iranian relations
have been mercurial. Iran allegedly harbored some elements of the IMU, creating
Uzbek-Iranian tensions. Relations appeared somewhat improved after 2003 as both

CRS-50
states cooperated on rebuilding projects in Afghanistan and as Uzbekistan attempted
to develop trade and transport links to Middle Eastern markets.
The establishment of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan
after September 11, 2001, has directly challenged Iran’s security and interests in the
region by surrounding Iran with U.S. friends and allies, although Iran also has gained
from the U.S.-led defeat of the Taliban and coalition operations in Iraq. Iran views
the U.S.-backed BTC pipeline and its regional military presence as part of U.S.
efforts to make Central Asia part of an anti-Iranian bloc. During the 1990s, Iran and
Russia shared similar interests in retaining their influence in the Caspian region by
hindering the growth of U.S. and Western influence. They also opposed U.S.
encouragement of Turkey’s role in the region. They used the issue of the status of
the Caspian Sea to hinder Western oil development efforts. With Russia’s adoption
of a more conciliatory stance regarding Caspian seabed development, Iran in 2001
became isolated in still calling for the Sea to be held in common, or alternatively for
each of the littoral states to control 20% of the Sea (and perhaps, any assets). This
ongoing stance and U.S. opposition have restrained Kazakhstan’s interest in building
pipelines through Iran to the Persian Gulf. (See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran:
U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Turkey. Turkey’s strategic interests have included enhancing its economic and
security relations with both the South Caucasian and Central Asian states along the
“Silk Road” to bolster its access to regional oil and gas. Turkey’s role as an energy
conduit also would enhance its influence and appeal as a prospective member of the
EU, according to some Turkish views. Turkey desires the abatement of ethnic
conflict in the Caspian region that threatens energy development. While Turkey
plays a significant and U.S.-supported role in trade and cultural affairs in Central
Asia among the region’s mainly Turkic peoples, it has been hampered by its own
political struggles between secularists and Islamic forces and has been obsessed with
its own economic and ethnic problems. Also, the authoritarian leaders in Central
Asia have been reluctant to embrace the “Turkish model” of relatively free markets
and democracy. Perhaps a sign of greater interest in forging ties, Turkey hosted a
meeting in November 2006 of Turkic heads of state (the last meeting was in 2001),
which was attended by the presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and by
Turkmenistan’s ambassador to Turkey.
Russia has opposed Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caspian region,
including Turkey’s building of gas and oil pipelines (the BTC oil pipeline from
Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea fields to Turkey’s Mediterranean Sea port at Ceyhan has
provided Kazakhstan with another oil export route circumventing Russia).
The South Caucasus. Central Asia is linked with the South Caucasus region
as an historic and re-emerging transport corridor. Construction and plans for major
pipeline and transport routes from Central Asia through the South Caucasus region
to Europe make Central Asia’s economic security somewhat dependent on the
stability of the South Caucasus. At the same time, the authoritarian Central Asian
leaders have been concerned that democratization in Georgia could inspire dissension
against their rule.

CRS-51
Table 1. Central Asia: Basic Facts
Central Asian State
Kaz.
Kyr.
Taj.
Turk.
Uzb.
Total
Territory (000 sq.mi.)
1,100
77
55.8
190
174.5
1,597.3
Population (2006;
15.2
5.2
7.3
5.0
27.3
60
Millions)
Gross Domestic
138.7
10.49
9.405
45.11
54.81
51.7
Product (Bill. Dollars,
(Avg.)
2006, Purchasing
Power Parity)
GDP per capita
9,100
2,000
1,300
8,900
2,000
4,660
(Dollars)
(Avg.)
Proven Oil Reserves
9-40
40 12
0.5-1.7
0.3-0.59 61.8-94.29
(Billion Barrels)
Natural Gas Reserves
65
0.2
0.2
71
66.2
202.6
(Tr. Cubic Feet)
Size of Military
65,800
12,500
7,600
26,000
55,000
166,900
FY2006 U.S. Aid
88.48
43.54
45.01
10.44
49.41
241.71a
Budgeted ($millions)
— of which:
58.35
12.57
9.29
2.17
28.12
111.18b
Security Assistance
($millions)
Administration
24.315
31.429
32.12
8.43
9.374
108.168d
Request FY2008
($millions; Foreign
Operations)c
— of which:
8.4
8.7
14.94
1.45
1.5
34.99
Security Assistance
($millions)c
Sources: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook; U.S. Energy Information
Administration, Department of Energy. Caspian Sea Region, January 2007; U.S. Energy Information
Administration. Central Asia Region, 2002 (data for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); International
Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, February 2007; Department of State. U.S.
Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States, FY2005
Annual Report
; Department of State. Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and
Eurasia. Data tables for FY2006; Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign
Operations, FY2008
.
a. Includes Central Asia Regional Funding of $4.83 million.
b. Includes Central Asia Regional Funding of $68,000.
c. Excludes Defense and Energy Department funds and food aid. Includes Peace Corps funds.
d. Includes Central Asia Regional Funding of $2.5 million.

CRS-52
Table 2. U.S. Government FY1992-FY2005 Budgeted Security Assistance to Central Asia,
FREEDOM Support Act, and Agency Budgets
(millions of dollars)
Kazakh-
Kyrgyz
Turkmeni-
Uzbeki-
Agencya
Program
Tajikistan
Total
stan
Republic
stan
stan
State
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
9.85
13.59
3.84
1.35
8.60
37.23
State
Law Enforcement Assistance
11.92
17.36
17.24
5.13
16.26
68.33a
State
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
10.50
1.25
3.25
15.00
USDA
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
6.29
2.52
8.81
DOE
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
0.67
0.67
DOE
Nuclear Reactor Safety
7.42
1.20
8.62
NSF
Civilian R & D Foundation (CRDF)
4.05
2.50
0.01
4.90
11.46
NRC
Nuclear Reactor Safety
6.23
6.23
HHS
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
3.39
3.39
EPA
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
1.52
1.52
DOJ
Law Enforcement Assistance
0.03
0.03
0.86
0.92
DHS/Customs
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
9.70
17.80
27.50
ESF:USAID
Democratic Reform
0.32
0.32
NADR:State
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
5.06
2.28
1.18
0.02
6.98
15.52
NADR:State
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
9.36
5.00
8.50
5.29
6.56
34.71
FMF:State
Foreign Military Financing
24.54
27.51
6.19
4.73
52.95
115.92
IMET:State
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
7.23
5.8
1.30
3.13
5.12
22.58
INCLE:State
Law Enforcement Assistance
9.00
2.00
11.00
NADR:State
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
2.42
0.91
3.33
NADR:State
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
8.50
4.10
1.4
6.04
20.03
PKO:State
Peacekeeping Operations
2.00
2.00
NADR:State
Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction
0.30
0.22
0.52
NADR:USDA
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
2.68
0.65
4.66
7.99
DOE
Global (Comprehensive) Threat Reduction Initiative
86.74
86.74

CRS-53
Kazakh-
Kyrgyz
Turkmeni-
Uzbeki-
Agencya
Program
Tajikistan
Total
stan
Republic
stan
stan
DOE
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPCA)
25.80
1.10
0.10
4.00
31.00
DOE
Nonproliferation and International Security Program
15.24
0.07
7.77
23.08
DOE
Nuclear Reactor Safety
7.24
1.20
8.44
DOE
Russian Transition Initiative
8.65
8.65
DOD/CTR
Chain of Custody Programs
33.02
33.02
DOD
Counter-Narcotics
5.30
9.60
4.90
2.30
22.77b
DOD/CTR
Demilitarization
35.64
35.64
DOD/CTR
Destruction and Dismantlement Program
202.45
93.23
295.68
DOD
International Counter-proliferation Programs
3.18
2.02
0.03
1.14
4.14
10.51
DOD
Warsaw Initiative (Partnership for Peace)
4.54
2.47
0.11
0.30
3.80
11.39c
NSF
Civilian R & D Foundation (CRDF)
0.38
0.57
0.15
1.10
NADR:HHS
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
1.00
1.00
NADR:EPA
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
1.14
1.44
Total
549.25
101.84
59.68
27.98
254.04
994.05d
Source: State Department, Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States.
a. Includes regional funding of $420,000.
b. Includes regional funding of $670,000.
c. Includes regional funding of $170,000.
d. Total includes regional funding.