Order Code RS22644
April 13, 2007
Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal
Elections: An Overview
R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
L. Paige Whitaker
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Summary
A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d), allows
political party committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election
candidates for federal office and specifies limits on such spending. These expenditures,
often called “coordinated party expenditures,” are important not only because they
provide financial support to campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns may
explicitly discuss how the money will be spent. Although they have long been the major
source of direct party financial support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have
recently been overshadowed by indirect aid via independent expenditures. Those who
support limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the limits help reduce
potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that they
limit parties’ and campaigns’ ability to communicate and are antiquated, particularly
because political parties may make unlimited independent expenditures supporting their
candidates. This report will be updated as events warrant.1
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures?
Federal campaign finance law provides political parties with three major options for
providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) direct
contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. With
direct contributions, parties give money (or in the case of in-kind contributions,
financially valuable services) to individual campaigns, but such contributions are subject
to strict limits; that is, most party committees are limited to direct contributions of $5,000
1 Joseph E. Cantor, Specialist in American National Government, contributed to this report.

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per candidate, per election.2 Since the 1996 Colorado I Supreme Court ruling (discussed
below), parties may make independent expenditures, which are not limited, on anything
allowable by law, but may not coordinate those expenses with candidates. Coordinated
expenditures3 allow parties (notwithstanding other provisions in the law regulating
contributions to campaigns) to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to
discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Candidates may request that parties make
coordinated expenditures, and may request specific purchases, but parties may not simply
give this money directly to campaigns. Because parties are the spending agents, they (not
candidates) report their coordinated expenditures to the FEC.
Coordinated party expenditures are subject to limits based on office sought, state,
and voting-age population (VAP). Exact amounts are determined by a formula.4 State
party committees may authorize their national counterparts to make party-coordinated
expenditures on their behalf (or vice versa), a common practice, effectively doubling the
amount of coordinated expenditures the parties can make. Assuming such an agreement
between state and national parties exists, limits for Senate candidates in 2007, adjusted
for inflation, range from $163,600 in states with the smallest VAPs to more than $4.4
million in California. Similarly, in 2007, parties can make up to $81,800 in coordinated
expenditures in support of each House candidate in multi-district states, and $163,600 in
support of House candidates in single-district states.5 In early 2008, these limits will be
adjusted again. Parties may also make coordinated expenditures on behalf of presidential
candidates (limited to $16.2 million per party in 2004).
Brief Overview of Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
Buckley v. Valeo.6 In its 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo,7 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),8
striking down expenditure limitations, while upholding reasonable contribution
limitations. Most notably, the Buckley Court determined that the spending of money,
2 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). See also, Federal Election Commission, “Contribution Limits 2007-08,”
available at [http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml].
3 Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations define “coordinated” as “cooperation,
consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s
authorized committee, or a political party committee.” 11 CFR § 109.20.
4 Senate limits are based primarily on VAP, whereas House limits are based primarily on a flat
allocation. Specifically, the limits for Senate candidates and House candidates in single-district
states are the greater of 2 cents multiplied by the VAP, adjusted for inflation, or $20,000,
adjusted for inflation. The limit for House candidates in multi-district states is $10,000 (the 1974
base amount) plus adjustments for inflation, which have greatly increased the current limits over
base amounts. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).
5 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(d)(3), 441a(c). See also, “2007 Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits,”
available at [http://www.fec.gov/info/charts_441ad.shtml#Senate].
6 For further discussion of Buckley and Colorado I and II, see CRS Report RL30669, Campaign
Finance Regulation Under the First Amendment: Buckley v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court
Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
7 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
8 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.

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whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of “speech” protected by
the First Amendment. However, according to the Court, contributions and expenditures
invoke different degrees of First Amendment protection.9 Recognizing contribution
limitations as one of the FECA’s “primary weapons against the reality or appearance of
improper influence” on candidates by contributors, the Court found that these limits
“serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral
process.”10 On the other hand, the Court determined that FECA’s expenditure limits on
individuals, political action committees (PACs), and candidates impose “direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech” and are not justified by an
overriding governmental interest.11
Colorado I and II. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission (Colorado I),12 the Supreme Court found that FECA’s
“Party Expenditure Provision”13 was unconstitutionally enforced against a party’s funding
of radio “attack ads” directed against its likely opponent in a federal senatorial election.
Specifically, this case concerned the constitutionality of the party expenditure limit as
applied to expenditures for radio ads by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP) that
attacked the likely Democratic Party candidate in the 1986 U.S. Senate election.14 The
Court’s ruling turned on whether CRP’s ad purchase was an “independent expenditure,”
a “campaign contribution,” or a “coordinated expenditure.”15 The Court found that the
CRP’s ad purchase was an independent expenditure deserving constitutional protection.
“Independent expenditures,” the Court held, do not raise heightened governmental
interests in regulation because the money is deployed to advance a political point of view
“independent” of a candidate’s viewpoint and, therefore, cannot be limited.16
The Court’s opinion in Colorado I was limited to the constitutionality of the
application of FECA’s “Party Expenditure Provision,”17 to an independent expenditure
by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP). Later, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee (Colorado II),18 the Court considered a facial challenge19 to the
constitutionality of the limit on coordinated party spending. In Colorado II, the Supreme
9 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
10 Id. at 59.
11 Id. at 39.
12 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
13 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).
14 See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 612.
15 Id. at 614, 615, 618, 622-623.
16 Id. at 614-615, citing Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC), 479 U.S. 238 (1985).
17 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3).
18 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
19 Generally, when a statute is challenged “facially,” a plaintiff is arguing that under all
circumstances, the statute operates unconstitutionally. By contrast, an “as-applied” challenge
involves a plaintiff arguing that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular
case or to a party.

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Court ruled that a political party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike genuine independent
expenditures, may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of
FECA contribution limits.
McConnell v. FEC.20 In McConnell v. FEC,21 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld key
portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) against facial
constitutional challenges.22 The Court, however, struck down BCRA’s requirement that
political parties choose between making coordinated or independent expenditures after
nominating a candidate,23 finding that it burdens the right of parties to make unlimited
independent expenditures.24
Recent Financial Overview and Analysis
Although coordinated expenditures played a large role in party financial activity
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, recent elections suggest that party reliance on
coordinated expenditures is changing. As Table 1 shows, although the Colorado I
decision permitted parties to make unlimited independent expenditures during and after
the 1996 cycle, those expenditures remained relatively modest through 2002. From 1996-
2002, total party coordinated expenditures outpaced independent expenditures — often
by large amounts. In 2004 and 2006, however, party spending shifted dramatically, with
far more total independent expenditures than coordinated expenditures. In 2004, the two
major parties made more than four times in independent expenditures what they did in
coordinated expenditures. That allocation of resources continued in 2006, with the two
parties making more than six times in independent expenditures than they did in
coordinated expenditures. Specifically, during the 2006 election cycle, both parties made
a total of more than $223.7 million in independent expenditures, compared with slightly
less than $35 million in coordinated expenditures. As the table also shows, at various
points since 1996, each major party has outspent the other in party coordinated
expenditures. For the most part, however, Democrats and Republicans have allocated
similar amounts to coordinated party expenditures.
20 For further discussion of McConnell, see CRS Report RL32245, Campaign Finance Law: A
Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in McConnell v. FEC, by L. Paige Whitaker.
21 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
22 P.L. 107-155.
23 Codified at 2 U.S.C. § 315(d)(4).
24 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 217.

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Table 1. National Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures
Coordinated Expenditures
Independent Expenditures
Election
Cycle
Democrat
Republican
Total
Democrat
Republican
Total
1996
$22,576,000 $30,959,151 $53,535,151
$1,495,090 $10,026,541 $11,521,631
1998
18,643,156 15,696,145
34,339,301 1,489,707 263,646
1,753,353
2000
20,989,872 29,598,965
50,588,837 2,310,175 1,556,802
3,866,977
2002
7,057,291 15,951,023
23,008,314 1,701,292 1,944,116
3,645,408
2004
33,113,799 29,101,396
62,215,195 176,491,696 88,032,382
264,524,078
2006
20,694,359 14,156,926
34,851,285 108,100,265 115,646,387
223,746,652
Source: Federal Election Commission, Party Financial Activity Summarized for the 2006 Election Cycle,
Mar. 7, 2007.
Note: Individual party totals include expenditures from the Democratic National Committee, Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and state and local
Democratic committees; and Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee,
National Republican Congressional Committee, and state and local Republican committees, as reflected in
the FEC data.
In terms of overall fundraising, the two major parties are now closer to parity than
they historically have been. As Figure 1 (below) shows, local, state, and national
Republican party committees have accumulated more receipts than their Democratic
counterparts since 1990, as has generally occurred since at least the 1970s. Although
Republican party committees still maintain a financial advantage, Democrats fared far
better in overall fundraising in 2004 and 2006 than they had during any other period
shown in the figure. By 2006, Democratic party committees raised 80% as much as
Republicans, although that amount fell slightly from the 2004 number (87%). On their
own, these do not suggest particular outcomes if caps on party coordinated expenditures
were lifted, but they do indicate that one party may not necessarily have a major total
financial advantage over the other if the caps are lifted in the near future.
For those who support lifting the caps on coordinated party expenditures, current
limits impinge on parties’ abilities to communicate with their candidates once parties
meet their coordinated spending limits. Unrestricted coordinated party expenditures
could shift party spending away from independent expenditures, although each option
would retain unique characteristics. Parties might continue to choose independent
expenditures if they wish to distance campaigns from what many political professionals
and some candidates view as necessary, but politically unpopular, purchases (e.g., for
political advertising attacking opponents).25 On the other hand, coordinated expenditures
25 On relationships between campaign actors, see David A. Dulio, For Better or Worse? How
Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2004); Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and
in Washington (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004); and Robin Kolodny,
Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics (Norman, OK:
(continued...)

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would be more attractive for parties wishing to communicate freely with campaigns about
direct financial support. Those expenditures could strengthen arguably weakening ties
between parties and campaigns.
Proponents of limits on party coordinated expenditures contend that the caps reduce
the amount of money in politics. They also potentially prevent circumvention of
individual contribution limits by donors who may seek to indirectly support campaigns
by making contributions to political parties. (However, it should be noted that FECA
already restricts “earmarked” contributions.26) For those who generally support regulating
political money, lifting the caps on party-coordinated expenditures would likely be
objectionable on principle, could appear to undercut similar regulatory efforts adopted
since the 1970s, and could go against public sentiment generally favoring limiting the
amount of money in politics.
Figure 1. Total Receipts of Democratic and Republican Party Committees
$900.0
782.4
$800.0
678.8
$700.0
602.3
$600.0
465.8
483.1
ts $500.0
p
416.5
424.1
$400.0
ecei
285.0 275.2
in r $300.0
264.9
s
244.1 221.6
217.2
202.0
$200.0
163.3
illion
132.8
160.0
m
78.5
$100.0
$0.0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Democratic
Republican
Note: Reflects federal account activity (i.e., hard money) of political party committees at national, state,
and local levels. While soft money represented a large share of party receipts through the 2002 election
cycle (after which it was banned by BCRA), the respective parties raised comparable levels of soft money
in most of the election cycles between 1992 and 2002; hence, the inclusion of soft money receipts in this
figure would not greatly affect the relative overall fundraising ratios of the two parties. (On soft money, see
U.S. Federal Election Commission, Party Committees Raise Over $1 Billion in 2001-2002, press release,
Mar. 20, 2003.) National committees include the Democratic and Republican National Committees, the
Democratic and Republican Senatorial Committees, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
and the National Republican Congressional Committee.
Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission, Party Financial Activity Summarized for the 2006 Election
Cycle, press release, Mar. 7, 2007.
25 (...continued)
University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).
26 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(8).

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