Order Code RL33962
Greenhouse Gas Reductions: California Action
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
April 13, 2007
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Environmental Policy Analyst
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Greenhouse Gas Reductions: California Action and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Summary
In the absence of a federal program requiring greenhouse gas reductions, a
growing group of U.S. states are taking action in this arena. Significant actions have
been undertaken in California and by a coalition of states from the Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic regions.
California has undertaken several initiatives that seek to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. In 2004, the state issued regulations to reduce greenhouse gases from
motor vehicles. Eleven other states have formally adopted California’s new vehicle
requirements. In 2006, California passed two climate change statutes. The first
would establish a statewide cap on greenhouse gases. The second would effectively
limit the use of coal-generated electricity in California. The state has also taken
action to reduce the carbon intensity in its transportation fuels.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a partnership of eight
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states, would set up a cap-and-trade system aimed at
limiting carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The cap is scheduled to take
effect in January 2009 and cap carbon dioxide emissions at 121 million metric tons
through the end of 2014. In 2015, the cap would begin to decrease, so that by 2018,
emissions would be capped at 10% below the initial level. Because some observers
see RGGI as a possible model for a federal cap-and-trade program, several of RGGI’s
design elements are generating interest and debate.
Predicting the precise consequences of these state-led climate change actions is
difficult. The actions may affect energy markets to some degree by encouraging the
use of fewer carbon-intensive fuels. Many observers suggest that the range of state
actions will catalyze federal activity. Industry stakeholders are especially concerned
that the states will create a patchwork of climate change regulations across the nation.
This prospect is causing some industry leaders to call for a federal climate change
program. If Congress seeks to establish a federal program, the experiences and
lessons learned in the states may be instructive.
The RGGI and climate change activities in California are aggressive, but the
resulting emission reductions may be offset by increased emissions in states without
such requirements. This is a primary limitation of state climate change programs.
Legal challenges to the state actions, particularly those that may affect interstate
commerce, represent another obstacle.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Climate Change Actions in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statewide Emission Reduction Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Emissions Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Linkage with Other Emissions Trading Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Greenhouse Gas Performance Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Motor Vehicle Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Transportation Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Emission Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Safety Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Emissions Cap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Emissions Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Potential Effects of State Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
States as Policy Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Possible Economic Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Patchwork of Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Limitations of State Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Legal Challenges to State Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1: California Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Historical and Projected
Levels Compared with 2020 Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2: Sources of California Electricity, by Fuel Type and Location of
Generation (based on 2005 data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 3: Comparison of Observed Emissions in RGGI States to RGGI
Emissions Cap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1: Top Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Nation and Selected U.S. States
(2001 data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Greenhouse Gas Reduction:
California Action and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Introduction
The connection between greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and climate change
has motivated efforts to achieve reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.1 In 1992,
the United States ratified the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), which called on industrialized countries to initiate greenhouse
gas reduction. However, in early 2001, President George W. Bush rejected the
UNFCCC 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which called for legally binding commitments by
developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
In the absence of a federal program requiring greenhouse gas reductions, a
growing number of U.S. states are taking action in this arena. Although a majority
of states have addressed climate change to some degree (e.g., by creating greenhouse
gas inventories or state action plans2), the most aggressive actions have come from
a smaller group of states, including California and a coalition of states from the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions.
California recently enacted several laws that seek to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The first section of this report discusses the activity in California. The
second section focuses on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a
cooperative effort of eight states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The report’s final section considers
these state-led actions from a federal policymaking perspective, examining the
potential effects, limitations, and legal challenges of state-led climate change actions.
Climate Change Actions in California
In the environmental policy domain, California is generally on the more
proactive side of the regulatory spectrum. The state’s recent climate change actions
continue this pattern. California has enacted several significant pieces of climate
change legislation, each addressing greenhouse gas emissions in different ways. A
1 This report does not address the debates associated with the climate change science, nor
the role of human activity. See CRS Report RL33849, Climate Change: Science and Policy
Implications, by Jane A. Leggett.
2 For a discussion of these actions, see CRS Report RL33812, Climate Change: Action by
States To Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
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recent executive order from the governor supplements the state’s climate change
statutes. This section discusses the actions California has taken to decrease its
greenhouse gas emissions.
Statewide Emission Reduction Program
California enacted legislation in September 2006 establishing a comprehensive
greenhouse gas reduction regime. The legislation — AB 32, The Global Warming
Solutions Act — directs the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to develop and
implement a statewide program that would reduce the state’s greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Recent emission levels (based on 2004 data) are
approximately 15% higher than emission levels in 1990.3 However, assuming a
business-as-usual trend (i.e., without accounting for any greenhouse gas reduction
requirements either underway or under development), greenhouse gas emissions are
projected to increase (Figure 1).
Figure 1: California Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Historical
and Projected Levels Compared with 2020 Target
t 700
n
le
a
Projected Em issions (2005-2020)
iv 600
u
q
-E 2 500
O
C 400
of
Historical Em issions
(1990-2004)
AB 32
300
Tons
Greenhouse
tric
Gas Target
200
e
M 100
illion
M
0
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
199
199
199
199
199
200
200
200
200
200
201
201
201
201
201
202
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from California Energy
Commission (CEC), Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 to 2004 —
Final Staff Report, Dec. 22, 2006, Figure 12 and Appendix F.
Note: The California CEC describes the projections as “rough estimates.” The estimates assume no
new emissions reduction strategies beyond those currently in place (i.e., following a business-as-usual
trend).
3 In 2004, California generated 492 million metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent
(MMTCO2E) greenhouse gases. This amount includes emissions from imported electricity
but excludes combustion of international fuels, as well as carbon sinks. The most recent
report estimated that an analogous value in 1990 was 427 MMTCO2E. See California
Energy Commission, Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990
to 2004 — Final Staff Report, Dec. 22, 2006, Table 6, p. 25.
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Implementation. Although AB 32 is far-reaching in principle, the law’s text
does not include many crucial details. Instead, the statute grants considerable
authority to CARB, which is charged with establishing the framework and
applicability of the program. For example, the law does not specifically require the
use of a market-based system, such as a cap-and-trade program, to reduce greenhouse
gases. Instead, AB 32 authorizes CARB to develop regulations to “achieve the
maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission
reductions....” Moreover, the statute does not include a list of regulated emission
sources or categories, but instructs CARB to determine which sources should be
controlled to meet the statewide target. These decisions, which will likely affect the
entire California economy to some degree, entrust CARB with significant
responsibility.
Although the law grants considerable discretion to CARB, the statute does
dictate a schedule for various agency deadlines. The following dates highlight
significant milestones of the mandatory schedule:
! June 30, 2007: CARB must identify the early reduction options,
which can be implemented prior to the mandatory program, and for
which a facility will receive emissions credit.
! January 1, 2008: CARB must establish the 1990 baseline, which
becomes the 2020 emissions cap.4
! January 1, 2008: CARB must develop a mandatory reporting scheme
for sources affected by the cap. Sources report emissions for four
years in order to establish accurate facility baselines.
! January 1, 2011: CARB must finalize regulations, including possible
market-based programs, that will implement the statewide emissions
cap.
! January 1, 2012: CARB begins to implement and enforce the
mandatory emission reduction program created in 2011.
Emissions Leakage. When setting up an emissions control program, AB 32
requires that emissions “leakage” be addressed. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) states that emissions leakage
occurs when economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control
regulation and, as a result, emission abatement achieved in one location that is
4 Note that the 1990 greenhouse gas emissions baseline (and thus the 2020 cap) is based on
estimates from multiple economic sectors and is difficult to quantify precisely. For
example, past estimates of 1990 levels range from a low of 425 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2E) to a high of 468 MMTCO2E. This is a 10%
variance between low and high estimates. See California Energy Commission, Inventory
of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 to 2004 — Final Staff Report,
Dec. 22, 2006, p. 4.
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subject to emission control regulation is offset by increased emissions in
unregulated locations.5
In recognition of emissions “leakage,” the statute requires regulators to account
for greenhouse gas emissions created by any source of electricity that is consumed
in California. CARB must develop a structure that will count emissions connected
with electricity that is generated from outside the state. Without this provision,
California utilities might have a financial incentive to import more electricity from
out-of-state generators, who are not subject to the cap. In such a scenario, California
emissions would decrease, but the benefit would be negated by increased (uncounted)
emissions, or leakage, in neighboring states.
Linkage with Other Emissions Trading Programs. When developing
the emission reduction program in California, AB 32 instructs CARB to consider
other greenhouse gas reduction regimes, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (discussed below) and the European Union’s emission trading program.
This instruction might open the door for future emissions trading between California
and other states. To catalyze this trading relationship, California Governor
Schwarzenegger issued an executive order6 just a few weeks after signing AB 32,
calling for CARB and other state agencies to create a “market-based compliance
program with the goal of creating a program that permits trading with the European
Union, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and other jurisdictions.”7
Along similar lines, Governor Schwarzenegger signed an initiative February 26,
2007, with the governors of Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and New Mexico. The
Western Regional Climate Action Initiative directs the participating state agencies
to develop a “market-based multi-sector mechanism, such as a load-based cap and
trade program” that will seek to reduce greenhouse gases in the region.8 The
initiative calls for the states to develop a mechanism (within 18 months), but it is
uncertain how a mechanism would be implemented and how many states might
participate. Without further state action, it is perhaps too early to assess the
significance of this partnership.
5 See Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Office of Air and Radiation, 2003, Tools of
the Trade: A Guide To Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade Program For Pollution
Control, Glossary.
6 Executive Order S-17-06 (signed October 16, 2006).
7 The proposed trading relationships may raise constitutional issues. For example, the U.S.
Constitution states that “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.... (Article I, Section 10,
Clause 3).
8 The text of the agreement is available through the California Climate Change Portal at
[http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/2007-02-26_WesternClimateAgreement
Final.pdf].
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Greenhouse Gas Performance Standard
California recently developed a greenhouse gas performance standard for the
electricity sector that aims to influence investment in long-term power generation.
Although not directly requiring emission reductions or offsets from specific facilities
or sources, the standard should influence future greenhouse gas emission levels by
affecting which energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, etc.) are used to generate
electricity for consumers.
The greenhouse gas performance standard, pursuant to legislation enacted in
September 2006 (SB 1368), forbids electricity producers — “load-serving entities”9
— from entering into new “long-term financial commitments”10 with power plants
unless the plant’s greenhouse gas emissions are as low or lower than those of a new,
combined-cycle natural gas facility. This emissions performance standard will apply
to both in-state power plants and out-of-state facilities that seek to export electricity
to California. The law directs the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to
issue standards for investor-owned facilities, which in 2003 accounted for 68% of
the electricity consumed in California.11 The PUC issued interim performance
standards January 25, 2007. To address the electricity consumption from publicly
owned utilities,12 the statute directs the California Energy Commission to issue
comparable regulations by June 30, 2007.
The new performance standards complement the statewide greenhouse gas
reduction program. The implementation of AB 32 is several years away (irrespective
of legal challenges). The performance standards act as a stop-gap measure,
preventing further utility investment in carbon-intensive fuels while the state is
crafting an economy-wide reduction regime.
As previous power commitments expire and are exchanged with contracts that
meet the new greenhouse gas performance standard, California’s portfolio of energy
sources will change. The statute and its accompanying regulations, once in full
effect, would appear to prohibit California consumers from using electricity
generated by conventional coal-fired power plants. Compared with a combined-cycle
natural gas plant, a conventional coal-fired power plant emits more than twice the
9 Defined as “every electrical corporation, electric service provider, or community choice
aggregator serving end-use customers in the state.” SB 1368 (codified in Public Utilities
Code, Section 8340(h)).
10 Defined as a “new ownership investment in baseload generation or a new or renewed
contract with a term of five or more years, which includes procurement of baseload
generation.” SB 1368 (codified in Public Utilities Code, Section 8340(j)).
11 See California Energy Commission, Electricity Consumption by Utility Type, at
[http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity].
12 Publicly owned utilities accounted for 27% of California’s electricity consumption in
2003. Self-generation units made up the remaining percentage (about 5%). See California
Energy Commission, Electricity Consumption by Utility Type.
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amount of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour. Using current technologies, coal-fired
generators would fail to meet the new emissions standard.13
From 2002 through 2005, approximately 20% of California’s electricity was
generated from coal (Figure 2).14 As the law takes effect, California will likely need
to reduce/conserve a comparable amount of energy or replace the coal-generated
electricity with alternative sources of power.
Figure 2: Sources of California Electricity, by Fuel Type and Location
of Generation (based on 2005 data)
In-State
Renew ables
In-State Coal
11%
Im ported
In-State Nuclear
1%
Hydroelectric
13%
5%
In-State
Hydroelectric
12%
Im ports
Im ported
Im ported
30%
Coal
Natural Gas
19%
4%
In-State Natural
Gas
Im ported Nuclear
33%
2%
Source: Prepared by Congressional Research Service with data from California Energy Commission
(CEC), 2005 Gross System Electricity Production, at [http://www.energy.ca.gov].
Note: The CEC counts two geographically out-of-state facilities as in-state coal generation, because
these facilities are owned by California utilities. However, the above pie chart counts these out-of-
state facilities’ generation as imported electricity. Because one of these facilities (Mohave) is at this
time closed, the percentage of coal-generated electricity imported to California, and thus consumed
in California, should decrease.
13 As technology advances, coal-fired plants might be able to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions through carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). However, this remains a future
prospect: “There is relatively little experience in combining CO capture, transport and
2
storage into a fully integrated CCS system. The utilization of CCS for large-scale power
plants (the potential application of major interest) still remains to be implemented.”
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2005, IPCC Special Report Carbon
Dioxide Capture and Storage, Summary for Policymakers, p. 8. See CRS Report RL33801,
Direct Carbon Sequestration: Capturing and Storing CO , by Peter Folger.
2
14 The percentage of California’s electricity generated from coal should decrease, because
a large coal-fired plant (Mohave facility) was shut down at the end of 2005. California
Energy Commission, Gross System Electricity Production, at [http://www.energy.ca.gov/
electricity].
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The new performance standards will affect not only California, but also other
states in the West. Although California’s electricity imports generally fall between
22% and 32% of the state’s total electricity consumption, its imports are responsible
for 39% to 57% of the total greenhouse gas emissions linked with its electricity.15
This is because most of California’s in-state electricity is produced from sources
other than coal, whereas most of the state’s imported electricity is generated through
coal combustion (Figure 2). Once the standard takes effect (and former power
contracts expire), the coal-fired plants in neighboring states, which previously
provided electricity to California, will need to look elsewhere for customers. The
same goes for coal-fired power plants still in development in western states, which
may have been designed, at least in part, to serve California consumers.16 Arguably,
the greenhouse gas performance standards disproportionately affect the neighboring
states that have historically exported coal-generated electricity to California
consumers. This possible consequence may raise legal issues, such as a state’s
general inability to regulate interstate commerce. These issues are discussed at the
end of this report.
Motor Vehicle Emissions
The U.S. transportation sector accounts for a substantial percentage — 28% in
200417 — of the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions. Automobiles and light-duty
trucks (fueled by gasoline or diesel) generate the majority — 63% in 2004 — of the
nation’s transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions.18 The transportation sector
is the single largest source of the primary greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, in 14
states.19
California’s transportation sector, in particular, generates almost 41% of the
state’s annual greenhouse emissions.20 Regarding the regulation of air emissions
from motor vehicles, California is in a unique position. California is the only state
with conditional authority — the state needs to obtain a waiver from the EPA — to
develop motor vehicle pollution standards that are as stringent or more stringent than
15 California Energy Commission, 2006, Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990 to 2004, p. 12.
16 See Memorandum from Michael Easley, Chairman of Wyoming Infrastructure Authority,
to California Energy Commission (Oct. 5, 2005); Chris Holly, “California PUC Issues IOU
Greenhouse Rules; Muni Nixes Coal Deal,” The Energy Daily, Dec. 15, 2006.
17 EPA, 2006, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2004,
Executive Summary, p. ES-13, at [http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.
html].
18 The transportation sector also includes emissions (in descending order) from heavy-duty
trucks, aircraft, boats, and trains. EPA, 2006, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2004, pp. 3-8, at [http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventory
report.html].
19 Based on 2003 data. EPA, Energy CO2 Emissions by State, at [http://epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/state_energyco2inv.html].
20 California Energy Commission, 2006, Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990 to 2004, p. 8.
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federal requirements.21 The law permits other states to choose between federal
standards or California’s more stringent provisions.22
In 2002, California enacted the first state law (AB 1493) requiring greenhouse
gas limits from motor vehicles.23 As directed by the statute, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) issued regulations in September 2004 limiting the “fleet
average greenhouse gas exhaust mass emission values from passenger cars, light-duty
trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles.”24 The fleet average caps first apply to
model year 2009 vehicles. The caps become more stringent annually, so that by
2016, the fleet average would be 30% below the 2009 level.
At least 11 states have formally adopted the California regulation. In order for
the states to implement this standard, California must receive a waiver from the EPA.
California requested a waiver (as required by Section 209 of the Clean Air Act) in
December 2005, but the EPA has yet to respond. Although the EPA has approved
every California waiver request since 1975, it has displayed a reluctance to use the
Clean Air Act to control greenhouse gases, arguing in federal court that the Clean Air
Act does not authorize the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases for the purpose of
addressing climate change.25
However, an April 2, 2007, Supreme Court decision (Massachusetts v. EPA)26
provided clarification on this issue. The Court found no doubt that the Clean Air Act
gives EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gases (in this case, from new motor
vehicles). Although the specifics of such regulation might be subject to agency
discretion, the decision should at least improve the possibility that the EPA will grant
a waiver to California. Some observers have suggested that the Clean Air Act waiver
may be the most direct impact of the decision.
Transportation Fuels
To complement California’s statewide greenhouse gas reduction program, the
governor issued an executive order (signed January 18, 2007) establishing a low
carbon fuel standard (LCFS). The LCFS aims to reduce the carbon intensity of
California’s transportation fuels by 10% by 2020. California currently relies on
petroleum-based fuels for 96% of its transportation needs.27 Achieving the carbon
intensity reduction is expected to replace 20% of the state’s gasoline consumption
21 Other states are preempted from doing so. See Clean Air Act Section § 209, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 7543.
22 Clean Air Act § 177, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
23 AB 1493 (or the California Vehicle Global Warming Law) was signed into law by
Governor Gray Davis on July 22, 2002.
24 Title 13, California Code of Regulations § 1961.1.
25 For a historical discussion of these issues, see CRS Report RL32764, Global Warming:
The Litigation Heats Up, by Robert Meltz.
26 The ruling is available at [http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf].
27 Executive Order S-01-07, signed January 18, 2007.
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with less carbon-intensive fuels.28 The LCFS would apply to all refiners, blenders,
producers, and importers of transport fuels.
The order states that transportation fuels shall be measured on a full fuel cycle
basis. Thus, regulators must factor in all of the energy used and potential greenhouse
gases emitted during the fuel’s development (extraction or production), delivery (via
vehicle or pipeline), and final use (combustion). Corn-based ethanol, for example,
is expected to play a role in meeting California’s LCFS. To comply with the full fuel
cycle assessment, regulators must consider the energy needed to produce fertilizers,
operate farm equipment, transport corn, convert corn to ethanol, and distribute the
final product. For more information on these issues, see CRS Report RL33290, Fuel
Ethanol: Background and Public Policy Issues, by Brent Yacobucci.
The LCFS executive order enhances alternative fuel legislation (AB 1007) that
California passed in 2005.29 AB 1007 requires the California Energy Commission
(CEC), in partnership with other agencies, including CARB, to develop and adopt a
State Alternative Fuels Plan by June 20, 2007. The executive order directs CEC to
supplement this plan with a compliance schedule for meeting the 2020 LCFS target.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based effort by
eight states — Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,30 New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont — to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from
power plants. RGGI has been under development since 2003, when states from the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions began to discuss setting up a cooperative effort
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Subsequent meetings and workshops culminated
in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed in December 2005. A
primary strategy of RGGI is to create a program with flexibility, so that in the future
other emission sources/sectors, greenhouse gases, and states could be included.
Maryland and Rhode Island are expected to join RGGI in 2007.31
The initiative would set up the nation’s first mandatory cap-and-trade program
for carbon dioxide. Starting in January 2009, RGGI states have agreed to implement
a cap of 121 million tons on carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The cap
28 California Office of the Governor, The Role of a Low Carbon Fuel Standard in Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Protecting Our Economy, Jan. 18, 2007.
29 The governor signed AB 1007 September 29, 2005.
30 Massachusetts and Rhode Island were involved in RGGI’s development from the
beginning. However, both states’ governors declined to sign the Memorandum of
Understanding in 2005, citing costs as their primary rationale for not participating. Under
a new governor, Massachusetts joined RGGI as a participant in January 2007.
31 Former Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. signed into law the Healthy Air Act on
April 6, 2006, which requires the governor to include the state in the northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) by June 30, 2007. Rhode Island Governor Donald
Carcieri announced (January 30, 2007) that his state plans to join the initiative.
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would remain constant through the end of 2014. In 2015 and each subsequent year,
the emissions cap would be lowered incrementally, so that by 2018, the cap would
be 10% below the initial level.32
In a cap-and-trade system, regulators set a cap (or limit) on the overall emissions
of a given gas from a specified group of sources, such as power plants. The
emissions allowed under the new cap are then allocated in the form of credits (or
permits) to individual sources. Sources that emit more than their allowance must buy
credits from those who emit less than their allowance, thus creating a financial
incentive for sources to reduce their own emissions.
The RGGI cap-and-trade program is to be implemented by the individual states.
Each RGGI state will need to establish its own law and/or regulation to administer
and enforce the emissions reduction program. However, each state will base its
law/regulation on a detailed model rule that was developed by the participant states.
To facilitate administration of the trading program, the MOU calls for the states to
create a non-profit, regional organization. This organization is to provide technical
assistance to the RGGI states and help maintain consistent implementation across
state lines.
Depending on various design details, cap-and-trade systems can vary
significantly. The cap level and cap applicability (i.e., when the cap takes effect and
which sources are affected) are perhaps the primary variables regarding the impact
of the program. Other details, such as emission allocation and whether to include a
safety valve, can further alter the character of a cap-and-trade program. Some
observers consider RGGI to be a model for a possible federal cap-and-trade program,
and thus several of RGGI’s design elements are generating interest and debate.
These issues are discussed below.
Emission Allocation
One specific feature of RGGI — the emission allocation scheme — is drawing
both praise and criticism. In both RGGI’s Memorandum of Understanding and its
Model Rule, states agreed that at least 25% of emission allowances will be allocated
for a “consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose.” This action would require
power plants to purchase the set-aside allowances, most likely through an auction,
instead of receiving them at no charge. Several states33 have indicated that they
intend to allocate 100% of their states’ allowances through an auction process. In
other emission trading programs, auctions have been used, but to a much lesser
extent.34
32 RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, signed by participating state governors on
December 20, 2005, and further amended August 8, 2006; both versions are available at
[http://www.rggi.org/modelrule.htm].
33 Vermont, New York, and Massachusetts, for example.
34 For example, in the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading system, the EPA sets aside 2.8% of its
annual allowances to be sold at auction. The European Union’s Emission Trading System
(continued...)
CRS-11
Stakeholders have raised various issues regarding this format. For example,
power companies may not be able to share part of the allowance costs with their
customer base if the companies have a long-term, fixed-price contract.35 On the other
hand, if utilities are able to pass along the additional costs, consumers worry that
their electricity bills may increase. Policymakers have some flexibility to address
these issues, because they can decide how best to use the revenues generated from
the allowance auction. For instance, states could use the auction revenues to provide
tax cuts to the affected industries, or to assist low-income families with paying for
increases in energy bills. Largely due to this flexibility, the auction approach is
considered more cost-effective than distributing allowances (for free) based on past
or predicted emission rates.36 For more discussion regarding these issues, see CRS
Report RL33799, Climate Change: Design Approaches for a Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Program, by Larry Parker.
Safety Valve
In a cap-and-trade system a safety valve allows policymakers to control the costs
of complying with the emissions reduction program. A traditional safety valve would
allow affected sources (e.g., power plants) to purchase credits at a fixed price ($X/ton
of carbon dioxide) instead of reducing emissions. The price cap could be set high
enough above market value so that facilities would consider it only during extreme
circumstances or unforeseen events. Thus, the incentive to reduce emissions would
remain, but the price cap (or safety valve) would assure the industry that it will not
have runaway compliance costs.37 The main disadvantage of a safety valve is that its
inclusion may limit the desired emission reductions, especially if the safety valve is
set too close to market value. In addition, a price cap may keep costs low enough
that this would reduce the economic incentive to invest in new technologies.
RGGI does not have a safety valve in this traditional sense. However, RGGI
does allow for compliance flexibility if the carbon dioxide allowance price reaches
a certain level. For example, if certain price thresholds are breached,38 facilities
receive an additional year to demonstrate emissions reductions. Also, in these cases,
companies may cover a greater proportion of their emissions by purchasing credits
from other facilities or other recognized emission offsets, instead of reducing
emissions internally.
34 (...continued)
(EU ETS) allows nation states to withhold 5% of their nation’s allowances for auction.
Although only 4 of the 27 EU member states have chosen to auction a portion of their
allowances, the amount available for auction will increase to 10% in 2008.
35 Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer, Summary of the Workshop to Support Implementing
the Minimum 25 Percent Public Benefit Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, September 2006.
36 Dallas Burtraw et al., 2001, The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon
Emission Trading, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 01-30.
37 For more background on safety valves, see CRS Report RL33799, Climate Change:
Design Approaches for a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, by Larry Parker.
38 RGGI has two price thresholds: $7/ton (2005$) and $10/ton (2005$).
CRS-12
If a national cap-and-trade regime were adopted, a traditional safety valve might
become an important bargaining chip. Reportedly, the lack of a price cap, which
could control costs to industry and consumers, was a central factor behind former
Massachusetts Governor Romney’s decision to withdraw his state from RGGI
participation in 2005.39
Emissions Cap
The level and timing of the emissions cap in a cap-and-trade program are
important considerations for policymakers. In general, a carbon dioxide cap level
and start date represent a balance between the benefits of climate change mitigation
and the economic burden imposed on the affected sources.40 Political feasibility is
often a factor when setting an emissions cap.41 The RGGI 2009 cap was not based
entirely on past emission levels (or expected levels), but was developed through a
negotiation among the states.42
One emissions cap strategy is to establish a cap that would take effect relatively
quickly but only require stabilization or modest reduction in emissions. The RGGI
cap resembles this approach. An advantage to this strategy is that it allows market
forces to affect behavior at an earlier date — for example, encouraging technological
development or influencing investment decisions in less carbon-intensive energy
sources.
There is some uncertainty as to whether RGGI’s initial cap — 121.3 million
short tons of carbon dioxide — will be higher than actual emissions when it takes
effect in 2009 (Figure 3). If this is the case, it could reduce the effectiveness of the
RGGI program, at least until the cap requires emission stabilization or reduction.
Although RGGI documents have described the initial cap as equivalent to “current”43
levels, the 2009 cap is 5% higher than emissions levels from 2004, the most recent
year for which data are available. If recent increases continue (2002-2004, as shown
in Figure 3),44 the emission levels will be on par with the cap by the time the cap is
39 See, for example, Robert Stavins (2006), “A Utility Safety Valve for Cutting CO2,” The
Environmental Forum, vol. 23, no. 2, March/April, 2006, p. 14. Note that Massachusetts
rejoined RGGI in January 2007.
40 Although some may contend that this is not an either/or choice, most economic studies
find that reducing carbon dioxide emissions will entail economic costs. That debate is
beyond the scope of this report.
41 See EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, 2003, Tools of the Trade: A Guide To Designing
and Operating a Cap and Trade Program For Pollution Control, pp. 3-9.
42 Per conversations with RGGI stakeholders.
43 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding in Brief.
Another RGGI document states that “the initial cap is approximately equivalent to 1990
emissions.” See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, “RGGI Overview,” both at
[http://www.rggi.org/agreement.htm].
44 Early figures from 2005 indicate continued increases. Per conversation with RGGI state
agency official.
CRS-13
applicable (2009). More recent data are needed to assess the significance of this
concern.
Figure 3: Comparison of Observed Emissions in RGGI States to
RGGI Emissions Cap
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2004
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2008
2010
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2014
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Observed Emissions (2000-2004)
Emission Cap (starting in 2009)
Source: Prepared by CRS with state emission data from RGGI website, available at
[http://www.rggi.org/draftdata.htm].
Note: The emissions data and cap include only the seven original participating RGGI states. Including
additional states’ emissions would increase both observed emissions and the emissions cap in equal
proportions.
Emissions Leakage
A critical design detail — electricity imports from non-RGGI states — remains
unresolved. RGGI faces the same “leakage” challenge as California. For example,
if an RGGI state lowers its emissions by importing more power from a non-RGGI
state, the emissions reductions in the RGGI state would likely be negated by an
emission increase (or leakage) in the exporting state. The opportunities for leakage
are partially related to the price difference between high-carbon fuels and low-carbon
fuels. For instance, if the price of natural gas rises in comparison to coal, there will
be more of an incentive to import the cheaper electricity from non-RGGI states.
RGGI states have established a working group to examine how best to address this
issue. The group plans to submit a report to state agency leaders by December 2007.
CRS-14
Issues for Congress
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the climate change
developments in California raise several issues that may be of interest to Congress.
This section discusses some of the potential effects of these actions by states, the
limitations of these actions, and legal challenges that may hinder or halt
implementation of the emission reduction programs.
Potential Effects of State Actions
From a international perspective, many U.S. states generate significant
emissions of greenhouse gases. If individual U.S. states were classified as sovereign
nations, 21 states would rank in the top 60 for nations that annually emit the most
carbon dioxide.45 Compared with other nations, the combined RGGI states and
California rank as top carbon dioxide emitters (Table 1). California and the RGGI
participants account for almost 20% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.
Table 1: Top Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Nation and Selected
U.S. States (2001 data)
Country, State, or
CO Emissions
Country, State, or
CO Emissions
2
2
Group
(million metric tons)
Group
(million metric tons)
United States
5,728
RGGI states
606
European Union
3,928
United Kingdom
562
China
3,452
Canada
522
Russian Federation
1,544
South Korea
473
Japan
1,221
Italy
448
India
1,068
France
389
Germany
884
Mexico
388
Texas
768
California
386
Source: Prepared by CRS with data from World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators
Tool, at [http://cait.wri.org/]. Note that the carbon dioxide data include only emissions, but exclude
land use changes.
Note: RGGI states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Maryland and Rhode Island have announced they will soon join, and
their emissions are included above.
States as Policy Laboratories. A primary argument in support of
individual or cooperative state climate change action is that states can serve as
laboratories for policymaking. States can test different ideas and policies on a
smaller scale, and help determine which climate change solutions are most
45 Based on 2001 data from the World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool,
at [http://cait.wri.org/].
CRS-15
appropriate. Many of the RGGI states and California have acted as pioneers in other
environmental policy venues — for example, automobile emissions standards in
California and acid rain provisions in New England states. Such programs often act
as precursors or even models to federal environmental regimes.
Most federal legislative proposals that seek to control greenhouse gases would
employ a cap-and-trade emissions regime.46 There has been some debate regarding
how a cap-and-trade program might work on a national level. Although the federal
acid rain program, which involves sulfur dioxide emissions trading, is generally
considered a success, some emissions trading programs have encountered problems
during implementation.47 State programs, such as RGGI, may offer the opportunity
to iron out logistical details that would be crucial in a national cap-and-trade system:
! Which sources to regulate.
! How to allocate emissions allowances.
! How high to set the emissions cap.
! When to allow offsets instead of actual reductions.
! Whether to include a safety valve, and if so, how high to set it.
State programs can inform federal policymakers in other ways. The political
process by which states create climate change policy can be enlightening and perhaps
adaptable on the federal level. For instance, by examining the development and
passage of state legislation, federal policymakers may better understand the
motivations of different stakeholders and learn how best to frame the issues.
Possible Economic Impacts. The mandatory emission reduction programs
in California and RGGI will likely have economic effects on consumers, businesses
and manufacturers, and possibly interstate commerce.48 The most immediate effects
of the emissions programs (at least the ones furthest along in development) will be
on the automotive manufacturing and electricity generation sectors.
For automotive manufacturers, the California motor vehicle regulations —
which at least 11 states plan to implement — will likely have the effect of dividing
the market, potentially requiring the manufacture of a different class of cars to meet
the new standards (scheduled to apply in 2009). For automotive companies, this
46 See CRS Report RL33846, Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bills in the 110th
Congress, by Larry Parker.
47 For example, the Southern California’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM), which was implemented in 1994 to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx)
and sulfur dioxide (SO ), saw a 50-fold increase in NOx allowance prices during the
2
2000-2001 California energy crisis. The European Union’s greenhouse gas trading system
has also experienced drastic swings in allowance prices during its start-up years, making
planning and decision making difficult for participating entities. For additional information
on the EU trading system, see CRS Report RL33581, Climate Change: The European
Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), by Larry Parker.
48 The question of whether and in what circumstances states can regulate interstate
commerce may raise legal questions, which are discussed below.
CRS-16
raises the issues of the technical means of meeting the standard, marketing, ensuring
compliance, and pricing. Depending on how the emission limits are to be met, they
may also influence fueling infrastructure. State governments will need resources to
enforce the standards. Consumers in regulated states may face higher prices for
vehicles.
For the electric generating sector, the California and RGGI requirements will
likely promote generation from low carbon-intensive fuels, while curtailing
generation from high carbon-intensive fuels, such as coal. California’s greenhouse
gas performance standards will reach into neighboring states as well, effectively
barring electricity imports generated by conventional coal-fired power plants. As
coal-fired plants tend to produce lower-cost electricity, the result of these
requirements may be to increase electricity prices within the states that limit
emissions, and possibly lower prices in states without such emission standards.
If the greenhouse gas limitations on motor vehicles and electricity increase
prices in the regulated states, businesses and manufacturers may factor this cost into
location decisions. There is some concern that regulated industries will have a
financial incentive to move (and thus transfer jobs) to states (or nations, such as
Mexico or Canada) that do not limit greenhouse gas emissions.49 Others fear that
emission limits will raise the cost of living and doing business within those states,
although in theory such effects can be at least partially addressed through the design
of the emissions reduction program.50
Patchwork of Regulations. One concern shared by many observers,
particularly industry stakeholders, is that state climate change programs (in the
absence of a federal program) will create a patchwork of regulations nationwide. It
is claimed that a patchwork system of standards may hinder a company’s efficiency
and possibly create economic burdens for firms that operate in multiple states. The
prospect of regulations that vary from state to state is moving some companies to
support a federal climate change program with comparable requirements across the
entire United States.51
49 This is also a central argument against having federal emission limits without cooperation
with other large economies (e.g., China and India).
50 A cap-and-trade program with an auction system (as discussed above), for instance,
would generate revenues that could be funneled to parties who bear an unfair percentage of
the program’s costs. See, for example, National Commission on Energy Policy, 2007,
Allocating Allowances in a Greenhouse Gas Trading System.
51 For example, the newly created United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), an
alliance of major businesses and leading climate and environmental groups, calls on the
federal government to enact legislation requiring significant reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions. See [http://us-cap.org].
CRS-17
Limitations of State Actions
Climate change has been described as the “ultimate global commons problem.”52
The global warming and climate impacts associated with increased greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere cannot be linked with specific emission sources. Unlike localized
reductions in other air pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide, particulate matter), when an
emissions source reduces its carbon dioxide emissions, it does not generate a
corresponding local climate change benefit unless there are similar widespread
reductions around the world.
From a practical standpoint, the actions of one or a small group of states cannot
by themselves significantly affect the global accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. However, as discussed above, actions now underway in California and
states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions may create examples and/or models
that will prove instructive in more widespread applications. Moreover, when
business and industry have confronted a growing patchwork of state requirements,
these sectors have historically begun to favor a national policy — as has begun to
happen in the case of state-level actions on climate change. However, the lack of a
national program or a truly global approach to greenhouse gas emissions reductions
does limit what individual states can accomplish in actually reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and accumulations.
Legal Challenges to State Actions
Legal challenges may halt or hinder state action. The possibility of legal
challenges creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future of state climate
change actions, particularly the more aggressive programs. There are already several
lawsuits against state actions that seek to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles. Car dealers and trade associations have filed suits in California,
Vermont, and Rhode Island seeking to halt the regulations on various grounds. For
example, the plaintiffs contend that California’s regulations are preempted by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94-163), which directs states not to
regulate fuel economy standards. It in uncertain what role the Massachusetts
decision may play in these proceedings, because some of the arguments in these cases
(e.g., the relationship between conflicting federal and state policing concerning
climate change) were not addressed in the Massachusetts case.
Further litigation confronting the more recent state actions is anticipated. Many
expect a legal challenge to the RGGI program when the first state’s rule is officially
issued.53 In addition, some observers question whether California’s recently enacted
52 Robert Stavins, 2006, “A Utility Safety Valve for Cutting CO2,” The Environmental
Forum, vol. 23, no. 2, March/April, 2006, p. 14.
53 New York state is expected to be the first state to issue its rule implementing RGGI,
according to statements made from state officials at a climate change workshop: Pew Center
on Climate Change, Innovative Approaches to Climate Change: A State and Regional
Workshop, Washington, DC, Oct. 10-11, 2006.
CRS-18
greenhouse gas performance standards are constitutional.54 They argue that the
performance standards disproportionately affect the neighboring states that have
historically exported coal-generated electricity to California consumers, raising the
question of whether the California standard, in effect, regulates interstate commerce.
The degree to which a state can influence interstate commerce is central to the
debate regarding state-led climate change activities. The U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.55 U.S. courts interpret this as
a limitation on the states’ ability to regulate interstate commerce.56
The legal arguments in these cases (and expected cases) are complicated and
beyond the scope of this report. Moreover, many of the legal and constitutional
issues chart new ground. For these reasons, many observers have concluded that it
is difficult to predict how the courts will interpret and decide these issues.
Regardless of the ultimate strength and outcome of the legal arguments opposing
state-led climate change policies, affected stakeholders will almost certainly
challenge the implementation of emission reduction programs. It is uncertain how
long these anticipated legal challenges might delay greenhouse gas reductions in the
states.
54 See Brian Potts, 2006, “Regulating Greenhouse Gas Leakage: How California Can Evade
the Impending Constitutional Attacks,” Electricity Journal, vol. 19, issue 5, June 2006.
55 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
56 For more discussion of these issues, see CRS Report RL30315, Federalism, State
Sovereignty, and the Constitution: Basis and Limits of Congressional Power, by Kenneth
R. Thomas.