Order Code RL33957
Elections in France, 2007
April 11, 2007
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Elections in France, 2007
Summary
On April 22, 2007, the first of two likely rounds of presidential elections is to
take place in France. Legislative elections would follow in June. The winner of the
presidential elections will have a five-year term.
Since 1981, France has had only two presidents. There is a sense of malaise in
the country, in part due to high unemployment and slow economic growth. The
current elections could bring to power a younger generation of leaders. The two
principal candidates are the Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy, and the Socialist Ségolène
Royal. They present themselves as outsiders, prepared to bring fresh life to French
democracy. A third candidate, in a field of 12, is François Bayrou, a center-right
party leader. Trailing Bayrou is the racist and anti-immigrant candidate Jean-Marie
Le Pen.
Sarkozy is a tough-minded former Interior Minister whose campaign builds on
his reputation as hard on illegal immigration and insistent on greater efforts by the
country’s large Muslim community to better integrate itself into French life.
Royal has pursued a campaign meant to place her directly in touch with French
voters. In doing so, she has circumvented some of the steps normally necessary to
gain the Socialist Party nomination. This campaign strategy has put her at odds with
some of the Party elders. She is gambling that her campaign of “participatory
democracy” will appeal to a range of voters beyond the Socialist Party. The core of
her political message has been attention to community and family life.
Foreign policy is important in the 2007 French elections. Sarkozy and Royal
have stressed the growing danger of Iran; each would maintain economic sanctions
against Iran. Both candidates support French participation in U.N., NATO, and EU
security and stabilization missions, but there are disagreements with the United States
over some elements of NATO’s mission and future. Each supports a strong
European Union as a partner but not rival of the United States.
Sarkozy presents himself as a friend of the United States and an admirer of
American culture, but adds that France under his leadership would assert its usual
independence. Royal has been sharply critical of the Bush Administration, and
contends that U.S. “unilateralism” in recent years has damaged bilateral relations and
increased instability in the Middle East.
It is possible that either Sarkozy or Royal, if elected, would pursue a practical
and non-ideological posture towards the United States. Neither is likely to alter the
U.S.-French relationship in a stark manner. Cooperation over counterterrorism
measures, multinational operations in Lebanon, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, and
good trade relations are likely to continue.
This report will be updated to reflect the outcome of the presidential and
legislative elections. See also CRS Report RL32464, France: Factors Shaping
Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
, by Paul Gallis.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Elections of 2007: A New Era in France? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Sarkozy: The Gaullist as “Outsider” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Domestic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Royal: The Socialist as “Outsider” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Domestic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Other Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Legislative Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Implications for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Elections in France, 2007
Introduction
On April 22, 2007, the first of two likely rounds of presidential elections will
occur in France. Legislative elections will follow in June. The presidential elections
may bring to power a younger generation of leaders at a time when a majority of the
French public believes their country is in decline, in part due to enduring low
economic growth and high unemployment, in part to an apparent diminishing
influence in guiding the course of the European Union (EU).
Since 1981, France has had only two presidents, the Socialist François
Mitterrand and the Gaullist Jacques Chirac, each a formidable political figure who
dominated his respective party. Chirac is at the end of his second presidential term
and is not running for re-election. In 2002, presidential terms were shortened from
seven years to five years; there are no limits on the number of terms a president may
serve. Legislative elections now follow the presidential elections by a month. The
close proximity of presidential and legislative elections may provide the winning
candidate with the opportunity to gain a parliament more in line with his or her
initiatives, and avoid the periods of divided government (called cohabitation by the
French) evident in recent years and blamed by some for periods of governmental
inertia.
Under the Fifth Republic (1958-present), France has had a strong presidential
system, significantly different from many European parliamentary systems. Fifth
Republic structures were meant to avoid the ever-changing parliamentary
governments of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), when the country needed but rarely
found strong leadership after the Second World War and during the Algerian war for
independence (1954-1962), a conflict that led to instability and violence in France as
well as in Algeria. The President is elected by a national vote and enjoys clear
command of national security and the armed forces. Although the President appoints
a prime minister who names a cabinet, it is the President who shapes all major policy
initiatives and is the unquestioned political leader of the government.
Compared with the United States, France is a highly centralized country, not
only in political authority but also in economic structures. While some industries
have been privatized in recent years, the state continues to control or to influence
many key industries to a degree unknown in the United States. Even the country’s
main road and rail systems run through or emanate from Paris.
Important domestic and foreign policy issues are at play in the current campaign.
Integration of the large Muslim minority, now nearly 10% of the population and
mostly North African in origin, has been a focal point of discussion for a decade, but
most pointedly since the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States and

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riots in the suburbs, where most Muslims live, of several major French cities in 2005.
A related matter, control of immigration, is another key electoral issue. A related
issue is high unemployment, plaguing the country for years. In foreign policy, the
unstable Middle East and the possible rise of a nuclear-armed Iran have drawn great
attention from the key candidates. France’s role in the European Union is also a
question of importance to the population.
There are three leading candidates for the presidency, two of whom present
themselves as new blood in the national electoral arena. Nicolas Sarkozy, until
recently the Interior Minister and previously the head of the Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP, the Gaullist Party), is the center-right candidate. Ségolène Royal
is the Socialist Party candidate. She is a member of the Chamber of Deputies and the
president of the Poitou-Charentes region. François Bayrou is the third candidate
scoring reasonably well in public opinion polls; he is the leader of the small centrist
Union for French Democracy (UDF) party, the political group founded by former
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and ran for the presidency in 2002.
Public opinion polls indicate a close race. Sarkozy has maintained a lead of
several points over Royal for several months. A poll in mid-April showed that 28%
of those polled favored Sarkozy, whereas Royal gathered 24% of the vote. Bayrou
trails with 18%. The same poll indicated that 47% of the electorate remains
undecided.1
Relations between the Bush Administration and France have been difficult since
the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. While the United States and
France cooperate closely on some issues, such as counterterrorism and instability in
Lebanon, President Chirac strongly opposed the invasion of Iraq and raised
international criticism of Administration policy, leading to sharp rejoinders from
Administration officials and some Members of Congress. Officials in both countries
are hoping that the 2007 French elections can lead to an improved bilateral
atmosphere on several issues, some of which are discussed in this report. France has
been an important contributor to a range of NATO and EU missions, and an
improved relationship could relieve strain on U.S. strategic resources.
The Elections of 2007: A New Era in France?
Over the past year, polls, several books, and media commentary have indicated
a widespread view in France that the country is enduring a decline in economic,
political, and intellectual vigor and influence. GDP growth was only 2% in 2006,
and unemployment is now 8.5%, a percentage point above the eurozone average. In
a May 2005 referendum, French voters failed to approve a proposed new EU treaty,
commonly referred to as the EU constitution, a development that, even if many voters
were expressing displeasure primarily with their government, reduced French leeway
to demonstrate leadership in the Union. As a result, there are calls for a “renewal”
from both the right and the left.
1 “Un nouveau sondage pointe une progression de Jean-Marie Le Pen,” Le Monde, Apr. 9,
2007, p. 6.

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The Gaullist Party and the Socialist Party nominate their candidates from within
the party structures. There are no national primaries in France. For most of the Fifth
Republic, individuals who emerged as a party’s candidate rose through the ranks and
were the consensus choice of those who ran the party structures. The election season
of 2006-2007 has unfolded somewhat differently.
Sarkozy: The Gaullist as “Outsider”
Nicolas Sarkozy is considered a controversial figure in the Gaullist Party. The
son of a Hungarian immigrant, Sarkozy was helped through the ranks by Chirac. He
is not a graduate of the National School of Administration (ENA), the elite institution
that provides France with many of its most important leaders. He broke with Chirac
in the 1995 presidential elections when he endorsed a Chirac rival, who lost.
Nonetheless, his forceful, aggressive style generated a political following. He
became head of the Gaullist Party and built a reputation for being tough on
immigration and crime as France’s interior minister. He prevailed as the party’s
choice for the presidency, bolstered by the faltering image of his principal rival,
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, politically damaged by an alleged scandal.
At a late moment, Chirac gave Sarkozy a rather tepid endorsement.
Sarkozy is a well-known figure in France. As an important political lieutenant
of President Chirac, he helped to continue the UMP as a major force in French
politics. He has a clear persona among the voters, who see him as decisive, hard-
working, and emphatic in his views. However, he is attempting to cast himself as an
“outsider” by calling for a “rupture” with past practices in leading the country.
Domestic Issues. As Interior Minister in 2005, Sarkozy referred to young
rioters in the suburbs of several major French cities as “scum” and said they should
be washed away “with a power hose.” Critics of such language contend that the
rioters were largely economically disadvantaged and were often North African
Muslim youth ostracized by elements of French society.2 In 2006 he promised to
deport more illegal immigrants than were deported in 2005, a pledge he carried out.
At the same time, he urged Muslim youth to become more involved in French society
and promised to begin a program of “positive discrimination” to ensure their entry
into public institutions and the job market as gateways into broader society.
Sarkozy, 52, began his campaign for the presidency in earnest in late 2006 and
at first sought to build a more moderate image. The Gaullist Party nominated him
in January 2007. In a speech before the party faithful, he said that he had changed.
He recounted difficult moments in his personal life and said that, because of certain
failures, he had become a milder, more inclusive leader. In his speeches, he has
ranged across a variety of issues, for which he has developed often detailed positions.
At the same time, his image as tough on illegal immigration and crime has shadowed
2 For a discussion of French efforts to assimilate its Muslim population, see CRS Report
RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, by Paul Gallis et al.

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him closely; it has gathered supporters from the extreme right and reassured those
who believe that there are too many foreigners in France.3
In early March 2007, Sarkozy, unable to put significant distance between
himself and his principal rivals for the presidency, reverted to a harder line. If
elected, he said, he would establish a ministry of “Immigration and National
Identity,” a proposal that appeared to be an effort to pull in more voters from the
extreme right. The proposal led some to question whether such a ministry was meant
to intimidate immigrants to accept vague, undefined prescriptions of “Frenchness.”
A month earlier, he told an audience, “If you want to become French, then you must
be proud of France.” He refused a demand from the Algerian government, as a
requirement for final agreement to a friendship treaty, that France apologize for its
era of colonization in Algeria and for brutal measures taken by some French forces
in Algeria’s war for independence. He said that most French citizens who went to
Algeria during the era of colonization “were neither monsters nor exploiters ... but
men who believed in good faith that they were serving an ideal of civilization.”4
Sarkozy has laid out a plan to revitalize the French economy, but his message
has been mixed. Critics in his own party and on the left have branded him as too
“liberal,” or free market. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development has long held that the French economy should loosen regulations on
the hiring and dismissal of workers to build a flexible labor marketplace better able
to infuse workers with new skills into the economy. Sarkozy supports a more
“flexible” employment contract that would allow employers to fire workers more
easily. He has criticized the 35-hour work week, put into law by a Socialist
government, as inhibiting employees who wish to work more and earn more. He is
promising tax-free income for those who work beyond 35 hours.5
His message on the international economy is more restrictive. He opposes the
acquisition or takeover of French “strategic” companies by foreign entities. He
condemned the purchase in 2006 of Arcelor, a French steel company, by the Dutch
company Mittal. During the campaign, Sarkozy has said that “free trade” is a “policy
of naïveté.” In 2004, as Finance Minister, he brokered a deal to merge the two
French companies Aventis and Sanofi to ward off a takeover by a Swiss company.
More recently, he said, “If I am president, then France will have a real industrial
policy.” He has blamed French unemployment in part on the European Central
Bank’s tight monetary policy, which, in his view, keeps the Euro at an artificially
high level compared with the yen and the dollar, and thereby harms exports and
economic growth.6
3 “M. Sarkozy centre sa campagne sur la France et le travail,” Le Monde, Jan. 16, 2007, p.
10. Interviews in France, February-March 2007.
4 Cited in “Nicolas Sarkozy prône désormais le ‘métissage des cultures,’” Le Monde, Feb.
9, 2007, p. 10.
5 “France’s three rivals frustrate economists,” Financial Times, Mar. 30, 2007, p. 4.
6 “Sarkozy warns EU to revise fiscal policy or lose popular support,” Financial Times, Apr.
3, 2007, p. 4; “Sarkozy underlines resolve to block foreign investors,” Financial Times, Mar.
(continued...)

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Foreign Policy. Sarkozy presents himself as a friend of the United States who
will nonetheless not be slavish to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In September 2006,
he gave a speech in Washington in which he acknowledged that the U.S.-French
relationship would always be “complicated.” He expressed his admiration for
American culture, openness, and entrepreneurship. He proclaimed himself an
“Atlanticist,”and argued that a stronger EU would not be a rival but a better partner
to the United States in solving problems around the world. Sarkozy criticized French
condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq as needlessly negative and political,7 a
possible swipe at President Chirac, who called Sarkozy’s speech “lamentable.”
Sarkozy’s foreign policy positions, however, have not centered on the United
States. He views Iran as the greatest danger to French interests and a highly
destabilizing influence in the Middle East. Sarkozy supports the efforts of the “EU-
3” (France, Britain, and Germany) and the United States to use economic sanctions
to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons, which he views as a direct threat
to Israel’s existence.
As is true of all key contenders for the French presidency, Sarkozy is a strong
supporter of French leadership of and involvement in the European Union. As
already noted, he places blame for slow French economic growth at the doorstep of
the EU and has pledged to use a “diplomatic offensive” to persuade the EU to pursue
a stronger anti-dumping policy and the European Central Bank to lower the value of
the Euro to boost trade and employment. He believes that the EU constitution,
defeated in a referendum in France in 2005, should be put in a simplified form before
the French Parliament for debate and possible passage. Sarkozy opposes Turkish
membership in the EU, stating simply that “Turkey is not a European country.”8
Sarkozy believes that western leaders should be more critical in their
assessments of developments in Russia and China. He believes that good trade
relations with the two countries are important, but has sharply criticized Russia over
human rights violations in Chechnya, and China over treatment of its dissidents.
Sarkozy has been critical of President Chirac’s use of the French armed forces.
To protect the country’s key interests, Sarkozy argues that French forces must be
carefully marshaled and not overextended. He has said that he would not allow
French troops to become “bogged down” in an operation such as the one in the Ivory
Coast, a reference to a French military presence there meant to bring stability.
Throughout his campaign he has indicated that, if elected, he will reduce France’s
military footprint in Africa. He has expressed “regret” at Chirac’s removal of French
special forces from Afghanistan, a view implying support for the U.S. and NATO
effort to stabilize that country. At the same time, Sarkozy has said that the French
army “is not an expeditionary corps that is supposed to play the role of firemen and
6 (...continued)
30, 2007, p. 4.
7 Sarkozy speech before the French American Foundation, Washington, DC, Sept. 12, 2006.
8 Ibid.; “Sarkozy veut que la BEC baisse euro,” Libération.fr, Mar. 29, 2007.

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gendarmes in the four corners of the world.”9 He supports continued increases in the
French defense budget to reach a figure equaling or exceeding 2% of GDP a year, in
line with an informal prescription by NATO for member states.
Although Sarkozy expresses admiration for U.S. values and supports a major
U.S. role in the world, he has called the U.S. invasion of Iraq “an historic mistake”
that has allowed Iran to expand its power in the region. He has chided the American
public and urged them to “be more interested in the world.”10 Sarkozy has criticized
anti-Americanism in France, and has added that although he will be a friend to the
United States, he will follow France’s traditionally independent foreign policy.
Royal: The Socialist as “Outsider”
Ségolène Royal began her presidential campaign in 2005 using new tactics in
an effort to gain national recognition. In 2004, she defeated former Gaullist Prime
Minister Pierre Raffarin for the presidency of the Poitou-Charentes region, a feat that
made her a prominent figure in the Socialist Party. She has served primarily in junior
ministerial positions under previous Socialist governments and has developed a
reputation for boldness and assertiveness. She is a graduate of the National School
of Administration. Navigating the internal party structures to leapfrog prominent
rivals for the nomination such as Laurent Fabius, a former prime minister, and
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a well- regarded former finance minister, was a formidable
undertaking.
Royal, 53, has developed a campaign based on direct contact with the voters, a
strategy designed to circumvent to some degree but also to influence the internal
party process for the nomination. In several ways, her campaign is a roll of the
political dice. Traditionally, Socialist candidates wait their turn, with the party
nomination going to a senior figure of long experience. Royal sought instead to jump
the line. If she could demonstrate a national appeal, the party bosses, known
popularly as “elephants,” might find difficulty in denying her the nomination. She
reportedly antagonized some of the elephants when she said, “I am tied to no
network, no money source, no lobby, no major media, no large commercial
enterprise.” She omitted any debt to the Socialist Party structure.11
The elephants manage a large national network of party militants, primarily
local elected officials such as mayors and town council members, who are influential
in their communities. Circumventing the elephants risks losing parts of this network.
Royal’s life partner, François Hollande, is chairman of the Socialist Party and one of
9 “M. Sarkozy veut impliquer plus le Parlement dans la politique de défense,” Le Monde,
Jan. 27, 2007, p. 10; interviews in France, Febrary-March 2007.
10 “Sarkozy: ‘J’aime l’énergie et la fluidité de l’Amérique,” Le Monde, Sept. 10-11, 2006,
p. 6; “Sarkozy outlines foreign policy,” Financial Times, Mar. 1, 2007, p. 3.
11 “Ségolène Royal: ‘Je ne dois rien à personne si ce n’est au peuple français,’” Le Monde,
Mar. 6, 2007, p. 8; interviews with French observers, March 2007. Some observers,
traditionally on the left, criticize the Socialist Party as increasingly unimaginative and
ossified by a rarely changing leadership. See, for example, André Glucksmann, “Pourquoi
je choisis Nicolas Sarkozy,” Le Monde, Jan. 30, 2007, p. 21.

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the elephants. He seemed to undercut her early in the campaign when he openly
opposed her tax plan, which he found too moderate. Her campaign must navigate
such political trap doors if she is to succeed.12
Royal has sounded a generally moderate message, concentrating on the home
and family, and developed an interactive website, [http://www.avenir.org], where she
carries on a dialogue with voters and features debates and discussions of policy issues
by prominent officials, local leaders, and others.
A member of the National Assembly, Royal raises issues of interest to the
French population on the website and solicits the public’s opinion. Her campaign of
“participatory democracy” is controversial. She has held meetings across France
with public groups where she pledged to listen to the voice of the average French
person before coming to settled policy positions, a practice sharply different from
that of previous Socialist candidates and Sarkozy. In a country where voters are used
to Socialist Party leaders presenting highly defined and finely tuned positions on
policy questions to the public, this tactic is unusual. Her political challenge has been
to listen carefully, but at the same time to demonstrate leadership and creative
thinking in guiding the public to resolution of important issues. Even after she bested
her party rivals and won the nomination in November 2006, she continued her
“listening campaign” and, in the view of some party observers, was slow to articulate
a formal position on key issues.13 For example, when initially asked whether she
supported Turkish membership in the EU, an idea opposed by the majority of the
French population, she seemed to some to respond disingenuously by saying that she
would “listen to the French people” and submit the matter to a referendum, a vote
likely to be negative.14 Such apparent indecisiveness was an apparent factor leading
to a sharp decline in her standing in the polls in January and February 2007.
Domestic Issues. Royal has also addressed the issue of immigration and
integration of Muslims into French society. In the Socialist Party tradition, she
insists that France remain a secular country and that young Muslims learn to speak
French well and perform well in French schools. She opposes a system of “positive
discrimination,” promoted by Sarkozy, for immigrants. At the same time, she
supports policy initiatives that might assist many young people in France. She has
pledged to increase the number of teachers, raise the minimum wage by 20% by
2012, and inaugurate a system of state-funded first jobs.15
Royal has a tough message meant to bring greater order and discipline to the
public school system. She would send troublesome students to military-style “boot
camps” to educate them about appropriate social conduct. This suggestion has
brought criticism from elements of the Socialist Party, but might appeal to parts of
12 Interviews with French observers, February-March 2007.
13 Interviews with French observers, March 2007; Michel Noblecourt (editorial), “La Course
au projet de Ségolène Royal,” Le Monde, Jan. 26, 2007, p. 2.
14 Interviews with French observers, January-March 2007.
15 “Ségolène Royal: ‘Je ne dois ...,’” op. cit.

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the center and right on the political spectrum.16 Royal was reportedly raised in a
strict environment, and she is the daughter of a military family that lived in a former
colony.
Royal’s views on how to reinvigorate the economy are in sharp contrast to those
of Sarkozy. She has pledged to scrap the “flexible contract,” which allows short-term
hiring and eases the firing of employees, for small businesses. She would extend the
35-hour work week to a larger part of the workforce.17 She would also re-nationalize
the large utility, Electricité de France, and merge it with the state-owned company
Gaz de France to create a public sector company. Such a policy would run counter
to EU efforts to persuade member governments to privatize state enterprises. She
agrees with Sarkozy that the European Central Bank should be persuaded to weaken
the Euro in order to generate more exports and expand the economy.
Foreign Policy. Royal has no experience in foreign policy, and she has made
several slips that have brought criticism. However, most of her views are
conventional within the general French approach to key issues. Like Sarkozy, she
believes that France should maintain its independent nuclear force, and like Sarkozy,
she also believes that France should spend at least 2% of GDP a year on defense.
Several stumbles on foreign policy may have damaged her standing in the polls.
She reportedly called for a “sovereign” Quebec, a view long ago abandoned by most
French nationalists. The Canadian prime minister rebuked her for the comment.
While visiting Lebanon, a Hezbollah member of the Lebanese Parliament, in a group
meeting with her, compared Israel to the Nazis. She criticized some of his remarks,
but did not refer to this particular comment. After she was taken to task by her
political opponents in France, she said that the interpreter had not translated the
remark, made in Arabic, likening Israel to Nazi Germany. She condemned the
comments by the Hezbollah representative several days later.18
Royal describes herself as a “committed European” and a strong supporter of
the European Union. She does not support a second vote in France on the proposed
EU constitution, preferring instead a debate and then a referendum on a new
“Protocol” capturing the essence of several aspects of the constitution, especially
matters related to “social progress,” the role of public services, and protection of the
environment.19 She has moderated her views on Turkey and, alone among major
candidates, supports Turkey’s membership in the EU if it achieves the progress
towards full democracy laid out by the EU Commission.
Royal supports strong EU initiatives to move forward the peace process between
Israel and the Arab world. In line with the views of many European leaders, she
believes that Islamic terrorism can best be attenuated by attacking its root causes,
16 Interviews in France, Febrary and March 2007.
17 “France’s three rivals frustrate economists,” Financial Times, Mar. 30, 2007, p. 4.
18 “Mme Royal critiquée à Paris, bienvenue au Proche-Orient,” Le Monde, Dec. 5, 2006, p.
11.
19 “Ségolène Royal: ‘Je ne dois ...,’” op. cit.

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such as poverty and poor education. She describes Iran’s leadership as a significant
danger to peace and stability, and supports sanctions to deny Tehran a civilian as well
as a military nuclear capability.
Royal is sharply critical of Bush Administration foreign policy. She has
described as “unilateralist” the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. A campaign document,
drafted by an aide, on the Socialist Party website describes Sarkozy as “a Bush clone”
whose “nourishing milk is American neo-conservatism.” Referring to Sarkozy, the
document asks, “Is France ready to vote in 2007 for an American neo-conservative
with a French passport?”20 Such comments may have been designed to tap into
widely held sentiments in France critical of the Bush Administration and, more
generally, a broad anti-Americanism that has increased in the past several years.21
Royal has not been specific in her assessment of NATO’s tasks and its future,
but she has said that it is “doing too much, moving into new fields that it should not
be pursuing.”22 Such a view may be in line with a position evident across much of
the political spectrum that NATO should concentrate on military issues and build
collective defense, rather than venture into political areas such as state-building, more
in the realm of responsibility of the European Union. Finally, like Sarkozy, she
believes that President Chirac has diluted the effectiveness of French forces by
sending them on too many disparate missions abroad.
Other Candidates
There are 12 candidates on the ballot for the first round. If a candidate wins
50% or more of the votes in the first round, that person becomes President. Such a
development is unlikely, given that the poll numbers of Sarkozy and Royal have been
consistently in the 22%-30% range since December 2006. Other parties in the race
include two Trotskyite parties, another far left party, the increasingly moribund
Communist Party, and the Greens. These parties, several of which are known as the
“boutique left,” played a key role in the 2002 first-round vote, accounting for 23%
of all votes cast. In effect, they denied a second round to one of the two favorites, the
Socialist Party candidate and Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin. The extreme right-wing
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen slipped in ahead of Jospin to the second round with
only 16.9% of the vote. Chirac easily defeated Le Pen in the second round.
Le Pen is again in the race, but he trails François Bayrou, leader of the Union
for French Democracy (UDF), a small party with only 29 seats (of 677) in the
National Assembly. Bayrou, 55, is a familiar figure on the French political scene; he
ran for the presidency in 2002, gaining only very modest support. However, he is
20 “Pour le PS, M. Sarkozy s’inspire des néoconservateurs américains,” Le Monde, Jan. 10,
2007, p. 10.
21 In summer 2006, 39% of those polled in France had a positive view of the United States.
“Image of U.S. falls again,” International Herald Tribune, June 14, 2006; and “Europeans
see US as greater threat to stability than Iran,” Financial Times, June 19, 2006, p. 1.
22 “Défense: Mme Royal dénonce l’absence de priorités de la droite,” Le Monde, Mar. 6,
2007, p. 9.

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benefitting from apparent voter dissatisfaction with both Sarkozy and Royal, and in
early March 2007 was briefly tied in the polls with Royal for second place.
Bayrou is widely viewed as earnest but dull and unimaginative in his views. A
former Minister of Education, he supports an improved school system and is strongly
pro-business. He is also a strong supporter of the EU. Bayrou opposes Turkish
membership in the Union. He is something of an anomaly among senior French
politicians in that he is a practicing Roman Catholic in a highly secular country. He
appears to be drawing support away from Sarkozy.23
The level of support for Le Pen, now 78, is uncertain. Over the years, he has
made virulently racist and anti-immigrant comments. His repeated denials of the
Holocaust, a crime in France, have led to heavy fines. He has consistently trailed
Bayrou in the polls, but he has surprised observers in the past, as in 2002, when few
expected him to reach the second round.
Legislative Elections
Under the revised electoral law that governed the 2002 as well as the current
elections, legislative elections will follow the second round presidential vote by
approximately one month. A high point of popularity for a French president is often
early in a term, a factor that could enhance chances for a majority for the president’s
party in Parliament and ease governing. At the same time, the modest standing in the
polls of the three leading candidates could indicate that the winning candidate will
again face a splintered Parliament.
The new president will choose a prime minister from Parliament. Under the
Fifth Republic Constitution, the president is clearly the most powerful figure in
government. However, over the past 12 years, a president has several times had to
choose a prime minister from an opposing party to reflect the composition of
Parliament. Such periods of cohabitation have seen sparring between the president
and the prime minister over authority and uncertainty over key policies.
Implications for the United States
The essence of the U.S.-French relationship is unlikely to change substantively
should any of the three leading candidates win the presidency. Trade disputes will
continue to be managed through the European Union. Some U.S. officials believe
that either Sarkozy or Royal would be more “practical” in discussing the EU’s
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with the United States; they believe
that President Chirac has impeded cooperation between NATO and the EU by
insisting that the United States, rather than NATO, engage in discussions over
strategic issues with the Union, and by pressing for an “EU caucus” in NATO, where
23 “La vague dépassera de beaucoup la présidentielle,” Le Monde, Mar. 3, 2007, p. 10;
interviews with French observers, March 2007.

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EU member states would present a united position on selected issues to the United
States and NATO governments not in the Union.24
At the same time, any relationship between allies is a two-way street. Just as
some U.S. officials believe that President Chirac has been an impediment to
improved relations, many observers in France, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of
Iraq and highly politicized criticism of France emanating from parts of the U.S.
government and media, believe that only the end of the Bush Administration will
lead to a moment when the political atmosphere between the two countries can
improve.
Despite sharp differences with the Bush Administration, the Chirac presidency
has worked closely with the United States on several key issues. These efforts
relieve pressure on U.S. resources by contributing to a sharing of the burden for
missions important to U.S. and allied security.25 By all accounts, U.S.-French
cooperation against terrorism, primarily through EU structures but also bilaterally,
is excellent. France, like the United States, is deeply critical of the Syrian
government, and the two countries have worked together to reduce Syria’s influence
in Lebanon and to shore up the Lebanese government. On the other hand, some
French officials believe that the Bush Administration should have used its influence
to restrain Israel in its response to attacks by Hezbollah in summer 2006, a response
that badly battered the Lebanese economy and political leadership. As noted above,
France is one of the EU-3 countries working with the United States to block Iran’s
nuclear ambitions through negotiations and by imposing and maintaining economic
sanctions.
France also contributes to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, where French forces provide security in Kabul and train
elements of the Afghan army. President Chirac, however, believes that the Bush
Administration concentrates too heavily on combat action against Taliban forces, to
the detriment of building a stable political environment conducive to reconstruction.
Chirac also believes that such international institutions as the EU and World Bank
are more suited than NATO to manage economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, a
view strongly opposed by the Administration. U.S. officials believe that France
continues to modernize its armed forces to be more “expeditionary,” or capable of
distant missions in an era of global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. France also plays a role in the EU stabilization mission in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and the NATO mission in Kosovo.
24 Interviews with U.S. officials, 2007.
25 For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32464, France: Factors Shaping Foreign
Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
, by Paul Gallis.