Order Code RL33530
Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Updated April 10, 2007
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Summary
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved
mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for
Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II
accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza. However, Israeli-Syrian
negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000.
Negotiations with Lebanon also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw
unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit
with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but
they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel,
and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards.
The post 9/11 war on terrorism prompted renewed U.S. focus on a peace
process, emphasizing as its goal a democratic Palestinian state as a precondition for
achieving peace. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union,
and Russia (known as the “Quartet”) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian
statehood. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have implemented it. Israel unilaterally
disengaged (withdrew) from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West
Bank in August 2005.
PA Chairman/President Yasir Arafat died on November 11, 2004; on January
9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected to succeed him and he seeks final status talks.
The victory of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group,
in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, however, complicated the
situation. The United States, Israel, and the Quartet agreed that they will not deal
with a Hamas-led government until it disavows violence, recognizes Israel, and
accepts prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. The rise of Hamas and the conflicts in Gaza
and Lebanon sparked by the Hamas and Hezbollah kidnapings of Israeli soldiers cast
shadows on the prospects for future talks.
Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its
oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen
constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other
commitments to the parties, and the 110th Congress is engaged in these matters.
Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, although
U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city is the
subject of final status negotiations. This CRS report will be updated as developments
warrant. See also CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah
Conflict, coordinated by Jeremy Sharp.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Olmert-Abbas Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Arab Peace Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Palestinian Unity Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Secretary Rice’s Shuttle Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Arab League Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Pelosi Visit to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Madrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bilateral Talks and Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Israel-Palestinians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Israel-Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Israel-Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Israel-Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Significant Agreements and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Declaration of Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip . . . . . . 29
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Wye River Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Agreement on Movement and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Compliance/Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
List of Figures
Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
Olmert-Abbas Meeting
On March 11, 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas met in Jerusalem. Olmert would only discuss quality-of-
life issues and not negotiate as long as the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA)
government does not meet the demands of the international Quartet (United States,
United Nations, European Union, and Russia) to disavow violence, recognize Israel,
and accept prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. Olmert’s spokeswoman described the
bilateral meeting as “confidence-building.” Abbas countered that he continues to be
the Palestinian interlocutor for peace talks in his capacity as head of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been responsible for prior negotiations,
and he urged Israel to engage with him on the major issues involved in a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Palestinians who attended the March 11 meeting described it as “very frank and
very difficult.” Olmert reaffirmed that “Israel will not cooperate with any Palestinian
government or any part (i.e., Fatah ministers) of a Palestinian government” that fails
to meet the demands of Israel and of the international Quartet. Abbas urged Olmert
to broaden the cease-fire that has been in place in the Gaza Strip since November
2006 to the West Bank. Olmert responded that first Corporal Gilad Shalit, the Israeli
soldier kidnaped by Hamas and others in June 2006, must be released; weapons
smuggling from Egypt to Gaza must end; and rocket-firing from Gaza into Israel
must cease.
Arab Peace Initiative
Abbas and Olmert also discussed the Saudi Peace Initiative. On February 17,
2002, then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah had unprecedentedly called for Israel’s “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations” with all Arab states in the
region. The Arab League endorsed the Saudi proposal with revisions insisting on the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, and it became known as the “Arab
Peace Initiative.”1 Following his widely reported but officially unconfirmed meeting
with Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006, Olmert
1 For “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudiembassy.net/
2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].

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CRS-2
noted in November that “some parts of the Saudi Peace Initiative are positive.”2
Before meeting Abbas, Olmert told his cabinet that the Saudi Initiative is “a plan that
we are ready to address seriously” and that it has “positive elements.” On March 12,
2007, the Prime Minister expressed hope that these elements would be strengthened
at an Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 28 in order to increase
the chances for negotiations on the basis of the Initiative.
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni called for elements of the Arab Peace
Initiative not acceptable to Israel to be amended, explicitly referring to a call for
repatriation of Palestinian refugees and a statement that a solution for the refugees
should not be found in the countries where they now reside, as well as a demand that
Israel return to the 1967 borders. Palestinian officials responded that Livni’s
demands are unacceptable to the Arabs and Palestinians, and the Arab Peace
Initiative would not be amended.
After meeting with European Union’s High Representative for Common
Security and Foreign Policy Javier Solana on March 13, Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud al Faisal called on Israel to agree to the Initiative and then discuss it.
In a March 14 address to a joint session of Congress, King Abdullah II of Jordan
pleaded for U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the “core issue in
the Middle East.” He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a
collective peace treaty.
Palestinian Unity Government
On March 15, a Palestinian unity government was formed, with a program
confirming the Palestinian people’s “legitimate” right of resistance, insisting that
halting resistance depends on ending the occupation, the right of refugees to return
to their land and belongings, and independence. The government asserted that it
“respects” international resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO. At the same
time, it said that it would work to consolidate the calm in Gaza, extend it to the West
Bank, and transform it into a comprehensive and mutual truce. On March 17, Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyah vowed to work to establish an independent Palestinian state,
with Jerusalem as its capital, along the 1967 borders.3 Hamas also has said that it
would not recognize Israel’s right to exist alongside that state and issued a statement
calling on the government to support resistance and offer “all possible means” to
2 It has been widely reported that Olmert met Saudi National Security Advisor Prince
Bandar in September 2006 in Jordan. Barbara Slavin, “Arabs try Outreach to Israel, U.S.
Jews....” USA Today, Feb. 12, 2007, quotes former Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Dani Ayalon confirming the meeting. For Olmert’s speech referring to the Saudi peace
initiative, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/
PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-Gurion+memorial+27-Nov-2006.htm].
3 Some commentators suggest that Hamas’s acceptance of a sate withing the 1967 borders
constitutes “implicit” recognition of Israel and that the demand for explicit recognition is
“unreasonable” due to Israel’s continuing occupation and failure to define its borders.
Daoud Kuttab, “Obstacle or Opportunity? How the Palestinian Unity Government Offers
a Path to Peace,” Washington Post, Mar. 26, 2007.

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CRS-3
confront “the continuous aggression.” The government program authorized President
Abbas to negotiate with Israel. The Palestinians hoped that formation of a new
government will end internecine fighting and the international aid embargo.
In response, the Israeli cabinet voted to shun all contact with the new Palestinian
government until it meets the Quartet’s demands and called on the international
community to maintain the aid embargo. White House spokesman Tony Snow
agreed, saying, “You need a government that is going to, in fact, abide by the Quartet
conditions.” The Bush Administration decided to deal with individuals in the PA
government on a case-by-case basis and, on March 20, the U.S. Consul General in
Jerusalem, Jacob Walles, met Finance Minister Salam Fayyad, an independent
member of the Palestinian cabinet. A State Department spokesman said that the aid
embargo would continue until the new government meets the Quartet’s demands. On
March 21, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a House committee that “it is
extremely important to show American commitment to a political horizon so that the
Palestinian people can see their future rests with moderate forces like Abu Mazen
(i.e., Abbas), not with those forces that are extreme.” She added, “We will not
suspend our contacts with those in the Palestinian government who have a record of
fighting for peace.”4
Secretary Rice’s Shuttle Diplomacy
The Secretary conducted shuttle diplomacy in the region, March 25-26, visiting
Israel, the West Bank, Egypt, and Jordan. She strived to establish a common agenda
in separate “parallel” talks with Abbas and Olmert but maintained that she did not
intend “to take control of the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue.” It was reported that
Olmert rejected negotiations on any final status issues.5 In the end, Rice announced
that the two leaders had agreed to hold biweekly, bilateral meetings on issues of
immediate concern, such as movement and access in the West Bank and Gaza and
preventing arms smuggling and rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, with the assistance
of U.S. Security Coordinator Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton. Secretary Rice said that they
would also discuss development of a political horizon consistent with the
establishment of a Palestinian state in accordance with the Roadmap. Olmert later
clarified that “political horizon” did not mean final status issues of borders, refugees,
and Jerusalem, but rather how a Palestinian state will be built.
4 “U.S. to Cut Palestinian Aid Package,” Associated Press, Mar. 22, 2007.
5 Helene Cooper and Warren Hoge, “Rice Works to Bring Israel’s Olmert and Arab Leaders
Closer on What Issues Can Be Broached,” New York Times, Mar. 27, 2007.

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CRS-4
Arab League Summit
A summit of Arab leaders in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 28-29, reiterated
adherence, without changes, to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative to achieve a peaceful
settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Israel’s full withdrawal from Arab
territories, including Palestinian territories, the Golan Heights, and areas of south
Lebanon, in exchange for normalization of relations with the Arab states. It
confirmed that the peace process must include a fair and agreed-upon solution to the
Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194
of 1948, which resolved that the refugees should be given the right of return (or
compensation). The summit called for a resumption of direct negotiations on all
tracks. Palestinian President Abbas voted for the Initiative, while Prime Minister
Haniyah abstained. The Saudi Foreign Minister said that if Israel rejects the
Initiative, then it does not want peace. The State Department viewed the summit’s
proposal positively. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stated, “Israel is sincerely interested
in pursuing dialogue with those Arab states that desire peace with Israel” in order to
promote a process of normalization.
In a March 30 interview, Prime Minister Olmert distinguished between the 2002
Saudi initiative and the Arab initiative that superseded it. He noted that the Saudi
initiative did not refer to the refugee problem and is more acceptable to Israel. He
said that he is not rejecting it and is prepared to hold meetings with Saudi leaders
immediately.6 On April 1, Olmert welcomed the Arab step as “a revolutionary
change in outlook” that represented “a new way of thinking, the willingness to
recognize Israel as an established fact and to debate the conditions of the future
solution.” Olmert invited all Arab heads of state, including the King of Saudi Arabia,
to meet, adding that if the Saudi King initiates a meeting of moderate Arab states and
invites Olmert and Abbas, and presents Saudi ideas, then he would attend to listen
and share ideas.7
Pelosi Visit to Syria
On April 4, with a fact-finding delegation to the Middle East, Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi held talks in Syria with President Bashar al Asad. President
Bush and other Administration officials denounced the visit. The Speaker stated that
she and her delegation had expressed concerns about Syria’s ties to Hamas and
Hezbollah and about militants’ infiltration from Syria into Iraq. She also said that
she had brought a message from Prime Minister Olmert that Israel was ready for
peace talks and that Asad responded that he was ready for negotiations. Ms. Pelosi
averred that “there is absolutely no division between this delegation and the President
of the United States on issues of concern.” The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office issued
a statement noting that “what was discussed with the House Speaker does not include
any change in Israel’s policy” and restated Israel’s demands that, to begin serious and
genuine peace negotiations, Syria must cease its support of terror and its sponsorship
6 “Special Holiday Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert,” Ma’ariv, Mar. 31, 2007,
BBC Monitoring Middle East, Apr. 1, 2007.
7 “Israeli PM Offers Dialogue to Arabs,” Associated Press, Apr. 2, 2007.

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CRS-5
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, stop arming Hezbollah and destabilizing Lebanon, and
relinquish its ties to Iran.
Background
Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade
since the founding of Israel. With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied
and became more intractable. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided
a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing conflict made refugees of hundreds of
thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with consequences
troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. It also led to a mass movement of Jewish
citizens of Arab states to Israel. The 1967 war ended with Israel occupying territory
of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in part, to regain
their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist incursions;
it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security zone” that Lebanon sought to
reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal
throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct
Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.8
U.S. Role
With the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the
Arab-Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a
framework for peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
the principle of “land for peace.” Secretary of State James Baker organized a peace
conference in Madrid in October 1991 that launched almost a decade of the “Oslo
process” efforts to achieve peace. It continued under President William Clinton, who
asserted that only the region’s leaders can make peace and vowed to be their partner.
With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United States seemed to become an
indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the
1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States coordinated its
implementation. He personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. After
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Administration focused on the peace
process mainly as part of the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
also has not appointed a special envoy, asserting, “Not every effort has to be an
8 For additional background, see William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press,
Revised Edition 2001; Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace
Process in the Middle East, New York, Other Press, 2003; Anton La Guardia, War Without
End: Israelis Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land, New York, St. Martin’s
Griffin, Revised and Updated, 2003; Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge, UK, Polity
Press, 2005; and Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle
East Peace, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.

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CRS-6
American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking
responsibility.”9 She encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act and personally
mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing Gaza and Egypt
after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. In 2007, she again engaged partly in order to
elicit the support of moderate Sunni Arab governments to thwart the rise of Iranian
influence. Those governments see resolution of the Palestinian issue as a key to
regional stability and to denying Iran opportunities for destabilizing actions.
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts
Madrid. The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were
represented by 14-member delegations. A combined Jordanian/Palestinian
delegation had 14 representatives from each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team
coordinated with the PLO. The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria,
Palestinians/Jordan, the European Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the
table. The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council,10 and the Arab Maghreb Union11
were observers.
Bilateral Talks and Developments
Israel-Palestinians. (Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In
November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate
the Israeli-Jordanian and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating tracks, the latter to
address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9,
1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination committee,
ending efforts to make it appear that the PLO was not part of the talks. Secret talks
in Oslo in 1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a Declaration of Principles
(DOP), signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993. Through the end of the
decade, incremental advances were made with interim accords. Perhaps the most
important developments were Israel’s withdrawal from major cities and towns and
the achievement of Palestinian self-government as the Palestinian Authority (PA).
However, no final agreement was ever reached. (See “Significant Agreements,”
below, for summaries of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000. This
narrative resumes with the Camp David summit.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority
(PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24,
2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The
parties had agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved.
9 Anne Gearan, “Rice Blasts Way Iran Treats Its Own People,” Associated Press, Feb. 4,
2005.
10 The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
11 The Arab Maghreb Union is comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia.

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CRS-7
Jerusalem was the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its
sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem
and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede more than 90% of the West Bank,
wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and offered to admit
thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An international
fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries. The
Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter
of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
particularly the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security
forces, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel
responded forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising against the
occupation began. On October 12, a mob in Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers,
provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian official sites. An
international summit in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, on October 16 set up a commission
under former U.S. Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister
in Israel. Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington,
D.C., December 19-23. On December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel
cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif and Arab neighborhoods
in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and annex settlement
blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza. Jerusalem
would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount
and sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. The agreement
would declare “an end to conflict.”12 Barak said he would accept the plan as a basis
for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought clarifications on contiguity of
Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of
return, among other issues. The Israeli-Palestinian talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and
vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other
areas for security. Sharon’s associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and
after Camp David were “null and void.”13 The Bush Administration said that
Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States proposals.”14 Sharon sought an
interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian
12 For text of the President’s speech describing his proposal, also known as “the Clinton
Plan” or “Clinton Parameters,” see the Israel Policy Forum website at [http://www.israel
policyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].
13 Lee Hockstader, “Jerusalem is ‘Indivisible,’ Sharon Says; Camp David Concessions are
Called ‘Null and Void,’” Washington Post, Feb. 8, 2001.
14 Jane Perlez, “Bush Officials Pronounce Clinton Mideast Plan Dead,” New York Times,
Feb. 9, 2001.

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CRS-8
state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.15
On April 30, 2001, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending
violence, rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two
sides accepted CIA Director George Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28,
they agreed to a seven-day period without violence followed by a six-week cooling-
off period. Secretary Powell said Sharon would determine if violence abated. On
August 8, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated in Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli
forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian national activity in East
Jerusalem, and then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On August 27, Israel
killed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what
no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President
Bush said, for the first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of
a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.”16 The PFLP assassinated
Israel’s Minister of Tourism on October 17. On November 10, President Bush
declared that the United States is “working toward the day when two states — Israel
and Palestine — live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders....”
Secretary Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire,
but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in
Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be
reached with Arafat, “who is a real terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed
an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings
in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was “directly responsible” for the
attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant....”17
On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-
commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell
stated that Arafat “cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at
the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.” At the White House
on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so
that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.” (On March 28, the Arab
League endorsed his proposal with some revisions; it is known as the “Arab Peace
Initiative.”18) Prime Minister Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea but
15 Interview by Ari Shavit, Ha’aretz, Apr. 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) Document GMP200110413000070.
16 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov] for presidential statements cited in this report.
17 “Israeli Cabinet Decision on Cutting Contacts with Arafat,” Government Press Office,
Dec. 13, 2001, FBIS Document GMP200111213000010.
18 For “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudiembassy.net/
(continued...)

---

CRS-9
that it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s right to
“secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, Hamas perpetrated a suicide bombing at a hotel in Netanya during
Passover celebrations, killing 27 and wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an
enemy” and Israeli forces besieged his compound in Ramallah; they soon controlled
all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a
conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. After another Hamas suicide
bombing near Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before
negotiations. After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions
were not ripe for a conference because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian
government. On June 24, the President called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders
“not compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the
United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and
certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He added,
“as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli) settlement activity
must stop.” The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years.19 On
September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary “Roadmap” to peace.
On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat
named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On April 14, Sharon
acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history
of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to
Israel.20 On April 14, Israeli emissaries submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap
to U.S. officials.21 On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Roadmap. Abbas
accepted it. On May 23, the Bush Administration stated that Israel had explained its
concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these are real concerns and
will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap,” leading
Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with reservations”
on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
On June 4, President Bush met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas
vowed to achieve the Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed
understanding of “the importance of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian
18 (...continued)
2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].
19 For text of the speech, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-
3.html].
20 “Sharon, ‘Certain” of Passing ‘Painful Concessions’ in Knesset,” Ma’ariv, Apr. 15, 2003,
FBIS Document GMP20030415000091.
21 For text of Israel’s reservations, see Israel’s Response to the Road Map, online at
[http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm].

---

CRS-10
state and promised to “remove unauthorized outposts.” Abbas said that he would use
dialogue, not force, to convince Palestinian groups. On June 29, Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations against Israel for three
months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not a party to the accord,
but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release Palestinian
prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat
free movement, and end construction of a security barrier that Israeli is building in
the West Bank. Israel demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist
infrastructures and act against terrorists.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide
bomber exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more
than 130. Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought
Arafat’s support to act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians,
halted plans to transfer cities to their control, and resumed “targeted killings” of
terrorist leaders, among other measures. On September 6, Abbas resigned because
of what he charged was lack of support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On
September 7, Arafat named Palestinian Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia,
aka Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing
three U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested
members of Popular Resistance Committees, who would be freed in April 2004.
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating
in the signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli
opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on December 1.22 Perhaps partly
to defuse these efforts, on December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish
and democratic Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by
redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and
intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank.23 On February 13,
2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but that
a final settlement “must be achieved through negotiations.” After an upsurge in
violence, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin on March 22.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters.24 The
President welcomed Israel’s plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S.
commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account changed
“realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,”
(i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” The
22 For text, see the Geneva Initiative website at [http://www.heskem.org.il].
23 For text, see “Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya
Speech,” Parts 1 and 2, Voice of Israel, Dec. 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents
GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167.
24 For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].

---

CRS-11
President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling
Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting
a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous,
sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented his disengagement plan as
independent of but “not inconsistent with the Roadmap.” He said that the
“temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders.
A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in
Hebron that Israel intends to retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the
President’s “legitimization” of settlements and prejudgement of final status. On
April 19, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov Weissglas gave National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle illegal settlement outposts.25
(As of April 2007, the commitment has not been fulfilled.)
On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby
Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the
northern West Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the
government’s right to build a security fence in the West Bank, but struck down some
land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights and ordered the route to be
changed. The government said that it would abide by the ruling. The Israeli Court
has attempted to balance Israel’s security needs and the humanitarian claims of
Palestinians in subsequent rulings and has sometimes required that the barrier be
rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding,
advisory opinion that the wall violates international law.26
On October 6, Sharon’s aide Dov Weissglas claimed that disengagement was
aimed at freezing the political process in order to “prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.”27
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the
PLO and, on January 9, 2005, was elected President of the PA. Abbas called for
implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues and
cautioned against interim solutions to delay reaching a comprehensive solution.

Secretary of State Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the
Israelis’ “historic” disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out
obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine
Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator
and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation for the
disengagement. (Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton succeeded Ward.) The Secretary did not
attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President Mubarak, and
25 For text of letter, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Press+Releases/2004/
04/Speeches7864.htm].
26 For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org]. Note, Israel refers to the barrier as a “fence” and
the Palestinians and other critics refer to it as a “wall.” Neutral observers often use the word
“barrier.”
27 Interview by Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze,” Ha’aretz, Oct. 8, 2004, FBIS Document
GMP20041008000026.

---

CRS-12
Jordanian King Abdullah II in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, where Sharon and Abbas
declared the end of violence and of military operations.
On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence
closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank
that includes major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel transferred Jericho to the
PA. On March 17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a “calm” or informal truce
until the end of the year. On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to the PA.
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the
building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and
East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut
East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern
and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary
Rice asserted that the plan was “at odds with American policy.” On April 11,
President Bush conveyed to Sharon his “concern that Israel not undertake any activity
that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.”
Sharon responded, “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers
will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement,” declared that Ma’ale
Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity
between it and Jerusalem.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas and said that “changes to the 1949
armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.” The U.S. President reaffirmed, “A
viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of
scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between
the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will be
the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.” He also
said, “The barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a security, rather than political,
barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future state should be those of before the
1967 war and asserted, “there is no justification for the wall and it is illegitimate.”
He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the Gaza disengagement with
Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final status negotiations.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in
Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and injuring more than 90. Israeli forces launched
operations against the PIJ, reoccupied Tulkarem, and closed the West Bank.
Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire against settlements in Gaza and
towns in southern Israel in order to show that disengagement meant that Hamas was
forcing Israel to withdraw from the Strip.
On August 15, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep
the settlement blocs of Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-
Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed — all are within or expected to be on Israel’s
side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift
Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border. 28
28 Interview by Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, Aug. 15, 2005, FBIS Document GMP20050

---

CRS-13
Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small
settlements in the northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. On
August 29, Sharon declared that there would be no further disengagements and that
the next step must be negotiations under the Roadmap. He affirmed that while the
large blocs of settlements would remain in Israeli hands and linked territorially to
Israel, not all West Bank settlements would remain, but this would be decided in the
final stage of negotiations.
After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, Hamas
announced on September 25 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but, on
September 27, it claimed responsibility for kidnaping and killing an Israeli settler in
the West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure of charities
linked to terror groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates in Palestinian
parliamentary elections, and targeted killings of terrorists.
On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront
the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not urge
him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that
candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to
renounce violence after election.
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in
Hadera, on the Israeli coast. Sharon announced an offensive against terrorism. He
ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes “serious action” against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her
that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian
legislative elections, and warned that if an armed terrorist organization is a partner
in the Palestinian administration it could lead to the end of the Roadmap. Rice
asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after the elections because
the entire international community would then exert pressure. She added that Abbas
would lose U.S. and international support if he does not disarm Hamas. Rice vowed
that the United States would not hold contacts with an armed Hamas even if it were
part of the Palestinian administration. On November 15, she announced that Israel
and the PA had achieved an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza
Strip. On November 25, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
reopened with EU monitors, but it has since been closed often.
On December 5, PIJ perpetrated another suicide bombing in Netanya, killing 5
and wounding more than 50. Israel barred Palestinians from entering Israel for one
week, arrested militants in the West Bank, began air strikes in Gaza, and did not hold
scheduled talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys.
After Hamas’s victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections,
speculation increased about possible effects on the peace process if Hamas were
similarly successful in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28,
28 (...continued)
815621002.

---

CRS-14
the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet “should include no member who
has not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and
an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.”29 On January 11, Secretary Rice
asserted, “It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the
political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.”
On January 4, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke
and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister. On
January 12, Olmert told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if
terrorist organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government. On January 19,
PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30.
Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, claims the entire land of Palestine,
including Israel, “from the river to the sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo
agreements of the 1990s, insists on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
Israel, and on the right to “resistance,” which it claims forced Israel from the Gaza
Strip.30 Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian
administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction
and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction
of Israel, and accept all prior agreements. President Bush stated that the United
States would not deal with a political party “that articulates the destruction of Israel
as part of its platform” and, on January 31, called on Hamas to “recognize Israel,
disarm, reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace.”
On January 30, the Quartet stated that “future assistance to any new
(Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government’s
commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance
of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.”31 Hamas countered
that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a “long-term truce” if
Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroyed all settlements,
and recognized the Palestinian refugees’ right to return (to Israel), and would create
a state on “any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding another. Abbas remained
committed to negotiating a two-state solution and suggested continued use of the
PLO for this purpose.
On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the
Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major
settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley. On March 8, he stated that he would wait
a “reasonable” amount of time to see whether Hamas met his conditions. He aimed
to reach a national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and said that the security
barrier would be moved to those borders. Olmert also declared that construction
29 This and subsequent Quartet statements cited may be found at the State Department’s
website: [http://www.state.gov].
30 For Hamas Covenant text, see [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm].
31 “UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,” M2 Presswire, Jan. 31, 2006.

---

CRS-15
would begin in the E-1 corridor between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and
Jerusalem. Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah of Hamas declared,
“Let them withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch of liberated
land....” Damascus-based Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish’al said that his
group would make no concessions to Israel and would “practice resistance side by
side with politics as long as the occupation continued.”
After his Kadima party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary
elections, Olmert said that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish
state with a permanent Jewish majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations
based on mutual recognition, agreements already signed, the principles of the
Roadmap, a halt to violence, and the disarming of terrorist organizations. He said,
“Israel will take its fate into its own hands” if the Palestinians do not act.
Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to Abbas negotiating with Israel and
that Hamas could redefine its position if the result served the people’s interests. In
an op-ed in (the British newspaper) The Guardian on March 31, Haniyah appealed
for no more talk about recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” or ending resistance until
Israel commits to withdraw from the Palestinians’ lands and recognizes their rights.
On March 30, the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades had claimed responsibility for a suicide
bombing near an Israeli settlement, killing four. Reacting to the bombing, the
Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister said that Hamas would never object to the
Palestinians’ “self-defense” as long as they were under occupation.
On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the
Hamas-led PA, which it called a “hostile entity.” Because it views the PA as “one
authority and not as having two heads,” the cabinet declared that there could be
personal contacts, but not negotiations, with President Abbas.
On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and
wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as
“despicable” and counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an
act of “self-defense.”
On April 26, Abbas called for an immediate international peace conference with
himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He said that the Hamas-led government is not
an obstacle to negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, has the mandate to
negotiate as it had all previous agreements. He also noted that he is empowered as
the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. In response, an Israeli
spokesman noted that the Roadmap does not call for an international conference until
its final phase and is the best way to move forward. Meanwhile, Hamas officials said
that, for negotiations to begin, Israel must accept withdrawal from territories
occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, recognition of the refugees’ right to
return, the release of prisoners, and the dismantling of the (security) wall.
On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to
strive to shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic Jewish
state, with a Jewish majority. Although preferring to achieve this goal through
negotiations, the government said that it would act to determine borders in their
absence. Prime Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted

---

CRS-16
to conform to the borders in both east and west. The PLO rejected the Olmert Plan
as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people’s right to a state in all territories
occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital.
On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other officials drafted a “National
Accord Document” calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the
right of the return of refugees, and the release of all prisoners. It also called for
renewing the PLO and for Hamas and PIJ to join it, supported the right to resist the
occupation in lands occupied in 1967, and stated that the PLO is responsible for
negotiations and that any agreement should be put to a vote by the Palestinian
National Council or a referendum.32 Abbas accepted the document, but Hamas
officials rejected its implied recognition of pre-1967 Israel.
On May 21, Olmert asserted that, since the Hamas-led government was elected,
Abbas is “unable to even stop the minimal terror activities amongst the Palestinians,
so how can he seriously negotiate with Israel and assume responsibility for the most
major, fundamental issues that are in controversy between us and them?”33 Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni met Abbas, who warned that Israeli “unilateralism will quickly
put an end to the two-state solution and will increase violence.”34
On May 23, at the White House, President Bush reported that Olmert agrees that
a negotiated final status agreement best serves both peoples and the cause of peace,
but accepted that Olmert’s ideas for removing most Israeli (West Bank) settlements
could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to progress on the Roadmap is not
open in the period ahead. Olmert said that he had presented the President ideas for
a “realignment” in the West Bank to “reduce friction between Israelis and
Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the Palestinians, and guarantee Israel’s
security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.”35
Violence increased, especially between Gaza and Israel. The Hamas military
wing and other Palestinian groups repeatedly launched rockets at Sderot in southern
Israel, and Israel responded with artillery fire and air strikes. On June 10, Hamas
called off its 16-month truce in response to the deaths of Palestinian civilians on a
Gaza beach from Israeli artillery fire on June 9. Israel denied responsibility for those
deaths, but Israeli strikes caused other Palestinian civilian casualties as well.
On June 13, Olmert said that he would not negotiate until the Quartet’s January
30 conditions were met. He told a group of British parliamentarians that, even with
negotiations, “Israel will never agree to withdraw from the entire West Bank because
32 For text of a later, final version of the National Accord Document (also known as the
Palestinian Prisoners’s Agreement), see Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations
Affairs Department website [http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=news-updates_pre].
33 In interview on CNN Late Edition, May 22, 2006.
34 “‘Full text’ of Palestinian President’s Speech at World Economic Forum,” BBC
Monitoring Middle East, May 25, 2006.
35 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-9.html] for text of joint
news conference.

---

CRS-17
the pre-1967 borders are not defensible.” Olmert also asserted that Israel would
withdraw from approximately 90% of the West Bank and observed that not all of
Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods would be part of the future Jewish capital.36
On June 28, Palestinian factions agreed on a revised National Accord
Document. The Document stated that the PLO and the President of the PA will be
responsible for negotiations with Israel to create a state on territories occupied by
Israel in 1967. It insisted on the right of Palestinian refugees “to return to their
homes and properties.” All agreements with Israel will be presented to a new
Palestine National Council or to a referendum in which Palestinians in both the
occupied territories and the diaspora will vote. In tandem with political action,
resistance will be concentrated in (but not limited to) territories occupied in 1967.
The signatories also vowed to work toward establishing a national unity government.
The PLO will be reformed to allow Hamas and PIJ to join.37 PIJ rejected the
Document, while Hamas officials insisted that it did not require them to recognize
Israel or to accept two states. The Israeli Foreign Ministry noted that the Document
did not mention recognizing Israel’s right to exist or ending the conflict with Israel.
It argued that the return of all refugees is a formula for the destruction of Israel and
contradicts a two-state solution.38
On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing, the Popular Resistance
Committees, and the previously unknown Army of Islam had attacked Israeli forces
in Israel, just outside of Gaza, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and
kidnaping one. The terrorists demanded the release of women and minors (an
estimated 400 persons) from Israeli prisons. Israel held the PA and its Hamas-led
government responsible for the attack and the fate of the kidnaped soldier.

On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the soldier’s release,
Israel forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter future Hamas attacks,
including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to weaken, bring down,
or change the conduct of the Hamas-led government. Israeli officials claimed that
Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the kidnaping and attack within pre-1967 Israel.
On June 28, Hamas political leaders echoed the demands of the kidnapers; Israeli
officials responded by insisting on the unconditional release of the soldier.
On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers,
parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem. On
July 1, the kidnapers demanded 1,000 prisoners in exchange for the soldier. Israeli
officials again called for his unconditional release. The next day, Israeli missiles
destroyed the empty offices of the Palestinian Prime Minister. Israeli troops and
36 Gil Hoffman, “Olmert Bids to Enlist Chirac Support for Realignment; PM tells British
MPS: Israel Would Never Agree to Withdraw to Pre-1967 Borders,” Jerusalem Post, June
14, 2006.
37 “Text of National Consensus Document signed by the Palestinian factions, except the
Islamic Jihad Movement,” Ramallah Al-Ayyam, Open Source Center Document GMP2006
0628253002.
38 For text of Foreign Ministry comments, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa].

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CRS-18
tanks began sweeping northern Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border
and continued operations targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank.
The Hamas military wing fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of
Ashkelon, a major population center, prompting the Israeli cabinet to approve
“prolonged” activities against Hamas.
Diplomatic efforts were undertaken to resolve the crisis. On July 10, Hamas
politburo chief Khalid Mish’al insisted on the mutual release (“swap”) of prisoners.
Prime Minister Olmert responded, “Trading prisoners with a terrorist bloody
organization such as Hamas is a major mistake that will cause a lot of damage to the
future of the State of Israel,” adding that to negotiate with Hamas would signal that
moderates such as President Abbas are not needed.
The White House spokesman said that Hamas had been “complicit in
perpetrating violence” and that Israel had a right to defend itself. Secretary Rice
described the abduction as the “root cause” of the problem, called on Syrians to use
their considerable leverage to gain the soldier’s release, and spoke of the need for
pressure on Hamas to stop rocket attacks; she also called for Israeli restraint.
Israeli forces expanded their offensive in Gaza and continued their round-up of
Hamas officials. Although sidelined by the kidnaping, President Abbas tried to assert
his power. He said that the National Accord Document would be implemented and
discussed the formation of a national unity government with Hamas officials.
Abbas told a visiting U.N. team in July that he wanted to “de-link” the crisis in
the Palestinian areas from the war in Lebanon that began three weeks later in order
to prevent non-Palestinian extremists (Hezbollah) from hijacking the leadership of
the Palestinian issue. (For the war in Lebanon, see “Israel-Lebanon” below.) Olmert
said that a prisoner release would only be done in coordination with Abbas in order
to strengthen his authority and that Israel would continue to avoid Hamas. Yet,
Abbas never controlled the kidnaped soldier. On September 11, Abbas and Haniyah
to agree to form a national unity government.
On September 20, the Quartet issued a statement welcoming Abbas’s effort to
form a government of national unity and hoping that the government’s platform
would reflect the Quartet’s principles.39
On September 21, Abbas told the U.N. General Assembly that any future
Palestinian government will commit to all prior agreements, particularly the
September 1993 mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO.40 Haniyah differed,
declaring, “I personally will not head any government that recognizes Israel.” Abbas
concluded that efforts to form a unity government have “gone back to point zero.”
39 For text of statement, see [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sg2116.doc.htm].
40 “‘Unofficial’ Text of Palestinian President’s Speech,” Palestinian News Agency, Sept. 22,
2006, BBC Monitoring Middle East.

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CRS-19
On October 31, Israeli forces began a six-day incursion into Beit Hanoun in the
northern Gaza Strip to stop Palestinian rocket fire into southern Israel. The offensive
resulted in heavy Palestinian casualties and did not stop rocket launches. After it
ended, on November 8, an errant Israeli artillery barrage killed 20 and wounded many
more at Beit Hanoun, prompting international outcries.
On November 25, Olmert and Abbas agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza. Hamas said
that it would respect the accord, but PIJ said that it would agree only if Israel
refrained from attacks in the West Bank as well. The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and
PIJ continued firing rockets and declared that they would do so until Israel ceases its
operations in the West Bank. The cease-fire nonetheless produced considerably less
rocket fire and shooting along the border.
On November 27, Olmert said if the Palestinians established a new government
committed to carrying out the Quartet’s principles, one that will implement the
Roadmap to a two-state solution and bring about the release of the kidnaped Israeli
soldier, then he would enter an immediate dialogue with Abbas to establish an
independent, viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and borders outlined
by President Bush in his April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon.41 Olmert
said that Israel would “free many Palestinian prisoners, including ones sentenced to
long prison terms,” upon the release of the soldier, increase freedom of movement
in the territories and across the borders, and release Palestinian funds it stopped
transferring to the PA when Hamas took power. He emphasized that Israel would
agree “to evacuate many areas and settlements” in exchange for true peace, and called
on the Palestinians to recognize Israel’s right to live in peace and security alongside
them and renounce their demand for the right of return. Olmert also noted that “some
parts of the (2002) Saudi Peace Initiative are positive.”42
Abbas found it difficult to meet Olmert’s preconditions. On November 30,
Abbas said that efforts to agree on a national unity government had reached a dead-
end. On December 8, in Iran, Haniyah declared that Hamas will never recognize
Israel and will continue its jihadist movement until Jerusalem and the Al Aqsa
Mosque are liberated and all Palestinian refugees are returned to their homes.43
Viewing Abbas as the only available partner for an Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, the Israeli government and Bush Administration took steps to bolster him
in his contest with Hamas for control of the PA. On December 23, Olmert promised
to hand over $100 million in tax revenue to Abbas for humanitarian purposes, to ease
41 For text of Roadmap, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm]. For text of
letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].
42 For text Olmert’s speech, see Israel’s MFA at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-
Gurion+memorial+27-Nov-2006.htm]. For what Olmert called the “Saudi Peace Initiative,
also called the “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudi
embassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].
43 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dec. 8, 2006, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.

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CRS-20
crossings of goods and people between Israel and the Gaza Strip, and to remove some
military checkpoints in the West Bank.44 On January 5, 2007, Olmert asserted that
Israel should deal with Palestinians who are genuinely interested in peace and fight
against the radical forces. To that end, Israel had authorized Egypt’s transfer of arms
and ammunition to security forces allied with Abbas in Gaza in late December.
On January 9, the Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that there is a common
Egyptian, Jordanian, Arab, and Palestinian position for an agreement on the “end
game” before resuming the 2003 Roadmap. Seeming to follow this line, Secretary
Rice said that she would meet with Olmert and Abbas to discuss “the broad issues
on the horizon, so that we can work on the Roadmap....” (The Administration
reportedly had promised the “moderate” Arab regimes that it would become more
engaged in the peace process in exchange for their support in countering increased
Iranian influence in the region.45) Rice described her intent as “confidence-building”
to which a broader political horizon can lend momentum. Olmert said that he
intended to continue bilateral meetings with the Palestinians, and his spokeswoman
also referred to “pre-negotiation” confidence-building.


At a meeting with Rice on January 14, Abbas had rejected the possible creation
of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, as called for in Stage II of the
Roadmap, suspecting that the temporary could become permanent. Rice appeared
to agree that it may be more difficult to negotiate a provisional state than to move
toward a final settlement.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in
Eilat on January 29, which killed three Israelis. It was the first suicide bombing
inside Israel since April 2006.
On February 2, 2007, the Quartet issued a statement reaffirming the primacy of
the Roadmap and a call for a Palestinian unity government to commit to non-
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements, including the
Roadmap.46
On February 8, Abbas designated Haniyah to form a new unity government and
called on him to “respect international resolutions and agreements signed by the
Palestine Liberation Organization,” that is, prior accords reached with Israel.
Abbas’s letter of designation resulted from the Mecca Accord reached at a meeting
of Abbas and Mish’al hosted by Saudi King Abdullah. The Accord aimed mainly to
stop internecine fighting between Palestinian factions and unite them in a new
government, and did not refer to Israel or to the Quartet’s demands.47
44 On January 19, Israel transferred the funds to a special account in an Israeli bank to ensure
that the money did not reach Hamas.
45 Camp Simpson, “Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian
Crisis....” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007.
46 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].
47 Text of the Mecca Accord was published on [http://www.middle-east-online.com] Feb.
(continued...)

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CRS-21
On February 19, Secretary Rice met with Olmert and Abbas in Jerusalem. Their
discussions focused on the Mecca Accord. Afterwards, Olmert said Israel would
continue to boycott the Palestinian government until it met the Quartet’s demands,
ended rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, and released the kidnaped Israeli soldier.
Israel would not have contact with moderates in a Palestinian government that does
not meet the Quartet’s conditions, but would maintain contact with Abbas in order
to limit terror and ease Palestinian daily life. Olmert rejected the idea that he
negotiate with Abbas as head of the PLO because doing so would free Hamas of the
requirement to recognize Israel.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450
square miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law
and administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not
recognize. In 1991, Syria referred to its goal in the peace conference as an end to the
state of belligerency, not a peace treaty, preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace, and rejected separate agreements between Israel and Arab parties. Israel
emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial
relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (after the 1967
war) applies to all fronts, meaning that it includes Syria’s Golan. Syria submitted a
draft declaration of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement,” not
simply an end to belligerency. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accepted an
undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.” On
September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange
for total withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Hafez
al Asad announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress
at different speeds. In June, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the
United States might be willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of
a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that
Syria was ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides
inched toward each other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again
told President Clinton on October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful
relations in return for full withdrawal. Asad never expressed his ideas publicly,
leaving it to his interlocutors to convey them.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military
talks under U.S. auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-
out zones may take topographical features into account and be unequal, if security
arrangements were equal. Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in
northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on the Golan Heights, but Syria
insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other
from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that
Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin insisted that
47 (...continued)
9, 2007.

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CRS-22
Israeli troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would
infringe on its sovereignty, but Syrian government-controlled media accepted
international or friendly forces in the stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation
in Maryland in December 1995, but were suspended when Israeli negotiators went
home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
A new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for
negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to Israel’s security and water needs
and that retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4,
1967-border (which differs slightly from the international border of 1923). Israeli
negotiators say that Rabin had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s
security and normalization needs, which Syria did not do. An Israeli law passed on
January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member majority and a national referendum to
approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June 1999, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak and Asad exchanged
compliments via a British writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from
“the point where they left off,” with each side defining the point to its satisfaction.
Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met in Washington on December 15-16, 1999,
and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000. President Clinton intervened.
On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli success in delaying
discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-
warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the summary,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000 were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House
spokesman reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be
productive for talks to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on
Israel’s reluctance to withdraw to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of
Galilee, on security arrangements, and on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that
the border/Sea issue had been the main obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son,
Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister of Israel in February
2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights. In a December 1 New York Times
interview, Bashar al Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations from where
they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hezbollah and
Palestinian terror organizations.48
On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that this is not the time to begin negotiations
with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building up Hezbollah, and
maintaining Palestinian terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from
which terrorist attacks against Israel are ordered. Moreover, Sharon observed that
there was no reason for Israel to relieve the pressure that France and the United States
are putting on Syria (over its alleged complicity in the February 2005 assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
48 See also CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B.
Prados.

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CRS-23
On June 28, 2006, Israeli warplanes caused sonic booms over President Asad’s
summer residence in Latakia to warn him to discontinue support for the Damascus-
based head of the Hamas political bureau, Khalid Mish’al, whom Israel considered
responsible for a June 25 attack in Israel, and for other Palestinian terrorists. On July
3, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem denied that Mish’al had a role in the
attack and said that Syria would never force him to leave the country.
In a speech on August 15 to mark the end of the war in Lebanon, President Asad
declared that the peace process had failed since its inception and that he did not
expect peace in the near future.49 Subsequently, he said that Shib’a Farms are
Lebanese, but that the border between Lebanon and Syria there cannot be demarcated
as long as it is occupied by Israel. The priority, he said, must be liberation.50
Responding to speculation by some members of his cabinet about reopening
peace talks with Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert said on August 21 that Syria
must stop supporting terrorist organizations before negotiations resume. In
September, Olmert declared, “As long as I am prime minister, the Golan Heights will
remain in our hands because it is an integral part of the State of Israel.”51 He also
indicated that he did not want to differ from the U.S. Administration, which views
Syria as a supporter of terror that should not be rewarded. On November 28, U.S.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley concurred with Olmert that as long as
Syria is “a supporter of terror, is both provisioning and supporting Hezbollah and
facilitating Iran in its efforts to support Hezbollah, and is supporting Hamas,” then
it is “not on the agenda to bring peace and security to the region.” Hadley agreed that
you cannot talk about negotiating with that Syria.52
On December 6, the Iraq Study Group released a Report that included
recommendations for changing U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict because
“Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues.”
It stated that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East
unless it has a “renewed and sustained commitment” to a comprehensive, negotiated
peace on all fronts, including “direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon,
Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and particularly Syria....” The
Report recommended that Israel return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security
guarantee that could include an international force on the border, including U.S.
troops if requested by both parties, in exchange for Syria’s taking actions regarding
49 For text of speech, see “Syria’s Asad Addresses ‘New Middle East,’ Arab ‘Failure’ to
Secure Peace,” Syrian Arab Television TV1, Open Source Center Document GMP2006
08156070001.
50 In interview by Hamdi Qandil on Dubai TV, August 23, 2006, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060823650015.
51 “Olmert Tells Israeli Paper: Golan ‘An Integral Part of the State of Israel’,” Yedi’ot
Aharonot, September 26, 2006, citing a Mishpaha newspaper interview, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060926746002.
52 Shmuel Rosner, “Chirac: France, U.S. Agree There is No Point Talking to Syria,” Ha’
aretz, Nov. 29, 2006.

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CRS-24
Lebanon and Palestinian groups.53 Olmert rejected any linkage between the Mideast
issue and the situation in Iraq and believes that President Bush shares his view.
In December, President Asad and his Foreign Minister expressed interest in
unconditional negotiations with Israel to achieve peace. Their statements deepened
a debate in Israel over Syria’s intentions. Olmert is skeptical of Asad’s motives and
demands that Syria first end support for Hamas and Hezbollah and sever its ties with
Iran.54 On January 17, 2007, Secretary of State Rice asserted that “this isn’t the time
to engage Syria,” blaming Damascus for allowing terrorists to cross its territory,
failing to support Palestinians who believe in peace with Israel, and trying to bring
down the Lebanese government.55
Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought
Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern
Lebanon, and the end of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its
shelling of villages that Israel said were sites of Hezbollah activity. Israel claimed
no Lebanese territory, but said that its forces would withdraw only when the
Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hezbollah attacks on northern
Israel. Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing Israel’s
security concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which then dominated
Lebanon, said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel’s July 1993 assault
on Hezbollah prompted 250,000 people to flee from south Lebanon. U.S. Secretary
of State Warren Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again
attacked Hezbollah and Hezbollah fired into northern Israel. Hezbollah and the
Israeli Defense Forces agreed to a cease-fire and to refrain from firing from or into
populated areas but retained the right of self-defense. The agreement was monitored
by U.S., French, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives.
On January 5, 1998, the Israeli Defense Minister indicated readiness to
withdraw from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the
restoration of peace and security in the region, were implemented. He and Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed withdrawal in exchange for security, not
peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an unconditional withdrawal.
As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased later in 1998, the
Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In April 1999, however, Israel
decreased its forces in Lebanon and, in June, the Israeli-allied South Lebanese Army
(SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. On taking office, new
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, that is, Hezbollah. He argued that Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected
their implantation in Lebanon. He also rejected Secretary of State Madeleine
53 For text of Iraq Study Group report, see [http://www.usip.org/isg/].
54 Gideon Alon, “Olmert, Peretz Spar over Syrian Overtures,” [http://www.haaretz.com/],
Dec. 18, 2006.
55 Interview with Andrea Mitchell of NBC News, January 17, 2007.

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CRS-25
Albright’s assertion that refugees would be a subject of Israeli-Palestinian final status
talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon
by July. Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel
unless Israel also withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue.
On April 17, Israel informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon told the U.N.
that Israel’s withdrawal would not be complete unless it included the small area
known as Shib’a Farms, where the Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian borders meet. On
May 23, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that most of Shib’a is within the
area of operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing
the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without
prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24
Israel completed its withdrawal. Hezbollah took over the former security zone. On
June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the border region
because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hezbollah.56
On October 7, Hezbollah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli
soldiers. On October 16, Hezbollah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel.
On November 13, the U.N. Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take
control of the area vacated by Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hezbollah
attacked its soldiers in Shib’a, Israel, claiming that Syria controls Hezbollah, bombed
Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it
deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased out. On January 28, 2002,
the Security Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hezbollah shelled Israeli positions in Shib’a and northern Israel.
Israel responded with air strikes and expressed concern about a possible second front
in addition to the Palestinian intifadah. At its request, the Secretary General
contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and, on April 8, U.S. Vice President
Dick Cheney called President Asad and Secretary of State Powell visited northern
Israel and called on Syria to curb Hezbollah. On January 30, 2004, Israel and
Hezbollah exchanged 400 Palestinian and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and
the remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli colonel and the bodies of the three Israeli
soldiers. The trade was very controversial in Israel.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the
withdrawal of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon.57 Massive anti-
Syrian demonstrations occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents.
On March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon,
which was completed on April 26.
56 See CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred
Prados.
57 For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, see [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_
resolutions04.html].

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CRS-26
On December 28, Israeli jets attacked a terrorist base south of Beirut after
rockets fired from Lebanon hit a northern Israeli town. On May 28, 2006, Palestinian
rockets hit deep inside northern Israel and Israeli planes and artillery responded by
striking PFLP-GC bases near Beirut and near the Syrian border. Hezbollah joined
the confrontation and was targeted by Israelis. UNIFIL brokered a cease-fire.
On July 12, in the midst of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel,
Hezbollah forces crossed into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli military
vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnaping two. Hezbollah demanded that
Israel release Lebanese and other Arab prisoners in exchange for the soldiers and for
a third soldier who had been kidnaped by the Palestinian group Hamas on June 25.
(For more on the latter situation, see “Israel-Palestinians,” above.) Hezbollah leader
Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah said that the soldiers would be returned only through
indirect negotiations for a prisoner exchange. Nasrallah suggested that the Hezbollah
operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel had negotiated
with Hezbollah in the past, although it refused to negotiate with Hamas now.
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert declared that Hezbollah’s attack was “an act of
war” and promised that Lebanon would suffer the consequences of Hezbollah’s
actions. The Lebanese government replied that it had no prior knowledge of the
operation and did not take responsibility or credit for it. Israeli officials also blamed
Syria and Iran but were careful to say that they had no plans to strike either one.
Immediately after the Hezbollah attack, Israeli forces launched a major military
campaign against and imposed an air, sea, and ground blockade on Lebanon. In a
July 17 speech, Olmert summarized Israel’s conditions for the end of military
operations: the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks,
and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border.58
Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora requested U.N. help in obtaining a cease-
fire. His cabinet agreed on a seven-point proposal to end the crisis. Hezbollah
ministers in the Lebanese government agreed to the proposal despite reservations.
On August 8, the Lebanese government promised to deploy 15,000 troops to the
south for the first time since 1978 if Israel withdrew its forces. Hezbollah agreed to
the government proposal, while Israeli Prime Minister Olmert found it “interesting.”
On August 9, the Israeli security cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and Defense
Minister to determine when to expand the ground campaign while continuing efforts
to achieve a political agreement. Only after the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1701 calling for the end to hostilities on August 11 did Olmert authorize
an offensive, and two days of costly fighting for both sides ensued.
Resolution 1701 called for the full cessation of hostilities, the extension of the
government of Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory, and for the deployment
of Lebanese forces and an expanded UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 15,000 each, in
a buffer zone between the Israeli-Lebanese border and the Litani River to be free of
58 For text of Olmert’s speech, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/
PMSpeaks/speechknesset170706.htm].

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CRS-27
“any armed personnel” other than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL.59 The deployment
would occur parallel to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The resolution authorized
UNIFIL to insure that its area of operations is not used for hostile activities and to
resist by forceful means attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties. The
resolution also banned the supply of arms to Lebanon, except as authorized by the
government. Reiterating prior resolutions, it called for the disarmament of all armed
groups in Lebanon. The resolution did not require the return of the abducted Israeli
soldiers or the release of Lebanese prisoners. It requested the Secretary General to
develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon,
“including by dealing with the Shib’a Farms area.” The truce went into effect on
August 14. The Lebanese Army began to move south to the border on August 17 as
Israeli forces handed over positions to the U.N.
Hezbollah leader Nasrallah declared victory for Lebanon and said that
Hezbollah would not disarm as long as Israel did not withdraw completely from
Lebanon, including the Shib’a Farms. On August 14, the Lebanese Defense Minister
said that the army had no intention of disarming Hezbollah, but Hezbollah weapons
would no longer be visible. On August 19, Israeli commandos raided an Hezbollah
stronghold near Ba’albek in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah did not respond and the
cease-fire held.
In a speech on August 14, Prime Minister Olmert accepted responsibility for the
military operation, and claimed as achievements a terrorist organization no longer
allowed to operate from Lebanon and the government of Lebanon responsible for its
territory. He declared that a severe blow had been dealt to Hezbollah.60 After the
war, Olmert expressed hope that the cease-fire could help “build a new reality
between Israel and Lebanon,” while Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora declared that
Lebanon would be the last country to sign a peace agreement with Israel. On
September 7, Olmert said that if the Shib’a Farms area is determined to be Lebanese
and not Syrian and if Lebanon fulfills its obligations under U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including the disarming of Hezbollah, then Israel would agree to discuss
the Farms with Lebanon.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian.
Jordan initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and
economic matters on September 14, 1993. On July 25, 1994, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein signed the Washington Declaration, a non-
belligerency accord. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See
“Significant Agreements,” below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew
from Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
Although supportive of the peace process and of normalization of relations with
Israel, on March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the peace process....” After Israeli agents bungled
59 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is accessible online at [http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm].
60 For text of Olmert’s statement, see Israeli Television Channel 1, Aug. 14, 2006, Open
Source Center Document GMP20060814728001.

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CRS-28
an attempt to assassinate Hamas official Khalid Mish’al in Jordan on September 25,
1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin, which
it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the
detained Israeli agents. On December 5, 1998, the King called for Jordan-Palestinian
coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national interests.
King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son Abdullah.
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy
sites in Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that
Jerusalem be an Israeli and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of a new
ambassador to Israel because of Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinians. On
March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss Israel’s security barrier and
disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan proposed deploying about
1,500 Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West Bank,
pending approval of the PA and Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz said that the
Badr Brigade could train Palestinians in the West Bank, but the Brigade still has not
deployed. Also in February 2005, Jordan sent an ambassador to Israel; in March, its
foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years.
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman
Yasir Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East peace process, and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook to prevent them,
stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict his commitments are
invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National Council, and
called upon his people to reject violence. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to
negotiate with it.61
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-
government for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway,
since January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza
and Jericho; transfer of authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza
to Palestinians; election of a Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West
Bank and Gaza. During the interim period, Israel is to be responsible for external
security, settlements, Israelis in the territories, and foreign relations. Permanent
status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may include
Jerusalem.62
61 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].
62 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].

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CRS-29
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4,
1994, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the
Palestinian Authority’s (PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period
of interim self-rule.63
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal
with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations,
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on
permanent status to begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and
Head of the Council’s Executive Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense
Force redeploy from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem,
and 450 towns and villages. Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary
for security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible for external security and the security
of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally responsible for Area “A,” the
six cities, plus Jericho. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have precedence
over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns and
villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas.
Palestinian Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within
two months of the Council’s inauguration.64
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel
and the PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying
Israeli and Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State
Christopher to Prime Minister Netanyahu.65
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps
to complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements
accompanying the Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in
exchange for Palestinian security measures. The PA will have complete or shared
responsibility for 40% of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control of
18.2%. The PLO Executive and Central Committees will reaffirm a January 22,
1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian
Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National Council will
reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this conclave.66

Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on
September 4, 1999.67 Israeli Prime Minister Barak and PA Chairman Arafat agreed
to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner in order to
63 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].
64 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].
65 For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].
66 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm].
67 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].

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conclude a framework agreement on permanent status issues in five months and a
comprehensive agreement on permanent status in one year. Other accords dealt with
unresolved matters of Hebron, prisoners, etc.
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (More briefly referred to as the Roadmap.)
Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, by the Quartet
(i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia). To achieve
a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for the Palestinians
to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake political
reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with
provisional borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement which will
end the conflict.68
Agreement on Movement and Access. From the Gaza Strip, reached on
November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with
European Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit TV feeds of the
crossing to Israel, Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza
beginning December 15, exports from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza
seaport.69
Role of Congress
Aid.70 Unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest,
P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2006,
prohibited aid for a Palestinian state and the PA unless its leaders have not supported
terrorism, been democratically elected, demonstrated their commitment to peaceful
coexistence with Israel, taken measures to counter terrorism and terrorism financing,
and established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts. It also
provided $150 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
After Hamas took power on March 30, 2006, Secretary of State Rice said, “We
are not going to fund a Hamas-led government. But we are going to look at what we
can do to increase humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people....” The
Administration requested that the PA return $50 million in direct aid provided in
2005; as of April 7, $30 million had been returned. On April 7, the Administration
announced that it would provide $245 million for basic human needs and democracy
68 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].
69 For text, see [http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].
70 See also CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical
Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request; CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign
Aid to the Palestinians; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, all by Jeremy
Sharp.

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building through various U.N. and nongovernmental agencies, suspend or cancel
$239 million for programs related to the PA ($105 million of which will be
redirected to human needs), and review $165 million in other projects. It redirected
about $100 million for humanitarian needs and $42 million for civil society groups.71
On May 9, the Quartet endorsed a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)
to be developed by the European Union (EU) to ensure direct delivery of aid to the
Palestinian people. On June 17, the Quartet endorsed a TIM plan open to all donors
to bypass the PA government. It called for the expanding a World Bank emergency
support program for essential health and social services programs and employees, for
contributions to ensure uninterrupted supply of essential utilities (fuel for electricity
from Israel), and for a needs-based social safety net for the poorest Palestinians. The
Quartet has since extended the TIM and expanded it to security sector reform,
reconstruction of infrastructure, and economic development.
P.L. 109-234, June 15, 2006, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, prohibits
obligation of ESF appropriated in P.L. 109-102 for the West Bank and Gaza (above)
until the Secretary of State submits a revised plan for such assistance and ensures that
it is not provided to or through entities associated with terrorist activity. Section 550
prohibits assistance to the PA unless the Secretary of State determines that it has
complied with the Quartet’s January 30 conditions. The President may waive the
prohibition with respect to the administrative and personal security costs of the
Office of the President of the PA and for his activities to promote democracy and
peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if it is in the U.S. national
security interest, if the President of the PA is not associated with Hamas or any other
foreign terrorist group, and if aid will not be transferred to Hamas.
H.R. 5522, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for 2007, passed on June
9, prohibits the provision of economic aid to the PA unless the President certifies that
it is important to U.S. national security interests. When the President exercises the
waiver authority, he must report to Congress on the steps that the PA has taken to
arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. It also
prohibits assistance to support a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State
certifies that its leadership has been democratically elected, has demonstrated a
commitment to peaceful coexistence with the State of Israel, is taking measures to
counter terrorism and terrorist financing, and is establishing a new security entity that
is cooperative with Israel, and the PA is working for a comprehensive peace. Again
it grants the President waiver authority.

Other legislation in the 109th Congress reacting to the Hamas victory in the
January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections included S.Con.Res. 79, passed in
both houses in February, which expressed the sense of Congress that no assistance
should be provided directly to the PA if a party calling for the destruction of Israel
holds a majority of its parliamentary seats. Also, H.R. 4681, passed in the House on
May 23, would have limited aid to the PA until it met specific conditions, to
nongovernmental organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza, and to U.N.
71 For details, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64234.htm].

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agencies and programs that “fail to ensure balance” in the U.N. approach to Israeli-
Palestinian issues; denied visas to PA officials; restricted the travel of PA and PLO
officials stationed at the U.N.; and prohibited PA and PLO representation in the
United States, among other measures. The White House said that H.R. 4681
“unnecessarily constrains the executive’s ability to use sanctions, if appropriate, as
tools to address rapidly changing circumstances.” The less restrictive Senate version,
S. 2370, passed on June 23, provides presidential waiver authority, and calls for
establishing a $20 million Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Reconciliation, and Democracy
Fund. The House passed the Senate version on December 7, by a voice vote, and the
President signed it into law, P.L. 109-446, on December 21, with a statement
directing executive agencies to construe certain provisions as advisory and not
mandatory to prevent encroachment on the President’s constitutional authority.72
On December 28, the White House notified Congress that it intended to provide
$86 million in non-lethal military aid for security forces allied with Palestinian
President Abbas. On January 26, 2007, President Bush issued the required waiver of
legislative restrictions on the aid. On February 4, House Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Chair Nita Lowey put a hold on the transfer of
the funds until the Administration provides additional information. On March 23,
the Administration requested $59 million in aid for the Palestinians, including $16
million to improve the Karni crossing between Israel and Gaza and $43 million for
training and non-lethal assistance to the Presidential Guard. These funds are to be
reprogrammed from FY2006 ESF funds.
H.R. 1856, introduced on March 30, would limit aid to Palestinian Authority
ministries, agencies, and instrumentalities controlled by a Foreign Terrorist
Organization until the PA meets specific conditions. Other provisions are similar to
H.R. 4681 of 2006, above.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel
over three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the
Administration deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year
because it determined that amount had been spent on the security barrier and
settlements in the occupied territories. P.L. 109-472, January 11, 2007, extends the
guarantees for a second time until September 30, 2011.
Jerusalem. Israel annexed the city in 1967 and proclaimed it to be Israel’s
eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital.
Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine the
fate of Jerusalem in negotiations. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21,
May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the
undivided capital of Israel. Congress has repeatedly prohibited official U.S.
government business with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to
create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows
72 For text of statement, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/query.html?col=colpics&qt=23
70&submit.x=10&submit.y=16].

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Israel to be recorded as the place of birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.73 The
State Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for
passports because the U.S. government does not recognize all of Jerusalem as part
of Israel. H.R. 895, introduced on February 7, 2007, would reaffirm congressional
prior policies on steps toward recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israeli.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is
not in the capital, that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy,
is unquestioned, and that Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital
in Jerusalem. Opponents say a move would undermine the peace process and U.S.
credibility in the Islamic world and with Palestinians, and would prejudge the final
status of the city. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the embassy’s
relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national security
interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the
authority. The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-
228, September 30, 2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy
“immediately.” The President replied that the provision would “if construed as
mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to
conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State Department declared, “our view of
Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be negotiated
between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold
Syria accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May
11, 2004, he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria and, on May 5,
2005 and May 8, 2006, he extended them for a year.
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah. S.Res. 524, passed on July
18, 2006, condemns the two terror groups and their state sponsors and supports
Israel’s exercise of its right to self-defense; H.Res. 921, passed on July 20, expresses
the same views.
H.Res. 107, agreed to by a voice vote on March 13, 2007, demanded that Hamas
and Hezbollah immediately release kidnaped Israeli soldiers and condemned the
actions of both groups and of Iran and Syria, their patrons.
73 See P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, and H.R. 5522, June 9, 2006, for recent
restrictions.

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Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors

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