Order Code RL30613
North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Updated April 6, 2007
Larry Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Raphael Perl
Specialist in International Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Summary
The issue of North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting
countries has arisen twice in recent U.S.-North Korean diplomacy. In 2000, North
Korea demanded that the Clinton Administration remove North Korea from the
terrorism-support list before North Korea would send a high level envoy to
Washington and accept the Clinton Administration’s proposal to begin negotiations
with the United States over the North Korean missile program. In 2003, multilateral
negotiations involving six governments began over North Korea’s nuclear programs
in the wake of North Korea’s actions to terminate its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. In
the six party talks, North Korea demanded that in return for a North Korean “freeze”
of its plutonium nuclear program, the United States agree to a number of U.S.
concessions, including removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorism-support list.
During the 2000 negotiation, the Clinton Administration heeded the urgings of
Japan to keep North Korea on the terrorism-support list until North Korea satisfied
Japan regarding North Korean terrorist acts against Japan, especially the kidnapping
of Japanese citizens. In June 2004, the Bush Administration tabled a proposal to
settle the North Korean nuclear issue through the complete dismantlement of North
Korea’s nuclear programs. Once North Korea had undertaken several specified
actions leading toward dismantlement, the United States would negotiate over the
terrorism-support list. In late 2006 and early 2007, the Bush Administration
reportedly offered North Korea removal from the U.S. terrorism list if North Korea
agreed to end its nuclear programs. U.S. and North Korean diplomats negotiated
much of the Six Party Nuclear Agreement, which was signed on February 13, 2007.
North Korea subsequently indicated that it would press the Bush Administration to
remove North Korea as a condition for negotiation of implementation of the second
phase of the Agreement, which was scheduled to begin in April 2007. The Bush
Administration will have to consider two other factors in this negotiation. One,
Japan, the United States’ key ally in East Asia, strongly urges the United States to
keep North Korea on the terrorism until Pyongyang resolves its kidnapping of
Japanese citizens. Two, Congress has supported Japan on the kidnapping issue
through a 2005 congressional resolution, and important elements of Congress have
demanded a resolution of the case of a Korean clergyman — a legal U.S. resident —
whom North Korea kidnapped in 2000.
Assuming clearly announced and demonstrated changes in DPRK policies
supportive of terrorism — a scenario that may occur within the next several years and
possibly sooner — Administration policymakers would face a number of options that
include (1) waiting, doing nothing, and retaining North Korea on both the “state
sponsors” of terrorism list and the nations “not fully cooperating” list; (2)
downgrading the DPRK to the “not fully cooperating” category; (3) easing sanctions
subject to presidential waiver; and (4) removing the DPRK from both lists. Congress
would have a direct role in a removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, because
the executive branch must notify Congress before actual removal and Congress
would have the option to initiate legislation to block removal.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-North Korean Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Three Stages in Diplomacy over the Terrorism List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Responses: The Clinton Administration in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration in 2003-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration,
October 2006-March 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Terrorist State Activity Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
State Sponsors/Supporters List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nations Not Fully Cooperating Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Adding and Removing Countries on the List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Rationale and Background for DPRK Retention on the Two Lists . . . . . . . . . . . 12
North Korea Previously Cited for Possible Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Prospects for Removal Are Set Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Background
U.S.-North Korean Negotiations
Three Stages in Diplomacy over the Terrorism List. The issue of North
Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism has been in U.S.-
North Korean diplomacy since 2000, but three stages are of particular importance:
the first in 2000 in Clinton Administration-North Korean negotiations; the second
during the 2003-2004 Six Party negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue;
and the third in the diplomacy around the Six Party nuclear agreement of February
2007. Until 2000, the core element of U.S.-North Korean diplomacy was the Agreed
Framework, which Washington and Pyongyang signed in October 1994. It dealt
primarily with North Korea’s nuclear program, but U.S. obligations specified in the
Agreed Framework included economic and diplomatic measures. However, the issue
of removal of North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list was omitted from the
Agreement. The issue appears not to have been a major object of the negotiations in
1994.
In October 1999, the Clinton Administration unveiled the Perry Initiative toward
North Korea. Formulated under the direction of William Perry, former Secretary of
Defense, the Perry initiative primarily sought a new round of U.S.-North Korean
negotiations over North Korea’s missile program. The Perry Initiative report of
October 1999 stated that if North Korea agreed to a “verifiable cessation” of its
missile program, the United States would provide a series of economic and
diplomatic benefits to North Korea leading to normalization of U.S.-North Korean
relations.1
The Clinton Administration sought an early visit of a high level North Korean
official to Washington to obtain substantive negotiations.2 North Korea, however,
began to demand several pre-conditions for a high level visit. Beginning in February
2000, one of these was removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-
supporting countries. North Korea reportedly persisted in this demand well into the
summer of 2000 before finally relenting. The high level envoy visited Washington
in October 2000.
1 Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea. Report by Dr. William J. Perry,
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State. Oct. 12, 1999.
2 Pomfret, John. North Korea Threatens To Skip Talks. Washington Post. Mar. 29, 2000.
p. A20.

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CRS-2
The terrorism list issue receded until 2003 when a new round of U.S.-North
Korean diplomacy ensued. This round was precipitated by the Bush Administration’s
claim that North Korea admitted in October 2002 to U.S. diplomats that it was
operating a secret uranium enrichment program. The Administration declared the
secret program a violation of the Agreed Framework and began to end U.S.
obligations under the Agreed Framework. North Korea retaliated by reopening
nuclear facilities that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework, expelling
monitors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and withdrawing from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Multilateral negotiations began in April 2003
hosted by China and ultimately involving six governments (the United States, North
Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan). At six party talks in August 2003,
North Korea demanded that in return for North Korean concessions on the nuclear
issue, the United States agree to a number of U.S. concessions, including removing
North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries. North Korea made
its demand more specific in December 2003 when it issued a revised proposal
centered on a “freeze” of North Korea’s plutonium nuclear programs (but not the
uranium enrichment program). This proposal restated North Korean demands for
multiple concessions in return for a freeze. Removal from the terrorism support list
was near the top of the list.3 North Korea reiterated its demand at the six party
meetings in February and June 2004 in the context of its freeze proposal.
The third stage began after North Korea’s test of an atomic bomb in October
2006. Bilateral meetings between Assistant Secretary of State Christopher and North
Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan in November 2006 and January 2007
contained discussions of the terrorism list issue as the two diplomats laid the
groundwork for the agreement that the six parties announced on February 13, 2007.
That agreement created a “working group” on North Korea-U.S. normalization of
relations. The agreement stated
The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral
issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The U.S. will begin the
process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism,
and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the
Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
U.S. Responses: The Clinton Administration in 2000. The Clinton
Administration reportedly presented to North Korea in February 2000 four steps that
North Korea would have to take to be removed from the terrorism list: (1) issue a
written guarantee that it no longer is engaged in terrorism; (2) provide evidence that
it has not engaged in any terrorist act in the past six months; (3) join international
anti-terrorism agreements; and (4) address issues of past support of terrorism.4 In
consulting U.S. allies, South Korea stated that the United States need not consider
North Korean terrorism against South Korea in responding to North Korea’s demand
and that the Kim Dae-jung administration in Seoul favored removal of North Korea
3 North Korean Foreign Ministry statement on talks. Reuters News Agency, Dec. 9, 2003.
4 Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong) report, Feb. 8, 2000. Yonhap News Agency (Seoul)
report, Feb. 8, 2000.

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CRS-3
from the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries.5 Japan, however, strongly urged
the Clinton Administration to make a redress of North Korean terrorist acts against
Japan conditions for removing North Korea from the list. Japan specifically cited
North Korea’s kidnapping of at least ten Japanese citizens and North Korea’s
harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists since the 1970s.6 The U.S. State
Department had cited North Korea’s harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists as
a reason for North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting states.
A State Department official stated on April 25, 2000, that the United States considers
“resolving this issue as an important step in addressing [U.S.] concerns about North
Korean support of terrorism.”7 Moreover, according to informed sources, U.S.
officials began to raise the kidnapping issue with the North Korea in negotiations
over the terrorism list.
Japan intensified diplomacy on the terrorism issue in September and October
2000 as the United States prepared to receive the high ranking North Korean official
and as Japan prepared for bilateral normalization talks with North Korea. Japan
urged the Clinton Administration to raise Japan’s concerns over terrorism in the high
level U.S.-North Korean exchanges of October 2000 and not to remove North Korea
from the terrorism list.8 The visit to Washington of North Korean military leader, Jo
Myong-rok on October 9-12, 2000, produced two general U.S.-North Korean
statements opposing terrorism. However, the State Department’s North Korea policy
coordinator, Wendy Sherman, said on October 12 that Secretary Albright’s planned
visit to Pyongyang did not mean that the Clinton Administration would remove North
Korea from the terrorism list. North Korea, she said, “knows what it needs to do.”9
The impact of Japan’s entreaties were demonstrated during Albright’s visit to
North Korea. In the first ever meeting between an American official and North
Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, Albright raised the issue of the kidnapped Japanese. She
reported to Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei that in her meetings with Kim
Jong-il, “I brought up the [abduction] issue time and again. I told him that this issue
was important not only to Japan but also to the United States as well.” Kono
reportedly expressed satisfaction, saying “She seems to have thought about Japan.”10
The Clinton Administration thus decided in late 2000 to give Japan’s concerns
over terrorism a higher priority in U.S. negotiations with North Korea over the U.S.
5 ROK to press US to remove DPRK from terrorism list. Korea Herald, internet version,
June 21, 2000.
6 U.S. to question DPRK on kidnappings of Japanese nationals. JIJI News Agency (Tokyo)
report, Feb. 16, 2000.
7 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing [by James P. Rubin], Apr. 25, 2000. p. 8.
8 Varied Aspects of Japan-North Korean Relations. Mainichi Shimbun (Nikkei Telecom
Database version), Oct. 28, 2000. Jiji Kokkoku Column. Asahi Shimbun (internet version),
Oct. 8, 2000.
9 Carter, Tom. Clinton Plans First-ever Presidential Trip to North Korea. Washington
Times, Oct. 13, 2000. p. A1.
10 Varied Aspects of Japan-North Korean Relations, Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 28, 2000.

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CRS-4
terrorism list. This, in effect, lowered the priority of South Korea’s position in U.S.
policy.
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration in 2003-2004. There were
at least three components to the Bush Administration’s policy regarding North
Korea’s inclusion on the terrorism-supporting list after the Agreed Framework
collapsed and the six party talks began in 2003. The first was the U.S. response to
North Korea’s demand at the six party talks for removal from the list. A second was
the raising by U.S. officials of the danger that North Korea would provide nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. The third was the
designation of the Japanese kidnapping issue as an official reason for North Korea’s
inclusion on the list of terrorism-supporting countries.
Until June 2004, the Bush Administration took the position that it would not
discuss issues in U.S.-North Korean relations, including the terrorism-support list,
until North Korea agreed to and took concrete steps to dismantle it nuclear programs.
In line with this stance, the Administration refused to submit any comprehensive U.S.
proposal at the six party talks. The Administration’s position changed in June 2004,
apparently because of pressure from U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, and
heightened criticism of the Administration’s position from China. At the six party
meeting in June 2004, the Administration proposed a detailed plan in which North
Korea would freeze its nuclear programs and submit to international verification
during a three-month preparatory period followed by a full dismantlement of all
nuclear programs. Once North Korea had met the requirements of the preparatory
period, the United States would begin negotiations with North Korea on other issues,
including the terrorism-support list.11
The Bush Administration has linked North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese
citizens to the six party talks and to the terrorism-support list. When the Bush
Administration took office in 2001, it assured Japan, including the families of
suspected kidnapping victims, that the United States would continue to raise the
kidnapping issue with North Korea and would not remove North Korea from the U.S.
list of terrorism-supporting countries.12 In the six party talks, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly stated several times to the North Korean delegates that
North Korea should settle the kidnapping issue with Japan. In April 2004, the State
Department designated the kidnapping of Japanese as an official reason for North
Korean’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries.13
In mid-2002, Japan and North Korea went into secret negotiations regarding the
kidnapping issue. In September 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro flew to
Pyongyang where North Korean leader Kim Jong-il admitted that North Korea had
abducted 13 Japanese citizens; of these, he claimed that 8 had died and that 5 were
11 See CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and
Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.
12 National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnaped by North Korea. Report of
Mission to the U.S. from Feb. 25 to Mar. 3, 2001.
13 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. p. 92.

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CRS-5
alive. The five subsequently went to Japan. In May 2004, Koizumi again traveled
to Pyongyang and secured the release of 6 children of the 5 Japanese. However, the
issue quickly reached an impasse. Japan harbored doubts about the truthfulness of
North Korea’s claim that 8 of the 13 kidnapped Japanese were dead and that the
remains of all 8 had been washed away by floods and were not available for
identification. In 2006, the Japanese government added 3 other missing Japanese
citizens to its list of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea. In Japan, publicized claims
also emerged that North Korea had kidnapped up to several hundred Japanese.
The Bush Administration supported Koizumi’s efforts but reportedly cautioned
him not to reciprocate with financial aid to North Korea before the nuclear and
missile issues with North Korea were resolved. The Administration urged Koizumi
prior to each visit to press North Korea for policy changes on the nuclear issue.14
These urgings pointed up the overall importance of Japan to U.S. policy toward
North Korea and thus the broader influence of the kidnapping issue. As far back as
the Perry initiative in 1999-2000, U.S. officials acted on the assumption that any
settlement of the nuclear and missile issues with North Korea would require a major
Japanese financial contribution. As a participant in the six party talks, Japan is
important to the United States in exerting influence and pressure on North Korea to
agree to a nuclear settlement. Japan was viewed as crucial in any settlement of the
nuclear or missile issues that involved reciprocal economic or financial benefits to
North Korea. As far back as the Perry initiative in 1999-2000, U.S. officials acted
on the assumption that any settlement of the nuclear and missile issues with North
Korea would require a major Japanese financial contribution.15 Japan promised
North Korea billions of dollars in aid as part of a normalization of relations, but
Japan specified that normalization depends on a settlement of the nuclear, missile,
and kidnapping issues.16
At the six party talks in June 2004, the Bush Administration put forth a detailed
settlement proposal under which North Korea would receive heavy oil in the initial
stage of a settlement process, financed by Japan and South Korea. The United States
also offered North Korea negotiations on resolving North Korea’s broader energy and
electricity needs, which also undoubtedly would require a substantial Japanese
financial input. On the other hand, the Bush Administration discussed with Japan the
imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea. Japan joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative in 2003, which President Bush proposed to stifle the proliferation
activities of states like North Korea. In 2006, Japan imposed strong economic
sanctions on North Korea when the United Nations Security Council approved
14 Japan, U.S. agree to put pressure on Pyongyang. Yonhap New Agency, May 1, 2004.
Japan PM says Bush supportive on North Korea trip. Reuters News Agency, Sept. 12, 2002.
Koizumi’s N. Korea gamble. The Nelson Report, Sept. 3, 2002.
15 Niksch, Larry A., North Korea and Terrorism: The Yokita Megumi Factor. The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis. Spring 2002. pp. 14-16.
16 For Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent statement of these conditions, see Kim, Jack and
Kitano, Masayuki. Japan, S. Korea urge N. Korea to move on crisis. Reuters News Agency,
July 22, 2004.

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CRS-6
sanctions in response to North Korea’s missile tests of July 2006 and atomic bomb
test of October 2006.
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration, October 2006-March
2007. Although the Bush Administration sought and obtained U.N. Security
Council sanctions after North Korea’s atomic bomb test in October 2006, it changed
its policy on the North Korean nuclear issue in more fundamental ways — one of
which was to bring the terrorism list issue more directly into negotiations. There
have been three fundamental changes in Bush Administration policy since the North
Korean nuclear test that have implications for the terrorism list issue. Tactically, the
Administration abandoned its opposition to bilateral talks with North Korea and
actively sought bilateral meetings with Pyongyang. Moreover, Assistant Secretary
of State Christopher Hill used these meetings, in late November 2006 and mid-
January 2007, to negotiate actively the details of the Six Party Agreement that was
announced on February 13, 2007.
The second change has been in the U.S. policy objective toward North Korea’s
nuclear programs and weapons. Dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear programs
and weapons remains as the official Bush Administration policy goal, but the
February 2007 Six Party Agreement says little about dismantlement. The two phases
outlined in the agreement focus on freezing North Korean nuclear facilities in the
first phase, to be completed in 60 days, then “disablement of all existing nuclear
facilities” and disclosure by North Korea of “all nuclear programs” in the second
phase that has no time deadline.” The Six Party Agreement thus signals an apparent
policy objective of containment of North Korea’s nuclear programs and nuclear
weapons development, limiting their size and scope. In the approximately 18 months
left of an actively functioning Bush Administration (prior to the U.S. presidential
election campaign starting in September 2008), the most realistic prospect of success
is negotiating and implementing the two phases of this Six Party Agreement or at
least a partial implementation. The dismantlement issue likely will be left for the
U.S. Administration that comes into office in January 2009.
As a third change, the Administration has linked a number of non-nuclear issues
between the United States and North Korea to a successful implementation of the
February 2007 Six Party Agreement. In announcing the Six Party Agreement,
Assistant Secretary of State Hill pledged to settle with North Korea within 30 days
the issue of U.S. financial sanctions against the Banco Delta bank in the Chinese
territory of Macau and the freezing of North Korean accounts of $25 million in
Banco Delta. Prior to the negotiation of the Six Party Agreement, the Bush
Administration had held that the U.S. financial sanctions against Banco Delta for
collaboration with North Korean criminal activities was a separate issue from the
nuclear negotiations. An agreement, announced in mid-March 2007, provided for the
transfer of the North Korean money in Banco Delta to accounts in the Bank of China.
The Bush Administration also has linked normalization of diplomatic relations with
North Korea more directly to a settlement of the nuclear issue, although it previously
had held that normalization depended on progress in settling other issues with North
Korea in addition to the nuclear issue: human rights, missiles, and other weapons of
mass destruction. Assistant Secretary of State Hill stated on March 8, 2007, that the

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establishment of diplomatic relations depended on North Korea agreeing to
“complete denuclearization.”17
Beginning with the Hill-Kim Kye-gwan meeting of November 28-29, 2006, Hill
reportedly said that the Bush Administration would remove North Korea from the
U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism if North Korea dismantled its nuclear
programs.18 The inclusion of removal from the terrorism supporting list in the topics
for U.S.-North Korean negotiations under the Six Party Agreement of February 2007
also indicates a closer linkage of the terrorism supporting list and the nuclear issue
in Bush Administration policy.
North Korea also may have increased the incentive for the Bush Administration
to strengthen this linkage. The South Korean newspaper, JongAng Ilbo, quoted “a
diplomatic source knowledgeable on the New York talks” between Hill and Kim
Kye-gwan on March 5-6, 2007, that Kim asserted that if the United States took steps
to normalize relations, North Korea could disable the Yongbyon nuclear installations
within a year (i.e., March 2008). Kim specifically mentioned as a key step the
removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.19
Media reports indicate that the South Korean Foreign Minister, Song Min-soon,
has cited the general diplomatic practice of taking “interim steps” in pursuing
diplomatic goals during his visit to Washington in March 2007. Such practices may
possibly be considered as an option for the Bush Administration, should it seek to
remove the DPRK from the list.20 A precedent for such “interim steps” would be the
Clinton Administration’s reported consideration in 1999 and 2000 of removing North
Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list and placing it on the other terrorism-
related list of countries “not fully cooperating” with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. (See
section below on “North Korea Previously Cited for Possible Removal.”)
These developments indicate that when the Six Party Agreement moves into the
second phase of disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities and disclosure of
North Korean nuclear programs, North Korea will press the Bush Administration
hard for removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism as a condition for
implementation of phase two. Thus, the second phase likely will involve a new
round of negotiations rather than just an implementation of the stated provisions of
the Six Party Agreement.
17 Lee, Brian. Pyongyang raises the uranium issue in talks with U.S. JoongAng Ilbo
(internet version), Mar. 8, 2007.
18 What ‘new ideas’ did Washington offer Pyongyang? Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, internet
version), Dec. 4, 2006. U.S. offered to remove N Korea from terror list — South Korea.
Dow Jones International News, Dec. 26, 2006.
19 Yi Sang-il and Chin Se-ku. Yongbyon nuclear facility can be disabled within a year.
JongAng Ilbo (internet version), Mar. 13, 2007.
20 FM Song: U.S. may take interim steps to remove N.K. from terrorism list. Yonhap News
Agency, Mar. 3, 2007.

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In judging the measures and timing of carrying out “the process of removing the
designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism” in the second phase of the
Six Party Agreement, the Bush Administration will have two other factors to
consider. One is Japan. Japan continues to urge the Administration to keep North
Korea on the list until Pyongyang resolves the Japanese kidnapping issue. The first
meeting of the Japan-North Korea working group under the Six Party Agreement
collapsed when the North Koreans walked out in response to the Japanese
negotiators’ call for progress on the kidnapping issue. President Bush reportedly
telephoned Prime Minister Abe the day after the announcement of the Six Party
Agreement and assured Abe that Japan would not be isolated on the kidnapping
issue. On the same day, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer stated that “it
is going to take a long time before the designation [of North Korea on the terrorism
list] is removed.”21 On his visit to Japan a few days later, Vice President Cheney met
with parents of kidnapping victims.
The second factor is Congress. In July 2005, the House and Senate passed
H.Con.Res. 168, expressing support for Japan on the North Korean kidnappings. The
resolution also mentioned the case of the Reverend Kim Dong-shik. Kim, a U.S.
legal resident who lived in Chicago, was kidnapped by North Korean agents in China
near the Chinese-North Korean border in 2000. He was taken to North Korea, and
his status is unknown. In January 2005, the entire Illinois delegation in Congress (all
Members of the House of Representatives and two Senators) sent a letter to North
Korea’s United Nations Ambassador demanding information on the Reverend Kim
and stating that the delegation would oppose removing North Korea from the U.S.
list of state sponsors of terrorism until his fate is resolved. On March 8, 2007, three
Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice a letter warning against concessions to North Korea on the
terrorism list issue. The Members raised several issues of North Korean terrorism
including the kidnapping of the Japanese and the kidnapping of the Reverend Kim
Dong-shik. The Members reminded Secretary Rice of the Illinois delegation’s letter
and the lack of response by the North Korean government.22
Terrorist State Activity Designations
In March 2006, the Department of State sent to Congress its annual global
terrorism report, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 [Country Reports, 2005].23
North Korea is prominently mentioned in the yearly report, which include data on
21 Nishioka Tsutomu. Six-Party talks: was Japan left behind? Seiron, Mar. 12, 2007.
22 Letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Edward Royce, and Donald Manzullo, Mar. 8, 2007.
23 Country Reports (formerly Patterns of Global Terrorism ; hereinafter: “Patterns” ) is an
annual report to Congress required by Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a).
See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm]. See also: testimony of John Scott Redd,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, and testimony of Henry A. Crumpton,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a
hearing on “Counterterrorism: The Changing Face of Terror,” June 13, 2006, available at
[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/].

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terrorist trends and activity worldwide and serves as the basis for the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism that are subject to U.S. sanctions. Emerging, or ongoing,
problem areas “areas of concern” are identified as well.
In addition to data on terrorist trends, groups, and activities worldwide, Country
Reports provide a description as to why countries are on the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism that are subject to U.S. sanctions. Thus, included in Country
Reports are detailed data on the five countries currently on the “terrorism list”: Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.24 U.S. Administration officials maintain that
the practice of designating and reporting on the activities of the state sponsors of
terrorism list and concomitant sanctions policy has contributed significantly to a
reduction in the overt — and apparently overall — activity level of states supporting
terrorism in the past decade. Libya and Sudan are frequently cited as examples of
such success, but to date, not North Korea. North Korea is also included on a
concomitant list of states “not fully cooperating” with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
This list includes the five state sponsors of terrorism currently on the Department of
State’s list and Afghanistan.
State Sponsors/Supporters List
North Korea remains one of five countries currently on the list that the Secretary
of State maintains have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.”25 Data supporting this list are drawn from the intelligence community.
Listed countries are subject to severe U.S. export controls — particularly of dual-use
24 The degree of support for, or involvement in, terrorist activities typically varies
dramatically from nation to nation. For 2005, of the five on the U.S. terrorism list, Iran
continued to be characterized on one extreme of the spectrum of terrorist list states as an
active supporter of terrorism: a nation that uses terrorism as an instrument of policy or
warfare beyond its borders. Closer to the middle of the spectrum is Syria. Although not
formally detected in an active role since 1986, Country Reports asserts that the Assad
regime reportedly uses groups in Syria and Lebanon to export terror into Israel and allows
groups to train in territory under its control. On the less active end of the spectrum, one
might place countries such as Cuba or North Korea, which at the height of the Cold War
were more active, but in recent years have seemed to settle for a more passive role of
granting ongoing safe haven to previously admitted terrorists. Also at the less active end of
the spectrum, and arguably falling off it, is Sudan, which reportedly has stepped up counter-
terrorism cooperation with the United States. An area of concern for some observers is the
impact DPRK removal from the state sponsors list may have on prospects for Cuba’s
removal.
Note that Libya was certified by the Secretary of State as being eligible for removal
from the list on May 12, 2006. See Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, May 12, 2006,
which went into effect June 28, 2006 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/
20060515-5.html]. Sanctions against Iraq pursuant to its inclusion on the terrorism list were
suspended on May 7, 2003 by Presidential Determination No. 2003-23 (Federal Register
of May 16, 2003), Vol. 68, No. 95, p. 26459). Iraq was removed from the list by a recision
of determination on Oct. 7, 2004 (Federal Resister, Oct. 20, 2004, Vol. 69, No. 202, p.
61702).
25 See generally CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism, Threat, Policy, and
Response, by Raphael Perl.

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technology and selling them military equipment is prohibited.26 Providing foreign
aid under the Foreign Assistance Act is also prohibited. Section 6(j) of the 1979
Export Administration Act stipulates that a validated license shall be required for
export of controlled items and technology to any country on the list, and that the
Secretaries of Commerce and State must notify the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
Foreign Relations at least 30 days before issuing any validated license for goods and
services that could significantly enhance a nation’s military capability or its ability
to support terrorism as required by this act.27 In addition, Section 509(a) of the 1986
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (P.L. 99-399) bars export of
munitions list items to countries on the terrorism list.
A restriction potentially related to North Korea is found in Section 1621 of the
International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118). Entitled “Opposition to
Assistance by International Financial Institutions to Terrorist States,” Section 1621
states: “The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive
director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the respective institution
to or for a country for which the Secretary of State has made a determination under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.” In short, the United States must oppose financial assistance
from institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to any
state on the U.S. terrorism list. Given the influence of the United States in these
institutions, U.S. opposition would constitute in effect a veto against any proposals
for financial aid to North Korea. Section 1621, however, does not require the United
States to oppose North Korean membership in the IMF and World Bank. North
Korean membership is the near term goal of the South Korean government, which
views this as an initial step toward financial aid.
Nations Not Fully Cooperating Category
The DPRK also remains on a list (required by P.L. 104-132), which prohibits,
absent a presidential waiver, the sale of arms to nations not fully cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.28
26 See CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack
27 The interpretation of these “significant dual use items,” especially when items such as
aircraft parts are involved, is often the subject of considerable discussion within the
executive branch as well as the subject of informal consultations with Congress.
28 Periodically, discussions have been held under differing administrations to provide for
graduated sanctions within this category to make it a more effective tool, but no substantive
action, to date, has been taken on this issue. Note that P.L. 104-132 also requires the
withholding of foreign assistance to nations providing lethal military aid to countries on the
list of state sponsors.

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CRS-11
Adding and Removing Countries on the List
In late January each year, under the provisions of Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, provides Congress with a list of countries supporting
terrorism. Compilation of the list is the result of an ongoing process. Throughout
the year the Department of State gathers data on terrorist activity worldwide, and then
beginning about November, the list is formally reviewed. Each new determination
under Section 6(j) of the act must also be published in the Federal Register.
Congressional report language provides guidelines for designation. A House
Foreign Affairs Committee report approving the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export
Amendments Act of 1989 (H.Rept. 101-296) included as criteria (1) allowing
territory to be used as a sanctuary; (2) furnishing lethal substances to
individuals/groups with the likelihood that they will be used for terrorism; (3)
providing logistical support to terrorists/groups; (4) providing safe haven or
headquarters for terrorists/organizations; (5) planning, directing, training or assisting
in the execution of terrorist activities; (6) providing direct or indirect financial
support for terrorist activities; and (7) providing diplomatic facilities such as support
or documentation to aid or abet terrorist activities. A Senate report had similar
criteria (S.Rept. 101-173).
Paragraph 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration Act prohibits removing a country
from the list unless the President first submits a report to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and Foreign Relations. When a government changes (i.e., a government is
significantly different from that in power at the time of the last determination), the
President’s report, submitted before the proposed rescission would take effect, must
certify that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of
the government of the country concerned (an actual change of government as a result
of an election, coup, or some other means); (2) the new government is not supporting
acts of international terrorism; and (3) the new government has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
When the same government is in power, the current situation with North Korea,
the President’s report — submitted at least 45 days before the proposed rescission
would take effect — must justify the rescission and certify that (1) the government
concerned has not provided support for international terrorism during the preceding
6-month period; and (2) the government concerned has provided assurances that it
will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Congress can let the
President’s action take effect, or pass legislation to block it, the latter most likely
over the President’s veto. Since enactment of this procedure in 1989, no such
removal has been proposed by an Administration, hence to date, Congress has not
considered such blocking legislation or resolution.
A complex challenge facing those charged with compiling and maintaining the
list is the degree to which diminution of hard evidence of a government’s active
involvement indicates a real change in behavior, particularly when a past history of
active support or use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy has been well

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CRS-12
established. For example, Iraq, which was removed in 1982, was again placed on the
list in 1990, to be again removed in 2004. Some observers suggest that one reason
that countries have not been dropped from the list is the reluctance of the executive
branch to confront Congress on the issue.
Rationale and Background for
DPRK Retention on the Two Lists
North Korea was added to the “official” list of countries supporting terrorism
because of its implication in the bombing of a South Korean airliner on November
29, 1987, which killed 115 persons. According to the State Department, North Korea
has not been conclusively linked to any terrorist acts since 1987. A North Korean
spokesman in 1993 condemned all forms of terrorism, and said his country resolutely
opposed the encouragement and support of terrorism. A similar statement was made
in November 1995 and again in 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Country Reports, 2005, in a brief two paragraph section on North Korea states
that
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have
sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in
1987.
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and
in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions
about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations
between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what
it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had
reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s
end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from
locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485
civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four
Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement
in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in
2004.29
Perhaps most revealing of United States’ policy rationale for keeping nations
such as North Korea on the terrorism list is text contained in the “State Sponsors Of
Terror Overview” section of Country Reports, 2005. Prominently mentioned are two
factors: (1) maintaining ties to terrorist groups and (2) “the capability to manufacture
WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists.”
Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global
war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to
maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique
safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.
29 [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm], p. 175.

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State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups.
Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty
obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan
and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also
have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies
that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist
that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups. [Emphasis
added]30
North Korea Previously Cited for Possible Removal
In its “Introduction,” the Patterns 1999 report cites North Korea as a possible
candidate for removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Patterns 1999
report states:
The designation of state sponsors is not permanent, however. In fact, a primary
focus of U.S. counterterrorist policy is to move state sponsors off the list by
delineating clearly what steps these countries must take to end their support for
terrorism and by urging them to take these steps ...There have been some
encouraging signs recently suggesting that some countries are considering taking
steps to distance themselves from terrorism. North Korea has made some
positive statements condemning terrorism in all its forms. We have outlined
clearly to the Government of North Korea the steps it must take to be removed
from the list, all of which are consistent with its stated policies.
The report states that “if a state sponsor meets the criteria for being dropped
from the terrorism list, it will be removed — notwithstanding other differences we
may have with a country’s other policies and actions.”
In June 15, 2000, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Michael Sheehan, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testified
that
We need to take into account all relevant considerations in connection with
moving states onto or off of the list, and we also need to explore whether it
would be appropriate in any cases to identify states as “not fully cooperating”
rather than as state sponsors of terrorism if doing so was warranted by the facts
and would advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives ... I have been considering
what intermediate steps could be taken to give state sponsors a clearer look at
how they might “graduate” off the list. It may be possible that in appropriate
cases state sponsors could step off the state sponsor list and be left only on the
“not fully cooperating” list, with an eye towards stepping off of that list when
they fully cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Similarly, in July 12 testimony before the House International Relations
Committee, Ambassador Sheehan confirmed that his earlier statements were intended
as a clear signal to terrorist supporting countries that the United States would
30 Country Reports, 2005, p. 171, at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm].

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CRS-14
consider taking them off the list if they take the necessary steps to cease their support
for terrorism.
Prospects for Removal Are Set Back
Patterns 2000 changed the tone. It does state that “the Department of State is
engaged in ongoing discussion with North Korea and Sudan with the object of getting
those governments completely out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism
list.” It cites the North Korean statement in the U.S.-North Korean joint statement
of October 12, 2000, in which “the DPRK reiterated its opposition to terrorism and
agreed to support international actions against such activity.” However, as stated
previously, Patterns 2000 was more specific in citing evidence of North Korean
support of other terrorist groups, particularly in the Philippines. The report also
asserts that “The US has a long memory and will not simply expunge a terrorist’s
record because time has passed.”
Patterns 2001 and Patterns 2002, arguably, softened language to designed to
provide a rationale for retaining the DPRK on the terror list. For example, Patterns
2002, although noting that “Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology
to countries designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including
Syria and Libya”, concluded with the statement that “North Korea is a party to six of
the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.”31 Contrast
such language to Patterns 2003: “Although it is a party to six international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken any
substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism. [italics
provided]”32
Patterns 2003, which covers the year North Korea was designated a member of
the “axis of evil” by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, appears
to take a somewhat more confrontational position.33 The 2003 report begins with
text to the effect that the DPRK is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts
since 1987. The report notes, however, that North Korea continued to give sanctuary
31 Patterns 2002, p. 81. On the other hand, the section covering North Korea begins with text
characterizing the DPRK’s response to international efforts to combat terrorism as
“disappointing throughout 2002.”
32 Patterns 2003, p. 92.
33 See text in preceding paragraph regarding lack of international cooperation. Note that
arguably, a factor that may affect whether the DPRK is removed from the terrorism list is
whether any other nations — notably Libya and possibly Sudan — are removed first. In
the wake of one or two successful cases of removal, a political climate may well be created
that is less risk adverse to chancing removal of a third state. Conversely, removing the
DPRK from the list prior to removing other nations would arguably create a climate more
favorably disposed to removal of additional states as well. In the past, the list has been
subject to criticism that it is governed by political criteria not necessarily connected to a
nation’s level of support for terrorism. See CRS Report RL32417, The Department of States
Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related Issues, by
Raphael Perl.

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CRS-15
to hijackers affiliated with the Japanese Red Army. Although Patterns 2003 arguably
indicates that North Korea’s support for international terrorism appears limited at
present, it offers no promising language to suggest that DPRK removal from the
terrorism list may occur anytime soon.
Country Reports, 2004, again offers no promising language to suggest that
DPRK removal from the terrorism list may occur anytime soon, but notes what can
be interpreted as progress in resolving the issue of kidnapped Japanese citizens.
Again restated is language to the effect that the DPRK is “not known” to have
sponsored any acts of terrorism since 1987. Pyongyang, however, is cited for lack
of “substantial steps” in co-operating in efforts to combat international terrorism,
although it has signed six international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have
sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in
1987.
At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang in September
2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged the
involvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnapping of Japanese
citizens and said that those responsible had already been punished. Pyongyang
in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of
eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the
fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan
and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as
the remains of two Japanese abductees whom the North had reported as having
died in North Korea. Subsequent DNA testing in Japan indicated that the remains
were not those of Megumi Yokota or Kaoru Matsuki, as Pyongyang had claimed,
and the issue remained contentious at year’s end. Four Japanese Red Army
members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in
1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to
combat international terrorism.34
Policy Options
Administration policymakers face a number of policy options, including (1)
doing nothing and retaining North Korea on both the “state sponsors” list and “not
fully cooperating” list; (2) downgrading the DPRK to the “not fully cooperating”
category; (3) removing the DPRK from both lists, including it instead in an informal
“countries of concern” warning category; and (4) relaxing further sanctions against
North Korea that can be done by presidential waiver.
34 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c14813.htm], p. 90 of the full pdf file, or the “North
Korea” section at the end of Chapter 5 — Country Reports B.

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Under any of these first three scenarios, a major challenge facing Administration
policymakers is whether any avowed prospective DPRK policy announcements/
changes will pass the congressional credibility test, should North Korea give
unequivocal assurances it will not support terrorism in the future. The Administration
would appear to face two questions related to anti-terrorism policy in weighing these
policy options. First, is North Korea currently or has North Korea in the very recent
past engaged in terrorist activities? Second, does North Korea’s continued holding
of kidnapped Japanese constitute a current act of terrorism? The chronologies of acts
of terrorism in the annual Patterns reports shows that the United States defines
kidnapping as a terrorist act. Moreover, the Administration faces the past analogous
situations in which the Carter and Reagan Administrations viewed as a continuing
act of terrorism the holding of kidnapped Americans for long periods in Iran and
Lebanon in 1979-1980 and during the 1980s respectively.
Dealing with these three questions could well fall within the context of policy
priority decisions. If North Korea makes its demand for removal from the terrorism
list a continuing condition to forward movement in the second phase of the February
2007 Six Party Nuclear Agreement, the Bush Administration would have to
determine the policy priorities among anti-terrorism goals; relations with a key ally,
Japan; and possible progress toward containment of North Korea’s nuclear programs.
Such a determination undoubtedly would influence how the Administration
addressed the policy options regarding North Korea’s status on the terrorism list.

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