Order Code RS21238
Updated April 5, 2007
Uzbekistan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Uzbekistan is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its relatively
large population, energy and other resources, and location in the heart of the region. It
has made scant progress in economic and political reforms, and many observers criticize
its human rights record. This report discusses U.S. policy and assistance. Basic facts
and biographical information are provided. This report may be updated. Related
products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests.
U.S. Policy
According to the Administration, the Uzbek
government “increasingly views U.S. assistance as
a threat to its rule,” and it avers that “democratic
and economic reforms are stalled [and] corruption
is endemic” in the country. Despite these
difficulties, the United States still attempts to
encourage “democratic reform and respect for
human rights, promote regional stability, counter
terrorism, strengthen economic growth, and address
health concerns [in] hopes of a reversal of the
backsliding trends.” Security assistance to
Uzbekistan partly is limited because the Secretary
of State has not been able to determine that
Uzbekistan has undertaken democratic and human rights reforms (see below). U.S.
assistance helps Uzbekistan combat terrorism, counter the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), and interdict narcotics trafficking. In October 2006, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Evan A. Feigenbaum evinced “serious disappointment” that
U.S.-Uzbek relations had “deteriorated so sharply.” He reportedly stated during another

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visit in March 2007 that it aimed at
Basic Facts
improving Uzbek-U.S. relations after a
Area and Population: Land area is 174,486 sq. mi.,
“difficult” hiatus.1
slightly larger than California. The population is 27.3
million (World Factbook, mid-2006 est.). Adminis-
trative subdivisions include the Karakalpak Republic.
Cumulative U.S. assistance bud-
Ethnicity: 80% are Uzbek, 5.5% Russian, 5% Tajik, 3%
geted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-
Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak, 1.5% Tatar, and others
FY2006 was $810.3 million (FREE-
(World Factbook, 1996 est.). Uzbeks are the most
DOM Support Act and agency bud-
numerous Central Asian nationality. More than 1.2
million Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan, one million in
gets). In FY2006 budgeted assistance
Tajikistan, and a half-million in Kyrgyzstan.
was $49.41 million (FREEDOM Sup-
Gross Domestic Product: $54.8 billion; per capita GDP
port Act and agency budgets). The
is about $2,000 (World Factbook, 2006 est., purchasing
Administration has requested $9.37
power parity).
million for FY2008 (FREEDOM Sup-
Political Leaders: President: Islam Karimov; Prime
Minister: Shavkat Mirziyoyev; Speaker of the
port Act and other Function 150 for-
Legislative Chamber: Erkin Xalilov; Speaker of the
eign aid, excluding Defense and En-
Senate: Ilgizar Sobirov; Foreign Minister: Vladimir
ergy Department funds). Some U.S.
Norov; Defense Minister: Ruslan Mirzayev.
aid for FY2006 and FY2007, even
Biography: Karimov, born in 1938, in 1989 became
First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. In 1990,
humanitarian, has been disrupted by
the Uzbek Supreme Soviet elected him to the newly
Uzbek government decisions to close
created post of President, and he also became a member
down the operations of many non-gov-
of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo. In December
ernmental organizations (NGOs) that
1991, he was popularly elected President of Uzbekistan,
receive U.S. support.
winning 86% of the vote against opposition Erk Party
candidate Mohammed Solikh. In 1995, Karimov
orchestrated a popular referendum to extend his presi-
Concerns about the proliferation
dency until 2000, won re-election, and in 2002 orches-
of WMD led the Administration at the
trated another to extend his term until December 2007.
end of 2003 to waive restrictions on
most anti-terrorism aid to Uzbekistan
under authority provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L.
107-314). The Administration indicated that Uzbekistan had not satisfied congressional
requirements to respect human rights, as contained in Sec. 1203(d)(6) of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-160), making the waiver necessary. The
waiver authority was exercised again for FY2005 funding. The waiver authority,
exercisable each fiscal year, expired at the end of FY2005, but Defense Authorizations
for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) provided a non-sunsetting waiver authority, exercisable
annually. This waiver authority was exercised for FY2006 and FY2007 CTR aid.
Since FY2003, Congress also has prohibited FREEDOM Support Act assistance to
the central government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports
that Uzbekistan is making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human
rights, establish a multiparty system, and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of
expression, and the independence of the media (P.L.108-7; P.L.108-199; P.L. 108-447;
P.L. 109-102). Congress received a determination of progress in FY2003. In July 2004,
the State Department announced that some FY2004 aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld
1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for FY2008;
U.S. Embassy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Transcript of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan A.
Feigenbaum’s Address to the 10th Annual Conference of the American-Uzbekistan Chamber of
Commerce, Oct. 3, 2006. Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report, March 8, 2007,
Doc. No. CEP-950059.

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because of “lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance
partners.” IMET and FMF programs — which are conditioned on respect for human
rights — were among those affected. Some aid that was subject to restrictions was able
to be reprogrammed or was allocated using notwithstanding authority. The then-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, during an August 2004 visit
to Uzbekistan, criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and not
“productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence. The Secretary of State in FY2005
and FY2006 did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making
significant progress in respecting human rights, so aid restrictions remained in place.
Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
In her testimony on April 8, 2004, to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice emphasized that early
Administration efforts to counter global terrorism — before the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States — included cooperation with Uzbekistan. These ties
proved useful in soliciting Uzbek support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan. An agreement on U.S. use of the Khanabad airbase, near the town of Karshi
(termed the K2 base) was signed on October 7, 2001, and a joint statement pledged the
two sides to consult in the event of a threat to Uzbekistan’s security and territorial
integrity. In March 2002, the two sides signed a “Strategic Partnership” accord that
reiterated this nonspecific security guarantee. The United States also pledged military aid,
and Uzbekistan pledged to “intensify democratic transformation.” In early 2003,
Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing”
(Kazakhstan joined later) that endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations
in Iraq, but Karimov later declined to send troops. Uzbekistan benefitted from its defense
ties with the United States. In addition to security assurances and increased military and
other aid, U.S. forces eliminated many terrorists belonging to the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU; dedicated to the forceful establishment of Islamic rule in Uzbekistan).
Not only were IMU bases destroyed in Afghanistan, but IMU military leader Juma
Namanganiy was killed.
On July 5, 2005, Karimov and other presidents of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO; other members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan) signed a declaration that called for coalition members supporting operations
in Afghanistan “to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and
for their military contingents’ presence in those countries.” The language seemed to target
U.S. and coalition bases in Central Asia. Despite this declaration, none of the Central
Asian leaders immediately called for closing such bases. However, after the United
States, the U.N., and others interceded so that refugees who had fled from fighting in
Uzbekistan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29, 2005, demanded that the United
States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United States officially
ceased operations at K2. The Uzbek government has permitted Germany to maintain a
small base at Termez.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Home to more than half the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a
leading role in regional affairs. From the late 1990s until mid-2005, Karimov’s priority

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was to seek closer security ties with the United States while maintaining working relations
with Russia and China. However, after the mid-2005 events in Andijon (see below), he
shifted to closer ties with the latter two states. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the SCO and
in 2003 insisted on hosting its Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. In March 2006, the SCO
sponsored an exercise in Tashkent on how to repulse terrorist attacks on the “state
infrastructure.” Uzbekistan has ongoing tensions with other Central Asian states over its
mining of borders, water-sharing, border delineation, and other issues. In 1998, the Tajik
president accused Uzbekistan of supporting an uprising in northern Tajikistan, and in
2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of conspiring to overthrow it.
The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had provided
training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants.
The Uzbek military is the most advanced among those of the Central Asian states.
The armed forces consist of about 40,000 ground force troops and 10.000 to 15,000 air
force troops. There are also up to 19,000 internal security (police) troops and 1,000
national guard troops (The Military Balance, February 2007). Uzbekistan’s military
doctrine proclaims that it makes no territorial claims on other states and adheres to
nuclear non-proliferation. Military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is
ensured through a 1992 Friendship Treaty, a 1994 military treaty, a 1999 accord on
combating terrorism and Islamic extremism, and a November 2005 Treaty of Alliance.
The latter accord calls for mutual consultations in case of a security threat to either party.
In December 2006, Uzbekistan rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (it
had withdrawn in 1999; members now include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and the Central
Asian states except Turkmenistan). Until 2005, Uzbekistan played an active role in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) by participating in military exercises and training,
including in the United States.
On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area by various
reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351. In response, the government arrested dozens
of suspects, including political dissidents. The motives for the bombing remain murky,
but Karimov termed them an assassination attempt. He alleged that exiled Erk Party
leader Mohammad Solikh led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s Taliban and IMU co-
leader Tahir Yuldashev. Solikh denied any role in the bombings. In November 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences and Solikh 15.5 years in prison (all
in absentia). Another defendant tried in absentia, Najmiddin Jalolov (see below),
received 18 years. Other security threats included the invasion of neighboring Kyrgyzstan
in July-August 1999 by several hundred IMU and other guerrillas. They were rumored
to be seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad
in Uzbekistan. By mid-October 1999, they had been forced out of Kyrgyzstan with
Uzbek aid. The next August, dozens of IMU and other guerrillas again invaded
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were expelled by late October. In September 2000, the
State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and stressed
that the “United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend [itself against] the
violent actions of the IMU.”
A series of bombings and armed attacks began in Uzbekistan on March 28, 2004, and
continued through April 1, reportedly killing 47 individuals. President Karimov asserted
that the attacks were aimed against his government to “cause panic among our people,
[and] to make them lose their trust.” Then-U.S. Air Force Secretary James Roche and the
then-Combined Forces Commander for Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno, visited

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Uzbekistan in April 2004, with Barno stressing that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing
down this terrorist menace.” An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG;
Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, reportedly an alias of the IMU) claimed responsibility for the
violence. Suspected terrorists testified at a trial in mid-2004 that Jalolov was the leader
of IJG, that they were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan,
and that the IJG was linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al
Qaeda. During this trial, explosions occurred in Tashkent on July 30, 2004, at the U.S.
and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office. The IMU and IJG
claimed responsibility.
On May 12, 2005, an armed group stormed a prison in Andijon where those on trial
were held and released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about
whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the
friends and families of 23 businessmen who were on trial on charges of belonging to an
Islamic terrorist group. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government
buildings the next day. Karimov flew to the city to direct operations and reportedly had
restored order by late on May 13. According to testimony at the first major trial in late
2005 of alleged Andijon terrorists, the governments of the United States and Kyrgyzstan
had helped finance and support the terrorists’ attempt to establish an Islamic caliphate,
and international media, local human rights groups, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) had conspired in this attempt. The U.S. and Kyrgyz governments and several
media organizations denied such involvement. The United States and others have called
for an international investigation, which Karimov has rejected. The events at Andijon and
their aftermath “severely tested the [U.S.-Uzbek] bilateral relationship,” according to the
State Department.2
Political and Economic Developments
In January 2002, Karimov orchestrated a constitutional referendum to create a
bicameral legislature and to extend his term to December 2007 (almost eight years). The
new legislature (termed the Oliy Majlis or Supreme Assembly) consists of a 120-member,
directly-elected lower chamber, the Legislative Chamber, and a 100-member upper
chamber, the Senate. The Senate is composed of 16 members appointed by the president,
with the rest selected by local legislatures. The lower chamber has most of the
responsibility for drafting laws and the Senate confirms the prime minister and other top
officials. Constitutional amendments approved in April 2003 established that — after the
next presidential election — the prime minister will exercise greater power. Explaining
his constitutional goals, Karimov in January 2005 proclaimed that he aimed to create
three powerful branches of government, to correct a situation where “everything now
depends on me.”
Only pro-Karimov parties operate legally: the Popular Democratic Party (PDP),
founded by Karimov; the Fidokorlar (Self-Sacrifice) National Democracy Party, created
by Karimov as a youth party; the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party; the Liberal-
Democratic Party, consisting of government-connected businessmen; and the National
Revival Party, consisting of state-supported intellectuals. After the Andijon events,
repression increased against the banned opposition parties Birlik (Unity), Erk (Will),
2 Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for FY2007.

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Ozod Dehqonlar (Free Farmers; formed in late 2003), and Serquyosh Ozbekistonim (My
Sunny Uzbekistan; formed in April 2005). In March 2006, the latter’s co-founder, Nodira
Khidoyatova, was given a 10-year prison term on embezzlement charges viewed by some
observers as politically motivated.
The last presidential race was in January 2000. The two candidates were incumbent
President Karimov and Abdulkhafiz Jalolov. Jalolov was nominated by the PDP —
which he headed after Karimov resigned as head in 1996 — to give the appearance of a
contest. Jalolov endorsed Karimov during the campaign. Karimov won 91.9% of 12.1
million votes cast. The State Department concluded that “this election was neither free
nor fair.” Similarly, a limited OSCE observer mission concluded that Legislative
Chamber elections held on December 26, 2004, “fell significantly short of ... international
standards for democratic elections.” The lack of open information about the race
contributed to low public interest and in less than a 50% turnout in half the districts,
triggering required run-offs on January 9, 2005. Two weeks later, local legislatures,
overseen by members of the Central Electoral Commission, selected Senators.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006
(released in March 2007) reported that Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record worsened
in 2006. Police and security forces routinely and systematically tortured, beat, and
harassed persons, including human rights activists, reporters, political dissidents, and
alleged religious extremists. Arrests almost invariably led to guilty verdicts. Prison
conditions were poor. There were reported cases of political and human rights activists
being committed to mental hospitals. More than 5,500 persons were estimated to be in
prison for political or religious reasons. The government severely restricted freedom of
speech and the press and continued to prohibit unauthorized public meetings and
demonstrations. The Uzbek government closed down the operations of most international
NGOs carrying out democratization, human rights, and humanitarian projects.
Compulsory labor continued to be reported, particularly in cotton harvesting.
After economic dislocations associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the
Uzbek economy ceased to decline and began to turn around in 1996. GDP increased an
estimated 6.8% in 2006 and consumer price inflation was an estimated 38% (The World
Factbook). After long resisting full currency convertibility, Uzbekistan in 2003
announced that it would permit it, but vitiated the reform by reducing money in
circulation, closing borders, and placing punitive tariffs on imports. These restrictions
helped fuel organized crime, corruption, consumer shortages, unemployment, and wage
arrears. Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth-largest cotton producer and second-largest
exporter, and about 30% of the country’s economic activity is based on agriculture. The
government closely controls this sector. Up to one-third of the population remains below
the poverty level. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced
in 2004 that it would limit its lending in Uzbekistan, citing the government’s poor
democratization and human rights record. Other international financial institutions have
maintained some engagement. The World Bank in mid-2006 offered technical assistance
and loans for poverty reduction, structural reforms, and civil society participation. A
mission of the International Monetary Fund in December 2006 praised Uzbekistan for
large trade and external current account surpluses mainly due to increases in exports,
increases in gold and foreign exchange reserves, and budgetary surpluses despite tax rate
reductions, and offered technical assistance.
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