Order Code 97-1055
Updated April 5, 2007
Turkmenistan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report examines the political, economic, and foreign policies of Turkmenistan,
where a leadership succession unfolded in late 2006. The report discusses U.S. policy
and assistance and provides basic facts and biographical information. It may be updated.
Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests.
U.S. Policy
According to the Bush Administration, the December
2006 death and replacement of Turkmenistan’s long-
ruling authoritarian president, Saparamurad Niyazov,
“offers the United States an opportunity to turn a page in
its relationship with Turkmenistan and encourage the
development of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous
country.” The Administration argues that “Turkmenistan
lags behind many other countries in terms of
democratization and civil rights.... [S]ignificant resources
will need to be applied ... if the U.S. goal of advancing”
democratic governance in Turkmenistan “is to be met.”
Of strategic concern, “Turkmenistan’s shared borders with
Iran and Afghanistan make it a key player in the fight to combat trafficking in weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), narcotics, and persons.”1 Perhaps marking the beginning of
improved U.S.-Turkmen ties, the new President, Kurbanguly Berdimuhammedow, in
February 2007 praised U.S. Peace Corps volunteers for fostering “friendly ties between
1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2008;
and U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2005 Annual
Report, January 2006.

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the people of our two countries.”2 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann
visited Turkmenistan on March 3-6, 2007, where he reported that he offered expanded
cooperation on education, healthcare, and energy resources development.
Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for
Basic Facts
Turkmenistan in FY1992-FY2006 was
Area and Population: Land area is 188,457 sq. mi.;
$265.8 million (FREEDOM Support Act
slightly larger than California. The Kara Kum desert
and other agency funding), most involving
covers about 80% of land area. Population is 5.0
million (CIA World Factbook, mid-2006 est.).
food aid and training and exchanges.
Ethnicity: 85% are Turkmen, 5% are Uzbek, 4% are
Turkmenistan’s lack of progress in eco-
Russian, and others (CIA World Factbook, 2003 est.).
nomic and political reforms under its late
Turkmen clans include the Tekke, Ersary, and Yomud.
president was cited by successive Admin-
About 150,000 ethnic Turkmen reside elsewhere in
the former Soviet Union, over 2 million in Iran, and
istrations as a reason why only limited
over 900,000 in Afghanistan.
U.S. aid was provided (compared with
Gross Domestic Product: $45 billion; per capita
other Central Asian states). Budgeted aid
GDP is about $8.900 (CIA World Factbook, 2006 est.,
for FY2006 was $10.44 million (FREE-
purchasing power parity).
DOM Support Act and agency budgets).
Political Leaders: President, Prime Minister, and
Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (legislative-
The Administration requested $8.43 mil-
executive body): Kurbanguly Berdimuhammedow
lion for FY2008 (FREEDOM Support Act
(also spelled Berdymukhammedov); Chairman of the
and other Function 150 foreign aid, ex-
Mejlis (legislature): Akja Nurberdiyewa; Foreign
cluding Defense and Energy Department
Minister (and deputy prime minister): Rashid
funds), including $300,000 for Interna-
Meredow; Minister of Defense: Agageldi
Mammetgeldiyew.
tional Military Education and Training
Biography: Berdimuhammedow was born in 1957 in
(IMET; for bringing officers to the United
the Ashkhabad Region. He graduated from the
States for language and rule of law train-
Turkmen Medical Institute in 1979 and undertook
ing), $1.88 million for Peace Corps activi-
graduate work in Moscow. Until 1995, he was a
junior member of the dentistry department, an
ties, and $750,000 for Non-proliferation,
associate professor, and the dean of the dentistry
Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related
faculty of the Turkmen Medical Institute. In
Activities (NADR). NADR aid aims “to
1995-1997, he was an official in the Turkmen
help Turkmenistan control its borders with
Ministry of Health and, since 1997, minister. Since
Iran and Afghanistan,” to improve
2001, he also was a deputy prime minister. He was
named acting president on December 21, 2006, and
counter-terrorism capabilities and prevent
was elected president on February 11, 2007.
trafficking in narcotics and WMD. The
Administration argues that its increased
foreign assistance request for Turkmenistan for FY2008 (about $750,000 more than it
requested for FY2007) “will allow the United States to demonstrate to the new
government the benefits of an expanded relationship.”3
Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
the Turkmen foreign ministry stated that Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality and its
friendship with the Taliban precluded cooperation in a U.S.-led military campaign. After
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin acceded to an expanded U.S. military presence in
Central Asia, however, former Turkmen President Saparamurad Niyazov on September
2 U.S. Embassy, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Peace Corps Celebrates its 46th Anniversary, March
1, 2007.
3 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2008.

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24, 2001, gave his consent for ground transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian
aid to support U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan because “evil must be
punished.” Turkmenistan also permitted refueling privileges for humanitarian flights.
During visits in 2004 and 2005, U.S. Central Command then-head John Abizaid thanked
Turkmenistan for permitting humanitarian aid sent to Afghanistan since September 11 to
transit the country, praised Turkmenistan’s increasing ties with Afghanistan, and called
for greater cooperation on terrorism, drug trafficking, and border protection. Before the
U.S.-led coalition launched actions in Iraq, then-president Niyazov made contradictory
statements. In April 2003, however, he called for establishing “democracy” in Iraq to
safeguard the interests of ethnic Turkomen living there, and in May 2005 praised the
creation of a multi-ethnic Iraqi government.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Turkmenistan’s “neutral” foreign policy is enshrined in its constitution and
Berdimuhammedow has pledged to continue to eschew joining political or military
alliances and to seek good relations with both East and West. The U.N. General
Assembly in 1995 recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality. Turkmenistan has pursued close
ties with both Iran and Turkey. In addition to trade ties with Iran, Turkmenistan is also
interested in cultural ties with the approximately one million Turkmen residing in Iran.
Turkmenistan has cooperated with Russia in some areas while seemingly resisting other
Russian influence. In 1992, the two states signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty
containing security provisions. Although Turkmenistan joined the post-Soviet
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it did not sign the Collective Security Treaty
and refused to sign other CIS agreements viewed as violating its sovereignty and
neutrality. Relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been contentious, although
both have endeavored to improve relations with the new Turkmen leadership.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence and argued over water
sharing. After a November 2002 coup attempt against Niyazov, he accused Russia and
Uzbekistan of colluding with the plotters, and both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
mobilized troops along their borders. Russia, however, has pursued close ties with
Turkmenistan (see below, Energy). Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have disagreed over
the ownership of offshore oil fields. In June 2006, Turkmen officials accused French
diplomats, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a Radio
Liberty (RL) free lancer, and the Warsaw Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights of
colluding with Turkmen oppositionists in exile to subvert the government.
Turkmenistan’s armed forces number about 26,000, including 21,000 ground, 4,300
air, and about 700 naval/coast guard forces (The Military Balance, February 2007). Other
forces include police and security troops, a presidential guard, and border troops. Former
president Niyazov repeatedly purged the military, police, and security agencies, ostensibly
to ensure their docility. Turkmenistan inherited a sizable arsenal from the Soviet Union,
but many air and ground craft may be inoperable. Ukraine and Georgia have upgraded
and repaired some aircraft and vehicles as part of their payments for Turkmen gas.
Troops are expected to grow their own food, earn money by picking cotton, and otherwise
work twenty or more days of each month on economic projects. Large-scale conscription
not only fills military needs but also provides “labor armies” that work with no pay in the
energy or agriculture sectors. In late 1999, Russia’s 1,000 border troops in Turkmenistan
pulled out at Turkmenistan’s request (some “special border troops” reportedly remain),
and by 2002, Turkmenistan had replaced its officer corps with ethnic Turkmen. In 1994,

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Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PFP). Turkmen officers have participated in or observed several PFP exercises.
Political and Economic Developments
During the late President Niyazov’s rule, Turkmenistan was the most authoritarian
of the Central Asian states, according to the State Department. Corruption and nepotism
were rife, and Niyazov’s Ahal-Tekke sub-tribe dominated cultural and political life.
Turkmenistan’s May 1992 constitution set up a “secular democracy” granted the president
overwhelming powers to rule by decree, although other provisions called for a balance of
powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The constitution includes
an impressive list of individual rights, but emphasizes that the exercise of rights must not
violate public order or damage national security. It created a 2,500-member People’s
Council (Halk Maslahaty or HM) with mixed executive and legislative powers, consisting
of the president, ministers, the fifty legislators of the Supreme Council (Mejlis), “people’s
representatives,” and others. The HM serves as an occasional forum and rubber stamp for
the president’s policy initiatives. The Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees and
has little legislative initiative. The court system retains its basic Soviet-era form. In
December 1999, members of the Mejlis, the HM, and Niyazov’s National Revival
Movement (a civic group) met in a joint session to approve changes to the Constitution,
including naming Niyazov president for life. In August 2003, the HM approved
constitutional changes making it the supreme legislative and executive body and greatly
expanding its size. Niyazov explained that it would be harder for coup plotters to take
over such a large body.
The most recent election of the 50-member Mejlis was held on December 19, 2004.
All candidates were pre-screened members of the Democratic Party. The OSCE offered
to send an assessment team but was refused. Whereas the Central Electoral Commission
reported a Soviet-era 99.8% turnout in 1999, it reported a 76.9% turnout in 2004. The
State Department reported that diplomats found polling stations mostly empty and that
the use of mobile ballot boxes and family voting was prevalent. Similarly, a 99.8%
turnout was reported for elections of people’s representatives to the HM in April 2003,
but diplomats reported few signs of voters at the polls.
Exile groups opposed to Niyazov were joined by more and more former officials
who fled his rule. Such groups included the United Democratic Opposition, headed by
former foreign minister Awdy Kulyyew (Kuliyev); the Watan Social-Political Movement,
headed by former deputy chairman of the Central Bank Annadurdy Hajyyew
(Khadzhiyev); the People’s Democratic Movement, headed by former foreign minister
Boris Orazowic Syhmyradow (Shikhmuradov); the Republican Party, headed by former
ambassador to Turkey Nurmuhammet Hanamow (Khanamov); and the Fatherland
movement, founded by former prime minister Hudayberdi Orazow (Orazov). The latter
three leaders received life sentences in absentia (except for Shikhmuradov, who was
apprehended) on charges of instigating the 2002 coup attempt.
President Niyazov died on December 21, 2006, at age 66, ostensibly from a heart
attack. The morning of his death, the government announced that deputy prime minister
and health minister Gurbanguly Malikgulyyewic Berdimuhammedow would serve as
acting president. The HM convened on December 26 and changed the constitution to
make legitimate Berdimuhammedow’s position as acting president. It quickly approved

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an electoral law and announced that the next presidential election would be held on
February 11, 2007. The HM designated six candidates for the presidential election, one
from each region, all of whom were government officials. The ruling Democratic Party
endorsed Berdimuhammedow as its candidate, thereby seemingly anointing him as
Niyazov’s heir-apparent. Exiled politicians were banned from participation. Reportedly,
nearly 99% of 2.6 million voters turned out, and 89.23% endorsed acting president
Berdimuhammedow.
An OSCE needs assessment mission visited during the campaign. It praised some
provisions of a new presidential election law, such as those permitting multiple
candidacies and access by electoral observers, but criticized others, including those
permitting only citizens approved by the legislature and who had served as state officials
to run. A small OSCE delegation on election day reportedly was not allowed to view
vote-counting, and one member allegedly termed the vote a “play” rather than a “real”
election. According to the U.S. State Department, the election “represent[ed] a modest
step toward political electoral change that could help create the conditions in the future
for a free, fair, open and truly competitive elections.”4 In his inaugural address on
February 14, 2007, Berdimuhammedow pledged to continue to provide free natural gas,
salt, water, and electricity and subsidized bread, gasoline, and housing to the populace,
and to uphold the foreign policy of the previous government. Berdimuhammedow was
acclaimed head of the HM on March 30, 2007, thus assuming all the top posts held by the
late Niyazov.
According to most observers, Turkmenistan’s humans rights record has been
extremely poor. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2006, numerous, systematic violations of due process, including arbitrary
arrest and torture, took place with impunity during 2006. Some prisoners died due to
overcrowding and untreated illnesses. The International Committee of the Red Cross
continued to be denied full access to prisoners. The government severely restricted
freedom of speech and assembly. It completely controlled radio and television and access
to the Internet, and censored all newspapers. Political opponents were imprisoned, sent
to psychiatric hospitals, or forcibly resettled in rural areas (so-called “internal exile”). A
Radio Liberty correspondent, Ogulsapar Myradowa, suffered a “violent death” in prison
in September 2006, according the NGO Reporters Without Borders. The U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended since 2000 that
Turkmenistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” where “egregious” abuses
against religious expression merit the consideration of aid penalties. In 2003, 2004, and
2005, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of
human rights in Turkmenistan. Perhaps a troubling sign of the human rights stance of the
new Turkmen government, oppositionist Annadurdy Hajyyew was detained in Bulgaria
on an arrest warrant from Turkmenistan on February 19, 2007. On the other hand,
Berdimuhammedow has pledged to make the internet more available.
Turkmenistan’s GDP growth was 13% in 2006, and consumer price inflation was
11% (The World Factbook; according to the Factbook, official Turkmen economic data
are problematic). The main sources of GDP growth were oil, gas, and cotton production.
4 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report, February 12, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-
950160. U.S. Department of State. Daily Press Briefing, February 15, 2007.

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Turkmenistan has been among the world’s top ten in cotton production, and about one-
half of the employed population works in agriculture. The public sector accounts for
about 75% of GDP. According to the World Bank, Turkmenistan’s underlying fiscal
position has weakened over the years as public sector deficits have ballooned (including
subsidies for consumer goods and industry and agriculture). About one-half the
population lives in poverty and about 60% are unemployed (leaving an employed labor
force of about 900,000-1,000,000), although a few necessities of life are provided free or
at low cost. In late 2006 and early 2007, bread shortages were reported. Some observers
allege that government corruption is exacerbated by official involvement in drug
trafficking. Perhaps lending credence to such allegations, Niyazov accused a former
prosecutor general in April 2006 of involvement with other relatives in drug trafficking.
In March 2007, the government announced the destruction of seized drugs, and the
president vowed to combat drug trafficking.
The U.S. Department of Energy in September 2005 reported estimates of 546 million
barrels of proven oil reserves and 71 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves
in Turkmenistan (which is less than 1% of the proven world oil reserves and less than 4%
of the proven gas reserves in the Persian Gulf). The NGO Global Witness alleged in
April 2006 that Turkmenistan’s energy sector is rife with corruption, which it claimed
makes Turkmenistan an unreliable gas supplier. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the
world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It is now largely dependent on Russian export
routes, and gas and oil production are held back by aging infrastructure, inadequate
investment, poor management, and export restrictions. In 1993, Russia halted Turkmen
gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other
Eurasian states that had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these
shipments because of transit fee arrears and as leverage to obtain Turkmenistan’s
agreement to terms offered by Russia’s state-owned gas firm Gazprom.
The late Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in 2003 on supplying Russia
up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising to
2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028, perhaps then tying up most if not all of
Turkmenistan’s future production. In 2006, Turkmenistan requested a price increase from
$65 per 35.314 thousand cubic feet to $100 for the rest of 2006 for gas supplied to Russia,
because Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom gas firm had raised the price it charged for
customers receiving the gas that it had purchased from Turkmenistan. In September 2006,
Gazprom agreed to pay $100 per 35.314 thousand cubic feet from 2007 to the end of
2009, and Turkmenistan pledged to supply 1.483 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2006, 1.765
tcf in 2007-2008, and 2.83 tcf from 2009-2028.
Seeking alternative export routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first
pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 120-mile pipeline
linkage to Iran’s pipeline system that has a capacity of about 300 bcf per year. Some oil
is also sent to Iran in a swap arrangement. In November 1999, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Turkey signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
Contention between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over shipment quotas for this planned
pipeline and other problems led Turkmenistan to reject participation. The United States
has advocated building such a pipeline since Turkmenistan could transport some of its gas
through routes not controlled by Russia and Iran. The United States also endorses
Turkmenistan’s proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and
India, but investment remains elusive.
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