Order Code RL33900
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for
Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes
Updated March 28, 2007
Stephen Daggett, Amy Belasco, Pat Towell, Susan B. Epstein,
Connie Veillette, Curt Tarnoff, and Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Bart Elias
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense,
Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes
Summary
On March 23, by a vote of 218-212, the House approved H.R. 1591, a bill
providing $124 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2007 and requiring the
redeployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq. The bill’s rule allowed no amendments and
opponents did not offer a motion to recommit. The Senate Appropriations
Committee marked up and reported its version of a supplemental appropriations bill,
S. 965, on March 22, and floor action began on March 26. The Senate took up the
House-passed bill and substituted the text of S. 965, and subsequent debate in the
Senate has proceeded using the House number, H.R. 1591.
The House-passed bill includes a Democratic leadership plan that sets three
alternative timetables for withdrawal from Iraq. It requires the President to certify
by July 1, 2007, that Iraq is making progress toward specific security and political
benchmarks and to certify by October 1, 2007, that progress on the political
benchmarks has been achieved. Redeployment of U.S. forces must be completed
within 180 days after either date if the certification is not made. Withdrawal must
begin, in any event, by March 1, 2008 and be completed by the end of August 2008.
Forces may remain in Iraq only to protect U.S. facilities and personnel, carry on
normal diplomatic activities, conduct targeted missions against members of terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda, and train Iraqi security forces. The bill also establishes
requirements for unit readiness and time between deployments, and requires either
that the President certify the requirements have been met or formally waive them.
On spending, the House bill provides $21.3 billion more than the
Administration requested. It provides $100.4 billion for defense, $7.1 billion higher
than the request. Major additions include $1.7 billion for health care, $1.4 billion for
housing allowances, $2.5 billion for a reserve readiness fund, and $3.1 billion for
base realignment and closure. Offsetting cuts from the request include $815 million
for use of contractors in Iraq. In addition, the bill provides $6.3 billion for
international affairs programs, $344 million more than the request. For domestic
programs, the bill adds almost $14 billion to the request. Funding includes $6.4
billion for hurricane disaster relief, $3.0 billion more than requested,$3.7 billion for
agricultural disaster relief, $2.5 billion for homeland security, $1.7 billion for
veterans health and other programs, $1.0 billion for pandemic flu preparedness, $750
million for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, $500 million for wildland
fire response, and $400 million for low-income energy assistance.
The Senate-reported bill directs the President to commence a withdrawal from
Iraq within 120 days of enactment, with a goal of redeploying most troops by March
31, 2008. On March 27, by a vote of 48 to 50, the Senate rejected an amendment by
Senator Cochran to eliminate the troop withdrawal provision. In all, the bill provides
$121.6 billion, $18.6 billion above the request. It provides $96 billion for defense
and $6.7 billion for hurricane relief, adds $4.3 billion for defense and veterans health
care, $2 billion for homeland security, $4.2 billion for agricultural disaster relief, and
funds for children’s health insurance, firefighting, low-income energy assistance, and
pandemic flu preparedness.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of the Administration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Elements of the Supplemental Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Highlights of House Appropriations Committee Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Highlights of House Floor Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Highlights of Senate Appropriations Committee Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Brief Overview of Major Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Iraq Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Effect of a Delay in Approving Supplemental Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Additions of Unrequested Funding for Domestic Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Designations of “Emergency” Spending in Defense and
International Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Using Defense Supplemental Funding to Offset Costs of Higher
Domestic Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Military Medical Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Additions to the Defense Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Keeping Open Walter Reed Army Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Potential Limitations on U.S. Military Operations in and Around Iraq . . . . . . . . 12
Iraq Deployment Restrictions in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appropriations Riders and Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Congressional Restrictions on Previous Military Operations . . . . . . . 15
Pending Action: House Supplemental Iraq Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Iraqi Government Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Troop Readiness Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Related Action: Senate Troop Withdrawal Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Pending Action: Senate Supplemental Iraq Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
‘Comprehensive Strategy’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Benchmarks for the Iraqi Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Debate Deferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Senate Floor Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FY2007 Defense Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Administration Amends FY2007 Supplemental to Finance Troop
Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Expansion of Activities Funded in the FY2007 Supplemental Request . . . 24
How Urgent is Passage of the FY2007 Supplemental? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Make-up of the FY2007 Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
DOD’s Justification for the FY2007 Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Military Personnel and Operations Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Temporary Troop “Surge” and Increased Naval Presence:
Amended Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Proposal to Increase Permanently the Size of the Army and
Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Regional War on Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
New Authorities for DOD Requested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Accelerating the Creation of Modular Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Front Loading Reconstitution or Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Equipping and Training Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Amendment to Restore FY2007 Funding for Base Realignment
and Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
FY2007 International Affairs Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Iraq Reconstruction Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
FY2007 Supplemental Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Sudan — Darfur and Other Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Darfur Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Other Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Avian Influenza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
State Department and International Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Liquidation of TSA Contract and Grant Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Ongoing Katrina Recovery Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Unrequested Funding for Domestic Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix. War-Related Appropriations, FY2005-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
List of Tables
Table 1. Overview of FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Request,
House-Passed, and Senate Committee Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. DOD War Budget Authority By Title:FY2004-FY2007 Requesta . . . . 23
Table 3. Department of Defense FY2007 War Request: FY2006 and
FY2007 Bridge, and FY2007 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 4. FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Request for Iraq
Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 5. Afghanistan Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 6. Sudan Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

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Table 7. Foreign Operations FY2007 Supplemental Request by
Appropriations Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Table 8. State Department and International Broadcasting FY2007
Supplemental Appropriations Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table A-1. War-Related Appropriations, FY2005-FY2007 Supplemental
Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Table A-2. FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations: Congressional
Action by Subcommittee/Title/Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

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FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for
Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other
Purposes
Most Recent Developments
On March 22, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up and reported its
version of a bill, S. 965, providing $121.6 billion in supplemental appropriations for
FY2007. The full Senate began floor consideration of the bill on March 26, when
it took up the House-passed version of the bill, H.R. 1591, inserted the text of S. 965,
and subsequently proceeded to consider the measure under the House number.
In a key vote on the bill, on March 27, by a margin of 48-50, the Senate rejected
an amendment by Senator Cochran to delete a provision in the committee bill
requiring that most troops be withdrawn from Iraq by March 31, 2008. The Senate
leadership expects to complete action on the bill by Thursday, March 29.
Earlier, on March 23, by a vote of 218-212, the House approved H.R. 1591, a
bill providing $124 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2007 and requiring
the redeployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq by no later than the end of August 2008.
In a press statement in response to the bill’s passage, President Bush warned that he
would veto a bill that includes restrictions on operations in Iraq and he complained
that delays in passing the bill beyond April 15 would disrupt funding for military
forces.
On March 19, the White House issued a Statement of Administration Policy
(SAP) on the House bill. The statement warned that the President would veto the bill
not only because of the Iraq withdrawal provisions, but also because of the amount
of unrequested domestic funding in the bill. On March 27, the White House issued
a statement promising a veto of the Senate bill on the same grounds.
On March 9, the White House submitted two amendments to its earlier $103
billion FY2007 supplemental appropriations request, one to provide $3.1 billion for
DOD base realignment and closure, offset by reductions in domestic programs, and
one to provide $3.2 billion mainly for costs of sending additional troops to Iraq and
Afghanistan, offset mainly by shifting funds originally requested in the FY2007
supplemental for Air Force and Navy aircraft to the FY2008 request for war funds.
Neither of these amendments was reflected in the House committee version of the
supplemental bill, though the House cut some of the same defense programs as in the
Administration’s proposed troop surge amendment.

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Overview of the Administration Request1
On February 5, the Administration requested $103 billion in supplemental
appropriations for FY2007 of which $93.4 billion was for the Department of Defense
and $6.0 billion for international affairs. The Administration also requested $3.4
billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief
Fund for ongoing Katrina relief measures. Earlier, in January, the Administration
requested authority to transfer $195 million in unobligated balances to liquidate
unfunded obligations of funds by the Transportation Security Administration.
Congress now considering these and additional funding proposals in action on a
supplemental appropriations bill.
Elements of the Supplemental Request
The main elements of the Administration’s supplemental requests include:
! $93.4 billion for the Department of Defense to finance military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and counter-terrorism operations
elsewhere through the remainder of FY2007; to cover costs of the
“surge” of additional troops to Iraq and an additional carrier to the
Persian Gulf; to repair and replace equipment lost or worn out in
current operations; to add equipment to fill recently identified war-
fighting needs; to add and upgrade equipment to improve current
and future war-on-terrorism capabilities; and to begin to finance
facility improvements and some other costs associated with Army
and Marine Corps plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the force
over the next several years;
! $4.8 billion for foreign operations, including $2,347.8 million for
security and reconstruction assistance to Iraq; $721 million for
assistance to Afghanistan; $362 million for activities in Sudan,
mainly for humanitarian and peacekeeping support in the Darfur
region; $586 million for reconstruction and security assistance to
Lebanon; $279 million for assistance to Kosovo in support of a UN-
led process to determine the region’s status; $367 million for various
other humanitarian assistance activities; $161 million for avian flu
prevention measures; and $102 million for migration and refugee
assistance in a number of areas;
! $1.2 billion for Department of State and International Broadcasting
programs, of which $824 million is for the U.S. mission and other
activities in Iraq and $200 million is for U.S. contributions for
international peacekeeping in Lebanon and Timor Leste;
! $3.4 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund to support on-going Katrina recovery
1 Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Specialist in National Defense.

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CRS-3
measures through December 2007, including housing assistance and
grants for public infrastructure repair in the Gulf Coast; and
! a transfer of $195 million in unobligated balances to resolve
insufficiently funded Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
contract and grant obligations incurred during FY2002 and FY2003.
Congress is also considering additions of unrequested funds for agricultural disaster
relief, child health insurance, avian flu preparedness, homeland security, and other
purposes.
Table 1, below, provides an overview of the request and of the main elements
of funding provided in the House Appropriations Committee supplemental bill,
broken down by Titles of the House bill.
Highlights of House Appropriations
Committee Bill
The bill as approved by the House Appropriations Committee on March 15 and
passed by the House on March 23, provides a total of $124 billion in supplemental
appropriations, including
! $100.4 billion for the Department of Defense, $7.1 billion above the
request, including $95.5 billion for personnel, operations,
procurement, and other accounts, and $4.9 billion for military
construction;
! $6.3 billion for international affairs, $344 million more than the
request;
! $6.4 billion for hurricane relief, $3.0 billion more than the request;
! $2.5 billion for homeland security measures;
! $1.7 billion for the Department of Veterans affairs, including funds
for veterans medical programs;
! $3.7 billion for agricultural disaster relief, for which no funds were
requested; and
! $3.0 billion for other domestic programs, including pandemic flu
preparedness, children’s health insurance, low-income energy
assistance, and wildland fire management, for all of which no funds
were requested.
Table 1 provides an overview of funding in the bill by title and for selected
programs.
The bill also includes a Democratic leadership plan that sets three alternative
timetables for withdrawal from Iraq. It requires the President to certify by July 1,
2007, that Iraq is making progress toward specific security and political benchmarks
and to certify by October 1, 2007, that progress on the political benchmarks has been
achieved. Withdrawals of U.S. combat forces must be completed within 180 days
after either date if the certification is not made. Withdrawal must begin, in any event,

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CRS-4
by March 1, 2008 and be completed by the end of August 2008. The bill also
establishes requirements for unit readiness and time between deployments and
requires either that the President certify the requirements have been met or formally
waive them.
In addition, the bill includes an increase in the minimum wage and a package
of tax cuts designed to offset the costs of the increase to small businesses. The
House had approved the minimum wage increase in separate legislation earlier in the
year.
In an initial draft, the bill also included a measure prohibiting the use of funds
for military action against Iran without congressional authorization. That language
was removed before the committee markup, however.
In the markup, the committee also approved an amendment to prohibit funds in
provided the bill or in any other bill from being used to close Walter Reed Army
Medical Center. This would reverse a decision made in the 2005 base realignment
and closure process.

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CRS-5
Table 1. Overview of FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations
Request, House-Passed, and Senate Committee Bills
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Change
Change
House
House
from
Senate
Senate
from
Request*
Bill*
Request
Request
Bill
Request
Title I: Global War on Terror
99,615.4
111,302.8 +11,687.4
99,615.4
107,384.8
+7,769.4
Defense
93,383.0
100,445.3
+7,062.3
93,273.0
96,813.6
+3,540.6
Department of Defense
91,529.0
95,529.7
+4,000.7
91,533.0
92,032.8
+499.8
Military Construction
1,854.0
4,915.5
+3,061.6
1,740.0
4,780.8
+3,040.8
International Affairs
5,996.0
6,340.2
+344.2
6,106.0
6,310.4
+204.5
Department of Agriculture, P.L. 480
350.0
450.0
+100.0
350.0
557.0
+207.0
Dept of State: Admin of For Aff/Intern'l
Orgs
1,168.0
1,321.8
+153.8
1,168.0
1,136.3
-31.7
Bilateral Economic Assistance
3,575.7
3,502.2
-73.5
3,685.7
3,638.9
-46.8
Other Department of State/Intern'l
Broadcasting
399.0
578.5
+179.5
399.0
432.5
+33.5
Department of the Treasury
5.3
2.8
-2.5
5.3
2.8
-2.5
Military Assistance
498.0
485.0
-13.0
498.0
543.0
+45.0
Other Agencies
236.5
4,517.4
+4,280.9
236.5
4,260.8
+4,024.3
Department of Homeland Security
--
2,500.0
+2,500.0
--
2,000.0
+2,000.0
Department of Veterans Affairs
--
1,702.1
+1,702.1
--
1,767.1
+1,767.1
Other Agencies
236.5
315.3
+78.8
236.5
493.7
+257.2
Title II: Hurricane Disaster Relief
and Recovery
3,400.0
6,357.4
+2,957.4
3,400.0
6,950.7
+3,550.7
Federal Emergency Management Agency
3,400.0
4,630.0
+1,230.0
3,400.0
4,630.0
+1,230.0
Corps of Engineers
--
1,337.1
+1,337.1
--
1,710.7
+1,710.7
Other
Agencies
-- 390.3
+390.3
-- 610.0
+610.0
Title III: Agricultural Assistance
-- 3,726.0
+3,726.0
-- 4,192.0
+4,192.0
Agriculture Disaster Assistance
--
--
--
--
4,192.0
+4,192.0
Crop Disaster Assistance
--
1,808.0
+1,808.0
--
--
--
Livestock Compensation Program
--
1,480.0
+1,480.0
--
--
--
Other Programs
--
438.0
+438.0
--
--
--
Title IV: Other Matters
--
2,481.4
+2,481.4
--
2,688.6
+2,688.6
Bureau of Land Mgmt Wildland Fire
Mgmt
-- 100.0
+100.0
-- 100.0
+100.0
Forest Services Wildland Fire Mgmt
--
400.0
+400.0
--
400.0
+400.0
Secure Rural Schools
--
400.0
+400.0
--
425.0
+425.0
Low Income Energy Home Energy Asst
--
400.0
+400.0
--
640.0
+640.0
Public Health Services, Pandemic Flu
--
969.7
+969.7
--
820.0
+820.0
Other
Programs
-- 211.8
+211.8
-- 303.6
+303.6
Title VI: SCHIP Shortfall
--
463.0
+463.0
--
448.0
+448.0
State Childrens Health Insurance Prog
--
750.0
+750.0
--
448.0
+448.0
Offsetting Rescissions
--
-287.0
-287.0
--
--
--
Grand Total
103,015.4
124,330.6 +21,315.2
103,015.4
121,664.1 +18,648.7
Source: H.Rept. 110-60; S.Rept. 110-37.
*Note: House request is as shown in Office of Management and Budget documents, which differ from figures in
Department of Defense justification books. Senate amounts are reorganized by Titles of the House bill.

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Highlights of House Floor Action
The House began floor debate on the supplemental bill on Thursday, March 22,
and approved the bill by a vote of 218-212 on March 23. Debate on the bill was
conducted under a closed rule (H.Res. 261), which permitted no amendments.
Among the amendments proposed to the Rules Committee were a proposal by
Representative Lewis to remove all the Iraq-related and readiness-related provisions;
by Representative King (IA) to strike the Iraq withdrawal provision; by
Representatives Lee (CA), Clarke, Watson, Woolsey, and Waters to prohibit funding
for operations in Iraq except to protect troops and to withdraw forces; by
Representative Jackson-Lee to withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2007; by
Representative Flake to strike all the agricultural disaster relief funds; by
Representative Kirk to strike $25 million for spinach growers; by Representative
Cole to add funds to fully fund all programs on military service unfunded priorities
lists; and by Representative McHenry to strike minimum wage provisions.
Highlights of Senate Appropriations
Committee Bill
The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up and reported its version of the
bill on Thursday, March 22. The bill provides a total of $118.6 billion in
supplemental appropriations, including
! $98.6 billion for the Department of Defense, $3.5 billion above the
request, including $92.0 billion for personnel, operations,
procurement, and other accounts, and $4.8 billion for military
construction;
! $6.3 billion for international affairs, $207 million more than the
Senate estimate of the request;
! $7.0 billion for hurricane relief, $3.6 billion more than the request;
! $2.0 billion for homeland security measures;
! $1.8 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs;
! $4.2 billion for agricultural disaster relief; and
! $3.1 billion for other domestic programs, including pandemic flu
preparedness, children’s health insurance, low-income energy
assistance, and wildland fire management.
Table 1 provides an overview of funding in the bill by title and for selected
programs.
On Iraq, the bill includes a Democratic-sponsored plan that directs the President
to commence the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq within 120 days of
enactment of the legislation, with the goal of redeploying all combat forces from Iraq

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by March 31, 2008, except for a limited number essential to protect U.S. and
coalition personnel and infrastructure, to train and equip Iraqi forces, and to conduct
targeted counter-terrorism operations. The measure also expresses the sense of
Congress that the government Iraq of should pursue several political and security
benchmarks on a schedule established by the government.
The committee bill prohibits the use of funds in the bill to close Walter Reed
Army Medical Center until the Secretary of Defense certifies that replacement
facilities in the Washington area are operational and that a plan is in place to
transition soldiers receiving care at Walter Reed to the other facilities.
Brief Overview of Major Issues2
Iraq Policy
Iraq policy has been the overriding issue in debate about the FY2007
supplemental appropriations bill, though the White House and congressional
opponents of the bill have also been critical of the amounts the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees added for domestic programs.
In the past, Congress has sometimes, though rarely, used the power of the purse
to cut off funding for military operations, to put limits on the numbers of troops that
may be deployed in specific military actions abroad, and to set other conditions on
the conduct of military operations.3 Now Congress is again considering measures
that would renew an ongoing constitutional battle about the authority of the President
to wage war and Congress’s ability to limit it.
In the House, the Democratic leadership presented a rider to the appropriations
bill that would set three alternative timetables for withdrawal, depending on political
progress inside Iraq.4 Even if the government of Iraq achieves all the political
benchmarks, the leadership plan would require the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces
from Iraq no later than August 2008. The leadership plan also includes requirements
originally proposed by Representative Murtha, the defense appropriations
subcommittee chairman, that units be fully equipped and trained before being
2 Prepared by Stephen Daggett, Specialist in National Defense.
3 For a review of selected funding and other restrictions since the Vietnam War, see CRS
Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by Amy
Belasco, Lynn J. Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry A. Niksch. See also, CRS Report
RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces
and Overseas Deployments, by Richard Grimmett and CRS Report RL33837, Congressional
Authority To Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Thomas J.
Nicola.
4 The Iraq withdrawal provisions are in Section 1904 of the House bill.

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deployed and that units have a minimum of time at home before being redeployed.
The President must either certify that deploying units meet these conditions or
formally waive the requirement.
In the Senate, the committee-passed bill directs the President to commence the
phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq within 120 days of enactment of the
legislation, with the goal of redeploying all combat forces from Iraq by March 31,
2008, except for a limited number essential to protect U.S. and coalition personnel
and infrastructure, to train and equip Iraqi forces, and to conduct targeted counter-
terrorism operations. The Senate measure expresses the sense of Congress that the
government Iraq of should pursue several political and security benchmarks on a
schedule established by the government.
In the House, the rule on floor consideration of the bill did not permit any
amendments, so there were no votes on alternative policies. The amendments
proposed to the rules committee included two Republican-sponsored measures to
delete all the Iraq policy language in the bill and two Democratic-sponsored measures
to accelerate the withdrawal, including one measure requiring withdrawal of all
personnel by December 31, 2007.
In the Senate Committee markup, Senator Shelby offered an amendment to
delete the Iraq redeployment provisions, but he did not demand a vote because
Senator Tim Johnson’s absence might have affected the outcome. His or a similar
amendment to delete the withdrawal language appears very likely to be proposed
during Senate floor debate.
Effect of a Delay in Approving Supplemental Funding
Army officials have warned that limits on available funding may require
disruptive changes in day-to-day operations unless Congress approves supplemental
funding by some time in April. The Army estimates that it is now spending operation
and maintenance (O&M) funds at a rate of about $6.3 billion per month both for
combat and for everyday operation of the force. To date, Congress has appropriated
a total of $52.6 billion for Army O&M in FY2007, of which $24.2 billion was
provided in the FY2007 base budget and $28.4 billion was provided in the FY2007
“bridge” fund for war costs. At an overall combat and non-combat “burn rate” of
$6.3 billion per month, the Army has enough money, therefore, to operate at the
current pace for just over eight months — that is, though the end of May and into
June.
Army officials complain that they will have to begin slowing down operations
long before then, however, in anticipation of funding restrictions. Last year, when
the supplemental was not passed until June, and when there was less money in the
bridge fund, Army officials say that restrictions on operations were quite damaging.
This year, they say, they are especially pressed because they do not want to delay
programs to absorb additional personnel into the force.

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The effect of a delay in passing the supplemental has now become a major issue.
Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly told Members of Congress in a March 22
meeting that the Army would have to slow training beginning in mid-April, and that
delays beyond the middle of May might lead the Army to extend the deployment term
of units already in Iraq rather than send new units without full training. In a press
statement on March 23, President Bush warned that if funding were delayed beyond
April 15, “our men and women in uniform will face significant disruptions, and so
will their families.”
CRS estimates that the Army could cover its operational costs until about June
or July 2007 by using war funds in the FY2007 “bridge” fund provided in Title IX
of the FY2007 appropriations bill, by temporarily transferring procurement funds to
operations, and by tapping monies in its baseline budget that would not be needed
until the end of the fiscal year. This does not mean, however, that the Army would
not face disruptions if funding is delayed. In order to ensure that funding is available
for the later months of the year, the Army may very well decide that it must slow
down its operations before money would run out by, for example, limiting facility
maintenance and repairs, slowing equipment overhauls, limiting travel and meetings,
and, perhaps, slowing down training. (See below for a further discussion.)
Additions of Unrequested Funding for Domestic Programs
The House bill provides almost $14 billion of unrequested for domestic
programs, including, in Title I of the bill, $2.5 billion for homeland security and $1.7
billion for veterans affairs, including money for veterans medical care; in Title II of
the bill, $3.0 billion above the request for hurricane relief; in Title III of the bill, $3.7
billion for agricultural disaster relief; and in Titles IV and VI of the bill, $3.0 billion
for programs ranging from pandemic flu preparedness at NIH to making up a
shortfall in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. The Administration has
warned that the President would veto the bill if it includes unrequested domestic
spending of this magnitude.
The Senate bill provides about $15 billion of unrequested funds for domestic
programs, including $2.0 billion for homeland security, $1.7 billion for veterans
programs, $6.7 billion for hurricane relief, $3.3 billion above the request, $4.0 billion
for agricultural disaster relief, $747 million for children’s health insurance, $870
million for pandemic flue preparedness, $640 million for low-income energy
assistance, and $500 million for a firefighting reserve fund.
Designations of “Emergency” Spending in Defense and
International Affairs
Both in the defense portion of the bill and in the international affairs portion,
one ongoing issue is what funding should properly be provided as emergency

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supplemental appropriations5 that are not subject to annual caps on federal spending
and what funding should instead be provided in the agency “base” budgets that are
financed in regular, non-emergency appropriations. In recent years, defense
appropriations exempted from budget caps (including “bridge funds” for overseas
operations provided as separate titles in the regular defense appropriations bills)
have grown from $16 billion in FY2002 to $63 billion in FY2003 and FY2004, to
$102 billion in FY2005,6 to $116 billion in FY2006, and to $163 billion approved or
requested in FY2007.
This reflects a progressive expansion of the kinds of equipment and operational
support that both the Defense Department and Congress have agreed to consider as
sufficiently urgent to warrant inclusion in emergency funding measures, even though
the funding may not meet definitions either of the narrowly defined incremental costs
of military operations, or of what constitutes an emergency by congressional
standards. An issue for Congress in the FY2007 supplemental is whether some of
the very large increase in weapons procurement that the Defense Department has
requested in the FY2007 supplemental goes beyond even the expanded definition of
war-related requirements that Congress has accepted in recent years. The Air Force,
for example, requested funds for two F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, a new system not yet
in production, on the basis that the aircraft will replace equipment lost in the war,
though F-35s will not be available for another three years. The House committee
eliminated funding for these and for Navy EA-18G aircraft even before the
Administration amended its request to delay these programs.
The supplemental request for international affairs funding raises the same issue.
In testifying before Congress about the FY2008 budget request, Secretary of State
Rice faced several questions about the continued practice of requesting emergency
supplemental funds for foreign affairs expenditures that do not seem unplanned or
unexpected. On February 8, 2007, Senator Biden, the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee complained, “We’ve been in Afghanistan for over five
years and Iraq for nearly four, and spending in neither country can hardly be called
an emergency.” Some legislators have questioned, in particular, proposed funding
for U.S. embassy operations and security in Iraq.
5 The term “emergency appropriations” is used loosely here to include all spending exempt
from annual budget resolution caps on discretionary appropriations. Technically, under
language used in annual congressional budget resolutions, exemptions from budget caps
cover funds formally designated as “emergency” spending and also funding for “military
contingency operations” in the House and for “military contingent operations” or for
“national defense” in the Senate. This is discussed further below.
6 This counts $25 billion in a “bridge fund” in the FY2005 defense appropriations bill as
FY2005 money, though it is technically “scored” by the Congressional Budget Office and
the Office of Management and Budget as FY2004 funding because it was made available
on enactment, which was before the beginning of FY2005. All but about $2 billion,
however, was not obligated until FY2005 or later.

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Using Defense Supplemental Funding to Offset Costs of
Higher Domestic Spending
Conversely, while some have objected what they see as the Administration’s
misuse of the “emergency” designation, the Administration has objected to the use
of “emergency” defense supplementals as an indirect means of avoiding cuts in non-
defense programs. In each of the past several years, it appears that some funding
that would normally be included in the base defense budget has migrated into the
supplementals, which frees up funding under discretionary spending caps not only
for other defense programs, but also for non-defense discretionary accounts. The
FY2007 continuing resolution, for example, cut $3.1 billion from the
Administration’s defense request for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), which
freed an equivalent amount for non-defense appropriations bills. Congress may now
add the BRAC funding to the FY2007 supplemental, which some may see as, in
effect, using the supplemental to finance non-defense programs without violating
FY2007 discretionary spending caps. At some point, some contend, Congress may
need to assert more effective limits on emergency spending if it wishes to restore
discipline over the budget as a whole.
Military Medical Care
Reports of poor conditions in housing for patients at the Walter Reed Army
Medical Center and other reports of shortcomings in medical care for wounded
veterans prompted Congress to add substantial amounts to the supplemental for
military medical care. The House bill adds $1.3 billion for the defense health
program including $400 million for post-traumatic stress counseling and 4300
million for brain injury care. The bill also adds $1.7 billion for the Department of
Veterans Affairs for medical care, disability pensions, and administration. The
Senate bill also adds $1.7 billion for defense health, though allocated differently from
the House, and $1.7 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Additions to the Defense Request
As large as the defense supplemental request is, it did not provide funding for
all of the programs the military services have identified as priorities, and many
legislators have complained that the readiness of Army and Marine Corps units not
deployed abroad has declined, particularly because of shortfalls of equipment for
training. In addition, it appears that the Defense Department underestimated costs
of the “surge” of 21,000 combat troops to Iraq. In February, each of the armed
services submitted an “Unfunded Priorities List” (UPL) of programs that did not
receive funding in the final Administration FY2008 request to Congress, but that the
services would like if more money were available. The Army FY2008 UPL includes
substantial amounts for force protection equipment, including $2.2 billion for Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
The House bill added $2.5 billion to the defense request for a reserve readiness
fund to be available for training, operations, repair of equipment, and purchases of

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new equipment to finance improvements in the readiness of “next-to-deploy” units
in the United States. The bill also added $250 million for Marine MRAP purchases
and smaller amounts for some other procurement programs, partly offset by cutting
funds in the original Administration request for Air Force purchases of the Joint
Strike Fighter and for Navy EA-18G aircraft.
The Senate bill adds $1 billion for Army National Guard and Reserve equipment
shortfalls. Both the House and Senate bills add $1.1 billion for Basic Allowance for
Housing shortfalls.
Keeping Open Walter Reed Army Medical Center
The House bill includes a provision that prohibits funds in the supplemental or
in any other legislation from being used to close Walter Reed hospital in Washington,
D.C. The Senate bill prohibits closing Walter Reed until replacement facilities in
Bethesda, Maryland, and Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, are completed and fully operational
and until the Secretary of Defense certifies that facilities are sufficient to meet
existing and projected demands for services. The House measure reverses a decision
of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. The BRAC process
was designed to prevent legislative efforts to keep open particular facilities by
requiring an up or down congressional vote on a package of base closure measures
not subject to amendment.
These and other issues are reviewed in more detail in the following discussion
of the main elements of the FY2007 supplemental appropriations request.
Potential Limitations on U.S. Military
Operations in and Around Iraq7
The House-passed version of H.R. 1591 includes provisions that would require
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from a combat role in Iraq (with certain exceptions) by
no later than August 31, 2008. Other provisions of the bill would bar the deployment
to Iraq of units that do not meet the Defense Department’s traditional standards of
combat readiness.
The version of the bill approved March 22 by the Senate Appropriations
Committee includes provisions that would require the President to begin withdrawing
U.S. forces from Iraq within 120 days of enactment, with the “goal” of removing all
U.S. combat forces from the country by March 31, 2008, except those engaged in
certain, limited missions. On March 27, the Senate rejected by a vote of 48-50 an
amendment that would have eliminated the provisions related to with withdrawal of
U.S. troops.
7 Prepared by Pat Towell, Specialist in National Defense.

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On March 28, the Senate adopted by a vote of xx-xx an amendment adding to
the bill provisions that would prohibit the deployment of any unit or service member
not rated by the relevant service chief as “fully mission capable.” The president could
waive the prohibition on a case-by-case basis.
That amendment also would bar deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom of any
Army unit or member for more than 12 months (or, in the case of the Marine Corps,
more than 7 months). In addition, it would bar the deployment of active-duty Army
units to Iraq within 12 months of their prior deployment to that theater (or within 7
months in the case of active-duty Marine Corps units or members) and it would bar
the re-deployment of any reserve component unit to Iraq within five years of a prior
deployment.
Iraq Deployment Restrictions in the 110th Congress
Members critical of President Bush’s Iraq policy secured, on February 16,
adoption by the House of a non-binding resolution (H.Con.Res. 63) expressing
disapproval of the decision to deploy more than 21,000 additional U.S. combat troops
to Iraq. Similar non-binding measures disapproving of the Administration’s troop
“surge” were introduced in the Senate (S. 470, S.Con.Res. 7, S. 574), but action on
them stalled.
Administration opponents also have introduced both in the House and in the
Senate binding legislation intended to substantially restrict U.S. military operations
in Iraq by various methods. Some of these proposals would repeal P.L.107-243, the
2002 resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq (e.g., H.R. 930,
H.R. 508). Others would bar the use of any funds for military operations in Iraq after
a date certain (S. 448). Others would prohibit any increase in the number of U.S.
troops in Iraq unless authorized by Congress (S. 308, H.R. 438), limit the missions
that U.S. forces could conduct in Iraq (H.R. 455, S. 433), or require that U.S. troops
be redeployed from Iraq to other locations (H.R. 746, S. 121). 8
Appropriations Riders and Military Operations
However, opponents of a continued U.S. combat role in Iraq might deem it
tactically advantageous to use the supplemental appropriations bill as a vehicle for
their efforts to rein in the Administration’s Iraq policy, because early enactment of
the supplemental is essential to fund ongoing military operations in Iraq. Defense
Secretary Robert M. Gates, testifying on the supplemental appropriations bill before
the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 27, said: “If these additional funds
8 For a frequently updated summary of Iraq-related legislative proposals see CRS
Congressional Distribution Memorandum, “Legislation Introduced Regarding Iraq War
Policy and U.S.Military Policy Concerning Iran, 110th Congress,” by Kim Walker Klarman,
updated Feb. 22, 2007.

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are delayed, the military will be forced to engage in costly and counterproductive
reprogramming actions starting this spring, in April, to make up the shortfall.”9
On March 22, Secretary Gates reportedly told members of Congress in a
meeting that if supplemental appropriations were not enacted by mid-April, the Army
might have to slow training of units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan and that, if
enactment were delayed thru mid May, the delay in training follow-on units might
force the Army to extend the deployment of units already in Iraq beyond their usual
year-long tours.10 CRS has estimated that the Army could continue to operate into
June with funds available through the end of the fiscal year and by reprogramming
funds from other accounts (see below for a further discussion).
One option would be for the critics to block enactment of the supplemental
funding bill, but that might draw accusations that they are failing to support troops
who are in harm’s way. Instead, the House bill would provide fund the troops in
Iraq, essentially at the level requested by the President, but also would require him
to remove most U.S. troops from that by August 31, 2008, while the Senate version
would require the president to begin a troop withdrawal by March 31, 2008, with the
“goal” of removing combat troops by August 31, 2008. Both versions of the bill
would allow a limited number of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq for certain missions.
Conditioning the availability of funds in an appropriations bill in this way raises
two fundamental questions. One is whether the President could legally circumvent
legislative restrictions on appropriations for military operations in Iraq. In the same
Senate hearing, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, told the
Appropriations Committee that President Bush would have latitude under provisions
of the Feed and Forage Act (41 U.S.C. 110) to continue funding ongoing operations,
even if Congress were to reject the supplemental funding bill.11 The scope of
presidential discretion under that law may be limited, however: It allows the
government to incur obligations for certain military expenses in the absence of an
appropriation, but requires that Congress appropriate the necessary funds before they
can be expended pursuant to such obligation.12
A second threshold question is whether there are limits on how far Congress can
go in using the power of the purse, not simply to fund or not fund a given military
operation, but also — through the use of appropriations riders — to change the
9 Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Hearing on Proposed Fiscal 2007
Supplemental Appropriations, February 27, 2007.
10 Noam N. Levey and Peter Spiegel, “Gates Pushes Back On Eve Of War Vote,” Los
Angeles Times, March 23, 2007.
11 Ibid. For an analysis of Congressional authority to limit Military Operations through its
use of the power of the purse and other means, see CRS Report RL33837, Congressional
Authority to Limit U. S. Military Operations in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Thomas J.
Nicola.
12 William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of the
Purse, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 71-72.

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parameters of a legally authorized conflict already underway. Some commentators
invoke the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” to argue that, while Congress
unquestionably can deny funding for an ongoing war, it cannot impose conditions on
the availability of funds that would vitiate the president’s constitutional authority as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces to direct military operations.13 Other
commentators argue that, since the courts have upheld Congress’ authority to limit
the scope of military operations by statute, it follows that Congress can exercise that
authority through the appropriations process.14
Congressional Restrictions on Previous Military Operations. Those
fundamental questions aside, there are several types of restrictions Congress has
considered since 1970 in efforts to reduce or terminate U.S. military operations in
Southeast Asia, Somalia and the countries formed from the former Yugoslavia.15
Congress has used an appropriations bill rider to simply terminate an ongoing
operation, namely the Byrd Amendment to the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act
(P.L. 103-139, Sec. 8151), which prohibited obligation of funds after March 31, 1994
for military operations in Somalia, unless subsequently authorized by law or if
necessary to protect U.S. civilians in that country.
But Congress also has considered or adopted riders that are more narrowly
drawn to limit the scope of U.S. military operations in a given area. For instance, in
1971, the House rejected an amendment to the Fiscal 1972 defense authorization bill
(H.R. 8687) that would have barred the use of funds authorized under the act for any
aerial attack in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam or Thailand, unless the president
determined such an attack necessary to ensure the safety of U.S. forces withdrawing
from Indochina. In 1999, the House passed H.R. 1569, a free-standing bill (on
which the Senate took no action) that would have barred the obligation or
expenditure of Defense Department funds for the deployment of “ground elements”
of the U.S. armed forces into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [i.e., the former
Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro], except to rescue U.S. or NATO
military personnel or U.S. civilians. In 1971, Congress enacted a provision that the
Cooper-Church amendment barring the use of any funds to deploy U.S. ground
13 David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “What Congress Can (And Can’t) Do On Iraq,”
Washington Post, P. A19, Jan. 16, 2007 summarize this view.
14 Elsea and Nicola, pp. 18-19. For a more extended discussion of this and other relevant
constitutional and legal issues, from a perspective that argues for broader Congressional
authority, see, Charles Tiefer, “Can Appropriations Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?,”
Stanford Journal of International Law, 42 ( 2006), pp. 291-342.
15 For further analysis of the following (and many other) examples of Congressional efforts
to restrict military operations abroad, see CRS Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions
on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia and Kosovo, by Amy
Belasco, Lynn J. Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry A. Niksch, and CRS Report
RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces
and Overseas Deployments, by Richard F. Grimmett.

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troops in Cambodia.16 In 1973, Congress enacted a provision that prohibited the
obligation or expenditure of funds in this or any previous law to finance “combat in
or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia,”
on or after August 15, 1973; U.S. bombing stopped on August 15, 1973.17
Pending Action: House Supplemental Iraq Provisions
The Iraq-related restrictions included in the House version of the supplemental
incorporate some of these earlier approaches, along with other provisions. The bill
would set a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq of no later
than the end of August 2008. It also sets earlier dates for withdrawal unless the
President can certify that the government of Iraq meets specific security and political
benchmarks.
The plan would also prohibit the deployment of units that do not meet certain
readiness benchmarks unless the president waives these requirements and reports to
Congress his reasons.
Iraqi Government Benchmarks. The bill would require the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq (with some exceptions) within a 180-day period beginning July
1. However, the start of the withdrawal would be deferred if the President certifies
by July 1, that Iraq is showing progress toward meeting a number of benchmarks of
progress toward political reconciliation, economic reform and improved security.
The security benchmarks include several steps intended to strengthen Iraqi Security
Forces and insulate them from political interference, make them more evenhanded
in providing security to all Iraqi citizens, and reduce the power of sectarian militias.
The political and economic benchmarks include:
! enactment of legislation that would equitably share oil revenues
among the country’s regions
! expenditure of $10 billion for reconstruction projects
! holding of provincial elections later this year
! easing employment restrictions on former members of Saddam
Hussein’s Baath Party, and
! facilitating the process of amending the country’s constitution to
secure broader national consensus.
If the President certifies July 1 that Iraq is showing progress toward all these security,
political and economic goals, the six-month U.S. redeployment would not start until
October 1.
If the President certifies on October 1 that Iraq has met the five political and
economic benchmarks, the start of the withdrawal would be further delayed until
16 Sec. 7, P.L.91-652, Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.
17 See Section 108, P.L. 93-52, Making Continuing Appropriations for he Fiscal Year 1974
and for Other Purposes.

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March 1, 2008. Not later than that date, however, U.S. troops would have to begin
withdrawing from combat roles, with the process to be completed within 180 days.
Regardless of when the six-month redeployment period ends, U.S. troops could
remain in Iraq after that time only for certain missions, including training Iraqi forces,
protecting U.S. diplomatic facilities and citizens and engaging in missions that are,
“limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations with global reach.”
Troop Readiness Criteria. The House version of the supplemental also
would prohibit the deployment to Iraq of military units that do not meet established
Defense Department policies intended to maintain combat readiness and morale.
These include requirements that (1) no unit could be deployed to Iraq for longer than
is the policy of its service — 12 months for Army brigade combat teams and seven
months for Marine regimental combat teams, (2) no Army unit could return to Iraq
within a year of its previous deployment to that country and no Marine Corps unit
within seven months, and (3) no unit be deployed unless the uniformed chief of its
service certify to Congress that it is “fully mission capable.” The President could
waive these limitations on a unit-by-unit basis if he reported to Congress why
deployment of a particular unit is necessary.
In his February 27 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Gen. Pace said that if the services were barred from (1) extending the deployment of
units beyond their normal duration, (2) deploying units that had not completed their
full training syllabus and (3) temporarily relaxing some other deployment policies,
the number of Army combat units that could be deployed in Iraq at any one time
would oscillate between 14 and 19 brigades, instead of the 20 called for by the
current plan.
The Defense Department’s long-established readiness measurement system
assesses a unit to be “fully mission capable” if it is manned, equipped and trained to
carry out the full range of traditional combat missions to which a unit of that type
might be assigned. However, the Department has another system for assessing —
through each unit commander’s subjective judgment — that unit’s readiness for a
specific, non-traditional mission — such as the missions many combat units are
conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan. By this alternative readiness assessment
method, units deploying to Iraq may be fully ready for the missions they are about to
undertake. The potential problem is that, should a contingency suddenly arise that
requires those units to revert to their traditional combat missions, the necessary skills
may have atrophied while the unit focused narrowly on the counterinsurgency
mission in Iraq.
Debate. By linking the duration of the U.S. combat mission to the Iraqi
government’s performance, the Administration’s critics can invoke President Bush’s
argument that the overall U.S. strategy depends on the Iraqi government meeting its
own benchmarks for progress toward economic reconstruction and political reform.
In his January 10 address unveiling the new U.S strategy in Iraq, President Bush said
that, for the new approach to succeed, Iraqi citizens would have to see improvements

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in their neighborhoods and communities. “So America will hold the Iraqi government
to the benchmarks it has announced,” he said18
Similarly, by requiring the President to waive the Defense Department’s own
policies for preserving readiness and morale in order to sustain the force in Iraq at its
planned strength, the bill would highlight concerns that have been publicly raised by
senior Army and Marine Corps officers over the adverse impact on their services of
the current tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.19
However, the President and other opponents of the bill’s deadline for
withdrawing combat units from Iraq and its limits on unit deployment argue that
these provisions would embolden U.S. adversaries in Iraq, interfere with the
President’s exercise of his constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, and deprive U.S. commanders in the field of the flexibility they need to win
the campaign.20
During its March 15 meeting to mark up the bill, the House Appropriations
Committee rejected 27-37 an amendment by Representative Jerry Lewis that would
have deleted the withdrawal deadline and deployment restrictions while adding a
provision declaring that Congress “will not cut off or restrict funding” for units
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The committee then adopted 37-27 an amendment
by Representative John P. Murtha adding to the bill a declaration that Congress “fully
supports the needs of members of the Armed Services” who have been deployed on
those missions, and their families. On both amendments, the committee divided
along party lines, with all voting Republicans supporting Lewis and opposing Murtha
while all voting Democrats opposed Lewis and supported Murtha,
The committee also rejected 0-37 an amendment by Representative C. W. Bill
Young that would have barred the use of any appropriated funds to finance U.S.
combat activities in Iraq, except to those that were necessary to protect the lives of
American citizens and to provide for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces.
After debating H.R. 1591 under a rule that allowed only technical amendments,
the House passed the bill March 23 by a vote of 218-212 , with the troop deployment
limitation provisions intact.
18 President George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” Jan, 10, 2007 [http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
19 During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Feb. 15, 2007, Army Chief of
Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway each
acknowledged concerns about the breadth of training units can undergo between
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The President’ proposal to increase the permanent
end-strength of those two services by a total of 92,000 troops is justified largely by the need
to reduce the frequency of deployments for any one unit.
20 President George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Republican Congressional
Committee Dinner,” March 15, 2007.

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CRS-19
Related Action: Senate Troop Withdrawal Resolution
On March 15, the Senate rejected 48-50 S J Res 9, which would have required
the president to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq within 120 days of
enactment. The joint resolution was sponsored by Majority Leader Senator Harry
Reid and 41 Democratic co-sponsors.
In its prefatory “whereas” clauses, the joint resolution declared (1) that Congress
and the American people support troops who have served or will serve in Iraq, (2)
that circumstances referred to in the 2002 resolution authorizing the use of military
force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243) have changed “substantially,” (3) that U.S. troops
“should not be policing a civil war,” and that U.S. policy in Iraq should change to
emphasize the need for a political solution among Iraqi leaders.
The body of the joint resolution would have mandated a “phased redeployment
from Iraq” of all U.S. combat forces except for “a limited number” essential for
protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure, training and equipping
Iraqi forces, and “conducting targeted counter-terrorism operations.” The legislation
would have required the President to begin the withdrawal within 120 days of
enactment, with a “goal” of completing the process by March 31, 2008. That is the
date by which the Iraq Study Group recommended last fall that, “subject to
unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all [U.S.] combat
brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.”21
Although the joint resolution identified March 31 as a goal for completing the
withdrawal rather than as a hard and fast deadline, thus implying that the deployment
could be continued beyond that date for unspecified reasons, some senators who
publicly opposed the President’s decision in January to send additional U.S. combat
troops to Iraq reportedly opposed S J Res 9 because it included even this tentative
deadline for removing troops from the country.
The joint resolution also would have directed that the removal of U.S. troops
from Iraq to be implemented, “as part of a comprehensive diplomatic, political and
economic strategy” to stabilize Iraq, including engagement of neighboring countries
and the international community. It would have directed the President to report on
progress in the required reshaping of U.S. policy on Iraq within 60 days of enactment
and at 90-day intervals thereafter.
Immediately after the Senate rejected S J Res 9, it adopted two other Iraq-related
measures:
! By a vote of 82-16, it adopted S Con Res 20, sponsored by Senator
Judd Gregg, expressing the sense of Congress that Congress would
not eliminate or reduce funding for troops in the field;
21 Iraq Study Group Report, Vintage Books, 2006, p. 72

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CRS-20
! By a vote of 96-2, it adopted S Res 107, sponsored by Senator Patty
Murray, expressing the sense of the Senate that the President and
Congress should ensure that U.S. forces, “have everything they need
to perform their assigned or future missions,’ and should review and
adjust policy and funding as needed, “to ensure our troops have the
best chance for success in Iraq and elsewhere.
Pending Action: Senate Supplemental Iraq Provisions
The Senate version of H.R. 1591 includes provisions, similar to those in the S
J Res 9, that would require the President to begin, within 120 days of enactment, a
“phased redeployment” of U.S. forces from Iraq with the goal of removing all combat
forces by March 31, 2008, except for “a limited number” that could remain to (1)
protect U.S. and coalition personnel and facilities, (2) train and equip Iraqi forces and
(3) conduct “targeted counter-terrorism operations.”
Unlike the timetable for U.S. troop move that would be established by the
House bill, the Senate measure describes its March 31, 2008 target date for
completing the redeployment as a “goal,” rather than a mandatory deadline.
The provision includes findings that Congress and the American people will
continue to support and protect troops who are serving or have served in Iraq, that the
circumstances referred to in the 2002 legislation authorizing the use of force against
Iraq (P.L. 107-243) have changed substantially, that U.S. troops “should not be
policing a civil war,” and that “the current conflict in Iraq requires principally a
political solution,” and that U.S. policy in Iraq must change to emphasize the need
for a political solution by Iraqi leaders.
‘Comprehensive Strategy’. The Senate version of the bill also declares that
the troop redeployment shall be implemented as part of a comprehensive political,
diplomatic and economic strategy for stabilizing Iraq, which will include, “sustained
engagement with Iraq’s neighbors and the international community.”
The bill requires the President to report to Congress 60 days after enactment of
the bill and every 90 days thereafter on progress made in withdrawing U.S. troops
and adopting the new strategy for stabilizing Iraq. On the same schedule, the
President also would be required to give Congress, “a classified campaign plan”
including strategic and operational benchmarks and projected redeployment dates for
withdrawing U.S. forces.
Benchmarks for the Iraqi Government. In addition, the Senate bill would
require the Commander, Multi-National Forces, Iraq (currently U.S. Army Gen.
David Petraeus), to report to Congress not later than 30 days after enactment of the
bill and every 60 days thereafter on the Iraqi government’s progress toward several
benchmarks of progress toward providing greater public security and political and
economic reform.

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CRS-21
The benchmarks which, the bill describes as reflecting previous commitments
of the government of Iraq, closely parallel the benchmarks that would be established
by H.R. 1591. They are:
! deployment of trained and ready Iraqi security forces in Baghdad;
! strengthening the authority of Iraqi commanders to make military
decisions without political interference;
! disarming sectarian militias and ensuring the Iraqi security forces are
accountable to the central government and are loyal to the
constitution.
! enacting legislation that would afford all Iraqis an equitable share in
the profits of the country’s petroleum industry;
! reforming the de-Ba’athification process;
! establishing an equitable process for amending the constitution; and
! establishing rules in Parliament that would protect the rights of
minority parties.
Debate Deferred. When the Senate Appropriations Committee took up the
supplemental appropriations bill March 22, there was no separate vote on the Iraq
withdrawal provisions.
The committee briefly debated an amendment offered by Republican Senator
Richard Shelby that would have stricken the Iraq withdrawal provisions. However
Senator Shelby withdrew the amendment as a gesture of comity because, although
the committee’s Democratic majority was united in support of the original provision,
their one-vote margin on the committee was temporarily nullified by the absence due
to illness of Senator Tim Johnson.
Senate Floor Amendments. On March 27, the Senate rejected by a vote of
48-50 and amendment by Senator Thad Cochran that would have eliminated from the
bill the provisions mandating that a troop withdrawal begin by March 31, 2008 with
the goal of removing U.S. troops from Iraq (except for specified, limited missions)
by August 31, 2008.
FY2007 Defense Supplemental22
In the fifth year of operations since the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is requesting a total of $163.4 billion in emergency funds to cover war costs
for FY2007 including $70 billion already provided in DOD’s regular FY2007
appropriations and a new supplemental request of $93.4 billion. If enacted, DOD’s
funding would increase by 40% above the previous year and would more than double
from the FY2004 funding level.
22 Prepared by Amy Belasco, Specialist in the U.S. Defense Budget.

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CRS-22
To date, according to CRS estimates, Congress has provided DOD with a total
of $472 billion for Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom or OIF), Afghanistan and other
counter-terror operations (Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) and enhanced
security (Operation Noble Eagle or ONE). If the FY2007 Supplemental request is
approved, DOD’s total would rise to $565.6 billion (see Table 2).23 In FY2008, the
Administration is also requesting $141.7 billion for war costs in addition to DOD’s
regular request for $481.4 billion.
In addition to the $472 billion received by DOD since the 9/11 attacks, the State
Department has received about $37 billion for foreign and diplomatic operations, and
the Department of Veterans’ Affairs about $1 billion for medical care for OIF/OEF
vets. That brings total funds appropriated to date for Iraq and the Global War on
Terror (GWOT) to $510 billion for military operations and support, repair,
replacement and upgrading of military equipment, foreign aid and diplomatic
operations and VA medical care.24
Table 2 shows war funding by title from FY2005 to the original FY2007
Administration request, which is being used as the baseline by the appropriations
committees. The figures reflect the FY2007 Supplemental Request as included in the
appendix of the FY2008 budget issued by OMB.25 In some cases, DOD’s request
figures do not match those in the appendix.
23 For information on war costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 by Amy Belasco
24 Ibid.
25 OMB, FY2008 Budget Appendix, “Other Materials: FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008,”
2-5-07 (figures differ from DOD request for several accounts), p. 1143ff.
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/sup.pdf]

---

CRS-23
Table 2. DOD War Budget Authority By Title:
FY2004-FY2007 Requesta
(in billions of dollars)
FY07
FY07
FY07 Total w/
Title
FY04 FY05 FY06
Bdgt
Req.
Req.
Military Personnel
17.9
19.7
16.7
5.4
12.4
17.5
Operation & Maintenance/Health/Otherb
42.7
49.0
61.5
39.2
38.8
77.9
Procurement
7.2
17.3
21.5
19.7
24.9
44.6
Research, Dev., Testing & Evaluation
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.4
1.4
1.9
Working Capital /National Sealift Fundsc
1.6
3.0
3.0
—
1.3
1.3
Military Construction
0.5
1.2
0.2
—
1.9
1.9
Subtotal: Regular Titles
70.3
90.9 103.7
64.7
80.9
145.6
Special Funds and Transfer Caps
Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF)
2.0
3.8
3.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
Afghan Sec. Forces Training Fund
—
1.3
1.9
1.5
5.9
7.4
Iraq Security Forces Training Fundd
[5.0]
5.7
3.0
1.7
3.8
5.5
Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
Defeat Funde
—
—
3.3
1.9
2.4
4.3
Coalition Support Capf
[1.2]
[1.2]
[1.5]
[.9]
[.3]
[1.2]
Commanders Emergency Response Capf
[.2]
[.8]
[.9]
[.5]
[.5]
[.9]
Intell. Comm. Mgt Fundg
—
0.3
0.2
—
0.1
0.1
Special Transfer Authorityh [3.0]
[3.0]
[4.5]
[3.0]
[3.5]
[6.5]
Subtotal: Special Funds
2.0
10.7
11.5
5.2
12.4
17.6
Totala
72.3 101.9 115.4
70.0
93.4
163.4
Notes and Sources:
a. This table separates funds with special purposes such as the Afghan Security Forces Fund. The BA
in these funds is distributed within each of the main titles (e.g., The Afghan Security Forces
Fund is an account within O&M). CRS has adjusted the amounts shown in those titles to avoid
double-counts. Includes amounts appropriated and amounts transferred with Congressional
approval. Reflects the Administration’s original FY2007 supplemental request of Feb. 5, 2007 that
the appropriators are marking to in their bill rather than the amended request of March 9,2007; see
OMB, FY2008 Budget Appendix, “Other Materials: FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008,” 2-5-07
(figures differ from DOD request for several accounts), p. 1143ff;
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/sup.pdf]
b. “Other” includes counter drug and Office of Inspector General funds.
c. Working capital funds finance support costs such as fuel.
d. Training Iraqi security forces was initially funded in the State Department [ shown in brackets ]but
is now funded in DOD.
e. Funds for IED Defeat that were appropriated to the IFF in FY2006 are shown here under Joint IED
Defeat Fund. The Joint IED Defeat Fund is a transfer account to finance procurement, RDT&E,
and operation and maintenance responses to IED attacks.
f. Congress sets caps that limit the total amount that can be spent on coalition support to countries
helping in the global war on terror, and on the CERP, a program which permits military
commanders to provide funds for small-scale reconstruction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.
g. Appropriated for the CIA in the DOD appropriations act.
h. Congress sets the amount of transfer authority in each bill. The table includes amounts provided
for both bridge and supplemental funds. Includes $10.4 billion for Iraq Freedom Fund in
FY2003 (deducting specified floors) plus $2 billion in transfer authority.

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CRS-24
Administration Amends FY2007 Supplemental
to Finance Troop Increase
On March 9, 2007, the Administration submitted an amended budget request to
Congress that would provide $3.2 billion for
! 4,700 troops to support the addition in combat forces in Iraq already
underway;
! to add 7,200 troops in Afghanistan for counterinsurgency operations
and training Afghan security forces;
! to add funds and authority for DOD to start up factories in Iraq, to
assist the Iraqi government to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate
militias, to fund Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and to equip and
train the Pakistan Frontier Corps that operates on the border; and
! to add $50 million in a new Medical Support transfer account to help
soldiers transition from deployment to continued military service or
civilian life.

See below for a discussion of surge issues.
To finance these increases, the Administration proposes to cut its original
FY2007 Supplemental by:
! eliminating requests for C-130J, V-22, JSF, and 5 of 6 EA_18G
electronic warfare aircraft;
! cutting its estimate of the cost of deploying additional naval forces
by more than half;
! eliminating lower priority military construction in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo;
! eliminating its request for $302 million for the Regional War on
Terror in Djibouti and the Philippines; and
! reducing various support programs.26
Expansion of Activities Funded
in the FY2007 Supplemental Request
DOD’s FY2007 Supplemental request appears to be based on a new and
expanded definition of war costs that permits the services to fund not only operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan but also “the longer war on terror.” On October 25, 2006,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, issued new “ground rules” for the
FY2007 Supplemental stating that the services could include “incremental costs
related to the longer war against terror (not just OEF/OIF)” including replacement of
war-worn equipment with newer models and “costs to accelerate specific force
26 See OMB, Estimate No. 3,March 9, 2007; [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
amendments/amendment_3_9_07.pdf]; DOD Briefing, “Adjustment fo FY2007 Emergency
Supplemental Request,” March 9, 2007.

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CRS-25
capability necessary to prosecute the war.”27 Estimates were due within a week and
decisions were to be made by November 15, 2006. There is no specific definition of
the “longer war on terror,” now one of the core missions of the Department of
Defense.
This new guidance may be the primary reason for the 40% increase over F2006
funding that DOD is proposing for FY2007. The new definition constitutes a
significant shift from long-standing DOD financial regulations that require that costs
be:
! necessary to carry out specific operations;
! strictly incremental, i.e., costs would not have been incurred “in the
absence of the contingency requirement;” and
! executable within the current fiscal year.28
These strictures were reiterated in guidance issued to the services on July 19, 2006
on developing FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008 war costs, with warnings that any
questionable procurement costs that did not appear to be incremental would be
closely scrutinized.29

Congress may want to consider whether this expanded definition is appropriate
for an emergency supplemental request intended to meet urgent needs. Many of the
items proposed in the FY2007 Supplemental request may not appear to be truly
urgent needs, strictly tied to OIF and OEF operations, or likely to be executed within
the fiscal year.
How Urgent is Passage of the FY2007 Supplemental?
In past years, Congress has been under pressure from the Army to pass
supplementals quickly in order to ensure that the Army will have enough funds to
meet both its wartime and peacetime operations. The FY2006 Supplemental was
enacted in mid-June 2006, which the Army claimed created considerable
management problems because the Army had to “cash flow” or temporarily finance
war costs by tapping funds from its regular budget slated to be spent at the end of the
fiscal year as well as transferring funds from other accounts.
27 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Memorandum for Secretaries of the
Military Department, “Ground Rules and Process for FY ‘07 Spring Supplemental,” October
25, 2006.
28 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation, Volume as, Chapter 23,
“Contingency Operations,”p. 23-25, 23-2.7;
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf]. These regulations were developed
in the mid 1990s to provide guidance about how to cost contingency operations such as
Bosnia.
29 Under Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments,
“Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2013 Program and Budget Review,” July 19, 2006, p. 34-49,
specifically p. 36,39, 41.

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CRS-26
The Army is currently claiming that the supplemental needs to be enacted by the
end of April to avoid such problems.30 In this year’s bridge fund, however, Congress
provided $28.4 billion to meet the Army’s operational needs, some $7 billion higher
than last year’s bridge fund.31 These additional funds could reduce the pressure to
pass the supplemental. Using DOD data, CRS estimates that the Army could cover
its operational costs until about June or July 2007 by using war funds in the bridge,
temporarily transferring procurement funds to operations, and tapping monies in its
baseline budget that would not be needed until the end of the year.32 This does not
mean, however, that the Army would not face disruptions if funding is delayed. In
order to ensure funding is available for the later months of the year, the Army may
slow down its operations long before money would run out by, for example, limiting
facility maintenance and repairs, slowing equipment overhauls, limiting travel and
meetings, and, perhaps, slowing down training.
Make-up of the FY2007 Supplemental
DOD’s FY2007 request adds to the $70 billion in war funding already received
in the bridge fund that was included in DOD’s regular appropriations (Title IX,
P.L.109-289). Table 2, above, shows amounts provided from FY2004 to the FY2007
bridge fund, the amount requested in the FY2007 Supplemental, and the total for
FY2007 if the supplemental request is approved. Funding levels are shown for
standard titles of defense appropriations bills and for various new accounts set up for
special purposes since the 9/11 attacks.
With the exception of fairly stable funding for military personnel, the FY2007
amounts requested by DOD would provide for major increases in annual funding
levels, including:
! a 25% increase in annual operating costs — from $61.5 billion to
$77.4 billion;
! close to a doubling in procurement costs — from $23 billion to $43
billion;
! a ten-fold increase in military construction from $200 million to
almost $2 billion;
! over a threefold increase in monies to train and equip Afghan
security forces for a total of $7.4 billion this year;
30 Army Budget Office, “OMA FY07 Spending Projections,” February 5, 2007
31 See H.Rept. 109-676, p. 357 and H.Rept. 109-359, p. 468.
32 The CRS estimate assumes that the Army spends at about $3.7 billion a month, above the
FY2006 rate but less than the amount full requested in FY2007. CRS also assumes that
Congress approves transfers that tap some of the $3 billion in special transfer authority in
the FY2007 bridge fund and the $4.5 billion in general transfer authority for its regular
FY2007 funds (see sections 9003 and 8005, P.L.109-289). Thus far the Army has obligated
funds at a higher rate — front loading obligations — so obligations would presumably be
lower later in the year.

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CRS-27
! an 80% increase in monies to train and equip Iraqi security forces to
$5.5 billion;
! a 30% increase in the joint fund set up to find responses to meet the
threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and
! a doubling to almost $2 billion for support to Pakistan and other
allies for support in the global war on terror (GWOT).
DOD’s Justification for the FY2007 Supplemental
According to the Department of Defense, the main goals of the FY2007
Supplemental are to provide for:
! incremental pay, benefits, and support of about 320,000 military
personnel who conduct military operations for OIF and OEF;
! reconstitution or reset — the repair and replacement of war-worn
equipment;
! force protection and defeat of IEDs;
! a temporary “plus-up” of 21,500 troops in Iraq and sending an
additional aircraft carrier group in the Gulf;
! accelerated conversion of Army and Marine Corps (MC) units to
new standard configurations;
! additional equipment and infrastructure to permanently expand the
size of the Army and Marine Corps by 2012;
! equipping and training Afghan and Iraqi security forces
! reimbursing coalition partners working with U.S. military forces;
! funds for small-scale reconstruction projects administered by
individual commanders;
! military construction in Iraq, Afghanistan and Djibouti; and
! classified programs.
Using these categories, Table 3, below shows the amounts enacted in FY2006, the
FY2007 bridge, the FY2007 Supplemental request, the total requested for FY2007,
and the annual change.33
33 From DOD, FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on Terror,
Feb.2007;[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2
007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf]

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CRS-28
Table 3. Department of Defense FY2007 War Request:
FY2006 and FY2007 Bridge, and FY2007 Request
(billions of dollars )
Percent
FY2007
Change
FY2006 FY2007 FY2007 Total with
FY06-
Program
Enacted Bridge
Supp.’l
Request
FY07
Incremental Pay and Benefits and
operating and support Costs
67.2
30.5
39.2
69.8
4%
Temporary Troop Plus-up and Higher
Naval Presence
0.0
0.0
5.6
5.6
NA
Accelerating Modularity
5.0
0.0
3.6
3.6
-28%
Infrastructure and equipment for
permanent Increase in Army and Marine
Corps 0.0
0.0
1.7
1.7
NA
Reconstitution or Reset
19.2
23.6
13.9
37.6
96%
Force Protection
5.4
3.4
8.0
11.3
111%
Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Fund
3.3
1.9
2.4
4.4
31%
Equip and Train Afghan and Iraq
Security Forces
4.9
3.2
9.7
12.9
163%
Coalition Support
1.2
0.9
1.0
1.9
58%
Commanders Emergency Response Fund
0.9
0.5
0.5
1.0
6%
Military Construction Overseas in Iraq
and Afghanistan
0.2
0.0
1.1
1.1
423%
Military Intelligence
1.5
0.8
2.7
3.5
135%
Non-DOD Classified
5.6
5.1
3.6
8.8
57%
Regional War on Terror
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
NA
GRAND TOTAL
114.4
70.0
93.4
163.4
43%
Sources: Department of Defense, FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on
Terror, February 2007, available online at [http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf].
DOD excludes in its calculation of war costs $1.5 billion provided in FY2006 appropriation to make
up for the increase in fuel prices in DOD’s baseline program.
Military Personnel and Operations Request
DOD shows an increase of $2.6 billion between FY2006 and FY2007 in day-to-
day war-related military personnel and operating costs, which appears to be
associated with additional costs to consolidate bases in Iraq and higher operating
tempo. This figure does not reflect personnel or operating expenses allocated to
specific purposes such as funding for the temporary 21,500 increase in troops,
accelerating modularity, repair of war-worn equipment, and force protection which
are shown separately.

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CRS-29
According to DOD, funding for pay and operations supports about 312,000
troops conducting OIF and OEF operations including about 140,000 in Iraq and
20,000 in Afghanistan.34 This figure of 312,000 military personnel for both
operations is higher than generally cited by DOD witnesses, and presumably includes
not only “boots on the ground,” but about 110,000 additional troops deployed in the
region or for other counter terror operations, and another 50,000 activated reservists
in the United States who are either training up to deploy, backfilling positions for
active-duty troops or providing enhanced security at defense installations.35
Recently, DOD appears to have expanded the types of operating expenses that
are considered war-related, now allowing the services to request additional funds for
some base support costs not in the theater of operations, arguing that there are
additional costs associated with deploying forces. For example, the Army includes
$2 billion for this type of base support including additional security guards in bases
in Europe and the United States. Some might question this rationale. Base support
costs could also be lower in some cases because deployed troops do not use base
services.
DOD has also included in the FY2007 supplemental request $500 million to
expand its inventory of spare and repair parts. This may reflect a judgment that the
services should be prepared to conduct large-scale contingency operations for a
longer period than had earlier been planned. This may be one more reflection of
DOD’s decision to expand the scope of costs permitted in supplemental requests to
include costs of the “long war on terror” and not just emergency war costs.
Temporary Troop “Surge” and
Increased Naval Presence: Amended Request
The FY2007 Supplemental amended request includes $6.0 billion to pay for the
president’s proposal, announced on January 10, 2007, to increase troops in Iraq by
21,500 and to heighten the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf by deploying an additional
aircraft carrier and a Marine Expeditionary Force. This initiative is already underway.
The amended request adds funds for about 4,600 support troops and contract support,
which is partially offset by a reduction in the estimated cost of the additional naval
deployments.36 The additional support troops reflects recent controversy raised by
34 DOD, FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on Terror, February
2007;[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2007_
Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf], p. 16. hereinafter, DOD, FY2007
Supplemental.
35 These figures reflect CRS calculations from data on average troop strength compiled by
the Defense Manpower Data Center as of November 2006.
36 The request would add 1,600 support troops, 2,200 additional military police to handle
more detainees, contract support, and additional force protection and vehicles; see OMB,
Estimate No. 3, “Amendment to FY2007 Supplemental for Additional Troops with
(continued...)

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CRS-30
a CBO estimate that suggested that DOD had not provided for support forces (see
below).
Unless Congress enacts specific restrictions, the president can use currently
available DOD funds to conduct military operations including the deployment of
additional troops because funds are appropriated for particular types of expenses —
e.g., military personnel costs — rather than designated for particular operations. This
gives the president leeway to conduct military operations as he sees fit. (See above
for a discussion of ways to restrict military operations.)
Because these additional expenses were not part of plans when the funds were
appropriated last year, DOD will likely use up its available funds sooner than
anticipated. The amended FY2007 Supplemental request includes $5.3 billion for
the troop increase plus $695 million for the additional carrier group (funded in
military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts). Assuming the FY2007
supplemental is enacted, DOD can restore funds to other activities whose funding
was temporarily tapped to pay for the “surge” or “plus-up.”
A recently published CBO estimate projected that the troop increase alone was
likely to cost from $9 billion to $13 billion if peak troop levels were sustained for
four months rather than the $3.1 billion proposed by DOD.37 The higher CBO
estimate assumes that DOD would also need to deploy not only 21,500 combat
troops, but from 15,000 to 28,000 support troops.38 Most recently, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gordon England told the House Budget Committee that the surge would
require 4,000 additional troops at a cost of about $1 billion through September 30.39
CBO also estimated that the cost could range from $20 billion to $27 billion if
the higher troop levels were sustained for 12 months rather than the temporary
increase proposed by the President, again with the range reflecting different
36 (...continued)
Offsets,”March 9, 2007, p. 1-2; [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/
amendment_3_9_07.pdf].
37 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate for Troop Increase Proposed by the
President,” February 1, 2007. Available online at [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs
/77xx/doc7778/TroopIncrease.pdf].
38 CBO, “Cost Estimate for Troop Increase Proposed by the President,” February 1, 2007,
p. 4; [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7778/TroopIncrease.pdf]. This estimate
assumes that peak levels are sustained for four months. The range in the estimate reflects
two alternative planning assumptions — one that about one support troop would be needed
for each combat troop (a relatively lean assumption that could fit a temporary increase) and
the other that about 1.4 support troops would be needed for each combat troop (the standard
Army planning assumptions).
39 Scott Cox, “England: DOD Likely to Reprogram Funding for Surge Support Personnel,”
Gallery Watch.com, March 6, 2007.

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CRS-31
assumptions about the number of support troops needed for each combat troop.40
Recently, General Petraeus, now in charge in Iraq, acknowledged that the additional
troops “would need to be sustained certainly some time well beyond the summer,”so
CBO’s alternate estimate that the higher levels would be sustained for 12 months
could be more realistic than the short time proposed by the president.41
The FY2007 Supplemental request for $1.5 billion for deploying an additional
carrier strike group to the Gulf was reduced to $695 million in the amended request.
Some would argue that naval presence is the everyday mission of the Navy, so that
providing funds in an emergency supplemental is not appropriate. Last year,
Congress questioned a proposal by the Navy to shift the cost of some steaming days
from its regular budget to the supplemental — the Navy included funding in its
regular budget for 37 days rather than the 51 days per quarter that has been the
standard for many years. Congress restored that funding to the base defense budget
and took an offset within the supplemental request for baseline regular training. This
cost shifting could be considered inconsistent with DOD financial regulations that
require that war-related costs be confined to activities that would not occur without
the contingency.
The Navy’s reduction in its estimate of the cost of moving one carrier group
from the Pacific to the Gulf and for deploying its replacement from $1.5 billion to
$695 million as a result of refining its cost estimate appears to acknowledge that the
original estimate was excessive — equal to about half of the Navy cost for steaming
hours for its entire fleet of 302 ships.42
Proposal to Increase Permanently the Size
of the Army and Marine Corps
In previous annual supplemental appropriations bills, Congress has provided
funding to cover costs of keeping additional active duty troops in the force over and
above the pre-Iraq end-strength levels of the Army and the Marine Corps. In all, the
two services have kept as many as 30,000 additional troops in the force in order to
reduce demands on personnel and, in the case of the Army, to ease strains as it
reorganized into a modular, brigade-based force structure.
DOD referred to the additional troops as “over strength,” and it requested
funding in supplementals to cover the cost of recruiting and retaining additional
personnel above the Army’s pre-war end strength of 482,000 and the Marine Corps
pre-war end strength of 175,000. DOD argued that these increases were strictly war-
related and temporary — a way to reduce the stress on forces. In January 2007,
40 CBO, “Cost Estimate for Troop Increase Proposed by the President,” February 1, 2007,
p. 4.
41 Reuters, “U.S. Commander Says No Military Solution To Iraq,” March 8, 2007.
42 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operation and Maintenance Overview,” Fiscal
Year 2007 Budget Estimates, February 2006, p. 158.

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CRS-32
however, the president announced plans to permanently increase the size of the Army
and Marine Corps by 92,000 over the next six years including the additional almost-
30,000 Army and Marine Corps personnel already on board.
The FY2007 supplemental includes a total of $4.9 billion to cover the military
personnel cost of additional troops plus $1.7 billion for equipment and infrastructure
for the forces to be added in FY2007 and in following years ($1.1 billion in
procurement and $600 million in military construction). DOD promises, however,
that funding to equip future increases in the force will be requested in the regular,
base budgets of the Army and Marine Corps starting in FY2009.
The proposal to add permanently to the size of the force marks a major change
in Administration policy. Its purpose is not to help in Iraq, however — most of the
additional forces are in future years when it is assumed that the U.S. military
presence in Iraq will be considerably lower. Instead, it reflects a new, more
demanding requirement for the number of troops that the United States should be
able to deploy abroad in major stability operations presumably close to today’s levels.
For an option roughly equivalent to the president’s proposal — adding two
divisions to the Army — in the past CBO estimated that the cost would be an
additional $90 billion between FY2008 and FY2017.43 Congress may consider
whether this plan is appropriately a war expense or whether it should be debated
within the context of DOD’s regular budget.
Regional War on Terror
DOD’s original request included $305 million for a newly-named “Regional
War on Terror,” referring to counter terror operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan
including in the Philippines, the Caribbean, Central America, Southern Cone
countries, North Africa and support for Northern Command for its support of first
responders.44 The amended request withdraws these funds.
New Authorities for DOD Requested
The amended request asks for an additional $359 million in the Iraq Freedom
Fund that would be used:
! to support Provincial Reconstruction teams ($150 million); and
! to restart businesses in Iraq ($100 million) through a Task Force to
Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq; and
! to provide economic assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas in Pakistan (through the State Department).
43 CBO, Budget Options, February 2007, pp. 9-10; [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
78xx/doc7821/02-23-BudgetOptions.pdf].
44 DOD, FY2007 Supplemental, p. 74.

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CRS-33
The request asks for additional authority for DOD to conduct help Iraq re-start
factories that could be controversial.
Accelerating the Creation of Modular Units
The distinction between war-related and regular funding has also been made
murky by DOD requests to treat conversion of Army and Marine Corps units to new
standard configurations — known as modularity and restructuring — as a war
requirement. For example, at DOD’s request, Congress, with some reluctance,
agreed to provide $5 billion in the FY2005 and the FY2006 supplementals for
converting units with the understanding that DOD would move these funds back to
its regular budget in later years. (This funding of modularity effectively gave the
Army $5 billion per year in additional funding in its regular budget for those two
years.) To implement this decision, DOD set aside $25 billion for the Army in future
years to cover the cost of modularity.45
The FY2007 supplemental, however, again requests $3.6 billion to convert two
Army brigade teams to the new modular design and to create additional Marine
Corps battalions. Costs include $900 million for military personnel, $300 million for
O&M, $2.3 billion for procurement and $100 million for military construction.46 As
before, Congress is being asked to finance reorganization of the Army and the Marine
Corps with supplemental funds rather than in the regular defense budget.
DOD argues that these costs should be considered war-related because the
addition of modular units makes it easier to rotate units to the war zone and hence
extends the time between deployments giving soldiers more time at home (“dwell
time”) which would reduce stress on forces, and thus improve readiness. This
conclusion has been questioned in studies by both CBO and the RAND. Both studies
found that modularity would only marginally improve force rotation schedules,
suggesting that the entire modularity initiative would only make available an
additional 6,000 to 7,000 troops.47
One question for Congress may be whether DOD can quantify how much the
time at home for soldiers increased beyond original plans because of previous
supplemental funding for modularity, and what the effect is expected to be of the
$3.6 billion requested in the FY2007 Supplemental.
45 Program Budget Decision 753, “Other Secretary of Defense Decisions,” December 23,
2004, p. 1.
46 DOD, FY2007 Supplemental, p. 86.
47 The RAND study argued that the types of units created were not those most needed and CBO found
that the number of additional troops available would be only 6,000 to 7,000. RAND, Stretched Thin:
Army Forces for Sustained Operations, 7-15-05; [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/
RAND_MG362.pdf]. CBO, An Analysis of the Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq:
an Update, October 5, 2005; [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6682/10-05-05-IraqLetter.pdf].

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CRS-34
Front Loading Reconstitution or Reset
Another potentially controversial request in the FY2007 Supplemental is $14
billion that DOD has requested for reset — the replacement of war-worn equipment.
That request appears to “front load” (or fund in advance) DOD’s reset requirements,
as OMB Director Portman acknowledged in recent testimony.48 During final
consideration of the FY2007 DOD appropriations bill, Congress added funds to the
Title IX bridge fund that covers war costs to ensure that DOD’s reset requirements
were fully met. As a result, that bill included $23.7 billion for Army and Marine
Corps reset costs, which is the entire amount that the services said was needed to
meet their FY2007 requirements and cover previously unfunded FY2006
requirements.49
Reset is defined as the “process of bringing a unit back to full readiness once
it has been rotated out of a combat operation,” by repairing and replacing equipment
and resting and retraining troops.50 Within DOD’s financial regulations,
“reconstitution” or “reset” is defined as the “supplies [that] must be replaced and
equipment repaired when troops and/or equipment are redeployed or rotated.”51
Reset and reconstitution (which appear to be used interchangeably) therefore
refer to the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment. Typically, about half of
the total has been for repair (funded in O&M) and half for replacement (funded in
procurement). Actual battle losses made up only about 10%, or $1.5 billion of the
Army’s total reset requirement in FY2006, with the remainder due to additional wear
and tear on equipment to added equipment requirements. Equipment is replaced, not
only when it is destroyed, but also when the services decide it is uneconomical to
repair it (“washouts”). Recently, the services have also included in reset requests
funds for recapitalization (rebuilding and upgrading equipment), for adding
modifications to current equipment, and for buying new versions of equipment. This
constitutes a substantial expansion of the traditional definition of reset. Between
FY2002 and the FY2007 bridge fund, the Army and Marine Corps have received a
total of $50.2 billion for reset under this broad definition.52
48 Testimony of OMB Director Portman before the House Budget Committee, Hearing on
the FY2008 DOD Budget, February 6, 2007, p. 41 of transcript.
49 See table inserted by Senator Stevens in Congressional Record, August 2, 2006, p. S8571
showing $23.7 billion for reset including $4.9 billion for an unfunded FY2006 requirement;
see also DOD’s Report to Congress, Long-Term Equipment Repair Costs, September 2006.
50 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress, Ground Force Equipment Repair,
Replacement, and Recapitalization Requirements Resulting from Sustained Combat Operations,
April 2005, p. 8; see also GAO-06-604T, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, p. 3.
51 DOD, Financial Management Regulations, Volume 12, Chapter 23, p. 23-21;
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf].
52 Army officials have frequently cited a figure of $12 billion to $13 billion a year for reset
(continued...)

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CRS-35
DOD support documents say that the FY2007 Supplemental includes $14 billion
for reconstitution — all procurement funds. This appears to include funds for
additional war losses, for anticipated replacement of equipment for future wear and
tear, and for upgrading equipment in all of the services. The FY2007 Supplemental
does not reflect additional funds to repair equipment.
If reset requirements were fully-funded in the FY2007 bridge fund, then it is not
clear why DOD should request additional funds in the FY2007 Supplemental.
Further evidence of the front loading of requirements is the inclusion in the FY2007
Supplemental of additional amounts for many of the same items funded in the
FY2007 bridge fund.
The FY2007 Supplemental includes funds “recapitalization” even when
recapitalization programs are ongoing and pre-dated OEF/OIF operations. The
request includes large amounts, for example, for Bradley fighting vehicle
recapitalization and M-1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program) tank upgrades.
Examples of front loading of reset in the FY2007 Supplemental include the following
items (bridge funding shown in brackets) :
! $520 million for Bradley base sustainment ($1.4 billion in bridge);
! $1.6 billion for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles ($795
million in bridge);
! $533 million for SINCGARS Family radios ($125 million in
bridge);
! $573 million for Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles (648 million in
bridge);
! $300 million for Marine Corps radio systems ($850 million in
bridge);
! $45 million for Family of Construction Vehicles ($98 million in
bridge).
One reason for concern about front loading of reset requirements is the
uncertainty of estimates of requirements, uncertainty acknowledged by DOD in a
report to Congress last fall.53 Although it is to be expected that reset requirements
will grow as equipment is stressed by operations, the validity of specific estimates
has not been established. Recently, GAO testified that until FY2007, the Army could
52 (...continued)
costs for the Army “as long as the conflict lasts at the current level and “for a minimum of
two to three years beyond.” This includes both repair (funded in O&M) and replacement
(funded in Procurement) of equipment. See statement of Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of
Staff, Department of the Army, before the House Armed Services Committee, “Reset
Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, p.2
53 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress: Long-Term Equipment
Repair Costs, September 2006; see p. 4 in the Executive Summary, which states “Future
Reset costs will continue to change over time as battle losses and equipment Reset
requirements continue to accrue.”

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CRS-36
not track reset expenditures sufficiently to ensure that funds appropriated for reset
were in fact spent for that purpose.54 Without tracking of reset underway, DOD will
have difficulty knowing whether the items included as reset were in fact, those that
broke down and were repaired or replaced. A question for Congress may be whether
front loading these costs is advisable given the uncertainty of requirements.

Reset requirements may also be uncertain because the number of troops and
intensity of operations may change, as DOD has also acknowledged. In an earlier
estimate last spring, the Army estimated that reset requirements would decrease from
$13 billion a year to $10.5 billion a year for the next two years and then decline to
$2 billion a year if troops were withdrawn over a two-year period.55 Earlier estimates
of cost were also lower. In March 2005, for example, CBO estimated that annual
repair and replacement costs would run about $8 billion a year for all four services
(about $6 billion to $7 billion for the Army and Marine Corps) based on the then-
current pace of operations and service data.56
Another question that has been raised about reset requirements is whether it is
appropriate for the services to replace equipment that is no longer being produced
with new items that are just beginning or have not yet begun production. DOD’s
regulations caution the services not to request “accelerations of baseline procurement
end items” for contingencies unless specifically approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, presumably on an exception basis.57
Yet, the Air Force includes $389 million for two JSF Joint Strike Fighters, $146
million for CV-22 Ospreys and $388 million for C-130J aircraft, all new systems
just beginning or not yet in production.58 DOD argues that in cases when an item
is no longer in production, it is appropriate to request such replacements. The
Administration’s amended requests cuts these programs probably recognizing
congressional scepticism about this argument.
Other, similar examples include the Navy request for $450 million for EA-18G
electronic warfare aircraft and $71 million for MV-22 aircraft, both new aircraft just
beginning production. In its March 9, 2007 amendment, the Administration
withdrew its request for five of the six EA-18G aircraft requested. Some might argue
54 GAO-07-439T, Testimony of William Solis before the Subcommittee on Readiness and
Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services Committee, January 31, 2007, p. 2 and 3.
55 Army Briefing, “Army equipment Reset Update,” May 18, 2006, p. 8.
56 CBO Testimony by Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, “The Potential Costs Resulting from
Increased Usage of Military Equipment in Ongoing Operations,” before the Subcommittee
on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee Apr. 6, 2005, p. 2. At the time, CBO had
estimates similar to the services for the amount of accrued costs for reset.
57 DOD, Financial Management Regulations, Volume 12, Chapter 23, p. 23-27;
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_23.pdf].
58 Production of Navy JSF aircraft begins in FY2008; advance procurement begins in
FY2007; see Air Force GWOT justification materials.

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CRS-37
that it is questionable whether these types of requests qualify as an emergency
requirement closely tied to war operations since the equipment ordered would not
be delivered for about three years.59
It appears that the FY2007 request includes substantial funds for major
platforms intended to anticipated losses from the stress of war operations as well as
replacement gear that would not be needed this year and many modifications
designed to improve capability. While such requests would fit the new guidance to
accelerate acquiring new capabilities anticipated to be needed for the longer war,
such requests may not be directly linked to OIF/OEF operations.
Equipping and Training Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces
In addition to funds already provided in the FY2007 bridge funds and other
funds still available from FY2006 appropriations, the FY2007 Supplemental request
includes $5.9 billion to equip and train Afghan security forces and $3.8 billion for
Iraqi security forces. If these funds are approved, the total to train and equip Afghan
and Iraqi security forces would more than double from $4.9 billion in FY2006 to
$12.9 billion in FY2007.
Between FY2006 and FY2007, annual appropriations would grow from $1.9
billion to $7.4 billion for Afghan forces and from $3.0 billion to $5.5 billion for Iraqi
forces if the FY2007 supplemental is approved. In addition to programmatic issues,
Congress may consider whether such steep increases can be absorbed effectively.
As of November 2006, DOD had available — from either FY2006 or FY2007 bridge
funds — $4.1 billion for Afghan security forces and $3.8 billion for Iraq security
forces.60 Taking these unobligated funds into account, the total available for Afghan
security forces would be $10 billion, and for Iraqi forces, $7 billion, over the next
year and a half if Congress approves DOD’s request.61
From FY2003 through the FY2007 bridge fund, Congress has appropriated
$15.4 billion to train and equip Iraqi forces and at least $4.7 billion for Afghan
forces.62 DOD reports that the United States and coalition forces have trained
328,500 Iraqi security forces and 112,000 Afghan army and police forces. The
additional funds for Afghanistan are intended to increase the number trained,
59 For equipment requested in the FY2007 Supplemental, see DOD, FY2007 Emergency
Supplemental Request, Procurement, P-1 Exhibit, February 2007;
[http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2007_Emer
gency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT/FY_2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Re
quest_(Atch).pdf]
60 CRS calculations based on Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS),
Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports, September 2006 and November 2006.
61 Funds are available for obligation for two years.
62 Total includes $5 billion appropriated for Iraq training in FY2004 to the State Department.
Afghanistan has received funding for its training through other accounts.

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CRS-38
equipped, sustained, and housed from 115,000 to 152,000 presumably at a cost of the
additional $10 billion available. For Iraq, funding would improve logistical
capabilities and enhance Air Force and naval capabilities.63
Amendment to Restore FY2007 Funding
for Base Realignment and Closure
On March 9, the White House submitted two formal amendments to its FY2007
supplemental request. One amendment, discussed above, is to add $3.2 billion for
4,700 additional troops in Iraq, 7,200 additional troops in Afghanistan, additional
armor protected vehicles, medical support for returning military personnel, and some
other purposes. Costs are offset by mainly be reducing funding for F-35 and EA-18G
aircraft.
A second amendment is to add $3.1 billion to finance FY2007 base realignment
and closure (BRAC) costs that Congress did not fund in military construction section
of the full-year FY2007 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5). The
amendment also proposes $3.1 billion of offsetting rescissions entirely from domestic
appropriations accounts. The proposal to take the offsets in domestic funds may
become a significant political issue. In effect, the White House is challenging
Congress on the whole process through which emergency supplemental funding has
come to be used to ease restrictions on overall discretionary funding. By eliminating
BRAC funding from the continuing resolution, Congress was able to increase non-
defense appropriations without exceeding budget resolution caps. To restore BRAC
funding as emergency supplemental appropriations would be, in effect, to use defense
emergency spending to allow an increase in non-defense programs. The White
House budget amendment constitutes an objection to the continued use of emergency
funding to avoid budget constraints.
FY2007 International Affairs Supplemental
Overview
In recent years, supplemental appropriations have become a significant source
of additional funds for international affairs (150 account) programs at a time when
regular appropriations have been constrained by budget pressures. Supplemental
funding has been used not only to support expanded U.S. efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but also to respond to international crises and natural disasters.
In response, there has been some criticism that the Administration has relied too
heavily on supplementals and that some items should be incorporated into the regular
appropriations cycle. The Administration counters that given the nature of rapidly
changing overseas events and unforeseen contingencies, it is necessary to make
supplemental requests for unexpected and non-recurring expenses. Since FY1999,
63 DOD, FY2007 Supplemental, pp. 38ff and pp. 50ff.

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CRS-39
after the bombings of two U.S. Embassies in Africa in August 1998, Congress has
approved Foreign Operations supplemental appropriations exceeding $1 billion each
year. The Bush Administration’s supplemental request for international affairs
totaled $6.3 billion in FY2005 and $4.2 billion in FY2006, amounting to about 13%
and 21%, respectively, of the regularly-enacted foreign affairs budgets.
The FY2007 supplemental request of $5.993 billion for international affairs
represents about 20% of the FY2007 enacted international affairs funding. Of the
nearly $6 billion for international affairs spending, $4.8 billion is proposed for
foreign assistance programs, while $1.18 billion would fund State Department
operations, public diplomacy, and broadcasting programs.
Within the foreign assistance part of the supplemental request, security and
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate, with $2.3 billion for Iraq and $721
million for Afghanistan. The supplemental request for Iraq is in addition to $749
million requested in the FY2007 regular budget, for a total of $3 billion.64 If
Congress approves the FY2007 supplemental request, amounts for Iraq would
represent nearly 11% of total foreign aid funds in 2007. Similarly, the
Administration’s funding request for Afghanistan of $1.1 billion in the regular
FY2007 budget would total $1.768 billion with the supplemental, representing 6%
of the total foreign aid budget.
Other significant bilateral assistance funding is requested for Kosovo, Lebanon,
and Sudan. Additional supplemental funds for humanitarian assistance, migration
assistance, peacekeeping operations, and food aid are also sought for a number of
countries. The supplemental request also includes $161 million to address the
potential for a global avian influenza pandemic.
For State Department operations, the Administration’s FY2007 supplemental
request of $1.17 billion would be largely for activities and the U.S. Mission in Iraq.
Another $10 million for the Broadcasting Board of Governors would be for expanded
broadcasting in Arabic on the U.S.-established Alhurra Television into 22 Middle
East countries.
The House FY2007 supplemental bill includes a total of $6.3 billion — $4,970
million for foreign assistance and $1,331.8 million for the State Department
operations and international broadcasting. This represents about $344 million more
than the Administration’s supplemental request for international affairs accounts.
64 Because the FY2007 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 109-289 as amended by P.L. 110-5) was
enacted late in the fiscal year, estimates of country level funding are not yet available for
FY2007. This analysis is based on the FY2007 request. As Iraq and Afghanistan are
considered critical programs by the Administration, and because the CR did not contain
specific limitations on funds to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is reasonable to assume that final
levels will be similar to the request.

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CRS-40
The Senate FY2007 supplemental bill includes a total of about $6.25 billion —
$5,108.2 million for foreign assistance and $1,146.3 million for State Department
operations and international broadcasting.
Iraq Reconstruction Assistance65
The Administration’s FY2007 supplemental request would provide a total of
$6.6 billion for Iraq reconstruction (see Table 4). Over $4 billion of this sum is out
of the Defense appropriations (050 account) portion of the request and would support
the equipping and training of Iraqi security forces ($3.8 billion for the Iraq Security
Forces Fund) as well as provide U.S. troops with the capability to fund small-scale,
grassroots development projects rapidly in an effort to stabilize areas of military
operation ($350 million in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program —
CERP). An Administration revision to the original request would support a scheme
to rehabilitate Iraqi State-owned enterprises ($100 million in the Iraq Freedom Fund).
The remaining $2.3 billion is requested under six foreign operations (150)
accounts meeting a variety of economic reconstruction and humanitarian objectives.
Most of this funding — $2.1 billion — falls under the Economic Support Fund and
would continue existing efforts to encourage private sector and agricultural policy
reform, strengthen civil society, foster democratization, and assist the national
ministry staff in the performance of their duties.
65 Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs.

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CRS-41
Table 4. FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Request
for Iraq Reconstruction
International Affairs (Budget Function 150 Accounts)
Economic Support Fund
$2,072 million:
(ESF)
of which —
$1,254 million for PRTs, CAPs, and CSP (community stabilization
program);
$100 million for ag reform, priv sec reform;
$718 million for Ministerial Capacity Development (MCD),
democracy, civil society.
International Narcotics
$200 million:
Control and Law
for strengthening judicial process and prison construction.
Enforcement (INCLE)
Non-Proliferation,
$7 million:
Anti-Terrorism, Demining,
for demining
and Related Programs
(NADR)
Migration and Refugee
$15 million
Assistance (MRA)
Treasury
$2.75 million
International Disaster and
$45 million
Famine Assistance (IDFA)
TOTAL 150 Account
$2,341.75 million
Department of Defense (Budget Function 050 Accounts) *
Iraq Security Forces Fund
$3,842.3 million
(ISFF)
Commander’s Emergency
$350 million
Response Program (CERP)
Iraq Freedom Fund
$100 million:
for Iraqi State-owned enterprises
GRAND TOTAL
$6,634.05 million
150 & 050
Sources: Department of State and Department of Defense FY2008 Congressional Budget
Justifications.
*Note: Department of Defense program funding is also discussed in the parts of this report that
address the DOD supplemental request and amounts are shown in other tables there.
More than half of the proposed ESF funds appear intended to directly assist the
President’s new strategy for Iraq. As announced in early January, the reconstruction
component of that strategy would double the number of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) from 10 to 20 and increase the number of U.S. civilian staff for them
from 250 to at least 400.66 The PRTs, composed of State Department, U.S. Agency
66 State Department Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield has said the staff increases from 290
to 600. Teleconference, February 7, 2007.

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CRS-42
for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DOD), and other
agency staff, work with the Iraqi provincial governments to identify projects that can
be implemented with U.S. funding, and, at the same time, they seek to strengthen the
capacity of Iraqi officials to meet local needs. In essence, the new strategy envisions
that, as U.S. and Iraqi military forces clear an area of Baghdad or Anbar province,
PRT staff would immediately work with local Iraqis to further stabilize the area by
drawing on all available spigots of U.S. and Iraqi government funding to create jobs
and meet other basic needs.
The President’s plan would increase PRTs in Baghdad from one to six and in
Anbar province from one to three. To enhance U.S. civilian staff security and
improve program effectiveness, greater effort would be made to integrate U.S.
civilian teams with U.S. military battalions. The military’s CERP, and USAID’s
Community Stabilization Program (CSP) and Community Action Program (CAP)
funded by the FY2007 Supplemental would help support activities identified by the
PRTs, as would the infusion of $10 billion in promised funds from the Iraqi
government. The FY2007 supplemental would provide funds to the PRTs for the
kinds of grassroots activities they have supported elsewhere, such as improvements
to community infrastructure, job training, vocational education, and micro-loans.
Security and staffing problems encountered by already existing PRTs, however,
could possibly hinder the effectiveness of an expanded PRT program. In October
2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) asserted that,
due to security constraints on travel outside their compounds, many PRT staff could
not regularly meet with local government officials to carry out their capacity-building
chores, and a former PRT staff member claims that local Iraqis are too intimidated
by insurgent threats to meet with U.S. staff. The State Department’s Coordinator for
Iraq, David Satterfield, asserts that the SIGIR views on this issue do not reflect
current reality.67 Most observers, however, would not dispute that the ability of U.S.
and Iraqi troops to secure and hold new areas of operation is key to the success of
expanded civilian PRT efforts.
A second issue that might affect the success of the PRT expansion is the
availability of U.S. civilian staff. In the past, DOD military civil affairs personnel
filled slots for which U.S. civilians could not be recruited. However, the SIGIR has
suggested that the need for required specialized skills for such posts as local
government, economic, and agricultural advisers is still not being fully met with this
approach. Although Secretary Rice has asserted that most positions are filled, it has
been reported that about 129 of the new PRT posts are going to be occupied
temporarily by military personnel until State is able to recruit sufficient numbers of
67 SIGIR, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 06-034, October
29, 2006; “Ex-Envoy Says Iraq Rebuilding Plan Won’t Work,” Reuters, February 17, 2007;
Teleconference of Ambassador Satterfield, February 7, 2007.

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CRS-43
civilian contract personnel. As many as 269 such personnel are expected to be
needed eventually.68
Associated with the reconstruction assistance program is an additional funding
request (not included in the table) within the State Department account to cover the
operational costs of both the PRTs ($414.1 million) and the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) ($35 million).
On March 9, the Administration submitted a revision to its original
supplemental request, including funds under the Iraq Freedom Fund account within
the DOD portion of the request that would support reconstruction programs and
operations. An additional $150 million to support PRT operational costs would go
to providing transportation, force protection, and body armor to all PRT personnel
co-located with U.S. military as well as special pay and benefits for the 129 DOD-
sponsored PRT temporary personnel noted above. A DOD plan to rehabilitate more
than 140 of the nearly 200 state-owned enterprises that composed a large portion of
the Iraqi economy prior to the U.S. occupation would be supported by $100 million.
Soon after the occupation began, the Coalition Provisional Authority, hoping to
create a free-market economy, attempted to privatize these enterprises, but gave up
when the turnover to sovereignty was accelerated. The Department of Defense
expects that the revitalized factories will generate employment for as many as
150,000 Iraqis. U.S. assistance will provide necessary machines, tools and
generators.
Congressional Action. The House-passed measure, H.R. 1591, would
provide $6,329.05 for Iraq reconstruction, a cut of $305 million from the
Administration request. The cuts occur in three accounts. The ESF account is
decreased by $185 million — $100 million from the PRTs, $30 million from the
Community Stabilization Program (CSP), and $80 million from the proposed
political development activities.69 H.R. 1591 adds $25 million to USAID’s
Community Action Program (CAP). A $20 million cut in INCLE funds is aimed at
the requested construction of prison facilities. The revised Iraq Freedom Fund $100
million request to assist Iraqi state-owned enterprises is neither funded nor addressed.
The House-passed legislation would impose conditions on the availability of
appropriated reconstruction funds under the ISFF, ESF, and INCLE accounts. Half
of the appropriated funds would be withheld unless the President certified by October
1, 2007, that, among other things, the Government of Iraq had enacted the hydro-
carbon law, taken specific steps toward provincial and local elections, reformed de-
68 Testimony of Secretary Rice to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 11, 2007;
“Pentagon Agrees to Help Fill State Department’s Iraq Reconstruction Jobs on Temporary
Basis,” New York Times, February 20, 2007; Teleconference of Ambassador Satterfield,
February 7, 2007.
69 It should be noted, however, that bill language would permit the Secretary of Defense to
move as much as $100 million from the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide account
to ESF in support of the PRTs.

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Baathification laws, and begun expenditure of the promised $10 billion Iraqi funds
for reconstruction. ESF funds supporting the CAP and CSP programs as well as
democratization activities, however, would be excepted from the certification
requirement.
The bill would require the appointment by the President of a Coordinator for
Iraq Assistance. The Coordinator would develop and implement an assistance
strategy, coordinate assistance implemented by multiple U.S. departments and
agencies, work with Iraq to achieve benchmarks, coordinate with other donors, and
ensure adequate management and accountability. Currently there are three
individuals who play roles that could be described as coordinating — the Coordinator
for Iraq policy in Washington (David Satterfield), the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO) head within the U.S. embassy who is expected to set
requirements and priorities for reconstruction (Ambassador Joseph Saloom), and the
newly appointed Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq expected to help the
Iraqis use their resources in conjunction with U.S. assistance to meet Iraqi
reconstruction needs (Ambassador Timothy Carney).
The request for operational costs associated with Iraq reconstruction would be
changed by the House measure. PRT operational support contained in the
Administration’s revised request for the DOD Iraq Freedom Fund is neither funded
nor addressed. PRT operational funding under the State Department would be cut
by $33.3 million to $380.8 million, while the appropriation for the SIGIR would
increase by $10.5 million to $45.5 million. The legislation would also extend the
life-span of the SIGIR by including, for the purpose of calculating its termination
date, FY2007 and FY2008 reconstruction funds from any account in the definition
of the IRRF. Currently, the SIGIR terminates ten months after 80% of the IRRF and
FY2006 funds are expended. The House Appropriations Committee’s report notes
that it intends FY2007 supplemental funds to be under the oversight jurisdiction of
the SIGIR. However, H.R. 1591 does not accordingly amend the SIGIR’s current
authorization.
In a March 19 Statement of Administration Policy, the Administration objected
to the House-proposed cuts in PRT programs and operations, arguing that PRT
activities are necessary to create a self-reliant Iraq. The Administration also opposed
a provision establishing an Iraq reconstruction coordinator, noting that a coordinator
already exists.
The Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of the FY2007
Supplemental would provide $6,491.05, $143 million less than the Administration
request. Four accounts are changed from the request. The Committee provides
$1.524 billion in ESF, $548 million less than the request. Most notably, the
Committee cuts $60 million from the PRTs, adds $50 million to the CAP, and cuts
$518 million from political, mostly democracy, activities. Compensating to some
extent for the political cuts, however, is the addition to the Democracy Fund, not
requested by the Administration, of $385 million for democracy activities in Iraq.
When this Fund is taken into account, the cut in broad ESF-type activities is $160
million less than the request.

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CRS-45
In addition, the INCLE account is set at $150 million – with $50 million cut
from prison construction. The MRA account is increased by $50 million to a level
of $65 million in view of the recent increases in displaced people. And IDFA is
increased by $20 million to a level of $65 million. Unlike the House, the Senate bill
matches the Administration revised request for $100 million under the Iraq Freedom
Fund to support Iraqi state-owned enterprises. The Senate measure contains the same
conditions on providing most economic assistance as the House version. The Senate
bill reconfigures the termination date of the SIGIR to include FY2007 funds, but,
unlike the House, does not include FY2008 funds. Like the House, the Senate
Committee report supports the extension of the SIGIR’s oversight authority without
providing the legislative language to accomplish that end.
With regard to operational costs, the Senate bill cut the State portion of PRT
costs by $41.4 million to a level of $372.7 million, but agreed to the revised request
of $150 million under the DOD Iraq Freedom Fund for PRT support costs. The
Committee met the Administration request for the SIGIR and added $3 million for
the USAID Inspector General’s activities in Iraq. In its report, the Committee also
noted its support for a longer-term presence in Iraq by the GAO.

Afghanistan70
Background. Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the
convening of a parliament in December 2005, but in 2006 insurgent threats to
Afghanistan’s government escalated to the point that some experts began questioning
the success of U.S. stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution
was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October
9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The
parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly
three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are
enjoying new personal freedoms, particularly in the northern and western regions of
the country, that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating in
economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and senior
levels of the new parliament.
The insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime escalated in 2006,
after several years in which it appeared the Taliban was mostly defeated. U.S. and
NATO commanders anticipate a Taliban “spring offensive” and are moving to try to
preempt it. Contributing to the Taliban resurgence has been popular frustration with
slow reconstruction, official corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government
authority into rural areas and provinces, particularly in the south and east. In
addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures, and independent militias
remain throughout the country, although many have been disarmed. The Afghan
government and U.S. officials have also said that some Taliban commanders are
70 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and Kenneth Katzman,
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

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CRS-46
operating from Pakistan, putting them outside the reach of U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan.
U.S. and partner stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central
government and its security forces and on promoting reconstructing while combating
the renewed insurgent challenge. As part of this effort, the international community
has been running PRTs to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
PRTs).
FY2007 Supplemental Request. The Administration is requesting a total
of $720.9 million in supplemental funds for Afghanistan, which include several
provisions intended to continue U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and continue
economic reconstruction efforts.
Key elements of the FY2007 supplemental request are:
! $653 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for reconstruction
efforts to continue security and development strategy. The ESF
funding focuses primarily on reconstruction efforts in provinces in
the south and southeastern regions that have been affected by the
recent increased threats by the insurgency and Taliban. Specific
efforts include emergency power sector projects; building roads;
expanding rural development projects; and expanding governance
initiatives. Support for democratic governance, reconstruction and
development programs are seen as critical to the counterinsurgency
effort. The Administration is also developing a new initiative,
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) in Afghanistan and border
regions with Pakistan to stimulate economic activity in
underdeveloped, isolated regions.
The $653 million would be allocated as follows:
! $382 million would be made available for infrastructure, including
road projects ($342 million) focused on those segments that are of
strategic military importance and provide key connections between
the central and provincial government capitals; and the development
of power sector projects ($40 million);
! $133 million would be used as part of an effort to improve
livelihoods in the counter-narcotics strategy. Alternative economic
development initiatives ($120 million) would be expanded to rural
areas likely to increase poppy cultivation; and $13 million would be
for agriculture;
! $138 million would be used to strengthen provincial governance,
particularly through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
including $82 million for infrastructure, tools, and training and $35

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CRS-47
million for PRT governance; and capacity building in governance
($21 million).
In addition to the ESF funding, the request includes:
! $47.155 million to support Diplomatic and Consular Programs
(DCP) in Afghanistan as part of a worldwide security upgrade in the
Global War on Terror;
! $15 million in Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) to support the Afghan leadership through
the Presidential Protection Service; and
! $5.7 million for FY2007 security requirements for U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) operations in Afghanistan.
Congressional Action. The House 2007 Supplemental recommends a total
of $743 million in ESF funding for Afghanistan (which is $90 million above the
Administration’s request) with the following proposed changes:
! $352 million to develop infrastructure ($50 million less than the
Administration’s request for road projects);
! $173 million to improve livelihoods ($40 million more than the
request for rural development); and
! $238 to strengthen provincial governance ($100 million more than
the request for PRTs).
The committee also recommends $94.5 million for International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) activities in Afghanistan specifically for
counternarcotics, Afghan police training, and development of justice institutions.
The Administration’s request did not include funding in this account. In its report,
the Committee expressed its belief that these activities are central to the
reconstruction and stabilization strategy in Afghanistan and requested that the State
Department report to the committee on planned expenditures for the INCLE account.
In its report, the committee also expressed its concerns about the increasing
attacks by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, what appear to be record levels of poppy
cultivation, and the links between opium production and the financing of terrorist
groups. The Committee identified rural development projects and the PRTs as two
important mechanisms for promoting stabilization, security and the reach of the
central government. While funding for infrastructure projects continues to be critical,
the Committee also noted that there should be more investment by other donors in
these kinds of programs.
The draft Senate 2007 Supplemental recommends a total of $686 million in ESF
funding for Afghanistan (which is $33 million above the Administration’s request)
with the following proposed changes:

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CRS-48
! $125 million to improve livelihoods ($5 million more than the
request for alternative economic development initiatives); and $25
million for agriculture ($12 million more than the request);
! $144 to strengthen provincial governance with$104 million for
PRTs ($22 million more than the request for PRT infrastructure,
tools and training) and $40 million for the PRT governance program
($5 million more than the request); and no funding under governance
building capacity ($21 million less than the request), but the
committee notes that $25 million is recommended for the
Democracy Fund (below);
! $10 million for a Civilian Assistance Program (not funded in the
request) for civilians suffering loss from military operations.
The committee also recommends
! $55 million to support DCP in Afghanistan (7.845 more than the
request) of which $13 million is for armored vehicles and $42
million is for local guards in Kabul; and
! USAID operating expenses ($5.7 million) remain unchanged from
the request, but the Committee recommends $1 million be added for
the USAID Office of the Inspector General (not included in the
request).
In addition to the ESF and other programs in the request for Afghanistan, the
committee recommends adding $62 million in programs as follows:
! $25 million for the Democracy Fund for programs on democracy,
human rights, governance, and rule of law (an increase of $4 million
over the governance building capacity of $21 million in the request
under ESF);
! $18 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance;
! $18 million for International Disaster and Famine Assistance for
Internally Displaced Persons Assistance, particularly in and around
Kabul.

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CRS-49
Table 5. Afghanistan Aid
(millions of dollars)
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
Activity
Base
Supp
Supp
Supp
FY2007
(appropriation account)a
Estimate
Request
House
Senate
Supp
Infrastructure aid (ESF)
230.0
653.0
743.0
686.0
Afghan refugees (MRA)
38.0
18.0
IDFA
18.0
Democracy Fund
25.0
U.S. mission security (DCP)
82.0
47.2
47.2
55.0
USAID mission security
13.3
5.7
5.7
6.7
(OE)
NADR
15.0
15.0
15.0
INCLE
94.5
Total
363.3
720.9
905.4
823.7
Source: FY2007 budget materials.
Notes: Data in this table reflect ongoing and FY2007 proposed funding for programs the same as or
similar to those requested in the FY2006 supplemental. The total line does not represent total aid or
mission operations for Afghanistan. Excluded from this table is proposed funding requested for FBI
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
ESF = economic Support Fund, MRA=Migration and Refugee Assistance, DCP=Diplomatic and
Consular Programs, OE=operating expenses, NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs, and INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
P.L. 480 - Title II emergency food aid funds are included in a total appropriation of $200 million
available for missions in Afghanistan and parts of Africa.
Sudan — Darfur and Other Sudan71
The Administration seeks a total of $361.9 million in supplemental funds for
Sudan, most of which would be for humanitarian and peacekeeping support in the
Darfur region.
Darfur Crisis. The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel
groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur.
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
claim that the government of Sudan discriminates against Muslim African ethnic
71 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in Foreign Affairs and Ted Dagne, Specialist
in International Relations.

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CRS-50
groups in Darfur and has systematically targeted these ethnic groups since the early
1990s. The conflict in Darfur burgeoned when the government of Sudan and its
allied militia began a campaign of terror against civilians in an effort to crush the
rebellion and to punish the core constituencies of the rebels. Since 2003, an
estimated 300,000-400,000 civilians have been killed, more than two million have
been displaced and more than half of the population has been affected directly and
is dependent on international support. The atrocities against civilians continue in
Darfur, according to U.N. reports, U.S. officials, and human rights groups. Congress
and the Bush Administration have called the atrocities genocide. The African Union
has deployed an estimated 7,700 peacekeeping troops, including military observers
and civilian police.
Major elements of the FY2007 supplemental request include:
! $40 million in International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA)
funding for immediate, life-saving needs of victims of the Darfur
crisis, including health care, access to water and sanitation, and
shelter;
! $150 million for additional food assistance (P.L. 480, Title II) in
Sudan and Eastern Chad;
! $150 million in support of Darfur peacekeeping, including the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). As part of the
supplemental request, and to maintain the flexibility to fund AMIS
or provide support for transition of AMIS to a United Nations
peacekeeping force, the Administration is requesting transfer
authority from Contributions for International Peacekeeping
Activities (CIPA) to Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and
! $21.9 million in support of U.S. Mission Security within State
Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Programs (DCP), both
Ongoing Operations and Worldwide Security Upgrades.
In addition to these funds specifically for Sudan, the FY2007 supplemental
request also includes $30 million in Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
(ERMA) funds for a number of crises. Some of these funds could support planning
for Darfur refugee flows to Chad. The request also includes $128 million to support
anticipated international peacekeeping missions in Africa, which could also focus on
Darfur.
Congressional Action. The House FY2007 supplemental bill appears to
recommend the same funding levels put forward in the Administration’s request for
Sudan.
The Senate FY2007 Supplemental makes a few changes as follows:

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CRS-51
! $49 million in International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA)
funding for Sudan ($9 million above the request); and
! $16.9 million in support of U.S. Mission Security within State
Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Programs (DCP), both
Ongoing Operations and Worldwide Security Upgrades ($5 million
less than the request).
! It is presumed that $150 million for additional food assistance (P.L.
480, Title II) in Sudan and Eastern Chad remains unchanged from
the request.
Table 6. Sudan Supplemental
( millions of dollars)
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
Activity
Base
Supp.
Supp.
Supp.
Supp
(appropriation account)a
Estimate
Request
House
Senate
Enacted
Humanitarian relief (IDFA)
40.0
40.0
49.0
Refugees in Darfur & Chad (MRA)
PL480, Title II food aid
150.0
150.0
150.0
AMIS (PKO)
150.0
150.0
150.0
U.N. peacekeeping mission/Darfur
0.0
0.0
(CIPA)
U.S. Mission Security (DCP)
21.9
21.9
16.9
Total
$361.9
$361.9
$365.9
Source: FY2007 budget materials.
As part of the supplemental request, the Administration is requesting transfer authority from CIPA
to PKO.
Notes: Data in this table reflect ongoing funding for programs the same as or similar to those
requested in the FY2006 supplemental. The Total line does not represent total aid or mission
operations for Sudan.
ERMA funds include a total appropriation of $30 million available for places such as Somalia,
Chad, West Bank/Gaza, Iraq and Sri Lanka. The funds could also support planning for Darfur
refugee flows to Chad.
PKO funds include an additional appropriation of $128 million to support anticipated
peacekeeping in Africa, including Darfur.

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CRS-52
Other Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Assistance72
In addition to amounts provided for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, the
request includes $2.69 billion in funding for other countries and activities from
a variety of accounts.
Lebanon. Following the Israeli-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict during the
summer of 2006, the Administration is requesting $585.5 million for Lebanon.
The largest portion is $300 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for budget
support and post-conflict reconstruction. The request also includes $220 million
in Foreign Military Financing to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) in support of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 that calls for
performance standards for the LAF. A third component is $60 million in
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds to support
the Internal Security Forces (ISF) that is in charge of guarding Lebanon’s ports,
airports, and borders. An additional $5.5 million is requested from the Non-
Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account
for a terrorist interdiction program.
Kosovo.73 The FY2007 supplemental request includes $279 million for
Kosovo under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act to support
the outcome of a U.N.-led process to determine Kosovo’s status. In February,
U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented a settlement proposal for a form
of internationally supervised independence in Kosovo with expanded rights for
Kosovo’s Serbian minority communities. Serbia’s swift rejection of the plan, on
the one hand, and early Kosovar Albanian grass roots-led protests against delays
to or conditions on full independence, on the other hand, point to a high potential
for unrest in the province. The U.N. Security Council may begin to consider the
Ahtisaari plan in late March, although the timing of a vote in the Council on a
new resolution on Kosovo is not yet clear. Presuming a political settlement is
achieved, a transition period of several months is expected to follow.
The requested supplemental funds for FY2007 are intended to support
Kosovo’s immediate needs in the areas of governance, rule of law, infrastructure
development, and new international civilian missions in Kosovo, among other
programs. DoD costs for U.S. participation in a follow-on NATO peacekeeping
operation in Kosovo are not included in this request. The Administration justifies
the need for supplemental funding for Kosovo based on its expectation that
Kosovo’s status will be settled “early this year...outside of the normal budget
process.” It claims that the European Union and the IFIs will contribute most of
the international assistance for Kosovo, which it says could amount to as much
as $2 billion (of which the $279 million from the United States would amount to
approximately 14%).
72 Unless otherwise noted, these sections were prepared by Connie Veillette, Specialist in
Foreign Affairs.
73 Prepared by Julie Kim, Specialist in International Relations.

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CRS-53
Humanitarian Assistance.74 Beyond the proposed aid packages for
specific countries, the Administration also seeks funding support for
humanitarian assistance in a range of anticipated and unanticipated crises:
! $200 million in additional P.L. 480 - Title II assistance to meet
emergency food needs elsewhere worldwide, including places
such as Afghanistan (particularly in the north due to drought
conditions), southern Africa, Zimbabwe and parts of the Horn of
Africa (for both drought conditions and rising insecurity);
! $65 million for International Disaster and Famine Assistance
(IDFA) to support unanticipated humanitarian assistance or to
replenish costs as a result of crises in Iraq ($45 million) and
Somalia ($20 million);
! $71.5 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) for
unanticipated refugee and migration emergencies, including
return operations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) ($16.5 million) where repatriation programs are
under way. The funds would help resettle some of the more than
370,000 Burundi refugees and 400,000 DRC refugees; assistance
to Iraqi refugees and conflict victims ($15 million); and the
emergency needs of Palestinian refugees ($40 million).
! $30 million for Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
(ERMA) for unanticipated emergencies in Somalia, Chad, West
Bank/Gaza, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. These funds would also support
contingency planning for increased Darfur refugees fleeing to
Chad. Current ERMA levels are reported to be at their lowest in
a decade with $6.2 million remaining, which is predicted to be
insufficient to respond to the needs required.
Congressional Action. The House 2007 Supplemental recommends
changes to the IDFA , MRA, ERMA allocations as follows:
! $95 million for IDFA, (in addition to $40 million proposed for
Sudan) which is $30 million above the Administration’s request
– $75 million would be for unanticipated emergencies including
replenishing costs incurred from humanitarian crises in Iraq.
The Committee expressed its concern about the deteriorating
situations in Chad and the Central African Republic and asked
for USAID and the State Department to consult with the
Committee about the status. It also expressed its support for a
resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda;
74 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in Foreign Affairs.

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CRS-54
! $111.5 million for MRA which is $40 million more than the
Administration’s request – $15 million is recommended to assist
Iraqi refugees; the other $96.5 million would be for
unanticipated humanitarian emergencies. The Committee
recognized that the number of refugees in neighboring countries
could increase. It also highlighted its concerns about progress in
Burundi and the DRC and the increasing needs of Palestinian
refugees;
! $35 million for ERMA (which is $5 million above the request)
to address unanticipated emergency needs.

The Senate 2007 Supplemental recommends changes to specific allocations as
follows:
! $325 million in additional P.L. 480 - Title II assistance to meet
emergency food needs elsewhere worldwide, including places
such as Afghanistan, Chad, and other Africa nations. It is
presumed that this is in addition to $150 million for Sudan (same
as the amount in the request);
! $138 million for IDFA, (in addition to $49 million proposed for
Sudan and $18 million proposed for Afghanistan) — which is a
total of $82 million above the Administration’s request — for
unanticipated emergencies including the humanitarian crises in
Iraq ($65 million, which is $20 million above the request), Chad
($10 million), Democratic Republic of Congo ($10 million),
Uganda ($10 million), and Somalia ($25 million, which is $5
million above the request);
! $125 million for MRA (in addition to $18 million proposed for
Afghanistan) which is $71.5 million more than the
Administration’s request – $65 million is recommended to assist
Iraqi refugees (an increase of $50 million over the request);
return operations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) which is the same as the request ($16.5 million)
and the emergency needs of Palestinian refugees ($43.5 million),
which is 3.5 million above the request.
! $55 million for ERMA (which is $25 million above the request)
to replenish the emergency fund.
Avian Influenza.75 The Administration is requesting $161 in Child
Survival and Health (CSH) funds to expand efforts to prevent the spread of the
avian influenza virus and the emergence of a virus that could cause a global
pandemic. Continuing outbreaks of the H5N1 virus have been reported in Asia,
Europe and Africa over the winter with indications that the virus continues to
75 Prepared by Connie Veillette, Specialist in Foreign Affairs.

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change rapidly. The first six months of 2006 saw a seasonal surge in outbreaks
that affected 53 countries.
Table 7. Foreign Operations FY2007 Supplemental Request
by Appropriations Account
(millions of dollars)
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
Base
Supp
Supp
Supp
Supp
Activity
estimate
Request
House
Senate
Final
Child Survival/Health
1,718.2
161.0
161.0
161.0
Economic Support Funds
2,455.0
3,025.0
2,953.0
2,602.2
Migration/Refugee Ass’t.
887.9
101.5
111.5
198.0
Foreign Military Financing
4,550.8
220.0
260.0
220.0
Disaster/Famine Assistance
361.0
105.0
135.0
187.0
Narcotics/Law Enforcement
472.0
260.0
334.5
210.0
Non-Proliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining
406.0
27.5
87.5
27.5
Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO)
223.3
278.0
225.0
323.0
P.L. 480, Title II
1,215.0
350.0
450.0
475.0
USAID Operating Expenses
624.0
5.7
10.7
5.7
Treasury Technical Ass’t.
20.0
2.8
2.8
2.8
E. Europe/Baltics Ass’t.
273.9
279.0
239.0
214.0
USAID IG
—
—
—
4.0
Democracy Fund
—
—
—
465.0
Rescission (INCLE)
—
—
—
13.0
Total Foreign Operations
13,207.1
4,815.5
4,970.0
5,108.2
Source: U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY2008
and CRS calculations.
State Department and International Broadcasting76
In addition to the more than $10 billion estimated FY2007 regular budget for the
Department of State and International Broadcasting, the Administration is requesting
$1.168 billion in the FY2007 supplemental request for the Department of State and
$10 million for International Broadcasting. (See Table 8 below.) The Department
is seeking most of its FY2007 supplemental funds for State’s Administration of
76 Prepared by Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade.

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CRS-56
Foreign Affairs ($968 million). The Diplomatic and Consular Programs account
would receive the most ($913 million) for additional funding of Iraq Operations,
Ongoing Operations, and Worldwide Security Upgrades. The bulk of D&CP funds
($823.9 million) would pay for Iraq Operations — U.S. activities, security, and the
U.S. Mission in Iraq.
About half of the Iraq Operations funds would be for setting up new Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. A total of $414.1 million would be for expanding from the
current number of 10 PRTs to as many as 18 to 21 teams. The cost would pay for
PRT personnel, support and security. (For more detail on PRT funding, see the
earlier section on Iraq Reconstruction and Assistance.)

The U.S. Mission in Iraq employs more than 1,000 American and locally
engaged staff representing about a dozen agencies. The FY2007 supplemental
includes $47.6 million for U.S. Mission Operations, $72.5 million for logistics
support for the mission, $8.9 million for mission information technology, and $15
million for installation of overhead cover and other physical security measures.
State’s request for supplemental funds for Ongoing Operations within the
D&CP account would consist of $21.9 million for public diplomacy activities to
combat violent extremism by funding exchanges and foreign language websites that
would promote American and Muslim dialogue. The Ongoing Operations request
also includes $1.9 million to support diplomatic, reconstruction, and stabilization
efforts in Sudan.
The State Department FY2007 supplemental request includes $67.155 million
for Worldwide Security Upgrades in Afghanistan and Sudan, $20 million for
international exchanges to combat violent extremism, and $200 million for U.S.
contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities in Lebanon and Timor Leste.
In addition, in the supplemental request for State Department funds is $35 million for
the Office of Inspector General to be transferred to the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).
The Broadcasting Board of Governors oversees all nonmilitary U.S.
international broadcasting activities. The FY2007 Supplemental request includes $10
million for expanded broadcasting in Arabic on the U.S.-established Alhurra
Television into 22 countries in the Middle East.
The House FY2007 supplemental bill would set funding for State’s
Administrations of Foreign Affairs at $1,033.8, $65.8 million more than the
Administration requested. Of that amount, $967 million would be for D&CP, $46.8
million for the Office of Inspector General (of which $45.5 million would be
transferred to SIGIR), and $20 million for international exchanges, as requested.
Of the $967 million for D&CP, $790.6 million would be for Iraq operations as
follows: $380.789 million for setting up new PRTs in Iraq, $265.827 million for
security costs and the U.S. Mission in Iraq, $72.505 million for logistics support in
Iraq, $47.646 million for mission operations, $15 million for overhead cover, and
$8.874 million for mission information technology. Also in the House D&CP

---

CRS-57
funding is $24.158 million for ongoing operations, as compared with the $21.9
million requested, and $102.2 million for worldwide security upgrades, $35 million
more than was requested. In addition, the House bill would provide $50 million,
contingent upon authorization, for establishing and maintaining a civilian reserve
corps.
The House Report (H.Rept. 110-60) states that $395 million in funds for D&CP
Iraq operations will be withheld until the Committee receives and approves a detailed
plan for expenditure of the funds. Furthermore, the Committee directs the
Department of State to report within 45 days of enactment of this act on how it would
spend the public diplomacy funds.
The House bill would also provide $288 million for Contributions to
International Peacekeeping, $88 million more than requested. The amount would
include $184 million for the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), $16 million
for the U.N. Mission in Timor Lest (UNMIT) and $88 million for a possible mission
in Chad.
Similar to the Administration request, the House FY2007 supplemental bill
would also provide $10 million for expanding broadcasting on Alhurra Television.
The Senate FY2007 supplemental bill would provide $815.8 million for D&CP.
This is $97.2 million below the Administration request and $151.2 million below the
House level. Included is $723.9 million for Iraq operations, 21.9 million for ongoing
operations ($20 million for public diplomacy and $1.9 million for ongoing
operations), and $70 million for worldwide security upgrades. Included in the $723.9
million for Iraq operations is: $42.9 million for mission support, $265.8 million for
mission security, $7.987 million for information technology, $12 million for
overhead security, and $372.7 million for PRTs. The Senate Committee would not
provide $50 million for temporary housing outside the compound, requesting a plan
to house people inside the compound. And it would not provide $5 million for travel
costs of U.S. dignitaries within Sudan, saying that this funding would normally be
in the regular appropriation request.
The Senate bill also would provide $36.5 million for the Office of Inspector
General of which $35 million is for the SIGIR, $59 million for U.S. Contributions
to International Organizations and $200 million for Contributions to International
Peacekeeping. In addition, the Senate bill would provide $10 million to the
Broadcasting Board of Governors for expanding Alhurra TV listenership.

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CRS-58
Table 8. State Department and International Broadcasting
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Request
(millions of dollars)
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2007
FY2008
FY2008
Base
Supp
Supp
Supp
Base
emergency
Activity
Estimate Request
House
Senate
Request Request
Administration of
Foreign Affairs
6,502.5
968.0
1,033.8
877.3
7,317.1
1,881.6
Diplomatic &
Consular Programs
4,314.0
913.0
967.0
815.8
4,942.7
1,881.6
Iraq Operations
—
823.9
864.8
723.9
—
1,881.6
Ongoing
Operations
—
21.9
24.2
21.9
—
—
Worldwide
Security Upgrades
795.2
67.2
102.2
70.0
964.8
—
Office of Inspector
General
30.9
35.0
46.8
36.5
32.5
—
Educational & cultural
exchange programs
445.3
20.0
20.0
25.0
486.4
—
International Orgs
2,286.6
200.0
288.0
259.0
2,461.4
53.0
Contributions to
Int’l Orgs
1,151.3
—
59.0
1,354.4
53.0
Contributions to
Int’l Peacekeeping
1,135.3
200.0
288.0
200.0
1,107.0
—
Other
171.7
—
—
—
235.3
—
Total State Approps
8,960.8
1,168.0
1,321.8
1,136.3 10,013.8
1,934.6
Total Int’l
Broadcasting
644.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
668.2
—
Total State and
Broadcasting
9,604.8
1,178.0
1,331.8
1,146.3 10,682.0
1,934.6
Source: Department of State’s Budget in Brief, FY2008 and House FY2007 supplemental
bill, Full Committee Print, March 15, 2007, Senate bill and Committee Report, as of March
23, 2007.
Liquidation of TSA Contract and Grant Obligations77
On January 10, 2007, the President transmitted to Congress a request to transfer
$195 million in unobligated balances to resolve insufficiently funded Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) contract and grant obligations incurred during
FY2002 and FY2003. These obligations, which were made in violation of the
77 Prepared by Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Security, Safety and Technology Policy,
Resource, Science, and Industry Division.

---

CRS-59
Antideficiency Act (ADA), were uncovered by the TSA in the summer of 2006
during a comprehensive financial review, and this violation was formally reported
to the President and the Congress on December 3, 2006.
Investigation has revealed that the deficiency resulted from erroneous voucher
entries made during the TSA’s migration from the Department of Transportation to
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, and the DHS
has found no evidence that the violation was intentional. The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) has indicated that the TSA has taken steps to improve internal
control processes, and OMB will continue to monitor the TSA implementation of its
corrective action plans to minimize the potential for future deficiency violations.
In order to correct the deficiency and ensure that adequate funding for future
contract and grant obligations are available, the President has requested a transfer of
$195 million, $175 million from the Aviation Security account and $20 million from
the Transportation Security Support account, to be transferred to the TSA’s Expenses
account. As indicated by the OMB, this proposed transfer, which requires statutory
authority, would not increase FY2007 budget authority and would not increase the
deficit.
Ongoing Katrina Recovery Measures
As part of its package of FY2007 supplemental appropriations requests, the
Administration has asked for $3.4 billion for the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to continue Katrina recovery efforts.
The funding is requested for expenses through December 2007 for housing assistance
and for grants for public infrastructure repair and replacement in Gulf Coast region.78
In the FY2006 supplemental, P.L. 109-234, Congress provided $6.0 billion for
FEMA activities funded through the DRF.
Congressional Action. The House Appropriations Committee version of the
FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill approves the $3.4 billion requested for
FEMA and adds $3.0 billion for other hurricane relief measures. The largest addition
is $1.3 billion for the Corps of Engineers to continue repairs and accelerate
completion of flood and storm damage reduction projects in the New Orleans and
south Louisiana area. Previously appropriated funds are insufficient to complete
these activities due to increased costs, improved data on costs, and other factors. In
its March 19 Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on the supplemental, the
White House objected to the added funds. The Administration argues that these
activities should be funded by reallocating previously appropriated, but unobligated,
FY2006 supplemental funds for other Corps flood and storm damage reduction
projects in the area. The SAP also opposes measures in the bill that would exempt
Gulf states from some matching requirements for FEMA grants.
78 For the formal request, see Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2008: Appendix, pp. 1164-1165.

---

CRS-60
Unrequested Funding for Domestic Programs
Supplemental appropriations bills traditionally become vehicles for Congress
to provide funds for high priority programs for which the Administration did not
request money. The House Appropriations Committee bill includes additional funds
for state children’s health insurance, low-income home energy assistance, homeland
security initiatives, avian flu preparedness, and agricultural disaster relief, among
other things. In all, the bill includes $3.7 billion agricultural disaster relief and $3.0
billion for other programs. Table 1, above, shows amounts for the larger additions.
In its March 19 Statement of Administration Policy on the House bill, the White
House complained that the bill contains “billions in unrequested spending that is
largely unjustified and non-emergency.” The message warned that the President
would veto the bill because of “excessive and extraneous non-emergency spending.”
For Additional Reading
CRS Multi-Media Presentation MM70099, FY2008 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress — Seminar Slides, by Stephen Daggett, Ronald O’Rourke, David F.
Burrelli, and Amy Belasco.
CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on
Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman.
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth
Katzman.
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS Report RL33851, Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects, by
Rhoda Margesson.
CRS Report RL33503, U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan:
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by
Kenneth Katzman.
CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority To Limit U.S. Military Operations
in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Thomas J. Nicola.

---

CRS-61
CRS Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding
Approaches, by Amy Belasco, Lynn J. Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry
A. Niksch.
CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving
U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, by Richard F. Grimmett.
CRS Report RL31693, U.S. Armed Forces Abroad: Selected Congressional Votes
Since 1982, by Lisa Mages.
CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006 and
FY2007 Appropriations and FY2008 Request, by Susan B. Epstein.

---

CRS-62
Appendix. War-Related Appropriations, FY2005-FY2007
Table A-1. War-Related Appropriations, FY2005-FY2007 Supplemental Request
(in billions of dollars)
Total
FY2007
Total FY2005
FY2006
Bridge
FY2007
Total FY2007:
(P.L.108-287, (P.L.109-148,
(P.L.109-
Request as of Enacted and FY07
House
TITLE AND ACCOUNT
P.L.109-13a) P.L.109-234)a
289)a
2-5-07c
Supp Requestb
Action
Senate Action
Conference
SUMMARY
TOTAL REGULAR ACCOUNTS
90.909
103.709
64.665
80.928
145.593
TOTAL SPECIAL ACCOUNTS
10.735
11.532
5.171
12.387
17.558
TOTAL DOD (Function 051)
101.644
115.241
69.835
93.316
163.151
DEFENSE-RELATED
0.250
0.159
0.019
0.248
0.267
TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE
(Function 050)
101.895
115.400
69.855
93.564
163.418
FUNDING BY ACCOUNT
Military Personneld
19.733
16.729
5.387
12.145
17.531
Army
15.069
11.984
4.730
8.889
13.620
Navy
0.573
1.592
0.143
0.765
0.908
Marine Corps
1.604
1.310
0.161
1.387
1.548
Air Force
2.487
1.843
0.352
1.104
1.455

---

CRS-63
Total
FY2007
Total FY2005
FY2006
Bridge
FY2007
Total FY2007:
(P.L.108-287, (P.L.109-148,
(P.L.109-
Request as of Enacted and FY07
House
TITLE AND ACCOUNT
P.L.109-13a) P.L.109-234)a
289)a
2-5-07c
Supp Requestb
Action
Senate Action
Conference
Operation and Maintenanced
47.852
60.040
39.090
37.929
77.019
Army 31.506
39.765
29.000
19.961
48.961
Navy 3.595
4.659
1.625
6.056
7.682
Marine Corps
2.682
3.592
2.737
1.415
4.152
Air Force
6.579
8.382
2.953
7.118
10.071
O&M Defensewide
3.490
3.642
2.775
3.378
6.153
Other Defense Programs
1.195
1.415
0.100
1.332
1.432
Defense Health
0.953
1.232
0.000
1.073
1.073
Medical Support Fund (new 2-yr transfer
acc’t)
Other O&M (DODIF, Counterdrug)
0.242
0.183
0.100
0.259
0.359
Working Capital Funds
3.022
3.033
0.000
1.321
1.321
Def. Working Capital Fund
2.989
3.033
0.000
1.316
1.316
Nat’l Def. Sealift Fd.
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.005
Procurement
17.300
21.496
19.680
24.900
44.580
Army Total
10.306
13.560
10.096
14.852
24.949
Aircraft
0.465
0.577
1.461
0.628
2.089
Missile Proc
0.310
0.258
0.000
0.160
0.160

---

CRS-64
Total
FY2007
Total FY2005
FY2006
Bridge
FY2007
Total FY2007:
(P.L.108-287, (P.L.109-148,
(P.L.109-
Request as of Enacted and FY07
House
TITLE AND ACCOUNT
P.L.109-13a) P.L.109-234)a
289)a
2-5-07c
Supp Requestb
Action
Senate Action
Conference
Weapons & Tracked Vehicles
2.601
2.628
3.393
3.474
6.868
Ammunition
0.643
1.103
0.238
0.682
0.919
Other
6.287
8.995
5.004
9.909
14.913
Navy/Marine Corps Procurement Total
3.852
5.581
5.942
4.090
10.033
Aircraft
0.275
0.656
0.487
1.106
1.593
Ammunition
0.170
0.362
0.128
0.160
0.288
Weapons
0.066
0.172
0.109
0.172
0.281
Other
0.078
0.104
0.320
0.847
1.167
Marine Corps
3.263
4.288
4.898
1.806
6.704
Air Force Procurement Total
3.142
2.354
3.642
4.978
8.620
Aircraft
0.424
0.790
2.291
2.649
4.941
Missiles
0.014
0.017
0.033
0.140
0.173
Ammunition
0.007
0.029
0.000
0.096
0.096
Other
2.697
1.518
1.318
2.093
3.410
Procurement Defensewide
0.691
0.513
0.146
0.979
1.125
Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation Total
0.637
0.761
0.408
1.448
1.855
Army
0.037
0.068
0.000
0.116
0.116
Navy
0.204
0.125
0.231
0.460
0.691

---

CRS-65
Total
FY2007
Total FY2005
FY2006
Bridge
FY2007
Total FY2007:
(P.L.108-287, (P.L.109-148,
(P.L.109-
Request as of Enacted and FY07
House
TITLE AND ACCOUNT
P.L.109-13a) P.L.109-234)a
289)a
2-5-07c
Supp Requestb
Action
Senate Action
Conference
AF
0.143
0.395
0.037
0.221
0.258
Defensewide
0.254
0.174
0.140
0.651
0.791
Military Construction
1.170
0.235
0.000
1.854
1.854
Army
0.882
0.187
0.000
1.381
1.381
Navy & Marine Corps
0.140
0.028
0.000
0.413
0.413
Air Force
0.149
0.000
0.000
0.060
0.060
Defense wide
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.000
Special Funds and Caps
10.735
11.532
5.171
12.387
17.558
Iraq Freedom Fund including
3.750
4.659
0.050
0.206
0.256
Redevelopment of Iraqi Industry
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Transfer to Economic Support Fund for
Pakistan
0.000
0.000
0.000
[.100]
[.100]
Afghan Security Forces Fund
1.285
1.908
1.500
5.906
7.406
Iraq Security Forces Fund
5.700
3.007
1.700
3.842
5.542
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Fund
0.000
1.958
1.921
2.433
4.354
Cmdrs Emerg. Response Prg (CERP)
[.800]
[.923]
[.500]
[.456]
[.956]
Coalition Support Cap
[1.220]
[1.545]
[.900]
[.300]
[1.200]

---

CRS-66
Total
FY2007
Total FY2005
FY2006
Bridge
FY2007
Total FY2007:
(P.L.108-287, (P.L.109-148,
(P.L.109-
Request as of Enacted and FY07
House
TITLE AND ACCOUNT
P.L.109-13a) P.L.109-234)a
289)a
2-5-07c
Supp Requestb
Action
Senate Action
Conference
Strategic Readiness Reserve Fund
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Transfer limit for Title IX and
Supplementals
[3.000]
[4.500]
[3.000]
[3.500]
[6.500]
Transfer limit for regular DOD funds
[6.185]
[5.000]
[5.000]
[4.500]
[6.000]
Defense-related Programs
0.250
0.159
0.019
0.248
0.267
Coast Gd transfer (in O&M Navy)
0.000
[.175]
[.090]
[.120]
[.210]
Intell. Comm. Mgt. Account
0.250
0.159
0.019
0.067
0.086
Defense Nuclear Non proliferation
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.063
0.063
Salaries & Expenses, FBI
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.118
0.118
Notes and Sources:
a. CRS calculations using conference reports and public laws for enacted bridge funds and supplementals; for FY2005, includes $23 billion of bridge fund in FY2005 and
allocates $1.9 billion obligated in FY2004 to that year; includes $2.1 billion obligated for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) in FY2005 and $800 million obligated in
FY2006; includes $1.5 billion transferred for war in FY2005.
b. Reflects figures included in FY2008 Budget Appendix for FY2007 Supplemental; for several accounts, DOD figures differ. Does not reflect amended request submitted by
OMB on March 9, 2007.OMB, FY2008 Budget Appendix, “Other Materials: FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008,” 2-5-07 *figures differ from DOD request;
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/sup.pdf]. For amended request, see OMB, Amendment to FY2007 Supplemental for Additional Troops with
offsets from Supplemental, March 9, 2007; [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_3_9_07.pdf].

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CRS-67
Table A-2. FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations:
Congressional Action by Subcommittee/Title/Account
(millions of dollars)
Change to
Appropriations Subcommittee/Title/Account
Request
House
Request
Title I: Global War on Terror
99,615.4
111,301.8
+11,686.4
Department of Agriculture, P.L. 480
350.0
450.0
+100.0
P.L. 480 Title II Grants
350.0
450.0
+100.0
Department of Justice
173.5
158.9
-14.6
General Legal Activities
4.1
1.6
-2.4
U.S. Attorneys
5.0
5.0
--
Marshall Service
14.9
2.8
-12.2
National Security Division
1.7
1.7
--
Federal Bureau of Investigation
118.3
118.3
--
Drug Enforcement Administration
8.5
8.5
--
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
4.0
4.0
--
Federal Prison System
17.0
17.0
--
Department of Defense
91,529.0
95,528.7
+3,999.7
Military Personnel
12,144.7
13,566.9
+1,422.3
Operation & Maintenance
50,316.1
52,500.0
+2,183.9
Procurement
24,900.0
24,813.7
-86.3
RDT&E
1,447.7
1,035.4
-412.4
Revolving & Management Funds
1,320.5
1,320.5
--
Defense Health
1,073.1
2,789.7
+1,716.6
Drug Interdiction
259.1
259.1
--
Intelligence Community Mgmnt Acct
66.7
57.4
-9.3
General Provisions
1.0
1.0
--
Contractor Efficiency
--
-815.0
-815.0
Department of Energy
63.0
150.0
+87.0
Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation
63.0
150.0
+87.0
Department of Homeland Security
--
2,500.0
+2,500.0
Departmental Management
--
35.0
+35.0
Customs and Border Protection
--
249.0
+249.0
Aviation Security/TSA
--
1,250.0
+1,250.0
Coast Guard [transfer from Navy]
--
[120.3]
[+120.3]
Infrastructure Protection
--
25.0
+25.0
Federal Emergency Management Agency
--
540.0
+540.0
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
--
1.0
+1.0
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
--
400.0
+400.0
Legislative Branch
--
6.4
+6.4
House Allowances & Expenses
--
6.4
+6.4
Architect of the Capitol House Offices
--
--
--
Military Construction
1,854.0
4,915.5
+3,061.6
Army
1,381.3
1,329.2
-52.1
Navy & Marine Corps
412.5
389.3
-23.2
Air Force
60.2
60.2
--
Base Closure 2005
--
3,136.8
+3,136.8
Department of Veterans Affairs
--
1,702.1
+1,702.1
Benefits Administration/Pensions
--
20.0
+20.0

---

CRS-68
Change to
Appropriations Subcommittee/Title/Account
Request
House
Request
Veterans Health
--
1,301.3
+1,301.3
Departmental Administration
--
380.8
+380.8
Department of State Administration of Foreign
Affairs
1,178.0
1,331.8
+153.8
Diplomatic and Consular Programs
913.0
967.0
+54.0
Inspector General
35.0
46.8
+11.8
Education & Cultural Exchange
20.0
20.0
--
International Peacekeeping Contributions
200.0
288.0
+88.0
International Broadcasting Operations
10.0
10.0
--
Bilateral Economic Assistance
3,575.7
3,502.2
-73.5
USAID Child Survival and Disease Programs
161.0
161.0
--
USAID International Disaster & Famine Asst.
105.0
135.0
+30.0
USAID Operating Expenses
5.7
10.7
+5.0
USAID Inspector General
--
3.5
+3.5
Economic Support Fund
3,025.0
2,953.0
-72.0
Asst. for Eastern Europe & Baltic States
279.0
239.0
-40.0
Other Department of State
389.0
568.5
+179.5
International Narcotics Control
260.0
334.5
+74.5
Migration & Refugee Asst.
71.5
111.5
+40.0
Emergency Refugee & Migration Asst. Fund
30.0
35.0
+5.0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related
27.5
87.5
+60.0
Department of the Treasury
5.3
2.8
-2.5
International Affairs Technical Assistance
2.8
2.8
--
Departmental Offices
2.5
--
-2.5
Military Assistance
498.0
485.0
-13.0
Foreign Military Financing Program
220.0
260.0
+40.0
Peacekeeping Operations
278.0
225.0
-53.0
Title II: Additional Hurricane Disaster Relief
and Recovery
3,400.0
6,357.4
+2,957.4
Department of Agriculture
--
140.0
+140.0
Livestock Assistance
--
25.0
+25.0
Irrigated Crops
--
15.0
+15.0
Citrus
--
100.0
+100.0
Department of Commerce
--
155.0
+155.0
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration
--
120.0
+120.0
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
--
35.0
+35.0
Corps of Engineers
--
1,337.1
+1,337.1
Construction
-270.0
37.1
+307.1
Flood Control
270.0
1,300.0
+1,030.0
Small Business Administration
--
25.1
+25.1
Disaster Loans
--
25.1
+25.1
Department of Homeland Security
3,400.0
4,630.0
+1,230.0
FEMA Disaster Relief
3,400.0
4,310.0
+910.0
Community Disaster Loan Act
--
320.0
+320.0
Department of Education
--
60.0
+60.0
Innovation and Improvement
--
30.0
+30.0
Higher Education
--
30.0
+30.0

---

CRS-69
Change to
Appropriations Subcommittee/Title/Account
Request
House
Request
Department of Housing and Urban Development
--
10.2
+10.2
Office of Inspector General
--
10.2
+10.2
Title III: Agricultural Assistance
--
3,726.0
+3,726.0
Crop Disaster Assistance
--
1,808.0
+1,808.0
Livestock Compensation Program
--
1,480.0
+1,480.0
Livestock Indemnity Payments
--
31.0
+31.0
Spinach
--
25.0
+25.0
Emergency Conservation Program
--
20.0
+20.0
National Dairy Market Loss Payment Program
--
283.0
+283.0
Peanut Storage
--
74.0
+74.0
Aquaculture
--
5.0
+5.0
Title IV: Other Matters
--
2,481.4
+2,481.4
Department of Agriculture
--
48.0
+48.0
Farm Management Agency
--
48.0
+48.0
Department of Commerce
--
60.4
+60.4
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration
--
60.4
+60.4
Department of Homeland Security
--
-20.0
-20.0
Rescission of Unobligated Balances
--
-20.0
-20.0
Department of the Interior
--
113.2
+113.2
Bureau of Land Management Wildland Fire
Management
--
100.0
+100.0
Fish and Wildlife Service Resource
Management
--
7.4
+7.4
National Park Service
--
0.5
+0.5
U.S. Geological Survey
--
5.3
+5.3
Department of Agriculture
--
800.0
+800.0
Forest Services Wildland Fire Management
--
400.0
+400.0
Secure Rural Schools
--
400.0
+400.0
Indian Health Facilities (Transfer)
--
-7.3
-7.3
Indian Health Services (Transfer)
--
7.3
+7.3
Department of Health and Human Services
--
1,419.7
+1,419.7
National Institute of Allergy & Infections
Diseases (Transfer)
--
-49.5
-49.5
Low Income Energy Home Energy Assistance
--
400.0
+400.0
Public Health & Social Services Emergency
Fund
969.7
+969.7
Public Health & Social Services Emergency
Fund (Transfer)
--
49.5
+49.5
Covered Countermeasure Process Fund
--
50.0
+50.0
Department of Labor
--
--
--
Employee Benefits Security Administration
(Transfer)
--
7.0
+7.0
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp (Transfer)
--
-7.0
-7.0
Legislative Branch
--
50.2
+50.2
House: Payments to Widows and Heirs
--
0.2
+0.2
Capitol Power Plant
--
50.0
+50.0

---

CRS-70
Change to
Appropriations Subcommittee/Title/Account
Request
House
Request
Department of State
--
10.0
+10.0
U.S. Mexico Boundary & Water Commission
--
10.0
+10.0
Title VI: Elimination of SCHIP Shortfall
--
214.0
+214.0
Department of Health and Human Services
--
214.0
+214.0
State Children’s Health Insurance Program
--
448.0
+448.0
Repeal of Medicare Advantage Enrollment
-1.0
-1.0
Rescission of Unobligated Balances for
Undocumented Alien ER
-233.0
-233.0
Grand Total
103,015.4
124,080.6
+21,065.2

---