Order Code RL33936
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:
A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?
March 23, 2007
Rhoda Margesson, Coordinator
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Jeremy M. Sharp
Analyst in Middle Eastern Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Andorra Bruno
Specialist in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:
A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?
Summary
The humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 as a result
of the war in Iraq appears to be unfolding. It is estimated that in total (including those
displaced prior to the war) there may be two million Iraqi refugees who have fled to
Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring states, and approximately two million Iraqis
who have been displaced within Iraq itself.
Throughout areas in western and central Iraq, the security situation is
deteriorating, and many of Iraq’s neighbors fear that they are being overwhelmed by
refugees fleeing over Iraq’s borders. There are now heightened concerns about the
absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they can provide adequately
for the populations moving across borders, and the impact of refugee flows on
stability in general. Some experts think that the Iraq situation could well begin to
outpace other refugee crises worldwide.
This report provides an analysis of the current crisis, including the conditions
for those displaced in Iraq and the refugee situations in Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.
It also provides information on the U.S. and international response and examines
refugee resettlement options in the United States. Aspects of this crisis that may be
of particular interest to the 110th Congress include a focus on an immediate response
(providing humanitarian relief funding), examining resettlement policies, and
developing a strategy to manage the displaced, particularly within Iraq. This report
will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Iraq, see CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, Christopher M. Blanchard,
Coordinator, and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Assessment of Iraqi Internal Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A History of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Profile of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Immediate Consequences of Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Assistance to IDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraqi Refugees in Syria and Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. and International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Refugee Program and Iraqi Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Increased International Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Humanitarian Response in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Links to Broader Iraq Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Tables
Inside Iraq: Profile of Estimated Populations of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Inside Iraq: Estimated Displacement Totals Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

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Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian
Crisis?
Overview
The violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife,
terrorism, and insurgency in Iraq has had a marked impact on civilian displacement
in different parts of the country. Since the bombing of the Shiite Muslim Al-
Askariya shrine in Samarra in February 2006, sectarian violence appears to have
accelerated an already developing pattern of population displacement and emigration.
In terms of overall figures, including those displaced prior to the 2003 war, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)1 believes that there may
be 2 million refugees who have fled Iraq, mostly to Jordan and Syria, and another
2 million who have fled to other parts of Iraq itself.
The conflict increasingly bears the mark of sectarian polarization and
“cleansing” in neighborhoods formerly of mixed religious orientation. Some argue
that displacement has become a tool of war and the means for feuding sects to
establish territorial control. Overall living standards have declined sharply. Direct
personal threats, abductions, assassinations, and death threats are commonplace.
Many middle class Iraqis with the means to leave have already done so. Religious
belief, political or tribal affiliation, or association with U.S. forces or Iraqi authorities
all can make someone a target for violence. Displacement can be the result of
sectarian conflict and general armed violence, local criminal activity, coalition
military operations, and fighting among militias and insurgents, all of which have
contributed to decreased security and an atmosphere of generalized fear for many
ordinary Iraqis.
In a November 2006 update on the situation, UNHCR suggested that the
humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 as a result of the
1 UNHCR is the U.N. agency dedicated to the protection of refugees and other populations
displaced by conflict, famine, and natural disasters. It provides legal protections,
implements long-term solutions, and coordinates emergency humanitarian relief for refugees
and other displaced persons. In Iraq, UNHCR is the lead on protection and shelter.
“Refugee” as defined under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, is a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to
return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
“Returnee” is a refugee who returns to his or her home country; and “IDP” is a person who
has not crossed an international border but remains displaced inside his or her own country.
UNHCR considers all categories part of “Populations of Concern.”

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CRS-2
war is happening now. “The massive displacement has emerged quietly and without
fanfare but the numbers affected are in excess of what many agencies had predicted
in 2003.”2 Then, as now, there were also concerns about the absorptive capacity of
neighboring countries, whether they could provide adequately for the populations
moving across borders, and the potential impact of refugee flows on stability in the
region. UNHCR estimates that between 40,000 and 50,000 Iraqis are currently
displaced each month and some observers speculate the pace of Iraq’s displacement
is continuing to increase. Some experts think that the Iraq situation could well begin
to outpace other refugee crises worldwide. UNHCR projects that, at this rate, by
December 2007 there could be 2.3 to 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in addition to more than 2 million refugees scattered throughout the region.3 On the
other hand, U.S. and Iraqi authorities are trying to resettle families in their former
homes as part of the Baghdad security plan now under way. What effect this may
have remains to be seen.

The figures on population displacement illustrate the challenges ahead. As the
110th Congress considers various policy options toward Iraq, the impact of this level
of displacement — which is the largest in the Middle East since 1948 — cannot be
underestimated in terms of its impact on regional stability and the potential for
humanitarian suffering. Experts suggest that what is badly needed — and quickly —
is the development of a robust response on the part of the international community
that provides and funds humanitarian relief; conducts a close examination of
resettlement policies and options in third countries; develops a strategy to manage the
displaced, particularly within Iraq; and implements increased funding to host
countries and aid agencies outside Iraq.
Assessment of Iraqi Internal Displacement
A History of Displacement
All internal displacement figures must be taken as estimates due to insufficient
data. Monitoring and registration are incomplete because of poor security, a lack of
access to some areas, and ongoing movement of possibly thousands of people per
day. It also should be noted that there are many patterns of displacement, some that
have their origins decades ago, but have now evolved into a new phase. For
example, approximately 300,000 refugees who were in Iran before the 2003 war, then
returned to Iraq, and now are believed to have been displaced again, this time within
Iraq. Others were refugees from other countries in the region who fled to Iraq and
are now on the move again within its borders. Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime left
2 UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006. See also CRS Report RL31814
Potential Humanitarian Issues in Post-War Iraq: An Overview for Congress, by Rhoda
Margesson and Joanne Bockman. Also, “Iraq Stands on Brink of Civil War, ‘Violence
Seems Out of Control’,” Special Representative Tells Security Council, SC/8895, Dec. 11,
2006. Figures provided are estimates and continue to change,
3 UNHCR, “Supplementary Appeal Iraq Situation Response: Protection and Assistance to
Iraqi Refugees in Neighbouring States and to IDPs and Non-Iraqi Refugees in Iraq,” January
2007.

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CRS-3
a legacy of displacement, as his regime forcibly displaced Iraqi Shiites and Kurds in
order to control territory, terrorize the population, and fight insurrection. Some
experts estimate as many as 1.5 million may have been displaced over the three
decades of his regime.
Current Displacement
Human development indicators — access to health care, social services,
education, employment — all have fractured under the current circumstances and
affected wider social networks in Iraqi society. Limited reconstruction activities and
access by the international community have made implementation of tangible, long-
term policy objectives difficult. Within many areas in Iraq, conditions are
deteriorating and, for those already displaced, are becoming more permanent
problems; many who cannot secure protection or assistance could soon find
themselves in the same situation. According to some estimates, Iraq’s population is
26.8 million, this means that nearly 13% of the population — or one in eight Iraqis
— may be displaced.

Profile of Displacement. There have been no reliable census data on Iraq’s
ethnic and sectarian makeup for decades. Iraq’s population represents a number of
different ethnic groups and religions. In a recent study, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) found that IDPs tended to be from mixed
neighborhoods and displaced to homogenous ones.4 The movement was
predominantly in and between urban areas — with more than 70% fleeing Baghdad.
In general throughout Iraq, patterns have shown that Shi’as have moved from the
center to the south; Sunnis from the south to the upper center; Christians fled to
Ninewah and Kurds ended up within Diyala or Tameem/Kirkuk.5
Palestinians in Iraq (who numbered 25,000-30,000 before the war and are
mostly Sunni) may be particularly vulnerable to reprisal attacks by Shiites as they
received preferential treatment from Saddam Hussein. The United Nations estimates
that only 5,000 Palestinians remain in Iraq, many have been killed, and others have
been displaced again.
4 International Organization for Migration (IOM) “Iraq Displacement 2006 Year in Review,”
January 2007.
5 Ibid. In addition, another account of displacement is provided by Al-Khalidid and Tanner,
who define several categories of those displaced, including: Sunni Arabs from Shi’a areas;
Shi’a from Sunni areas; Arabs (both Shi’a and Sunni) and other minorities from Kurdish
areas; and minority groups from both Sunni and Shi’a areas. These include Iraqi Christians,
Sabean-Mandeans, Shi’a Turkmen, the Roma, Baghdad and Basra Kurds, and third country
nationals, including Palestinians and Iranian Kurds. See Ashraf al-Khalidid and Victor
Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,” October
2006.

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CRS-4
Those Iraqis who have worked with the U.S. government, the new Iraqi
government, or international organizations also have been targeted.6 In addition,
there are vulnerable groups within these categories of displaced including the elderly,
sick, pregnant women, and children.
There are different types of displacement: Micro and nighttime displacement
means that a person is living in his or her home, but sleeping elsewhere to avoid a
pattern. Daylight displacement involves shifting routines, routes, activities, again to
avoid establishing any predictable pattern. Repeat-displacement, which means
moving a second time, or repeatedly, most commonly applies to those displaced by
military operations. And fake displacement are those who pretend to be displaced and
build homes on government land or the land of locals.7
Most of those displaced are moving in with family and friends. When this is not
possible they go to public facilities, such as schools and factories (some people are
squatting in damaged or abandoned property, such as mosques) and in much smaller
numbers, to camps set up by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society or Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MoDM).
Immediate Consequences of Displacement. There are many
consequences to displacement. In the short term, the IOM report examines the
deterioration of basic humanitarian needs and services, not only from displacement
itself, but due to lack of employment and a huge economic decline throughout the
country. Needs expressed by displaced Iraqis include food, water and sanitation, fuel
and electricity, shelter, and health care. As displacement continues to increase, so
does competition for limited resources and the impact on host communities. This is
beginning to impact communities that have reached their saturation point.8
Inside Iraq: Profile of Estimated Populations of Concern
Refugees in Iraq (Palestinian, Syrian, Iranian, Turkish,
50,000 +
Sudanese, many further displaced in Iraq)
Returnees (mainly from Iran; many further displaced in Iraq)
300,000
Stateless (Bedouins, etc.)
130,000
Source: Data from UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006 and Iraq Support Unit,
“Iraq Update,” November 3, 2006.
6 Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, “Humanitarian Issues and Politics in
Iraq,” Feb. 14, 2007.
7 Al-Khalidid and Tanner.
8 International Organization for Migration, “Iraq Displacement 2006 Year in Review,”
January 2007.

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CRS-5
Inside Iraq: Estimated Displacement Totals Over Time
IDPs (old caseload, prior to 2003)
1,200,000
IDPs (2003-2005)
approx. 200,000
IDPs (since Feb 2006)
730,000
Total
2,130,000
Assistance to IDPs
Government ministries providing assistance to the displaced within Iraq include
the MoDM, the Ministry of Trade, which is in charge of the allocation of food
rations, the Ministry of Interior, which provides documentation for services, such as
registration for food rations, and the Ministry of Education, which is in charge of
registering school children, many of whom have been displaced and need to be
enrolled in local schools. Support of the displaced in the provinces is usually
handled by a committee and is considered more effective. There are also informal
committees set up in local communities and in mosques. As a national aid agency
that is largely viewed as non-sectarian, the Iraqi Red Crescent assists the displaced
throughout the country.9
Experts believe that the sectarian groups have tried not only to consolidate
territory, but also to fill the gap as “protector and provider” in the provision of
services the government cannot fulfill for the displaced.10 Few international
humanitarian organizations are working in Iraq due to the unstable security situation.
Those that are there keep a very low profile.
In coordination with the MoDM, UNHCR is the focal point for the United
Nations in providing assistance to refugees and IDPs, finding durable solutions, and
preventing new displacement. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
is the deputy coordinator. In addition to working with the United Nations Assistance
Missions for Iraq (UNAMI), other partners include U.N. Operations (UNOPS),
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), U.N. Habitat, and the World Health
Organization (WHO). In neighboring countries, UNHCR works with the U.N.
country teams.
9 Al-Khalidi and Tanner, p. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 1

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CRS-6
Iraqi Refugees in Syria and Jordan11
Overview
UNHCR estimates that since 2003, nearly two million Iraqi refugees have fled
to Iraq’s neighboring states. The bulk of these refugees (est. 1.8 million) are currently
living in Jordan and Syria with several hundred thousand residing elsewhere in the
region (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran). Analysts note that neither Jordan nor
Syria has sufficient resources to sustain their respective refugee populations over the
long term. Although the plight of many Iraqis refugees is difficult but not dire, there
is much concern that the situation could deteriorate over time if new waves of
refugees flood Iraq’s neighbors.
Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries
Country
Refugee Estimates
Syria
1,000,000
Jordan
800,000
Egypt
100,000
Iran
54,000
Lebanon
25,000 - 40,000
Total
2,000,000 (est.)*
Source: UNHCR
* Refugee figures should be considered estimates. UNHCR has been short of funding, staff and
resources, and therefore unable to process all refugee documentation and adequately monitor
borders. It is relying on host governments to record refugee inflows.
Of those who have fled Iraq, various reports indicate that many refugees were
from Iraq’s now decimated middle class. Numerous interviews of Iraqi refugees
conducted outside Iraq have revealed that Iraqi professionals who fled the country
were the least sectarian elements in society, and many fled to escape both the general
threat of sectarian violence and the specific threat of kidnapping, which has become
a common criminal enterprise conducted by insurgents and organized gangs.
Unlike other refugee crises in war-torn areas, the status of Iraqi refugees in
neighboring states is more difficult to discern. At present, there are no makeshift tent
cities for the homeless and destitute, though aid agencies did construct such facilities
in 2003 in anticipation of a refugee crisis that did not materialize. While Iraqis
refugees are far from being assimilated into their host country, they have blended into
11 This section was written by Jeremy Sharp, Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division.

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CRS-7
urban areas, settling into cities like Amman and Damascus. Many Iraqis who fled the
country before/after the U.S. invasion had some temporary means of supporting
themselves either through their personal savings or remittances from relatives abroad.
Wealthy Baath party members and supporters of the Saddam Hussein regime who
fled to Jordan in 2003 were dubbed “Mercedes refugees” by the diplomatic
community and the press.12 Nevertheless, aid workers assert that the newer waves of
Iraqis streaming over the border are progressively poorer than their predecessors. As
the number of refugees increases, prioritizing those most in need of assistance has
become more critical. Aid workers note that because the Iraqi refugee population has
blended into urban areas, they are harder to identify, document, and assist.
There are many challenges that face Iraqi refugees living abroad. Aside from the
social isolation that accompanies their separation from family and tribe, Iraqis may
face discrimination and disdain from citizens who view them as competition for jobs
and access to strained social welfare services. Unemployment was already high in
Syria and Jordan before the Iraqis’ arrival, and both countries bar them from legally
working during their stay. Moreover, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are not state parties
to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its
1967 Protocol, which makes UNHCR’s role more difficult, as the term “refugee” and
the protection mandates recognized under international law are not formally
recognized in these countries. UNHCR currently operates in Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon under a Memorandum of Understanding that binds UNHCR to resettle
every person it determines is a refugee.
Syria
Syria has long considered itself to be the vanguard of a pan-Arab identity, a
stance that has led it to maintain a liberal immigration policy toward Arab visitors.
The Syrian government does not typically require visas for Arab visitors, a policy
that, according to many U.S. officials, has made Syria an ideal launching pad for
foreign fighters attempting to enter Iraq and join the insurgency. Syria has been open
to accepting Iraqis fleeing their country, and it has been the primary destination for
many displaced Iraqi Christians and Shiites.13 Syrian officials estimate that as many
as a million Iraqi refugees have settled at least temporarily in Damascus and its
suburbs, changing the character of entire neighborhoods and creating strains on the
Syrian economy in the form of rising rents, housing demands,14 and impending water
and electricity shortages. So far, Syrian authorities have kept an open door policy
regarding these new arrivals; however, there are increasing concerns that the
12 U.S. policymakers assert that some senior ex-Baath party members residing in Syria have
provided material and logistic support to the Sunni-led insurgency in Iraq.
13 Currently, Iraqi refugees receive a one-month permit on arrival in Syria. Iraqis must then
apply for a three-month permit that can be renewed by leaving Syria and returning again as
early as the same day. In February 2007, Syria tightened its immigration rules, but then
reversed its actions after vocal protests from the international community, the Iraqi
government, and Iraqis living in Syria.
14 In order to control rising housing prices, the Syrian government passed a law in 2005 that
prohibits Iraqis from investing in real estate.

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CRS-8
ethnic/sectarian and political factional disputes among Iraqis could be transferred to
the Iraqi refugee communities in Syria as well.
The Syrian government has sought assistance from the international community
in dealing with the Iraqi refugee issue. In March 2007, Ellen R. Sauerbrey, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, met with Syrian
Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad in Damascus reportedly to discuss refugee
issues.15 Syria claims that because it provides public subsidies for common household
necessities such as bread and fuel, the rising demand for such benefits due to the
influx of Iraqis is straining the national budget.
Jordan
Iraqis have perceived Jordan as an escape from violence, as some foreign
officials estimate that 800,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan over the last three years.16
For a small, relatively poor country such as Jordan, this population influx is creating
profound changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Jordan’s banking and real estate
sectors are soaring with the increased demand for housing and the influx of capital
from middle class expatriate Iraqis. On the other hand, inflation is rapidly rising, and
there have been anecdotal reports of increased tension between Jordanian citizens and
Iraqi refugees due to the strains placed on social services by a near 20% increase in
the country’s population in a short period of time. Some reports indicate that Sunni-
Shiite tensions may be simmering below the surface in Jordan, an overwhelming
Sunni Arab state whose East Bank inhabitants have strong tribal ties to Sunni Iraqis.
At this time, it is unclear whether displaced Iraqis will become a permanent fixture
in Jordan or will return to Iraq if, or when, violence subsides. According to a U.S.
State Department-conducted survey of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, “Nearly all [Iraqi]
participants say they would return to Iraq if the security situation alone improved —
even with continued problems in basic services or lack of job opportunities.”17 Other
Iraqis may be using Jordan as a gateway for obtaining residency/asylum in the West.
The Jordanian government classifies displaced Iraqis living in Jordan as
“visitors” or “guests,” not refugees, as Jordan does not have a domestic refugee law,
nor is it a party to the 1951 UN refugees’ convention.18 Iraqis who are able to deposit
$150,000 in Amman banks are granted residency almost instantly, while the vast
majority of Iraqis in Jordan have become illegal aliens due to the expiration of their
15 “U.S. Vetting Iraqi Refugees for Resettlement,” Washington Times, Mar. 14, 2007.
16 The Jordanian government recently contracted with a Norwegian organization (the
Applied Science Institute) to carry out a census of Iraqis living in Jordan.
17 “Iraqi Refugees in Jordan Await Stability before Returning,” Office of Research, Opinion
Analysis, U.S. Department of State, Feb. 28, 2007.
18 According to the UNHCR’s representative in Jordan, Robert Breen, “The term ‘refugee’
has political implications for the government and Iraqis because of the Palestinian
question.... Most Iraqis, who represent a very diverse group here, don’t view themselves as
refugees.” See, “Uncertain Future for Jordan’s ‘Guests,’” Financial Times, Mar. 12, 2007.

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CRS-9
visitor visas.19 According to a recent Human Rights Watch report on Iraqi refugees
in Jordan, “Jordan has not enforced immigration laws against overstayers in a
consistent manner. Yet, none of the Iraqis interviewed complained of police
irregularities, and many Iraqis even praised the police as treating them humanely and
without discrimination even though they are working and residing illegally.”20
In February 2007, Jordan tightened its immigration laws, requiring that all Iraqis
entering Jordan possess the newly-issued G-Series passports, a costly and difficult
item to obtain from the Iraqi government. Most Iraqis possess older passports and
many entered Jordan after obtaining forged documents. In addition to concerns over
absorbing more Iraqis, the Jordanian government may be treating the steady inflow
of Iraqi refugees as a national security issue. On November 9, 2005, near-
simultaneous explosions at three Western-owned hotels in Amman killed 58 persons
and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed
responsibility for the attacks.
U.S. and International Assistance
International Response
UNHCR’s Iraq budget in 2003 was approximately $150 million to deal with
possibly 600,000 refugees. In 2006, its Iraq budget was $29 million (although not
fully funded) until January 31, 2007, when it submitted its 2007 supplementary
appeal for $60 million.
An international conference on Iraqi displacement is scheduled to take place in
Geneva, Switzerland on April 17-18, 2007. Donor contributions from other
governments and intergovernmental entities have also been forthcoming, particularly
towards the emergency U.N. and other humanitarian appeals.
Resettlement applications from Iraqi refugees are up in Europe by almost 100
percent in two years. Sweden has seen a fourfold increase in applications in the past
year. As countries determine their resettlement policies with regard to Iraqi refugees,
it will be possible to compare these with the U.S. limit.
U.S. Response
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. The State
Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) at the State
Department is providing assistance to refugees and IDPs mostly through
implementing partners, including UNHCR and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). Small groups displaced at the border are also considered
19 Many Iraqis in Jordan lack valid residency permits or visas altogether. “Uneasy Havens
Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, Dec. 8, 2006.
20 “‘The Silent Treatment,’ Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan,” Human Rights Watch,
Volume 18, No.10 (E), November 2006.

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CRS-10
refugees. So far, $50 million in needs that have been identified as follows: $20
million has been appropriated in the FY2007 Continuing Resolution, with another
$15 million requested in the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental. PRM has identified
another $15 million that is required and for which it is currently seeking alternate
sources of funds.
In March 2007 Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey undertook a mission to the region
to expand assistance and protection (including resettlement in the United States) for
vulnerable Iraqis. Field assessments by the U.S. government to survey the situation
are also underway. It is unclear what percentage of Iraq’s displaced are in need of
international assistance. There are also different interpretations of what qualifies a
person for IDP status. Furthermore, many IDPs and refugees have thus far made it
on their own, particularly those who have been displaced for some time. It is
expected that newer refugees, and those reaching the limits of their options inside
Iraq, will require support first.
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is
providing assistance focused on IDPs and the host communities inside Iraq. Since
March 2003, OFDA has continued its aid program at various levels. The total spent
to date is approximately $196 million.
OFDA has five implementing partners that work mostly with local agencies, in
part because of the security situation and limited access in Iraq. OFDA’s total
funding needs for Iraq total $65 million — $20 million will come from
reprogrammed FY2007 funding and $45 million has been requested in the FY2007
Emergency Supplemental. With the number of new IDPs now exceeding 730,000
(since February 2006) these funding numbers may have to be adjusted.
OFDA is continuing its work with host communities, a number of which are
feeling the strain and finding it hard to cope with the extra burden of the increasing
numbers. OFDA’s strategy has been to support the host to help meet their needs and
so they in turn can maintain their capacity for helping IDPs.
There are a wide range of skills and capacities in the NGO community. The
NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq is reportedly made up of mostly European
NGOs, but it does not interact with the U.S. government. Interaction, the U.S.-based
umbrella organization for American NGOs, also has an Iraq working group.
Congressional Action. Congress has held hearings pertaining to the Iraqi
Refugee situation. Legislation before the 110th Congress with a section or more
focused on Iraqi refugees includes:
H.R. 663, the New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007 (Blumenauer). Introduced and
referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Armed Services
Committee on January 24, 2007.
H.R. 1591, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year
Ending September 20, 2007 (Obey). Introduced and referred to the House
Appropriations Committee.

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U.S. Refugee Program and Iraqi Refugees21
The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are
authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended.22 Under the
INA, a refugee is typically a person who is outside his or her country and who is
unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United
States from abroad. The Department of State (DOS) handles overseas processing of
refugees, which is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission.
Priority One (P-1) covers compelling protection cases and individuals for whom no
durable solution exists, who are referred to the U.S. refugee program by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a
designated nongovernmental organization (NGO). Iraqis, like all nationalities, are
eligible for P-1 processing. Priority Two (P-2) covers groups of special humanitarian
concern to the United States. It includes specific groups within certain nationalities,
clans, or ethnic groups, such as Iranian religious minorities. Priority Three (P-3)
comprises family reunification cases involving spouses, unmarried children under age
21, and parents of persons who were admitted to the United States as refugees or
granted asylum. Iraqis are among the 17 nationalities eligible for P-3 processing in
FY2007.
All refugee applicants are checked through DOS’s Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS).23 In addition, DOS must obtain a Security Advisory
Opinion (SAO) from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on certain applicants. In
the SAO process, additional databases are checked for information on the individual.
Individuals who are preliminarily determined to qualify for a processing priority are
presented to the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) for an in-person interview. USCIS makes
determinations about whether individuals are eligible for refugee status and are
otherwise admissible to the United States.
Each year, the President submits a report to Congress, known as the consultation
document, which contains the Administration’s proposed refugee ceiling and regional
allocations for the upcoming fiscal year. Following congressional consultations on
the Administration’s proposal, the President issues a Presidential Determination
setting the refugee numbers for that year. Since FY2002, the annual U.S. worldwide
refugee ceiling has been 70,000. During this period, the allocation for the Near
East/South Asia region, which includes Iraq, has ranged from a high of 15,000 in
21 This section was written by Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Social Legislation, Domestic
Social Policy Division.
22 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477; 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The Refugee Act (P.L. 96-212, Mar.
17, 1980) amended the INA to establish procedures for the admission of refugees to the
United States. For additional information on the U.S. refugee program, see CRS Report
RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno.
23 CLASS contains records on people ineligible to receive visas, including individuals who
are suspected or known terrorists and their associates or who are associated with suspected
or known terrorist organizations.

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FY2002 to a low of 3,000 in FY2004. The Near East/South Asia allocation for
FY2007 is 5,500 and, according to the FY2007 consultation document, includes
primarily vulnerable Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranian religious and ethnic minorities.
Since FY2003, the worldwide ceiling has included a significant unallocated reserve
of refugee numbers, which can be used if, and where, a need develops for refugee
slots in excess of the regional allocations. According to DOS’s Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), a total of 687 Iraqi refugees were
admitted to the United States between April 1, 2003, and February 28, 2007.24
Included in this total are 198 admissions in FY2005, 202 admissions in FY2006, and
60 admissions in FY 2007 through February 28, 2007.
In February 2007, DOS established the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced
Persons Task Force to coordinate refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP)
assistance to the region and refugee resettlement. Led by Under Secretary of State
for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, the task force includes officials
from DOS, USAID and DHS. It is charged with “focus[ing] the State Department’s
coordination with other USG [U.S. government] agencies, the UN [United Nations],
and other stakeholders.”25 At a February 14 DOS briefing, Under Secretary
Dobriansky described the task force’s work, as follows:
Our key immediate objectives are to assist internally displaced Iraqis and Iraqi
refugees by building up the capacities of UN agencies and NGOs. This includes
increasing opportunities for permanent resettlement for the most vulnerable
Iraqis, to establish specialized programs to assist Iraqis who are at risk because
of their employment or close association with the United States Government, to
work diplomatically with regional governments through bilateral and multilateral
channels to uphold the principle of first asylum.26
At the briefing, Under Secretary Dobriansky also discussed the Bush
Administration’s plans to accept additional Iraqi refugees for U.S. resettlement, as
part of a larger effort by UNHCR to increase Iraqi referrals worldwide. She stated:
We are expanding our capacity to receive referrals from UNHCR and plan to
process expeditiously some 7,000 Iraqi refugee referrals in the near term.27
In addition to these UNHCR referrals, Iraqi refugee referrals may also come from the
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Referrals to the U.S. refugee program are expected to
consist primarily of vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqis who are at risk because they have
worked for, or been closely associated with, the U.S. government, including the U.S.
24 Telephone conversation with PRM, Mar. 21, 2007.
25 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Establishes New Iraq Refugee and Internally
Displaced Persons Task Force,” press statement, Feb. 5, 2007, at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2007/february/80090.htm].
26 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Antonio Gutterres, and Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and
Migration Ellen Sauerbrey,” Feb. 14, 2007, at [http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/80532.htm].
27 Ibid.

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military. PRM estimates that 2,000 to 3,000 Iraqi refugees will arrive in the United
States by the end of FY2007.28
Beyond the formal refugee program, other immigration mechanisms have been
established or, as Under Secretary Dobriansky noted in her remarks on the task
force’s work, are under consideration to facilitate the admission to the United States
of Iraqis who have worked for or been closely associated with the U.S. government,
including the U.S. military. Provisions enacted in 2006 as part of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2006. 29 authorize DHS to grant legal permanent
resident status as special immigrants to certain nationals of Iraq and Afghanistan who
worked with the U.S. Armed Forces as translators, and their spouses and children.
This program is capped at 50 aliens (excluding spouses and children) annually.30
With respect to other possible options, Under Secretary Dobriansky stated the
following at the February 2007 DOS briefing:
We are also developing in cooperation with other agencies of the U.S.
Government proposed legislation to provide additional immigration mechanisms
for Iraqis in need of protection due to their employment or close association with
our government.
In response to questions at the briefing, Under Secretary Dobriansky and Assistant
Secretary Sauerbrey mentioned two possible mechanisms to assist Iraqis at risk
because of their association with the United States: special immigrant status, like that
authorized for certain translators and parole31 with refugee-like benefits. As of this
writing, other possible mechanisms are still under discussion.32
Issues for Congress
Increased International Funding
UNHCR and other experts say that more international aid in the form of
contributions and program development is required for host countries, domestic
NGOs, and for organizations providing assistance, such as UNHCR. It is often
difficult for international NGOs to register in these countries, and greater access
needs to be negotiated. UNHCR is short of funds and cannot provide adequate
assistance or protection to Iraqi refugees.
In its findings, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) refers specifically to the dramatic
increase in population displacement that could cause further destabilization both in
28 Telephone conversation with PRM, Mar. 21, 2007.
29 P.L. 109-163, §1059, Jan. 6, 2006.
30 P.L. 109-163, §1059, Jan. 6, 2006.
31 Parole is the discretionary authority of the Secretary of DHS to allow an alien to enter the
United States temporarily (but not to be formally admitted) for urgent humanitarian reasons
or when the entry is determined to be for significant public benefit.
32 Telephone conversation with PRM, Mar. 21, 2007.

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Iraq and the region and contribute to a humanitarian crisis. Specifically the ISG
suggests that the United States should “take the lead in funding assistance requests
from the UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies.” (Recommendation 66).33 Some
argue that bringing pressure to bear on other donors to participate in these relief
efforts, either by funding UNHCR’s 2007 supplemental appeal for Iraqi refugees or
by providing bilateral funding to host countries with specific allocations to Iraqi
refugees, could make a measurable difference in the humanitarian situation
developing on the ground.
U.S. Humanitarian Response in Iraq
Determining the immediate steps the United States can take with regard to Iraqi
IDPs in particular (and in a more general sense to the Iraqi refugees) and how other
international partners could be involved may prove to be critical in the next phase of
the U.S. Iraq strategy. Iraq’s internal population displacement appears to be
accelerating into a humanitarian crisis that is well beyond the current capacity on the
ground. Difficult decisions lie ahead including identifying who should be in charge
of any comprehensive relief effort, bringing together key players, and working out
a coordination strategy. Whether or not the MoDM has the resources and competence
to be effective remains to be seen in the long term, but in the immediate
circumstance, it is reportedly overwhelmed. It is not clear what role the U.S. military
might play in the humanitarian response on a local level in Iraq and whether the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) may be an immediate resource to consider.
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities
Amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing
or reducing discretionary spending or finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid
pledges may be difficult. When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the
Administration may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster contingency
accounts. In order to respond to future humanitarian crises, however, these resources
would need to be replenished. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other
emergencies could be curtailed. In the case of Iraq, with a humanitarian crisis
looming, the question of whether or not sufficient funds have been requested by the
Administration for a potential crisis remains. Moreover, some believe the United
States has greater responsibility to lead the way on committing funds to address the
needs of Iraqi refugees and IDPs. For broader political reasons, finding a balance on
burdensharing with the international community may be unique in the Iraq context.
Donor fatigue is also an issue, with some experts concerned about funding priorities
and the ongoing need for resources for other disaster areas.
Links to Broader Iraq Policy
With respect to the possible repatriation of Iraqi refugees, the refugee
admissions report to Congress states “It is hoped that significant numbers of Iraqi
refugees located throughout the Middle East and Europe will soon be able to return
home, although the security situation will remain an important consideration in
33 The Iraq Study Group Report, p. 58.

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repatriation.”34 It is not clear whether there are policy implications for refugee
resettlement at present, and whether, when viewed as a temporary situation, the
obligation by the United States to resettle Iraqi refugees becomes less pressing. In
addition, there is some concern that if, among those determined to be most vulnerable
and in need, proportionally more Christian Iraqis are resettled in the United States
than Muslim Iraqis, this could contribute to the perception of preference granted to
groups of one religion over another.
The question of granting preference to vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqis who are at
risk because they have worked for, or been closely associated with, the U.S.
government, including the U.S. military, may also have unforseen consequences.
Some have questioned whether it may create resentment among Iraqis seeking
resettling who do not qualify for preferential treatment. Others have asked whether
Iraqis will see “collaboration” with the United States as a means to resettle in the
United States and therefore will be eager to take advantage of any opportunity to do
so.
34 Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2007: Report to the Congress, p. 40.

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Appendix35
Refugees in Iraq (old caseload, prior to 2003) — Total more than 51,000. Many are
now targeted, some displaced again, within Iraq.
Country of Origin
Number
Palestinians
up to 22,500
Iranian Ahwazi
2,460
Sudanese
142
Syrian Arabs
681
Iranian 10,606
Turkish
15,000
Total
51,389
Returnees (those who were refugees) — (2002 - 2006, mainly from Iran to Southern
Iraq) Total nearly 300,000. The majority of returnees are now believed to be
displaced within Iraq.
Year
Number
2002
1,142
2003
50,524
2004
191,645
2005
55,267
2006
401
Total
298,979
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) — An old caseload of approximately 1,200,000
IDPs existed before 2006. Since February 2006 730,000 are thought to have been
displaced.
35 Data from UNHCR, “Update on the Iraq Situation,” November 2006 and telephone
conversation with USAID, OFDA, Mar. 21, 2007.

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