Order Code RS21968
Updated March 20, 2007
Iraq: Elections, Constitution, and Government
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transition government (January 30, 2005), a permanent
constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) government (December 15)
produced a broad-based but Shiite-led government that has been unable to reduce Sunni
popular resentment. President Bush’s January 10, 2007, Baghdad security initiative
requires Iraqi efforts to achieve national reconciliation; these efforts have proceeded far
more slowly than expected but are not broadly deadlocked. (See CRS Report RL31339,
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.)
After deposing Saddam Hussein militarily in April 2003, the Bush Administration
linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the adoption of a new constitution and
national elections, tasks expected to take two years. Prominent Iraqis persuaded the
Administration to accelerate the process, and sovereignty was given to an appointed
government on June 28, 2004. A government and a permanent constitution were voted
on thereafter, as stipulated in a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).1
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
The first of the 2005 elections was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat
transitional National Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41
seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). Run by an
“Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq” (IECI), the elections were conducted by
proportional representation (closed list); voters chose among “political entities” (a party,
a coalition of parties, or individuals). Any entity receiving at least 1/275 of the vote
(about 31,000 votes) won a seat. A female candidate occupied every third position on
electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal for at least 25% female membership. A
total of 111 entities were on the National Assembly ballot: 9 multi-party coalitions, 75
single parties, and 27 individual persons. The 111 entities had 7,000 candidates.
1 Text available at [http://cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].

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The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million, of which $130 million was
offset by international donors, including about $40 million from the European Union.
Out of $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States provided $40 million
to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and $40 million for political
party development. In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were
eligible to vote. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run
the “out-of-country voting” (OCV) program, which took place in Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain,
Netherlands, and the United States. About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens and
anyone whose father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90% of them voted (in January).
OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11 million was for the U.S. component,
but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Violence was less than anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks, but no
polling stations were overrun. Polling centers were guarded by the 130,000 members of
Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq available for backup. Two
days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and
polling locations were confirmed. Security measures were similar for the October 15 and
December 15 votes. Polling places were staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis in all three
elections in 2005. International monitoring was limited to 25 observers (in the January
elections) and some European parliament members and others (December elections).
The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in the January elections were those
best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and established secular parties. Most
notable was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA): 228 candidates from 22
parties, primarily the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the
Da’wa Party. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr had 14 supporters on the UIA slate;
eight of these won seats. The two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate list.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by
his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population),
perceiving electoral defeat and insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only
17 seats spread over several lists. Government formation was delayed by factional
bargaining over governmental posts, particularly the “presidency council” (president and
two deputies) and the post of prime minister, which had executive power. During April
and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one of two deputy
presidents, one of three deputy prime ministers, Defense Minister, and five other
ministers. Other major positions were held by Shiites or Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal
Talabani (President) and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari (Prime Minister).
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. One duty of the Assembly was to
draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005,
subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. The Assembly
appointed (May 10, 2005) a 55-member drafting committee, chaired by SCIRI official
Humam al-Hammoudi. The committee included only two Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni
resentment, and 15 Sunnis were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as
advisors. The talks produced a draft on August 28 (missing an August 15 deadline) that,
favoring the Kurds, set a December 31, 2007, deadline to resettle Kurds in Kirkuk and to
hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article 140);

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designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the
“established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);2 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article
47); allowed families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and
inheritance (Article 39); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said
that federal supreme court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and
experts in civil law (Article 89). These latter provisions concerned many women who
fear that the provisions gave too much discretion to males of their families in personal
legal issues.
The major disputes centered (and continue) on the draft’s provision allowing two or
more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and on provisions to allocate
oil revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces,
which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian (presumably Shiite) militias, in addition
to the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 required the central
government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to
population, and gave the “regions” a role in determining allocation of revenues from new
energy discoveries. Sunni negotiators opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunni-
dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields are said to
lie in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
of size and powers to be determined by subsequent law.
After further negotiations, the National Assembly approved a September 19, 2005,
“final” draft, but with the most contentious provisions unresolved. Sunnis registered in
large numbers (70%-85% in some Sunni cities) to try to defeat the draft, which was
printed and distributed by the United Nations. Sunni opposition prompted U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to mediate an agreement (October 11) providing
for a panel to propose a bloc of amendments within four months after the installation of
a post-December 15 election government (Article 137). The amendments would require
a majority Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to
a public referendum under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. In the relatively
peaceful October 15 referendum, 78.6% in favor and 21.4% against, nationwide. The
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” and Diyala, believed mostly Sunni, had
a 51% “yes” vote. The draft passed because only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by
a 2/3 majority.
December 15, 2005 Elections. The next transition step was the election of a
permanent government, to take place on December 15, 2005, and with the new
government to take office by December 31, 2005. In these elections, under a formula
designed to enhance Sunni representation, each province contributed a pre-determined
number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR). Of the 275-seat body, 230
seats were allocated this way, and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that
would have won additional seats had the election constituency been the whole nation. A
total of 361 political “entities” registered: 19 of them were coalition slates (comprising
125 different political parties), and 342 were other “entities” (parties or individual
persons). About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities. The UIA slate formally included
Sadr’s faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties including Fadila (Virtue). Former
2 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party “Iraqi National” slate was
broader than his January 2005 list, incorporating not only his Iraq National Accord but
also several smaller secular parties. The Kurdish alliance slate was intact from January.
Major Sunni slates, fearing long-lasting exclusion from Iraqi politics, competed. The
three-party “Iraqi Consensus Front” was led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), the party that
entered but then withdrew from the January 2005 elections. Another major Sunni faction
(Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran a separate slate. The hardline
Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate, although it did not, as it had in
January 2005, call for a broad Sunni boycott. Violence was minor (about 30 incidents)
as Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni representation in parliament, facilitated the
voting. As shown in the table, results suggest that voters chose lists representing their
sects and regions, not secular lists. The COR first convened on March 16 but did not
meet its deadlines to convene and choose a speaker (February 25 deadline); to select a
President and two deputies (no deadline specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice
after subsequent COR elections, by two thirds vote); to designate the “nominee of the
[COR] bloc with the largest number” as Prime Minister (15 days after choosing the
presidency council, by two thirds vote); or to name a cabinet and obtain approval (with
another 30 days, by majority vote).
With 181 seats combined (nearly two thirds of the COR), the UIA and the Kurds
continued their joint dominance, but they differed over the UIA’s preference for Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. On April 20, Jafari stepped aside in favor of another senior
Da’wa Party figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. National Dialogue Front
figure Mahmoud Mashhadani, a Sunni hardliner, was chosen COR speaker.
Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki won approval of a 39 member cabinet
(including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006, one day prior to a 30-day deadline.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently
until June 8 because of factional infighting; the Defense Ministry went to Gen. Abdul
Qadir Mohammad Jassim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi
military and imprisoned for criticizing the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Interior Ministry
went to Jawad al-Bulani, a relatively non-partisan Shiite, replacing SCIRI’s Bayan Jabr,
who became Finance Minister. Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a faction of the Da’wa
Party, became Minister for National Security. Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni
Arab Salam al-Zubaie are deputy prime ministers. Four ministers are women. The
KDP’s Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign Minister. Hussein Shahristani, aide to
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is Oil Minister. Sadr followers are Ministers of Health, of
Transportation, and of Agriculture; another is Minister of State for Tourism and
Antiquities. Of the 37 ministerial posts, there are eight Sunnis; seven Kurds; twenty-one
Shiites; and one Christian.
According to the Administration and the Iraq Study Group (ISG), the Iraqi
government has put forward milestones to achieve national reconciliation. The
President’s January 10, 2007, security plan — announcing the addition of 21,500 U.S.
troops (now increased to 28,000 including support troops) to secure Baghdad and Anbar

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Province — requires progress on the uncompleted steps to achieve reconciliation. The
President’s plan does not follow the ISG recommendation that the United States reduce
its political, military, and economic support for the government if it fails to meet these
milestones. In part because the parliament has not reached a quorum on most days since
November 2006, only a few of the milestones have been completely met, as follows:
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution under
the special amendment process promised; approval of a law to implement formation
of regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law establishing the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The investment law was adopted
in October 2006. The IHEC law was passed on January 23, 2007. The constitutional
review committee has been formed. The law on regions was adopted October 12,
2006, although, to mollify Sunni opposition, the major factions agreed to delay the
formation of any new region for 18 months. The IHEC law is close to completion,
according to U.S. officials in Iraq.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial election law (which would presumably
lead to more Sunnis on provincial councils; the 51-seat Baghdad city council has only
one Sunni Arab, for example) and approval of a new oil law. On February 26, 2007,
Iraq’s cabinet passed and submitted to parliament a draft oil law that would set up a
broad Federal Oil and Gas Council that would review exploration contracts signed
with foreign energy companies, including those signed by Iraq’s regions. According
to circulating drafts, some seats on the Council could go to foreign energy firms. To
be fully implemented, other laws are needed simultaneously, including a law on
sharing oil revenues among Iraq’s communities, and a law regulating the dealings with
foreign energy firms. The draft had been long delayed by the Kurd’s insistence that
regions be allowed to sign contracts with foreign firms; the draft included a provision
to this effect. No agreement on a provincial election law has been evident to date.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval of a
flag and national anthem law. Iraqi leaders announced on January 17, 2007, that they
had returned 2,300 ex-Baathists to their jobs or given them pensions instead, but a
draft law that reportedly would allow all but 1,500 senior ex-Baathists to return to
their jobs or receive pensions remains stalled by the dominant Shiite and Kurdish
factions.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty to
insurgent supporters.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process. The
constitution review committee has not completed proposed amendments to date.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee
governance.
(7) Holding of a referendum on the special amendments to the constitution.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten Iraqi
Army divisions are now under Iraqi control.
(9) By June 2007, the holding of provincial elections.

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(10) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security
Forces now have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf.
On February 21, 2007, Britain said it would turn over Basra Province by mid-2007.
(11) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
The President’s Baghdad security plan also requires the commitment of three Iraqi
brigades and an unspecified number of police commandos and regular police in nine
sectors of Baghdad. U.S. commanders say that these units are showing up, at a better than
anticipated 80% strength. Iraq has, as was required, designated a commander (Lt. Gen.
Abboud Qanbar) and deputy commander of Baghdad, and its 2007 budget, adopted
February 8, 2007, commits the pledged $10 billion in Iraqi funds for reconstruction.
Skeptics argue that Maliki’s government has previously not allowed U.S. forces to
raid Shiite militias because Maliki is politically dependent on Sadr. However, on
February 13, 2007, he banned all fielding of weapons by those not in the ISF. a signal to
Sadr that the Mahdi Army is not immune from U.S.-led operations under the new plan.
Possibly in response, Sadr reportedly directed Mahdi commanders not to challenge the
new security operations, and some reports say Sadr himself fled to Iran to avoid being
targeted by the new plan. In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly tried to forge a
new coalition that would exclude Sadr, although the defection of the Shiite Fadilah party
from the UIA in March 2007 has set up the potential for a new coalition among it,
Allawi’s secular bloc, and the Sunni blocs into a new coalition that could end up isolating
the Da’wa Party and SCIRI. For several months, Maliki has foreshadowed a cabinet
reshuffle to possibly remove Sadrist ministers, but no action has been taken to date.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Slate/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
140
128
(SCIRI~30; Da’wa~28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
44
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
11
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)
2
5
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200.
Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December.
Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

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