Order Code RL32723
Zimbabwe: Current Issues
and U.S. Policy
Updated March 13, 2007
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
Zimbabwe’s prospects appeared promising in 1980, as it gained independence
after a long liberation war. The country exhibited steady economic growth, enabling
the new government to provide free education and widespread access to health care.
Challenges grew in the 1990s, however. Rising inflation and unemployment bred
discontent, as evidenced by regular student and labor protests, and led in 1999 to the
formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The new
party surprised many with its initial success, campaigning against a 2000 referendum
that would have legalized the president’s continued rule, made government officials
immune from prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned
land for redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won
nearly half the seats in the 2000 parliamentary election. The ruling party has since
taken numerous, often undemocratic actions to bolster its power, including an
aggressive land redistribution policy.
President Robert Mugabe’s government is seen as autocratic and repressive by
its critics, and its human rights record is poor. The regime suppresses freedom of
speech and assembly, and many contend that the government restricts access to food,
already scarce, in opposition areas. The MDC, divided over how to respond, split into
two factions in 2005, hampering its ability to challenge the ruling party. Some
analysts suggest the March 2007 arrest and reported police assault of the two faction
leaders may signal a move toward reconciliation. Mugabe has repeatedly extended
his rule and has not named a successor to lead his party after his eventual departure
from office. Despite a proposal to postpone elections, a behind-the-scenes succession
power struggle within his party adds to concerns for the country’s stability.
Zimbabwe’s economic output has decreased 40% since 1998, inflation is over
1,500%, and unemployment is estimated at more than 80%. A widely criticized urban
cleanup program in 2005 resulted in the demolition of thousands of homes and
businesses in poor urban areas, seen by the government as a base of MDC support.
The adult HIV infection rate of 20% has contributed to a sharp drop in life
expectancy. Deteriorating conditions in the country have led many Zimbabweans to
emigrate to neighboring countries, creating a substantial burden on the region.

President Mugabe has enjoyed considerable popularity in Africa as a former
liberation leader. However, some African leaders have come to see his conduct as
damaging to the continent and are urging democratic reforms. South Africa has
pursued “quiet diplomacy” aimed at resolving the problems in Zimbabwe through
dialogue between the government and opposition, but many view this policy as
ineffective. Following controversial elections in 2000 and citing abuses of human
rights and the rule of law, the United States and other former allies of the Mugabe
government have become vocal critics. The U.S. Secretary of State has labeled
Zimbabwe an “outpost of tyranny,” and the United States has enforced targeted
sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002. This report has
been revised to describe recent developments and reactions from the international
community, including those of the United States. This report will be updated as
events warrant.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Parliamentary Elections 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Election-Related Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Charges of Election Rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Election Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Restrictions on Political Freedoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2005 Senate Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Presidential Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Origins of the MDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Treason Charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Division in the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Could an Extension of Mugabe’s Term Reunite the Opposition? . . . . 12
Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies . . . . . . . . 12
Political Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Humanitarian Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Operation Murambatsvina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Political Motivations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Continued Evictions and Operation Garikai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Violations of Domestic and International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Operation Taguta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Food as a Political Weapon? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The IMF and the World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Attempts to Revive Agriculture Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The Mining Industry and “Blood” Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
“Look East” Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Military and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
International Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Support for African Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Other International Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
SADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Prospects for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Background1
After years of economic sanctions by the international community and a
decades-long civil war that resulted in more than 30,000 dead, the white minority rule
government of Southern Rhodesia concluded a series of agreements with the black
majority in 1979 that resulted in the establishment of the government of the Republic
of Zimbabwe. Among the greatest challenges facing the new government was the
demand by the majority for greater equity in land distribution.2 At independence, the
white minority, who composed less than 5% of the population, owned the vast
majority of the arable land. Many observers considered the country’s white-owned
commercial farms crucial to the country’s economy, although there was a general
recognition that land reform was necessary. Britain initially funded a “willing buyer,
willing seller” program to redistribute commercial farmland, offering compensation
to white farmers amenable to leaving their lands.
Dissatisfaction with the pace of land reform grew and led in the 1990s to
spontaneous and often violent farm invasions. At the same time, the country’s labor
movement and a segment of its urban middle class were becoming increasingly
critical of the government’s economic performance. Facing rising political and
economic challenges, the government of Zimbabwe began to implement aggressive
land expropriation policies, leading Britain and other donors to begin withdrawing
financial support for resettlement.
In 2000, the government held a referendum to approve changes to the
constitution that would allow land seizures without compensation, a responsibility
that in its view lay with Britain. The referendum was rejected by 55% of voters and
was seen as a victory for a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC). Within days of the vote war veterans and ruling party supporters
moved onto an estimated 1,000 white-owned farms, and, months later, the President
invoked emergency powers to take land without compensation. During this time
there were numerous attacks against white farmers and their employees, as well as
against supporters of the MDC; more than 30 people were killed.
Since then, the country’s problems have deepened. Substantial political
violence and human rights violations accompanied parliamentary elections in 2000
and 2005 and the presidential election in 2002. There are continuing reports of
human rights abuses and of food being used as a political weapon. Zimbabwe’s
1 This report was originally authored by Raymond W. Copson and Jeffrey Townsend.
2 For more information on Zimbabwe’s land redistribution issue and other historical context,
see CRS Report RL31229, Zimbabwe Backgrounder, by Raymond Copson.

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CRS-2
political difficulties have been accompanied by a sharp decline in living standards,
with more than 80% of the population living on less than $2 per day.3 Once touted
as a potential “breadbasket of Africa,” much of Zimbabwe’s population is now
dependent on food aid. More than 20% of adults in Zimbabwe are infected by the
HIV/AIDS virus, and life expectancy fell from an estimated 56 years in 1990 to 39
in 2006.4 In fact, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), the life
expectancy for Zimbabwean women is just 34, the lowest in the world. Foreign
Policy magazine has ranked Zimbabwe fifth in its index of failed states.5 Observers
are concerned that the difficulties confronting Zimbabwe are affecting neighboring
countries and deterring investors from the region.
Zimbabwe at a Glance
Name: Republic of Zimbabwe
Population: 12.2 million (2006 estimate)
Approximate size: Slightly larger than Montana
Population growth rate: 0.62% (2006 estimate)
Life expectancy at birth: 39 years
Ethnic groups: African 98% (Shona 82%, Ndebele 14%, other 2%), Mixed and
Asian 1%, White less than 1%
Languages: English (official), Shona, Sindebele and a number of tribal dialects.
Literacy: Total Population: 90.7%

Male: 94.2%
Female: 87.2% (2003 est.)
GDP real growth rate: -4.4% (2006 est.)
HIV Infection Rate: 20.1% (adults, aged 15-49; 2006 est.)
Unemployment: 80% (2005 est.)
Industries: Mining (coal, gold, nickel, tin, clay, numerous metallic and nonmetallic
ores), steel, wood products, cement, chemicals, fertilizer, clothing and
footwear, foodstuffs, beverages.
Sources: CIA World Factbook, Zimbabwe, 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit, Zimbabwe
3 Department for International Development (DFID), Country Profile: Zimbabwe, December
2006.
4 UNAIDS, UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2006, and CIA, CIA World
Factbook 2006.
5 The Washington-based Foreign Policy magazine uses 12 economic, social, political, and
military indicators to rank countries in order of their “vulnerability to violent internal
conflict and social dysfunction.” Zimbabwe’s ranking on the index dropped 14 points from
the previous year, suggesting the country’s situation has deteriorated. For more
information, see “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2006.

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CRS-3
Political Situation
Zimbabwe has been ruled since independence by the Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which has come under increasing
scrutiny from human rights activists, both at home and abroad. Critics cite high levels
of corruption, political violence, and strictly enforced laws restricting basic freedoms.
The government contends its detractors have engaged in a “propaganda war” backed
by Britain and the United States, using democracy and human rights as a cover to
push for regime change.6 Many domestic and international observers have judged
elections since 2000 to be “far from free and fair.” Zimbabweans also appear
disenchanted with the electoral process; voter turnout in the 2005 elections for the
new Senate was less than 20%. The country’s main opposition party, the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), split over tactical issues in 2005. The ruling party
has also suffered some internal competition, although a recent proposal to prolong
President Mugabe’s retirement may lessen the infighting until the party is forced to
choose a new standard bearer. The timing of this transition, and the means by which
it will occur, cannot be predicted, but with Mugabe in his 80s, it appears inevitable.
Parliamentary Elections 2005
Zimbabwe held its most recent legislative elections in 2005. The elections, like
those before them in 2000 and 2002, were controversial, with the opposition
disputing the results and alleging government efforts to deny a fair race. ZANU-PF
retained control of the 150-member parliament, taking 108 seats (of these, 30 are
appointed by the President rather than elected). The opposition MDC won 41 seats,
and one seat went to an independent.7
The MDC’s representation in parliament has declined since 2000, when it won
57 seats in its first elections. Some observers argue that the MDC did not do as well
in the 2005 election because it delayed a decision to participate until December 2004,
leaving little time to campaign. Violence against MDC voters in past elections, and
the alleged use of food distributions by the ruling party to secure votes, and a general
climate of intimidation may have also discouraged MDC support. Government
supporters suggest voters simply lost faith in MDC promises.
Opposition access to the state-run media was severely limited prior to the
election, according to Reporters Without Borders, a Paris-based organization that
supports press freedom.8 The MDC was rarely covered in news stories on television
or in the Herald, the government-controlled newspaper, and the stories that did
appear were typically disparaging.
6 “Imperialists Can’t Preach Human Rights,” The Herald, Jan. 19, 2007.
7 Jonathan Moyo, former Information Minister, left ZANU-PF and was elected as an
independent candidate.
8 Reporters Without Borders, “No Letup in Abusive Media Tactics Three Weeks Before
Legislative Elections,” Mar. 8, 2005.

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CRS-4
Election-Related Violence. While most observers agree that the level of
political violence surrounding the 2005 elections was significantly less than that
which preceded the 2000 and 2002 elections, many argue the election was not “free
and fair,” and that there were some incidents of violence. Critics suggest that state
harassment of civil society and the political opposition, combined with limitations
on press and other political freedoms, left little need for violent repression.
Nevertheless, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of 17 human
rights organizations, reported more than 300 assaults in the pre- election period.9
Charges of Election Rigging. Many analysts argue that the Zimbabwean
political system is undemocratic because elections are administered by institutions
and under laws that many consider biased in favor of the ruling party. In response
to democratic protocols established by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the government passed the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
(ZEC) Act and the Electoral Act prior to the 2005 elections. However, the new
“independent” ZEC, appointed by the president, was only established two months
before the election, leaving many of the preparations to the old Electoral
Commission, which many considered discredited by its past performance. According
to the U.S.-based democracy advocacy group Freedom House, “despite some
improvements, the Electoral Act granted the ZEC powers to employ security forces,
retained biased residency requirements for voters, denied most expatriates the right
to vote, and created an Electoral Court staffed by a deeply compromised judiciary.”10
The Mugabe government has employed other legal tactics seen by critics as
designed to intimidate the opposition and produce a political landscape favorable to
ZANU-PF. The 2004 gerrymandering of constituencies, which the government
attributed to population shifts arising from its land reform program, resulted in the
redistricting of three urban seats held by the MDC into three new rural
constituencies, which ZANU-PF candidates won in 2005. The International Council
of Barristers and Advocates described extensive efforts by ZANU-PF to gain control
over the legal system in a 2004 report, suggesting the ruling party has interfered in
judicial appointments and forced the removal of impartial judges “through a
combination of psychological and physical intimidation and threats of violence.”11
The MDC has challenged the results of 16 races in court, claiming that the
election was rigged. Their allegations focus on several largely rural districts in which
the ZEC announced voter turnout totals before the vote results were reported. Once
the results came in, the ZANU-PF candidate won in each case, but the vote for the
two candidates added together exceeded the initial ZEC-reported turnout total. This
created a suspicion that additional votes had been given to the ZANU-PF candidates
9 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, March 2005. The
forum produces monthly reports on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and assists
victims of violence. See [http://www.hrforumzim.com].
10 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006.
11 International Council of Barristers and Advocates, The State of Justice in Zimbabwe,
December 2004. The Council sent an investigative team to Zimbabwe which included
Chairmans of the Bar of England and Wales and the Irish Bar, and Vice Chairman of the
South African Bar.

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CRS-5
during the tabulation phase to prevent MDC victories. The ZEC eventually halted
the release of turnout totals, so it is not known if there were similar discrepancies in
other districts. According to the ZEC, they had initially released early totals coming
in to provide an indication of voter turnout, and the discrepancies between those
initial figures and the final tallies were due to poor communications from rural areas.
Other opposition allegations focus on large numbers of voters were reportedly turned
away by poll officials for alleged registration problems, which seem to have been
more common in contested areas than in districts regarded as safe for ZANU-PF.
Although none of the 2005 results have been overturned, a July 2006
Zimbabwean supreme court decision may give the opposition further legal recourse.
Against the arguments of the chief justice, the attorney-general, and the justice
minister, the court ruled that the judicial appointment of commissioners to the
electoral court was unconstitutional and violated the principle of separation of
powers. Legal experts suggest this ruling may reopen the MDC’s petitions, as well
as a challenge by a former MDC MP who was disqualified from the race in 2005.12
Election Observers. Many domestic election observers, such as the
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the Zimbabwe Election Support
Network (ZESN), were critical of the elections. During the pre-election period, they
cited a lack of transparency surrounding voter registration as a “significant and
serious threat to the overall credibility of the electoral process.” Their reports cited
no incidents of overt political violence, but noted the pre-election period was marked
by intimidation, “politicization of food distribution,” and a lack of media access by
the opposition. The observers contended they were restricted access to the vote
counting process at many polling stations, and that in some cases the total voter tally
did not coincide with the total number of votes cast for the candidates.13 Both groups
reported the use of POSA, MOA, and AIPPA throughout the election period against
opposition supporters. The ZLHR report concluded, “Zimbabwean authorities have
failed, on most accounts, to ensure a free and fair electoral process.”14
The Mugabe regime placed limits on foreign observers for the election. No U.S.
observers were invited, and Russia was the only European country asked to send a
team. Leading the Southern African Development Community (SADC) delegation,
South African Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka congratulated Zimbabwe on “the
holding of a peaceful, credible, well managed and transparent election. The people
of Zimbabwe have expressed their will in an impressively instructive manner that
will go a long way in contributing to the consolidation of democracy and political
12 “Zimbabwe Court Rules 2005 Electoral Legislation ‘Inconsistent’ with Constitution,” The
Financial Gazette, July 27, 2006.
13 ZESN, Report on Zimbabwe’s 2005 General Election, April 2005. The ZESN, a coalition
of 35 human rights and civic groups based in Zimbabwe, deployed 260 long-term observers
and 6000 observers for the election itself.
14 The report of the ZLHR,a local human rights organization that deployed 44 observers for
the election, is available at [http://www.zlhr.org.zw].

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CRS-6
stability not only in Zimbabwe, but also in the region as a whole.”15 The head of
South Africa’s parliamentary observer mission was quoted saying that the delegation
had “unanimously agreed that the elections were credible, legitimate, free and fair.”16
Both statements received substantial criticism in the international press. The SADC
Parliamentary Forum, which consists of legislators from the region and had issued
a report critical of the 2002 election, was not invited to observe the vote.
Western governments condemned the elections. Based on reports from domestic
observers and U.S. Embassy staff who were allowed to observe the election, U.S.
Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice issued the following statement:
Although the campaign and election day itself was generally peaceful, the
election process was not free and fair. The electoral playing field was heavily
tilted in the government’s favor. The independent press was muzzled; freedom
of assembly was constrained; food was used as a weapon to sway hungry voters;
and millions of Zimbabweans who have been forced by the nation’s economic
collapse to emigrate were disenfranchised.17
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commended the election’s lack of violence but
noted concern that “the electoral process has not countered the sense of disadvantage
felt by opposition political parties who consider the conditions were unfair.”18
Restrictions on Political Freedoms
Legislative actions in the ZANU-PF-dominated parliament have raised concerns
about human rights in Zimbabwe. Laws that critics contend are used to quiet dissent
and influence political developments include the following:
! The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(AIPPA). This 2002 Act requires that all media services be licensed
by the government, and that all journalists, including foreign
correspondents, be officially accredited. The government, citing
AIPPA, closed The Daily News, the only remaining independent
daily, in 2003. In 2005, three Zimbabwean correspondents for the
Associated Press, Bloomberg Financial News, and the Times of
London, fled Zimbabwe after police raided their office. The Media
Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has stated that AIPPA is “one
of the most effective legal instruments of state control over the
media and civil society communication anywhere in the world,” and
warned that elections in 2005 would not be free and fair unless
15 “Zimbabwe’s Enabler; South Africa Falls Short as Monitor of Democracy,” Washington
Post, Apr. 4, 2005.
16 “The Real Fraud in Zimbabwe,” Washington Times, Apr. 6, 2005.
17 The statement of Secretary Rice, made on Apr.1, 2005, is available online at
[http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44141.htm].
18 Secretary-General Annan’s statement is available at [http://www.un.org/News/ossg/].

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CRS-7
media restrictions were lifted.19 The government counters that
AIPPA encourages responsible journalism.
! The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act (“Criminal Law Code”), and the
Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA). POSA, also enacted in 2002,
prohibits any statements deemed to be “abusive, indecent, obscene,
or false” about the president or considered to “undermin(e) public
confidence” in the security forces, and prohibits false statements
prejudicial to the state.20 The measure, which the government
suggests prevents anarchy, has been used in the arrest of thousands
of political opponents and in police action to break up public
meetings and demonstrations. Zimbabweans overheard criticizing
the President in a public place have also been jailed. The MOA
criminalized “conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace,” and
was often used with POSA against activists. Police and “persons
assisting the police” may use “all necessary force” to stop unlawful
gatherings.21 In mid-2006 many offences under POSA and MOA
were transferred to the new Criminal Law Code.
! Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Bill and the Private
Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Act. The controversial NGO Bill,
pushed through parliament in 2004 despite objections to its
constitutionality, has not been signed into law by the President,
although concerns remain about its future. The bill would have
prohibited foreign NGOs from operating in Zimbabwe if their
principal objectives include “issues of governance,” which in turn
include “the promotion and protection of human rights.”22 Domestic
NGOs would have been prohibited from accepting foreign funds for
activities involving issues of governance. Instead, the government
uses the PVO Act, enacted in 2002. NGOs are required to register
with the government, and a “probe team” of intelligence officers has
wide powers to investigate groups and demand documents related to
activities and funding. The African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights has recommended that it be repealed.
The opposition has had some limited success in preventing the ruling party
from passing other legislation that it contends would restrict freedoms. The
government withdrew its Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Bill
after accepting the contention that some provisions were unconstitutional, although
a modified version was reintroduced in December 2006. The original draft defined
19 MISA, Annual Report, April 2003-March 2004; “Media Institute Says Press Restrictions
in Zimbabwe Rule Out Fair Elections,” Voice Of America (VOA), Apr. 5, 2004.
20 For the text of the POSA, see [http://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/posa060203.doc].
21 Solidarity Peace Trust, Policing the State, December 2006.
22 International Bar Association, “An Analysis of the Zimbabwean Non-Governmental
Organizations Bill, 2004,” Aug. 24, 2004.

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CRS-8
mercenary activity as “an act aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining
the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state.”23 Some charge
it would allow the government to imprison critics. The government contends the
legislation demonstrates its commitment to the fight against terrorism. The
parliament is also debating legislation which would allow the government to monitor
all Internet, email, and telephone communications for threats to national security.
The Interception of Communications Bill, which had been stalled by the
Parliamentary Legal Committee (chaired by an MDC MP), was revised in late 2006
and is expected to be approved in 2007. Critics suggest the revisions are cosmetic.
In the 2005 elections ZANU-PF won over two-thirds of the seats in the House
of Assembly, giving the party the power to amend the constitution. Since then, the
parliament has passed several controversial constitutional amendments which some
analysts contend breach international human rights standards. The Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.17), approved in 2005, allows the government to
limit the right to freedom of movement when it is in “the public interest” or in “the
economic interests of the State” and restricts the right to leave Zimbabwe. Several
journalists, MDC officials, and union leaders have had their passports revoked under
the act; the government has charged that they planned to lobby abroad for sanctions
or military intervention against the country.24 The act also creates a constitutional
amendment that prevents land owners from challenging the acquisition of agricultural
land by the state. It paved the way for the passage of Gazetted Land (Consequential
Provisions) Act in late 2006, making it illegal for former farm owners to occupy land
the government has nationalized and allowing the government to evict farmers and
resettle the land without compensation. The constitutional amendment also revived
the upper house of the parliament, the Senate, which was abolished in 1989.
2005 Senate Elections
Elections to the new 66-seat Senate were held in September 2005, and were
marked by record low voter turnout. Of 26 MDC candidates who ran, seven were
elected; ZANU-PF gained the overwhelming majority of seats. Observers suggest one
of the reasons for the low turnout may have been a lack of solidarity on the part of
the opposition, which split prior to the election over whether to boycott the vote.
Presidential Succession
In view of President Mugabe’s advanced age, the presidential succession in the
event of his death or retirement is a matter of intense interest to Zimbabwe analysts.
Some observers worry that Zimbabwe could experience a violent succession struggle
and a possible military coup when he leaves the scene. Under the Zimbabwe
constitution, the president may designate one of the country’s two vice presidents to
serve as acting president until the next election, should he leave office, but Mugabe
has not done so. One of the vice presidential posts was vacant prior to the ZANU-PF
23 The text of the original legislation can be found at [http://www.kubatana.net/docs/
legisl/supp_foreign_int_terror_bill.doc].
24 “Title Deeds to 4,000 Farms Nullified,” The Herald, Sept. 23, 2005.

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CRS-9
party conference in late 2004, setting off a power struggle that transformed
Zimbabwe’s political scene by revealing internal party divisions.
Despite his age, President Mugabe is reportedly in good health and in no rush
to relinquish his post. Many observers suggest he has used the country’s anti-
corruption authority to check the political ambitions of his party members, and
almost all potential contenders have been linked to corruption scandals. The recent
proposal to extend the next presidential elections to 2010, which Mugabe himself has
endorsed, implies the President has no plans to pick a successor in the near future.
Mugabe has also indicated his willingness to run again if nominated by his party
should elections be held as scheduled in 2008.25
25 “Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe Says He May Seek Re-election in 2008 Ballot,” Voice
of America, Mar. 12, 2007.

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Who Will Succeed Mugabe?
Prior to ZANU-PF’s December 2004 party conference, Emmerson
Mnangagwa, speaker of the parliament and a political veteran long touted as
Mugabe’s heir, campaigned actively for the position of ZANU-PF’s second vice
president. His selection to that position would likely have assured his
appointment by Mugabe as national vice president, but Mnangagwa was caught
off guard when Mugabe decided that the country should have a woman in the
post. Mugabe’s choice for the position, Joice Mujuru, was inevitably elected by
the party convention, and Mugabe swore her into office as Zimbabwe’s second
vice president on December 6. Mujuru, a veteran of the liberation war and a
women’s movement leader, had been serving as Minister of Water Resources
and Infrastructure. Analysts differ on whether she is the new heir apparent, or
might be pushed aside in a succession crisis.
The outcome of any succession struggle will likely be affected by the
country’s ethnic and clan divisions. Mugabe and many key party and clan
officials are from the Zezuru clan of the Shona people, who are dominant in a
wide area encircling Harare, the country’s capital. One of Mugabe’s closest
advisors, regarded as a king-maker, is retired General Solomon “Rex” Mujuru,
a Zezuru and husband of Joice Mujuru. Mnangagwa was seen as a
representative of the large Karanga clan, which reportedly felt that its turn to
control the reins of power had come. Mnangagwa’s viability as a presidential
contender was hampered by accusations that he led the purge of alleged regime
opponents in provinces of Matabeleland in the 1980s, which is believed to have
resulted in the deaths of 20,000 Ndebele civilians. The events of the 1980s help
to explain why Bulawayo has long been regarded as a center of opposition to the
government, although Mugabe has sought to gain support in the region by
elevating a number of Ndebele to party and government posts.
In any event, Mnangagwa’s power has been much reduced, as has that of
a number of his backers, including the former minister of information, Jonathan
Moyo. Moyo was fired in early 2005 for his sharp-tongued defenses of the
regime and for picking spats with other ZANU-PF leaders. He deeply angered
Mugabe by convening an unsanctioned meeting of Mnangagwa supporters
before the party convention, allegedly to strategize on ways of derailing the
Mujuru candidacy. Moyo left the party and ran as an independent in 2005.
According to reports, neither the Mnangagwa nor Mujuru camps support
Mugabe’s proposed term extension; Solomon Mujuru voiced his disapproval at
a recent party politburo meeting. At present, the only politician to declare his
interest in the presidency is ZANU PF National Chairman John Nkomo, who is
Speaker of the National Assembly and a long-time Mugabe ally.

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The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Origins of the MDC. The MDC party rose from the Zimbabwe labor
movement. As poverty deepened in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, and allegations of
corruption against regime leaders became more frequent, the Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organized a number of strikes and protests. In September
1999, the MDC was formed on this trade union base with support from many in
Zimbabwe’s churches and in urban areas. In February 2000, MDC members elected
the ZCTU secretary general, Morgan Tsvangirai (CHANG-gerai), born in 1952, as
MDC president, and union president Gibson Sibanda as MDC vice president.
The MDC proved formidable in the 2000 referendum and in the 2000
parliamentary election; some contend their success may have prompted a range of
repressive actions against the party and its supporters. Among the retaliatory
measures alleged, several leaders of the MDC, including Tsvangirai himself, were
arrested and charged with treason two weeks before the MDC leader ran against
Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections.

Treason Charges. On October 15, 2004, Tsvangirai was acquitted of a
treason charge based on a video recorded in Canada, which the government claimed
showed him calling for the “elimination” of Mugabe. The verdict surprised many
observers in view of the regime’s perceived influence over the courts. The judge
stated that the evidence had been unconvincing, with the witnesses produced by the
state “suspect” and the video unreliable. The government can appeal the verdict, and
Tsvangirai may be tried again because the law does not prohibit double jeopardy. In
August 2005, the government dropped a second treason charge that had been based
on claims that he urged violence to bring down the government in 2004.
Division in the Opposition. In late 2004, the MDC became increasingly
divided in its strategy to defeat the Mugabe government. MDC officials initially
decided that the party would not participate in the 2005 parliamentary campaign,
unless the government took steps to assure a free and fair election. Several party
members questioned this stance on grounds that non-participation would deprive the
party of any influence in the next parliament. Some reportedly felt that a refusal to
participate would hand control of parliament to Mugabe on a “silver platter.”
Tsvangirai supported a boycott, arguing that the elections should be postponed until
substantial electoral reforms could be implemented. The party did eventually
participate “under protest,” but did not do as well as in previous polls.
In the months prior to the 2005 Senate elections, the MDC was once again
divided on whether to participate. Supported by some civil society groups who
suggested the elections were “meaningless” and “a waste of time and resources,”
Tsvangirai argued that participating in the Senate would legitimize previous “rigged”
elections, and vowed instead to lead the opposition through mass action. He was
opposed by a group of MDC politicians led by the party’s secretary-general,
Welshman Ncube, who had also been accused by the government of treason in 2003
(the charges were subsequently dropped), and Gibson Sibanda. In October, the
party’s national council voted 33-31 to participate in the election, but Tsvangirai
overruled the vote and, reportedly in violation of the party’s constitution, expelled
26 senior officials from the party. He announced the boycott, touring the country to

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CRS-12
encourage voters to stay home. The Ncube faction refused to accept their expulsion
and fielded candidates in the Senate race, although they gained only seven seats.
Both factions held party conferences in early 2006; Tsvangirai was confirmed
as the leader of one faction, while Ncube ceded control of the “pro-senate” faction
to Arthur Mutambara, a noted student leader in the 1980s. The two factions have
attacked each other in the press, and there were allegations in 2006 that the
Tsvangirai faction was behind a violent July assault on Member of Parliament (MP)
Trudy Stevenson and several other Mutambara supporters. Stevenson has identified
the youths who attacked her as known followers of the former labor leader, but
Tsvangirai has denied the charges and denounced the beatings. Although the
Tsvangirai faction is reported to have the larger support base, which includes the
backing of the ZCTU, observers suggest neither faction will be effective unless they
can resolve their differences and reunite.
Could an Extension of Mugabe’s Term Reunite the Opposition? In
December 2006, a proposal to postpone the next presidential elections from 2008 to
2010 to coincide with the parliamentary elections was presented to ZANU-PF
delegates at the party’s annual conference. Despite government press reports
suggesting the delegates were in favor of the proposal, the matter was reportedly not
voted on at the conference, and was instead referred to the party’s central committee.
Should the committee approve the proposal, the change will require a constitutional
amendment. Some media reports have suggested that a number of ZANU-PF MPs,
perhaps motivated by their own ambitions, may vote with the opposition to defeat
such an amendment. ZANU-PF currently has the two-thirds majority required to
change the constitution, so the opposition, holding 41 seats, would need at least 10
additional votes to defeat the measure. Observers speculate whether the proposed
term extension may be the common ground around which the MDC factions could
reunite. They have agreed to work together, along with 21 civil society and church
groups, on the “Save Zimbabwe Campaign,” to challenge the 2010 plan.
Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies. On
February 22, 2007, the Zimbabwean government announced a three-month ban on
political rallies and public demonstrations in Harare “due to the volatile situation in
the country.”26 The MDC has filed an appeal with the High Court to lift the ban,
which coincides with an increase in public activity by the opposition and civic
groups. On February 18, despite a High Court decision allowing Morgan Tsvangirai
to launch his presidential campaign at a rally in Harare, police reportedly used batons
and water cannons to break up the event. A rally planned by the Mutambara faction
in Bulawayo was similarly dispersed, and numerous opposition supporters were
arrested. The ban was announced three days later, and police have subsequently
arrested several hundred civic activists, according to press reports.
On March 11, 2007, police broke up a Save Zimbabwe Campaign prayer
meeting attended by both Tsvangirai and Mutambara, arresting an estimated 50
members of the opposition and civil society, including both MDC leaders. Police
26 “Rally Ban a Fatal Govt Assault on Social Contract,” Zimbabwe Independent,” Mar. 2,
2007.

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CRS-13
shot and killed one opposition supporter after MDC youth reportedly began throwing
stones at police. The following day, police arrested an estimated 240 opposition
supporters during a demonstration protesting the March 11 crackdown. Media and
human rights reports suggest that Tsvangirai was severely beaten while in custody,
and he appeared in court on March 13 showing signs of head trauma.27 Other
opposition and civic leaders also reportedly sustained injuries after their arrest. The
protestors were released into the custody of their lawyers on March 14 after
prosecutors reportedly failed to appear at their court hearing
The Zimbabwean government contends that the MDC incites violence and was
responsible for the fire-bombing of a Harare police station on March 14.28 U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a highly critical statement, saying, “The
world community again has been shown that the regime of Robert Mugabe is ruthless
and repressive and creates only suffering for the people of Zimbabwe. We will
continue to follow closely events in Zimbabwe, and we urge the Government to
allow all Zimbabweans to freely express their views without being subject to
violence and intimidation.”29 The United States has requested that the U.N. Human
Rights Council consider the issue. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also
condemned the “reported beating of those leaders in police custody” and criticized
the ban, noting that “such actions violate the basic democratic right of citizens to
engage in peaceful assembly.”30 Several of Zimbabwe’s neighbors, including South
Africa and Zambia, issued statements of concern regarding the incident, and
Ghanaian President John Kufuor, who serves as president of the African Union,
called the event “very embarrassing.”31
Mutambara stood beside Tsvangirai during their first appearance in court, in
what some analysts consider a show of solidarity between the two faction leaders.
Whether this “defiance campaign” will reunify the opposition remains to be seen, but
public outrage at perceived police brutality may provide a rallying point for the two
sides.
Political Violence
Human rights groups have documented numerous accounts of political violence
in recent years. According to Freedom House, “Zimbabwe’s descent into the ranks
of the world’s most repressive states continued unabated.”32 The U.S. Department
of State has deemed Zimbabwe’s human rights record “very poor,” contending that
27 “Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Taken to Hospital From Court,” CNN, Mar. 13, 2007, and
“Mugabe Foes Vow to Intensify Action,” Washington Post, Mar. 13, 2007.
28 “Zimbabwean Police ‘Fire-Bombed,’” BBC, Mar. 15, 2007.
29 Statement of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Call for Immediate Release of
Zimbabwean Opposition Leaders,” on Mar. 13, 2007.
30 Statement issued by the Spokesman of the U.N. Secretary General on Mar. 12, 2007.
31 “Zimbabwe Leader Faces Growing Condemnation,” Associated Press, Mar. 15, 2007.
32 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.

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CRS-14
“security forces were involved in incidents of political violence, including instances
where soldiers and persons in military uniforms beat civilians, particularly in areas
suspected of heavy support for the opposition,” and noting “torture, rape, and abuse
of persons perceived to be opposition supporters by security forces, government-
sanctioned youth militia, and ruling party supporters.”33 Amnesty International has
been similarly critical:
The government engaged in widespread and systematic violations of the rights
to shelter, food, freedom of movement and residence, and the protection of the
law.... Despite overwhelming evidence of humanitarian need the government
repeatedly obstructed the humanitarian efforts of the UN and civil society
groups. The police continued to operate in a politically biased manner and police
officers were implicated in numerous human rights violations, including arbitrary
arrest and detention, assault, ill-treatment of detainees and excessive use of force.
Freedom of expression, association and assembly continued to be severely
curtailed. Hundreds of people were arrested for holding meetings or participating
in peaceful protests.34
President Mugabe has repeatedly condoned police and military brutality against
Zimbabwean citizens. During Heroes’ Day, a holiday honoring war veterans, Mugabe
warned that his security forces “will pull the trigger” against protesters.35 A month
later, in a September 2006 incident caught on video, Zimbabwean police conducted
a particularly violent crackdown against leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), who had planned a civic protest to highlight the impact of inflation
on the country’s citizenry. Mugabe sanctioned the police action, saying, “Some
people are now crying foul that they were assaulted, yes you get a beating…when the
police say move, move, if you don’t move, you invite the police to use force.”36
Subsequent mass ZCTU protests were not held.
Mugabe has received international attention for his statement; the UN Country
Team (UNCT) in Zimbabwe announced “a profound sense of dismay” over
comments that “might be interpreted as condoning the use of force and torture to deal
with peaceful demonstrations by its citizens.”37 The UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture38 is expected to visit the country in 2007 to investigate, and the Harare
magistrate who heard the case against the ZCTU leaders has ordered an independent
investigation into the allegations of police brutality.
33 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
34 Amnesty International (AI), “Zimbabwe,” Annual Report 2006.
35 “Threat by Mugabe,” New York Times, Aug. 16, 2006.
36 See Mugabe’s statement as part of an article from the government-owned newspaper, The
Herald at “Zimbabwe Press Review for 25 Sep 06”, BBC Monitoring Africa, Sept. 25, 2006.
37 “U.N. Slams President Mugabe,” Zimbabwe Independent, Sept. 29, 2006.
38 The post of Rapporteur was created by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1985
to investigate questions relating to torture. For information on the Rapporteur’s mandate,
see [http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/index.htm].

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CRS-15
The UN Rapporteur may have several other cases to investigate — the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reports that there were 368 incidents of
torture from January through November 2006, as well as 503 incidents of assault and
11 incidents of politically motivated abduction/kidnaping.39 Among these is a
November 2006 incident in which 40 women from Women of Zimbabwe Arise
(WOZA), a civil society group whose members have been arrested on numerous
occasions, were arrested and allegedly beaten by police for staging a protest against
deteriorating living conditions. The U.S. State Department condemned the police
action. Some reports suggest the government may be having difficulty paying its
police and security forces, which rights activists infer could affect their willingness
to suppress protests with violence or conduct other alleged rights violations.
Humanitarian Situation
Operation Murambatsvina
In May 2005, the Government of Zimbabwe initiated Operation Murambatsvina
(variously translated as “Restore Order” or “Clean Out the Filth”), a massive
demolition program aimed at destroying allegedly illegal urban structures, such as
informal housing and markets. By early July 2005, an estimated 700,000 urban
Zimbabweans had been rendered homeless or unemployed by the operation, and an
estimated 2.1 million (in total, almost 20% of the population) were indirectly affected
by the demolitions.40 These are considered “low-end estimates,” and some reports
suggest the numbers of those affected may be much higher.41 According to some
sources, 70% of the country’s urban population may have lost shelter, while
approximately 76% lost their source of income.42 Police and military who carried out
the event reportedly arrested forty thousand for allegedly illegal activities, and told
those whose homes were destroyed to “return to their rural origins,” although many
had no rural home to return to.43
Operation Murambatsvina has had a severe impact on the nation’s economy and
on the livelihood of its citizens. For many, this was not the first time they had been
forcibly removed from their homes. As a result of the 2000 land reform program, an
estimated 400,000 black laborers on commercial farms lost their livelihoods and/or
homes, and many fled to urban areas to find work. Political violence surrounding the
39 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, November 2006.
40 The U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Anna Kajumulo
Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess The Scope and Impact
of Operation Murambatsvina, July 2005.
41 A survey by ActionAid International, a Netherlands-based international development
agency, found that 840,000 were directly affected and 1.2 million indirectly affected, while
a survey by the independent research firm Afrobarometer reported that an estimated 2.7
million were directly affected.
42 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in
Zimbabwe, August 2005.
43 Tibaijuka, 13.

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CRS-16
2002 elections also forced many from their homes, reportedly displacing more than
100,000.44 In 2004, under a new phase of land resettlement, an estimated 500,000
who settled on farms during the 2000 invasions were evicted.45 Many of these
displaced inhabited the urban “slums” prior to the demolitions, making their living
from trading on the black market. Given the collapse of the formal economy, 40%
of the labor force was estimated to be informally employed prior to Murambatsvina,
while 44% worked in the communal sector (including the agriculture industry), and
16% worked in the formal sector.46 Of those living in towns and cities, an estimated
70% were involved in informal trading prior to the demolitions.
Political Motivations? The government describes Murambatsvina as a
program designed to restore the capital city to its former image as “the Sunshine
City,” ridding the country’s urban areas of illegal structures that foster criminal
activity and stemming the black market trade in foreign currency.47 Launched shortly
after the disputed 2005 parliamentary elections, many contend the demolitions were
a political move aimed either at preventing mass protests over the growing economic
crisis or at punishing the reputed urban support base of the MDC. The Harare
Commission that initiated the campaign was established in order to contravene the
authority of the elected City Council, of which the MDC held the majority. The
mayor of Harare, an MDC politician who was elected by 80% of the vote, was fired
in April 2004, along with 19 MDC-allied city councillors, after having been arrested
in 2003 under POSA for holding a public meeting without prior state approval.
The legality of the Harare Commission, which was appointed by the Minister
of Local Government, was challenged in a November 2003 high court ruling that
found the Commission did not have the authority to fire the mayor. A new election
was supposed to be held within 90 days, according to law, but when no election
occurred, the Harare Commission was reappointed. The remaining MDC councillors
resigned in protest. With the exception of Harare, the local authorities of the other
areas (many of which are MDC-controlled) affected by Murambatsvina have reported
that they were not informed of the demolitions prior to the event. The implications
of this breakdown in governance are reflected by the United Nations, which found
that Murambatsvina “was implemented in a highly polarized political climate
characterized by mistrust, fear and a lack of dialogue between Government and local
authorities, and between the former and civil society.”48
The International Response. International reaction has been highly critical.
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Tanzanian-born Anna Tibaijuka,
Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special Envoy on Human
Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the
44 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “World Refugee Survey, Zimbabwe
Country Report,” 2003.
45 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
46 Tibaijuka, 34.
47 “Clean Up Commendable,” The Herald, May 23, 2005.
48 Ibid, 7.

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CRS-17
demolitions. Following a fact-finding mission to the country, she issued a
comprehensive report, which concluded:
Operation Restore Order, while purporting to target illegal dwellings and
structures and to clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an
indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering and,
in repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of national and
international legal frameworks.49
The report also described police preventing civil society and humanitarian
organizations from assisting those affected by the demolitions, and suggested that the
groups were operating in a “climate of fear” and practicing “‘self-censorship’ to
avoid being closed down or evicted.”50 The Chairman of the African Union sent his
own envoy, but he was prevented from conducting an assessment (see “International
Perspectives,” below). The presentation of the U.N. envoy’s report to the U.N.
Security Council stirred controversy as China, Algeria, Benin, and Russia objected
to debate on the report. The majority of Security Council members voted to allow its
discussion, albeit in a closed session. Secretary-General Annan also issued a strong
statement condemning Murambatsvina, calling on the government of Zimbabwe to
stop the evictions and allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance:
“Operation Murambatsvina” has done a catastrophic injustice to as many as
700,000 of Zimbabwe’s poorest citizens, through indiscriminate actions, carried out
with disquieting indifference to human suffering. I call on the Government to stop
these forced evictions and demolitions immediately, and to ensure that those who
orchestrated this ill-advised policy are held fully accountable for their actions.... the
Government must recognize the virtual state of emergency that now exists, allow
unhindered access for humanitarian operations, and create conditions for sustainable
relief and reconstruction.51

Continued Evictions and Operation Garikai. Many observers suggest the
Zimbabwean government has done little to respond to the U.N. envoy’s
recommendations.52 Civil society groups report that forced evictions were continuing
as recently as December 2006, despite government declarations to the contrary. As
was the case during the initial evictions, several thousand of those made homeless
were taken, in some cases reportedly against their will, to police-run “transit camps.”
Conditions in these camps have been described as dire, often lacking shelter, water,
or basic latrine facilities.53 In keeping with the findings of the U.N. report, Amnesty
International alleges that Zimbabwe has repeatedly prohibited aid organizations,
including the United Nations, from providing the displaced with temporary shelters,
49 Ibid, 7.
50 Ibid, 54.
51 The Secretary-General’s statement, made on July 22, 2005, is available online at
[http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1589].
52 See, for example, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum , “Political Repression Disguised
as Civic Mindedness: Operation Murambatsvina One Year Later,” November 2006.
53 AI, “Zimbabwe: No Justice for the Victims of Forced Evictions,” September 2006.

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CRS-18
such as tents, until permanent housing became available. Secretary-General Annan
expressed his concern in October 2005 over the government’s rejection of U.N.
assistance to “tens of thousands,” noting “there is no clear evidence that subsequent
Government efforts have significantly benefitted these groups.”54 The United Nations
has subsequently been permitted to erect 2,000 shelters (as of August 2006), a
fraction of their target of 40,000.
In response to international criticism of Murambatsvina, the government
announced a new housing scheme, Operation Garikai, in June 2005. Under Garakai,
also known as “Hlalani Kuhle” (Live Well), new housing for those rendered
homeless was to be built with public funds. The ambitious reconstruction program
would allegedly create tens of thousands of new homes, but given the shortage of
building materials and the government’s budgetary problems, it is highly unlikely the
original target of 5,275 homes will be met. Reports suggest that few houses have
actually been completed, and, instead of going to victims of Murambatsvina, the
newly built houses have been more often occupied by soldiers, police, and members
of the ruling party.55 The government denies these allegations.
Violations of Domestic and International Law. Human rights
organizations have raised questions about how Zimbabwe and the international
community should respond to what some have termed “crimes against humanity,”56
as defined by Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC),57 and whether there is a “responsibility to protect”58 those affected by
Murambatsvina. Among the U.N. report recommendations, the envoy suggests:
Although a case for crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute
might be difficult to sustain, the Government of Zimbabwe clearly caused large
sections of its population serious suffering that must now be redressed with the
assistance of the United Nations and the international community. The
international community should encourage the Government to prosecute all those
who orchestrated this catastrophe and those who may have caused criminal
negligence leading to alleged deaths, if so confirmed by an independent internal
inquiry/inquest. The international community should then continue to be engaged
with human rights concerns in Zimbabwe in consensus building political forums
such as the UN Commission on Human Rights, or its successor, the African
54 The October 31, 2005, statement of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on
Zimbabwe is available at [http://www.un.org/News/ossg/].
55 See the AI report; Solidarity Peace Trust, Meltdown: Murambatsvina One Year On,
Aug.30, 2006.
56 Institute of War and Peace Reporting, “Prosecution of Mugabe Urged,” Jan. 20, 2006.
57 The United States is not party to the Rome Statute. For more information, see CRS Report
RL31495, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court, by Jennifer Elsea.
58 For more information on the “Responsibility to Protect,” see the Report on the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which aims to
“reconcil[e] the international community’s responsibility to act in the face of massive
violations of humanitarian norms while respecting the sovereign rights of states.” The
report is available at [http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp].

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Union Peer Review Mechanism, and in the Southern African Development
Community.
The report includes a legal analysis of Murambatsvina through international and
regional, and national legal frameworks. Several domestic and international
organizations, including the International Bar Association (IBA), have called for the
Zimbabwean government to be brought before the ICC, not only for violations
related to the demolitions, but also for the government’s alleged support of political
violence against its critics. Responding to President Mugabe’s comments supporting
the beating of the ZCTU leaders in September 2006, the Executive Director of the
IBA made the following statement:
Mugabe’s statements add to the weight of evidence that torture and other serious
violations of international law are sanctioned at the highest level in Zimbabwe.
This underscores the urgent need for international and regional action to hold the
Zimbabwean Government to account...the torture of the trade union activists is
not an isolated incident, but part of a dangerous and illegal system of repression
which constitutes crimes against humanity in international law. Decisive action
is required by both the United Nations and the African Union to end impunity
and violence in Zimbabwe.59
Because Zimbabwe is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, a U.N. Security Council
resolution would be needed for any referral to the ICC. Given the objections of some
Security Council members to the envoy’s report itself, which as stated above
suggested an ICC case would be “difficult to sustain,” it is unlikely such a referral
would be made. The U.N. Envoy found that “The Government of Zimbabwe is
collectively responsible for what has happened,” but cautioned that “it appears there
was no collective decision-making with respect to both the conception and
implementation. Evidence suggests it was based on improper advice by a few
architects of the operation.”60 According to one media source, though, Zimbabwe’s
State Security Minister has claimed, “All the decisions to do with the operation
emanated from the politburo [the ruling party’s inner cabinet] and were sent through
me to the government.”61
The government of Zimbabwe has yet to prosecute those who might be
responsible for crimes related to Operation Murambatsvina or the subsequent
evictions. The victims, in most cases, lack the financial resources to seek redress in
the courts, although Zimbabwean human rights lawyers have represented groups of
victims on several occasions. In one such case, in November 2005, residents of a
Harare suburb were given a temporary stay of eviction by the High Court, but police
ignored the court order and forcibly moved the group to a transit camp. The inability
of the country’s judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide
59 The IBA is comprised of Bar Associations and Law Societies around the world. The
comments of its Executive Director can be found at [http://www.ibanet.org/iba/article.
cfm?article=95].
60 Tibaijuka, 76.
61 See an excerpt from South-Africa based website ZimOnline in “Ex-Ethiopian Leader Said
Behind Zimbabwe’s Cleanup Operation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, Feb. 20, 2006.

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due process to those seeking remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis
in Zimbabwe’s rule of law.
Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis
Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity
in recent years, stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made
factors, including prolonged drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the
impact of HIV/AIDS.62 Zimbabwe has been particularly hard hit. Grain silos across
the country that once held strategic grain reserves three times the population’s annual
food needs now stand empty. Five million Zimbabweans, almost half the population,
received food aid in the first quarter of 2006. Experts attribute this food insecurity
to unexpectedly severe crop failure,63 but some suggest Murambatsvina significantly
limited the population’s ability to feed itself, particularly in urban areas.64 The United
Nations predicts that an estimated 1.4 million in rural areas will need food assistance
in early 2007, and the needs of the urban population have yet to be assessed. Doctors
in the cities of Harare and Bulawayo have reported that severe child malnutrition
doubled from 2005 to 2006.65
Although drought is partly to blame for the country’s food shortages, analysts
believe that disruptions to the farming sector resulting from Mugabe’s land seizure
program are the main reason for reduced food production.66 Nearly all of the
country’s 4,500 commercial farms have now been taken over; the government’s land
redistribution program is reportedly plagued by inefficiencies, with large portions of
redistributed land not being actively farmed. Tractors and other inputs to production
are reportedly in short supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers were
reportedly forced to flee seized commercial farms, and many of those who now hold
farmland have no agricultural expertise.
Operation Taguta. In late 2005, the Zimbabwean government established
Operation Taguta (or “Eat Well”), a move seen by many as an acknowledgment that
the government’s farm resettlement policies had failed to meet the country’s
agricultural production needs. With food distribution already under the control of the
government’s Grain Marketing Board, which is led by military officers, the
government has established a command agriculture system, in which the military is
responsible for not only the distribution, but also the production of food. Since the
program’s inception, there have been numerous reports of the illegal seizure of farm
equipment, the destruction of the fruit, vegetable, and other cash crops small-scale
62 For more information on the region’s food crisis, see CRS Report RS21301, The Food
Crisis in Southern Africa: Background and Issues, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
63 United Nations, 2006 CAP Mid-Year Review, June 2006.
64 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in
Zimbabwe, Aug.2005. This study suggests up to 54% of the country may have become food
insecure as a result of Murambatsvina.
65 “Zimbabwe Children Die of Starvation, AIDS,” UPI, Apr. 3, 2006.
66 On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger — Violations
of the Right to Food, Oct. 15, 2004.

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CRS-21
farmers grow to sell at market to support their families, and even army brutality
against farmers. Local civic groups report concerns from farmers that their harvests
will be confiscated to feed soldiers. Some critics of the government suggest
Operation Taguta is being used by the government as an excuse to deploy military
forces throughout the country to control the population.67
Food as a Political Weapon? The Mugabe regime’s stance on food aid
leads many observers to suspect that food is being used as a political weapon, a
charge the government denies.68 Despite assessments by multiple international donor
agencies suggesting the country is in need of food assistance, President Mugabe has
confounded observers in recent years by repeatedly declaring the country was running
a maize surplus and would not need food aid.69 In 2004, the government stopped a
U.N. food needs assessment and later halted general food aid distribution by donors
(targeted food aid to vulnerable groups continued), despite independent estimates that
suggested 4.8 million would require food assistance.70 In March 2005, the
government finally acknowledged that Zimbabwe faced serious food shortages, but
delayed in signing a memorandum of understanding to allow the World Food
Program (WFP) and its implementing partners to provide food assistance until
December of that year.71
The Grain Marketing Board announced on Zimbabwean television that it had
contracted with “foreign grain suppliers” to meet the country’s food needs through
June 2006.72 A May 2006 needs assessment by the WFP identified 1.4 million
Zimbabweans in critical need of food assistance, but in October they were forced to
limit assistance to half of the 900,000 they had originally targeted due to funding
shortages. WFP has requested an additional $17 million to be able to feed an
estimated 1.9 million during the lean season (January through April).73 The
government continues to maintain tight control of food distributions — the WFP
reported in December 2006 that it had been waiting for two months for permission
from Mugabe to provide that aid through April.74 The government has accused aid
agencies of using food to turn Zimbabweans away from the ruling party.
67 Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi, April 2006.
68 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger.
69 “Mugabe Word for Word,”Sky News, May 24, 2004.
70 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger, and USAID, 2004 Annual Report for the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
71 “ZANU-PF Admits Food Crisis,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (London), Mar.7,
2005; “10 More Die of Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe Standard, Mar.7, 2005; “14 More
Die of Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe Standard, Feb.15, 2005.
72 See text from a report that aired on ZTV1 (Harare) in “Zimbabwe ‘Assured of Food
Security’,”BBC Monitoring Africa, Oct. 6, 2005.
73 WFP, “Funding Shortage Edges Millions of Southern Africans into Food Crisis,” Oct. 26,
2006.
74 “Govt Delays Stall WFP Food Distribution,” Financial Gazette, Dec. 13, 2006.

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Critics like Catholic Archbishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo have accused the
government of distributing food only in areas where people would agree to vote for
ZANU-PF. During past elections, civil rights groups and the opposition have
reported instances of the ruling party holding campaign rallies in conjunction with
government food distributions. In some areas, government officials distributing food
have required those in line to show a party card — and MDC supporters have
reportedly been turned away. Two court rulings made in October 2005 have
supported these claims, finding that ZANU-PF candidates politicized food
distribution and used violence against the opposition.75
HIV/AIDS
In the midst of its political and economic crisis, Zimbabwe is being ravaged by
HIV/AIDS. One in five Zimbabweans is HIV positive. The United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that almost one quarter of Zimbabwe’s children
are orphans (primarily attributable to AIDS), the highest percentage in the world.76
The epidemic is also causing a severe strain on the country’s healthcare system; 75%
of hospital admissions are AIDS-related, leaving few beds or resources for other
patients. To compound this problem, the economic crisis has resulted in the exodus
of many of the country’s medical professionals. Of those who have remained, many
are infected with HIV themselves, leaving Zimbabwe to rely upon additional
assistance from others. Cuba, a close ally of the Mugabe Administration, routinely
contributes doctors and specialists to serve terms in the country. The AIDS epidemic
is having a crippling effect on the economy- the inability of infected agricultural
workers to adequately contribute to food production further hamstrings the country’s
struggling agriculture industry.
Although its infection rate remains high, Zimbabwe is the only country in Sub-
Saharan Africa in which HIV prevalence and incidence rates have declined. While
reports suggest evidence of changes in sexual behavior, the country’s high mortality
rates also play a role in the decreased prevalence rate.77 There are indications that
efforts to prevent mother-to-child transmission may be working — vertical
transmission rates have dropped from 30% in early 2000s to 24% in 2004.78
Zimbabwe’s government has claimed significant resolve to fight the disease. The
country was the first to introduce a tax to finance HIV/AIDS programs (3% on
taxable income). President Mugabe announced in Zimbabwe’s commitment to
universal access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) by 2010. Despite this commitment,
75 Reference to the rulings, made by Judges Nicholas Ndou and Rita Makarau, can be found
in DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
76 “Zimbabwe Has Highest Percentage of Orphans in the World,” Associated Press, Dec. 6,
2006.
77 Dr. Peter Piot, “Launch of the 2005 AIDS Epidemic Update,” Nov.21, 2005. Speech
available at [http://data.unaids.org/Media/Speeches02/SP_Piot_EPI05_21Nov05_en.pdf].
78 UNAIDS, 2006 AIDS Epidemic Update, May 2006.

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access to ART is low — an estimated one in seven HIV positive Zimbabweans is
currently able to access the drugs.79
For those who are able to access treatment, the country’s economic crisis is
limiting its impact. Patients taking ART must maintain healthy diets for the
treatment to be effective, but with malnutrition rates high, few are able to benefit.
Murambatsvina reportedly displaced an estimated 80,000 infected with HIV/AIDS,
leaving many not only food insecure but also without access to ART. Experts
suggest this disruption in ART may lead to increased resistance in HIV-positive
patients to the most common medication, Nevirapine.80 The displacement and
separation of families may also lead to an increase in unsafe sexual behavior, which
could reverse the country’s decreasing prevalence rate.
The Economy
The turmoil in Zimbabwe has led to a severe economic contraction, a sharp drop
in living standards for the rural and urban poor, and a massive exodus of
Zimbabweans in search of work. According to the Solidarity Peace Trust, founded
by clergy from Zimbabwe and South Africa, an estimated 3.4 million Zimbabweans
are now living outside the country. The Trust calculates that this amounts to 25%-
30% of the total population, or 60%-70% of productive adults.81 Those forced to
leave the country because of economic hardship often face difficult conditions
because economic refugees are not entitled to political asylum.
The IMF and the World Bank
Dubbed “the world’s fastest shrinking economy,” Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) has declined an estimated 40% since 1998.82 World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending has been suspended for more than six
years due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign currency for essential imports,
particularly fuel, is in extremely short supply. The IMF estimates the inflation rate,
which has been in the triple digits since 2001, is now at 1,280% and suggests without
significant changes in government spending, inflation could rise above 4,000% in
2007.83 Zimbabweans continue to face steep rises in the prices of food and non-food
items, including rents — the cost of living rose 43% from December 2006 to January
2007 alone.
79 “Zimbabweans Pledge to Redouble Efforts to Beat AIDS,” VOA,Dec 1, 2006. Other
figures are more conservative — the United Nations estimates that 10%, or 1 in 10
Zimbabweans, are receiving ART.
80 Tibaijuka, 40.
81 Solidarity Peace Trust, An Account of the Exodus of a Nation’s People, November 2004,
8.
82 See, for example, Simon Robinson, “Great Leap Backwards,” Time, May 29, 2005.
83 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, September 2006.

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In December 2003, Mugabe selected Gideon Gono, credited with turning around
a troubled commercial bank, as governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The
move was welcomed by some, since Gono was regarded as a successful technocrat.
However, critics maintain that his measures to fight corruption and discover illegally
held foreign exchange are being used to damage government opponents and further
the interests of ZANU-PF.84 Regardless of Gono’s efforts, international assessments
of Zimbabwe’s economic prospects remain bleak. Ignoring the advice of the IMF,
the government has refused to devalue the official exchange rate. Instead, in June
2006, Gono devalued the country’s currency, the Zimbabwe dollar, removing three
zeros in an effort to mitigate inflation.
Under “Operation Sunrise,” the government printed new “rebased” currency,
known as “little heroes,” in an effort to combat corruption and money laundering,
according to the government.85 Zimbabweans were given only 21 days to exchange
their old currency. Individuals were restricted from exchanging more than Z$100
million (USD$1000) of the old notes without clearance from tax authorities
(companies were allowed to exchange Z$5 billion). Police arrested more than 3,000
at roadblocks for holding currency over the individual limit and seized a reported $40
million.86 Analysts suggest the devaluation has done little to reverse the foreign
exchange rate shortages.87
Zimbabwe is currently restricted from borrowing from the IMF, to which the
country still owes an estimated $119 million. The government paid $120 million in
2005 and $9 million in 2006 to settle other outstanding arrears with the Fund and to
avoid compulsory withdrawal from the IMF. The source of the funds used to pay the
IMF debt has been a source of considerable speculation in the media.88 An IMF team
recently visited the country for its annual evaluation, a visit some observers suggest
Mugabe repeatedly postponed to avoid a report that might reflect negatively on the
government’s fiscal policies. Mugabe has dubbed the IMF a “political instrument”
and “monster” for regime change.89 Zimbabwe also owes an estimated $409 million
to the World Bank and $300 million to the African Development Bank (AFDB).
84 “Gono’s Mission Is to Save ZANU-PF, Not the Economy,” LiquidAfrica, Dec. 3, 2004.
85 “Country is Committed to Uprooting All Forms of Corruption,” The Herald, Aug. 24,
2006.
86 “Much Ado About Money,” IRIN, Aug. 18, 2006.
87 “Bag of Bricks: Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe,” The Economist, Aug. 26, 2006, and
“Zimbabwe: Millions no Longer Millionaires,” African Business, October 2006.
88 See, for example,”A Zimbabwean Businessman, His Farms Seized, Takes on Mugabe,”
Washington Post, Feb. 24, 2006.
89 “Mugabe’s 82nd Birthday Blast at Zimbabwe,” Business Day, Feb. 21, 2006.

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Attempts to Revive Agriculture Industry
In addition to the government’s attempts to revive its flagging agriculture
industry through the introduction of a command agriculture system (see “Food
Crisis” section, above), the administration has introduced long-term leases to provide
security of tenure for farmers willing to cultivate land nationalized in the 2005
constitutional amendment. One of the unintended side effects of Mugabe’s 2000
land reform strategy, which resulted in the abolition of land tenure, was that farmers
were unable to use their land as collateral to obtain bank loans to invest in their
farms. As a result, few commercial farmers were able to find the capital to maintain
productivity. The government began to distribute 99-year leases in November 2006,
and among the initial recipients were 19 white farmers, which came as a shock to
many after Mugabe declared in July 2005 that his land reform program would be
complete only when there was “not a single white on the farms.”90 There are
currently less than 600 white farmers left in Zimbabwe. Some suggest financial
institutions may be reluctant to accept the new leases as collateral, given that the
government reserves the right to cancel the lease if it deems the farm is not
productive.
The Mining Industry and “Blood” Diamonds
While the country’s agriculture industry founders, its mining industry continues
to flourish. Mining accounted for 44% of Zimbabwe’s total foreign currency
revenues in 2005. In March 2006, the government announced plans to take a 51%
share of all foreign-owned mines for local black investors; 25% of that share would
be acquired at no cost to the government, and mines that refused to part with their
shares would be expropriated. After industry officials cautioned that the plan would
deter foreign investment, the proposal was modified, allowing firms that invested in
community projects to keep their majority share. Parliament is expected to consider
the legislation in early 2007. The government has also taken steps to crackdown on
illegal mining. Police arrested an estimated 20,000 illegal miners in late 2006,
including several hundred reportedly legal small-scale miners, confiscating gold, as
well as diamonds, emeralds, and gold ore. Since the collapse of the formal economy,
many of the country’s unemployed have resorted to illegal mining activities, selling
their goods on the black market. According to reports, most of the miners were
released after paying fines. In March 2007, police arrested a senior ZANU-PF
official for attempting to smuggle diamonds worth an estimated $33 million out of
the country.91
The Kimberly Process, an international government certification scheme
designed to prevent trade in conflict diamonds, is currently investigating allegations
by the World Diamond Council that “blood diamonds” from the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) are being smuggled along with rough stones from
Zimbabwe into South Africa for export. Under particular scrutiny are stones from
a Zimbabwean mine owned in part by Mugabe-ally Solomon Mujuru. If the
90 “In Reversal, Mugabe Seeks White Farmers,” UPI, Dec. 17, 2006.
91 “Nhara Begs President for Mercy,” Financial Gazette, Mar. 7, 2007.

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allegations are proven, Zimbabwe’s legal diamond exports could be banned. The
government has dismissed the claims as a western attempt to promote regime change.
Zimbabwe has been linked to conflict diamonds in the past; senior Zimbabwe
officials were named in a 2003 U.N. report for profiting from illicit diamond trade
during Zimbabwe’s military operations in the DRC.92
“Look East” Policy
Blaming the United States, the United Kingdom, and other western governments
for the country’s economic crisis, President Mugabe has sought to engender
investment and trade opportunities with Asia, particularly China. Dubbed the “Look
East” policy, Mugabe’s efforts have been criticized by his own party as insufficient
to address the economy’s slide. In December 2006, the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Budget, Finance, and Economic Development, chaired by a ZANU-PF
MP, accused the central bank governor of exacerbating inflation with “quasi-fiscal
activities” and warned the administration that “the Far East destinations be viewed
as a market in its infancy and that the traditional market of the West should not be
neglected as the nation moves toward regularizing relations with the international
community.”93
The Military and the Economy
Critics contend that President Mugabe is buying the continued loyalty of the
country’s security forces through patronage and bribery.94 Some observers suggest
that loyalty of the security forces may come at a heavy cost to the economy. In 2006
the government reportedly spent more than $20 million to purchase new cars for
police, military and intelligence officers. The security forces and civil service also
reportedly received an almost 300% pay raise to counter record desertion rates. The
2006 defense budget submitted to parliament was reportedly four times higher than
that of the previous year, and observers continue to speculate on how the government
will pay for its military purchases from China, including $240 million in fighter jets.
In addition to allegations of land and housing handouts to security personnel,
critics of the government highlight a significant number of current and former
military officers who have been appointed to civilian government positions. Current
or former military officers currently control the Ministries of Energy and Industry,
the office of the Attorney-General, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (in charge of
tax collection), the electoral commission, the state railway, the Grain Marketing
Board, and the parks authority, and several are also serving in the new Senate and
ambassadorial posts abroad.
92 Zimbabwe is a signatory of the Kimberly Process. For more information on “blood
diamonds,” see CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and
Legislation, by Nicholas Cook.
93 “Zimbabwe: Parliamentary Body Urges State to ‘Normalize’ Trade Ties with West,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, Dec. 8, 2006.
94 “Militarization of State Firms Cause for Worry,” Zimbabwe Independent, May 26, 2006.

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International Perspectives
The international community appears divided on how to respond to Zimbabwe’s
persistent political and economic crisis. In general, Western nations and institutions
have expressed opposition to Mugabe’s methods of rule, and have pursued policies
intended to pressure the Zimbabwe government for reforms. In contrast, the Mugabe
government has enjoyed considerable sympathy in Africa, where he is viewed as an
elder statesman and a leader of the anti-colonial struggle, and among the Non-
Aligned nations generally. This is changing to an extent, however, with some
African leaders concluding that the Zimbabwe situation is damaging to Africa’s
interests and that political and economic reforms are needed.
U.S. Policy
The United States has been critical of the Mugabe regime for its poor human
rights record and lack of respect for the rule of law. Key elements of U.S. policy
toward Zimbabwe include the imposition of targeted sanctions against high-ranking
members of ZANU-PF and their affiliates, support for South Africa to spearhead an
African effort to restore democracy, and the provision of assistance intended to help
the country’s poor and strengthen civil society. In January 2005, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during her
confirmation hearing, that Zimbabwe was one of six “outposts of tyranny” worldwide
and that the United States stood with the oppressed people there.95 These remarks
provoked an angry personal response from Mugabe.96 In February 2005, Thomas
Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was similarly
critical in a speech in Washington, suggesting that Zimbabwe “has now become a
textbook case of bad and illegitimate government.”97
Sanctions. The Mugabe administration has routinely blamed its economic
crisis on sanctions from the west. The United States does not currently have trade
sanctions against Zimbabwe, with the exception of a ban on transfers of defense
items and services to the country. The U.S. government has, however, cancelled all
non-humanitarian government-to-government aid. In 2006, Zimbabwe was found
to be in violation of crimes related to human trafficking and is subject to sanction
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386).98 Zimbabwe
is not eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) because and its poor record of economic management and human rights
abuses.
95 “Rice Targets 6 ‘Outposts of Tyranny,’” Washington Times, Jan. 19, 2005. The others
were Cuba, Burma, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus.
96 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Lashes Out at Rice, Blair at Campaign Launch,” AFP, Feb. 11,
2005.
97 DOS, “Zimbabwe a Textbook Case of Bad Governance, U.S. Official Says,” Feb. 28,
2005.
98 For information on human trafficking and related legislation, see CRS Report RL30545,
Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and International Response, by Francis Miko.

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President Bush announced a renewal of U.S. sanctions against ZANU-PF
leaders in March 2006. The sanctions are intended to punish those responsible for
Zimbabwe’s difficulties without harming the Zimbabwe population at large. The
initial sanctions, imposed in 2002, ban travel to the United States by “senior
members of the government of Robert Mugabe and others...who formulate,
implement, or benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe’s democratic
institutions or impede the transition to a multi-party democracy.” Persons who
benefit financially from business dealings with such individuals are also banned, as
are the spouses of people in either group. In 2003, the President issued an executive
order freezing assets held in the United States by 75 high-ranking Zimbabwe officials
and Mugabe’s wife, Grace.99 Nine firms and farms were added in 2004, and the list
was further expanded in November 2005 to block the assets of 128 individuals and
33 entities. The President’s executive order also allows the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to go beyond previous authority
and block the property of additional persons who “have engaged in actions or policies
to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions,” their immediate
family members, and any persons assisting them.100
Congressional Response. Congress has made clear its opposition to
Mugabe’s policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001
(P.L. 107-99), which criticized “economic mismanagement” and “undemocratic
practices” in Zimbabwe. This legislation called for consultations with allies on
economic sanctions and a travel ban. In the 109th Congress, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed H.Res. 409 in December 2005, condemning Operation
Murambatsvina, which the resolution termed a “humanitarian disaster that has
compounded the country’s humanitarian food and economic crises.” The resolution
also called on the UN and African regional bodies to investigate the impact of the
demolitions and requested that the Administration use its influence to advocate
further action by the IMF against the Zimbabwean government. Senator Russ
Feingold (D-WI) introduced S.Amdt. 1254, which was included in the final version
of the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102). This
amendment provided $4 million for democracy and governance activities in
Zimbabwe. The Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs held a hearing on
Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in June 2001. The House Subcommittee
on Africa (now referred to as the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health) has
likewise held hearings on challenges to democracy in Zimbabwe: in June 2000 prior
to the parliamentary elections, in February 2002 prior to Zimbabwe’s presidential
elections, and in April 2005 following the parliamentary elections.
U.S. Support for African Diplomacy. During President Bush’s visit to
South Africa in 2003, he praised the work of President Thabo Mbeki as the “point
man” in seeking a Zimbabwe solution. The statement suggested to some that the
United States was stepping back from a lead role on the Zimbabwe issue and would
accede to Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” (see “South Africa” section, below) as the best
99 Seventy-seven individuals are named in the executive order (EO 13288), but one of these,
Vice President Simon Muzenda, has died.
100 The text of this annex to EO 13288 can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].

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means of achieving reform in Zimbabwe.101 Mbeki reportedly assured President
Bush that he would be able to bring about talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC,
which have not occurred. In August 2004, the current U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Africa and then Ambassador to South Africa, Jendayi Frazer, called for the
formation of a “coalition of the willing” to deal with Zimbabwe. Ambassador Frazer
reiterated South Africa’s position of leverage, and insisted more needed to be done
by African states to return Zimbabwe to democracy.102 Frazer specifically urged the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to do more, cautioning that it
was difficult for Africa’s friends in the United States to argue for aid increases for the
region while the Zimbabwe impasse continues.103 Some critics of urging South
Africa and SADC to resolve the Zimbabwe problem favor a stronger direct role for
the United States in opposing Mugabe, but others argue that Mugabe would exploit
a stronger U.S. role to win additional sympathy in Africa.
U.S. Assistance. The United States remains the leader in humanitarian relief
aid to the Zimbabwean people, supplying more than $300 million in food aid and
disaster assistance since 2002. The United States provided $155 million in food aid
to southern Africa in 2006 through the WFP.104 In addition, the United States
provided $14.3 million in economic assistance for Zimbabwe in 2006, and $15.2
million was requested for 2007. According to the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the assistance program focuses on three critical areas:
mitigating the HIV/AIDS pandemic; increasing dialogue between the citizenry and
selected governmental institutions; and enhancing access of the most disadvantaged
groups to appropriate business and technical services.105 Zimbabwe is not among the
countries eligible to participate in the Millennium Challenge Account program, nor
is it a focus country for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
USAID continues to support local democracy advocates in Zimbabwe through
a variety of programs aimed at ensuring media freedom and strengthening civil
society and the legislative process. USAID partners were reportedly instrumental in
documenting the demolitions and human rights violations during Operation
Murambatsvina and assisting in relief efforts. Legal restrictions continue to limit the
ability of journalists and independent newspapers to provide alternative source for
news, and the Zimbabwean government controls all domestic radio and television
broadcasting stations. USAID provides funding for Voice of America to broadcast
Studio 7, a daily program on shortwave and AM radio that USAID describes as “the
principal source of independent electronic media in the country.” Studio 7, along
with UK-based Shortwave (SW) Radio Africa and the Dutch-funded Voice of the
People (VOP) have had their broadcasts periodically interrupted by the Mugabe
government using Chinese jamming equipment.
101 “Bush Backs Mbeki on Zimbabwe,” The Guardian (London) July 10, 2003.
102 “US Seeks ‘Coalition’ to Force Zimbabwe Regime Change,” The Independent (UK),
Aug. 25, 2004.
103 “SADC Inaction on Zimbabwe Places Aid at Risk,” Business Day, Feb. 25, 2005.
104 WFP, “Funding Shortage Edges Millions of Southern Africans into Food Crisis,” Oct.
26, 2006.
105 USAID, “Zimbabwe,” 2006 Congressional Budget Justification.

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The U.S. State Department warns that travelers suspected of having a “bias”
against the government may be refused entry to Zimbabwe.106 In 2006, a delegation
of the U.S. Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), led by AFL-CIO Vice
President William Lucy, was expelled from the country. U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Dell said,
Clearly, the Zimbabwe government’s decision not to honor the delegation’s visas
is the result of the events of 13 September, when security forces brutally
suppressed planned peaceful demonstrations by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions....This transparent attempt to deflect international attention from the
vicious beatings is itself an example of the Zimbabwean government’s repression
and of its fear of the truth....There is increasing acknowledgment that a man who
was regarded as a liberator of his people is an oppressor.107
Other International Perspectives
United Kingdom. In February 2002, in conjunction with the United States and
the European Union, the British Parliament imposed targeted sanctions on leading
members and affiliates of the ZANU-PF regime, as well an arms embargo and an
asset freeze. The UK has imposed travel bans on 126 members of the ZANU-PF and
close affiliates of the party. The Zimbabwe crisis continues to be discussed in the
House of Commons and the House of Lords. To date, however, the UK has not
strengthened its sanctions, and has opted instead to stand within the EU mandate. The
UK continues to provide humanitarian aid in Zimbabwe. Concurrently, the UK
maintains its willingness to release funds to Zimbabwe to pay for parts of an orderly
land redistribution program if Mugabe retires and the rule of law is returned.
Mugabe is extremely hostile toward British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a persistent
critic. Speaking at his 81st birthday celebration, Mugabe said the upcoming election
would “kill once and for all the machinations of that man in Number 10 Downing
Street, who for some reason thinks he has the divine power to rule Zimbabwe and
Britain.... On March 31, we must dig a grave not just six feet but 12 feet and bury Mr.
Blair and the Union Jack.”108
European Union. The European Union was among the first to take action
against Mugabe’s regime. The EU imposed targeted sanctions on 19 members of
Zimbabwe’s elite and their spouses after pulling the EU election observer team out
of Zimbabwe in February 2002. These “light” sanctions were upgraded by the EU
to target 35 Zimbabwean leaders, and have been renewed yearly, most recently in
February 2007. Current EU sanctions include a travel ban on 125 members and
beneficiaries of the ZANU-PF, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze. Mugabe defied
the travel ban in 2005 to attend the funeral of Pope John Paul II. The EU continues
to put pressure on the ZANU-PF government to hold talks with the MDC, while at
the same time providing humanitarian assistance to benefit Zimbabwe’s poor.
106 DOS’s Consular Information Sheet for Zimbabwe is available at [http://travel.state.gov/].
107 “EU Demands Probe into Congress of Trade Union Attacks,” Zimbabwe Standard, Sept.
24, 2006.
108 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Marks 81st Birthday With Attack on Opposition, Blair,” AFP, Feb.
26, 2005.

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France is generally seen as favoring more engagement with the Mugabe regime
than Britain or other EU members, and it lifted travel restrictions against Mugabe for
a visit in 2005. France justified the move by arguing that the inclusion of Mugabe
rather than isolation would provide a quicker path to easing the crisis. Cynics
suggest that France may see engagement with Zimbabwe as a means of extending
French influence in southern Africa, where it has historically not had a major role.
French President Jacques Chirac has reportedly been sympathetic to the quiet
diplomacy initiative of President Mbeki. Nevertheless, France has publicly stressed
the need for dialogue with the opposition before Zimbabwe can improve relations
with the international community, and it declined to invite Zimbabwe to the Franco-
Africa Summit in February 2007.109
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Nations sent a team of observers
to the March 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe, and the group found “that the
conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for the free expression of the will
of the electors.”110 Consequently, on March 19, 2002, a special committee appointed
to monitor and respond to the vote, consisting of Australia, South Africa and Nigeria,
determined that Zimbabwe would be suspended from the Commonwealth for one
year. The suspension was the first public action against Mugabe by a body that
included influential African countries. In December 2003, the Commonwealth,
including 19 other African members, voted to suspend Zimbabwe indefinitely. On
this occasion, the decision was strongly criticized by South Africa’s President
Mbeki, who had by then committed to his policy of quiet diplomacy, and by other
governments in southern Africa. Mugabe responded by withdrawing Zimbabwe from
the Commonwealth and ruling out any further discussions or a possible return.111
Some speculated, as a result, that the Commonwealth’s action had backfired by
placing Zimbabwe fully outside the bounds of its influence. Others argued that
indefinite suspension by a body including many African members had important
symbolic value in Africa and worldwide.
China and Iran. While many western governments have moved to isolate the
Mugabe regime, China and Iran have been improving ties and deepening involvement
in Zimbabwe’s economy. China, which became active on the continent in the 1950s
and 1960s to gain global influence, now looks to Africa for natural resources to meet
the needs of its growing population. A longtime ally of ZANU-PF, which it backed
during the liberation struggle, China is reported to be Zimbabwe’s largest tobacco
purchaser. In a controversial move, Mugabe has reportedly invited Chinese farmers
to cultivate several formerly white-owned farms that had been taken over by black
Zimbabweans and later “nationalized.”112 Many observers see Zimbabwe’s platinum
concessions as a major draw for Beijing, and Chinese firms are playing roles in the
109 “France, US Say ‘No Zimbabwe-UK Dispute, Call for Internal Dialogue,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, July 21, 2006.
110 “Commonwealth Observer Group’s Preliminary Report on Zimbabwean Presidential
Elections,” Mar. 14, 2002. Available at [http://www.afrol.com].
111 “Mugabe Rules Out Zimbabwe’s Return to the Commonwealth,” AFP, Dec. 16, 2003.
112 Roger Bate, “The Shell Game Comes to Zimbabwe; Mugabe Shuffles Around Farms to
Curry Favor with the Chinese,” The Weekly Standard, May 26, 2005.

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cell phone industry, as well as in television, radio, and power generation. China holds
controlling interest in the country’s only electricity generator.
Some critics worry China’s investment in Zimbabwe comes without the “strings
attached” that Western governments might require, such as commitments to human
rights, accountability, and anti-corruption. A $3 billion bid made in late 2006 by a
Chinese company for a controlling stake in Zimbabwe’s steel parastatal recently
became a major scandal due to the reported lack of transparency in the bidding
process. China provided the country with three MA-60 passenger planes in 2005,
although reports suggest technical problems and lack of spare parts have grounded
the planes. Arms agreements between China and Zimbabwe have attracted
considerable attention in recent years, as most Western governments continue to
enforce an arms embargo against the country. Zimbabwe’s $240 million purchase of
twelve Chinese K-8 fighter jets has drawn questions from analysts as to why a
country that faces no immediate external threat from its neighbors would need such
an air force.113 Reports indicate that Zimbabwe has also ordered riot gear, water
cannons, armored vehicles, and AK-47 rifles from China. How impoverished
Zimbabwe could pay for arms from China is a subject of much speculation; Defense
Ministry officials have admitted to being in arrears for the 2005 arms purchases.
Some observers suspect that the acquisitions are covered in some way by China’s
growing economic role in Zimbabwe.114
In the face of Western condemnation and isolation, Zimbabwe has also found
an ally in Iran. During a recent visit to Tehran, President Mugabe reportedly secured
commitments from Iran for direct aid and Iranian assistance to its energy, agriculture,
and mining industries. Reports indicate that Iran may also provide technical
assistance to Zimbabwe to revive the country’s only oil refinery, built 40 years ago
to process Iranian crude. Most of Zimbabwe’s fuel comes by road from South
Africa, but the country has insufficient foreign currency to import fuel in bulk
through a pipeline from the nearest port, Beira, Mozambique to Zimbabwe.
In spite of Mugabe’s assurances of Iranian assistance, some observers suggest
Iran may not meet his expectations. Despite an agreement signed by the two countries
in 2005, little financial assistance appears to have been provided. Whether Mugabe’s
2006 Tehran visit proves more fruitful remains to be seen. As one economic advisor
points out, “At the end of the day, whether its China or Iran, investors want one
thing: a return on their investment and they do not seem to believe they can get that
return (from Zimbabwe).”115 Likewise, Mugabe, traveling to Beijing in 2005 to
request assistance to deal with the country’s foreign exchange shortfall and fuel
shortage, received a scant $6 million for grain imports reportedly because Zimbabwe
113 Defense analysts describe the K-8 as a trainer jet with light ground attack capabilities.
Zambia and Namibia have likewise purchased K-8s from China.
114 EIU, “The Government is to Buy More Jets from China,” Sept. 15, 2006.
115 Excerpt from South Africa-based website ZimOnline in “Zimbabwe Leader ‘Frantically’
Seeking Allies,” BBC Monitoring Africa, Nov. 23, 2006.

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was deemed unworthy of significant investment.116 On the other hand, Mugabe
recently secured a $200 million buyer credit loan from China to promote agricultural
production, reportedly the largest loan to Zimbabwe since western donors ceased
lending in 1999. There are reports that China and Zimbabwe may be negotiating a
much larger $2 billion loan meant to revive the country’s flagging economy.117
In addition to investment and economic assistance, Zimbabwe’s Asian partners
have offered diplomatic support. A Chinese official visiting in 2004 said that his
government “appreciates the reasons for the land issue” and was opposed to any
interference by foreign governments.118 China played a lead role in trying to quiet
U.N. efforts to condemn Zimbabwe for Murambatsvina, and is expected to veto any
proposed action by the Security Council to punish the Mugabe Administration.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed support during Mugabe’s recent
visit, saying “We believe Zimbabweans have every right to defend their sovereignty
and land. We are happy that Zimbabwe has once again taken control over its
resources and we support the land redistribution programme... We strongly condemn
the bullying tactics of a number of (Western) governments against Zimbabwe.”119
Nigeria. Although an observer team from Nigeria endorsed the 2002
presidential election in Zimbabwe, Nigeria’s president, Olusegun Obasanjo, has
attempted to mediate the country’s crisis. He is reportedly concerned about the
consequences of the Zimbabwe situation for the credibility of the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an initiative aimed at demonstrating
Africa’s capabilities for resolving its own problems in exchange for increased aid,
trade, and investment.120 Obasanjo supported Zimbabwe’s suspension from the
Commonwealth, and in 2004, he held a long discussion with Tsvangirai and an MDC
delegation in Abuja, the Nigerian capital. The Nigerian leader then took the
Zimbabwe visitors on a personal tour of his farm — an unusual privilege.121 After
the 2005 elections, Obasanjo met again with Tsvangirai in Abuja, and the
government-owned Herald newspaper accused the Nigerian president of funding the
MDC.122
South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” toward Zimbabwe
has drawn criticism from some for its slow pace and seeming lack of results.
However, some analysts point out that Mbeki’s reluctance to openly confront or
116 “China Aid ‘Snub’ to Enable South Africa to Extract Concessions from Zimbabwe,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, Aug. 1, 2005.
117 “Zimbabwe, China to Negotiate $2 Billion Dollar Loan Deal,” AFP, Dec. 22, 2006 and
China and Zimbabwe to Negotiate Possible US$2-bil. Loan Facility,” Global Insight, Dec.
22, 2006.
118 “Chinese Envoy Supports Zimbabwe’s Land Reforms,” AFP, Nov. 2, 2004.
119 “Iran Slams Sactions Against Zim,” AllAfrica, Nov. 22, 2006.
120 See CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), by
Nicolas Cook.
121 “Nigeria Rolls Out Red Carpet for Tsvangirai,” Zimbabwe Standard, Nov. 15, 2004.
122 “The SA, Nigeria, and MDC Connection,” The Herald, Nov. 6, 2005.

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CRS-34
condemn President Mugabe is understandable on a number of grounds. Mugabe lent
aid and shelter to the African National Congress (ANC), now the ruling party in
South Africa, during its long struggle against white minority rule, creating a bond of
gratitude. Mugabe enjoys considerable popularity around Africa and in South Africa
itself, not least because of his moves to seize lands owned by comparatively wealthy
white farmers, and this may constrain Mbeki as well.
Nonetheless, many are dissatisfied that South Africa, which is immensely more
powerful than neighboring Zimbabwe, and which has extensive control over
Zimbabwe’s transport links to the outside world, as well as over its electricity
supplies, has not been able to do more to improve the Zimbabwe situation. As
Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, many, including the Bush Administration,
consider South Africa in a position to exert substantial leverage. At the same time,
South Africa must weigh the unintended effects of such leverage — state collapse
across its northern border could produce a sharp increase in illegal migration and
have a substantial impact on South Africa. Some estimate that three million
Zimbabweans have fled into the country, and an average of 12,000 Zimbabweans
were deported from South Africa monthly in 2006, a number that is expected to grow
in 2007.123
Through his policy of engagement, President Mbeki has attempted to bring the
Zimbabwean government and the MDC together to discuss Zimbabwe’s future.
Mbeki’s offer of economic incentives and an exit strategy for Mugabe in exchange
for negotiations with the opposition and a commitment to free and fair elections have,
to date, been unsuccessful. In 2005, as the IMF threatened to expel Zimbabwe from
the Fund for debt payment arrears, the country requested a loan of up to $1 billion
from South Africa for fuel, food, and electricity, as well as to address the IMF
payments. Amid rumors that the South African government would make any
potential loan conditional on economic and political reforms, the loan negotiations
stalled and Mugabe found another source from which to repay the IMF dues.124 In
February 2006, Mugabe warned Mbeki in speech that he should “keep away” from
interference in Zimbabwe’s affairs.
Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policies have drawn criticism from within his country;
former President Nelson Mandela, Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
opposition leader Tony Leon, and even the ANC’s ally, the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU), have been vocal detractors. Some analysts
suggest Mbeki may be ready to change his “quiet diplomacy” approach toward
Mugabe, although it has been suggested by members of his administration that any
stronger measures should come through the African Union or SADC, rather than
from South Africa alone.125
123 U.N., United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2007, November 2007.
124 “Zimbabwe Pays Part of IMF Debt,” Washington Post, Sept. 2, 2005.
125 “South Africa is Ready To Get Tough with Mugabe Regime,” The Daily Telegraph,
Aug. 20, 2005.

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COSATU, South Africa’s powerful labor confederation, strongly opposes the
quiet diplomacy policy, and has become so outspoken on the issue that some
observers believe its longstanding political alliance with the ANC is threatened. A
certain sympathy on the part of COSATU toward the MDC may be inevitable, since
the MDC has its roots in the union movement. COSATU delegations have been
forcibly expelled from Zimbabwe twice, first in 2004 and more recently in late 2006,
when COSATU members traveled to Harare to express their support for the ZCTU
after the incidents of police violence. One COSATU leader remarked, “we are not
quiet diplomats,” and “we will not keep mum when freedom does not lead to respect
for workers and human rights.”126 When the Mbeki government issued a terse initial
statement following the March 11, 2007, arrest of MDC and civil society activists,
COSATU criticized the government for a “disgraceful” response, “in the face of such
massive attacks on democracy and human rights, especially coming from those who
owed so much to international solidarity when South Africans were fighting for
democracy and human rights against the apartheid regime.”127
Defenders of President Mbeki’s approach argue that he is the only leader with
the influence and prestige needed to sway Mugabe. Harvard’s Robert Rotberg, a
veteran Africanist, contends that “only Mbeki can restore peace and sanity to
Zimbabwe.”128 Rotberg urges that Mbeki try to persuade Mugabe to leave the
country and take up residence in Namibia, where he has a farm, or in South Africa
itself. Whether Mbeki could succeed in this, should he decide to try, remains to be
seen. However, some claim that Mbeki and South African diplomats have already
made a contribution in Zimbabwe — helping to prevent the country from slipping
into anarchy in 2002, for example.129 Some observers expressed hope for Mbeki’s
mediation role when the President and Morgan Tsvangirai met in October 2004, after
Tsvangirai’s acquittal. Tsvangirai, who had been critical of quiet diplomacy in the
past, said after the meeting that he welcomed President Mbeki’s efforts to mediate.130
But Mbeki stunned the MDC and many supporters of democracy in Zimbabwe in
March 2005, when he told a press conference that he had “no reason to think that
anyone in Zimbabwe will militate in a way so that the elections will not be free and
fair.” He insisted that “there will be a free and fair election in Zimbabwe” and that
“things like access to the public media, things like violence-free election have been
addressed.”131 Earlier, he had termed Secretary Rice’s description of Zimbabwe as
an outpost of tyranny as “an exaggeration.”132 These remarks have left critics
questioning the substance behind Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy.
126 “We Are Not Quiet Diplomats,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), Nov. 5, 2004.
127 “South Africa Ends ‘s ‘Silence’ on Zimbabwe, Urges Harare ‘to Respect Rule of Law,’”
BBC Monitoring Africa, Mar. 14, 2007.
128 “Only Mbeki Can Rescue Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, Dec. 7, 2004.
129 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 14.
130 “Tsvangirai Changes Tune on Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy,” Business Day, Oct. 29, 2004.
131 “Mbeki Pays Tribute to Zimbabwe, Says Polls Will Be Free and Fair,” AFP, Mar. 2,
2005.
132 “Mbeki Criticizes U.S Over Zimbabwe,” BBC, Feb. 22, 2005.

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The future of South Africa’s policy toward Zimbabwe may be determined at the
ANC’s national conference in December 2007, when the party chooses Mbeki’s
successor, who will likely succeed him as President of South Africa after the 2008
national elections. Among the possible candidates, former Deputy President Jacob
Zuma, who has been plagued by scandal, has referred to the Zimbabwean president
as “a monster,” but has defended Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy.133 Current Deputy
President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, has suggested South Africa has “lessons to
learn from Zimbabwe” on how to speed up its land reform process.134 Analysts
contend businessman Tokyo Sexwale, who spent ten years as a political prisoner
with Nelson Mandela, might take a stronger approach toward Zimbabwe. Sexwale
has criticized Mbeki’s policy, saying, “When a freedom fighter takes a wrong step,
it is time for other freedom fighters to stand up and say ‘we know you are a great
man, but we cannot support what you are doing.’”135
Although Mbeki’s approach to the Zimbabwe situation has not caused major
difficulties in its relations with the United States, that potential exists, particularly if
the United States intensifies pressure on the Mugabe regime. U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Jendayi Frazer reportedly suggested in a 2005 speech that U.S. support for
the region may be affected by the situation in Zimbabwe. If African organizations are
“not seen to act forcefully against tyranny,” she said, “it is going to be a problem in
terms of trying to build international support and resources.”136
The African Union. The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), have been supportive of Mugabe in the past.
In 2002, an OAU observer team labeled Mugabe’s election victory legitimate, free,
and fair. In July 2004, when the AU allowed a report critical of the Mugabe regime
to be circulated at its annual summit, some believed the regional body might be
indicating a change in its approach. The 114-page report, prepared by a delegation
from the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) that visited
Zimbabwe in 2002, reportedly criticized the Zimbabwe government for police
abuses, press censorship, and compromising the judiciary.137 The AU tabled the
report at the summit, however, and declared it would keep its contents secret until
Zimbabwe has had a chance to respond in detail. According to some media reports,
the Zimbabwean government used procedural regulations and technicalities to
prevent its release.138 The ACHPR passed a resolution in December 2005 calling on
the “government of Zimbabwe to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
133 “I’m No Mugabe, but I Have Sympathy for What He Has Done,” The Sunday Telegraph
(London), Nov. 26, 2006.
134 “Mugabe: Why Africans Applaud Him,” New Statesman (London), Aug. 7, 2006.
135 “Chorus of Disapproval Grows As Sexwale Speaks Out on Mugabe,” Zimbabwe
Independent, Oct. 6, 2006.
136 “South Africa’s President Feels the Squeeze over Zimbabwe,” Christian Science
Monitor, Mar. 28, 2005.
137 “AU Report Slams Erosion of Rule of Law,” Zimbabwe Independent, July 16, 2004.
138 “It’s the Very Leaders Who Are Denying the People Their Justice,” Financial Gazette,
July 20, 2006.

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CRS-37
expression” and to allow a second fact-finding mission to enter the country. The
ACHPR resolution was hailed by human rights advocates, who suggested, “This will
exert a lot of pressure on Zimbabwe - this is the first time such a significant body, so
close to African heads of state, observes and condemns such defiance of human
rights compliance.”139 But like the previous report, the second mission’s findings
were rejected by the AU’s Council of Ministers in 2006 because of “irregularities and
procedural flaws.”140
Some observers and international human rights organizations such as the
International Press Institute (IPI), suggest that the AU’s repeated rejection of ACHPR
resolutions on Zimbabwe tarnishes the integrity of the body. As one AU official
warned, “If we continue to throw out every human rights report that comes before us,
people out there will stop taking us seriously.”141 IPI also suggests that refusal of the
AU to act on the ACHPR resolutions or to condemn human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe damages the credibility of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
initiative, a vital part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).142
Criticism from the AU may have little effect on Mugabe regardless, unless it is
accompanied by more substantial policy changes toward his administration.
Zimbabwe has routinely ignored its detractors and frequently denies those who might
be critical of the regime access to the country. In 2005, AU Commission Chairman
Alpha Konare sent Tom Nyanduga, Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Internally
Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers in Africa, as his envoy to investigate
Operation Murambatsvina. The Zimbabwean government prevented Nyanduga from
conducting his assessment and deported him, accusing the envoy of “western
collusion and agenda adoption.”143 In 2006 at an AU Summit in Gambia, African
leaders pushed for former Tanzanian President Robert Mkapa to mediate between
Zimbabwe and Britain. Many analysts contend the Mkapa initiative is a non-starter.
While the Zimbabwean government is favorable toward Mkapa’s role, which it views
as serving as a mediator between itself and Britain, the British contend that there is
no need for mediation because Zimbabwe’s problems are domestic, rather than
bilateral.144 Mugabe has repeatedly rejected intervention from other mediators who
have suggested negotiations with the MDC, including former Mozambican president
139 “African Union Slams Human Rights Record,” IRIN, Jan. 3, 2006.
140 International Press Institute, “IPI Disappointed By African Union’s Slow Progress in
Criticizing Zimbabwe’s Record on Human Rights, Press Freedom,”Apr. 4, 2006. IPI is a
global network of editors, media executives and leading journalists in over 110 countries
that promotes press freedoms and journalistic standards.
141 “Mkapa Has a Long Shot at Moving ‘Bad Boy’ Mugabe,” AllAfrica, Aug. 25, 2006.
142 For further information on the APRM and NEPAD, see CRS Report RS21353, New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), by Nicholas Cook.
143 “Harare Raps African Union Human Rights Body,” U.S. Fed News, July 6, 2005.
144 “Britain says Zimbabwe ‘blocked’ opportunity to build bridges,” Agence France-Presse,
July 29, 2006.

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Joachim Chissano and former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, contending there
is no need to negotiate with the opposition outside parliament.145
SADC. Many of the 14 members of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) are linked to Zimbabwe by a common historical experience, as
well as cultural and economic ties, and the organization has been seen as disinclined
to condemn the actions of President Mugabe’s regime. At its August 2004 summit
in Mauritius, SADC approved new electoral principles and guidelines for all its
member nations.146 Analysts were hopeful that these rules might motivate meaningful
democratic reforms in Zimbabwe, particularly since they laid out detailed guidelines
for SADC observer missions.147 The signatory countries, including Zimbabwe, are
pledged to allow SADC observers freedom of movement and access. As noted
above, the SADC observer delegation’s favorable report for Zimbabwe’s 2005
elections was considered by critics of the Mugabe administration to be disappointing.
Although Mugabe’s neighboring leaders have not singled him out for criticism,
they do appear increasingly concerned with the impact of Zimbabwe’s crisis on their
own countries. Southern African leaders blamed Zimbabwe and Swaziland for
undermining economic growth in the region at a SADC Summit in Lesotho in August
2006. Botswana has spoken out in the past on regional problems attributed to
Mugabe’s policies, including the burden placed on the country by Zimbabwe’s
refugees. Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa are reported to be concerned about
the potential postponement of Zimbabwe’s presidential elections, and are apparently
preparing a fact-finding mission in 2007 on behalf of SADC’s Committee on Politics
and Defense. The regional body has also designated Lesotho, Namibia, and Tanzania
to formulate SADC’s response to Zimbabwe’s political crisis. In March 2007,
following the arrest of Tsvangirai and other opposition members, Tanzanian
President Jakaya Kikwete traveled to Harare to discuss the incident.
Prospects for the Future
The future of Zimbabwe, in the short term, appears grave. Inflation and the cost
of living remain on the rise, and the country’s agriculture industry shows little sign
of recovery. Prospects for Zimbabwe’s youngest generation are equally grim.
Primary school attendance has reportedly dropped almost 25% since 2000 (some
reports suggest enrollment may have dropped a further 25% as a result of
Murambatsvina), and the cost of school fees rose 250% in December 2006 alone.
Many families are unable to afford basic food items, not to mention medicines or
doctors. Analysts have cited a number of reasons for Zimbabwe’s economic
problems, including recurrent drought, difficulties encountered in implementing
economic reforms, and industrial competition from comparatively cheap South
145 “‘Mad Marathon’ to the United Nations,” The Herald, Aug. 21, 2005.
146 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Adopted by the
SADC Summit, Mauritius, August 2004). Available at [http://www.iss.co.za].
147 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 13.

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African imports.148 At the same time, analysts place considerable responsibility for
Zimbabwe’s problems on the policies adopted and actions taken by the government
since 1997. The government has taken some fiscal measures to reverse the economic
downturn, but as hyperinflation continues to rise, they have been largely ineffective.
The government of Zimbabwe has displayed little respect for the rule of law,
which has, according to reports, in turn deterred desperately needed foreign investors.
While President Mugabe’s allies may maintain their diplomatic solidarity, financial
support could dwindle if they do not see a return on their investments. Likewise, the
African solidarity on which Mugabe has relied may be wane as countries consider the
impact of his policies on their own countries. Nigeria and Botswana, for example,
have become increasingly critical. Zimbabwe refuses to extradite former Ethiopian
dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, who has been convicted in absentia for crimes of
genocide in an Ethiopian court, and who has been in Zimbabwe in 1991. Experts
will watch with interest the outcome of South Africa’s succession contest, which
could precipitate a change in the country’s policy toward its neighbor.
Ultimately, Mugabe’s greatest challenge may come from within. If reports of
opposition to his term extension within his own party are accurate, parliament could
reject a constitutional amendment to postpone the presidential elections. The
president would then face the dilemma of either running again or choosing a
successor, thus possibly losing the loyalty of others who aspire to the post. Many
suggest that none of the aspirants have the popularity of the current president, and
even a significant amount of state resources might not be enough to secure an
electoral victory for a ZANU-PF candidate in 2008 if the electorate considers the
party responsible for the country’s economic problems. If the GDP continues its
decline, the Zimbabwean government will also find itself with dwindling resources
from which to draw to maintain support from its civil servants and its security forces.
It appears there may already be signs of unrest — doctors in public hospitals
across the country went on strike for better wages in early 2007, as did workers at
Zimbabwe’s only electricity provider, leading to power outages throughout the
country. Nevertheless, the opposition remains divided and, some observers contend,
disorganized. The Mutambara faction proved unable to defeat ZANU-PF electorally
in late 2005, and neither faction has been able to win seats in recent by-elections.
Opposition demonstrations in early 2007 may revitalize public support for the MDC,
although police crackdowns on protesters could discourage turnout. Mutambara’s
show of solidarity with Tsvangirai at a court hearing following their March 11 arrest
may signal a move toward reconciliation between the factions, but that remains
uncertain.
As Zimbabwe’s economy continues to collapse, the country’s political situation
may be approaching a tipping point. Analysts will be closely watching developments
within the ruling party in the coming months, particularly decisions regarding
Mugabe’s continued tenure as president. Some have suggested that there are
members of the ruling party who may be amenable to negotiations with the
148 Teddy Brett and Simon Winter, “Origins of the Zimbabwe Crisis,” Focus (Helen Suzman
Foundation), June 2003.

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CRS-40
opposition over the establishment of a two-year transitional government with
representation from both parties, to be followed by general elections in 2010. The
opposition’s role in Zimbabwe’s political future may depend on its ability to present
a unified and credible alternative to the Mugabe government, as well as its
willingness to work with moderate elements of ZANU-PF.
Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe
crsphpgw

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