Order Code RL33530
Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Updated March 5, 2007
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Summary
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved
mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for
Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II
accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza. However, Israeli-Syrian
negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000.
Negotiations with Lebanon also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw
unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit
with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but
they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel,
and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards.
The post 9/11 war on terrorism prompted renewed U.S. focus on a peace
process, emphasizing as its goal a democratic Palestinian state as a precondition for
achieving peace. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union,
and Russia (known as the “Quartet”) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian
statehood. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have implemented it. Israel unilaterally
disengaged (withdrew) from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West
Bank in August 2005.
PA Chairman/President Yasir Arafat died on November 11, 2004; on January
9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected to succeed him and he seeks final status talks.
The victory of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group,
in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, however, complicated the
situation. The United States, Israel, and the Quartet have agreed that they will not
deal with a Hamas-led government until it disavows violence, recognizes Israel, and
accepts prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. The rise of Hamas and the conflicts in Gaza
and Lebanon sparked by the Hamas and Hezbollah kidnapings of Israeli soldiers have
cast shadows on the prospects for future talks.
Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its
oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen
constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other
commitments to the parties, and the 110th Congress has begun to be engaged in these
matters. Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel,
although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city
is the subject of final status negotiations. This CRS report will be updated as
developments warrant. See also CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The
Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated by Jeremy Sharp.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Madrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bilateral Talks and Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Israel-Palestinians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Israel-Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Israel-Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Israel-Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Significant Agreements and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Declaration of Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip . . . . . . 27
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Wye River Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Agreement on Movement and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Compliance/Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
On February 2, 2007, the Quartet (United Nations, United States, European
Union, and Russia) issued a statement reaffirming the primacy of the 2003
international Roadmap to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
reiterated a call for a Palestinian unity government to commit to non-violence,
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements, including the
Roadmap.1
On February 4, House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations Chair Nita Lowey froze the transfer of $86 million in aid for security
forces allied with Palestinian President Abbas until the Administration provides
additional information.
On February 8, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas designated Prime Minister
Ismail Haniyah of Hamas to form a new unity government and called on him to
“respect international resolutions and agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO),” that is, prior accords reached with Israel. Abbas’s letter of
designation resulted from the Mecca Accord reached at a meeting of Abbas and
Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish’al hosted by Saudi King Abdullah. Under
the Accord, Hamas will hold nine ministries in the cabinet, Fatah six, and other
factions four. Independents will hold the foreign and finance portfolios. The Accord
mainly aims to stop internecine fighting between Palestinian factions and unite them
in a new government, and does not refer to Israel or to the Quartet’s demands.2 On
February 11, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told his cabinet that “at this stage,
Israel neither rejects nor accepts the (Mecca) agreement” and is studying it.
On February 19, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Olmert and
Abbas in Jerusalem. Their discussions reportedly focused on the Mecca Accord but
did not result in a joint statement. Afterwards, Olmert said Israel would continue to
boycott the Palestinian government until it met the Quartet’s demands, ended rocket
attacks from the Gaza Strip, and released the Israeli soldier kidnaped in June 2006.
Israel also would not have contact with moderates who serve in a Palestinian
government that does not meet the Quartet’s conditions but would maintain contact
with Abbas only in order to limit terror and ease Palestinian daily life. Olmert
1 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].
2 Text of the Mecca Accord was published on [http://www.middle-east-online.com] Feb. 9,
2007.

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CRS-2
rejected the idea that he negotiate with Abbas as head of the PLO because doing so
will free Hamas of the requirement to recognize Israel.
Background
Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade
since the founding of Israel. With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied
and became more intractable. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided
a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing conflict made refugees of hundreds of
thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with consequences
troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. It also led to a mass movement of Jewish
citizens of Arab states to Israel. The 1967 war ended with Israel occupying territory
of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in part, to regain
their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist incursions;
it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security zone” that Lebanon sought to
reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal
throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct
Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.3
U.S. Role
With the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the
Arab-Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a
framework for peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
the principle of “land for peace.” Secretary of State James Baker organized a peace
conference in Madrid in October 1991 that launched almost a decade of the “Oslo
process” efforts to achieve peace. It continued under President William Clinton, who
asserted that only the region’s leaders can make peace and vowed to be their partner.
With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United States seemed to become an
indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the
1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States coordinated its
implementation. He personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. After
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Administration focused on the peace
process mainly as part of the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
also has not appointed a special envoy, asserting, “Not every effort has to be an
3 For additional background, see William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press,
Revised Edition 2001; Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace
Process in the Middle East, New York, Other Press, 2003; Anton La Guardia, War Without
End: Israelis Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land, New York, St. Martin’s
Griffin, Revised and Updated, 2003; Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge, UK, Polity
Press, 2005; and Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle
East Peace, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.

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CRS-3
American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking
responsibility.”4 Nonetheless, she has actively encouraged Israelis and Palestinians
to act and personally mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border
crossing Gaza and Egypt after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. In 2007, she has again
personally engaged partly in order to elicit the support of moderate Sunni Arab
governments to thwart the rise of Iranian influence. Those governments see
resolution of the Palestinian issue as a key to regional stability and to denying Iran
opportunities for destabilizing actions.
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts
Madrid. The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were
represented by 14-member delegations. A combined Jordanian/Palestinian
delegation had 14 representatives from each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team
coordinated with the PLO. The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria,
Palestinians/Jordan, the European Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the
table. The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council,5 and the Arab Maghreb Union6 were
observers.
Bilateral Talks and Developments
Israel-Palestinians. (Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In
November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate
the Israeli-Jordanian and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating tracks, the latter to
address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9,
1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination committee,
ending efforts to distance the PLO from the talks. Secret talks in Oslo in 1993
produced an August 19 agreement on a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by
Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993. Through the end of the decade,
incremental advances were made with interim accords. Perhaps the most important
developments were Israel’s withdrawal from major cities and towns and the
achievement of Palestinian self-government as the Palestinian Authority (PA),
electing a chief executive (translated as “chairman” or “president”) and a legislature
to administer those territories. However, no final agreement was ever reached. (See
“Significant Agreements,” below, for summaries of and links to accords reached
between 1993 and 2000. This narrative resumes with the Camp David summit.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority
(PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24,
4 Anne Gearan, “Rice Blasts Way Iran Treats Its Own People,” Associated Press, Feb. 4,
2005.
5 The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
6 The Arab Maghreb Union is comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia.

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CRS-4
2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The
parties had agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved.
Jerusalem was the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its
sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem
and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede more than 90% of the West Bank,
wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and offered to admit
thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An international
fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries. The
Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter
of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
particularly the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security
forces, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel
responded forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising against the
occupation began. On October 12, a mob in Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers,
provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian official sites. An
international summit in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, on October 16 set up a commission
under former U.S. Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister
in Israel. Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington,
D.C., December 19-23. On December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel
cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif and Arab neighborhoods
in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and annex settlement
blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza. Jerusalem
would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount
and sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would
control borders in the Jordan Valley for three to six years, and then be replaced by an
international force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.”7 Barak said
he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought
clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East
Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of return, among other issues. The Israeli-Palestinian
talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and
vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other
areas for security. Sharon’s associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and
after Camp David were “null and void.”8 The Bush Administration said that
Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States proposals.”9 Sharon sought an
7 For text of the President’s speech describing his proposal, also known as “the Clinton
Plan” or “Clinton Parameters,” see the Israel Policy Forum website at [http://www.israel
policyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].
8 Lee Hockstader, “Jerusalem is ‘Indivisible,’ Sharon Says; Camp David Concessions are
Called ‘Null and Void,’” Washington Post, Feb. 8, 2001.
9 Jane Perlez, “Bush Officials Pronounce Clinton Mideast Plan Dead,” New York Times,
(continued...)

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CRS-5
interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian
state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.10
On April 30, 2001, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending
violence, rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two
sides accepted CIA Director George Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28,
they agreed to a seven-day period without violence followed by a six-week cooling-
off period. Secretary Powell said Sharon would determine if violence abated. On
August 8, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated in Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli
forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian national activity in East
Jerusalem, and then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On August 27, Israel
killed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what
no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President
Bush said, for the first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of
a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.”11 The PFLP assassinated
Israel’s Minister of Tourism on October 17. On November 10, President Bush
declared that the United States is “working toward the day when two states — Israel
and Palestine — live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders....”
Secretary Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire,
but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in
Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be
reached with Arafat, “who is a real terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed
an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings
in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was “directly responsible” for the
attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant....”12
On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-
commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell
stated that Arafat “cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at
the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.” At the White House
on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so
that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.” (On March 28, the Arab
League endorsed his proposal with some revisions; it is known as the “Arab Peace
9 (...continued)
Feb. 9, 2001.
10 Interview by Ari Shavit, Ha’aretz, Apr. 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) Document GMP200110413000070.
11 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov] for presidential statements cited in this report.
12 “Israeli Cabinet Decision on Cutting Contacts with Arafat,” Government Press Office,
Dec. 13, 2001, FBIS Document GMP200111213000010.

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CRS-6
Initiative.”13) Prime Minister Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea but
that it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s right to
“secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, Hamas perpetrated a suicide bombing at a hotel in Netanya during
Passover celebrations, killing 27 and wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an
enemy” and the Israeli armed forces besieged his compound in Ramallah; they soon
controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a
conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. After another Hamas suicide
bombing near Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before
negotiations. After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions
were not ripe for a conference because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian
government. On June 24, the President called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders
“not compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the
United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and
certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He added,
“as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli) settlement activity
must stop.” The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years.14 On
September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary “Roadmap” to peace.
On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat
named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On April 14, Sharon
acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history
of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to
Israel.15 On April 14, Israeli emissaries submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap
to U.S. officials.16 On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Roadmap. Abbas
accepted it. On May 23, the Bush Administration stated that Israel had explained its
concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these are real concerns and
will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap,” leading
Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with reservations”
on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
On June 4, President Bush met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas
vowed to achieve the Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed
13 For “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudiembassy.net/
2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].
14 For text of the speech, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-
3.html].
15 “Sharon, ‘Certain” of Passing ‘Painful Concessions’ in Knesset,” Ma’ariv, Apr. 15, 2003,
FBIS Document GMP20030415000091.
16 For text of Israel’s reservations, see Israel’s Response to the Road Map, online at
[http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm].

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CRS-7
understanding of “the importance of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian
state and promised to “remove unauthorized outposts.” Abbas said that he would use
dialogue, not force, to convince Palestinian groups. On June 29, Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations against Israel for three
months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not a party to the accord,
but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release Palestinian
prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat
free movement, and end construction of a security barrier that Israeli is building in
the West Bank. Israel demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist
infrastructures and act against terrorists.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide
bomber exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more
than 130. Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought
Arafat’s support to act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians,
halted plans to transfer cities to their control, and resumed “targeted killings” of
terrorist leaders, among other measures. On September 6, Abbas resigned because
of what he charged was lack of support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On
September 7, Arafat named Palestinian Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia,
aka Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing
three U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested
members of Popular Resistance Committees — disaffected former members of the
Palestinian security services, Fatah, and other groups. (They would be freed in April
2004.)
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating
in the signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli
opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on December 1.17 Perhaps partly
to defuse these efforts, on December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish
and democratic Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by
redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and
intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank.18 On February 13,
2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but that
a final settlement “must be achieved through negotiations.” After an upsurge in
violence, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and others on
March 22.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters.19 The
President welcomed Israel’s plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S.
17 For text, see the Geneva Initiative website at [http://www.heskem.org.il].
18 For text, see “Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya
Speech,” Parts 1 and 2, Voice of Israel, Dec. 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents
GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167.
19 For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].

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CRS-8
commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account changed
“realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,”
(i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” The
President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling
Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting
a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous,
sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented his disengagement plan as
independent of but “not inconsistent with the Roadmap.” He said that the
“temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders.
A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in
Hebron that Israel intends to retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the
President’s “legitimization” of settlements and prejudgement of final status. On
April 19, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov Weissglas gave National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle illegal settlement outposts.20
(As of March 2007, very few outposts have been dismantled.)
On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby
Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the
northern West Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the
government’s right to build a security fence in the West Bank, but struck down some
land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights and ordered the route to be
changed. The government said that it would abide by the ruling. The Israeli Court
has attempted to balance Israel’s security needs and the humanitarian claims of
Palestinians in subsequent rulings; in some cases, it has required that the barrier be
rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding,
advisory opinion that the wall violates international law.21
On October 6, Sharon’s aide Dov Weissglas claimed that disengagement was
aimed at freezing the political process in order to “prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.”22
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the
PLO and, on January 9, 2005, was elected President of the PA. Abbas called for
implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues and
cautioned against interim solutions to delay reaching a comprehensive solution.

Secretary of State Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the
Israelis’ “historic” disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out
obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine
Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator
20 For text of letter, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Press+Releases/2004/
04/Speeches7864.htm].
21 For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org]. Note, Israel refers to the barrier as a “fence” and
the Palestinians and other critics refer to it as a “wall.” Neutral observers often use the word
“barrier.”
22 Interview by Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze,” Ha’aretz, Oct. 8, 2004, FBIS Document
GMP20041008000026.

---

CRS-9
and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation for the
disengagement. (Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton succeeded Ward.) The Secretary did not
attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President Mubarak, and
Jordanian King Abdullah II in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt, where Sharon and Abbas
declared the end of violence and of military operations.
On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence
closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank
that includes major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel transferred Jericho to the
PA. On March 17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a “calm” or informal truce
until the end of the year. On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to the PA.
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the
building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and
East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut
East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern
and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary
Rice asserted that the plan was “at odds with American policy.” On April 11,
President Bush conveyed to Sharon his “concern that Israel not undertake any activity
that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.”
Sharon responded, “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers
will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement,” declared that Ma’ale
Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity
between it and Jerusalem.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House and said that
“changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.” The U.S. President
reaffirmed, “A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank,
and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful
linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States
today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status
negotiations.” He also said, “The barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a
security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future state
should be those of before the 1967 war and asserted, “there is no justification for the
wall and it is illegitimate.” He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the
Gaza disengagement with Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final
status negotiations.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in
Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and injuring more than 90. Israeli forces launched
operations against the PIJ, reoccupied Tulkarem, and closed the West Bank.
Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire against settlements in Gaza and
towns in southern Israel in order to show that disengagement meant that Hamas was
forcing Israel to withdraw from the Strip.
On August 15, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep
the settlement blocs of Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-
Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed — all are within or expected to be on Israel’s

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CRS-10
side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift
Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border. 23
Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small
settlements in the northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. On
August 29, Sharon declared that there would be no further unilateral or coordinated
disengagements and that the next step must be negotiations under the Roadmap. He
affirmed that while the large blocs of settlements would remain in Israeli hands and
linked territorially to Israel, not all West Bank settlements would remain, but this
would be decided in the final stage of negotiations.
After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, Hamas
announced on September 25 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but, on
September 27, it claimed responsibility for kidnaping and killing an Israeli settler in
the West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure of charities
linked to terror groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates in Palestinian
parliamentary elections, and targeted killings of terrorists.
On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront
the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not urge
him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that
candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to
renounce violence after election.
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in
Hadera, on the Israeli coast. Sharon announced an offensive against terrorism. He
ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes “serious action” against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her
that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian
legislative elections. He added that if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in
the Palestinian administration it could lead to the end of the Roadmap. Rice asserted
that it would be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after the elections because the
entire international community would then exert pressure. She added that Abbas
would lose U.S. and international support if he does not disarm Hamas. Rice vowed
that the United States would not hold contacts with an armed Hamas even if it were
part of the Palestinian administration. On November 15, she announced that Israel
and the PA had achieved an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza
Strip. On November 25, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
reopened with EU monitors; it has been open infrequently since then.
On December 5, PIJ perpetrated another suicide bombing in Netanya, killing 5
and wounding more than 50. Israel barred Palestinians from entering Israel for one
week, arrested militants in the West Bank, and began air strikes in Gaza. Israeli
officials suspended talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys that were
23 Interview by Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, Aug. 15, 2005, FBIS Document GMP20050
815621002.

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CRS-11
to begin on December 15. PIJ claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings at an
Israeli army checkpoint in the northern West Bank on December 28, killing a soldier.
After Hamas’s victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections,
speculation increased about possible effects on the peace process if Hamas were
similarly successful in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28,
the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet “should include no member who
has not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and
an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.”24 On January 11, Secretary Rice
stated, “It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the
political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.”
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke on January 4.
Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister and, on January
12, he told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if terrorist
organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government. On January 19, PIJ
perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30.
Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, claims the entire land of Palestine,
including Israel, “from the river to the sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo
agreements of the 1990s, insists on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
Israel, and on the right to “resistance,” which it claims forced Israel from the Gaza
Strip.25 Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian
administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction
and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction
of Israel, and accept all prior agreements. President Bush stated that the United
States would not deal with a political party “that articulates the destruction of Israel
as part of its platform” and, on January 31, called on Hamas to “recognize Israel,
disarm, reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace.”
On January 30, the Quartet stated that “future assistance to any new
(Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government’s
commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance
of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.”26 Hamas countered
that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a “long-term truce” if
Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroyed all settlements,
and recognized the Palestinian refugees’ right to return (to Israel), and would create
a state on “any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding another. Abbas remained
committed to negotiating a two-state solution and suggested continued use of the
PLO for this purpose.
24 This and subsequent Quartet statements cited may be found at the State Department’s
website: [http://www.state.gov].
25 For Hamas Covenant text, see [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm].
26 “UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,” M2 Presswire, Jan. 31, 2006.

---

CRS-12
On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the
Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major
settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley. On March 5, his security advisor Avi
Dichter added that the Israeli Defense Forces would retain control over territory to
prevent terrorism. On March 8, Olmert stated that he would wait a “reasonable”
amount of time to see whether Hamas met his conditions. He aimed to reach a
national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and stated that the security barrier
would be moved to those borders. Olmert also declared that construction would
begin in the E-1 corridor between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem.
Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah of Hamas declared, “Let them
withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch of liberated land....”
Damascus-based Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish’al said that his group
would make no concessions to Israel and would “practice resistance side by side with
politics as long as the occupation continued.”
After his Kadima party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary
elections, Olmert said that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish
state with a permanent Jewish majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations
based on mutual recognition, agreements already signed, the principles of the
Roadmap, a halt to violence, and the disarming of terrorist organizations. He said he
hoped to hear a similar announcement from the PA, but “Israel will take its fate into
its own hands” if the Palestinians do not act.
Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to President Abbas negotiating with
Israel and that Hamas could redefine its position if the result served the people’s
interests. In an op-ed in (the British newspaper) The Guardian on March 31,
Haniyah appealed for no more talk about recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” or
ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw from the Palestinians’ lands and
recognizes their rights. On March 30, the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades had claimed
responsibility for a suicide bombing near the Israeli settlement of Kedumim, killing
four. Reacting to the bombing, the Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister said that
Hamas would never object to the Palestinians’ “self-defense” as long as they were
under occupation.
On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the
Hamas-led PA, which it called a “hostile entity.” Because it views the PA as “one
authority and not as having two heads,” the cabinet declared that there could be
personal contacts, but not negotiations, with President Abbas.
On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and
wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as
“despicable” and counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an
act of “self-defense.” Israel did not respond militarily, but revoked the Jerusalem
residency of three Hamas officials, among other steps.
On April 26, Abbas called for an immediate international peace conference with
himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He said that the Hamas-led government is not
an obstacle to negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, has the mandate to
negotiate as it had all previous agreements. He also noted that he is empowered as
the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. In response, an Israeli

---

CRS-13
spokesman cited the Roadmap, which does not call for an international conference
until its final phase, as the best way to move forward. Meanwhile, Hamas officials
said that, for negotiations to begin, Israel must accept withdrawal from territories
occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, recognition of the refugees’ right to
return, the release of prisoners, and the dismantling of the (security) wall, which
others might consider the goals of negotiations.
On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to
strive to shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic Jewish
state, with a Jewish majority. Although preferring to achieve this goal through
negotiations, the government said that it would act to determine borders in their
absence. Prime Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted
to conform to the borders in both east and west. The PLO rejected the Olmert Plan
as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people’s right to a state in all territories
occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital.
On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other officials drafted a “National
Accord Document” calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the
right of the return of refugees, and the release of all prisoners. It also called for
renewing the PLO and for Hamas and PIJ to join it. It supported the right to resist
the occupation in lands occupied in 1967. It stated that the PLO is responsible for
negotiations and that any agreement should be put to a vote by the Palestinian
National Council or a referendum.27 Abbas accepted the document, but Hamas
officials rejected its implied recognition of pre-1967 Israel.
On May 21, Olmert asserted that, since the Hamas-led government was elected,
Abbas is “unable to even stop the minimal terror activities amongst the Palestinians,
so how can he seriously negotiate with Israel and assume responsibility for the most
major, fundamental issues that are in controversy between us and them?”28 Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met Abbas on the sidelines of a World Economic
Forum meeting in Egypt, where Abbas asserted that “permanent” arrangements are
impossible without resolving the main issues of conflict: security, borders, Jerusalem,
and refugees. He warned that Israeli “unilateralism will quickly put an end to the
two-state solution and will increase violence.”29
On May 23, Olmert met President Bush at the White House. The President said
that Olmert agrees that a negotiated final status agreement best serves both peoples
and the cause of peace, but that Olmert’s ideas for removing most Israeli settlements
could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to progress on the Roadmap is not
open in the period ahead. Olmert said that he had presented the President ideas for
a “realignment” in the West Bank to “reduce friction between Israelis and
Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the Palestinians, and guarantee Israel’s
27 For text of a later, final version of the National Accord Document (also known as the
Palestinian Prisoners’s Agreement), see Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations
Affairs Department website [http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=news-updates_pre].
28 In interview on CNN Late Edition, May 22, 2006.
29 “‘Full text’ of Palestinian President’s Speech at World Economic Forum,” BBC
Monitoring Middle East, May 25, 2006.

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CRS-14
security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.”30 He repeated these ideas in his
address to Congress on May 24.31
On May 25, President Abbas called on Hamas to agree within 10 days to the
prisoners’ National Accord Document or he would hold a national referendum on the
document within 40 days. Prime Minister Haniyah claimed that Palestinian laws do
not authorize referenda and demanded more time for a dialogue to revise the
proposals. On June 10, Abbas scheduled a July 26 referendum on the question: “Do
you agree to the National Accord Document, the prisoners’ document?” He also
stated that the dialogue with Hamas would continue and an agreement could preclude
the referendum.
Violence increased, especially between Gaza and Israel. The Hamas military
wing and other Palestinian groups repeatedly launched rockets at Sderot in southern
Israel, and Israel responded with artillery fire and air strikes. On June 10, Hamas
called off its 16-month truce in response to the deaths of Palestinian civilians on a
Gaza beach from Israeli artillery fire on June 9. Israel denied responsibility for those
deaths, but Israeli strikes caused other Palestinian civilian casualties as well.
On June 13, Olmert said that he would not negotiate until the Quartet’s January
30 conditions were met. He told a group of British parliamentarians that, even with
negotiations, “Israel will never agree to withdraw from the entire West Bank because
the pre-1967 borders are not defensible.” Olmert also asserted that Israel would
withdraw from approximately 90% of the West Bank and observed that not all of
Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods would be part of the future Jewish capital.32 On
June 22, Olmert and Abbas had a cordial, informal meeting in Jordan and agreed to
meet officially in a few weeks. They did not do so.
On June 28, Palestinian factions agreed on a revised National Accord
Document. The Document states that the PLO and the President of the PA will be
responsible for negotiations with Israel to create a state on territories occupied by
Israel in 1967. It insists on the right of Palestinian refugees “to return to their homes
and properties.” All agreements with Israel will be presented to a new Palestine
National Council or to a referendum in which Palestinians in both the occupied
territories and the diaspora will vote. In tandem with political action, resistance will
be concentrated in (but not limited to) territories occupied in 1967. The signatories
also vow to work toward establishing a national unity government. The PLO will be
30 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-9.html] for text of joint
news conference.
31 For text of speech, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+ Israeli+
leaders/2006/Address+by+PM+Olmert+to+a+joint+meeting+of+US+Congress+24-May-
2006.htm].
32 Gil Hoffman, “Olmert Bids to Enlist Chirac Support for Realignment; PM tells British
MPS: Israel Would Never Agree to Withdraw to Pre-1967 Borders,” Jerusalem Post, June
14, 2006.

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CRS-15
reformed to allow Hamas and PIJ to join.33 PIJ rejected the Document, while Hamas
officials insisted that it does not require them to recognize Israel or to accept two
states. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, among other comments, noted that the Document
does not mention recognizing Israel’s right to exist or ending the conflict with Israel.
It said that the demand for the return of all refugees is a formula for the ultimate
destruction of Israel and contradicts a two-state solution.34
On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing, the Popular Resistance
Committees, and the previously unknown Army of Islam had attacked Israeli forces
in Israel, near Kerem Shalom and the Egyptian border, just outside of Gaza, killing
two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and kidnaping one. The terrorists had entered
Israel via a long tunnel from Gaza and demanded the release of women and minors
(an estimated 400 persons) from Israeli prisons. It was the first cross-border attack
since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Israel held the PA and its
Hamas-led government responsible for the attack and the fate of the kidnaped soldier.
On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the soldier’s release,
Israel forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter future Hamas attacks,
including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to weaken, bring down,
or change the conduct of the Hamas-led government. Israeli officials claimed that
Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the kidnaping and attack within pre-1967 Israel.
On June 28, Hamas political leaders echoed the demands of the kidnapers; Israeli
officials responded by insisting on the unconditional release of the soldier.
On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers,
parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
On July 1, the three groups of kidnapers then demanded that Israel release 1,000
prisoners in exchange for the soldier. Israeli officials again demanded his
unconditional release. The next day, Israeli missiles destroyed the empty offices of
the Palestinian Prime Minister. Israeli troops and tanks began sweeping northern
Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and continued operations
targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank.
The Hamas military wing fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of
Ashkelon, a major population center. It was the farthest north that a Palestinian
rocket had ever struck and prompted the Israeli cabinet to approve “prolonged”
activities against Hamas. In the first intense fighting in Palestinian populated areas
since the crisis began, the Israeli soldiers encountered militants from Hamas and
other groups and Palestinian casualties mounted.
Diplomatic efforts were undertaken to resolve the crisis. On July 10, however,
Hamas politburo chief Khalid Mish’al insisted on the mutual release (“swap”) of
prisoners, but Prime Minister Olmert responded, “Trading prisoners with a terrorist
33 “Text of National Consensus Document signed by the Palestinian factions, except the
Islamic Jihad Movement,” Ramallah Al-Ayyam, Open Source Center Document GMP2006
0628253002.
34 For text of Foreign Ministry comments, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa].

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CRS-16
bloody organization such as Hamas is a major mistake that will cause a lot of damage
to the future of the State of Israel.” He added that to negotiate with Hamas would
signal that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed.
The White House spokesman said that Hamas had been “complicit in
perpetrating violence” and that Israel had a right to defend itself. He urged Israel not
to harm civilians and to avoid unnecessary destruction of property and infrastructure.
In remarks on July 5, Secretary Rice described the abduction as the “root cause” of
the problem, called on Syrians to use their considerable leverage to gain the soldier’s
release, and spoke of the need for pressure on Hamas to stop rocket attacks; she also
called on the Israelis to exercise restraint.
Israeli forces expanded their offensive in Gaza and continued their round-up of
Hamas officials. Although he appeared to have been sidelined by the kidnaping,
President Abbas persisted in his efforts to assert his power. On July 15, he said that
the National Accord Document would be implemented after Israel released the
arrested Palestinian officials and that a national referendum was no longer needed to
approve it. He also discussed the formation of a national unity government with
Hamas officials. Prime Minister Haniyah insisted that Hamas retain a majority in the
new government.
Abbas told a visiting U.N. team in July that he wanted to “de-link” the crisis in
the Palestinian areas from the war in Lebanon that began three weeks later in order
to prevent non-Palestinian extremists (Hezbollah) from hijacking the leadership of
the Palestinian issue. (For the war in Lebanon, see “Israel-Lebanon” below.) Olmert
said that a prisoner release would only be done in coordination with Abbas in order
to strengthen his authority and that Israel would continue to avoid Hamas. Yet,
Abbas does not control the kidnaped soldier.
On September 2, Palestinian public employees began a strike for unpaid salaries.
This pressure resulted from and added to that of the international embargo on aid to
the Hamas-led government. It apparently prompted Abbas and Haniyah to agree on
September 11 to form a national unity government on the basis of the National
Accord Document.
On September 20, the Quartet issued a statement welcoming Abbas’s effort to
form a government of national unity and hoping that the government’s platform
would reflect the Quartet’s principles.35 The statement did not say that acceptance of
the principles is a precondition for aid or relations. Secretary Rice maintained,
however, “it only goes without saying that you cannot have peace if you do not
recognize the right of the other party to exist and that the renunciation of violence is
a key to negotiations.”36
On September 21, Abbas told the U.N. General Assembly that any future
Palestinian government will commit to all prior agreements, particularly the
35 For text of statement, see [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sg2116.doc.htm].
36 Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see [http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2006/72891.htm].

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CRS-17
September 1993 mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO.37 Hamas officials
differed, with Haniyah declaring, “I personally will not head any government that
recognizes Israel.” Abbas responded that efforts to establish a unity government have
“gone back to point zero.”
On October 31, Israeli forces began a six-day incursion into Beit Hanoun in the
northern Gaza Strip to stop Palestinian rocket fire into southern Israel. The offensive
resulted in heavy Palestinian casualties and did not stop rocket launches. After it
ended, on November 8, a reportedly errant Israeli artillery barrage killed 20 and
wounded many more at Beit Hanoun, prompting international outcries.
On November 25, Olmert and Abbas agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza, and it went
into effect the next day. Hamas said that it would respect the accord, but Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) said that it would agree only if Israel refrained from attacks in the
West Bank as well. The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ continued firing rockets
and declared that they will do so until Israel ceases its operations in the West Bank.
The cease-fire has nonetheless produced considerably less rocket fire and shooting
along the border.
On November 27, Olmert said if the Palestinians established a new government
committed to carrying out the Quartet’s principles, one that will implement the
Roadmap to a two-state solution and bring about the release of the kidnaped Israeli
soldier, then he would enter an immediate dialogue with Abbas to establish an
independent, viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and borders outlined
by President Bush in his April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon.38 Olmert
said that Israel would “free many Palestinian prisoners, including ones sentenced to
long prison terms,” upon the release of the soldier. Israel also would increase
freedom of movement in the territories and across the borders and release the
Palestinian funds it stopped transferring to the PA when Hamas took power. Olmert
emphasized that Israel would agree “to evacuate many areas and settlements” in
exchange for true peace. He called on the Palestinians to recognize Israel’s right to
live in peace and security alongside them and renounce their demand to realize the
right of return (of Palestinian refugees to Israel). Olmert also noted that “some parts
of the (2002) Saudi peace initiative are positive.”39
Abbas has found it difficult to meet Olmert’s preconditions. On November 30,
Abbas said that efforts to reach an accord with Hamas on a national unity government
37 “‘Unofficial’ Text of Palestinian President’s Speech,” Palestinian News Agency, Sept. 22,
2006, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
38 For text of Roadmap, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm]. For text of
letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].
39 For text Olmert’s speech, see Israel’s MFA at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-
Gurion+memorial+27-Nov-2006.htm]. For what Olmert called the “Saudi Peace Initiative,
also called the “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudi
embassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].

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CRS-18
had reached a dead-end. On December 8, in Iran, Haniyah declared that Hamas will
never recognize Israel and will continue its jihadist movement until Jerusalem and
the Al Aqsa Mosque are liberated and all Palestinian refugees are returned to their
homes.40
Viewing Abbas as the only available partner for an Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, the Israeli government and Bush Administration took steps to bolster Abbas
in his contest with Hamas for control of the PA. On December 23, Olmert and Abbas
held talks at which Olmert promised to hand over $100 million in tax revenue to
Abbas for humanitarian purposes, to ease crossings of goods and people between
Israel and the Gaza Strip, and to remove some military checkpoints in the West
Bank.41 Abbas proposed the start of “backdoor” negotiations on all final status issues
with the participation of one or all members of the Quartet and reported that Olmert
responded that he would consider the idea.
On January 5, 2007, Olmert asserted that Israel should try to Palestinians who
are genuinely interested in peace fight against the radical forces. To that end, Israel
had authorized Egypt’s transfer of arms and ammunition to security forces allied with
Abbas in the Gaza Strip in late December.
On January 9, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al Ghayt asserted that
there is a common Egyptian, Jordanian, Arab, and Palestinian position for an
agreement on the “end game” before resuming the 2003 Roadmap. Seeming to
follow up on this idea while in the region on January 16, Secretary Rice said that she
would meet with Olmert and Abbas “to have discussions about the broad issues on
the horizon, so that we can work on the Roadmap....” (The Administration reportedly
had promised the “moderate” Arab regimes that it would become more engaged in
the peace process in exchange for their support in countering increased Iranian
influence in the region.42) Rice described her intent as “confidence-building” to
which a broader political horizon can lend momentum. Olmert said that he intended
to continue bilateral meetings with the Palestinians, and his spokeswoman also
referred to “pre-negotiation” confidence-building and not peace talks per se.


At a meeting with Rice on January 14, Abbas had rejected the possible creation
of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, as called for in Stage II of the
Roadmap, suspecting that the temporary could become permanent. Rice appeared
to agree that it may be more difficult to negotiate a provisional state than to move
toward a final settlement.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in
Eilat on January 29, which killed three Israelis. It was the first suicide bombing in
Israel since April 2006.
40 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dec. 8, 2006, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.
41 On January 19, Israel transferred the funds to a special account in an Israeli bank to ensure
that the money did not reach Hamas.
42 Camp Simpson, “Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian
Crisis....” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007.

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CRS-19
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450
square miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law
and administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not
recognize. In 1991, Syria referred to its goal in the peace conference as an end to the
state of belligerency, not a peace treaty, preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace, and rejected separate agreements between Israel and Arab parties. Israel
emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial
relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (after the 1967
war) applies to all fronts, meaning that it includes Syria’s Golan. Syria submitted a
draft declaration of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement,” not
simply an end to belligerency. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accepted an
undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.” On
September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange
for total withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Hafez
al Asad announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress
at different speeds. In June, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the
United States might be willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of
a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that
Syria was ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides
inched toward each other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again
told President Clinton on October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful
relations in return for full withdrawal. Asad never expressed his ideas publicly,
leaving it to his interlocutors to convey them.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military
talks under U.S. auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-
out zones may take topographical features into account and be unequal, if security
arrangements were equal. Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in
northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on the Golan Heights, but Syria
insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other
from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that
Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin insisted that
Israeli troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would
infringe on its sovereignty, but Syrian government-controlled media accepted
international or friendly forces in the stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation
in Maryland in December 1995, but were suspended when Israeli negotiators went
home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
A new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for
negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to Israel’s security and water needs
and that retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4,
1967-border (which differs slightly from the international border of 1923). Israeli
negotiators say that Rabin had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s
security and normalization needs, which Syria did not do. An Israeli law passed on

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CRS-20
January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member majority and a national referendum to
approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June 1999, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak and Asad exchanged
compliments via a British writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from
“the point where they left off,” with each side defining the point to its satisfaction.
Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met in Washington on December 15-16, 1999,
and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000. President Clinton intervened.
On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli success in delaying
discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-
warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the summary,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000 were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House
spokesman reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be
productive for talks to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on
Israel’s reluctance to withdraw to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of
Galilee, on security arrangements, and on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that
the border/Sea issue had been the main obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son,
Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister of Israel in February
2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights. In a December 1 New York Times
interview, Bashar al Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations from where
they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hezbollah and
Palestinian terror organizations.43
On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that this is not the time to begin negotiations
with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building up Hezbollah, and
maintaining Palestinian terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from
which terrorist attacks against Israel are ordered. Moreover, Sharon observed that
there was no reason for Israel to relieve the pressure that France and the United States
are putting on Syria (over its alleged complicity in the February 2005 assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
On June 28, 2006, Israeli warplanes caused sonic booms over President Asad’s
summer residence in Latakia to warn him to discontinue support for the Damascus-
based head of the Hamas political bureau, Khalid Mish’al, whom Israel considered
responsible for a June 25 attack in Israel, and for other Palestinian terrorists. On July
3, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem denied that Mish’al had a role in the
attack and said that Syria would never force him to leave the country.
In a speech on August 15 to mark the end of the war in Lebanon, President Asad
declared that the peace process had failed since its inception and that he did not
expect peace in the near future.44 Subsequently, he said that Shib’a Farms are
43 See also CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B.
Prados.
44 For text of speech, see “Syria’s Asad Addresses ‘New Middle East,’ Arab ‘Failure’ to
Secure Peace,” Syrian Arab Television TV1, Open Source Center Document GMP2006

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CRS-21
Lebanese, but that the border between Lebanon and Syria there cannot be demarcated
as long as it is occupied by Israel. The priority, he said, must be liberation.45
Responding to speculation by some members of his cabinet about reopening
peace talks with Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert said on August 21 that Syria
must stop supporting terrorist organizations before negotiations resume. In
September, Olmert said, “As long as I am prime minister, the Golan Heights will
remain in our hands because it is an integral part of the State of Israel.”46 He also
indicated that he did not want to differ from the U.S. Administration, which views
Syria as a supporter of terror that should not be rewarded.
On November 28, U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley concurred
with Olmert’s position that as long as Syria is “a supporter of terror, is both
provisioning and supporting Hezbollah and facilitating Iran in its efforts to support
Hezbollah, and is supporting Hamas,” then it is “not on the agenda to bring peace and
security to the region.” Hadley agreed that you cannot talk about negotiating on the
Golan Heights with that Syria.47
On December 6, the Iraq Study Group released a Report that included
recommendations for changing U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict because
“Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues.”
It stated that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East
unless it has a “renewed and sustained commitment” to a comprehensive, negotiated
peace on all fronts, including “direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon,
Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and particularly Syria....” The
Report recommended that Israel return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security
guarantee that could include an international force on the border, including U.S.
troops if requested by both parties, in exchange for Syria’s taking actions regarding
Lebanon and Palestinian groups.48 Olmert rejected any linkage between the Mideast
issue and the situation in Iraq and believes that President Bush shares his view.
In December, President Asad and his Foreign Minister expressed interest in
unconditional negotiations with Israel to achieve peace. Their statements deepened
a debate in Israel over Syria’s intentions. Olmert is skeptical of Asad’s motives and
demands that Syria first end support for Hamas and Hezbollah and sever its ties with
44 (...continued)
08156070001.
45 In interview by Hamdi Qandil on Dubai TV, August 23, 2006, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060823650015.
46 “Olmert Tells Israeli Paper: Golan ‘An Integral Part of the State of Israel’,” Yedi’ot
Aharonot, September 26, 2006, citing a Mishpaha newspaper interview, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060926746002.
47 Shmuel Rosner, “Chirac: France, U.S. Agree There is No Point Talking to Syria,” Ha’
aretz, Nov. 29, 2006.
48 For text of Iraq Study Group report, see [http://www.usip.org/isg/].

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CRS-22
Iran.49 On January 17, 2007, Secretary of State Rice asserted that “this isn’t the time
to engage Syria,” blaming Damascus for allowing terrorists to cross its territory,
failing to support Palestinians who believe in peace with Israel, and trying to bring
down the Lebanese government.50
Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought
Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern
Lebanon, and the end of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its
shelling of villages that Israel said were sites of Hezbollah activity. Israel claimed
no Lebanese territory, but said that its forces would withdraw only when the
Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hezbollah attacks on northern
Israel. Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing Israel’s
security concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which then dominated
Lebanon, said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel’s July 1993 assault
on Hezbollah prompted 250,000 people to flee from south Lebanon. U.S. Secretary
of State Warren Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again
attacked Hezbollah and Hezbollah fired into northern Israel. Hezbollah and the
Israeli Defense Forces agreed to a cease-fire and to refrain from firing from or into
populated areas but retained the right of self-defense. The agreement was monitored
by U.S., French, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives.
On January 5, 1998, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai indicated
readiness to withdraw from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425,
calling for the restoration of peace and security in the region, were implemented. He
and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then proposed withdrawal in exchange for
security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an unconditional
withdrawal. As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased later in
1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In April 1999,
however, Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon and, in June, the Israeli-allied South
Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. On taking
office, new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by
July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, that is, Hezbollah. He argued that Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected
their implantation in Lebanon. He also rejected Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright’s assertion that refugees will be a subject of Israeli-Palestinian final status
talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon
by July. Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel
unless Israel also withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue.
On April 17, Israel informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon told the U.N.
that Israel’s withdrawal would not be complete unless it included the small area
49 Gideon Alon, “Olmert, Peretz Spar over Syrian Overtures,” [http://www.haaretz.com/],
Dec. 18, 2006.
50 Interview with Andrea Mitchell of NBC News, January 17, 2007.

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CRS-23
known as Shib’a Farms, where the Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian borders meet. On
May 23, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that most of Shib’a is within the
area of operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing
the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without
prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24
Israel completed its withdrawal. Hezbollah took over the former security zone. On
June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the border region
because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hezbollah.51
On October 7, Hezbollah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli
soldiers. On October 16, Hezbollah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel.
On November 13, the Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control
of the area vacated by Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hezbollah attacked
its soldiers in Shib’a, Israel, claiming that Syria controls Hezbollah, bombed Syrian
radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to
the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased out. On January 28, 2002, the Security
Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hezbollah shelled Israeli positions in Shib’a and northern Israel.
Israel responded with air strikes and expressed concern about a possible second front
in addition to the Palestinian intifadah. At its request, the Secretary General
contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and, on April 8, U.S. Vice President
Dick Cheney called President Asad. In April, Secretary Powell visited northern Israel
and called on Syria to curb Hezbollah. On January 30, 2004, Israel and Hezbollah
exchanged 400 Palestinian and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the
remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli colonel and the bodies of the three Israeli
soldiers.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the
withdrawal of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon.52 Massive anti-
Syrian demonstrations occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents.
On March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon,
which was completed on April 26. On December 28, Israeli jets attacked a terrorist
base south of Beirut after rockets fired from Lebanon hit a northern Israeli town; Al
Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the claim has not been
verified.
On May 28, 2006, Palestinian rockets hit deep inside northern Israel and Israeli
planes and artillery responded by striking PFLP-GC bases near Beirut and near the
Syrian border. Hezbollah joined the confrontation and, in turn, was targeted by
Israelis. UNIFIL eventually brokered a cease-fire.
51 See CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred
Prados.
52 For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, see [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_
resolutions04.html].

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CRS-24
On July 12, in the midst of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel,
Hezbollah forces crossed into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli military
vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnaping two. Hezbollah demanded that
Israel release Lebanese and other Arab prisoners in exchange for the soldiers and for
a third soldier who had been kidnaped by the Palestinian group Hamas on June 25.
(For more on the latter situation, see “Israel-Palestinians,” above.) Hezbollah leader
Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah said that the soldiers would be returned only through
indirect negotiations for a prisoner exchange. Nasrallah suggested that the Hezbollah
operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel has negotiated
with Hezbollah in the past, although it refuses to negotiate with Hamas now.
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert declared that Hezbollah’s attack was “an act of
war” and promised that Lebanon would suffer the consequences of Hezbollah’s
actions. The Lebanese government replied that it had no prior knowledge of the
operation and did not take responsibility or credit for it. Israeli officials also blamed
Syria and Iran but were careful to say that they had no plans to strike either one.
Immediately after the Hezbollah attack, Israeli forces launched a major military
campaign against and imposed an air, sea, and ground blockade on Lebanon. In a
July 17 speech, Olmert summarized Israel’s conditions for the end of military
operations: the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks,
and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border.53
Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora requested U.N. help in obtaining a cease-
fire. His cabinet agreed on a seven-point proposal to end the crisis: an immediate
cease-fire; the release of Lebanese prisoners by Israel and of Israeli soldiers by
Hezbollah; the return of displaced Lebanese to their homes; Israeli-Lebanese
negotiations on Shib’a Farms, which would be put under U.N. supervision until a
settlement on the territory’s fate; Israeli disclosure of minefields north of the border;
the deployment and strengthening of the Lebanese army and the expansion of the
U.N. force in the south; and implementation of the Taif Accords of 1990, which call
for the disarming of militias. Hezbollah ministers in the government agreed to the
proposal despite reservations about the international force and disarmament, with the
understanding that additional discussion would occur after the U.N. Security Council
decided on the force.
On August 8, the Lebanese government promised to deploy 15,000 troops to the
south for the first time since 1978 if Israel withdrew its forces. Hezbollah agreed to
the government proposal, while Israeli Prime Minister Olmert found it “interesting.”
On August 9, the Israeli security cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and Defense
Minister to determine when to expand the ground campaign while continuing efforts
to achieve a political agreement. Their stated goals for an agreement included the
immediate, unconditional return of the kidnaped soldiers, the cessation of hostilities
against Israel, implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, which
called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, deployment of an international
force and the Lebanese army in south Lebanon along the border, and prevention of
53 For text of Olmert’s speech, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/
PMSpeaks/speechknesset170706.htm].

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CRS-25
the rearming of Hezbollah. Only after the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1701 calling for the end to hostilities on August 11 did Olmert authorize the
offensive, and two days of costly fighting for both sides ensued.
Resolution 1701 called for the full cessation of hostilities, the extension of the
government of Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory, and for the deployment
of Lebanese forces and an expanded UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 15,000 each, in
a buffer zone between the Israeli-Lebanese border and the Litani River to be free of
“any armed personnel” other than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL.54 The deployment
would occur parallel to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The resolution authorized
UNIFIL to insure that its area of operations is not used for hostile activities and to
resist by forceful means attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties. The
resolution also bans the supply of arms to Lebanon, except as authorized by the
government. Reiterating prior resolutions, it calls for the disarmament of all armed
groups in Lebanon. The resolution does not require the return of the abducted Israeli
soldiers or the release of Lebanese prisoners. It requests the Secretary General to
develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon,
“including by dealing with the Shib’a Farms area.” On August 14, the truce went
into effect. The Lebanese Army began to move south to the border on August 17 as
Israeli forces handed over positions to the U.N.
Hezbollah leader Nasrallah declared victory for Lebanon and said that
Hezbollah would not disarm as long as Israel did not withdraw completely from
Lebanon, including the Shib’a Farms. On August 14, Lebanese Defense Minister
Elias Murr said that the army had no intention of disarming Hezbollah, but Hezbollah
weapons would no longer be visible. On August 19, Israeli commandos raided an
Hezbollah stronghold near Ba’albek in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah did not respond
and the cease-fire has held.
In a speech on August 14, Prime Minister Olmert accepted responsibility for the
military operation, but claimed as achievements a terrorist organization no longer
allowed to operate from Lebanon and the government of Lebanon responsible for its
territory. He declared that a severe blow had been dealt to Hezbollah.55 After the
war, Olmert expressed hope that the cease-fire could help “build a new reality
between Israel and Lebanon,” while Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora declared
that Lebanon would be the last country to sign a peace agreement with Israel. On
September 7, Olmert said that if the Shib’a Farms area is determined to be Lebanese
and not Syrian and if Lebanon fulfills its obligations under U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including the disarming of Hezbollah, then Israel would agree to discuss
the Farms with Lebanon.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian.
Jordan initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and
economic matters on September 14, 1993. On July 25, 1994, Israeli Prime Minister
54 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is accessible online at [http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm].
55 For text of Olmert’s statement, see Israeli Television Channel 1, Aug. 14, 2006, Open
Source Center Document GMP20060814728001.

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CRS-26
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein signed the Washington Declaration, a non-
belligerency accord. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See
“Significant Agreements,” below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew
from Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
Although supportive of the peace process and of normalization of relations with
Israel, on March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the peace process....” After Israeli agents
bungled an attempt to assassinate Hamas official Khalid Mish’al in Jordan on
September 25, 1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh
Yassin, which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in
exchange for the detained Israeli agents. On December 5, 1998, the King called for
Jordan-Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian
national interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his
son.
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy
sites in Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that
Jerusalem be an Israeli and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new
ambassador to Israel because of Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinians. On
March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss Israel’s security fence and
disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan proposed deploying about
1,500 Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West Bank,
pending approval of the PA and Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz has said that
the Badr Brigade could train Palestinians in the West Bank. Jordan is training
Palestinian security force officers in Jordan. Also in February, Jordan sent an
ambassador to Israel and, in March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time
in four years.
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman
Yasir Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East peace process, and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook to prevent them,
stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict his commitments are
invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National Council, and
called upon his people to reject violence. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to
negotiate with it.56
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-
government for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway,
since January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza
56 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].

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CRS-27
and Jericho; transfer of authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza
to Palestinians; election of a Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West
Bank and Gaza. During the interim period, Israel is to be responsible for external
security, settlements, Israelis in the territories, and foreign relations. Permanent
status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may include
Jerusalem.57
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4,
1994, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the
Palestinian Authority’s (PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period
of interim self-rule.58
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal
with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations,
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on
permanent status to begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and
Head of the Council’s Executive Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense
Force redeploy from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem,
and 450 towns and villages. Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary
for security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible for external security and the security
of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally responsible for Area “A,” the
six cities, plus Jericho. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have precedence
over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns and
villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas.
Palestinian Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within
two months of the Council’s inauguration.59
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel
and the PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying
Israeli and Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State
Christopher to Prime Minister Netanyahu.60
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps
to complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements
accompanying the Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in
exchange for Palestinian security measures. The PA will have complete or shared
responsibility for 40% of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control of
18.2%. The PLO Executive and Central Committees will reaffirm a January 22,
1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian
57 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].
58 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].
59 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].
60 For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].

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CRS-28
Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National Council will
reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this conclave.61
Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on
September 4, 1999.62 Israeli Prime Minister Barak and PA Chairman Arafat agreed
to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner in order to
conclude a framework agreement on permanent status issues in five months and a
comprehensive agreement on permanent status in one year. Other accords dealt with
unresolved matters of Hebron, prisoners, etc.
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (More briefly referred to as the Roadmap.)
Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, by the Quartet
(i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia). To achieve
a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for the Palestinians
to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake political
reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with
provisional borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement which will
end the conflict.63
Agreement on Movement and Access. From the Gaza Strip, reached on
November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with
European Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit TV feeds of the
crossing to Israel, Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza
beginning December 15, exports from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza
seaport.64
Role of Congress
Aid.65 Unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest,
P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2006,
prohibits aid for a Palestinian state and the PA unless its leaders have not supported
terrorism, been democratically elected, demonstrated their commitment to peaceful
coexistence with Israel, taken measures to counter terrorism and terrorism financing,
and established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts. It also
61 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm].
62 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].
63 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].
64 For text, see [http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].
65 See also CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical
Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request; CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign
Aid to the Palestinians; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, all by Jeremy
Sharp.

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CRS-29
provides $150 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
After Hamas took power on March 30, 2006, Secretary of State Rice said, “We
are not going to fund a Hamas-led government. But we are going to look at what we
can do to increase humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people....” The
Administration requested that the PA return $50 million in direct aid provided in
2005; as of April 7, $30 million had been returned. On April 7, the Administration
announced that it would provide $245 million for basic human needs and democracy
building through various U.N. and nongovernmental agencies, suspend or cancel
$239 million for programs related to the PA ($105 million of which will be
redirected to human needs), and review $165 million in other projects. It redirected
about $100 million for humanitarian needs and $42 million for civil society groups.66
On May 9, the Quartet endorsed a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)
to be developed by the European Union (EU) to ensure direct delivery of aid to the
Palestinian people. In June, the EU presented a three-prong plan open to all donors
to bypass the PA government. It calls for the expanding a World Bank emergency
support program for essential health and social services programs and employees, for
contributions to ensure uninterrupted supply of essential utilities (fuel for electricity
from Israel), and for a needs-based social safety net for the poorest Palestinians. The
Quartet endorsed the TIM on June 17. The Quartet has since extended the TIM and
expanded it to security sector reform, reconstruction of infrastructure, and economic
development.
P.L. 109-234, June 15, 2006, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, prohibits
obligation of ESF appropriated in P.L. 109-102 for the West Bank and Gaza (above)
until the Secretary of State submits a revised plan for such assistance and ensures that
it is not provided to or through entities associated with terrorist activity. Section 550
prohibits assistance to the PA unless the Secretary of State determines that it has
complied with the Quartet’s January 30 conditions. The President may waive the
prohibition with respect to the administrative and personal security costs of the
Office of the President of the PA and for his activities to promote democracy and
peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if it is in the U.S. national
security interest, if the President of the PA is not associated with Hamas or any other
foreign terrorist group, and if aid will not be transferred to Hamas.
H.R. 5522, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for 2007, passed on June
9, prohibits the provision of economic aid to the PA unless the President certifies that
it is important to U.S. national security interests. When the President exercises the
waiver authority, he must report to Congress on the steps that the PA has taken to
arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. It also
prohibits assistance to support a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State
certifies that its leadership has been democratically elected, has demonstrated a
commitment to peaceful coexistence with the State of Israel, is taking measures to
counter terrorism and terrorist financing, and is establishing a new security entity that
66 For details, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64234.htm].

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is cooperative with Israel, and the PA is working for a comprehensive peace. Again
it grants the President waiver authority.

Other legislation in the 109th Congress reacting to the Hamas victory in the
January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections included S.Con.Res. 79, passed in
both houses in February, which expressed the sense of Congress that no assistance
should be provided directly to the PA if a party calling for the destruction of Israel
holds a majority of its parliamentary seats. Also, H.R. 4681, passed in the House on
May 23, would have limited aid to the PA until it met specific conditions, to
nongovernmental organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza, and to U.N.
agencies and programs that “fail to ensure balance” in the U.N. approach to Israeli-
Palestinian issues; denied visas to PA officials; restricted the travel of PA and PLO
officials stationed at the U.N.; and prohibited PA and PLO representation in the
United States, among other measures. The White House said that H.R. 4681
“unnecessarily constrains the executive’s ability to use sanctions, if appropriate, as
tools to address rapidly changing circumstances.” The Senate version, S. 2370,
passed on June 23, is less restrictive, provides presidential waiver authority, and calls
for establishing a $20 million Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Reconciliation, and
Democracy Fund. The House passed the Senate version on December 7, by a voice
vote, and the President signed it into law, P.L. 109-446, on December 21, with a
statement directing executive agencies to construe certain provisions as advisory and
not mandatory to prevent encroachment on the President’s constitutional authority.67
On December 28, the White House notified Congress that it intended to provide
$86 million in non-lethal military aid for security forces allied with Palestinian
President Abbas. On January 26, 2007, President Bush issued the required waiver of
legislative restrictions on the aid.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel
over three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the
Administration deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year
because it determined that amount had been spent on the security barrier and
settlements in the occupied territories. P.L. 109-472, January 11, 2007, extends the
guarantees for a second time until September 30, 2011.
Jerusalem. Israel annexed the city in 1967 and proclaimed it to be Israel’s
eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital.
Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine the
fate of Jerusalem in negotiations. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21,
May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the
undivided capital of Israel. Congress has repeatedly prohibited official U.S.
government business with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to
create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows
Israel to be recorded as the place of birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.68 The
67 For text of statement, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/query.html?col=colpics&qt=23
70&submit.x=10&submit.y=16].
68 See P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, and H.R. 5522, June 9, 2006, for recent
(continued...)

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State Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for
passports because the U.S. government does not recognize all of Jerusalem as part
of Israel.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is
not in the capital, that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy,
is unquestioned, and that Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital
in Jerusalem. Opponents say a move would undermine the peace process and U.S.
credibility in the Islamic world and with Palestinians, and would prejudge the final
status of the city. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the embassy’s
relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national security
interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the
authority. The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-
228, September 30, 2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy
“immediately.” The President replied that the provision would “if construed as
mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to
conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State Department declared, “our view of
Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be negotiated
between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold
Syria accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May
11, 2004, he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria and, on May 5,
2005 and May 8, 2006, he extended them for a year.
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah. S.Res. 524, passed on July
18, 2006, condemns the two terror groups and their state sponsors and supports
Israel’s exercise of its right to self-defense; H.Res. 921, passed on July 20, expresses
the same views.
68 (...continued)
restrictions.

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Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors
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