Order Code RL30588
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated February 14, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening of a
parliament in December 2005, but in 2006 insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s
government escalated to the point that some experts were questioning the success of
U.S. stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in
January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and
parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has
become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to
debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal
freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating in
economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and senior
levels of the new parliament.
The insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime escalated in 2006,
after several years in which it appeared the Taliban were mostly defeated. U.S. and
NATO commanders anticipate a Taliban “spring offensive” and are moving to try to
preempt it. Contributing to the Taliban resurgence has been popular frustration with
slow reconstruction, official corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government
authority into rural areas and provinces. In addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting
counter-measures, and independent militias remain throughout the country, although
many have been disarmed. The Afghan government and U.S. officials have also said
that some Taliban commanders are operating from Pakistan, putting them outside the
reach of U.S./NATO forces in Afghanistan.
U.S. and partner stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central
government and its security forces and on promoting reconstructing while combating
the renewed insurgent challenge. The United States and other countries are building
an Afghan National Army, deploying a NATO-led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, and
running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
PRTs). Approximately 27,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to help combat the
insurgency, of which all but about 12,000 are under NATO/ISAF command.
To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave
Afghanistan about $4.35 billion in FY2005, including funds to equip and train
Afghan security forces. Another approximately $3 billion was provided in FY2006.
FY2007 appropriations add another approximately $2.6 billion, including security
forces funding, and the Administration has requested a total of $10.6 billion in
additional FY2007 and FY2008 funds for both security and civilian reconstruction
functions.
This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.

Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Political Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 15
Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.S. Operations/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The NATO-Led International Security Force (ISAF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Afghan National Police/Justice Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. Security Forces Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 36
FY2007 and FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and
WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 8. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 10. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Background to Recent Developments
Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani,
Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to
neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929)
launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won
complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi
(August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a
government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King
Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans
for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and
promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and
hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist
factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms
purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically
opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving
medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control
over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction.
They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by
Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the
country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-
Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against
Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of
natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s
losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the

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reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the
director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva
Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed
its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its
pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991
collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting
communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and
Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics
Population:
31 million (July 2006 est.)
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen
3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
Literacy Rate:
28% of population over 15 years of age
GDP:
$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP per capita:
$800 (purchasing power parity)
GDP real growth:
8.4% (2006)
Unemployment rate:
40% (2005)
Revenues (2006):
$500 million
Expenditures (2005): $561 million, including $42 million in capital expenditures
External Debt:
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. has forgiven
$108 million in debt to U.S. in 2006
Foreign Exchange
$2 billion
Reserves:
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production:
negligible
Oil Consumption:
4,500 barrels per day
Oil Proven Reserves: 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to
Afghan government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports:
food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Imports:
Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%; Turkey 4.1%;
Turkmenistan 4.1%
Source: CIA World Factbook, January 2007, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.; Afghan
leadership press statements (October 2006).
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid
program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per

CRS-3
year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of
Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.1
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed
to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern
Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of
the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud
had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan.
Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.2
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties.
The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic
scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April - May 1992. Under
an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with
the understanding that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step
down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly
that of nominal “prime minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had
received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that
could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.
The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students,
many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic
seminaries (“madrassas”). They were practitioners of an orthodox Sunni Islam
called “Wahhabism,” which is similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban
was composed of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan who
viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for civil
war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city
of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul,
after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995,
the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor,
Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge
in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of
their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
1 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300
million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half
of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State
Dispatch,
vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
2 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul
until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

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Immediately thereafter, Taliban gunmen entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize
Najibullah, his brother, and aides sheltered there, and subsequently hanged them.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in
the anti-Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic
Party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the
Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely
appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 60 years old.
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed
strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh
punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to
enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what
many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two
large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they
represented un-Islamic idolatry.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took
power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition
of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no
faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition,
the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the
Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C.,
closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998)
and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against
women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration
not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a
resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan
government that discriminates against women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton
Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.3 In April 1998,
then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and
asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7,
1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton
Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S.
sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. On
August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training
camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not at any of the camps at the time.
Some observers assert that the Administration, for varying reasons, missed other
3 For more information on Al Qaeda, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and
Threat Assessment
, by Kenneth Katzman.

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purported opportunities to strike bin Laden. Clinton Administration officials say that
they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with U.S. military force because
domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents
were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban
The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the
ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition,
into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Among them were the Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and
Pashtun Islamist factions below (see also Table 10 on “Major Factions/Leaders in
Afghanistan”).
! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the
Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, although Dostam
had earlier contributed to efforts to oust Rabbani. During the U.S.-
led war against the Taliban, Dostam reportedly impressed U.S.
military commanders by leading horse-mounted forces against fixed
Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading
to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse.
! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims,
are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are
always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic
factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight
smaller groups).
! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now
a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated
mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the
Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the
Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure
short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration
did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11
Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the
Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report added that some
Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and not just
the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under consideration as
well.4 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration
4 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles
(continued...)

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stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end support for the
Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February
2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in
New York, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In
March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban foreign ministry aide
Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.
Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian support, the Northern Alliance
continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the
September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including
almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback
on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah
Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists.
He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but
who lacked Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a
friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces
could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the
Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:5
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or
persons
.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on
October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S.
special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance
and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines)
moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the
fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S.
and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan
opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces
in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November
9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially
promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on
November 12 to popular celebrations. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and
4 (...continued)
Times, May 18, 2002.
5 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL,
providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002.

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east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban
regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered
Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by
Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai brothers. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces
conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia
Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al
Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld said “major combat operations” had ended.
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction6
The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a
broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible
mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many
of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a
traditional assembly, the loya jirga. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between
warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better,
particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran,
China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other efforts included
a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts,
including one from the Karzai clan and one centered on Zahir Shah.
Political Transition
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar
Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999).
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling
for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration
and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid
delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations gathered
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the
former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany.
Bonn Agreement. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn
Agreement.”7 It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December
6, 2001). The agreement included the following provisions:
! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the
holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would
6 More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth Katzman.
7 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm].

CRS-8
choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is
approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004).
Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration,
weighted toward the Northern Alliance with 17 out of 30 of the
positions, including Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks,
in their 40s, had been close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. In the
interim, the constitution of 1964 would apply.8
! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security,
at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to
withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to
cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics
trafficking, crime, and terrorism. The international peacekeeping
force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386
(December 20, 2001).
Hamid Karzai
Hamid Karzai, about 51, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he was a credible
Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation of his opponents
through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to
compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate
corruption, resulting in a slower than expected pace of reform and professionalization
of government. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan.
Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s
government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as
a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and
forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai
entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the
Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after
Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S.
support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have
lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the
September 2005 election. Karzai said in August 2006 that he might not run for a second
term in 2009 presidential elections.
Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a
popular imprimatur on the transition government. Former King Zahir Shah returned
to Afghanistan in April 2002 for the meeting, for which 381 districts of Afghanistan
chose 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the
former King and Rabbani withdrew their candidacies and Karzai was selected to
remain leader until presidential elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the
8 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a
constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that
gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

CRS-9
assembly approved a new cabinet. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional
commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and
unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run
caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January
4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval
of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly,
members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in
measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship.
However, major powers were given to an elected parliament, such as the power to
veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president.
National Elections. The October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly
and turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner
(55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a
runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May
2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in
confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for
the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were
postponed. No date is set for these elections.
Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the
need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. Even though many believe the Karzai
supporters are a slight majority of the parliament, when it convened on December
18, 2005, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, engineered selection of
former Karzai presidential election rival Qanooni for speaker of the lower house.
Qanooni subsequently said he would work cooperatively with Karzai; the role of
“opposition leader” was subsequently taken up by Northern Alliance political leader
Rabbani, who won a seat, although Rabbani told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that
he supports “reform” and not opposition to Karzai. The 102-seat upper house,
selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known
figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in
the constitution). The leader of that body is Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in
a bombing of his convoy in March 2006.
The new parliament asserted itself in the process of confirming a post-election
cabinet, deciding to confirm each nominee individually. Modernizers in the
parliament also succeeded in forcing Karzai to oust several major conservatives from
the Supreme Court in favor of those with more experience in modern jurisprudence,
and it has established itself in oversight of the national budget.

Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition
The political transition has proceeded, but Karzai’s government suffers from
lack of capacity and has expanded its writ only in a few outlying regions near Kabul.
A Washington Post report on June 26, 2006, said that confidence in Karzai on the
part of some European nations that contribute forces to Afghanistan is waning
because of government corruption, as well as his compromises with local leaders and
factions that have the effect of slowing modernization and reform. A reported CIA
assessment in November 2006 seemed to corroborate the criticism, finding that

CRS-10
increasing numbers of Afghans view the government as weak and corrupt.9 Secretary
of State Rice has rebutted the criticism of Karzai and said the United States maintains
confidence in his leadership, but Some observers say that Karzai’s domestic
opponents, including some fellow Pashtuns, are using Karzai’s perceived weakness
to maneuver against him politically.
Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization
effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government, an objective that has not to
date been accomplished in the southern provinces. During 2006, the former
commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Carl Eikenberry (he departed
Afghanistan in January 2007), worked to extend Afghan government authority by
conducting visits to all provinces along with Afghan ministers to determine local
needs and heighten the profile of the central government. In a February 2007 CNN
interview, Eikenberry said the amount of “governed space” in Afghanistan has been
increasing. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the
Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President Cheney
attended Karzai’s inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, First Lady Laura
Bush visited. President Bush made his first visit on March 1, 2006.
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build
democratic traditions at the local level. At the local level, an Afghan government
“National Solidarity Program,” largely funded by international donors, seeks to
create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local reconstruction
projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and
almost 40% of those elected have been women.10
U.S. Embassy Operations and Funding. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American
of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, was ambassador
during December 2003-August 2005, and he reportedly had significant influence on
Afghan government decisions.11 The current ambassador is Ronald Neumann. To
assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in
2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs. As part of a
2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed a 15-
person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul, to serve as advisors to the Afghan government. The group is now mostly
focused on helping Afghanistan attract private investment and develop revenue-
generating industries.
The U.S. embassy, now housed in a newly constructed building, has expanded
its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process. The tables
at the end of this paper discuss U.S. funding for Embassy operations and Karzai
9 Rohde, David and James Risen. CIA Review Highlights Afghan Leader’s Woes. New
York Times
, November 5, 2006.
10 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.
11 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times,
April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly
a Karzai aide.

CRS-11
protection, which is now led by Afghan forces. An FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided a requested $50 million for security costs to
protect U.S. facilities and personnel.
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias. Karzai, as well as numerous
private studies and U.S. official statements, have cited regional and factional militias
as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of
justice and generation of popular resentment. Some argue that Afghans have always
sought substantial regional autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and
manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains the local militias. In June 2006,
suggesting that Karzai believes militias can play a useful role in filling security gaps,
particularly the deficit of national police, Karzai authorized arming some local tribal
militias (arbokai) to help in local policing. Karzai said his assessment was that these
militias would provide security and be loyal to the nation and central government and
that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below.
Several of these local militias are now operating.
Although the smaller militias persist, Karzai has marginalized most of the
largest regional leaders. Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed in September
2004 and was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand,
Khan was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in
February 2006, clashes that some in Kabul believe were stoked by Khan himself to
demonstrate his continued influence in Herat. Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top
military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli
faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed charismatic Northern Alliance commander
Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, appointing him
as governor of Balkh province, although he reportedly remains resistant to central
government control. Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan
Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat Ali
was subsequently elected to parliament.
Karzai has tried to appoint some relatively younger technocrats in key
governorships instead of local strongmen; examples include Qandahar governor
Asadullah Khalid, Paktika governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, Helmand
governor Asadullah Wafa, and Paktia governor Abdul Hakim Taniwal. However,
Taniwal was killed in a suicide bombing on September 10, 2006.
As noted above, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the
upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and
reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also
turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January
2005 (including four Scud missiles).
DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism
was a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
(UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias.
The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program:
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in
partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States.

CRS-12
The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not
enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior
positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai replaced
22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters,
although that figure was later reduced by Afghan officials to just over 60,000.
According to UNAMA, a total of 63,380 militia fighters were disarmed by the end
of the program. Of those, 55,800 exercised reintegration options provided by the
program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options, although U.N.
officials say about 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. The
total cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors,
including the United States. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for
failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of
weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United
States and its partners.12 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons. Figures for collected weapons are contained in the
table below. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were
collected.
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program
called “DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan
Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. The
program seeks to disarm, by December 2007, a pool of as many as 150,000 members
of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of
recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls
of the Defense Ministry.
Under the DIAG, no payments are available to fighters, and the program
depends on persuasion and negotiation rather than direct use of force against the
illegal groups. The program is not operating in most of the south because Taliban
and other insurgent groups refuse to disarm voluntarily. DIAG is not as well funded
as is DDR: thus far, the program has received $11 million in operating funds. As an
incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors are making available $35 million
for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded.
Combating Narcotics Trafficking.13 Narcotics trafficking is regarded by
some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan, generating funds to sustain
local militias, Taliban and other insurgents, and criminal groups. Narcotics account
for an estimated $2.7 billion in value — about one third of Afghanistan’s GDP.
Karzai has called for a focus on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade
Afghans from growing and on targeting key traffickers, rather than on eradication of
poppy fields. His statement reflected setbacks later confirmed by a November 2006
12 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization
and Rearmament?
, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament
%20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf].
13 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

CRS-13
study by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank that the
amount of land on which poppy is grown in Afghanistan increased by 61% over 2005
levels. Production increased 26% to 5,644 metric tons. Production in the restive
provinces of Helmand and Uruzgan increased 132% in the year. Afghan officials
said in early November 2006 that, based on observations of plantings now under way,
the opium crop for 2006-2007 will probably rival that of this year’s crop.
Reflecting mixed Afghan cooperation on the issue, on January 25, 2007, the
cabinet voted down a U.S. proposal to allow ground-based chemical spraying of
poppy fields, saying that the chemicals would threaten plants and animals. Those
who praise Afghan cooperation against narcotics note the December 2006
appointment of Asadullah Wafa as governor of poppy-rich Helmand Province (as
well as a new deputy governor), and their replacement by officials presumably more
amenable to countering the narcotics trade.
To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome
its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and is playing a greater
role in counter-narcotics. It is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug
Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates
casualties from counter-drug operations. The U.S. military is still reportedly resisting
calls by the DEA and other agencies to move to active attacks on drug bazaars and
other narcotics-related targets.14 NATO commanders, who have taken over security
responsibilities throughout Afghanistan, say they are providing information to
Afghan counter-narcotics officials to help them target their efforts and increasingly
target operations against large drug traffickers. The Bush Administration has taken
some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers;15 in April 2005, a DEA
operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji
Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York.
The Bush Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of
countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to
international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics
measures set forth in U.S. law.16 However, the Administration also has not, to date,
made a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that is required to provide
more than $225 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan (FY2006 funds). Narcotics
trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much
of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy
cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in
14 Meyer, Josh. “Pentagon Resists Pleas For Help in Afghan Opium Fight.” Los Angeles
Times
, December 5, 2006.
15 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters,
November 2, 2004.
16 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every
year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug
trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

CRS-14
February 2001 had dramatically decreased cultivation.17 The Northern Alliance did
not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan
officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy
ravaged by war and lack of investment. U.S. economic reconstruction efforts are
showing some results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed.
International investors have returned to some extent, and there is substantial new
construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005. A $25
million new Coca Cola bottling factory was opened in Kabul on September 11,
2006. However, the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets, and some
Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially
lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone
used in jewelry). The five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan
Compact” adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on
Afghanistan re-states that the sectors discussed below are priorities. Later in this
paper are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan and
discussing the February 5, 2007, Administration request for a total of about $1.975
billion in civilian reconstruction aid to Afghanistan for FY2007 (supplemental) and
FY2008 (regular appropriation).
! Roads. U.S. and international aid has thus far rebuilt about 1,800
miles of roads, as of December 2006. However, many villages
remain isolated by poor and non-existent roads and U.S. officials
have consistently said that expanding road building is a major U.S.
priority to expand the writ of the Afghan government and build a
viable legitimate economy. Among projects completed: the Kabul-
Qandahar roadway project (Phase I, completed December 2003, and
Phase II, completed November 2004); the Qandahar-Herat roadway,
funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, was largely
completed in late 2005; and a $20 million road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in late
2005. A U.S.-funded ($16 million) road linking the Panjshir Valley
to Kabul has been built. Other U.S. projects to build a Khost-
Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province are under way. On
October 19, 2006, the United States announced $94 million in
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to build
about 200 miles of new roads in Qandahar, Uruzgan, Nuristan,
Kunar, Paktika, and Ghazni provinces.
! Education and Health. According to U.S. officials, 5.2 million
Afghan children are now in school — up from only 800,000 in 2001
— and girls’ attendance is up sharply. About 525,000 girls were
enrolled in school during 2005, according to UNAMA. However,
those in school still represent only about half of the total Afghan
child population. Additional work is being conducted on school and
17 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times
, February 7, 2001.

CRS-15
health clinic rebuilding; at least 278 schools and 326 clinics have
been built thus far, although that is far short of the 1,000 clinics that
U.S. funds were estimated to be able to build. About $152 million
in U.S. funds were programmed for Afghanistan education during
FY2003-FY2005. The Senate version of FY2007 appropriations
measure (H.R. 5522, S.Rept. 109-277) earmarks $81 million for
Afghanistan education in FY2007. Egypt operates a 65-person field
hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians.
Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at
U.S. Embassy Kabul, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its
agricultural output over the past four years. Afghan officials say
agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority
as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation. As noted in tables below, the FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided a requested $5 million for
agriculture development. The Senate version of H.R. 5522 (FY2007
foreign aid appropriation) recommends $20 million in ESF for
Afghan agriculture assistance.
! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in
rural areas by 2010. Currently, there is no national power grid, and
only about 10% of Afghans have access to electricity. Press reports
say that there are severe power shortages in Kabul, partly because
the city population has swelled to nearly 4 million, up from half a
million when the Taliban was in power. The Afghan government,
with help from international donors, plans to import electricity from
Central Asian and other neighbors beginning in 2009 to help address
the shortages. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234)
appropriated most of the $28 million requested for key electricity
projects (Northeast Transmission Project).
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to
meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political
factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders, according to the
State Department report on human rights practices for 2005 (released March 8,
2006).18 According to the report, “The lack of an effective police force, poor
infrastructure and communications, instability, and insecurity hampered
investigations of unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths...” Some observers
were disappointed by Karzai’s July 2006 decision to reconstitute a “Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” although Karzai says it would not
abuse individual rights but rather promote moral behavior and seek to discredit
alcohol, drugs, and corruption.
18 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm].

CRS-16
The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2006 (released
September 15, 2006) indicates progress on religious freedom but says there continues
to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority and some other minorities
such as Sikhs and Hindus. On the other hand, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom said in a report released in May 2006 that there is rising religious
persecution, a judgment that is consistent with observations of other experts. Some
observers have noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions
that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated
in Islamic law. Other accounts say that alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in
restaurants and stores.
A major religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006.
An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago
while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a
potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam.
Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan
constitution’s commitment to international standards of human rights protections,
President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on
March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release
came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government
to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. Another case that demonstrated
judicial conservatism on religious matters was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme
Court conviction of a male journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s
Rights” magazine), of blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for
articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he
was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. The replacement of the chief justice
of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative, might
prevent a repeat of similar incidents in the future.
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed
to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department
reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s
Affairs minister Sima Samar.
Funding Issues. USAID plans to spend $149.237 million on democracy and
rule of law programs for FY2004-FY2007, composed of $105.292 million in ESF
and $43.945 million in DA. Of these funds, about $84 million went to supporting the
national elections in 2004 and 2005. The funding includes support for the new
parliament, civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, rule
of law programs, and local governance.
Advancement of Women. According to State Department report, the
Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses
continue, primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first
major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry
of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous
accounts say the Ministry’s powers and influence are limited. It promotes the
involvement of women in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of
the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs.

CRS-17
There were three female ministers in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential
candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for
Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai
nominated only one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the cabinet
that followed the parliamentary elections, and she was voted down by opposition
from Islamist conservatives in parliament, leaving no women in the cabinet at this
time. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs,
Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As
noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the
upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new
parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for
women.
More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work,
that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996,
including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly
learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it
than was the case a few years ago. On the other hand, women’s advancement has
made women a target of Taliban attacks. Attacks on girls’ schools have increased,
and on September 25, 2006, the chief of the Women’s Affairs Ministry branch in
Qandahar, Safia Amajan, was assassinated.
The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the
treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in
persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government
took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s
visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United
States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women,
including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.
Funding Issues. Recent congressional action includes the following.
! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House
unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children
Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed
December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of
supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the
Office of the President a $40 billion Emergency Response Fund to
respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks) to fund educational and
health programs for Afghan women and children.
! Subsequent appropriations for programs for women and girls are
contained in the tables at the end of this paper. The Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized $15
million per year (FY2003-2006) for the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs. Recent appropriations have required that about $50 million

CRS-18
per year, from various accounts, be used specifically to support
programs and organizations that benefit Afghan women and girls.
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building
The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda
and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S.
security effort are (1) continuing combat operations by U.S. and other coalition
forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial
reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force.
U.S. Operations/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United
States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 27,000 troops in
Afghanistan — an increase from the 19,000 there in 2005 in response to the 2006
upsurge of Taliban attacks. As of October 5, 2006, NATO/ISAF is now leading
peacekeeping operations throughout Afghanistan; that force is headed as of February
2007 by U.S. Gen. Dan McNeil, taking over from U.K. General David Richards.
About 15,000 of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan are under NATO/ISAF command.
As of the January 2007 departure of Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, U.S. non-NATO
combat operations are directed by lower-ranking U.S. generals of the “Combined
Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A),” headquartered at Camp Eggers, near the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
Prior to the transfer to NATO command, nineteen coalition countries —
primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy — were contributing approximately
4,000 combat troops to OEF, but almost all of these have now been “re-badged” to
the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. The remaining approximately 1,000 non-
U.S. forces outside NATO/ISAF will continue to operate in conjunction with the
approximately 12,000 U.S. forces under direct U.S. command. These forces continue
to conduct “counter-terrorism” combat against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant
formations throughout Afghanistan (“Operation Enduring Freedom,” OEF). As part
of the U.S.-led combat, French aircraft have been flying strikes (after a hiatus during
November 2005-May 2006) from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and
Qatar as part of the “Combined Air Operations Center.” However, in December
2006, France announced it would withdraw its 200 Special Forces that were
performing counter-terrorism missions near Jalalabad, a decision that will not affect
the other French forces serving under NATO/ISAF. France will provide two
additional helicopters to OEF and train Afghan special forces.
Among other coalition efforts, Japan provides naval refueling capabilities in the
Arabian sea. Italy is leading the related naval interdiction mission in the Persian
Gulf/Arabian Sea intended to prevent the movement of terrorists from
Afghanistan/Pakistan across those waters. This operation had been led by the United
States from a naval headquarters in Bahrain.

Prior to 2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of
Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted
“Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December

CRS-19
2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in
and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning
Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar
Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005). By 2005, U.S. commanders had
believed that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction,
had weakened the insurgency to the point of virtual irrelevance.
In the upsurge of violence since mid-2006, Taliban insurgents, sometimes
adapting suicide and roadside bombing characteristic of the Iraq insurgency, have
stepped up their operations in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand,
Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces, areas that NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for
on July 31, 2006. Fighting was particularly intense between May and August 2006,
as NATO forces fought large (300-person) Taliban formations in those provinces.
The Taliban resistance and resilience led to U.S. military comments that the Taliban
is “growing in influence” in the south, and there has been debate among experts
whether the Taliban resurgence has been driven by popular frustration with the
widely perceived corruption within the Karzai government and the slow pace of
economic reconstruction. Some believe that Afghans in the restive areas have been
intimidated by the Taliban into providing food and shelter. However, Taliban attacks
on schools, teachers, and other civilian infrastructure have caused popular anger
against the movement. The Afghan government asserts that the increase in the
insurgency is because Pakistan is not denying the Taliban a safe haven there.
In mid-2006, the U.S. and NATO forces launched “Operation Mountain Lion”
and “Operation Mountain Thrust;” the latter began in June 2006 and was intended
to clear areas of the restive southern provinces in advance of the NATO assumption
of responsibility. The operation formally ended on July 31 with about 700 Taliban
killed, according to U.S. military officials. Another offensive, led by NATO, was
conducted in August 2006 (Operation Medusa), which was considered a success in
ousting Taliban fighters from the Panjwai district near Qandahar. That Operation
was also considered proof that NATO will conduct intensive combat in Afghanistan.
In the aftermath of that operation, British forces entered into an agreement with
tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they would
secure the main town of the district without an active NATO presence.
Following the 2006 operations, U.S. and NATO commanders expressed
optimism that the offensives had suppressed the new Taliban challenge, and Taliban
commanders admitted they were conducting a “tactical retreat” from the southern
provinces and began to operate in provinces more north and west, including Ghazni
and Farah. However, U.S. and partner commanders are anticipating a Taliban
“spring offensive” and have called for intensified civilian reconstruction to win over
the loyalty of the population in the south, as well as pre-emptive combat. The
anticipated combat activity contributed to the U.S. decision to increase its force
levels in Afghanistan to 27,000, achieved by extending the tour of part of the 10th
Mountain Division by 120 days. During the 2006-2007 winter months, Taliban
formations have been attacking NATO positions in these areas, although at a
relatively lower frequency than in mid-2006. In a possible prelude to the Taliban
offensive, the Musa Qala arrangement discussed above unraveled on February 2,
2007, when Taliban insurgents overran and held Musa Qala town, demonstrating that
the tribes were unable to secure the district without NATO forces. Subsequently,

CRS-20
NATO aircraft killed the Taliban commander who led the attack, and NATO moved
to retake the town.
The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still mostly intact and
believed to be working with Al Qaeda leaders still at large. In addition to Mullah
Umar, several key commanders remain at large: Jalaludin Haqqani (who some
believe heads a separate insurgent faction, operating around Khost), and the
purportedly ruthless Mullah Dadullah. Dadullah and Umar continue to issue
statements to media outlets, including through an official spokesman, Qari Yusuf
Ahmadi. However, a U.S. airstrike in late December 2006 killed one prominent
commander, Mullah Akhtar Usmani. The same month, a religious police minister
in the Taliban regime was killed in a NATO airstrike. In April 2005, Taliban
remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” suggesting the
movement still has substantial resources.
Some Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political
process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60
militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the
reconciliation process, headed by Mojadeddi. Another Taliban figure, its former
ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted
above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil,
ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban
leadership would not be eligible for amnesty, although Karzai reportedly has
indicated a willingness to conduct peace talks even with Mullah Umar. Through a
spokesman, on October 29, 2006, Umar rejected any talks. The Taliban official who
was governor of Bamiyan Province when the Buddha statues there were blown up,
Mohammad Islam Mohammedi, and who was later elected to the post-Taliban
parliament from Samangan Province, was assassinated in Kabul in January 2007.
Whereabouts of Bin Laden and Other Militants. Complicating the U.S.
mission has been the difficulty in locating so-called “high value targets” of Al Qaeda
— leaders believed to be in Pakistan but who are believed able to direct Al Qaeda
fighters to assist the Taliban. The two most notable are bin Laden himself and his
close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan
offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in
December 2001.19 A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few
hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the
United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.20 Mullah
Umar told media in early January 2007 that he had not seen bin Laden since the
Taliban’s fall from power.

Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the Hikmatyar
faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents.
His fighters are operating in Kunar Province, east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003,
19 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
20 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours. New York
Times
, November 10, 2006.

CRS-21
the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated
Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to
financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign
Terrorist Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups”
in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April
2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005
might have been searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team
was shot down, killing the 16 aboard.
U.S. Military Presence/Use of Facilities. Even if the Taliban insurgency
is completely defeated, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain
a long-term presence in Afghanistan, although U.S. officials have not committed to
that outcome. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a
consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host permanent U.S. bases. Delegates
reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain
security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and
President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access
to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international
terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give
Karzai his requested greater control over facilities used by U.S. forces, over U.S.
operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the bases, both in and
near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include the following.:
! Bagram Air Base. This base, north of Kabul, is the operational hub
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.21 At least 500 U.S. military personnel
are based there. Bagram, along with thirteen other airfields in
Afghanistan, handles the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in
the country and substantial infrastructure is being added to it. A
hospital is being constructed on the facility; one of the first
permanent structures there. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
provided a total of about $52 million for various projects to upgrade
facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations
center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234)
provides $20 million for military construction there. It is expected
that NATO will be using the base — and sharing operational costs
— in conjunction with the handover of NATO security
responsibilities in Afghanistan.
! Qandahar Airfield. This airfield, just outside Qandahar, bases about
500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provided
$16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar.
! Shindand Air Base. This base is 20 miles from the Iranian border.
It has been used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October
2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose
militia forces controlled the facility.
21 Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the
Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005.

CRS-22
! Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. This Uzbekistan base once housed
about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and
450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan
expelled U.S. forces from it in September 2005, following U.S
criticism of the May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon.
! Peter Ganci Base, Kyrgyzstan. This base at Manas airport has about
1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft.
Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising
against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly
received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from his
successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, Bakiyev demanded a
large increase in the $2 million per year U.S. contribution for use of
the base, and in July 2006, the dispute was resolved with a U.S.
agreement to give Kyrgyzstan $150 million in assistance and base
use payments.
! Persian Gulf Bases. Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to
support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE
(about 1,800 U.S. military personnel in UAE) and Al Udeid in Qatar
(10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar). P.L. 109-13 appropriated $1.4
million to upgrade Al Dhafra. As noted above, military facilities in
Bahrain house U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF and Iraq-
related naval operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.
(About 5,100 U.S. military personnel are in Bahrain.)
! Incirlik Air Base. On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend
for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use
Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Turkey.)
OEF Costs and Casualties. As of February 13, 2007, 297 U.S. military
personnel have been killed Afghanistan. In 2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in
Afghanistan, double the 2004 number. Additional U.S. casualties have occurred in
other theaters of OEF, including the Phillipines and parts of Africa (OEF-Trans
Sahara). No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al
Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths
generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. Incremental costs of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan appear to be running about $1.5 billion per month. For
information on U.S. military costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy
Belasco.
The NATO-Led International Security Force (ISAF).22 As discussed
above, the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF, consisting of
all 26 NATO members states plus 11 partner countries) now commands the
22 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to
OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.

CRS-23
peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan. ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement
and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001),23 initially limited
to Kabul. NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF in August 2003 paved the way for
an expansion of its scope, and NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly
in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility for northern and
western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2,
Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively).24
The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this
“Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was
formed. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in
fourteen provinces of eastern Afghanistan, was agreed to at a NATO meeting in
Slovenia on September 28, 2006, and was completed on October 5. As part of the
completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover of command, the United States put U.S.
troops operating in eastern Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF command; they form the
bulk of “Regional Command East” (RC-E). The new commander, who took over
in February 2007, is U.S. Army General Dan McNeil; he heads “ISAF 10.” He is
perceived as emphasizing combat to a greater degree than his predecessor, British
Gen. David Richards, who argued that reconstruction activities are vital and that the
solution to the Taliban insurgency is not purely military.
At the same time, NATO members Britain, Poland, Romania, Norway, the
Czech Republic, and Canada have agreed to deploy most of the additional 2,000 -
2,500 troops that former U.S. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO
commander) Gen. James Jones has said is needed in Regional Commands South and
East to combat the Taliban. Of those, about 900 will be from Poland, and they will
constitute a reserve combat force, although they might not arrive until later in 2007.
About 800 are expected to be contributed by Britain. Another additional 75 will
come from the Czech Republic, and Norway will be contributing another 150.
Contributors recommitted to the new force pledges at a February 2007 NATO
meeting in Seville, Spain.
In conjunction with the expansion of NATO responsibilities, total NATO/ISAF
force levels have increased sharply from the 2005 levels of about 12,000. During
2002-2004, ISAF’s force was about 6,400 troops from all contributors. Table 8 lists
each contributing country to ISAF and the approximate number of forces contributed.
In order to avoid the impression that foreign forces are “occupying” Afghanistan,
NATO said on August 15, 2006, that it would negotiate an agreement with
23 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution
1623 (September 13, 2005); and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12,
2006).
24 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities,
contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after
Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the
city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003)
formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul.

CRS-24
Afghanistan to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15
initiatives to secure Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces.
The NATO assumption of command represents a quieting of the initial
opposition of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related
peacekeeping with anti-insurgent combat. Some in the Dutch parliament opposed
their country’s deployment to the south, but the parliament voted on February 3,
2006, to permit the move. On May 17, 2006, despite recent deaths of Canadian
forces in Qandahar, Canada’s House of Commons voted to keep Canadian soldiers
in Afghanistan until at least 2009. On the basis of that domestic opposition in the
NATO countries, Afghan and some U.S. officials privately questioned the resolve of
NATO nations to combat the Taliban resurgence, although the intensity of combat
in 2006 might have assuaged Afghan concerns.
In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that allow NATO/ISAF
forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the
combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. Still, most NATO countries have so-
called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that NATO leaders are trying to
reduce. There reportedly are about 50 such “caveats” that NATO commanders say
limit operational flexibility. Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example, refuse to deploy
ground troops in the south where the mission is mostly combat, although German
transport aircraft reportedly have been helping with airlift to southern Afghanistan.
Others have refused to conduct night-time combat. These caveats were troubling to
those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which
feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and attendant casualties. At the NATO
summit in Riga, Latvia during November 28-29, 2006, some NATO countries,
particularly the Netherlands, Romania, and France, pledged to remove some of these
caveats, and all agreed that their forces would come to each others’ defense in times
of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan.
One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that NATO
has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages (particularly helicopters) for the
Afghanistan mission. Those shortages began to ease somewhat in December 2003
when NATO made available 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and
Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. In connection with their
increased responsibilities as of July 2006, Britain has brought in additional
equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, and the Netherlands is deploying
additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces in the south.
Italy is reportedly sending “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and six
AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.25 Additional pledges of helicopters and equipment,
including from France, were made at the NATO summit in Riga in November. At
the NATO meeting in February 2007 in Seville, Germany pledged an additional four
combat aircraft for use in Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF also coordinates with Afghan
security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of
Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where
Dutch combat aircraft also are located).
25 Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19,
2006.

CRS-25
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO/ISAF expansion in
Afghanistan builds on a December 2002 U.S. initiative to establish provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for
international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the
Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to
coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus mostly
on counter-insurgency. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the
PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.26
However, other relief groups do not want to associate with military force because
doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Plans are to eventually establish
PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; the list of existing PRTs, including lead
country, is shown in Table 9. U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects.
Appropriations and USAID allocations for PRT-led reconstruction are noted in the
tables at the end of this paper.
Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military
personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID,
State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry)
personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train
Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-located” with
“forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops.
In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United
States has been turning over PRTs to its partners. The NATO agreement to take over
the entire peacekeeping operation included a commitment for NATO/ISAF to
eventually take over all PRTs in Afghanistan. In August 2005, in preparation for the
establishment of Regional Command South, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT
in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of
Helmand Province. The Netherlands took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of
restive Uruzgan Province. As noted above, Italy and Spain, through their PRTs, now
have primary control of western Afghanistan. Germany (with Turkey and France)
took over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain and the
Netherlands when those countries have deployed to the south.
Some other countries are considering taking over other PRTs. Turkey opened
a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006. It will reportedly focus on
providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that
region. U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to
turn over the lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably
State Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the
establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.
Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation
Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are
training the new ANA. The table below shows its current strength and target levels,
as well as that of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The target ANA size was
26 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times,
April 11, 2003.

CRS-26
reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006,
although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of
the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Defense Minister
says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be
at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he
said in January 2007 that the ANA is growing by about 2,000 per month. The
United States has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and
Mazar-e-Sharif).
The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers (about ten
to twenty per battalion). Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training
for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of
Kabul. Fully trained recruits are paid about $100 per month; generals receive about
$530 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a
provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism,
human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
The ANA is earning mixed reviews. Some U.S. and allied officers say that the
ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol.
The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and
to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city.
It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005
Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength
operations, according to U.S. officers.
Other officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill
discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time
the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures
reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base.
Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S.
officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better
pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically
integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense
Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in
that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen.
Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander. U.S. officers in
Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds
to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others,
according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns.
An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior
to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has
about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia
overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In
May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said
the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes
and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment,
according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is

CRS-27
seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in
Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan.
ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue
to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or
armor. In July 2006, the Administration announced it would be drawing down about
$2 billion worth of equipment for transfer to the ANA over the next 12 to 18 months.
The United States is also providing surplus weaponry to the Afghan security forces.
On February 2, 2007, in the largest weapons transfer to date, the United States
delivered 213 Humvees to the Afghan National Army (ANA), as well as 12,000 light
weapons. The transfer was the first installment of a planned transfer of over 800
various armored vehicles to the ANA. Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
International donors (primarily East bloc nations), Defense Ministry weapons
stocks, 27 and the DDR program discussed above have previously furnished most of
the ANA weaponry. International donors have also furnished $120 million in cash
for the Afghan National Police. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give
the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has
already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Egypt has made two major shipments of weapons to the ANA containing 17,000
small arms. The Czech Republic is said to be considering providing up to 10
refurbished helicopters to the ANA.
Afghan National Police/Justice Sector. U.S. and Afghan officials believe
that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important
to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA, but all accounts say that
the police force and justice sector are key weaknesses. The United States and
Germany (41 trainers) are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force, and, to
try to accelerate training, the European Union announced on February 12, 2007, that
its countries would send an additional 150 police officers and 60 other experts to help
train the ANP. The U.S. effort was first led by State Department/INL, primarily
through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department took over the lead in
police training in April 2005. There are currently seven police training centers
around Afghanistan, which includes training in human rights principles and
democratic policing concepts. To address the widely cited continuing inadequacy of
ANP presence around Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition began a program in August
2006 to hire 11,200 “auxiliary police” to serve in the restive south. In the 110th
Congress, H.R. 1, passed by the House on January 9, 2007, recommends a major
increase in U.S. and international training of the Afghan police. Figures on police
are provided in Table 1 below.
To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A said on July 13, 2006, that the ANP
will soon receive 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. A
report by the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Department, circulated to
27 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July
22, 2003.

CRS-28
Congress in December 2006, found that most ANP units have less than 50% of their
authorized equipment,28 among its significant criticisms.
Many experts believe that comprehensive police and justice sector reform is
vital to Afghan governance, but some governments criticized Karzai for setting back
police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders
that included 11 (out of 86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the
11 were reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations
of a police reform committee. The ANP work in the communities they come from,
often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. Another problem is
widespread corruption, because ANP officers only receive salaries of about $70 per
month, and they reputedly encourage bribery to supplement these earnings, causing
popular resentment. Some outside experts recommend raising police salaries as a
means of reducing the incentive to engage in corruption.
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry
to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities.
According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the
first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol
forces (which are included in the figures cited above).
U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial
system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are
conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial
reform. The United States has trained over 500 judges, according to USAID, and it
trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of
the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.
U.S. Security Forces Funding. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for
the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in
the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance
funds controlled by the State Department. The Administration’s February 5, 2007,
budget request asks a total of an additional $8.6 billion to train and equip Afghan
security forces. Of that total, $5.9 billion are FY2007 supplemental funds, and $2.7
billion will be for FY2008 regular funds.
28 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and of Defense. Interagency Assessment
of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. November 2006. Department Of State
report No. ISP-IQ0-07-07.

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Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators
(February 2007)
Force
Current Level
Target Level
Total U.S. Forces in
27,000
Reduced level of 16,600 by
Afghanistan
end of 2006 was set in early
2006, but later scrapped
U.S. Forces Not Under ISAF
12,000 for OEF combat,
Command
primarily in east. A few
thousand training Afghan
security forces or are attached
to PRTs.
OEF Partner Forces (now Op.
About 1,000
Decreasing as NATO/ISAF
Active Endeavor) not under
has taken over nationwide
NATO/ISAF
peacekeeping as of October
5, 2006
Number of U.S. airstrikes
2,000 (May - November 2006)
flown in support of operations
NATO/ISAF Peacekeeping
About 35,500 (incl. 15,000
about 37,500 (following
U.S. now formally under ISAF
NATO commander call for
command, but operationally led 2,000 additional forces)
by U.S. commanders)
NATO Sectors
RC-S - 11,500
(Regional Commands-south,
RC-E - 10,500
east, north, west, and
RC-N - 3,000
capital/Kabul)
RC-W - 1,900
RC-Kabul - 4,700
national contingent commands
- 1,650
Afghan National Army (ANA)
70,000 (official goal, by
36,000
2010)
Afghan National Police (ANP) 70,000 on duty, of which
82,000 trained and equipped
50,000 are both trained and
equipped. 375 U.S. advisors,
mostly contractors
Counter-Narcotics Police
2,600
Number of Pakistani troops in
About 80,000
Pakistani border provinces
Legally Armed Fighters
63,380
63,380
disarmed by DDR
Weapons Collected by DDR
36,000 medium and light;
12, 250 heavy
Armed Groups disbanded by
Commanders in areas of the
goal is to disband 1,800
DIAG
following provinces have
groups, of which several
disarmed: Badakhshan, Takhar, hundred are “significant”
Kapisa, Laghman, Paktia,
(five or more fighters).
Baghlan, Ghazni
Weapons Collected by DIAG
22,000
Number of Suicide Bombings
0
21
(2005)
Suicide Bombings (2006)
138
0
Number of insurgents killed in
4,000 in 2006, including 2,000
operations
killed September-December

CRS-30
Regional Context
Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban
has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments
are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though
six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration)
on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below.
Pakistan
Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public
defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (one of only three countries
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government: Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are the others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some
Afghan leaders, still views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an
Afghanistan sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth
against rival India. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the
September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan
government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its
diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents.
The efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations have not
recovered from a setback in March 2006, when Afghan leaders stepped up
accusations that Pakistan was allowing Taliban remnants from operating there. That
assessment was subsequently reinforced in comments by State Department
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Henry Crumpton, on a visit to Kabul in May
2006. Some progress was made during a September 6, 2006, visit by President
Musharraf to Kabul where he pledged to seek out and destroy the Pakistan-based
command structure of the Taliban. Despite continuing mutual accusations during
visits by Karzai and Musharraf to Washington, D.C. in late September, further
progress was made at a joint dinner for Karzai and Musharraf hosted by President
Bush on September 28, 2006. At that session, the two leaders agreed to gather tribal
elders on both sides of their border to persuade them not to host Taliban militants.
Suggesting it can act against the Taliban when it intends to, on July 19, 2005,
Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah
Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to
Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi. On August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced
the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta.
However, reflecting remaining differences, in October 2006 Karzai said that
Mullah Umar is hiding in the Pakistani city of Quetta, an allegation denied by
Pakistan. There have also been questions about the wisdom of a September 5, 2006,
agreement between Pakistan and tribal elders in this region to exchange an end to
Pakistani military incursions into the tribal areas for a promise by the tribal elders to
expel militants from the border area. Some say that “Pakistani Taliban” have
continued to gain influence over the villages in these regions. In a meeting with
Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Kabul in early January 2007, Karzai

CRS-31
strongly criticized a Pakistani plan to mine and fence their common border in an
effort to prevent infiltration of militants to Afghanistan. Even though the move was
a Pakistani attempt to increase its efforts to help Afghanistan, Karzai said the move
would separate tribes and families that straddle the border. He said there was still an
“increasing lack of trust” between the countries. Pakistan subsequently dropped the
idea of mining the border, but is continuing to plan for some fencing. In a press
interview on February 2, 2007, President Musharraf tacitly acknowledged that some
senior Taliban leaders might be able to operate from Pakistan but strongly denied
that any Pakistani intelligence agencies were deliberately assisting the Taliban.
Exemplifying the degree to which Pakistan-based Taliban fighters are a problem for
U.S. forces, U.S. military elements fired artillery rounds at Taliban positions inside
Pakistan on February 12, 2007.
Particularly following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against
President Musharraf, Pakistan has exerted substantial efforts against Al Qaeda.
Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are
suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces
began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the
Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other
indirect support. The U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training
Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.29 This activity
represents a continuation of Pakistan’s support against Al Qaeda after the September
11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace,
some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al
Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United
States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah
(captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September
11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top
planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the
“Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893,
separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan
after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees
have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
remain in Pakistan.
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional
influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to
Afghanistan has totaled about $205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to
build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and
29 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April
27, 2005.

CRS-32
villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President
Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S.
criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
but it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of Iranian
“meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized
in the government. For his part, Karzai, who again visited Iran in May 2006 — and
who met with hardline Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tajikistan on
July 26, 2006 — says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not
strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan as Herat governor in
September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand
air base.30 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics
along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the
Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society.
Even though Iran’s position in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still
greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its
interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western
province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer
to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and
ammunition,31 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian
and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of
its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the
crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene
on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan
during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse
of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in
Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the
mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use
one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India
saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al
Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to
ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have
committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of
using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.
India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-
financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in
northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s
30 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall
Street Journal
, October 18, 2004.
31 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997.

CRS-33
struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi
and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and
committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house
for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects
are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development
Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity
from Central Asia to Afghanistan.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan
stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.
Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt
Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.32 Russia, which still feels humiliated
by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, views Northern Alliance figures as
instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. Although
Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out
of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to
reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism
emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a
Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a
militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one
in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters
fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian
leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous
February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.33 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed
while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas
transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban;
Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that
Alliance. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China
into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the
Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the
region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of
32 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.
33 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.

CRS-34
the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending
its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their
pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French
combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In
July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train
some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose
to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly
viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical
Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov,
who died in December 2006, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a
natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The
September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda
guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have
been based in Turkmenistan.
China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China
has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor”
(see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al
Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing
China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met
with Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military
action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of
strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition,
China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi
Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the
Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government.
The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor
in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to
Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade
them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently
believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away
from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the
Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban
leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan
Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi
Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland
on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime.

CRS-35
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not
publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September
2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of
U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch
strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to
allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.
U.S. and International Aid
to Afghanistan
Many experts believe that financial assistance and accelerating reconstruction
would do more to improve the security situation than intensified anti-Taliban combat.
Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left
about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than
3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number
remain outside Afghanistan.
Although still heavily dependent on donors, the government has made
significant progress in generating a growing portion of its budget domestically. It
now raises domestically about half of its $900 million annual operating budget from
tax and customs revenues after succeeding in forcing customs revenue to be remitted
to the central government. Tax revenue from such growing Afghan companies as
Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cell phone service), and Tolo Television are providing
substantial funds as well. Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by
establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Nonetheless, the Afghan
government still depends on international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs for
operating as well as reconstruction funds. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of
assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to
that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between
1985-1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan,
implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of
administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2002 and
including funds appropriated for FY2006, the United States has provided
approximately $3.9 billion in civilian-related reconstruction and other civilian
assistance and $6.3 billion in military/security-related assistance. This latter
category included training and equipping the ANA and ANP, DOD and INL counter-
narcotics operations, Karzai protection, and de-mining/anti-terrorism. Table 2
breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover FY2003-

CRS-36
FY2006. A history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in
Table 7.34
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key
post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The
total authorization, for all categories for FY2003-FY2006), is over $3.7 billion. For
the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets
authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations.
However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has
been funded by contributing nations. It authorized the following:
! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $30 million in assistance for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for
FY2003-FY2005);
! $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights
oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-
2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
! $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for
Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for
$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by
P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
! $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand
ISAF if such an expansion takes place.
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the
appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional
Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and
progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required in the original law;
(2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other
countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense
Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also
contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR
activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives. The law did not
specify dollar amount authorizations for FY2005 and FY2006. H.R. 1, a bill in the
110th Congress to implement the September 11 Commission recommendations,
34 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured.
The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds
were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency
Response Fund.

CRS-37
contains a sense of Congress that the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act be
reauthorized; it passed the House on January 9, 2006.
FY2007 and FY2008. On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Ron Neumann signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister
under which the United States pledges to provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in
civilian economic aid over the next five years. The U.S. aid plan is reportedly
programmed for education, health care, and economic and democratic development.
On February 6, 2006, the Administration requested, for FY2007, the following for
Afghanistan:
! $42.8 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH);
! $150 million in Development Assistance (DA);
! $610 million in ESF (an increase of about $190 million over what is
being provided in ESF for FY2006);
! $297 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) for counter-narcotics operations (an increase of about $60
million over what is being provided for FY2006);
! $1.2 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET);
! no funds specifically requested for Karzai protection (NADR) or
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and a
! total request of about $1.1 billion, in line with the Administration
pledge at the February 1, 2006, “London Conference.”
In congressional action, FY2007 aid is operating under the terms of P.L. 109-
383, a continuation appropriation. The House-passed (H.R. 5522) aid levels appear
to provide guidance for FY2007 aid levels: it contains $510.77 million in ESF for
Afghanistan and $235 million for counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan, but
appears to fully fund the remaining program categories. USAID says it plans to
spend about $42 million on PRT-related reconstruction programs. In addition, the
FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-289) provides $1.5 billion to train and
equip Afghan security forces and $100 million for DOD counter-narcotics support
operations in Afghanistan.
On February 5, 2007, the Administration asked for supplemental FY2007 and
FY2008 funds. As discussed above, funds for training and equipping the Afghan
security forces were $8.6 billion total ($5.9 billion for FY2007 supplemental and
$2.7 billion for FY2008). The request for civilian reconstruction activities was about
$1.975 billion for FY2007 supplemental and FY2008 ($668 million for FY2007
supplemental and $1.306.8 billion for FY2008). The FY2007 supplemental
breakdown includes $653 million in ESF and $15 million for NADR (anti-terrorism,
de-mining, and related assistance). The FY2008 breakdown includes $992 million
in ESF and $274.8 million for INCLE (counter-narcotics and law enforcement).
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the
Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC)
has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking
entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and
another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for

CRS-38
currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States
to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Another $20 million in overflight fees withheld
by U.N. sanctions on the Taliban were provided as well. Together with its allies,
over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment
credits of $100 million.
World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank
reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced
a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World
Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the
telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in
Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in
project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned
Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance,
and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90
million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy
sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a
project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. In December 2004, the
Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections
of the road system.
International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that
Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At donors
conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), and Kabul (April 2005), about
$9.5 billion in non-U.S. contributions were pledged. However, only about half has
been received as of January 2006. At the London conference in February 2006,
another $6 billion (non-U.S.) in pledges was made for the next five years. Of the
new pledges, Britain pledged about $900 million. The London conference also
leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be
channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor
community. In exchange, the Afghan government is promising greater financial
transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international
contributions are used wisely and effectively.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a
long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States
has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan
living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-1998, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion
Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to
construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through

CRS-39
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.35 The deterioration in
U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while
the Taliban was in power.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all
three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their
oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Turkmenistan’s new
leadership is likely to favor the project as well because it is following the policies of
the late President Niyazov. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior
alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in
March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of
gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan
relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its
neighbors. Some Afghan leaders believe the government needs to better develop
other resources such as copper and coal mines that have gone unused.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO
Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war
economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President
Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade
and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen
as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On
December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start
membership talks with Afghanistan.
Residual Issues From Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such
as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the
Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft
missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300
Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below
35 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

CRS-40
100.36 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when
U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the
war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are
likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose
less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold
to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan
government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.37 In late
January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at
a reported cost of $150,000 each.38
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the
United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a
premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported
on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was
competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA
would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On
March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a
fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran
bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some
reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a
Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in
Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.39 It was
a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by
Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their
targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute
one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that
5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates
are lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land
mines. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on de-
mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around
Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 2), the U.S. de-
mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the
amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds
have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program
for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006
36 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
37 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
38 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
39 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

CRS-41
states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan
contaminated by mines by 70%.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for
131.0
198.12 (for
Agriculture (DOA)
wheat
165,000 metric
(300,000
food
and USAID Food For
(100,000
tons. (60,000
metric tons
commodities)
Peace (FFP), via
metric tons
tons for May
under P.L.480,
World Food
under
2000 drought
Title II, and
Program(WFP)
“416(b)”
relief)
416(b))
program.)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for
14.03 for the
22.03 for
136.54 (to
Population, Refugees
Afghan
same purposes
similar
U.N. agencies)
and Migration (PRM)
refugees in
purposes
via UNHCR and
Pakistan and
ICRC
Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for
18.934 for
113.36 (to
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
drought relief
similar
various U.N.
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
and health,
programs
agencies and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
water, and
NGOs)
sanitation
programs
State
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust/other
(Humanitarian
demining
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
5.44 (2.789
6.169, of
5.31 for
Refugees in Pakistan
for health,
which $3.82
similar
(through various
training -
went to similar
purposes
NGOs)
Afghan
purposes
females in
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics
1.50
63.0
USAID/
0.45 (Afghan
24.35 for
Office of Transition
women in
broadcasting/
Initiatives
Pakistan)
media
Dept. of Defense
50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Foreign Military
57.0 (for
Financing
Afghan
national army)
Anti-Terrorism 36.4
Economic Support
105.2
Funds (E.S.F)
Peacekeeping
24.0
Totals
76.6 113.2 182.6
815.9

CRS-42
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, 2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 2)
From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health
90
Food Aid
47
Peacekeeping
10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, Demining,
5
Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and
21
equip (FMF)
Total from this law:
372
From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction
100
(ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737

CRS-43
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)
Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF)
30
Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection
70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF)
69
Roads (ESF)
181
Schools/Education (ESF)
95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF)
49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation
95
Water Projects
23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE).
170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations
73
Afghan National Army (FMF)
287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR)
35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations
92
Total from this law:
1,327
(of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls)
From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)
Development/Health
171
Disaster Relief
35
Refugee Relief
72
Afghan women (ESF)
5
Judicial reform commission (ESF)
2
Reforestation (ESF)
2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF)
2
Other reconstruction (ESF). (Total FY2004 funds spent by
64
USAID for PRT-related reconstruction = $56.4 million.)
ANA train and equip (FMF)
50
Total from this law:
403
Total for FY2004
1,727

CRS-44
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)
Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF)
225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF)
400
Assistance to benefit women and girls
50
Agriculture, private sector investment, environment,
primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-
300
building
Reforestation
2
Child and maternal health
6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Total from this law
985
From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture,
alternative livelihoods, government capacity building,
training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs
1,073.5
(ESF). (Total FY2005 funds spent by USAID for PRT-
led reconstruction = $87.89 million.)
Aid to displaced persons (ESF)
5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF)
2.5
Women-led NGOs (ESF)
5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces.
Of the funds, $34 million may go to Afghan security
elements for that purpose. Also, $290 million of the
1,285
funds is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already
obligated for this purpose.
DOD counter-narcotics support operations
242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)
220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE)
400
Karzi protection (NADR funds)
17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan
7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul
60
Total from this law
3,317
Total from all FY2005 laws
4,302

CRS-45
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
From the FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102)
ESF for reconstruction, governance, democracy-building
430
(ESF over $225 million subject to certification that Afghanistan is
cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts.) Total FY2006 funds to
be spent on reconstruction by USAID via PRTs = $20 million.
Counter-narcotics (INCLE).
235
Of the funds, $60 million is to train the ANP.
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries)
18
Karzai protection (NADR funds)
18
Child Survival and Health (CSH)
43
Reforestation
3
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations
2
Programs to benefit women and girls
50
Development Assistance
130.4
Total from this law:
931.4
From the FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 109-234)
Security Forces Fund
1,908
ESF (Includes $11 million for debt relief costs and $5 million for
43
agriculture development)
DOD counter-narcotics operations
103
Embassy operations
50.1
Migration and Refugee aid
3.4
DEA counter-narcotics operations
9.2
Total from this law:
2,116.7
Total for FY2006:
3,048.1

CRS-46
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
Supp.
P.L. 480
(Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
(Title I and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978
4.989

5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074

7.195

0.347
10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion - December 1979)


1981






1982






1983






1984






1985
3.369




3.369
1986


8.9


8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6


32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9


74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6


77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1


88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1


80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4


81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0

30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0

27.9
42.3
1995
1.8

12.4

31.6
45.8
1996


16.1

26.4
42.5
1997


18.0

31.9a
49.9
1998


3.6

49.14b
52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.

CRS-47
Table 8. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(Numbers approximate)
(As of NATO Stage 4 transition, completed October 5, 2006)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partner Nations
Belgium
300
Albania
30
Bulgaria
150
Austria
5
Canada
2,200
Azerbaijan
20
Czech Republic
100
Croatia
120
Denmark
320
Finland
100
Estonia
90
Ireland
10
France
1,000
Macedonia
120
Germany
2,750
New Zealand
100
Greece
180
Sweden
350
Hungary
200
Switzerland
5
Iceland
15
Total ISAF force
35,440
Italy
1,800
Latvia
35
Note: See NATO’s
Lithuania
135
Afghanistan page at
Luxemburg
10
[http://www.nato.int/issues/
afghanistan].
Netherlands 2,100
Norway
530
Poland
120
Portugal
180
Romania
750
Slovakia
60
Slovenia
50
Spain
625
Turkey
475
United Kingdom
5,200
United States
15,000

CRS-48
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(RC=Regional Command)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Country
Gardez
Paktia (RC-East, E)
U.S.
Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E)
U.S.
Bagram A.B.
Parwan (RC-C, Central)
U.S. (assisted by 175 troops from
South Korea)
Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
U.S.
Khost
Khost (RC-E)
U.S.
Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S)
U.S. (with Romania)
Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
U.S.
Sharana
Paktika (RC-E)
U.S.
Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
U.S.
Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-
U.S. (State Department lead)
E)
Nuristan
Nuristan (RC-E)
U.S.
Farah
Farah (RC-W)
U.S.
NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs
Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
NATO/Canada (as of September
2005)
Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
NATO/ Britain (with Denmark and
Estonia)
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
NATO/Netherlands (with Australia)
Herat
Herat (RC-W)
NATO/Italy
Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
NATO/Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
ISAF/Sweden
Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
NATO/Germany
Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
NATO/Germany
Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
NATO/Norway
Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
NATO/Lithuania
Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
NATO/Hungary (as of October 1,
2006)
Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-C)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF)
Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey

CRS-49
Table 10. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/
Regional
Commander
Leader
Ethnicity
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at
ultra-
Insurgent
large possibly in Afghanistan)/Mullah
orthodox
groups, mostly
Dadullah/Jalaludin Haqqani.
Islamic,
in the south
Pashtun
and east, and
in Pakistan.
Islamic
Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (elected to
moderate
Much of
Society
lower house)/Muhammad Fahim (in upper
Islamic,
northern and
(leader of
house)/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister
mostly
western
“Northern
2001-2006). Ismail Khan heads faction of the
Tajik
Afghanistan,
Alliance”)
grouping in Herat area.
including
Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March
secular,
Mazar-e-
Islamic
1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated his
Uzbek
Sharif,
Movement of
overthrow. Subsequently fought Rabbani
Shebergan,
Afghanistan
government (1992-1995), but later joined
and environs
Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000
troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud
missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces
that captured his region by August 1998. Karzai
rival in October 2004 presidential election, now
Karzai’s chief “security adviser.”
Hizb-e-
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad
Shiite,
Bamiyan
Wahdat
Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election
Hazara
province
and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part
tribes
of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city,
the Hazara base.
Pashtun
Various regional governors; central government
Moderate
Dominant in
Leaders
led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
southern,
Pashtun
eastern
Afghanistan
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.
orthodox
Small groups
Gulbuddin
Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in Islamic,
around
(HIG)
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in
Pashtun
Jalalabad,
2002. Now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda;
Nuristan and
likely in Pakistan or eastern Afghanistan. Leader
in southeast.
of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the
mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative,
orthodox
Paghman
leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. He lived
Islamic,
(west of
many years in and is politically close to Saudi
Pashtun
Kabul)
Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of
Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During anti-Soviet
war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a
principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized
the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

CRS-50
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed
during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been
lifted.
! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making
Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products.
Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive
Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of
Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of
agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls
were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the
Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-
72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This
opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President
Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided
for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and
suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of
negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a
non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the
United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United
States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the
Taliban, by President Bush.
! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986
proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437)
that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for
Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations
for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan.
! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government,

CRS-51
reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had
also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had
been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999
declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton
determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked
Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade
with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these
sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana
assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S.
citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-
controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when
the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no
territory within Afghanistan.
! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October
15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution
1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267
banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana),
and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.
Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice
to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of
Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel
by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors
in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was
provided to the Taliban.
! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright,
completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to
restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had
issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer
a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not
implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition,
Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because
the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize
for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)


CRS-52
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan
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