Order Code RL33546
Jordan: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues
Updated January 25, 2007
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Jeremy M. Sharp
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in
U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief overview of Jordan’s government and
economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S.
policy objectives in the Middle East. This report will be updated regularly.
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by
Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan.
These include the stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic reform under way in
Jordan, the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s concerns over
the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other regional
states. Following the 9/11 attacks, Jordan issued bans on banking operations linked
to terrorist activities and pursued individuals linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
organization.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
For fiscal year 2007, the Bush Administration has requested $245 million in
economic aid and $206 million in military aid to Jordan. Congress recently passed
the FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-234) which provides $50
million in economic assistance to Jordan.

Contents
Latest Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Domestic Politics and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Hashemite Royal Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2006 Detention and Trial of IAF Parliamentarians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Professional Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Military and Security Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Water Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Allegations of Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Jordan’s Role in Promoting Peace in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Peace Agreements and Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Opposition to Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The West Bank and East Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Hamas and Rejectionist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Perspectives and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Economic and Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Potential Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FY2006 Supplemental Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FY2007 and Other Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Millennium Challenge Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Free Trade Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Qualifying Industrial Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Sweat Shop Allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Military Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Military Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Joint Exercises and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Other Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

List of Figures
Figure 1. Country Map of Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Jordan: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues
Latest Developments
On January 19, 2007, King Abdullah II of Jordan suggested in a media
interview that Jordan would develop its own civilian nuclear energy program. King
Abdullah stated that “The Egyptians are looking for a nuclear program. The GCC
[Gulf Cooperation Council] are looking at one, and we are actually looking at nuclear
power for peaceful and energy purposes. We’ve been discussing it with the West.”
In November 2006, a Jordanian United Nations peacekeeping patrol in the
Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, was killed while on patrol. Jordan has about 1,500
troops in the Brazilian-led U.N. force, which includes more than 8,000 soldiers and
police supported by some 1,000 civilian personnel. Two other Jordanian soldiers
were killed in January 2006.
Overview
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of Saddam
Hussein.


CRS-2
Figure 1. Country Map of Jordan
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of
desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people
of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel brought large
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small
Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River. The original “East Bank” Jordanians,
though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s
political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the
Jordanian monarchy. Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the
population, in some cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and others
are at most lukewarm in their support for the Jordanian regime.1
1 A commentator recently estimated that 67% of the population is of Palestinian descent.
Tom Pepper, “Building a Safe Haven,” Middle East Economic Digest, July 22-28, 2005.

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The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitu-
Jordan in Brief
tional monarchy under the presti-
gious Hashemite family, which
Population
5,906,760; growth rate: 2.49%
(July 2005):
claims descent from the Prophet
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
Muhammad. King Abdullah II has
slightly smaller than Indiana)
ruled the country since 1999, when
Ethnic
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
he succeeded to the throne upon the
Groups:
Armenians 1%
death of his father, the late King
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
Hussein, upon the latter’s death
small Muslim sects 2% (2001
after a 47-year reign. Educated
est.)
largely in Britain and the United
Literacy
91% (male 96%, female 86%)
States, King Abdullah had earlier
(2003):
pursued a military career, ultimately
GDP (2005): $11.5 billion; real growth 6.1%
serving as commander of Jordan’s
Inflation
5%
Special Operations Forces with the
(2004):
rank of Major General. There is
Unemploy-
12.5% (official estimate); ca. 30%
currently no designated Crown
ment (2004): according to some unofficial
Prince; however, under Article 28
estimates
of the Jordanian constitution, the
Armed
personnel 100,500; tanks 952;
Forces
King’s 11-year-old son Prince
combat aircraft 101
(2004):
Hussein is next in line of succession
External
to the throne. King Abdullah (age
$8.4 billion
Debt (2004):
44) has won approval for his ener-
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State; Central Bank of Jordan;
getic and hands-on style of govern-
other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;
ing; however, some Jordanians,
The Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
notably Palestinians and Islamic
fundamentalists, are opposed to his
policies of cooperating with the United States on issues such as Iraq and the Arab-
Israeli peace process. In a recent Los Angeles Times article, one Jordanian cabinet
official was quoted as saying that “He [King Abdullah] talks about information
technology and foreign investment, but he doesn’t really know his own people.”2
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of
Ministers (cabinet). Typically, Jordanian governments last about 1.5 years before
they are dissolved by royal decree. This is done in order to bolster the king’s reform
credentials and to dispense patronage to various elites. The king also appoints all
judges and is commander of the armed forces.
Parliament, Constitution, and Elections
Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower
house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Building on his father’s legacy,
King Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically
curtailing dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations
with Israel. The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62
2 “Jordan’s King Risks Shah’s Fate, Critics Warn,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1, 2006.

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seats in the 110-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies
of King Abdullah. However, the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front
(IAF), which had boycotted the previous elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote,
thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six sympathizers. Six seats in the
lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a member of the IAF. The
IAF also participated in municipal elections for the capital city of Amman, held on
July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest against
what IAF spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures. The next
parliamentary elections in Jordan are scheduled for sometime in 2007. A series of
recent press reports have suggested that King Abdullah may be considering
postponing legislative elections due to concerns over Islamist gains.
The Jordanian Parliament has limited power. In theory, it can override the veto
authority of the king with a two-thirds majority in both the upper and lower houses.
A two-thirds majority of the lower house can also dissolve the cabinet with a “no
confidence” vote. However, since both houses have solid pro-government majorities,
such actions are rarely attempted (once in April 1963). The Jordanian Constitution
enables the king to dissolve parliament and postpone lower house elections for two
years.3
Overall, political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the IAF is the only
well organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are
composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe. There
are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan, consisting of a total of only 4,100 total
members. According to Jordanian scholar Samer Abu Libdeh, a draft political parties
law submitted by the government would require parties to include members from at
least five different governorates, legally forcing parties to reach out nationally rather
than appeal to their local constituencies.4
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has long been integrated into the political
mainstream due to its acceptance of the legitimacy of Hashemite monarchy, although
relations between the Brotherhood and the Palace have fluctuated over the years. The
Brotherhood presence in Jordan dates back to the 1930s, as it has been tacitly
recognized first as a charitable organization and later as a quasi-political
organization, which has openly fielded candidates in parliamentary elections albeit
under a different name (Islamic Action Front, IAF). The relationship between the
Brotherhood and the Palace has been mutually beneficial over the years. Successive
Jordanian monarchs have found that the Brotherhood has been more useful politically
3 The king also is allowed to declare martial law and suspend the provisions of the
constitution. See United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Programme on
Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), Historical Background of Jordan’s Constitution,
available online at [http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=7].
4 Samer Abu Libdeh, “Jordan Looks Inward: The Hashemite Kingdom in the Wake of
Zarqawi and the Hamas-Israel Clash,” PolicyWatch #1120, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, July 7, 2006.

CRS-5
as an ally than as an opponent (as opposed to the Brotherhood in Egypt), as it secured
Islamist support in countering Arab nationalist interference during the 1950’s and
1960’s and secular Palestinian nationalism in the 1970s. The Brotherhood’s
educational, social, and health services have grown so extensive over the years that
some experts believe that the Brotherhood’s budget for services rivals that of the
Jordanian government.
In 2006, there has been much speculation about the IAF’s ties to Hamas. In a
recent interview on Al Arabiya, Zaki Sa’d Bani-Irshayd, the new secretary general
of the IAF, was careful to emphasize that the IAF and Hamas have agreed to avoid
any inter-organizational relations, emphasizing that each movement has its own
financial, administrative, and organizational system. On February 16, 2006, Jordanian
Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit congratulated Hamas on winning the January 2006
Palestinian Authority legislative elections and said Jordan would welcome a visit by
a Hamas delegation. However, on April 20, 2006, the press reported that Jordan
cancelled a planned visit by the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar,
who is also a high-level Hamas official, on the grounds that Hamas had hidden
weapons and explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas denied the charge and claimed
that Jordan was using this allegation to justify cancelling the visit. Hamas had been
expelled from Jordan in 1999, shortly after the ascension of King Abdullah II to the
throne.
2006 Detention and Trial of IAF Parliamentarians. In June 2006, just
days after the death of the terrorist mastermind Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, four IAF
parliamentarians were arrested after making statements praising the Al Qaeda leader.
One IAF deputy reportedly remarked that Zarqawi was a “martyr” and a holy warrior.
The government charged that such remarks were in violation of Article 150 of
Jordan’s Penal Code, which bans all writing or speech that is “intended to, or results
in, stirring up sectarian or racial tension or strife among different elements of the
nation.”5 Several weeks later, the Jordanian government dissolved the administration
of the Islamic Centre Charity Society, the Brotherhood’s main vehicle for dispensing
social welfare to its supporters. Some estimate that the charity controls over $1
billion in assets. The Jordanian Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) appointed
a seven-member ad hoc board to run the charity.
After the four Brotherhood parliamentarians were arrested, one was released and
the remaining three stood trial before a state security court. During the trial, several
journalists testified that two of the three parliamentarians called Zarqawi a martyr.
At the sentencing, one member was acquitted for lack of evidence and the two others
received sentences of two years and one and a half years respectively, though their
sentences were reduced to 13 months shortly thereafter. The case did not draw a great
deal of international attention. According to Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the
Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, “Expressing
condolences to the family of a dead man, however murderous he might be, is not a
crime.... And it shouldn’t be grounds for prosecution.”
5 “Jordan: Rise in Arrests Restricting Free Speech,” Human Rights Watch, June 17, 2006.

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Professional Associations
Jordan’s 14 professional associations, consisting of approximately 130,000
members, have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and nationalist groups
opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S. policies on
Iraq. The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these
associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations. More
recently, the government has circulated a draft law which alters the electoral
procedures for professional associations in a way that would dilute the influence of
Islamist candidates and prohibit ties to association branches in the Palestinian
territories.6 The law was debated in parliament but not enacted during the summer
of 2005. On August 24, Prime Minister Badran told reporters that the government
would not withdraw the controversial bill but that the bill would include some
unspecified amendments.
The Military and Security Establishment
Many tribal east bank Jordanians or their descendants form the backbone of
Jordan’s armed forces and internal security establishment. Most observers agree that
with the possible exception of Syria, Jordan faces few conventional threats from its
neighbors and that the greatest threats to its security are internal and asymmetrical.
In general, counter-terrorism and homeland security policies are carried out by a
number of institutions, most notably the security services under direct palace control,
the military, and the Interior Ministry. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
reports directly to King Abdullah II and is responsible for both covert operations
abroad and internal security. The military’s elite special forces units also are directly
involved in countering threats to internal security and were reportedly used to thwart
a chemical weapons plot in April 2004. The Interior Ministry controls all civilian
police forces and civil defense units through a branch agency known as the Public
Security Directorate (PSD).
Reform
The reform process in Jordan largely comes from the top down, as King
Abdullah has worked hard at cultivating a progressive image for both himself and the
government. Nevertheless, the pace of reforms, particularly democratic reform,
remains slow by Western standards, as for every step forward on issues such as
women’s rights, economic liberalization, and education, there are steps back on press
freedoms and institutional reforms. Jordanian officials have been adamant in insisting
that they be allowed to institute social changes at their own pace, asserting that
Jordanian society has changed dramatically over the past century from a desert tribal
society into a modern nation state. The Jordanian government believes that some
portions of its population are suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region and that local
leaders would consider some U.S. democratic reform proposals to be antithetical to
Jordan’s conservative Islamic and tribal social culture.
6 “Restrictive Jordanian Bill on Professional Associations,” Arab Reform Bulletin, March
2005, Volume 3, Issue 2.

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In order to jumpstart the reform process and possibly appease some Western
donors, the King formed a National Agenda Committee to develop a road map to
reforming economic and political life. The National Agenda was released in early
2006 as a 10-year plan for comprehensive reform of eight sectors: education,
infrastructure, employment, social welfare, finances, judiciary, investment, and
political development. Since its release, the political reform goals have been the most
controversial, pitting liberal reformists against conservative and traditional forces.
Meanwhile, Jordan has also been the recipient of several grants under the U.S.-
sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program for projects in the
political, economic, educational, and women’s fields.
The Economy
Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has an economy
which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker
remittances, and the service sector. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces
are corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally
around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.7 Corruption,
common in most developing nations, is particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of
intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”(connections), is widespread, and
many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic
mobility that corruption engenders. Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad
in search of better jobs and opportunities.
In recent years, Jordan has experienced solid economic growth, though
inflationary pressures, budget deficits, and population growth have worked to
minimize some of its benefits. The London-based Economic Intelligence Unit
forecasts GDP growth to be close to 4.5% in 2006. High oil prices have impacted the
Jordanian economy in different ways. On the one hand, oil booms benefit the families
of Jordanians employed in oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf, as these guest workers
have more income to send back home or invest in Jordanian real estate. On the other
hand, higher oil prices put enormous pressure on the national budget, since the
government subsidizes gas and home heating oil. In 2005, the government enacted
several cuts to the fuel subsidy, effectively raising the price of gas in increments
ranging from 8% to 59%.8 Although in the past, deep cuts to certain subsidies have
led to social unrest, there has been no such reaction from the public thus far.
7 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma
attached to menial labor jobs. Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal
traditions look down on certain types of employment such as construction. In fact, the
government estimates that there are approximately 300-400 thousand foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks.
8 Prior to the Iraq War in 2003, Jordan had received oil from Iraq at deeply reduced prices.
After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan received some oil
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a temporary basis at
discounted rates. In the spring of 2006, Jordan stopped receiving oil discounts from its
neighbors forcing it to purchase all of its oil needs (100,000 barrels per day) at international
market prices.

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Nevertheless, the government is keenly aware of growing dissatisfaction from rising
prices.
The situation in Iraq has had a noticeable impact on Jordan’s economy. An
estimated 500,000-700,000 Iraqis have moved to Jordan since 2003, infusing its
economy with new investment, particularly in the real estate sector. In the capital of
Amman, new construction is evident and land prices have skyrocketed. Jordan also
has served as a staging ground for international contractors involved in Iraqi
reconstruction, bringing a number of foreigners to Amman in recent years.
Water Shortages. Jordan is one of the ten most water deprived countries in
the world and is in constant search of new water resources. The Dead Sea, which
abuts both Jordan and Israel, is losing water at an estimated three feet per year, and
some scientists suggest that without significant action it will be gone by 2050. Jordan
has been exploring new water development projects, including the feasibility of
pumping water from the Red Sea, desalinating it, and then transferring it down to the
Dead Sea. This project, referred to as the Red-Dead Canal, is being studied by the
government and international lenders.
Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its
main intelligence organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is
considered one of the most effective organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist
networks. Jordanian intelligence reportedly played a role in assisting U.S. forces in
killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist mastermind who
headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it vulnerable
to terrorist attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On
November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in
Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously
wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq,
formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act. Many Jordanians,
even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East
policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and
denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at
ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned,
were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, 2005, Jordan’s Minister of the
Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from
operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify
authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners. An
official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun drafting new and
tougher anti-terrorism laws which are currently under debate in parliament.

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Other recent terrorist activity in Jordan include the following:
! On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program
in Jordan, was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was
leaving for work. A Jordanian military court convicted and
sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and
presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two
others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant. Six of the eight
sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and
two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
! In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by
a terrorist cell linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical
attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman. According to press
reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited
Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from
Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled
by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of
operations in Amman.
! On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S.
amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba
narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and
another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport
at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was
killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of
responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with bin
Laden or his (now deceased) associate, Zarqawi.
! On September 4, 2006, a lone gunman opened fire on a group of
Western tourists visiting the historic Roman amphitheater in
downtown Amman, killing a British man and wounding six others,
including a Jordanian policeman. The assailant was a 38-year old
Jordanian named Nabeel Jaoura, who claimed his attack was in
retaliation for the murder of his two brothers in 1982 at the hands of
Israeli soldiers during the war in southern Lebanon. According to the
New York Times, Jaoura had worked in Israel, where he was arrested
two years ago for overstaying his visa. Jordanian security officials
believe his incarceration may have further radicalized him.9
Allegations of Torture. In July 2006, the human rights group Amnesty
International accused the Jordanian security establishment of torturing terrorist
suspects on behalf of the United States government. Amnesty International identified
10 suspected cases of men subjected to rendition from U.S. custody to interrogation
9 “Typical of a New Terror Threat: Anger of a Gunman in Jordan,” New York Times, Sept.
6, 2006.

CRS-10
centers in Jordan.10 A second report, released by Human Rights Watch in September
2006, claimed that Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) carries out
arbitrary arrests and abuses suspects in its own detention facility. The report studied
the cases of 16 men whom the GID had arrested and found that in 14 of the 16 cases,
detainees were tortured or ill-treated. In response, the GID denied any wrongdoing.
Jordan’s Role in Promoting Peace in the Middle East
Peace Agreements and Normalization. Jordan and Israel signed a peace
treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel
returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan;
the Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two
countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was
partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim
arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from
Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic
meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the
peace treaty).
Opposition to Normalization. King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize
relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly
among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and
influential trade and professional organizations (see above). Among many
mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not
brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far. Opponents of normalization
have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists
among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies
that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists,
but courts have upheld their right to publish them.
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations. Jordan supports current Middle East
peace plans, including a land-for-peace initiative proposed by Saudi then-Crown
Prince Abdullah and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002; and the Road Map,
a three-phase process released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) on April 30, 2003, in an effort to
jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On June 4, 2003, King Abdullah
hosted a summit conference at the Red Sea port of Aqaba attended by President Bush
and the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers, where attendees discussed steps to
implement the Road Map. Despite the subsequent breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian
talks, King Abdullah has continued to press for resumption of negotiations. Jordan
initially opposed an Israeli proposal to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and
four West Bank towns, but later expressed support as long as the withdrawal was part
of the Road Map process.11
10 “Group: Jordan Tortures Suspects for U.S.,” Associated Press, July 24, 2006.
11 According to press reports, President Bush gave King Abdullah a private letter in which
he reiterated support for the Road Map. Steven R. Weisman, “Bush and King of Jordan
(continued...)

CRS-11
The West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
does not address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan
in 1950 but occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East
Jerusalem (except as noted below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian
rather than Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. The late King Hussein decided in August
1988 “to disengage our legal and administrative relations with the West Bank,” but
he and King Abdullah remained involved in Palestinian issues.
Jerusalem. On a related issue, Palestinian leaders have taken exception to
Article 9 of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty, which states that Israel “respects the
historical role of the Hashemite Kingdom [of Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem”
and “will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” The late
Palestinian leader Arafat asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision
of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.” In a speech to a Washington, DC audience on May
13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he
Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing for a shared city open to all
faiths.”
Hamas and Rejectionist Groups.12 Since the 2006 Hamas electoral
victory, the Jordanian government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of
its citizenry (with perhaps more than half of Palestinian origin) sympathizes with
Hamas,13 and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) reportedly
maintains close ties to Hamas. In a recent interview on Al Arabiya, Zaki Sa’d Bani-
Irshayd, the new secretary general of the IAF, was careful to emphasize that the IAF
and Hamas have agreed to avoid any inter-organizational relations between them,
emphasizing that each movement has its own financial, administrative, and
organizational system.14
11 (...continued)
Ease Tensions Between Them,” New York Times, May 7, 2004.
12 On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces closed offices used by the fundamentalist
Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late King Hussein had tolerated to some degree,
on the grounds that the offices were registered as businesses but were conducting illegal
political activity. In November 1999, authorities announced that the Hamas offices would
be closed permanently.
13 Some U.S.-Jordanian tension arose in early 2005 over restrictions imposed by the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the New York offices of the Jordan-based
Arab Bank, which allegedly allowed diversion of funds to families of Palestinians involved
in attacks against Israelis. See, Glenn R. Simpson, “U.S. Crackdown On Arab Bank Tangles
Policy,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 2005. Jordanian officials have stressed that in 2006,
banks in Jordan are complying with U.S. regulations to ban all financial transactions with
Hamas-controlled accounts.
14 “Jordan’s Islamic Action Front Leader Comments on Ties with HAMAS,” Dubai Al-
Arabiyah Television, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], Apr.
6, 2006. Document ID#GMP20060421537006.

CRS-12
Iraq
Perspectives and Interests. Jordan’s relations with Iraq during the Saddam
Hussein era were strong. In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed military action against
Iraq, but it informally and quietly provided logistical support to the U.S.-led
campaign to oust Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Jordanians have repeatedly criticized
what they perceive to be the political marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arab
population. Unlike Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan has a limited ability to intervene
in Iraq’s affairs at present, and, since 2003, Jordanian leaders have been far more
concerned with Iraq’s influence on the kingdom’s own politics, trade, and internal
security. The Jordanian government’s principal interests with regard to Iraq include
managing Jordanian Islamist opposition movements in light of the empowerment of
Islamist groups in Iraq, preventing the creation of safe havens for terrorists in western
Iraq that could threaten Jordan’s internal security, and limiting the growth of Iran’s
regional influence as a means of preventing the development of a serious strategic
threat to Jordan.
Looking forward, Jordan would prefer the emergence of a stable Iraq under
Sunni Arab control. As this scenario appears unlikely given current circumstances,
Jordan seems committed both to supporting the continued presence of U.S. troops in
Iraq and the fledgling Iraqi government so long as the latter makes an effort to
reintegrate Sunni Arab Iraqis into the military and government and does not become
a vehicle for destabilizing Iranian initiatives. Over the long term, the Jordanian
government has serious concerns regarding Iraq’s future and the potential deleterious
consequences that may arise from wider sectarian warfare within Iraq.
Policy Priorities. Although Jordan always has been dependent on foreign
patrons, King Abdullah has brought Jordanian policy closer to that of the United
States since his ascension to the throne in 1999 than at any previous point in the
kingdom’s history. Since mid-2003, Jordan has made modest contributions to Iraq’s
stability that have been widely interpreted as symbolic attempts to cooperate with
U.S. rebuilding efforts and to minimize the negative consequences for Jordan of
instability in Iraq. The centerpiece of Jordan’s stabilization efforts remains the
Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) located outside of the capital city
of Amman, which has prepared more than 30,000 Iraqi cadets since 2003 with the
support of approximately $100 million in annual U.S. funding. According to allied
coalition officials, Jordan also has donated military and police equipment to support
the new Iraqi security forces.15
Although the pursuit of these policies has brought tangible benefits to Jordan,
such as increased U.S. trade and foreign assistance, Jordan’s close ties to the United
States make it an easy target for the king’s opponents, especially Jordanian Islamists
who are largely opposed to U.S. policy in the region. Some Jordanians fear that, like
the 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Authority elections, the political participation
of Islamist parties in Iraq is accelerating a growing pattern of Islamist political
15 Jordanian supplied equipment reportedly includes 250 Ukranian-built BTR-94 armored
personnel carriers (APCs), 100 British Spartan APCs, and U.S. M113A1 APCs, along with
2 C-130BHercules transport aircraft and 16 UH-1H utility helicopters.

CRS-13
ascendance in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Although many believe that Arab
regimes deliberately stoke Western fears of a growing Islamist radicalism to justify
the repression of domestic opposition, the potential for Jordanian groups to emulate
Iraqi Islamists cannot be wholly dismissed and is viewed with great consternation by
Jordan’s royal family and its allies.
Potential threats from transnational terrorism and increased Iranian influence
also dominate Jordan’s Iraq policy agenda. Despite the killing of Jordanian terrorist
mastermind Abu Musab al Zarqawi in June 2006 by U.S. and Iraqi forces (reportedly
with assistance from Jordanian intelligence), the threat of Al Qaeda-affiliated or
inspired terrorists using Iraq’s predominately Sunni Al Anbar Province as a
launching pad to destabilize Jordan remains high. On November 9, 2005, near
simultaneous explosions at three Western-owned hotels in Amman killed 58 persons
and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed
responsibility for the attacks. In December 2006, Jordan and Iraq signed an
agreement to coordinate intelligence on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Overall,
Jordanian Islamists have stressed their loyalty to the monarchy in the face of the
terrorist threat, although four Islamist parliamentarians were arrested in the summer
of 2006 for praising Al Zarqawi by calling him a “martyr.”
In 2004, King Abdullah warned that Iran was seeking to create “a Shiite
crescent” in the Middle East, which alarms not only Jordan, but its oil-rich Sunni-led
Gulf allies upon whom it relies for political and financial support. Iran’s ability to
further inflame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the use of radical proxy
groups, such as the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah organization and the Palestinian
Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups, could have potentially adverse effects on Jordan’s
security, a fact also recognized by Jordan’s Sunni Islamists.16
Economic and Diplomatic Relations. International efforts to rebuild Iraq
have reverberated throughout various sectors of Jordan’s economy. Since 2003,
many observers have dubbed Jordan as the “gateway to Iraq,” as thousands of
contractors, businessmen, and foreign officials have used Jordan as a base for their
Iraq operations.17 Iraqi-Jordanian trade has yet to return to pre-2003 levels, but has
recovered since 2003, reaching an estimated $834 million in total trade in 2005.18
Iraqis have perceived Jordan as an escape from violence, as some foreign officials
16 In one recent press release, Hamzah Mansur, a leader of Jordan’s main Islamist party, the
Islamic Action Front (IAF), warned Iran to cease provoking sectarianism in Iraq, stating, “If
Iran’s involvement in the bloodshed in Iraq is ascertained, then the Islamic movements will
find themselves forced to reconsider their stand on Iran since its involvement in sectarian
sedition would lead to serious consequences across the Islamic world.” See “Jordan: IAF
Calls on Iranian President To End Sectarian Sedition in Iraq,” Al Arab Al Yawm, OSC
Document - GMP20061208641001, Dec. 8, 2006.
17 See Scott Lasensky, Jordan and Iraq: Between Cooperation and Crisis, USIP, Special
Report No. 178, Nov. 2006.
18 Total trade is equal to exports plus imports. Iraq imports from Jordan during 2005 totaled
$809 million, whereas Iraq exports totaled $25 million. In 2002, Iraq’s exports to Jordan
were worth $684 million and imports from Jordan were worth $664 million. Source:
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.

CRS-14
estimate that 700,000 to 1 million Iraqis have fled to Jordan over the last three years.
For a small, poor country such as Jordan, this population influx is creating profound
changes in Jordan’s economy and society. Jordan’s banking and real estate sectors
are soaring with the increased demand for housing and the influx of capital from
middle class expatriate Iraqis. On the other hand, inflation is rapidly rising,19 and
there have been anecdotal reports of increased tension between Jordanian citizens and
Iraqi refugees due to the strains placed on social services by a near 20% increase in
the country’s population in a short period of time.20 At this time, it is unclear whether
displaced Iraqis will become a permanent fixture in Jordan or will return to Iraq if or
when violence subsides.
In August 2006, Jordanian diplomat Ahmed al Lozi became the first accredited
Arab ambassador to serve in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Iraq reciprocated by
announcing shortly thereafter its intention to re-establish direct oil shipments to
oil-deprived Jordan at preferential market prices.21 Some of Iraq’s new Shiite leaders
view with suspicion Jordan’s former close ties to the Saddam Hussein regime and
continuing strong relations with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Frictions between Jordan and
Iraq continue over the future status of Saddam Hussein’s relatives and former Baath
Party officials residing in Jordan as guests of the government.22 Jordan has hosted
and facilitated meetings between U.S. officials and Iraqi leaders aimed at resolving
these and other political disputes, including the highly publicized summit in Amman
between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in December 2006.
Recent reports also suggest that Jordan has facilitated meetings between members of
the Sunni Arab-led insurgency and U.S. representatives at the Iraqi Embassy in
Amman.23
19 One foreign official noted that, “The impression of many Jordanians is that the Iraqis here
are all wealthy ... and that they are the cause of the inflation and the rising cost of prices in
Jordan.” See “Iraqi Refugees Spill into Jordan, Driving Up Prices,” Christian Science
Monitor
, Nov. 29, 2006.
20 One report noted that Iraqi Shiite refugees in Jordan feel they are being unfairly targeted
by police out of fear that Iraqi Shiite militias are trying to organize in Jordan. See, “Uneasy
Havens Await Those Who Flee Iraq,” New York Times, Dec. 8, 2006.
21 Reportedly, Jordan will receive approximately 10,000-30,000 barrels of oil per day
(roughly 10%-30% of their daily consumption) from Iraq, at a price of $10 per barrel. This
quantity would increase to 50,000 barrels at a later stage, based on the memorandum of
understanding signed between the two countries.
22 King Abdullah granted Saddam’s eldest daughter, Raghdad, and her sister, Rana, asylum
on humanitarian grounds after the start of U.S. military operations in 2003. The Iraqi
government has placed Raghdad on a list of its 41 most wanted persons and demanded that
Raghad be extradited to Iraq to stand trial. Iraqi officials have alleged that members of
Saddam Hussein’s family and inner circle currently in Jordan are providing financial and
media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize the Baath Party in Iraq.
23 According to Saad al Hayani, Iraq’s Ambassador to Jordan, “Two large meetings
happened here in the embassy.... They included leaders from the last government, the
Baathists, and the old Army. They were offered the opportunity to participate in the political
situation if their hands were clean. The meetings were successful and necessary and
beneficial.” See “Quiet U.S. Bid to Talk to Iraqi Insurgents,”Christian Science Monitor,
(continued...)

CRS-15
Potential Responses. As a country with a limited ability to project political
or military power in Iraq, it is doubtful that Jordan alone could bring about a
compromise solution to Iraq’s sectarian violence and insurgency. Nevertheless,
should the Administration heed the main recommendations of the Iraq Study Group
report and pursue an all out push for Iraqi national reconciliation, Jordan could be
useful in serving as one of several symbolic bridges to Iraq’s Sunni community. The
ISG report argues that Jordan has the professional capability to train and equip Iraqi
military and security forces, and Iraqi-Jordanian tribal ties may facilitate this process
should more Sunni Iraqis join Iraq’s army.
Under the more grave scenario of a nationwide civil war that draws Iraq’s
neighbors into the ongoing conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the Jordanian
government would provide support to Sunni militias with possible ties to Al Qaeda.
On the other hand, it is plausible that Jordan, along with neighboring Saudi Arabia
and other states, could provide financing and materiel support to other elements of
Iraq’s Sunni Arab population, including tribally-led and -organized groups or, more
controversially, to Iraqis formerly associated with the military, intelligence, or
security services of the Saddam Hussein regime. In the event of continuing or
widened conflict in Iraq, Jordan also could move to seal its border with Iraq or
establish a security zone inside western Iraq in order to insulate itself from any
spillover of violence or destabilizing refugee flows.
Iran
Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the establishment of the
Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran was
promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan. There were indications of a warming trend
between the two countries during mid-2004, however, at least on the commercial
level. During a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3, 2004 — the
first by a Jordanian ruler in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade
and security. Asked about Iran’s nuclear program during his September 28, 2004
interview, then Foreign Minister Muasher reiterated Jordan’s view that there should
be a nuclear freeze in the Middle East including “Israel, Iran, and the others.”
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to
Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2004 amounted to
approximately $8 billion. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to
threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or
worldwide curbs on aid funding. The United States has markedly increased its aid
to Jordan since the mid-1990s to help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain
23 (...continued)
Dec. 7, 2006.

CRS-16
domestic stability, and pursue normalization with Israel. Between FY1998 and
FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to Jordan were approximately
$150 million and $75 million, respectively. However, after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, aid to Jordan increased significantly. In FY2003, aid to Jordan was
almost doubled, amounting to $250 million in economic and $198 million in military
assistance. In addition, Jordan received $700 million in economic and $406 million
in military assistance in FY2003 supplemental funding, to help offset the effects of
the war with Iraq on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security. Between FY2004-
2006, U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan averaged approximately $556 million. Table
2
shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance to Jordan since 1990.
FY2006 Supplemental Aid. P.L. 109-234 (H.R. 4939), the FY2006
Emergency Supplemental Act, provides $50 million in economic assistance to
Jordan. The Jordanian government had originally requested $200 million from the
Administration. The Senate version of H.R. 4939 contained $100 million in
economic aid for Jordan to continue and accelerate economic reforms. The House
version contained no funding.
FY2007 and Other Funds. For FY2007, the Administration is requesting
$245 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $206 million in Foreign Military
Financing Funds (FMF) for Jordan. U.S. economic aid to Jordan is provided partially
to support USAID projects and partly as a cash transfer to service Jordan’s debt
(which currently stands at $8.4 billion).24 In addition to the preceding funds
specifically earmarked for Jordan, three recent emergency supplemental bills have
contained funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation states for
logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations: $1.4 billion in FY2003;
$1.15 billion in FY2004; and $1.37 billion in FY2005.
Millennium Challenge Account. In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a threshold country in the lower
middle-income bracket. Although this designation does not qualify Jordan for
immediate assistance, as a threshold country, Jordan could receive small grants to
help it improve underperforming areas so that Jordan would be more competitive for
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) funding in future years. The MCC evaluated
the Jordanian government’s reform efforts before deciding whether it qualifies for
MCC threshold assistance. If the MCC were to conclude that Jordanian democratic
reforms have been sufficient, Jordan could then receive threshold assistance in
FY2007. These funds may be used to accelerate domestic reforms to allow Jordan to
qualify for the MCC’s larger Compact funding program. MCC Compact grants may
be as large as several hundred million dollars.
On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s Board of Directors approved up to $25
million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. The MCC funds will be used to
24 In 2006, USAID and Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation signed
a grant agreement outlining the use U.S. economic assistance in Jordan. Under the terms of
the agreement, U.S. assistance will be used to construct a water supply distribution system
in northern Jordan, rehabilitate schools, and increase employment in Jordan’s vital, ut
underdeveloped tourism sector.

CRS-17
support Jordan’s reform efforts in increasing government transparency and
accountability and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of customs
administration. According to the MCC, the Jordan Threshold Program will, among
other things, provide technical assistance and training to increase participation in
local elections and institute programs to improve relations and collaboration among
municipalities, citizens, and the private sector in 9 of Jordan’s 99 municipalities.25
USAID is the main U.S. government agency charged with implementing the Jordan
Threshold Program.
Trade
Jordan ranked 70th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the
United States in 2005, about the same as its ranking of 69th in 2004. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from
$317 million to $643 million between 2000 and 2005, and Jordan’s exports to the
United States increased even more notably from $73 million to $1,267 million during
the same period. Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of
aircraft parts, machinery and appliances, vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main
exports to the United States included clothing and accessories, precious stones, and
precious metals. Two recent measures, in particular, have helped expand U.S.-
Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S. investment in
Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement. On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and
King Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement,
which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and
services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released on September
26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or
exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two
countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental
protection. On January 6, 2001, then-President Clinton transmitted to the 107th
Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S.
Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher
exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve
disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters
were designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the
possible use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty.
President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on
September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the
September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS Report RL30652,
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones. An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace
treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which
25 See MCC Jordan Fact Sheet, “Jordan and Millennium Challenge Corporation:
Strengthening Democratic Institutions,” Sept. 12, 2006. Available at [http://www.mca.gov/
public_affairs/fact_sheets/Jordan_tp_fact_sheet.shtml].

CRS-18
goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the
United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act amended
previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel
free trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between
Israel and Egypt. QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to
serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan and Israel.
Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.-Jordanian trade, there has been only
a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 11-13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 55,000
people (working 8 hour days/6 days a week), 69% of whom are foreign workers from
South East Asian nations like Pakistan, India, Banghladesh, and Sri Lanka. In
general, foreign laborers are generally viewed as more skilled and productive than
local Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to recruit local Jordanians
since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant to separate from their
families, though in some areas local Jordanians are provided with free transportation
to the QIZs.
Sweat Shop Allegations. On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee
(NLC), a New York-based human rights advocacy group, issued a 161-page report
alleging sweatshop-like conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ)
plants in Jordan. Jordan’s trade minister Sharif Zu’bi subsequently acknowledged
that the government had failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and
has taken action since to close down factories in violation of the law. The NLC has
recognized the government’s recent actions, though it has suggested that violations
of worker rights may continue in smaller factories. Foreign companies with
operations inside QIZs must provide food and housing for workers. Conditions in
worker dormitories are reportedly inspected by retail garment buyers, and the
Jordanian government provides medical clinics and security for the zones. For
additional information, see CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in
Jordan: A Model for Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East?
, by Mary
Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp.
Military Cooperation
Military Sales. The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed
forces, which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian
military forces, though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned
by each of Jordan’s neighboring forces. In recent years, Jordan has used U.S. military
assistance grants to purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, upgrades
for its fleet of F-16 fighters (approximately 70-80), and BlackHawk helicopters. The
United States also delivered three Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early
2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations in Iraq.

CRS-19
Table 1. Recent Foreign Military Sales to Jordan
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime
Contractor

FY2006
National Command & Control
$450 million
Northrop
System
Grumman
Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and
General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million
BAE Company
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
Joint Exercises and Training. A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission
has functioned since 1974. Combined training exercises by U.S. and Jordanian
military units continue to take place in Jordan ( dubbed “Early Victor”), at least on
an annual basis and sometimes more often. The above-mentioned courses conducted
by Jordan for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the United
States under a program called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.26 In addition,
plans are underway to construct the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations
Training, which is scheduled to be completed in 2006. The Center, which has been
partially financed by the United States including with $99 million in appropriations
from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13), will serve as a
regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training. In 2003, Jordan built a Special
Operations Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-
terrorism capabilities within the military.
Other Activities. Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, then President Clinton designated Jordan as a
major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on November 13, 1996.
According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan eligible for
priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already
appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases,
the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium
munitions.”
According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military
hospitals to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health
care professionals to the two facilities. Both facilities provide critical health care to
numerous patients, including civilians. The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more
than 650 patients a day, having treated more than 500,000 since it was first deployed
in December 2001. The one in Iraq has treated more than four million people, and
surgeons have performed 1,638 operations.
Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
FY2005, bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal
26 Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army — in Jordan,” Defense News, Feb. 9, 2004,
p.8.

CRS-20
Court (ICC) and have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing
the ICC from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned.
This act contains waiver authority in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies
of the United States. A similar provision is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-
102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006. Jordan signed such an
agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004; however, the Jordanian
lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special session of
parliament on July 14, 2005. Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush
issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to
Jordan for six months. (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on
February 10, 2005, though PD-2005-20.) On January 8, 2006, however, the lower
house reversed its July 2005 vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from
ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel and U.S. employees working in Jordan. The bill
had already been endorsed by the upper house, paving the way for the King’s
signature.

CRS-21
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Totals
Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF*
IMET**
1991
35.0a
0
0
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
1992
30.0b
20.0
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
1993c
5.0
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
1994d
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f
150.0
0
0
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1.6
223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004
250.0
0
0
2.3
206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005
250.0
0
0
1.6
206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006i
250.0
0
0
1.6
210.0
3.0
464.60
2007j
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining
assistance. Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in
FY2001 (never acted upon by Congress).
*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program
a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF
under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100
million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace
and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i. Administration’s request for FY2006, with FMF slightly increased by the conference report on P.L.
109-102.
j. Administration’s request.