Order Code RL33347
Pipeline Safety and Security:
Federal Programs
Updated January 25, 2007
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Science and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Summary
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the
United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many
pipelines carry hazardous materials with the potential to cause public injury and
environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running
alternately through remote and densely populated regions; consequently, these
systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 109th Congress passed
the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) to improve pipeline
safety and security practices, and to reauthorize the federal Office of Pipeline Safety.
The 110th Congress is overseeing the implementation of the act and examining
ongoing policy issues related to the nation’s pipeline network. The Surface
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007 (S. 184) would require federal plans for
critical pipeline security and incident recovery, and would mandate pipeline security
inspections and enforcement.
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), is the lead federal regulator of pipeline safety. The OPS uses a variety of
strategies to promote compliance with its safety regulations, including inspections,
investigation of safety incidents, and maintaining a dialogue with pipeline operators.
The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations through a range of communications
and relies upon a range of enforcement actions to ensure that pipeline operators
correct safety violations and take preventive measures to preclude future problems.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes of
transportation — including pipelines. The agency oversees industry’s identification
and protection of pipelines by developing security standards; implementing measures
to mitigate security risk; building stakeholder relations; and monitoring compliance
with security standards, requirements, and regulation. While the OPS and TSA have
distinct missions, pipeline safety and security are intertwined.
Federal activities in pipeline safety and security are evolving. Although pipeline
impacts on the environment remain a concern of some public interest groups, both
federal government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline
programs have been on the right track. As oversight of the federal role in pipeline
safety and security continues, Congress may focus on the effectiveness of state
pipeline damage prevention programs, the promulgation of low-stress pipeline
regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, and the relationship between DHS
and the DOT with respect to pipeline security, among other provisions in federal
pipeline safety regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish
to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit
together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pipeline Industry Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pipeline Safety Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pipeline Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Office of Pipeline Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
OPS Pipeline Security Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Transportation Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TSA Pipeline Security Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Key Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pipeline Damage Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
OPS Safety Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Federal Pipeline Security Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Pipeline Security Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
TSA Security Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Identifying Critical Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Additional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Distribution integrity management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
National Pipeline Mapping System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Pipeline Safety and Security:
Federal Programs
Introduction1
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the
United States.2 These pipelines are integral to U.S. energy supply and have vital
links to other critical infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military bases.
While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry
volatile or flammable materials with the potential to cause public injury and
environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running
alternately through remote and densely populated regions; consequently, these
systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 2006 partial shutdown
of the Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil field, the largest in the United States, due to pipeline
safety problems was a demonstration of this vulnerability.3
The 109th Congress passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-468) to improve pipeline safety and security practices, and to reauthorize the
federal Office of Pipeline Safety. The President signed the act on December 29,
2006. The 110th Congress is overseeing the implementation of the act and examining
ongoing policy issues related to the nation’s pipeline network. The Surface
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007 (S. 184), introduced on January 4, 2007
by Senator Daniel K. Inouye and 20 co-sponsors, would require federal plans for
critical pipeline security and incident recovery (Sec. 207), and would mandate
pipeline security inspections and enforcement (Sec. 208).
Pipeline Industry Characteristics
Roughly 160,000 miles of oil pipeline in the United States carry over 75% of the
nation’s crude oil and around 60% of its refined petroleum products.4 Some 180
companies operate the interstate lines, which account for roughly 80% of total
1 Parts of this report were previously published in CRS Report RL31990, Pipeline Security:
An Overview of Federal Activities and Current Policy Issues
, by Paul W. Parfomak.
2 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), National Transportation Statistics 2005, Dec.
2005, Table 1-10. In this report “oil” includes petroleum and other hazardous liquids such
as gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and propane, unless otherwise noted.
3 For specific discussion of BP Alaska’s pipeline problems, see CRS Report RL33629, BP
Alaska North Slope Pipeline Shutdowns: Regulatory Policy Issues
, by Paul W. Parfomak.
4 BTS, Dec. 2005, Table 1-10.

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pipeline mileage and transported volume.5 The U.S. natural gas pipeline network
consists of around 210,000 miles of interstate transmission, 85,000 miles of
intrastate transmission, and 40,000 miles of field and gathering pipeline, which
connect gas extraction wells to processing facilities. Around 100 systems make up
the interstate network. Another 90 or so systems operate strictly within individual
states.6 These interstate and intrastate gas transmission pipelines feed around 1.1
million miles of regional lines in some 1,300 local distribution networks.7 Natural
gas pipelines also connect to 113 liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage sites, which
augment pipeline gas supplies during peak demand periods.8
Pipeline Safety Record. Taken as a whole, releases from pipelines cause
few annual fatalities compared to other product transportation modes. Oil pipelines
reported an average of 1.4 deaths per year from 2000 to 2004; gas pipelines reported
an average of 17.0 deaths per year during the same period.9 Accidental pipeline
releases result from a variety of causes, including third-party excavation, corrosion,
mechanical failure, control system failure, and operator error. Natural forces, such
as floods and earthquakes, can also damage pipelines. According to the Department
of Transportation (DOT), there were 124 oil pipeline accidents and 172 gas
transmission pipeline accidents in 2005.10 Although pipeline releases have caused
relatively few fatalities in absolute numbers, a single pipeline accident can be
catastrophic. For example, a 1999 gasoline pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington, killed two children and an 18-year-old man, and caused $45 million in
damage to a city water plant and other property. In 2000, a natural gas pipeline
explosion near Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed 12 campers, including four children.11
In 2006, damaged pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over 200,000
gallons of crude oil in an environmentally sensitive area. These accidents have
generated substantial scrutiny of pipeline regulation and increased state and
community activity related to pipeline safety.12
Pipeline Security Risks. Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist
attack with firearms, with explosives, or by other physical means. Some pipelines
may also be vulnerable to “cyber-attacks” on computer control systems or attacks on
5 C. J. Trench, How Pipelines Make the Oil Market Work — Their Networks, Operation and
Regulation.
For Assoc. of Oil Pipelines, Allegro Energy Group, New York, Dec. 2001.
6 James Tobin, Changes in U.S. Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure in 2004, Energy
Information Administration (EIA), June 2005, p. 4.
7 BTS, Dec. 2005, Tables 1-2 and 1-10.
8 Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. LNG Markets and Uses, Jan. 2003, p. 1.
9 BTS, Dec. 2005, Table 2-46.
10 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Liquid Pipeline Accident Summary by Cause and Natural
Gas Transmission Incident Summary by Cause
, Feb. 11, 2006.
11 National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report PAR-03-01, Feb. 2003.
12 W. Loy, “Slope Mayor Questions Leak Detection,” Anchorage Daily News, Mar. 14,
2006; J. Nesmith and R. K. M. Haurwitz, “Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,” Austin
American-Statesman
(Austin, TX), July 22, 2001.

CRS-3
electricity grids or telecommunications networks.13 Oil and gas pipelines have been
a target of terrorists outside and within the United States. In Colombia, for example,
rebels have bombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline over 600 times since 1995.14 In
1996, London police foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to bomb gas
pipelines and other utilities across the city.15 In 1997, Texas police prevented the
bombing of natural gas storage tanks at a processing plant by Ku Klux Klan members
seeking to create a diversion for a robbery (to finance other terrorist actions).16
Since September 11, 2001, federal warnings about Al Qaeda have mentioned
pipelines specifically as potential terror targets in the United States.17 One U.S.
pipeline of particular concern and with a history of terrorist and vandal activity is the
Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s
North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in Valdez. TAPS runs some 800 miles
and delivers nearly 17% of United States domestic oil production.18 In 1999,
Vancouver police arrested a man planning to blow up TAPS for personal profit in oil
futures.19 In 2001, a vandal’s attack on TAPS with a high-powered rifle forced a
two-day shutdown and caused extensive economic and ecological damage.20 In
January 2006, federal authorities acknowledged the discovery of a detailed posting
on a website purportedly linked to Al Qaeda that reportedly encouraged attacks on
U.S. pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons or hidden explosives.21 In February
2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a U.S. citizen for trying to
conspire with Al Qaeda to attack TAPS and a major natural gas pipeline in the
eastern United States.22 To date, there have been no known Al Qaeda attacks on
TAPS or other U.S. pipelines, but operators remain alert.
13 J.L. Shreeve. “Science&Technology: The Enemy Within.” The Independent. London. May
31, 2006. p. 8.
14 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure
Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges
Remain
, GAO-05-971, Sept. 2005, p. 15.
15 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures
, Washington, DC, Oct. 1997.
16 S. A. Pressley, “Group Planned Massacre and Big Robbery, FBI Says,” Washington Post,
April 25, 1997, p. A02.
17 “Already Hard at Work on Security, Pipelines Told of Terrorist Threat,” Inside FERC,
McGraw-Hill Companies, Jan. 3, 2002.
18 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Internet page, Anchorage, AK, March 2006, at [http://www.
alyeska-pipe.com/about.html].
19 D. S. Cloud, “A Former Green Beret’s Plot to Make Millions Through Terrorism,”
Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 24, 1999, p. E15.
20 Y. Rosen, “Alaska Critics Take Potshots at Line Security,” Houston Chronicle, Feb. 17,
2002.
21 W. Loy, “Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,” Anchorage Daily News,
Jan. 19, 2006.
22 A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman, “Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
Feb. 12, 2006, p. A1.

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Office of Pipeline Safety
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481) and the Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-129) are two of the key early acts establishing
the federal role in pipeline safety. Under both statutes, the Transportation Secretary
is given primary authority to regulate key aspects of interstate pipeline safety: design,
construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response planning. Pipeline safety
regulations are covered in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.23 The DOT
administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) within
the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).24 The OPS
has approximately 250 staff, including inspectors, based in Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta, Kansas City, Houston, and Denver.25 In addition to its own staff, the OPS’s
enabling legislation allows the agency to delegate authority to intrastate pipeline
safety offices, and allows state offices to act as “agents” administering interstate
pipeline safety programs (excluding enforcement) for those sections of interstate
pipelines within their boundaries.26 Over 400 state pipeline safety inspectors are
available in 2007. The OPS safety program is funded primarily by user fees assessed
on a per-mile basis on each regulated pipeline operator (49 U.S.C. § 60107). P.L.
109-468 authorizes annual OPS expenditures (Sec. 18) of $79.0 million in FY2007
rising to $96.5 million in FY2010.
The OPS uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance with its safety
standards. The agency conducts physical inspections of facilities and construction
projects; conducts programmatic inspections of management systems, procedures,
and processes; investigates safety incidents; and maintains a dialogue with pipeline
operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations through a range of
communications tools including published protocols and regulatory orders, guidance
manuals, and public meetings. The OPS also relies upon a range of enforcement
actions, including administrative actions and civil penalties, to ensure that pipeline
operators correct safety violations and take preventive measures to preclude future
safety problems.27 According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
analysis, between 1994 and 2004, the OPS took 1,430 enforcement actions against
pipeline operators.28 Civil penalties proposed by the OPS for pipeline safety
23 Safety and security of liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities used in gas pipeline
transportation is regulated under CFR Title 49, Part 193.
24 PHMSA succeeds the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA),
reorganized under P.L. 108-246, which was signed by the President on Nov. 30, 2004.
25 OPS phone directory, updated Aug. 30, 2006. [http://ops.dot.gov/contact/phonelist.htm].
26 49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for these programs from the
federal government.
27 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), “Enforcement,” Internet page, Feb. 14, 2006, at [http://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/Enforcement.htm].
28 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Safety: Management of the Office of
Pipeline Safety’s Enforcement Program Needs Further Strengthening
, GAO-04-80 July
2004, p. 26.

CRS-5
violations in 2005 exceeded $4 million.29 The OPS also conducts accident
investigations and systemwide reviews designed to focus on high-risk operational or
procedural problems and areas of the pipeline near sensitive environmental areas or
high-density populations. To improve its regulations and activities, the agency
conducts a pipeline safety research program.
Since 1997, the OPS has increasingly encouraged industry’s implementation of
“integrity management” programs on pipeline segments near “high consequence”
areas. Integrity management provides for continual evaluation of pipeline condition;
assessment of risks to the pipeline; inspection or testing; data analysis; and followup
repair, as well as preventive or mitigative actions. High-consequence areas include
population centers, commercially navigable waters, and environmentally sensitive
areas, such as drinking water supplies or ecological reserves. The integrity
management approach directs priority resources to locations of highest consequence
rather than applying uniform treatment to the entire pipeline network.30 The OPS
made integrity management programs mandatory for most operators with 500 or
more miles of regulated oil pipeline as of March 31, 2001 (49 C.F.R. § 195).
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. On December 12, 2002,
President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-355). The act reauthorizes funding for the OPS through FY2006. It also
strengthens federal pipeline safety programs, state oversight of pipeline operators,
and public education regarding pipeline safety.31 Among other provisions, P.L. 107-
355 requires operators of regulated gas pipelines in high-consequence areas to
conduct risk analysis and implement integrity management programs similar to those
required for oil pipelines.32 The act authorizes the DOT to order safety actions for
pipelines with potential safety problems (Sec. 7) and increases violation penalties
(Sec. 8). The act attempts to streamline the permitting process for emergency
pipeline restoration by establishing an interagency committee, including the DOT,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, and other agencies, to ensure coordinated review
and permitting of pipeline repairs (Sec. 16). The act authorizes $100 million for
29 B. McCown, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., statement before the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit
and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2005.
30 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Pipeline Safety. Pipeline
Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators with 500
or More Miles of Pipeline)
, Federal Register, Dec. 1, 2000, p. 75378.
31 P.L. 107-355 encourages the implementation of state “one-call” excavation notification
programs (Sec. 2) and allows states to enforce “one-call” program requirements. The act
expands criminal responsibility for pipeline damage to cases where damage was not caused
“knowingly and willfully” (Sec. 3). The act adds provisions for ending federal-state pipeline
oversight partnerships if states do not comply with federal requirements (Sec. 4).
32 A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the OPS’s gas
integrity management program benefitted public safety, although the report recommended
revisions to the OPS’s performance measures. See GAO. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety:
Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures
Should Be Improved
. GAO-06-946, Sept. 8, 2006. pp. 2-3.

CRS-6
research and development in pipeline integrity, safety, reliability, and security (Sec.
12). It requires DOT to study ways to limit pipeline safety risks from population
encroachment and ways to preserve environmental resources in pipeline rights-of-
way (Sec. 11). P.L. 107-355 also includes provisions for public education, grants for
community pipeline safety studies, “whistle blower” and other employee protection,
employee qualification programs, and mapping data submission.
OPS Pipeline Security Activities. Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63), issued during the Clinton administration, assigned lead responsibility for
pipeline security to the DOT.33 At the time, these responsibilities fell to the OPS,
since the agency was already addressing some elements of pipeline security in its role
as safety regulator. In 2002, the OPS conducted a vulnerability assessment to
identify critical pipeline facilities and worked with industry groups and state pipeline
safety organizations “to assess the industry’s readiness to prepare for, withstand and
respond to a terrorist attack....”34 Together with the Department of Energy and state
pipeline agencies, the OPS promoted the development of consensus standards for
security measures tiered to correspond with the five levels of threat warnings issued
by the Office of Homeland Security.35 The OPS also developed protocols for
inspections of critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate
security practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the OPS
established a variety of communication links to key staff at the most critical pipeline
facilities throughout the country. The OPS also began identifying near-term
technology to enhance deterrence, detection, response, and recovery, and began
seeking to advance public and private sector planning for response and recovery.36
On September 5, 2002, the OPS circulated formal guidance developed in
cooperation with the pipeline industry associations defining the agency’s security
program recommendations and implementation expectations. This guidance
recommended that operators identify critical facilities, develop security plans
consistent with prior trade association security guidance, implement these plans, and
review them annually.37 While the guidance was voluntary, the OPS expected
compliance and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing security programs
within 12 months, potentially as part of more comprehensive safety inspections.38
33 Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures, May
22, 1998.
34 RSPA, RSPA Pipeline Security Preparedness, Dec. 2001.
35 Ellen Engleman, RSPA Administrator, statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, Mar. 19, 2002.
36 Ellen Engleman, RSPA Administrator, statement before the Subcommittee on Highways
and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Feb, 13, 2002.
37 James K. O’Steen, RSPA, Implementation of RSPA Security Guidance, presentation to
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Feb. 25, 2003.
38 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June 10, 2003.

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Transportation Security Administration
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (P.L. 107-71) establishing the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) within the DOT. According to TSA, the act placed the DOT’s pipeline
security authority (under PDD-63) within TSA. The act specified for TSA a range
of duties and powers related to general transportation security, such as intelligence
management, threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) creating the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Among other provisions, the act transferred to DHS the
Transportation Security Administration from the DOT (Sec. 403). On December 17,
2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7),
clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and
protecting critical infrastructure. HSPD-7 maintains DHS as the lead agency for
pipeline security (par. 15), and instructs the DOT to “collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines)” (par. 22h).
The order also requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with
“appropriate private sector entities” in sharing information and protecting critical
infrastructure (par. 25). HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (par. 37). Pipeline security
activities at TSA are led by the Pipeline Security Program Office (PSPO) within the
agency’s Intermodal Security Program Office.
TSA Pipeline Security Activities. In 2003, TSA initiated its Corporate
Security Review (CSR) program, wherein the agency visits the largest pipeline and
natural gas distribution operators to review their security plans and inspect their
facilities. (The OPS participated with TSA in a number of security reviews in 2003,
but has not done so since then.) During the reviews, TSA evaluates whether each
company is following the intent of the OPS security guidance, and seeks to collect
the list of assets each company had identified meeting the criteria established for
critical facilities. In 2004, the DOT reported that the plans reviewed to date
(approximately 25) had been “judged responsive to the OPS guidance.”39 As of
December 2006, TSA had completed 60 CSR reviews, with a long-term goal of one
per month. According to TSA, virtually all of the companies reviewed through 2006
had developed security plans, identified critical assets, and conducted background
checks on new employees. Most had also implemented employee security training
programs and raised local community and law enforcement awareness of pipeline
security as part of their emergency response obligations. The TSA reviews also have
identified inadequacies in some company security programs such as poor access
controls, deficient security equipment, lack of real-time threat information, and
irregular security exercises.40
In addition to its CSR program, TSA has engaged in a number of other pipeline
security activities. The TSA has worked to establish qualifications for personnel
39 Department of Transportation (DOT), “Action Taken and Actions Needed to Improve
Pipeline Safety,” CC-2004-061, June 16, 2004, p. 21.
40 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, presentation to the DGC Homeland Security
Conference, Alexandria, VA, Dec. 7, 2005. pp. 18-20.

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seeking unrestricted access to critical pipeline assets and maintains its own inventory
of critical pipeline infrastructure.41 The agency has also addressed legal issues
regarding recovery from terrorist attacks, such as FBI control of crime scenes and
eminent domain in pipeline restoration. TSA has been performing cross-border
pipeline system vulnerability assessments with other U.S. federal agencies and
Natural Resources Canada.42 In October 2005, TSA issued an overview of
recommended security practices for pipeline operators “for informational purposes
only ... not intended to replace security measures already implemented by individual
companies.”43 The agency released revised guidance on security best practices at the
end of 2006. TSA has joined both the Energy Government Coordinating Council and
the Transportation Government Coordinating Council under provisions in HSPD-7.
The missions of the councils are to work with their industry counterparts to
coordinate critical infrastructure protection programs in the energy and transportation
sectors, respectively, and to facilitate the sharing of security information. TSA has
also performed a limited number of vulnerability assessments for specific companies
and assets where intelligence information has suggested potential terrorist activity.
The agency sponsors an annual pipeline security conference as part of its outreach to
the private sector.44
According to TSA, the Pipeline Security Program Office’s current pipeline
security mission includes developing security standards; implementing measures to
mitigate security risk; building and maintaining stakeholder relations, coordination,
education and outreach; and monitoring compliance with security standards,
requirements, and regulations.45 The President’s FY2007 budget request for DHS did
not include a separate line item for TSA’s pipeline security activities. The budget
request did include a $37.2 million line item for “Surface Transportation Security,”
which encompassed all security activities in non-aviation transportation modes,
including pipelines.46 The PSPO has traditionally received from the agency’s general
operational budget an allocation for routine operations such as regulation
development, travel, and outreach. According to the PSPO, the current budget funds
11 full-time staff within the office. These staff will conduct pipeline security
inspections, maintain TSA’s asset database, support TSA’s multi-modal risk models,
develop new security standards, and issue regulations as required. In addition, the
PSPO has access to approximately 100 surface transportation inspectors within TSA
41 TSA, TSA Multi-Modal Criticality Evaluation Tool, TSA Threat Assessment and Risk
Management Program, slide presentation, April 15, 2003.
42 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
43 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, Pipeline Security Best Practices, Oct. 19,
2005, p. 1.
44 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
45 Ibid.
46 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2007 — Appendix
, Washington, DC, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 485.

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who could potentially be trained to perform pipeline inspections in the future should
the need arise.47
In January, 2007 testimony before Congress, the TSA Administrator stated that
the agency intended to conduct a pipeline infrastructure study to identify the “highest
risk” pipeline assets, building upon such a list developed through the CSR program.
He also stated that the agency would use its ongoing security review process to
determine the future implementation of baseline risk standards against which to set
measurable pipeline risk reduction targets.48 The Surface Transportation and Rail
Security Act of 2007 (S. 184) would require TSA, in consultation with the OPS, to
develop a plan for the federal government to provide increased security support to the
“most critical” pipelines at high or severe security alert levels and when there is
specific security threat information relating to such pipeline infrastructure (Sec.
207(a)(1)). The act also requires a recovery protocol plan in the event of an incident
affecting the interstate and intrastate pipeline system (Sec. 207(a)(2)).
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
One area related to pipeline safety and security not under either the OPS’s or
TSA’s primary jurisdiction is the siting approval of new gas pipelines, which is the
responsibility of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Companies
building interstate gas pipelines must first obtain from FERC certificates of public
convenience and necessity. (FERC does not oversee oil pipeline construction.)
FERC must also approve the abandonment of gas facility use and services. These
approvals may include safety and security provisions with respect to pipeline routing,
safety standards and other factors.49 As a practical matter, however, FERC has
traditionally left these considerations to the OPS.50
On September 14, 2001, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
notified FERC regulated companies that it would “approve applications proposing
the recovery of prudently incurred costs necessary to further safeguard the nation’s
energy systems and infrastructure” in response to the terror attacks of 9/11. FERC
also committed to “expedite the processing on a priority basis of any application that
would specifically recover such costs from wholesale customers.” Companies could
propose a surcharge over currently existing rates or some other cost recovery
47 TSA, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
48 Hawley, Kip, Asst. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security. Testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail
and Surface Transportation Security. Jan. 18, 2007.
49 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 18 CFR 157.
50 FERC. Personal communication. May 22, 2003.

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method.51 In FY2004, the commission processed security cost recovery requests
from 17 oil pipelines and 2 natural gas pipelines.52
On February 2003, FERC handed down a new rule (RM02-4-000) to protect
critical energy infrastructure information (CEII). The rule defines CEII as information
that “must relate to critical infrastructure, be potentially useful to terrorists, and be
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.” According to the
rule, critical infrastructure is “existing and proposed systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect
security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.” CEII excludes “information that identifies the location of infrastructure.”
The rule also establishes procedures for the public to request and obtain such critical
information, and applies both to proposed and existing infrastructure.53
On May 14, 2003, FERC handed down new rules (RM03-4) facilitating the
restoration of pipelines after a terrorist attack. The rules allow owners of a damaged
pipeline to use blanket certificate authority to immediately start rebuilding, regardless
of project cost, even outside existing rights-of-way. Pipeline owners would still need
to notify landowners and comply with environmental laws. Prior rules limited
blanket authority to $17.5 million projects and 45-day advance notice.54
Key Policy Issues
The 110th Congress is overseeing the implementation of the Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) which amends pipeline safety and security
law, and reauthorizes the federal Office of Pipeline Safety. In its ongoing oversight
of federal pipeline safety and security activities, Congress may examine a number of
key issues which have drawn particular attention in policy debate. P.L. 109-468
contains additional provisions not discussed in this report
Pipeline Damage Prevention
According to OPS statistics, third-party excavation damage is the single greatest
cause of accidents among natural gas distribution pipelines.55 It is also a leading
cause of damage among natural gas transmission and hazardous liquids pipelines.
51 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). News release. R-01-38. Washington,
DC. September 14, 2001.
52 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FY2006 Performance and Accountability Report
. 2006. p. 76.
53 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).. News release. R-03-08. Washington,
DC. February 20, 2003.
54 Schmollinger, Christian. “FERC OKs Emergency Reconstruction.” Natural Gas Week.
May 13, 2003.
55 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). “Distribution Pipeline Incident Summary by Cause:
1/1/2006 - 07/26/2006.” Aug. 15, 2007. [http://ops.dot.gov/stats/NGDIST06.HTM]

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Some policy makers have proposed the establishment of federal civil penalties for
violations of state “one-call” notification programs to prevent excavation damage to
underground pipelines. While supporting stronger enforcement of excavation
damage prevention programs, other stakeholders have argued that such enforcement
is best performed by state regulators responsible for administering one-call programs
rather than by the federal government. They favor an approach which encourages
state enforcement, unless the federal government determines that a state’s
enforcement efforts are ineffective.56 Consistent with this approach, P.L. 109-468
prohibits federal enforcement in states already imposing such penalties (Sec. 2). The
act also authorizes grants to states (and certain municipalities) for improving damage
prevention programs if the states have been certified (under 49 U.S.C. § 60105-
60106) or can demonstrate that they are establishing an “effective” program, as
subsequently defined (Sec. 2).
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations
Pipelines operated at less than 20% of the specified minimum strength of the
material from which they are constructed are classified as “low-stress” pipelines
under 49 C.F.R. § 195.2. According to the OPS, federal pipeline safety regulations
originally did not apply to low-stress pipelines because they operated at low
pressures, were not prone to accidents, and were thought to pose little risk to the
public. In 1994, however, the OPS extended its hazardous liquid pipeline regulations
under 49 C.F.R. § 195 to include low-stress pipelines that 1) transport highly volatile
liquids, 2) are not located in rural areas, 3) are located offshore, or 4) are located in
waterways used for commercial navigation (§ 195.1(b)(3)).
The regulation of low-stress pipeline regulations has come under greater
Congressional scrutiny since March 2006, after a spill from a BP pipeline oil pipeline
led to the partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay area oil field on the North Slope of
Alaska. In its March 15, 2006, Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued to BP, the
OPS found that BP’s pipelines met the definition of a “hazardous pipeline facility”
under 49 U.S.C. § 60112(a), which grants general authority under the statute, but that
specific federal pipeline safety regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195 did not apply at that
time because BP’s pipelines were classified as “low-stress” and fell under the
exception in 49 C.F.R. § 195.1(b)(3).57 In August, 2006, BP announced additional
disruption of North Slope oil supplies to conduct major pipeline repairs “following
the discovery of unexpectedly severe corrosion and a small spill from a Prudhoe Bay
oil transit line.”58 BP has since admitted to flaws in its maintenance models and, in
56 Felt, T., President and CEO, Explorer Pipeline. Statement before the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on
Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. July 27, 2006.
57 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Admin. (PHMSA). Corrective Action Order in
the Matter of BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.,Respondent
. CPF No. 5-2006-5015H. March 15,
2006. [http://ops.dot.gov/regions/west/BP%205-2006-5015H%20-%20Final.pdf]..
58 BP Exploration Alaska, Inc. “BP to Shutdown Prudhoe Bay Oil Field.” Press release. Aug.
6, 2006. [http://usresponse.bp.com/go/doc/1249/127496]

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retrospect, the inadequacy of its overall maintenance program for its North Slope
operations.59
On September 6, 2006, the OPS published in the Federal Register proposed
rules for risk-based regulation of hazardous liquid low-stress pipelines located in
“unusually sensitive areas” and exempted from its regulations under 49 C.F.R. §
195.60 The OPS defines an unusually sensitive area (USA) as “a drinking water or
ecological resource area that is unusually sensitive to environmental damage from a
hazardous liquid pipeline release” (49 C.F.R. § 195.6).61 Although USAs would be
identified on a site-by-site basis, the OPS has indicated that the North Slope is a
USA.62 There is general agreement that the OPS can promulgate new low-stress
pipeline regulations under its existing statutory authority under Section 49 of the U.S.
Code. The agency expected to finalize regulations for low-stress hazardous liquids
pipelines in USAs by the end of 2006, but has not yet done so.63 P.L. 109-648
requires the OPS to promulgate these regulations by December 31, 2007 (Sec. 4).
Members of Congress, the pipeline industry, and public advocates have long
expressed support in principle for additional regulation of low-stress pipelines.64 One
key question, however, has been how broadly those regulations should apply. The
OPS’s proposed rules would regulate previously exempt low-stress pipelines within
a quarter mile of a USA, which reportedly would cover approximately 1,600 miles
out of approximately 5,000 miles of U.S. low-pressure pipelines.65 Public and
environmental advocacy groups have proposed regulation of nearly all low-stress
pipelines, regardless of location.66 Consistent with the latter approach, P.L. 109-468
would require that nearly all low-stress hazardous liquids pipelines be subject to the
same regulations as other hazardous liquids pipelines (Sec. 4). Other advocates have
59 Marshall, S., President, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. Comments to the Joint Alaska
Senate and House Resources Committee. Aug.18, 2006; Malone, R.,. Aug. 7, 2006.
60 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration(PHMSA). “Pipeline Safety:
Protecting Unusually Sensitive Areas From Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering
Lines and Low-Stress Lines.” Federal Register. Vol. 71. No. 172. Sept. 6, 2006. pp. 52504-
52519.
61 49 C.F.R. § 195.6 further define “drinking water” or “ecological resource” areas.
62 Dept. of Transportation (DOT). “U.S. Department of Transportation Proposes New Safety
Requirements for Rural Low-Stress and Gathering Pipelines in Unusually Sensitive Areas.”
Press release. PHMSA 8-06. Aug. 31, 2006.
63 Ibid. DOT. Aug. 31, 2006; Hebert, H.J. “In Wake of Pipeline Trouble in Alaska,
Government Renews Push for Regulations.” Associated Press. Aug. 10, 2006.
64 See testimony in: “Pipeline Safety: a Progress Report since the Enactment of the Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act of 2002.” Hearing before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality. Serial No. 109-84. April 27, 2006.
65 “Oversight of Pipelines May Increase.” Los Angeles Times. Aug. 18, 2006. p. C3.
66 Epstein, L.N., Cook Inlet Keeper. Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act Reauthorization and H.R. 5782, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006. July 27, 2006.

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proposed using the “high consequence” criteria in the OPS’s existing integrity
management regulations for determining which specific pipelines should be covered
under OPS’s new provisions. In reviewing the final criteria for low-stress pipeline
regulation, Congress may consider the balance between the potential safety benefits
and the potential costs of stricter safety programs in light of BP’s pipeline problems
and potential problems among similar pipeline systems elsewhere in the United
States.
OPS Safety Enforcement
The adequacy of the OPS’s enforcement strategy has been an ongoing concern
of Congress, particularly after the fatal pipeline accidents in Washington and New
Mexico. A report from the General Accounting Office in 2000 called into question
fundamental changes in OPS’s enforcement strategy at the time, such as sharply
reducing the use of fines to enforce compliance with pipeline safety regulations.67
Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355) put added
scrutiny on the effectiveness of the OPS’s enforcement strategy and assessment of
civil penalties (Sec. 8). A 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
reexamining OPS enforcement stated that the agency had made a number of changes
in its enforcement strategy with the potential to improve pipeline safety. The report
concluded, however, that the effectiveness of the strategy could not yet be determined
because OPS’s program had not incorporated “clear program goals, a well-defined
strategy for achieving those goals, and performance measures linked to the program
goals.”68 In March 2006 testimony before Congress, the GAO reported that the OPS
had adopted measures that appeared to be responsive to the agency’s earlier concerns,
although the GAO had not reviewed the strategy or its implementation in depth.69
In April 2006, PHMSA testified before Congress that the OPS had
institutionalized a “tough-but-fair” approach to enforcement, “imposing and
collecting larger penalties, while guiding pipeline operators to enhance higher
performance.”70 According to the agency, $4 million in proposed civil penalties in
2005 was three times greater than penalties proposed in 2003, the first year higher
penalties could be imposed under P.L. 107-355 (Sec. 8(a)).71 Notwithstanding these
efforts to change its pipeline safety enforcement strategy, some analysts have held
that the OPS’s enforcement actions have not been sufficiently transparent to the
67 General Accounting Office (GAO). Pipeline Safety: The Office of Pipeline Safety Is
Changing How It Oversees the Pipeline Industry.
GAO/RCED-00-128. May 2000. p. 22.
68 Ibid. GAO. July, 2004. p3.
69 Siggerud, K. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines hearing on Pipeline Safety. GAO-06-474T. March 16, 2006. p11.
70 Gerard, S. L., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Admin.(PHMSA). Testimony before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee hearing
on Pipeline Safety. Serial No. 109-84. April 27, 2006. p. 14.
71 Ibid.

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public, other government agencies, or industry.72 P.L. 109-468 requires the agency
to issue monthly summaries of OPS enforcement actions including violation and
penalty information for each action, and provide a mechanism for pipeline operators
to make response information available to the public (Sec. 6).
Federal Pipeline Security Authority
Congress has repeatedly raised questions about the appropriate division of
pipeline security authority between the OPS and TSA.73 Both the OPS and TSA have
played important roles in the federal pipeline security program, with TSA the
designated lead agency since 2002. In 2004, the DOT and DHS entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning their respective security roles in
all modes of transportation. The MOU notes that DHS has the primary responsibility
for transportation security with support from the DOT, and establishes a general
framework for cooperation and coordination. The MOU states that “specific tasks
and areas of responsibility that are appropriate for cooperation will be documented
in annexes ... individually approved and signed by appropriate representatives of
DHS and DOT.”74 On August 9, 2006, the departments signed an annex “to delineate
clear lines of authority and responsibility and promote communications, efficiency,
and nonduplication of effort through cooperation and collaboration between the
parties in the area of transportation security.”75 In January, 2007, the PHMSA
Administrator testified before Congress that the agency had established a joint
working group with TSA “to improve interagency coordination on transportation
security and safety matters, and to develop and advance plans for improving
transportation security, presumably including pipeline security.76 P.L. 109-468
requires the DOT Inspector General to assess the pipeline security actions taken by
the DOT in implementing its 2004 MOU with the DHS (Sec. 23). It remains to be
determined what additional cooperative activities will be put in place between the
OPS and TSA based on the provisions in their MOU and annex, and whether they
can be implemented effectively given the two agencies’ existing structures and
obligations.
72 Ibid. Epstein, L.N.. July 27, 2006.
73 For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines,
hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006.
74 Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. Of Transportation (DOT). Memorandum
of Understanding Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation on Roles and Responsibilities
. Sept. 28, 2004. p. 4.
75 Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. of Transportation (DOT). Annex to the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Transportation Concerning Transportation Security Administration and
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on Pipelines and
Hazardous Materials Transportation Security
. Aug. 9, 2006. p. 1.
76 Barrett, T.J., Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA). Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface Transportation Security. Jan.
18, 2007.

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Pipeline Security Regulations
As noted earlier in this report, federal pipeline security activities have to date
relied upon voluntary industry compliance with OPS security guidance and TSA
security best practices. By initiating this voluntary approach, the OPS sought to
speed adoption of security measures by industry and avoid the publication of
sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset lists) that would normally be
required in public rulemaking.77 Likewise, although TSA’s FY2005 budget
justification stated that the agency would “issue regulations where appropriate to
improve the security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,” the agency has not
done so for pipelines.78 TSA believes that the pipeline industry “has taken the
security guidance seriously and has done a good job” to date.79 The pipelines
industry has expressed concern that new security regulations and related requirements
may be “redundant” and “may not be necessary to increase pipeline security.”80
Likewise the PHMSA Administrator has testified that enhancing security “does not
necessarily mean that we must impose regulatory requirements.”81 Accordingly,
neither TSA nor OPS appear to be actively developing pipeline security regulations,
although they have not ruled out doing so in the future.
Provisions in P.L. 109-468 require the DOT Inspector General to “address the
adequacy of security standards for gas and oil pipelines” (Sec. 23(b)(4)). S. 184
would require TSA, in consultation with the OPS, to establish within one year of
enactment a program for reviewing the adoption by pipeline operators of the 2002
OPS security guidance, including the review of security plans and critical facility
inspections (Sec. 208 (a)). The act would also require within nine months of
enactment the security plan reviews and inspections of the 100 “most critical”
pipeline operators using risk assessment methods to target inspections and
enforcement (Sec. 208 (b), (c)). Finally, the act would direct TSA to promulgate
pipeline security regulations and carry out necessary inspection and enforcement, if
the agency determines that regulations are appropriate (Sec. 208(d)). In considering
potential pipeline security regulations, Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of the
current voluntary pipeline security standards based on findings from the TSA’s CSR
reviews and future DOT Inspector General reports.
77 GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication
Needed
, GAO-02-785, Aug. 2002, p. 22.
78 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration Fiscal
Year 2005 Congressional Budget Justification
, Washington, DC, Feb. 2, 2004, p. 20.
79 TSA, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006
80 American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), Association of
Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and American Public Gas Association (APGA), joint letter to
members of the Senate Commerce Committee providing views on S. 1052, Aug. 22, 2005.
81 Barrett, T.J. Jan. 18, 2007.

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TSA Security Resources
Congress has long been critical of TSA’s funding of non-aviation security
activities, including pipeline activities. For example, as one Member remarked in
2005, “aviation security has received 90% of TSA’s funds and virtually all of its
attention. There is simply not enough being done to address ... pipeline security.”82
At its current staffing level, TSA’s Pipelines Branch has limited field presence for
inspections and possible enforcement of future regulations. TSA’s plan to focus
security inspections on the largest pipeline and distribution system operators seeks
to make the best use of limited resources. The concern is that TSA currently lacks
sufficient resources for rigorous security plan verification and a credible threat of
enforcement, so operator compliance with security guidance may be inadequate,
leaving the pipeline network as a whole less secure than it might be with more
universal inspection and enforcement coverage. S. 184 would specifically authorize
funding of $2 million annually through FY2009 for TSA’s pipeline security
inspections and enforcement program (Sec. 208(e)). It is an open question whether
$2 million annually would be sufficient to enable TSA to meet congressional
expectations for federal pipeline security activities.
Identifying Critical Assets
Pipeline operators seek clear definitions of pipeline asset “criticality” so they
will know exactly what assets to protect and how well to protect them. The
definition of “criticality” developed by industry in 2002 (and supported in the OPS
guidance) avoided numerical thresholds, relying instead on discretionary qualitative
metrics like “significance” of impact.83 The OPS has since expressed its belief that
this definition may be too general and that clearer criticality thresholds are needed.84
The HSPD-7 directive appears to narrow the definition of “criticality” by
emphasizing infrastructure “that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health
effects or mass casualties” (par. 13), but it is not clear how this emphasis applies to
pipelines. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate
within DHS developed a list of critical pipelines within its national asset database,
but Congress, the GAO, and the DHS Inspector General have identified problems
with DHS’s criteria for critical asset identification.85 As discussed above, TSA has
82 Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, hearing on the President’s FY2006 Budget Request for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Feb. 15, 2005.
83 American Gas Association (AGA) and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA), Security Guidelines Natural Gas Industry Transmission and Distribution,
Washington, DC, Sept. 6, 2002, p. 6.
84 OPS, personal communication, June 9, 2003.
85 For example, see Rep. Zoe Lofgren, remarks at the House Homeland Security Committee,
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, hearing
on Terrorism Risk Assessment at the Department of Homeland Security,” Nov. 17, 2005;
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical

(continued...)

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developed its own list of critical pipeline systems in support of its CSR program, but
has not made public its methodology or the list itself. Given the continuing
uncertainty among industry and policy makers about what constitutes a critical asset,
how the DOT or TSA identify critical pipelines under the provisions in S. 184 may
require clarification.
Additional Issues
In addition to the issues mentioned above, Congress may consider several key
issues related to proposed pipeline legislation or otherwise raised by pipeline
stakeholders.
Distribution integrity management. As noted earlier in this report, the
OPS made integrity management programs mandatory for oil transmission pipelines
in 2001 and for gas transmission pipelines in 2003. Congress and other stakeholders
have since sought to extend these regulations to natural gas distribution pipelines,
such as those operated by regional natural gas utilities. Because distribution
pipelines are designed and operate differently from transmission lines, the OPS has
been developing approaches to structuring unique regulations for distribution
systems.86 Natural gas distribution companies seek flexible, risk-based options in any
future integrity management regulations directed at distribution systems.87 P.L. 109-
468 would mandate the promulgation by OPS of minimum standards for integrity
management programs for distribution pipelines by December 31, 2007 (Sec. 9). As
the OPS’s study of distribution integrity management measures continues, Congress
may act to ensure that any resulting regulations balance the potential benefits of
improved pipeline safety with the potential costs to distribution pipeline operators.
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals. The Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002 requires that natural gas pipelines operators subject to the
act perform integrity management reassessments at least every seven years after an
initial baseline assessment (Sec. 14a). Some pipeline operators believe that this
reassessment interval may be too prescriptive and may not be appropriate for all
pipelines. Operators argue that assessing pipelines too frequently is costly and
inefficient, diverting limited safety resources from other uses with greater pipeline
safety benefits.88 Based on assessments conducted through 2005, “and the generally
85 (...continued)
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 81-82; Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS),
Office of Inspector General. Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. OIG-06-
04. June 2006.
86 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (PHMSA) et al. Integrity Management
for Gas Distribution Pipelines, Report of Phase 1 Investigations
. Dec. 2005.
87 E. F. Bender, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006, p. 10.
88 J. L. Mohn, Panhandle Energy, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on pipeline
(continued...)

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safe condition of gas transmission pipelines,” the GAO has concluded that the seven
year reassessment interval “appears to be conservative.”89 The GAO recommends
that Congress permit pipeline operators to reassess gas transmission pipelines at
intervals based on risk factors, technical data, and engineering analyses. The agency
believes such a revision would allow the OPS more flexibility to establish longer or
shorter reassessment intervals as warranted by pipeline conditions.90 P.L. 109-468
does not change gas pipeline assessment intervals.
National Pipeline Mapping System. The National Pipeline Mapping
System (NPMS) was established by the OPS as a publicly accessible geographic
information system (GIS) containing geospatial and attribute data for pipelines and
LNG facilities under OPS jurisdiction. The NPMS is an essential decision support
tool for emergency planning, inspection planning, and safety enhancement in the
nation’s pipeline system. In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the
OPS restricted NPMS access to government officials and pipeline operators only and
prohibited the transfer of NPMS data outside the NPMS system. Some analysts
believe that these access and data restrictions have hampered the ability of local
agencies and the general public to incorporate essential pipeline information into
local safety planning, ultimately jeopardizing public safety. They believe that the
NPMS restrictions are also ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks because pipeline
location maps are publicly available from other sources and because pipelines must
be physically marked under federal regulation.91 Other critics have questioned the
accuracy of the NPMS pipeline data, citing recent media reports that the NPMS
contains significant errors because the system relies on unverified pipeline operator
submissions.92 In response to concerns about access, the OPS intends to permit
members of the public to access certain maps and data in the NPMS on a county-by-
county basis.93 The agency has reportedly acknowledged some limitations in NPMS
accuracy, but has not publicly discussed plans to address them.94 Congress may
reevaluate whether the OPS’s security restrictions on NPMS data, and the quality of
NPMS maps, are appropriately balanced with respect to their potential impacts on
local community safety and security planning.
88 (...continued)
Safety, Mar. 16, 2006, p. 9.
89 Government Accountability Office (GAO). Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Risk-Based
Standards Should Allow Operators to Better Tailor Reassessments to Pipeline Threats
.
GAO-06-945. Sept. 8, 2006. p. 3.
90 Ibid. p. 6.
91 C. Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006.
92 Cappielo, D. “What Lies Beneath.” Houston Chronicle. Nov. 12, 2006. p. A1.
93 Barrett, T.J. Jan. 18, 2007.
94 Cappiel, D. Nov. 12, 2006.

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Conclusions
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline
safety and security since 2001. Federal activities in these areas are evolving and
agency responsibilities are still being sorted out. Although pipeline impacts on the
environment remain a concern of some public interest groups, both federal
government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline programs have
been on the right track. Furthermore, ongoing dialogue among the operators and
federal agencies appears to be addressing many elements of federal pipeline safety
and security policy that have been causing concern.
As oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues,
questions may be raised concerning the effectiveness of state pipeline damage
prevention programs, the promulgation of low-stress pipeline regulations, federal
pipeline safety enforcement, the relationship between DHS and the DOT with respect
to pipeline security, and particular provisions in federal pipeline safety regulation.
In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the various
elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation’s
overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. For example, mandating
pipeline security requirements could be of limited value if asset “criticality” is not
clearly defined and federal threat information remains ambiguous. Likewise,
diverting pipeline resources away from safety to enhance security might further
reduce terror risk, but not overall pipeline risk, if safety programs become less
effective as a result. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups:
federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators,
and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve
common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.