Order Code RL33848
United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and
International Perspectives
January 22, 2007
Luisa Blanchfield
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

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United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and
International Perspectives
Summary
Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has been in a constant state
of transition as various international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the U.N. system. Recently, controversies such as the Iraq Oil-
For-Food Program, allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, and instances
of waste, fraud and abuse by U.N. staff, have focused renewed attention on the need
for change and improvement of the United Nations. Many in the international
community, including the United States, have increased pressure on U.N. member
states to implement substantive reforms. The 110th Congress may continue to focus
on U.N. reform as it considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United
Nations and monitors the progress and implementation of ongoing and previously-
approved reform measures.
In September 2005, heads of U.N. member states met for the World Summit at
U.N. Headquarters in New York to discuss strengthening the United Nations through
institutional reform. The resulting Summit Outcome Document laid the groundwork
for a series of reforms that included establishing a Peacebuilding Commission,
creating a new Human Rights Council, and strengthening the U.N. Security Council.
Member states also agreed to Secretariat and management reforms including
improving internal U.N. oversight capacity, establishing a U.N. ethics office,
enhancing U.N. whistle-blower protection, and reviewing all U.N. mandates five
years or older.
Since the World Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward
implementing these reforms with varied degrees of success. Some reforms, such as
the creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, have
already occurred or are ongoing. Other reforms, such as the U.N. Security Council
enlargement, have stalled or not been addressed. U.N. member states disagree on
whether some proposed reforms are necessary, as well as how to most effectively
implement previously agreed-to reforms. Developed countries support delegating
more power to the Secretary-General to implement management reforms, for
example, whereas developing countries fear that giving the Secretary-General more
authority may undermine the power of the U.N. General Assembly and therefore the
influence of individual countries.
Congress has maintained a significant interest in the overall effectiveness of the
United Nations. It is particularly interested in U.N. Secretariat and management
reform, with a focus on enhanced accountability and internal oversight. In the past,
Congress has enacted legislation that links U.S. funding of the United Nations to
specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Opponents of this strategy argue that tying U.S.
funding to U.N. reform may negatively impact diplomatic relations and could hinder
the United States’ ability to conduct foreign policy. Supporters contend that the
United Nations has been slow to implement reforms and that linking payment of U.S.
assessments to progress on U.N. reform is the most effective way to motivate
member states to efficiently pursue comprehensive reform. This report will be
updated as policy changes or congressional actions warrant.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Reform Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Reform Efforts (1980s and early 1990s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reform Efforts (1997 to 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Recently Adopted Reforms and the
New Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Adopted Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and U.N. Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Congress and U.N. Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Funding as a Tool for U.N. Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Administration Policy and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Reform Perspectives and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Selected International Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Implementing Reform:Mechanics and Possible Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Mechanics of Implementing Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Possible Challenges to Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A — Previous Reform Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B — Key U.N. Reform Recommendations and Proposals by
Independent and U.N. Affiliated Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix C — Organizational Chart of the U.N. System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix D — Additional U.N. Reform Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Websites (NGOs, Think Tanks, U.S. Government, United Nations) . . . . . 29
U.S. Government Reports (CRS and GAO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and
International Perspectives
Introduction
U.N. reform is an ongoing policy issue for the United States, and may be a point
of focus during the 110th Congress. As the single largest financial contributor to the
U.N. system, the U.S. government has an interest in ensuring the United Nations
operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. In 2005, the United States was
assessed 22% (approximately $439.6 million) of the U.N. regular budget, and $1.2
billion to U.N. peacekeeping accounts. Congress has the responsibility to appropriate
U.S. funds to these accounts, and can impose restrictions on payments. On several
occasions, Congress has sought to link U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific
reform benchmarks.
In recent years, there has been growing concern among some in the international
community that the United Nations has become ineffective and unwieldy in the face
of increasing global challenges and responsibilities. In response to these concerns,
former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and some U.N. member states proposed
a series of management, programmatic, and structural reforms to improve the
organization. Many of these reforms are in various stages of implementation, while
others are still being considered by member states. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
who assumed the position of Secretary-General in January 2007, has indicated that
he will continue to support U.N. reform efforts.
This report focuses on current U.N. reform efforts and priorities from the
perspective of several key actors, including the U.S. government, the U.N. Secretary-
General, selected groups of member states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and a cross-section of groups tasked with addressing U.N. reform. It also examines
congressional actions related to U.N. reform, as well as future policy considerations.
Background
Reform Trends
Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and
past secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. These
reform efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering waves of new
reform proposals every five to ten years. The reform attempts can be initiated by a
member state, groups of member states, and/or the current secretary-general. They
generally focus on three areas of concern: 1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of
accountability in the U.N. Secretariat; 2) duplication and redundancy of U.N.

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mandates, missions, and/or programs; and 3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse and/or
mismanagement of U.N. resources.
Proposed reforms often reflect the political, economic, and cultural climate of
the time. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, member states focused on increasing
membership on the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) to account for growing U.N. membership.1 In the 1970s, as the
economic and political gap between developed and developing countries grew more
pronounced, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to appoint a
group of experts to recommend structural changes that would help the United Nations
address “problems of international economic co-operation.”2 The most recent wave
of U.N. reform may be driven by a combination of U.N. budgetary and financial
issues, controversy over possible mismanagement of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program,
perceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human rights mechanisms, and recent allegations
of sexual abuse committed by U.N. staff and peacekeepers, among other things.
Reform Efforts (1980s and early 1990s)
U.N. reform initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s focused primarily on
financial and structural issues. In 1986, under pressure from the United States and
other industrialized countries, the General Assembly established a high-level group
of 18 intergovernmental experts to “review the efficiency of the administrative and
financial functioning,” of the United Nations. The group made 71 recommendations
to the General Assembly, including a revised budgetary process that introduced the
use of consensus-based budgeting.3 In the early 1990s, U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced broad reform proposals in reports, “An Agenda for
Peace,” (1992) and “An Agenda for Development” (1994).4 Some of these reform
1 U.N. membership grew from 51 countries in 1945, to 114 countries in 1963. Currently,
the United Nations has 192 member states. Amendments to the Charter related to increased
membership are discussed in the “Mechanics of Implementing Reform,” section of this
report.
2 The General Assembly approved some, but not all, of the recommendations in 1977. For
more information on this group and other U.N. reform efforts prior to the 1980s, see
“Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress,” by Edward C. Luck,
Academic Council on the United Nations System — Occasional Papers Series, 2003.
3 U.N. document, A/RES/41/213, December 19, 1986. The group of experts was convened,
in part, because of U.S. legislation popularly known as the “Kassebaum-Solomon
Amendment,” which directed that U.S. contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced
if larger U.N. financial contributors did not have a more substantial influence in the U.N.
budget process. See “Previous Reform Legislation”section of this report.
4 In response to the proposals in Boutrous-Ghali’s reports, the General Assembly created
five open-ended working groups to consider reforms in specific areas, including peace,
development, the Security Council, the U.N. financial situation, and strengthening the U.N.
system. Only one working group completed its work (the Working Group on Development),
and three stopped meeting due to an inability to reach agreement on key issues. The fifth
Security Council Working Group still meets regularly. For more information on this
working group, see “The Mechanics of Implementing Reform” section of this report.

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initiatives proposed in the early 1990s led to substantive changes to the U.N.
structure.5
Reform Efforts (1997 to 2005)
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan ran for Secretary-General on a platform of
reform and introduced many reform proposals during his tenure, most notably in
1997, 2002, and 2005. Annan also appointed several independent panels and
commissions to propose reforms on specific issues, such as the effectiveness of U.N.
peacekeeping operations.6 Annan first proposed a “two track” reform program that
recommended cutting Secretariat administrative costs, combining three smaller
departments into one large Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), and
creating the post of Deputy Secretary-General.7 Over time, some of these early
reform initiatives were achieved.8 In September 2002, Annan proposed additional
reforms, including a reorganization of the budget and planning system to make it less
complex; a thorough review of the U.N. work program; establishing a high-level
panel to examine the relationship between the United Nations and civil society;
improving U.N. human rights protection; and enhancing U.N. information services.9
In September 2003, Annan appointed a High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change to evaluate how the United Nations addressed present-day
threats to international peace and security.10 The Panel recommended enlarging the
U.N. Security Council, establishing a Peacebuilding Commission, and enhancing the
role of the Secretary-General. Annan drew from many of the Panel’s
5 Notably, in 1994 the General Assembly established the Office of Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS) to enhance and improve oversight in the U.N. system.
6 Annan appointed a special panel on U.N. Peace Operations in March 2000 to make
recommendations for improving the peacekeeping system. The panel’s recommendations
were consolidated into what is known as the “Brahimi Report.” A number of the report’s
recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N.
member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved.
7 Annan subsequently outlined the thematic and technical aspects of these reform proposals
in his report, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, (A/51/950, July 14,
1997) which was endorsed by the General Assembly on December 19, 1997.
8 Completed reforms include establishment of a strategic planning unit; creation of a senior
management group; establishment of a Department for Disarmament and Arms regulation;
creation of the Deputy-Secretary-General position; and the establishment of a U.N.
Development Group to better coordinate U.N. development mechanisms and programs.
9 U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An
Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented,
including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western
Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the
establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs;
10 The Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, was released on
December 2, 2004, and is available at [http://www.un.org/secureworld/].

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recommendations in his report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security,
and Human Rights for All.11
The 2005 U.N. World Summit. In September 2005, U.N. reform efforts
seemed to gain momentum as heads of state and governments met for the 2005
World Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York. The Summit convened to review
the progress made in the fulfillment of the 2000 Millennium Summit goals and
commitments made in other major U.N. conferences.12 It provided the groundwork
for potentially significant changes to the U.N. system, with a focus on strengthening
the United Nations through various reforms. The Summit Outcome Document was
negotiated by 191 member states and adopted by consensus on September 16, 2005.
The document laid the foundation for reforms such as: establishing a Peacebuilding
Commission; strengthening Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF);13
establishing a Democracy Fund; strengthening the Security Council; improving U.N.
system coordination; and creating a new Human Rights Council. Member states also
agreed to Secretariat and management reforms, including 1) establishment of an
ethics office; 2) greater whistle-blower protection; 3) strengthening oversight
capacity; 4) review of all General Assembly mandates over five years old; and 5) full
financial disclosure by U.N. staff.14
Recently Adopted Reforms and the
New Secretary-General
Adopted Reforms
U.N. member states have worked toward implementing reform with varied
results since the 2005 World Summit. Some reforms, particularly initiatives related
to internal oversight, human resources reform, and Security Council enhancement,
are stalled or have not been addressed. Other reforms, such as changes to CERF, the
establishment of the Human Rights Council, and the creation of a Peacebuilding
Commission, are already completed or are underway. Some management and budget
reforms endorsed by heads of state and government at the World Summit were also
implemented, including the establishment of a U.N. Ethics Office, enhanced whistle-
blower protection policies, and improved financial disclosure policies for U.N.
11 See “Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups” section for more information on the report,
which was released on March 21, 2005. A copy is available at [http://www.un.org/
largerfreedom/].
12 The 2000 Millennium Summit was held from September 6-8, 2000, in New York. Its
theme was “the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.” More information on the
Summit is available at [http://www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm].
13 CERF was re-launched on March 9, 2006, with an aim of ensuring a more timely and
efficient response to humanitarian disasters. The Fund is administered by emergency relief
coordinators on behalf of the Secretary-General, and to date over $300 million has been
committed and pledged by U.N. member states. More information is available at
[http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2101].
14 U.N. document, A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 16, 2005.

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staff.15 On July 7, 2006, the U.N. General Assembly reached consensus on a series
of additional management reforms, including:16
! establishment of the post of Chief Information Technology Officer
to assist in the replacement of an outdated U.N. information system;
! authorization of approximately $700,000 for the Secretary-General
to strengthen the U.N. procurement system;
! full operation of a U.N. Ethics Office, with a need for strengthening
internal oversight and accountability;
! “experimental” authorization of up to $20 million in discretionary
spending for the Secretary-General to meet the needs of the
organization;17 and
! adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standards.18
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document also called on the Secretary-
General to improve system-wide coherence and coordination by “strengthening
linkages between the normative work of the United Nations system and its
operational activities.”19 Accordingly, in February 2006, the Secretary-General
announced the creation of a High-Level Panel to examine how the U.N. system can
work more effectively, especially in the areas of development, humanitarian
assistance, and the environment.20 The Panel’s final report emphasized the overall
value and progress of the United Nations, but also noted that without substantial
15 The improved financial disclosure requirements were expanded to include senior
managers, procurement officers, and individuals who invest in U.N. assets. The new
requirements lowered the threshold for accepting gifts and provided mechanisms for
improving the monitoring of disclosure forms. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has agreed
to submit a disclosure form and release it to the public. Former Secretary-General Annan
submitted the form but did not make it publicly available. The newly-implemented U.N.
whistle-blower protection policy was labeled the “gold standard” for other international
organizations. More information is available at
[http://www.un.org/reform/highlights.shtml].
16 These reforms were proposed in Secretary-General Annan’s March 2006 report, Investing
in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide, available at
[http://www.un.org/reform/].
17 The resolution includes nine criteria for how the money may be spent by the Secretary-
General, including a stipulation that if over $6 million is spent per biennium, the Secretary-
General must receive prior approval from the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
18 U.N. press release, GA/10481, General Assembly Approves Reform Measures to
Strengthen United Nations, July 7, 2006.
19 U.N. document, A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 16, 2005, p. 36.
20 The 15-member panel released its report, Delivering as One, on November 9, 2006. The
Panel met over a six month period and engaged in a thorough examination of the strengths
and weaknesses of the U.N. system. For a list of Panel members, their affiliations, and a
copy of the Panel’s final report and recommendations, see [http://www.un.org/events/
panel/].

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reforms the United Nations will be “unable to deliver on its promises and maintain
its legitimate position at the heart of the multilateral system.”21
The Panel recommended the concept of “One U.N.,” to promote greater
coherence and consolidation of U.N. departments and agencies at a country, regional,
and headquarters level, and also recommended an overhaul of U.N. business
practices to bring greater focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).22 On December 8, 2006, the United Nations announced that it would test
a One U.N. pilot program in Vietnam with an aim of ensuring “faster and more
effective development.”23
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and U.N. Reform
On December 14, 2006, Ban Ki-moon of South Korea took the oath of office to
replace outgoing U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.24 Ban stated that U.N. reform
is “the most pressing and principled issue of today,” and that it will be a top priority
during his tenure.25 Though the extent and nature of Ban’s reform agenda is unclear
at this time, he indicated that his overall priorities will include consolidation and
better coordination in the U.N. system, improving morale, accountability and
professionalism for U.N. staff, and restoring trust in the United Nations.26 Ban has
commented on aspects of U.N. reform, including:
! General Management and Secretariat Reform — In a speech to
U.N. staff, Ban stated that the Secretariat had been subject to “harsh
and sometimes unfair criticism,” but noted that “not all of the
criticisms were unjustified and those warrant urgent attention.”27
21 U.N. document, A/61/583, Delivering as One, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-
Level Panel, November 9, 2006.
22 Examples of MDGs include cutting the number of people living on less than a dollar a day
by half; ensuring that all children receive primary schooling; reduce the number of people
who do not have access to safe drinking water by half; and reverse the spread of diseases
such as malaria and HIV, among other things. More information on MDGs is available at
[http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/].
23 The United Nations currently has 11 agencies in ten separate buildings in Hanoi. The One
U.N. Initiative would consolidate these agencies into one building to avoid duplication and
harmonize management practices. In early to mid-2007, the United Nations plans to
announce the establishment of One U.N. initiatives in six additional countries. For more
information, visit [http://www.undp.org.vn/].
24 Prior to becoming U.N. Secretary-General, Ban was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade for the Republic of Korea. A biography of Secretary-General Ban is available at
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sg2118.doc.htm].
25 “U.N. Security Council Reform is Most Pressing Issue — New Secretary-General,” ITAR-
TASS Russian News Agency, November 1, 2006.
26 U.N. press release, SG/2119, GA/10558, Speech of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on
Taking Oath of Office, December 14, 2006.
27 “Addressing Staff, New Secretary-General Renews Commitment to U.N. Management
(continued...)

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! Financial Disclosure — Ban submitted his mandatory personal
financial disclosure form and stated his intention to release it to the
public. He encouraged other U.N. staff to follow his example of
public financial disclosure, but will not make it a requirement.
! Staff Mobility — Ban announced the availability of several
Secretariat positions to be filled by internal U.N. staff. He
encouraged other managers to do the same, noting the importance of
staff mobility among U.N. agencies and departments.
! Security Council Reform — Ban supported U.N. Security Council
expansion, calling it “an important and sensitive issue.”28 He said
he will use his position as Secretary-General to facilitate cooperation
among member states in order to build a broad consensus for
Security Council enhancement.
! Investigation of U.N. Development Programs — Amid
controversy over the U.N. Development Programs’s operation in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ban announced that he
would seek an “independent, external audit,” of all U.N. field
activities.29
Congress and U.N. Reform
Generally, Congress supports the U.N. system and its mission. It authorizes and
appropriates U.S. funds to the organization each year, and often utilizes U.N.
mechanisms to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.30 Congress can also be critical
of the United Nations, however, especially when some Members believe that the
organization may not be running as effectively as it could be. When this happens,
Congress may utilize a wide range of legislative tools to influence and direct U.S.
policy at the United Nations. Such efforts can range from “sense of the Congress”
resolutions to holding hearings to investigating U.N. programs or overseeing
Administration policies and nominees for U.N. posts. Placing financial conditions
27 (...continued)
Reform,” U.N. News Centre Press Release, January 2, 2007.
28 U.N. document, SG/2120, Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General-Designate
Ban Ki-moon, December 14, 2006.
29 “UNDP seeks full audit of its DPR Korea work; Ban Ki-moon orders system wide
inquiry,” U.N. News Service, January 19, 2007.
30 Congress has enacted laws supporting U.N. policies and/or requiring that U.N. member
states comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions or the directives of other U.N. bodies.
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364, §302)
states, “Congress urges ... in the event Iran fails to comply with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 1006), the Security Council to work for the adoption of
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”

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or limits on U.S. funding to the United Nations is also a common congressional
policy approach to U.N. reform.
U.S. Funding as a Tool for U.N. Reform
Overview and Options. In the past, Congress has used its authority to limit
U.S. funds to the United Nations as a mechanism for influencing U.N. policy.31 In
some cases, Congress withheld a proportionate share of funding for U.N. programs
and policies it did not approve of. Since 1980, it has withheld funds from regular
budget programs, including the U.N. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights (for projects
involving the Palestine Liberation Organization and South West Africa People’s
Organization), and the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea.
The overall impact of withholding a proportionate share of assessed payments
depends on the origin of the program’s funding. If a program is funded by the U.N.
regular budget and the United States withholds a proportionate share of its normal
contributions, the cost of the program will most likely be covered by surplus regular
budget funds. Some U.N. programs are funded from several budgets that may
include the U.N. regular budget, specialized agency budgets, and separate conference
and administrative budgets. Because of this, it could be more difficult for U.S.
proportionate withholdings to have a significant impact because the program’s
funding comes from several sources. In such cases, a U.S. withholding would largely
be a symbolic gesture that may not affect the program’s operation or funding levels.
If the United States withholds funds from a program funded primarily by member
state contributions, however, the impact of a U.S. withdrawal could be greater.
Currently, the only proportionate U.S. withholding from the U.N. regular budget is
for some activities and programs related to the Palestine Liberation Organization or
entities associated with it.32
In addition to withholding a proportionate share of U.S. funding, Congress may
consider enacting legislation decreasing or increasing U.S. assessment levels or
linking payment of U.S. arrears to policies it favors. In October 2003, for example,
Congress directed that the U.S. payments of peacekeeping assessments be capped at
25% (lower than the assessment level set by the United Nations).33 Congress also
used this strategy to further its U.N. reform policies. Enacted legislation such as the
Helms-Biden Agreement and proposed legislation such as the Henry J. Hyde U.N.
Reform Act sought to link U.S. assessment levels and the payment of U.S. arrears to
reform benchmarks (see Appendix A for more information on these legislative
activities).
31 For a more detailed examination of U.S. funding of the United Nations, see CRS Report
RL33611, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
32 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; Sec. 307; 22 USC 2227), as amended.
33 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236), April 30, 1994.
On September 30, 2002, Congress lifted the 25% cap on Peacekeeping assessment to allow
the United States to pay its current assessments (P.L. 107-228, section 402). For more
information on U.N. Peacekeeping funding, see CRS Report RL33700, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.

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Arguments For and Against Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform.
Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that
doing so may weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting its
ability to conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions.34 Some argue that
withholding U.S. assessed payments to the United Nations infringes on U.S. treaty
obligations and alienates other U.N. member states. Opponents also note that
withholding U.S. funds could have an impact on diplomatic relations outside of the
U.N. system. Additionally, some contend that U.N. reform legislation proposals
(such as the Hyde Act) may be unrealistic because the scope and depth of reforms
required by the legislation cannot be adequately achieved in the proposed time
frames.35
Supporters of linking U.S. funding to specific reforms argue that the United
States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the
implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. They note that despite
diplomatic and political pressures from many countries, the United Nations has been
slow to implement substantive reform. Advocates also argue that some previously
implemented reforms, such as the new Human Rights Council, have proved to be
ineffective. They believe that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may motivate
countries to find common ground on divisive issues. They also emphasize that past
legislation that threatened to cut off U.S. funding of the United Nations (such as the
Kassebaum-Solomon amendment) was effective, and led to substantive changes in
U.N. operations and programs.
Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy
Congress’s influence over U.S. funding of the United Nation is a powerful tool
for furthering U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. However, there may be other
strategies for Congress to consider when advocating its reform agenda. These
strategies are widely used by many past and current Members of Congress and the
Administration, and include, but are not limited to:
! Resolutions — Members of Congress may propose and/or enact
simple or concurrent resolutions regarding an opinion, fact, or
principle in one or both chambers of Congress. Some Members of
Congress have used these resolutions to voice an opinion about U.S.
policy in the United Nations/or the United Nations itself.
34 Additionally, some observers contend that if the United States were to delay or stop
payment of its arrears, it may risk losing its vote in the General Assembly — a generally
undesirable outcome for many Members of Congress and the Administration. In 1999, for
example, the United States came very close to losing its General Assembly vote. Under
Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N. member state with arrears equaling or exceeding the
member states’s assessments for the two preceding years will have no vote in the General
Assembly.
35 “The Right Approach to Achieving U.N. Reform,” Better World Campaign Fact Sheet,
available at [http://www.betterworldcampaign.org]. For a brief overview of the
Administration position, see Colum Lynch, “Bolton Criticizes Bill Withholding U.N.
Funds,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2005, p. A20.

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! Working with the U.N. Secretary-General — Some past and
current Members of Congress and Administrations have worked to
earn the support of U.N. secretaries-general to help advocate their
positions. Developing a relationship with the chief administrative
officer of the United Nations can be valuable during some
negotiations, where the secretary-general can act as a bridge among
member states that disagree on issues. In addition, U.S. citizens have
also held key U.N. reform-related posts at the United Nations, which
some Members of Congress believe may play a role in furthering
U.S. reform policy interests. Most recently, Christopher Burnham
served as U.N. Under-Secretary for Management.36
! Collaborating with U.N. Member States — The United States may
wish to continue to reach out to other U.N. member states to build
consensus and form partnerships on reform policies, either within
the framework of the United Nations or bilaterally. Some observers
have noted that U.S. support for certain U.N. reform initiatives can
be a liability because some member states may view U.S. support as
self-serving. In these cases, the United States may consider allowing
like-minded countries advocate its reform agenda.
! Identifying Key Priorities — The United States may wish to focus
on a small number of reform priorities and pursue them vigorously
in both multilateral and bilateral fora. It may also consider
compromising with other member states on U.N. reform issues that
it has identified as lesser priorities.
Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan often stated that U.N. reform is a process
and not an event.37 With this in mind, the 110th Congress may wish to continue
monitoring the implementation and overall progress of recently-approved reform
initiatives. It may also consider future reform initiatives proposed by member states
and the Administration, as well as newly-appointed Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
or Members of Congress.
36 Under-Secretary-General Burnham stepped down before Secretary-General Annan’s term
ended in 2007. Prior to Christopher Burnham, the post was held by Catherine Bertini, also
a U.S. citizen. The new U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Management for Secretary-
General Ban is Alicia Bárcena Ibarra of Mexico.
37 U.N. press release, SG/SM/10089, “Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General
Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters,” September 13, 2005. This is a view shared
by many who are involved in formulating U.N. reform policy. Former U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations John Bolton stated, “revolution of reform means you’re going to have
continuing work day-in-and-day-out over a long period of time. Reform is not a one-night
stand. Reform is forever.” (November 22, 2005).

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Administration Policy and Priorities
The United States generally supports the mission and mandate of the United
Nations. It played a key role in establishing the United Nations in 1945, and serves
as one of five permanent members of the Security Council. However, some
Administrations have been critical of the United Nations and have advocated
sweeping reform of the organization.
The George W. Bush Administration is an active participant in recent U.N.
reform efforts. Prior to and since the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, the Administration attempted to work with like-minded countries and the
U.N. Secretary-General to move a reform agenda forward. Some initiatives supported
by the United States, particularly management and oversight reforms, were not
approved or considered by the General Assembly. In addition, the Administration
expressed its displeasure with the overall effectiveness of some previously
implemented reforms. On May 25, 2006, in a statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton
stated that overall reform results, “have not been particularly encouraging,” and that
there have been “no real notable successes so far.” Ambassador Bolton also stated
that while the United States does not agree with all of Secretary-General Annan’s
proposed reforms, it agrees with “his diagnosis of the problem and supports his
efforts.”38 The Administration stated that it will continue to advocate its reform
agenda, though it does not support mandatory withholding of U.S. payments to the
United Nations.39 It identified several key priorities that it believes will help the
United Nations “move towards a goal of strong, effective, and accountable
organization.”40
Management, Budget and Secretariat Reform. The Administration
views management, budget, and secretariat reform as a top U.S. priority for U.N.
reform. It contends that substantive change in the U.N.’s management and budget
structure, particularly within the Secretariat, may contribute to the implementation
of more effective U.N. policies and further reforms.41 In a statement before the
General Assembly in 2005, President Bush said that meaningful reforms “include
measures to improve internal oversight, identify cost savings, and ensure that
38 Testimony by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Challenges and Opportunities in Pushing Ahead on U.N.
Reform, May 25, 2006. Available at [http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/66904.htm].
39 Testimony by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Challenges and Opportunities in Moving Ahead on U.N.
Reform, October 18, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/55341.htm].
40 Drawn from U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “U.S. Priorities for a Stronger, More
Effective United Nations,” June 17, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/53104.pdf].
41 Testimony by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, May 25, 2006.

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CRS-12
precious resources are used for their intended purpose.”42 President Bush also
emphasized the creation of U.N. structures to “ensure financial accountability and
administration and organizational efficiency.”43 Specifically, the Administration
advocates:
Increased Oversight and Accountability in U.N. Management Structure.
This includes enhanced oversight of procurement activities and management in the
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretariat, as well as a fully
independent Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).44 The Administration also
advocates increasing the authority of the Secretary-General to hire and deploy
personnel.
Review of All U.N. Program Mandates and/or Missions. The Outcome
Document negotiated by member states at the 2005 U.N. World Summit called for
a systematic review of all U.N. mandates five years or older, a process which has
never been undertaken. Member states are currently reviewing mandates but
progress is slow due to resistance from some countries who fear that mandates
important to them will be discarded. The Administration has pushed hard for a full
mandate review, stressing that the United Nations has over 9,000 mandates and/or
programs, some of which may be duplicative or obsolete. The Administration
maintains that cost savings resulting from identifying and eliminating these programs
can be transferred to fund other reforms.45
Fiscal Discipline. The Administration believes that the United Nations should
implement reforms within existing U.N. budget resources, and encourages
reallocating funds from programs identified as lower priority to those identified as
higher priority.46
The Administration also generally supports some management reform initiatives
that were recently approved by the General Assembly and Secretariat, including the
establishment of the U.N. Ethics Office, increase in internal oversight funding;
42 “President Addresses United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting,” Office the Press
Secretary, The White House, September 14, 2005.
43 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Executive Office of the
President, March 2006, p. 45.
44 OIOS funding is dependent upon funding from the U.N. programs that it audits, which
some believe creates a conflict of interest. For more information, see U.S. Government
Accountability Office Report GAO-05-392T, United Nations: Sustained Oversight is
Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results, March 2, 2006.
45 “Statement by Ambassador Mark D. Wallace, U.S. Representative for U.N. Management
and Reform, on ‘Investing in the U.N.: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide,’” U.S.
Mission to the United Nations Press Release, July 7, 2006.
46 Testimony by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, May 25, 2006.

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CRS-13
improved whistle-blower protections, and stricter U.N. staff financial disclosure
requirements.47
Peacebuilding Commission. The Administration supported the recent
creation of a U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, which was established by concurrent
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on December 20, 2005.48 The
Commission’s mandate is to advise and propose “integrated strategies for post-
conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and
sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict.”49 Many consider the
Commission to be a key component of broader U.N. reform efforts, though
Ambassador Bolton stated that it is not as significant a priority for the United States
as management and budget reform.50 The Commission operates under the authority
of the Security Council and has a 31-member organizational committee. It held its
first session on June 23, 2006 in New York.
Democracy Initiatives. The Administration identified democracy promotion
— particularly the U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF) — as a U.S. priority for U.N.
reform. On September 21, 2004, President Bush proposed the establishment of
UNDEF to provide resources and assistance for projects that promote emerging
democracies. The Fund accepts voluntary funding from U.N. member states and
promotes activities related to democratic governance, rule of law, electoral
assistance, and anti-corruption in new democracies.51 In 2005, Secretary-General
Annan established UNDEF as a U.N. trust fund, and held its inaugural advisory
board meeting on March 6, 2006. The United States pledged an initial contribution
of $10 million to UNDEF, and as of December 2006, it received more that $53
million in contributions and pledges.52
Human Rights Council. The Administration generally supported the
establishment of a Human Rights Council (the Council) to replace the now-defunct
Commission on Human Rights as a component of U.N. reform. The previous
Commission was criticized by the United States and other countries over the
composition of its membership when countries perceived by many to have poor
human rights standards were elected as members. On March 15, 2006, the U.N.
General Assembly agreed to a resolution creating the new Council, but the United
States was one of four countries to vote against the resolution, contending that the
47 Ibid.
48 U.N. documents, A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645(2005), December 20, 2006.
49 Further information on the Peacebuilding Commission is available at [http://www.un.org/
peace/peacebuilding/].
50 “Remarks by Ambassador John Bolton on the Peacebuilding Commission, at the Security
Council Stakeout,” U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release, December 20, 2005,
available at [http://www.un.int/usa/05_266.htm].
51 For further information on UNDEF, see
[http://www.unfoundation.org/features/un_democracy_fund.asp].
52 Top UNDEF donors are Australia, France, Germany, India, Qatar, and the United States.

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CRS-14
new Council “lacked stronger mechanisms for maintaining credible membership.”53
The United States chose not to run for a Council seat in 2006, and has expressed
disappointment with the Council’s work during its initial sessions, which has focused
primarily on alleged Israel’s human rights abuses in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories and in Lebanon.54 The Administration has not decided if it will run in the
May 2007 Council elections.
Convention on Terrorism. The Administration supports the adoption of a
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism as part of its U.N. reform
platform. However, disagreement among U.N. member states regarding the
definition of terrorism has delayed progress on the Convention. The United States
put forward several proposals for what it perceives to be “internationally acceptable
formulations” of terrorism. It agrees with Secretary-General Annan’s assertion in his
2005 report, In Larger Freedom, that “the right to resist occupation does not justify
the targeting and killing of civilians.” Currently, a draft legal framework for the
Convention is being considered by the Ad Hoc Committee established by General
Assembly Resolution 51/210 of December 17, 1996.55
Development. The Administration identifies economic development as a
U.N. reform priority, and aims to build “healthy institutions and strong economies
through trade, foreign investment, and aid,”with a focus on “supporting good
governance and sound economic policies.”56 At the 2005 U.N. World Summit in New
York, the United States joined other member states in agreeing to a $50 billion a year
increase in funding (until 2010) to combat poverty, and supported assistance for anti-
malaria initiatives, education, and healthcare. The Administration also reaffirmed its
commitment to achieving the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by
2015.
Security Council Reform. One of the most discussed issues in the U.N.
reform debate is the possibility of modifying the composition of the Security Council
so that it more adequately reflects present-day political and economic realities. The
Administration is generally open to Security Council reform but stresses that the
Council should be changed only if it will increase the Council’s overall
effectiveness.57 Additionally, it supports Japan as a permanent Security Council
member given its democratic and human rights record, and its role as the second
53 Drawn from Ambassador Bolton’s statement in the U.N. provisional verbatim record.
U.N. document, A/60/PV.72, March 15, 2006, p. 6.
54 For more information on the Human Rights Council, see CRS Report RL33608, United
Nations Human Rights Council: Issues for Congress, by Luisa Blanchfield.
55 More information on the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee is available at
[http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/index.html].
56 “U.S. Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective United Nations,” U.S. Department of State
Fact Sheet, June 17, 2005.
57 Statement by Ambassador John Bolton on Security Council reform and expansion, to the
General Assembly, U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release, July 21, 2006.

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largest contributor to the United Nations.58 The Administration believes that
developing countries deserve increased representation in the Council, and maintains
that any new potential permanent members should meet specific criteria, including
the “size of economy and population; military capacity; contributions to
peacekeeping operations; commitment to democracy and human rights; financial
contributions to the United Nations; non-proliferation and counter-terrorism records;
and equitable geographic balance.”59 The Administration states it will remain
engaged in the Security Council reform debate, and will continue to be an active
participant in the U.N. Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation
on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. It has not supported any
of the Security Council reform proposals that were submitted for consideration by
U.N. member states or Secretary-General Annan.
Reform Perspectives and Priorities
A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is to find common ground
among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. The global
community has no common definition of U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often
debate among some over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and
current reform initiatives. One method for determining how a stakeholder defines
“U.N. reform” may be to identify policy priorities in the U.N. reform debate. In some
cases, common objectives among stakeholders have translated into substantive
reform policy, though shared goals do not always guarantee successful outcomes.
Recent reform debates in the U.N. General Assembly and its committees drew
attention to fundamental differences that exist among some member states,
particularly developing countries (represented primarily by the Group of 77 and
China), and developed countries (including the United States, Japan, and the United
Kingdom). Developed countries, who account for the majority of assessed
contributions to the U.N. regular budget, would like the Secretariat to have greater
flexibility and authority to implement reforms, specifically those related to oversight
and human resources. Developing countries, however, generally object to policies
that may enhance the power of the Secretary-General and decrease the power of the
General Assembly and its budget and administrative committees. Observers are
concerned that this difference in reform philosophy will create a deadlock in the
General Assembly and significantly delay the implementation of some key
management and budget reforms.
58 In 2005, Japan contributed 19.46% (approximately $346.4 million) to the U.N. regular
budget. For more information on individual member state contributions to the United
Nations, see CRS Report RL30605, United Nations Regular Budget Contributions:
Members Compared, 1989-2005, by Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield.
59 Statement by Ambassador John Bolton on Security Council Reform, in the General
Assembly, November 10, 2005, available at [https://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/
statements/2005/1129bolton.htm].

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Selected International Perspectives
Stakeholders engaged in the U.N. reform debate have different perspectives on
how U.N. reform should be implemented and how to prioritize specific U.N. reform
issues.60 Several key actors, including the European Union, the Group of 77 and
China, developed countries, and non-governmental organizations, have weighed in
on several reform issues, most notably management and budget reform and
development.
European Union (EU). The EU is composed of 25 countries, accounting for
13% of the vote share in the U.N. General Assembly and approximately 38% of the
U.N. regular budget.61 The EU’s reform initiatives often focus on management
reform and increasing the U.N. capacity for development. The EU “attaches great
importance to keeping U.N. management reform on track,” and “vigorously supports
“management reforms such as mandate review.62 It also views the work of the
Secretary-General-appointed Panel on System-Wide Coherence as a high priority,
and supports the Panel’s efforts to explore how the U.N. system may improve system
coordination in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the
environment. The EU actively supports the reform of core U.N. organs, including
the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC,63 and it also attaches
particular importance to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.64
The Group of 77 and China (G-77). The G-77 is a loosely affiliated group
of 132 U.N. member states representing the interests of developing countries.65 It
has played a significant role in recent reform debates due in part to its large
membership, which can be a significant voting bloc in the General Assembly. The
G-77 generally supports U.N. reform and has long viewed development as a key U.N.
reform issue, emphasizing that it should be given the”utmost priority by the United
60 The groups of U.N. member states discussed in this report are only a few of many political
and geographical alliances in the United Nations. Others include the Non-Aligned
Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the African Union. The only
member state that is not a full member of a regional group is Israel. A list of U.N. alliances
is available at [http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?1=11&p=55].
61 Each U.N. member state has one vote in the U.N. General Assembly regardless of its
affiliations. For more information, see “The EU at the U.N. — Overview,” at
[http://www.europa-eu-un.org/documents/infopack/en/EU-UNBrochure-1_en.pdf].
62 “EU Priorities for the 61st U.N. General Assembly,” July 18, 2006, available at
[http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6242_en.htm].
63 An October 25, 2005 EU paper on ECOSOC reform is available at [http://www.europa-
eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5350_en.htm].
64 “EU Priorities for the 61st U.N. General Assembly,” July 18, 2006, available at
[http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6242_en.htm].
65 The G-77 was established in 1964 and represents approximately 69% of U.N. member
states. For more information and records of G-77 statements made at the United Nations,
see [http://www.g77.org/index.html].

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Nations.”66 The G-77 views reform as a process to examine how the mandates of the
United Nations can work through “well-coordinated synergies to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals.” It believes that U.N. reform should not alter the
“intergovernmental nature of our [the United Nations] decision-making, oversight,
and monitoring process.” Additionally, the G-77 does not view reform as a
mechanism to “reduce budget levels... to fund more activities from within the
existing pool of resources, nor to redefine the roles and responsibilities assigned to
the various organs.” 67
The G-77 supported some management reforms adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly, including the establishment of an ethics office and whistle-blower
protection policy. It has, however, actively opposed other initiatives proposed by the
Secretary-General, particularly those proposals that it feels may weaken the authority
of the General Assembly in the areas of management, budget, and oversight.68 The
G-77 also maintains that the positions of all member countries should be taken into
consideration during the reform process. The G-77 has also expressed concern that
reform initiatives proposed by the Secretary-General may be influenced by the larger
U.N. financial contributors, such as the United States, Japan, and some members of
European Union.69
Developed Countries. In some cases, the reform priorities of developed
countries may not always align with the reform priorities of the G-77 and other
developing countries. While the G-77 views development as a top U.N. reform
priority, many developed countries tend to focus on management, budget, and
structural reform. Generally, developed countries make significantly larger financial
contributions to the U.N. system than developing country member states and
therefore may want to ensure that their funds are used in what they perceive as the
most effective way. For example, the United States and the EU, which together
accounted for over 50% of the U.N. regular budget in 2005, view management and
budget reform as a top priority. Japan, which contributed approximately 19% of the
U.N. regular budget in 2005, also views management reform as a priority,
specifically noting the importance of Secretariat reform, Security Council reform, and
system-wide coherence.70
66 U.N. document, A/60/879, Statement Adopted by the Special Ministerial Meeting of the
Group of 77 and China, Putrajaya (Malaysia), June 7, 2006.
67 U.N. document, A/60/907, June 27, 2006.
68 For example, the G-77 opposed proposals by Secretary-General Annan that gave the
Secretariat more power to move, hire, and fire U.N. Secretariat staff, as well as to modify
and consolidate the budgeting process.
69 “Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China on Secretariat and Management
Reform: Report of the Secretary-General entitled ‘Investing in the United Nations’” New
York, April 3, 2006, available at [http://www.g77.org/Speeches/040306.htm]. See also,
Meena Raman,”G-77 Ministers Voice Concerns on U.N. Reform,” South-North
Development Monitor, May 30, 2006.
70 The foremost institutional reform priority for Japan is changing the composition of the
Security Council to “reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st Century.”
(continued...)

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The differing perspectives on U.N. reform among developing and developed
nations were highlighted in December 2005 when a group of U.N. member states, led
primarily by developed countries such as the United States and Japan, sought to link
progress on management reforms to the U.N. budget. The countries placed a
spending cap of $950 million (about six months of U.N. spending) on the two-year
$3.6 billion budget in hopes that the General Assembly would adopt a series of
management and budget reform measures proposed by Secretary-General Annan.71
On May 8, 2006, the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (Administrative and
Budgetary) bypassed the traditional practice of budget-by-consensus and passed a
resolution, supported by the G-77, that approved some reforms but delayed the
consideration of several others. The developed nations that imposed the budget cap
were disappointed with the outcome, and eventually lifted the budget cap in June
2006 because they were unwilling to cause a shutdown of the United Nations. On
July 7, 2006, the General Assembly approved the reforms recommended by the Fifth
Committee.72
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Generally, many NGOs
believe that the United Nations needs reform, though they may differ on the best way
to achieve this goal. NGO interest in a specific U.N. reform issue is largely
dependent on the mission and purpose of the organization. One U.N. reform issue
that has captured the attention of some NGOs is the improvement of U.N. human
rights mechanisms. The majority of human rights organizations generally supported
the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace the discredited U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. Many believed that the Council was an improvement
over the Commission because its structure made it more difficult for countries with
poor human rights records to be elected as members. Since the Council began its
work in September of 2006, however, some NGOs have been concerned that it has
paid too much attention to alleged Israeli human right abuses in Lebanon and in the
Occupied Arab Territories.
NGOs closely monitored the progress on management reforms proposed by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005 and 2006. On June 8, 2006, 42 organizations
delivered a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that offered their “continued
support” for the management reforms proposed by Annan. The letter expressed
concern with the G-77’s opposition to the reforms, and criticized the United States’
threat to withhold U.N. funding in response to G-77 opposition, which “may have
harmful and potentially irreparable effects on our shared goal of improving the
70 (...continued)
For more information on Japanese U.N. reform priorities, see the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs publication, “Japan’s Efforts for Reform of the U.N.,” available at
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/pamph0608.pdf].
71 Annan’s reforms were proposed in his March 2006 report, Investing in the United
Nations: For a Stronger Organization World Wide.
72 U.N. document, A/RES/60/283, July 7, 2006. A list of the approved reforms is available
in the “Recently Adopted Reforms and the New Secretary-General” section of this report.
For more information and additional resources on the six-month budget cap controversy,
[http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/docs/unindex.htm].

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United Nations.”73 Other NGOs expressed dissatisfaction with ongoing reform efforts
and the work of the United Nations in general. Some believe that the current reform
attempts do not go far enough to improve the organization.74
Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups
Since the United Nations was established in 1945, many commissions, panels,
committees, and task forces (hereafter referred to collectively as “groups”) have been
created to examine ways to improve the United Nations.75 These groups are
established by a variety of stakeholders, including past secretaries-general, individual
member states, groups of member states, NGOs, academic institutions, and others.
The following paragraphs will address the findings of a cross-section of these groups,
the Volcker Commission, the U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force, and
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development,
Security, and Human Rights for All.
Though the circumstances and mandates for each group are different, they made
similar recommendations for improving the United Nations. Notably, each group
highlighted the need for enhanced internal oversight and Secretariat reform, including
staff buyouts and enhanced financial disclosure requirements. The groups also
emphasized the need for overall streamlining and consolidation of the U.N. system
(see Appendix B for a side-by-side comparison of the recommendations).
The Volcker Commission. In April 2004, Secretary-General Annan, with
the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, appointed an independent high-level
commission to inquire into potential corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq Oil-for-Food
Program.76 The Commission, led by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,
concluded that the failures of the Oil-For-Food Program were evidence of a greater
need for “fundamental and wide-ranging administrative reform” in the United
73 A copy of the June 8, 2006 letter from 42 NGOs to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
is available at [http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=1833403].
74 For additional NGO perspectives on the United Nations, see Appendix D for a selection
of U.N. reform perspectives and resources.
75 For a discussion on the effectiveness of various U.N. reform groups, see keynote speech
at University of Waterloo made by Edward C. Luck, Director of the Center on International
Organization at Columbia University, “U.N. Reform Commissions: Is Anyone Listening?”
May 16, 2002, available at [http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/cio/cio/projects/waterloo.pdf].
76 U.N. document, A/RES/1538, April 21, 2004. The Committee was chaired by Paul
Volcker and included Professor Mark Peith of Switzerland, an expert on money laundering
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and Justice
Richard Goldstone of South Africa, a former prosecutor with the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Commission’s final report was
released on October 27, 2005. For more detailed information on the functioning of the Iraq
Oil-For-Food Program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil for Food Program,
International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade, by Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-20
Nations.77 The Commission recommended: establishing an Independent Oversight
Board to review U.N. auditing, accounting, and budgeting activities; creating the
position of chief operating officer (COO) to oversee administrative matters such as
personnel and planning practices; providing fair compensation to third parties
involved in U.N. programs (while ensuring that the compensation does not lead to
inappropriate profit); and expanding financial disclosure requirements to cover a
variety of U.N. staff, including those who cover procurement.
U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force. In December 2004,
Congress directed the U.S. Institute of Peace to create a bipartisan task force to
examine ways to improve the United Nations so that it is better-equipped to meet
modern-day security and human rights challenges.78 Congress appropriated $1.5
million to the Task Force and required that it submit a report on its findings to the
House Committee on Appropriations.79 The Task Force identified improving internal
oversight as its single most important reform recommendation. It supported the
creation of an independent oversight board to direct the budget and activities of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). It also recommended several
management reforms, including establishing the position of Chief Operating Officer,
creating a U.N. Ethics Office, and enhancing whistle-blower protection. It supported
broadening the U.N. staff financial disclosure policy, and recommended the review
of all U.N. mandates five years or older, as well as the incorporation of sunset clauses
into all new mandates. The Task Force supported incorporating results-based
budgeting into the U.N. system, and a one-time buyout for all unwanted or unneeded
staff. It recommended the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace
the discredited Commission on Human Rights, but was unable to come to consensus
on Security Council Reform.80
77 “Briefing by Paul A. Volcker Chairman of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the
U.N. Oil-For-Food Program for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S.
Senate,” Washington, DC, October 31, 2005.
78 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, (P.L. 108-447), December 8, 2004. In the report
accompanying the act, conferees stated that they were “deeply troubled by the inaction of
the United Nations on many fronts, especially in regard to the genocide in Darfur, Sudan and
the allegations of corruption regarding the United Nations Oil-For-Food Program.”
Conferees directed that the task force should include experts from the American Enterprise
Institute, Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Hoover Institution, and the Heritage Foundation.
79 The Task Force was co-chaired by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and
former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, and released its first report, American
Interests and U.N. Reform in June 2005. Following the 2005 U.N. World Summit in New
York, the Task Force released an updated report entitled, The Imperative for Action, in
December 2005. The USIP Task Force reports are available at [http://www.usip.org/un/
report/].
80 The Task Force stated that any Security Council reform should “enhance the effectiveness
of the Security Council and not in any way detract from the Council’s efficiency and ability
to act in accordance with the U.N. Charter.” (See page 7 of the Task Force’s report,
American Interests and U.N. Reform.)

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In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human
Rights for All. On March 21, 2005, Secretary-General Annan released his report,
In Larger Freedom, in response to the findings of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change.81 The report was presented to member states as a starting
point for discussion at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, and included some of the
following management reforms:
! the review of all U.N. mandates over five years old;
! a one-time staff-buyout to ensure U.N. Secretariat staff meets current
needs;
! the establishment of a cabinet-style decision-making body in the
Secretariat to improve management and policy activities;
! the review of all budget and human resource operations; and
! a comprehensive review of Office of Internal Oversight Services to
examine ways to enhance its authority and effectiveness.
In addition, Secretary-General Annan proposed a broad range of institutional
and programmatic reforms, including modifying the composition of the U.N. Security
Council so that it more adequately reflects current political realities, and replacing
the Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council. Annan also
recommended streamlining the General Assembly agenda and committee structure
so that the Assembly can increase the speed of its decision-making and react more
swiftly and efficiently to events as they occur.82
Implementing Reform:
Mechanics and Possible Challenges
Mechanics of Implementing Reform
Previous and current U.N. reform initiatives encompass an array of
organizational issues that may require different processes for implementation.
These reforms can be achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various
non-Charter reforms. Charter reform is a relatively rare practice and has only
occurred on three occasions. Non-Charter reforms are more common and
comparatively easier to achieve.
Amending the U.N. Charter. Articles 108 and 109 provide for potential
changes to the U.N. Charter. Article 108 of the Charter states that a proposed Charter
amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the full General Assembly, and be
81 See “Reform Efforts (1997-2005)” section of this report for more information on the
High-Level Panel.
82 Annan also supported reforming the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) so
that it may better coordinate with economic and social agencies and departments within the
United Nations. More information on ECOSOC reform is available at
[http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/186] and [http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/un/
reform/articlesindex.htm].

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CRS-22
ratified “according to the constitutional processes” of two-thirds of U.N. member
states, including the all permanent members of the Security Council.83 The Charter
was first amended in 1963 to increase U.N. Security Council membership from 11
to 15 members, and to increase ECOSOC membership from 18 to 27. It was last
amended in 1973, when ECOSOC increased its membership from 27 to 54.84
Examples of possible reform initiatives that might involve amending the U.N.
Charter include, but are not limited to: increasing Security Council membership —
both permanent and non-permanent members; increasing membership on ECOSOC;
and adding or removing a principal organ.85
Article 109 of the Charter allows for a convening of a General Conference of
U.N. members with the purpose of “reviewing the present Charter.” The date and
place of the Conference would be determined by a two-thirds vote in the General
Assembly, and an affirmative vote from any nine Security Council members.
Potential revisions to the Charter would be adopted at the conference by a two-thirds
vote (with each country having one vote), and take effect when ratified by the
governments of two-thirds of U.N. member states. A Charter review conference has
never been held.
Non-Charter Reform Process. Since 1945, the General Assembly has
authorized reforms of its own processes and procedures — as well as those of the
Secretariat — without Charter amendment. The General Assembly has established
various fora for discussing reform issues, including a Committee on the Charter of
the United Nations86 and a Working Group on the Security Council.87 The General
83 Charter of the United Nations, Article 108: “Amendments to the present Charter shall
come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a
vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” A copy of the U.N. Charter
is available at [http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/].
84 Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Second Edition, Vol.
II. New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1367-1357.
85 Principal Organs of the United Nations include the Trusteeship Council (TC); Security
Council; General Assembly; Economic and Social Council; International Court of Justice;
and the Secretariat. There is an ongoing effort to abolish the TC, a system that was designed
to administrate and supervise U.N. trust territories. The TC suspended its operations on
November 1, 1994, with the independence of its last trust territory, Palau.
86 The “Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening
of the Role of the Organization,” was established in 1974 to consider “any specific
proposals that Governments might make with a view to enhancing the ability of the U.N. to
achieve its purposes,” as well as “suggestions for the more effective functioning of the U.N.
that might not require amendments to the Charter.” The Committee also makes
recommendations for possible Charter amendments. Most recently, in 1995 it proposed an
amendment to delete “enemy state” clauses in the Charter. For more information on the
Committee, see [http://www.un.org/law/chartercomm/].
87 The “Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council,”
(continued...)

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CRS-23
Assembly has also implemented reforms on its own by adopting proposals introduced
by member states or the Secretary-General.88 The Secretary-General can also
implement reform in his capacity as chief administrative officer. For example, as
part of his reform proposal in 1997, Annan established a Senior Management Group
to “ensure more integrated and cohesive management of the Secretariat.”89 The
Secretary-General can also make administrative decisions regarding the organization
of some U.N. departments.
Other non-Charter reforms have included the establishment of consensus-based
budgeting in 1986; the creation of an Office of Strategic Planning in the Secretariat,
authorized by Kofi Annan in 1997; and the establishment of a Peacebuilding
Commission by the Security Council and General Assembly in 2006.90
Possible Challenges to Reform
Achieving meaningful and comprehensive U.N. reform is a significant and
ongoing challenge for U.N. member states. Congress may wish to take the following
possible reform obstacles into account when considering legislation that pushes a
reform agenda or exercises oversight.
National Self-Interest and Differing Reform Perspectives. Each U.N.
member state has its own political agenda and foreign policy goals, and may also
have its own definition of U.N. reform. As a result, member states often hold
differing views on how best to implement reform and how to measure the success or
failure of a given reform initiative. In some cases, failure to reach consensus can
lead to significant delay, or failure, of certain reform initiatives. Some member states
package their policy priorities as U.N. reform to further their own policy goals. This
can cause distrust among member states as countries question whether reform
proposals by other member states are based on self-interest or a genuine desire to
improve the U.N. system.
Competing Priorities. Some observers cite the inability of U.N. member
states or secretaries-general to effectively prioritize reform initiatives an obstacle to
U.N. reform. When Secretary-General Annan presented his 2005 reform proposals,
87 (...continued)
was established in 1993, and a copy of its most recent report is available at
[http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=1757].
88 For example, on March 15, 2005, the Assembly negotiated and approved a resolution
replacing the previous U.N. Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights
Council, which was considered a key component of U.N. reform by many member states and
NGOs.
89 U.N. document, A/52/684, November 10, 1997.
90 An example of a possible non-Charter reform could be the redistribution of regional seats
on the Security Council or ECOSOC. For further discussion on possible non-Charter
reforms, see article by Louis B. Sohn, “Important Improvements in the Functioning of the
Principal Organs of the United Nations that Can be Made Without Charter Revision,”
American Journal of International Law, October, 1997.

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CRS-24
for example, he requested that the reforms be adopted by the General Assembly not
in increments, but as a package of reforms.91 Instead of considering a large series of
reform proposals, some observers argue that member states should select only a few
reform priorities and work toward their adoption and implementation. Others
contend that the most efficient way to achieve reform may be for member states first
to adopt reform initiatives they can agree to and then gradually work toward tackling
the more divisive and complicated reform issues.
Organizational Structure and Bureaucracy. The United Nations is a
highly complex and decentralized organization, and therefore may be slow to
consider or implement potential reforms. Some argue that there is a “culture of
inaction”92 in the United Nations, and that U.N. managers and staff are resistant to
the implementation of new programs or changes to existing programs. Many
contend that prospective and agreed-to reforms lack clear plans for implementation,
including deadlines and cost estimates. They stress that this overall lack of planning
may affect the progress and ultimate success of reforms already implemented, as well
as those reforms currently being considered by the General Assembly.93 Some also
emphasize that without proper implementation plans and follow-up, U.N. member
states will be unable to adequately gauge the overall effectiveness of reforms.
Limited Resources. Many observers note that a significant challenge for
U.N. reform efforts may be the effective implementation of reforms within the
current U.N. budget. Some reform initiatives, such as the Peacebuilding
Commission, were established as operating “within existing resources,” by member
states.94 Many argue that the existing U.N. budget may not be able to support all of
the reform initiatives currently being considered. Some member states, including the
United States, however, contend that money saved from other reforms, such as
mandate-review, could create a funding source for the creation of new U.N. programs
or bodies.
External Influences. The complex relationships that exist among member
states outside of the U.N. system may be another challenge affecting U.N. reform
efforts. These relationships are entirely independent of United Nations but can affect
how countries work together within the U.N. framework to achieve reform
objectives. Military conflict, religious and ethnic differences, political conflict, trade
and economic issues, and geography can all potentially impact reform cooperation
among U.N. member states.
91 “The Secretary-General’s Statement to the General Assembly,” New York, March 21,
2005, available at [http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/sg-statement.html].
92 “Annan’s ‘Culture of Inaction.’” The Chicago Tribune, December 12, 2006.
93 U.S. Government Accountability Office Report, GAO-07-14, United Nations Management
Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many Awaiting General Assembly Review, October 2006.
94 U.N. document, A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 16, 2005.

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CRS-25
Appendix A — Previous Reform Legislation
When considering U.N. reform issues, the 110th Congress may wish to explore
the nature and effectiveness of past legislative approaches and how or if they may
have influenced the adoption of reform measures at the United Nations. There is
evidence that legislation such as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment and the
Helms-Biden Agreement may have led, either directly or indirectly, to substantive
changes in U.N. policies. The following paragraphs highlight selected reform
legislation from 1986 to the present and note any subsequent changes to internal U.N.
policy.
Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment (1986-1987).95 In the mid-1980s,
some Members of Congress expressed concern that U.S. influence over the U.N.
budget was not proportionate to its rate of assessment. In 1986 Congress passed
legislation, popularly known as the “Kassebaum-Solomon amendment,” which
required that U.S. assessed contribution to the U.N. regular budget be reduced to 20%
unless the United Nations gave major U.N. financial contributors a greater say in the
budget process.96 Subsequently, in 1986 the General Assembly adopted a new budget
and planning process that incorporated consensus-based budgeting as a decision-
making mechanism, thus giving member states with higher assessment levels a
potentially greater voice in the budget process.
U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (1993). In the early 1990s,
some Members of Congress and the Administration were concerned with the
apparent lack of oversight and accountability within the U.N. system. In 1993, as part
of the FY1994 State Department Appropriations Act, Congress directed that 10% of
U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget be withheld until the Secretary
of State certified to Congress that “the United Nations has established an independent
office with responsibilities and powers substantially similar to offices of Inspectors
General Act of 1978.”97 On July 29, 1994, the U.N. General Assembly established
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) which reports directly to the
Secretary-General and provides “internal auditing, investigation, inspection,
programme monitoring, evaluation and consulting services to all U.N. activities
under the Secretary-General’s authority.”98
Helms-Biden Agreement (1999). In the late 1990s, Congress and the
Administration negotiated and agreed to legislation that would further U.S. reform
policy at the United Nations. The Helms-Biden bill authorized payment of some U.S.
arrears if specific reform benchmarks were met and certified to Congress by the
95 For a more detailed account of the Kassebaum-Solomon Provisions, see CRS Report
RL33611, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
96 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1986 and 1987 (H.R. 2608, P.L. 99-93), Section
143, August 16, 1985.
97 U.S. Department of State Appropriations Act, 1994 (H.R. 2519, P.L. 103-121), October
27, 1993.
98 More information on OIOS is available at [http://www.un.org/depts/oios/]. See U.N.
document, A/RES/48/218 B, August 12, 1994, for a detailed description of its mandate.

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Secretary of State.99 Under the terms of Helms-Biden, the United States agreed to:
1) pay $819 million in arrearages over fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, and 2)
forgive $107 million owed to the United States by the United Nations in
peacekeeping costs if the United Nations applied the $107 million to U.S.
peacekeeping arrears. For arrearage payments to occur, Congress required that the
U.S. assessment for contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced from 25%
to 22% and that the peacekeeping contribution be reduced from 30% to 25%.100 In
December 2000, the U.N. General Assembly reduced the regular budget assessment
level to from 25% to 22%, and the Peacekeeping share from approximately 30.4%
to 28%. In subsequent years, the U.S. peacekeeping assessment continued to fall and
is now close to 26.5%.
Henry J. Hyde U.N. Reform Act (2005). In the 109th Congress, the House
of Representatives passed, but Congress did not enact, H.R. 2745, The Henry J. Hyde
United Nations Reform Act. The act would have required that United States withhold
50% of its assessed payments beginning in calendar year 2007 if the United Nations
does not implement 32 of 40 changes, including 15 mandatory reforms (the potential
withholding would come from FY2008 funds). The proposed changes included:
! establishing an internal oversight board, and creating the position of
U.N. Chief Operating Officer;
! transferring 18 U.N. programs from mandatory to voluntary funding,
and reducing funding for U.N. General Assembly Affairs and
Conference Services;
! banning countries under investigation for human rights violations
from membership in U.N. human rights bodies; and
! U.N. peacekeeping reform, including a global audit and review of
mandates and closing operations.101
Under the act, the State Department would have been required to certify and
report to Congress that each condition was accomplished. Other provisions would
have included a requirement for the Office of Management and Budget to report on
all U.S. contributions to the U.N. system; zero nominal growth in the U.N. assessed
budget and the regular budgets of specialized agencies; and a requirement for the
Independent Oversight Board to examine the report of the Independent Inquiry
Committee on the Iraq Oil-for-Food-Program, among other things. The Bush
Administration did not fully support the Hyde Act because it was concerned the
automatic withholdings would impact its ability to pursue its foreign policy
objectives.
99 Helms-Biden was incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000
(H.R. 3194, P.L. 106-113), November 19, 1999.
100 See CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne for further information.
101 H.R. 2745, The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, 109th Congress, 1st
Session, June 20, 2005.

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CRS-27
Appendix B — Key U.N. Reform Recommendations
and Proposals by Independent and U.N. Affiliated
Groups
Report of the Task Force on
In Larger Freedom:
Report of the Independent
the United Nations
Towards Development,
Inquiry Committee into the
(June 2004,
Security and Human Rights
United Nations Oil-for-Food
December 2005)
for All
Program
(March 2005)
(October 2005)
Improved management
Secretariat reform, including:
Strengthen U.N. management
reform, including:

practices, including:
Establish an Independent
Review of the Office of
Establish an Independent
Oversight Board to function
Internal Oversight Services
Oversight Board with
as an independent audit
and general strengthening of
responsibility over internal
committee;
internal oversight;
and external audits and
investigations;
Establish the role of Chief
Creation of a cabinet-style
Create the position of Chief
Operating Officer (COO);
decision-making mechanism;
Operating Officer (COO);
Establish policies for
Authority/resources for
Expand financial disclosure
improved financial disclosure
Secretary-General to realign
requirements for U.N. staff,
standards, whistle-blower
and/or buy-out Secretariat
including the Secretary-
protection; and
staff; and full review of
General, Deputy-Secretary-
budget and human resources
General, and those involved
operations; and
in procurement and/or
disbursement;
Review of all U.N. mandates
Review of all U.N. mandates
and sunset clauses for new
five years or older.
Improve coordination and
mandates.
framework for cross-agency
U.N. programs; and
Reorganization of the
Streamlining the General
General Assembly;
Assembly to speed-up
Ensure third party agencies
decision-making processes;
involved in U.N. programs
are entitled to fair
Replace the Commission on
Replace the discredited
compensation.
Human Rights with a new
Commission on Human
Human Rights Council;
Rights with a new Human
Rights Council;
Identification of U.N.
programs that could be more
Modify composition of the
effective if funded by
Security Council to reflect
voluntary contributions; and
current political realities; and
Improving the Department of
Reform ECOSOC so it may
Peacekeeping Operations so
better coordinate the U.N.
that it becomes “a more
development agenda and
independent program” with
guide other economic and
its own rules and regulations
social agencies in the United
to address its unique mission.
Nations.

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CRS-28
Appendix C — Organizational Chart of the U.N. System

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CRS-29
Appendix D — Additional U.N. Reform Resources
Websites (NGOs, Think Tanks, U.S. Government, United
Nations)
Better World Campaign — U.N. Reform
[http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/un_reform.asp]
Center for U.N. Reform Education
[http://www.centerforunreform.org/]
Eye on the U.N. (joint project of Hudson Institute and the Touro Law Center Institute
for Human Rights)
[http://www.eyeontheun.org/]
Global Policy Forum — U.N. Reform, An Analysis
[http://www.centerforunreform.org/]
Heritage Foundation — International Organizations
[http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/]
ReformTheUN.org
[http://www.reformtheun.org/]
United Nations Association of the USA
[http://www.unausa.org]
U.N. Reform (Official U.N. web page)
[http://www.un.org/reform/]
U.S. Department of State
[http://www.state.gov/p/io/c15031.htm] and [http://www.un.int/usa/]
U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force and Report
[http://www.usip.org/un/report/index.html]
U.S. Government Reports (CRS and GAO)
CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne.
CRS Report RL33608, United Nations Human Rights Council: Issues for Congress,
by Luisa Blanchfield.
CRS Report RL30605, United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members
Compared, 1989-2005, by Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield.

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CRS-30
CRS Report RL33611, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, by
Marjorie Ann Browne.
Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) Report 07-14, United Nations
Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many Awaiting General
Assembly Review, October 2006.
GAO Report 06-330, United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program
Indicate the Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight Activities,
April 25, 2006.
GAO Report 06-701T, United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement
Controls and Processes Need Strengthening, April 27, 2006.
GAO Report 06-577, United Nations Procurement Internal Controls are Weak, April
2006.
GAO Report 06-575, United Nations Funding Arrangement Impede Independence
of Internal Auditors, April 2006.
GAO Report 05-392T, United Nations Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms
to Achieve Lasting Results - Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade, March 2, 2006.
GAO Report 04-339, United Nations Reform Progressing, but Comprehensive
Assessments Needed to Measure Impact, February 2004.

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