Order Code RL33819
Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
January 22, 2007
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Summary
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba under Fidel Castro has consisted
largely of isolating the communist nation through comprehensive economic
sanctions, which have been significantly tightened by the Bush Administration,
including restrictions on travel, private humanitarian assistance, and payment terms
for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. A second component of U.S. policy has
consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian
donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba.
As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th
Congress will be how to best support political and economic change in one of the
world’s remaining few communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress is
now examining policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro’s temporary, and
potentially permanent, departure from the political scene because of health
conditions, which could foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. Although there has
been broad agreement in Congress on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward
Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island — there
have been several schools of thought on how best to achieve that objective. Some
advocate maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted;
others argue for lifting some sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people,
or as part of a strategy of lifting sanctions incrementally in response to positive
changes in Cuba. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.
Over the past several years, Congress has continued its high level of interest in
Cuba with a variety of legislative initiatives regarding sanctions and human rights.
Although one or both houses have at times approved legislative provisions that
would ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba, ultimately these provisions have been stripped
out of the final enacted measures. President Bush has regularly threatened to veto
various appropriations bills if they contained provisions weakening the embargo.
Legislative action on several FY2007 appropriations measures was not
completed in the 109th Congress, so action can be anticipated in 2007. House-passed
H.R. 5522 would have funded FY2007 Cuba democracy projects, and House and
Senate versions of the bill had contrasting provisions on anti-drug cooperation with
Cuba. Other bills addressed provisions on agricultural exports, travel, and Cuba
broadcasting. In the 110th Congress, several measures have been introduced that
would ease Cuba sanctions — H.R. 177 (educational travel), H.R. 216 (Cuban
baseball players), and H.R. 217 (overall embargo) — while one measure would
tighten sanctions — H.R. 571 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba).

This report will be updated regularly. Also see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba
after Fidel Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and Approaches; CRS Report RL31139,
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; CRS Report RL32251, Cuba
and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List; CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food
and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and
Implementation; CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues; and
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress.

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Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Varela Project and the National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Assembly to Promote Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . . 9
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Trademark Sanction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Offshore Oil Sector Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Drug Interdiction Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Cuba and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Radio and TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Debate on TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
FY2007 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Migration Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Guantanamo Naval Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Human Rights Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress
Recent Developments
On January 11, 2007, a federal grand jury in Texas indicted Luis Posada Carriles
for lying about how he entered the United States illegally in March 2005, an
indictment that could justify his continued detention. Posada had been imprisoned
in Panama for several years for involvement in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, and
allegedly was involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner.
In January 11, 2007 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples stated
that “Raúl Castro is firmly in control as Cuba’s acting president and will likely
maintain power and stability after Fidel Castro dies, at least for the short-term.”
In December 2006, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting of the Broadcasting Board
of Governors contracted with a commercial television station and a commercial radio
station in Florida to broadcast some Radio and TV Marti programming on a daily
basis in order to overcome broadcast jamming by the Cuban government.
On December 12, 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas
Hernández received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters
Without Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding
broader Internet access for Cubans.
On December 6, 2006, the Cuban government released dissident Hector Palacios
from prison for health reasons. Palacios, who had been sentenced to 25 years in
prison, was part of the group of 75 democracy and human rights activists arrested in
March 2003. Of the 75, 16 have been released for health reasons. Some 300
political prisoners in all remain jailed in Cuba.
In a December 2, 2006, speech, Raúl Castro reiterated an offer to negotiate with
the United States, as long as it respected Cuba’s independence and as long as the
results were based on “equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”
On November 15, 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005 and
concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better
management and oversight.

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Political Conditions
Politically Cuba remains a hard-line communist state. Until he recently stepped
down temporarily while recuperating from surgery, Fidel Castro ruled as head of
state and government since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt
government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that the Cuban
Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a
Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was
enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state
and in society with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. The
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures.
Executive power has been vested in a Council of Ministers headed by Fidel Castro
as President of the Council.
Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power,
currently with 609 members, that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the
Assembly is not in session, a Council of State acts on its behalf. As President of the
Council of State until recently, Castro has served as head of state and head of
government. Although Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in
February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. In October 1997, the
Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in
which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel
and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries. Direct elections for the
National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters
again were not offered a choice of candidates.
For a number of years, Fidel’s younger brother Raúl, as First Vice President of
the Council of State, has been the officially designated successor and was slated to
become head of state and head of government with Fidel’s departure. Raúl — who
turned 75 on June 3, 2006 — also served as First Vice President of the Council of
Ministers, as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and as second
secretary of the Communist Party.
On July 31, 2006, Fidel provisionally ceded political power to his brother Raúl
in order to recover from intestinal surgery. As a result, in a proclamation signed by
Fidel, Raúl Castro became First Secretary of the Communist Party, Commander in
Chief of the FAR, and President of the Council of State and Government.
At the same time, Fidel tapped six other high-ranking government officials on
a provisional basis for key roles in health, education, and energy projects. He
delegated the job of promoting public and international health projects to current
Minister of Public Health José Ramón Balaguer Cabrera. On education, he
designated José Ramón Machado Ventura and Esteban Lazo Hernández, both
members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party and both Vice
Presidents of the Council of State. On energy, he designated Carlos Lage, a Vice
President of the Council of State and Executive Secretary of the Council of Ministers.
Lage is known for orchestrating Cuba’s economic recovery in the 1990s. Fidel also
directed Lage, as well as Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque and Central Bank

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President Francisco Soberón Valdés, to form a commission to manage and prioritize
funds for the health, education, and energy programs.

Scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro
Because of Fidel’s recovery, celebrations for his 80th birthday on August 13,
2006, were postponed until December 2, 2006 (the 50th anniversary of the arrival of
Fidel and his followers from Mexico on the boat Granma), but Castro was unable to
appear at the celebration in December, fueling speculation that he was gravely ill and
would not be returning to power. A number of observers have speculated that Castro
is suffering from cancer, although Cuban officials deny it.1 In late December 2006,
a Spanish surgeon who has been treating Castro asserted that he does not have
cancer, but that he is recovering from a very serious surgery.2
Although many observers believe that the eventual demise of Cuba’s communist
government ultimately is inevitable, there is considerable disagreement over when
or how this may occur. Some still predict that the regime will collapse when Fidel
Castro permanently departs the political scene or dies. Other observers stress that
Fidel is still not out of the picture and that when he does die or become permanently
debilitated, the Cuban government has a plan for the permanent succession of his
brother Raúl. They point to Cuba’s strong security apparatus and the extraordinary
system of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popular support.
Before Fidel’s recent surgery, observers discerned several potential scenarios
for Cuba’s future when Fidel either dies in office or departs the political scene
because of age or declining heath. These fit into three broad categories: the
continuation of a communist government; a military government; or a democratic
transition or fully democratic government. According to most observers, the most
likely scenario, at least in the short term, is a successor communist government led
by Raúl Castro. This is likely for a variety of reasons, but especially because of
Raúl’s designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the
FAR. The FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since
1989 and has played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of
numerous business enterprises. The scenario of a military-led government is viewed
by some observers as a possibility only if a successor communist government fails
because of divisiveness among leaders or political instability. For many observers,
the least likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or departure is a democratic transition
government. With a strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro government has
successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with only a small
and tightly regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified
political opposition. (For further information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after
Fidel Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
1 “U.S. Government Says Castro’s Condition is Terminal,” Latin America Regional Report:
Caribbean & Central America, November 2006; Julia Preston, “Castro to Recover, but not
Return, Cubans Say,” New York Times, Dec. 18, 2006.
2 Frances Robles, “Doctor: Castro Doesn’t Have Cancer,” Miami Herald, Dec. 27, 2006.

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Human Rights
Overview. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government
sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time. There was a severe crackdown on
activists in March 2003 when the government imprisoned 75 democracy activists,
including independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor
unions and opposition parties. As of January 2007, 59 of the “group of 75” political
prisoners remain in prison. The most recent release of the group of 75 was Hector
Palacios, released for health reasons on December 6, 2006; Palacios had been
sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2003. In January 2007, the independent Cuban
Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported that the number
of political prisoners stood at 283 at the end of 2006, compared to 333 at the end of
2005. Despite the reduction, Elizardo Sánchez, the leader of the Commission,
asserted that the Cuban government is still repressing Cuban dissidents with threats,
police searches of people’s homes, interrogations, and short detentions.3
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2005, the Cuban
government is one of the world’s most systematic human rights violators, controlling
all aspects of life through the Communist Party and state-controlled mass
organizations. The report asserted that the Cuban government continued to commit
numerous serious abuses in 2005. These included arbitrary arrest and detention of
human rights advocates and members of independent professional organizations;
denial of the right to a fair trial, especially for political prisoners; abuse of detainees
and prisoners; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; denial of freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and association; and targeted “acts of repudiation”
(organized public protests) against those who disagree with the government. The
government maintained a pervasive system of surveillance through undercover
agents, informers, and neighborhood-based Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDRs). The government also continued to retaliate against those seeking
peaceful political change, including supporters of the Varela Project, which proposes
a national referendum to bring about political and economic reform.
In October 2005, a Cuban human rights group known as the Ladies in White
(Damas de Blanco) received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought from the
European Parliament. The group, formed after Cuba’s March 2003 crackdown,
consists of wives, mothers, and sisters of dissidents who conduct peaceful protests
calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners.
In December 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas Hernández
received the 2006 Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters Without
3 “Cuba: No Improvement under Raúl, Say Human Rights Activists,” Latinnews Daily, Jan.
10, 2007.

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CRS-5
Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-month hunger strike in 2006, demanding broader
Internet access for Cubans.
Varela Project and the National Dialogue. Named for the 19th century
priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of
slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban
Constitution. The referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights,
an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changes to the country’s
electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organized
by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement.
In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to
the National Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”4 In response
to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late
June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution
to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered
despite the 2003 human rights crackdown, which included the arrest of 21 Project
activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to
Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.
Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the
National Dialogue with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of
discussing and preparing for a democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands
of Cubans have met in dialogue groups to discuss a working document covering such
themes as: economic, political, and institutional changes; social issues; public health
and the environment; public order and the armed forces; media, science, and culture;
reconciliation; and reuniting with the exile community.5
Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Led by three prominent Cuban
human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez Manzano, and Felix
Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana
on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because
May 20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government
to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some
Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was
dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959
4 “Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press, May
15, 2002.
5 Oswaldo Payá, “Dissidents’ Goal: A National Dialogue,” Miami Herald, Aug. 9, 2005.

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Cuban revolution.6 The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda
for political and economic change in Cuba.7 Among its provisions, the resolution
called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights,
demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document
on political and economic rights entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All.”8
Legislative Initiatives. In the 109th Congress, five resolutions were approved
regarding Cuba’s human rights situation. H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez), approved in
April 2005, expressed the sense of Congress regarding the two-year anniversary of
the human rights crackdown in Cuba. The resolution demanded that Cuba release all
political prisoners; legalize all political parties, labor unions, and press; and hold free
and fair elections. Two resolutions approved in May 2005 — H.Res. 193 (Diaz-
Balart, Mario) and S.Res. 140 (Martinez) — expressed support for the organizers and
participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote
Civil Society. H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln), approved in September 2005,
expressed the sense of the House regarding the Cuban government’s crackdown
against dissidents in July 2005. S.Res. 469 (Lieberman), approved in May 2006,
condemned the April 25, 2006, beating and intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha
Beatriz Roque. In addition, Congress funds democracy and human rights projects for
Cuba in annual Foreign Operations appropriations measures. For more details, see
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights, below.
Economic Conditions
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline
ranging from 35-50%, but there has been considerable improvement since 1994.
From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented
economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually. From 2001-2006,
economic growth averaged almost 5%.
Economic growth was especially strong over the past two years, registering an
impressive 9.5% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis
and Wilma) and an estimated 8.7% in 2006. The economy has benefitted from the
growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China
in terms of investment commitments and credit lines.9 Cuba benefits from a
preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than
90,000 barrels of oil a day. Some observers maintain that Venezuela’s oil subsidies
amounted to more than $2 billion a year 2006. Venezuela is also helping Cuba
6 Nancy San Martin, “‘A Triumph’ in Cuba as Dissidents Gather,” Miami Herald, May 21,
2005.
7 The full text of the resolution is available in Spanish from Cubanet: [http://www.cubanet.
org/ref/dis/052305.htm].
8 See the full text of “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” online at [http://www.cubanet.org/
CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm].
9 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2007.

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upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, and reportedly is providing some $300-500
million in credit for a variety of projects ranging from housing to electricity.10
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in
health and education. In 2004, according to the U.N. Development Programs’s 2006
Human Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba was 77.6 years, adult literacy
was estimated at almost 100%, and the infant mortality rate was 6 per 1,000 live
births, the lowest rate in Latin America. For 2006, Cuba has boasted an infant
mortality rate of 5.3, just second behind Canada in the Western Hemisphere.11
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993, the
government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural
markets in 1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market,
and it also permitted artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the
government allowed private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares),
in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place), and approved a new
foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by foreigners in all
sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In 1996,
it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of
such zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking
system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and
independent entity.
Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult —
characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of
medicines, and power outages (although these have been significantly reduced) —
and the government has backtracked on some of its reform efforts. Regulations and
new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed.
Some home restaurants have been forced to close because of the regulations. In
2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any
services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed
the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures.12 In
October 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in
entities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead,
Cubans would need to exchange their dollars for “convertible pesos,” with a 10%
10 Frances Robles and Steven Dudley, “Chávez May Be Buying Cuba’s Future with Oil,”
Miami Herald, Aug. 30, 2006.
11 “Cuba Says Its Infant Mortality Rate is Lowest in Latin America,” Agence France Presse,
Jan. 4, 2007.
12 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once
Again,” CubaNews, April 2004.

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surcharge for the exchange. Cubans could exchange their dollars or deposit them in
banks with the surcharge until November 14. Dollar bank accounts will still be
allowed, but Cubans will not be able to deposit new dollars into the accounts.
Beginning in April 2005, convertible pesos were no longer on par with the U.S.
dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign currencies. This reduces the
value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard currency to the
Cuban government.13
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which
resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo
on trade and financial transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR),
first issued by the Treasury Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of
economic sanctions against Cuba, including a prohibition on most financial
transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States.
The CACR have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in
policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of
1992 (P.L.102-484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton
legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba
and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if
it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two
U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase
pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition
to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its
13 Larry Luxner, “Cuba’s ‘Convertible Peso’ No Longer Linked to U.S. Dollar,” CubaNews,
April 2005, p. 3.

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long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is
circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are met. Another
significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable
for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law,
however, both President Clinton and President Bush have suspended the
implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second
track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private
humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts,
and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th
Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with
restrictions on financing such exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by U.S. nationals and residents
for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994
in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for
the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In
January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support
the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that
all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances
to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional
U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles
and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening
restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional
researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track U.S. policy of
isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people
through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the
Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic sanctions and has
further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift parcels to
Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening
of restrictions for family visits and to the Administration’s February 2005 tightening
of restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In May
2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the inter-
agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State

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Colin Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to
“hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to
help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy in various areas. The
President directed that up to $59 million be committed to implement key
recommendations of the Commission, including support for democracy-building
activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The report’s
most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten
economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private
humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent
regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June 2004
implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State
Department website at [http://www.state. gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].)
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may
be paid for their sales. In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed
Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct
U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to identify additional
measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a plan to
help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report. In July
2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its second
report making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a
democratic transition. The full report is available at [http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/].
The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two
years for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund
education programs and exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided
by third countries and scholarships for economically disadvantaged students from
Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10 million); to fund additional efforts
to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and expand access to
independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to support
international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15
million). According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be
additional funding beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for
these programs.14 Thereafter, the Commission recommended funding of not less than
$20 million annually for Cuba democracy programs “until the dictatorship ceases to
exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently spent on Cuba democracy
programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with
the international community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide
assistance to a Cuban transition government to help it respond to critical
humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair elections, and to move
14 U.S. Department of State, Second Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba, Briefing, July 10, 2006.

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CRS-11
toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of preparatory
steps that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so
that it will be well prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new
Cuban government. These included steps in the areas of government organization,
electoral preparation, and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.
The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident
community. Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro
Roca, maintain that they would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the
Cuban dissident movement, others expressed concerns about the report. Dissident
economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans
have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe, “We are
thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and
elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.”15 Miriam Leiva,
a founding member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed
concern that the report could serve as a rationale for the government to imprison
dissidents.16 Leiva also faulted the Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban
transition must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be provided. According
to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such singular
importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a
difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”17
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power. In response to Fidel Castro’s
announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother Raúl, President
Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely
committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.”
The President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged
U.S. support to the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in
Cuba. U.S. officials indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach
out” to the new leader. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support
for the Cuban people in an August 4, 2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV
Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who desire peaceful democratic
change can count on the support of the United States.”18
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could
prompt a migration crisis, there has been no unusual traffic since Castro ceded power
temporarily to his brother. The U.S. Coast Guard has plans to respond to such a
migration crisis, with support from the Navy if needed. In her August 4, 2006,
message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged “the Cuban people
to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security officials
15 Nicholas Kralev, “Bush OKs Initiative to Support Opposition,” Washington Times, July
11, 2006.
16 Frances Robles and Pablo Bachelet, “Plan for Change in Cuba Gets OK,” Miami Herald,
July 11, 2006.
17 Miriam Leiva, “We Cubans Must Decide,” Miami Herald, July 15, 2006.
18 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Message to the People
of Cuba,” Aug. 4, 2006.

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CRS-12
also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community
wanting to travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba.
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has
“always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time
he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he
described as “arrogant and interventionist.”19 In response, Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to
Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was
willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin
a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo
if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the
creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward
free and fair elections.20
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the
United States. He said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the
longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they
accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate
any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the
principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.”21
In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush
Administration established five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy
toward Cuba. The State Department is leading working groups on diplomatic
actions, to build international support for U.S. policies; strategic communications,
to ensure that Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic
promotion. The Commerce Department is leading a working group on humanitarian
aid, in the event that a democratic transition government requests assistance. The
Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Council are heading a
working group on migration.22 In addition to these working groups, U.S. Director of
National Intelligence John Negroponte announced in mid-August 2006 the
establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela
responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries across the
Intelligence Community.
19 “No Enemy Can Defeat Us,” interview of Raúl Castro by Laszar Barredo Medina, Diario
Granma, Aug. 18, 2006.
20 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Thomas Shannon, Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Aug. 23, 2006.
21 “English Transcript of Raul Castro’s Speech,” Miami Herald, Dec. 2, 2006.
22 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Creates Five Groups to Eye Cuba,” Miami Herald, Sept. 13, 2006.

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CRS-13
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall
objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for
human rights to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how
to achieve those objectives. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure
on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S.
efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes
referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they
believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue.
Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S.
embargo. Fidel Castro’s July 31, 2006, announcement that he was ceding political
power to his brother Raúl temporarily in order to recover from surgery could foster
a re-examination of U.S. policy, especially if Fidel’s departure from the political
scene becomes permanent as many predict. In this new context, there are two broad
policy approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach
that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government
while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing
the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.
(For additional information, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after Fidel Castro: U.S.
Policy Implications and Approaches.)
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several
policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward
Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue — then the seeds
of reform would be planted, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for
peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of
avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United
States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They
argue that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear
imminent, even if Fidel Castro dies, the United States should espouse a more
pragmatic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing
policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the
missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the
embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo.
Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China
or Vietnam, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human
rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the
steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the United States to normalize relations.
They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms
would boost the Castro regime, politically and economically, and facilitate the

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CRS-14
survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human
rights in Cuba, and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S.
sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,
are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living conditions.
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and
for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CACR, the overall embargo
regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC).
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to
the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and
may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights
of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist
or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba
travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing
his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are
legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by
thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on
Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to
Cuba have been tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for
people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June
2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and
the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances
and gift parcels. In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious
organizations promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their
license by taking individuals not affiliated with their organizations. OFAC’s actions
were prompted by reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería
had been taking large groups to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions.23
In 2006, the Administration suspended the licenses of several travel service
providers, including one of the largest such providers in Florida, La Estrella de Cuba.
Several religious organizations also had their licenses suspended, and church groups
and several Members of Congress expressed concern about more restrictive licenses
for religious travel.24
23 Oscar Corral, “Is Santería Used as Ploy to Skirt Travel Rules?,” Miami Herald, Feb. 27,
2005
24 Oscar Corral, “Feds Lay Down the Law on Cuba to Travel Agents,” Miami Herald, Apr.
29, 2006; Pablo Bachelet, “New Rules Impede Religious Travel,” Miami Herald, Mar. 16,
2006.

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CRS-15
Among the June 2004 restrictions that remain in place are the following:
! Family visits were restricted to one trip every three years under a
specific license and are restricted to immediate family members,
with no exceptions. Under previous regulations, family visits could
occur once a year under a general license, with travel more than once
a year allowed, but under a specific license. Previously travel had
been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship
to the traveler.
! Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to
$800 million, were further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300
may still be sent, but are now restricted to members of the remitter’s
immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government
officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The
regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances
that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
! Gift parcels were limited to immediate family members and were
denied to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party. The contents of gift parcels may no longer
include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, or soap-making
equipment.
! The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit was reduced from
the State Department per diem rate, currently $167 per day, to $50
per day.
! With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers
may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it
back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to
Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.
! Fully-hosted travel, by a person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, was
prohibited as a permissible category of travel.
! Travel for educational activities was further restricted, including the
elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary
schools.
There has been mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance
restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions will deny the Cuban
government dollars that help maintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that
the tightened sanctions are anti-family and will only result in more suffering for the
Cuban people. There were also concerns that the new restrictions were drafted
without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students
receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the

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CRS-16
establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that
the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new
OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimately licensed the
medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies for a period of two years
and engage in travel-related transactions.
Legislative Initiatives. From 2000-2004, one or both houses of Congress
approved amendments to appropriations bills that would have eased restrictions on
travel to Cuba in various ways, but these provisions ultimately were stripped out of
final enacted measures. The Administration regularly threatened to veto legislation
if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.
In the second session of the 109th Congress, on June 14, 2006, the House
rejected two amendments to the FY2007 Transportation/Treasury appropriation bill,
H.R. 5576, that would have eased Cuba travel restrictions. H.Amdt. 1050 (Rangel),
rejected by a vote of 183-245, would have prohibited funds from being used to
implement the overall economic embargo of Cuba. H.Amdt. 1051 (Lee), rejected
by a vote of 187-236, would have prohibited funds from being used to implement
the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions on educational travel to
Cuba. An additional Cuba amendment, H.Amdt. 1032 (Flake), that would have
prohibited the use of funds to amend regulations relating to travel for religious
activities in Cuba, was withdrawn from consideration.
In other action, on June 22, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee
reported its version of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 5384
(S.Rept. 109-266), which contained a provision (Section 755) that would have
liberalized travel to Cuba related to the sale of agricultural and medical goods. The
provision would have provided for such travel under a general license, instead of
under a specific license as currently required, issued on a case-by-case basis by the
Treasury Department. Final action on the bill was not completed before the end of
the 109th Congress. Similar Senate provisions in FY2004 and FY2005 agricultural
appropriations bills were stripped out of the final enacted measures.
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several
years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling
agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign
assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance
such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with
financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods
from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct
business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that
TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received
by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at

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which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress
strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the intent
of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba.
OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the
common understanding of the term in international trade.”25 On July 29, 2005,
OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign
bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at
ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims
while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005
amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were pleased by the
clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February rule.26
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased more than $1.5 billion in agricultural
products from the United States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to about
$7 million in 2001, $146 million in 2002, $259 million in 2003, $404 million in
2004, $369 million in 2005, and $324 for the first 11 months of 2006, the majority
in agricultural products. In the first seven months of 2005, U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba had fallen by 25%, but rebounded beginning in August 2005 so that for the
year overall, U.S. exports to Cuba had declined just 8.7% compared to 2004.27 The
rebound in U.S. exports to Cuba in the second half of 2005 coincided with OFAC’s
late July 2005 clarification regarding “payment of cash in advance” noted above.
The Cuban government maintains that the overall decline in U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba in 2005 was because of the stricter U.S. regulations. Other
observers maintain that the decline was in part a result of Cuba’s efforts to influence
U.S. companies, local and state officials, and Members to lobby for changes in U.S.
policy.28

Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba.
They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban
population. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of restrictions on
agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market
of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some exporters want
to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to
Cuba.29 Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on
25 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before
the House Committee on Agriculture, Mar. 16, 2005.
26 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents
on Nominees,” International Trade Reporter, Aug. 4, 2005.
27 World Trade Atlas. Department of Commerce Statistics.
28 Jane Bussey, “Export Reversal, Food Exports to Cuba Dipped by 11% in 2005,” Miami
Herald, Feb. 25, 2006.
29 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal, Feb.
11, 2003.

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financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies
expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.30
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba
maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the
large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department,
since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed
billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that
easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and
extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that
could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural
producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing
for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.
Legislative Initiatives. In the second session of the 109th Congress, both the
House-passed and Senate Appropriations Committee-reported versions of the
FY2007 Transportation/Treasury appropriation bill, H.R. 5576, contained a
provision that would have prohibited funds from being used to implement the
February 2005 tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to
Cuba. The House provision (Section 950) was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran,
Kansas), which was adopted by voice vote on June 14, 2006. The Senate provision
(Section 846) was in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill
reported on July 26, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-293); it was added by an amendment offered
by Senator Dorgan by voice vote during the committee’s July 20, 2006, markup of
the bill. The Administration’s Statement of Policy on the bill had a presidential veto
threat if the bill contained any provision weakening Cuba sanctions. Action on H.R.
5576 was not completed by the end of the 109th Congress, so final action on FY2007
Transportation/Treasury appropriations will be completed in 2007.
Also in the second session, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its
version of the FY2007 Agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 5384 (S.Rept. 109-266),
which contains a provision (Section 755) liberalizing travel to Cuba related to the
sale of agricultural and medical goods. It would have provided for such travel under
a general license, instead of under a specific license currently issued by the Treasury
Department on a case-by-case basis. Action on H.R. 5384 was not completed by the
end of the 109th Congress, so FY2007 agriculture appropriations will need to be
addressed in the new Congress.
Trademark Sanction31
A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of
Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the
United States from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from
30 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III, No. 7, Feb. 17, 2003.
31 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of
Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.

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Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in
Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has
consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks
without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based
Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government
to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi, whose company in Cuba was
expropriated in the 1960s, maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name.
Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because
of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement
proceedings in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO
ultimately found that the trademark sanction violated WTO provisions on national
treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.32
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into
compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.33
That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken
to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005,
however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request
authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.34 On August 3, 2006,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club
trademark registration was “cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a
Cuban government company the license that it needed to renew the registration of
the trademark.35
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211
would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited
to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the
United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed
32 For more detailed information on the case, see CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute
Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and CRS
Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
33 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside
U.S. Trade, Apr. 12, 2002.
34 “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 15, 2005.
35 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,”
International Trade Daily, Aug. 10, 2006.

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CRS-20
is based on a foreign compensation.”36 Others want Section 211 repealed altogether.
They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.37 They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against
U.S. companies under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection.
Several legislative initiatives in the 108th and 109th Congresses would have
repealed the Section 211 trademark provision from law, while other bills would
have advanced the narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the WTO
ruling, but no action was taken on these measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral
agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United States, but
reserved the right to do so at a later date, reduced pressure on Congress to take
action to comply with the WTO ruling.
Offshore Oil Sector Development
The issue of Cuba’s development of its offshore oil reserves along its northwest
coast, which reportedly could amount to more than 5 billion barrels of oil, has been
a concern among some Members of Congress. Cuba has signed agreements with
four foreign oil companies — Repsol (Spain), Sherritt International (Canada),
Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC (India) — for the exploration of offshore oil
and gas. Some Members expressed concern about the oil development so close to
the United States and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast.
In the 109th Congress, legislation was introduced in both houses — H.R. 5292
(Ros-Lehtinen), S. 2682 (Nelson), and S. 2795 (Martinez) — that would have
imposed sanctions related to Cuba’s offshore oil development on its northern coast.
In contrast, other Members introduced legislation, H.R. 5353 (Flake) and S. 2787
(Craig), that would have authorized U.S. companies to work with Cuba for the
offshore exploitation and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern coast. They argued
that U.S. companies’ involvement in Cuba’s offshore oil development would
reduce the likelihood of potential environmental damage caused by an oil spill.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations
in the United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed
concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as
increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of
measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for
traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with
a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics
agreements with 33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others,
36 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An
Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
37 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, Apr. 1, 2002.

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CRS-21
according to the Department of State. In 2003, Cuba began nationwide multi-
agency anti-drug efforts: Operation Hatchet III, focusing on maritime and air
interdiction; and Operation Popular Shield, focusing on investigations.
There has been a mixed record of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts.
In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6
tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba
turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation
and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the United States.
Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana
to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted an upgrading
of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast
Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist
(DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted
to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination
has increased somewhat.
The State Department, in its March 2006 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, maintains narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis
through the Coast Guard specialist. The report notes that Cuba has provided to the
investigation information to the United States on narcotics trafficking cases as well
as information on suspect vessels and aircraft. The report contends, however, that
Cuba consistently seeks to engage U.S. cooperation on counternarcotics efforts in
order “to project an aura of normalization with the United States.” The report
maintains that broader cooperation with Cuba, such as through a bilateral agreement,
is not possible until Cuba “abandons its totalitarian character and its role as a state
sponsor of terrorism.”
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat
drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug
cooperation agreement with the United States.38 In January 2002, Cuba deported to
the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in
early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael
Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s
actions, but indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not
through a bilateral agreement.39
Legislative Initiatives. Over the past several years, House and Senate
versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills have contained contrasting
38 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and
the State Department in Washington proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism,
and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Prominent Drug
Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, Mar. 17,
2002; “Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, Apr. 8, 2006.
39 Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-Drug Accord,” Reuters, Mar.
19, 2002.

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CRS-22
provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on counternarcotics efforts.
House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while Senate versions
would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included
in enacted measures.
In the second session of the 109th Congress, the House-passed provision of the
FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 5522, included a provision
that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds could
be made available to the Cuban government. The report to the bill (H.Rept. 109-
486) maintained that full reporting and transparency by the Cuban government and
U.S. monitoring of counternarcotics assistance in Cuba would be difficult, if not
impossible, given Cuba’s hostility toward the U.S. government. As in past years, the
Senate version of the bill had a provision, in Section 551(e), that would have
provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish cooperation
with Cuba on counternarcotics matters. The money would not have been available
if the President certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to
protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection
with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the
Cuban government in drug trafficking. Final action on H.R. 5522 was not completed
before the end of the 109th Congress.
Cuba and Terrorism40
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism
and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a long history of
supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa,
but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was
a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 report (issued in April 2006),
Cuba has “actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the
global war on terror and has publicly condemned various U.S. polices and action.”
The State Department report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships
with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea and has
provided safe haven for members of several foreign terrorist organizations. The
report maintained that Cuba provides safe haven to various Basque Homeland and
Freedom (ETA) members from Spain and to members of two Colombian insurgent
groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN), although the report also maintained that there is no
information concerning terrorist activities of these or other organizations in Cuba.
The State Department’s 2002 and 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism reports
40 For further information, see CRS Report RL32551, Cuba and the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.

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CRS-23
acknowledged that Colombia acquiesced to this arrangement and that Colombia
publicly said that it wanted Cuba’s continued mediation with the ELN in Cuba.
Since December 2005, the Colombian government and the ELN have held four
rounds of exploratory talks in Havana, and in October 2006, the two parties
announced plans to launch a formal peace process.41
The 2005 report also maintained that Cuba permits U.S. fugitives from justice
to live legally in Cuba. Many are accused of hijacking or committing violent actions
in the United States, including Joanne Chesimard, who is wanted for the murder of
a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. The State Department report noted that most
of the fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s and that Cuba has stated that it will no
longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba. In the 109th
Congress, Section 101(1)(H) of House-passed H.R. 2601 would have authorized
funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to disseminate the names of U.S.
fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their capture. H.R. 332 (King) would
have amended the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require
that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists,
the government extradite to the United States individuals who are living in Cuba in
order to escape prosecution or confinement for a criminal offense committed in the
United States.
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that
there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the
government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin
America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members
of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining
Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They
argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and
maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles
against serious terrorist threats.
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various
terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73
people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana
and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and
several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to
death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain
that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot
to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly
involved in the 1976 Cuban airline bombing noted above.42 The four stood trial in
March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms
ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President
41 CRS Report RL32250, Colombia Issues for Congress, by Colleen Cook.
42 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald, Sept.
4, 2003.

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CRS-24
Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term.
Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received
strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles
reportedly traveled to another country.
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United
States after entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States
because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel
Castro.43 Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the
bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from
prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden.44 He had been
acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal.45
Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of
bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.46 U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada on May 17, 2005, and
subsequently charged him with illegally entering the United States. A Department
of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not generally deport
people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.47 Venezuela
requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to
Cuba, but on September 26, 2005, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that Posada likely
faced torture in Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with U.S.
obligations under the Convention Against Torture.48 ICE reviewed the case and
determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would not be freed from a federal
immigration facility in El Paso, Texas.49
In November 2006, however, a U.S. federal judge, who is considering Posada’s
plea that he be released, ordered the government to supply evidence, by February 1,
2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a federal grand jury
in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the United
States illegally in March 2005, an indictment that could justify his continued
detention. The Cuban government responded by maintaining that Posada needs to
43 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami
Herald, Apr. 14, 2005.
44 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post, Apr.
17, 2005.
45 Although Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian
trial. Reportedly a first set of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a
second set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada escaped during that time in 1985.
See Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.
46 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005.
47 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
48 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,”
Associated Press, Sept. 28, 2005.
49 Oscar Corral, “Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Denied Release,” Miami Herald, Mar.
22, 2006.

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be charged with terrorism, not just lying about how he entered the United States.
Another grand jury in New Jersey is reportedly examining Posada’s alleged role in
the 1997 bombings in Cuba.50
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Over the past several years, the United States provided assistance — primarily
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through
the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — to
increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba.
USAID’s Cuba program supports a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental
organizations to promote rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, help develop civil
society, and build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.51 These efforts are
largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign
operations appropriations bill. Funding for such projects amounted to about $5
million for each of FY2001 and FY2002, $6 million in FY2003, $21.4 million in
FY2004 (because of re-programmed ESF assistance to fund the democracy-building
recommendations of the Commission to Provide Assistance for a Free Cuba), $8.9
million in FY2005, and an estimated $10.9 million in FY2006.
For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the
recommendations of the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and
to support USAID-administrated democracy and human rights programs. The report
to the House-passed version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations bill,
H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of USAID in promoting
democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue
to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522
(S.Rept. 109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs,
$6.5 million less than the Administration’s request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was
not completed before the end of the 109th Congress, so action on FY2007 Foreign
Operations appropriations will be completed in 2007. The July 2006 report of the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba recommended, in addition to current
funding, $80 million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s
transition to democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba
democracy programs.
The NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba is funded largely through the
annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, although NED
has also received some State Department ESF for its Cuba program. NED funding
for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001;
50 Alfonso Chardy and Jay Weaver, “Posada a Target of New Federal Probes,” Miami
Herald, Nov. 12, 2006, and “Grand Jury Indicts Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Carriles,”
Miami Herald, Jan. 12, 2007.
51 See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america
_caribbean/country/cuba/].

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CRS-26
$841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For
FY2005, NED funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million.
In mid-November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and
concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better
management and oversight. According to GAO, internal controls, for both the
awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in
compliance with applicable law and regulations.”52 Investigative news reports on
the program maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished
its effectiveness.53 Representative William Delahunt, who along with
Representative Jeff Flake had requested the GAO study, promised hearings on the
Cuba democracy funding in the 110th Congress.
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba —
Radio and TV Marti — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2007 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Marti are 1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; 2) to be
effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through use
of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable
and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to
provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and
elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the
Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV
Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress
(P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south
Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Marti broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours
six days per week, and for18 hours one day per week. TV Marti broadcasts 24 hours
a day, seven days a week on the Hispasat satellite and is also available on the
Internet 24 hours a day. Until July 2005, TV Marti had also been broadcast via
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs
Better Management and Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
53 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami
Herald, Nov. 14, 2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, Nov. 15,
2006.

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CRS-27
blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but
the aerostats were destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. Since mid-2004, both Radio and
TV Marti programming have been transmitted for several hours once a week via
airborne broadcasts conducted by the Air Force. Since August 2006, a dedicated
contracted private aircraft has been used to transmit TV Marti Monday through
Saturday evenings, and Radio Marti broadcasts will reportedly be added in the
future.54 In addition, the OCB contracted with a private U.S. commercial television
station to broadcast some TV Marti programs daily, beginning on December 18,
2006. OCB also contracted with a private commercial radio station in Miami, Radio
Mambi, to broadcast some Radio Marti programming.55
Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies,
including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been
various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV
Marti, which has not had an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. Various
studies and audits of these programs have been conducted, including investigations
by the U.S. General Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established
Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, and by the State Department’s and BBG’s
Inspector General offices in 1999 and 2003.56 More recently, in December 2006,
press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s operations, with claims of
cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.57
From FY1984 through FY2006, about $530 million has been spent for
broadcasting to Cuba, with about $316 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984) and
$214 million for TV Marti (since FY1989).
Debate on TV Marti. In the various congressional debates on TV Marti over
the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain that virtually the
54 “TV Marti Broadcasts to Cuba Have Increased to Six-Times-a-Week,” Miami Herald,
Aug. 6, 2006.
55 Christina Hoag, “Radio, TV Marti To Be Aired Locally,” Miami Herald, Dec. 19, 2006.
56 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV
Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements,
GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon.
John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, Feb. 17,
1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio and
TV Marti, Three Volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review
Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S.
Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Inspector General, Review of Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti
Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010, June 1999; U.S. Department of
State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of the
Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program
Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-03-01, January 2003.
57 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Marti Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald, Dec.
18, 2006, and “Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, Dec. 19, 2006.

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only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular
section of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which
TV Marti may be viewed. These critics argue that some $190 million has been
spent by the United States for TV Marti, while the Cuban government only needs
to spend a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcasts effectively. They argue that
TV Marti is a waste of taxpayers’ money because it does not contribute to the
promotion of freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which some
Cubans listen to as a source of information. Opponents also argue that the
conversion of TV Marti from VHF to UHF transmission has not succeeded in
overcoming Cuba’s jamming efforts.
In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a
congressionally mandated Advisory Panel in 1994, which stated that “the Cuban
people have an ardent desire and a genuine need to receive the programming
produced by TV Marti.”58 Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send
a message to the Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause
of freedom in Cuba. They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to
the dictatorial Castro government, which suppresses the free flow of information in
Cuba. These proponents contend that it is impossible for the Cuban government to
completely jam TV Marti, and maintain that significant numbers of Cubans have
attempted to tune in to the programming. Still others point to the potential use of
TV Marti in the event of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba’s future, and argue that in such
a scenario, it would be important to have TV Marti available as a news source.
FY2007 Request. The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7 million of this to purchase an aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The request was slightly below the $37.129 million
appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request to
acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts
to Cuba), but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in FY2005.
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice,
Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba
broadcasting under the International Broadcasting Operations account. The report
to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for Cuba broadcasting,
including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Marti. The Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report
to the bill (S.Rept. 109-277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s
request of $36.279 million. Final action was not completed on either bill before the
end of the 109th Congress, so the 110th Congress may face action in 2007.
Migration Issues
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995
designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States
by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which
58 Advisory Panel on Radio Marti and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
Marti and TV Marti, Executive Summary, March 1994.

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125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In
response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S.
resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans,
on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy,
under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United
States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans
rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change
in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change
of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to
all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take
measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to
enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries
would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no
action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of
their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and
housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled
into the United States.
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country,
while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and
then found asylum in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed
to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has
been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make
it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that
U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not
they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in
recent years, from 931 in 2002 to 1,464 in 2003 and 1,499 in 2004. In 2005, 2,952
Cubans were interdicted, almost twice the number of Cubans interdicted in 2004,
but in 2006, the number of interdictions declined to 2,293 for the year.59
59 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement,
“Total Interdictions, Calender Year 1982 to Present,” Apr. 28, 2006.

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U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent
years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in
which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials
have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In July 2003, a U.S. federal
court in Florida convicted a Cuban national for hijacking a plane to Key West on
April 1, 2003. Another six Cubans were convicted in Key West in December 2003
for hijacking a Cubana Airlines plane to Florida earlier in the year.
The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging
in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against
those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a
life sentence may be imposed. On April 11, 2003, the Cuban government executed
three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April 2 in an attempt to reach the
United States. The ferry hijacking had been preceded by the hijacking of two small
planes to the United States. The summary execution prompted worldwide
condemnation of the Cuban government. The Cuban government maintained that
it took the action to prevent additional hijackings.
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 31, 2006, announcement that he was
temporarily ceding political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security
officials announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives
on the open seas. On August 11, 2006, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban people to stay on the island”
and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in order to travel
to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United
States. The measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of
Cuban migrants admitted to the United States each year who have family members
in the United States, although the overall number of Cubans admitted to the United
States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans who attempt to enter the United
States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new family reunification
procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries will be allowed to
enter the United States; their families in Cuba will also be allowed to enter the
United States.60
Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba
and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and
1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks
scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since.
According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified
migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant
lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the
60 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Additional Measures to Combat
Alien Smuggling of Cubans,” and “USCIS Will Further Strengthen Measures that Support
the Reunification of Families Separated by the Castro Regime,” Press Releases, Aug. 11,
2006.

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repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S.
diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept
the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.61
In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S.
decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues
raised by the United States.62
Guantanamo Naval Base
The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a
U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S.
presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the
United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the
new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments,
including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however,
as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence
as illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base
was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to
the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential
military operations in the region. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house
thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of the
refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant
to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while
a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to
Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country.
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global
campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States decided to send some captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be
imprisoned in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected to the
U.S. presence at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing
detainees. Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a
prisoner would escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and
return him to the base.63 The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns
about the treatment of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing
the international community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects.64 In
61 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. Jan. 7,
2004.
62 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, Jan. 8, 2004.
63 “Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raúl Castro Says,” Miami Herald, Jan. 20, 2002.
64 For information on terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo, see CRS Report RL31367,
Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

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January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the
Guantanamo base.65
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states
that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to
be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to
renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.
Legislation in the 109th Congress
The following listing consists of enacted appropriations measures with Cuba-
related provisions, FY2007 appropriations bills with Cuba provisions that were not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress, and human rights resolutions that were
approved. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives in the 109th Congress, see
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress.
Appropriations Measures
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs. Signed into law November 14, 2005. Funds FY2006
democracy and human rights funding for Cuba. The Administration requested $15
million in ESF assistance for democracy activities for Cuba. Neither the House nor
the Senate versions addressed this issue, and the conference report did not include
a specific earmark for Cuba.
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee
(H.Rept. 109-118). House passed June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005.
Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed November 7, 2005. House approved
conference November 9; Senate approved conference November 16, 2005. Signed
into law November 22, 2005. The report to the House bill included a committee
recommendation of $27.9 million for Cuba broadcasting, $10 million below the
Administration’s request, and did not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit
Radio and TV Marti programming. Senate action on appropriations for Cuba
broadcasting were included in the Senate version of H.R. 3057 rather than H.R.
2862, and fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million. The
conference report fully funds the Administration’s request of $37.7 million for
Broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations account.
H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23,
2006. Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-266). The Senate version contains a provision, Section 755, providing for travel
to Cuba under a general license for travel related to the sale of agricultural and
65 Ana Radelat, “Cuba Turns Up Rhetoric on Guantanamo as UN Condemns Human Rights
Abuses,” CubaNews, April 2005.

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medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a specific license
issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs. Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006.
The Senate Appropriations reported its version of the bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept.
109-277). With regard to Cuba democracy programs, the Senate-reported version
recommended $2.5 million in ESF, $6.5 million less than the request, while the
House report to the bill recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and
humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its
Cuba program. With regard to counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, the House-
passed bill, in Section 570, would have provided that no International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds may be made available for Cuba,
while the Senate-reported version, in Section 551(e), would have provided $5
million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba.
The money would not be available if the President certified that Cuba did not have
in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air
and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was
evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in drug trafficking. The Senate-
reported version also would have funded Cuba broadcasting, with the Senate report
to the bill recommending full funding of the Administration’s $36.279 million
request. The House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in H.R. 5672, the
FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations
bill, described below. Final action was not completed before the end of the 109th
Congress.
H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced June 9, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed (406-22) June 14,
2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July 26,
2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section
950 in the House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds
from being used to implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba that were issued in February 2005. In the House bill,
the provision was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran, Kansas), approved by voice vote
during floor consideration on June 14, 2006. Final action on the measure was not
completed by the end of the 109th Congress.
H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related
Agencies appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As
approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the International Broadcasting
Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102 million for Cuba
broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via
aerostat for broadcasting TV Marti. Final action on the measure was not completed
before the end of the 109th Congress.

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Human Rights Resolutions
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 2,
2005; approved by the House Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005.
House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27, 2005.
H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of
Representatives to the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005;
approved by the Committee on International Relations April 27, 2005. House
passed (392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of
Representatives regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against
members of Cuba’s pro-democracy movement in July 2005; condemns gross human
rights violations committed by the Cuban regime; calls on the Secretary of State to
initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of the immediate release of
all Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine its current
policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations and other international organizations to work with member
countries of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong
resolution on Cuba at the 62nd session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005.
House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12,
2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman). Condemns the April 25, 2006, beating and
intimidation of Cuban dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Introduced May 8, 2006;
Senate passed May 25, 2006, by unanimous consent.
Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress
H.R. 177 (Lee). Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2007. Prohibits
the use of funds available to the Department of the Treasury to implement
regulations from June 2004 that tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba for
educational activities. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 216 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions
with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized
baseball. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs
and Judiciary.

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H.R. 217 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo.
Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal
of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments with
respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial
Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 525 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected
government in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted
felon William Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to
escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United
States. Introduced January 17, 2007; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33551, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies (TTHUD): FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL32905, Transportation, the Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, the Executive Office of
the President and Independent Agencies: FY2006 Appropriations, coordinated
by David Randall Peterman and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL33412, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2007 Appropriations,
coordinated by Jim Monke.
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba after Fidel Castro: U.S. Policy Implications and
Approaches, by Mark P Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales.

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CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An
Overview, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and
Issues Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006
Appropriations and FY2007 Request, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by
David M. Ackerman.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in
Pending Cases, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.

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