Order Code RL33814
Public Financing of Congressional Elections:
Background and Analysis
January 22, 2007
Joseph E. Cantor
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

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Public Financing of Congressional Elections:
Background and Analysis
Summary
Since the early 20th century, Congress has legislated in the area of campaign
financing in federal elections, enacting major statutes that have sought to prevent real
or apparent corrupt electoral practices and to curb undue influence by wealthy
individuals and interest groups. It has done so by requiring disclosure, limiting or
banning certain sources of funds, and limiting certain expenditures.

To many critics of the federal campaign finance system, public funding of
elections, generally in conjunction with campaign spending limits, is the ultimate
solution to the perceived problems arising from ever-growing costs of campaigns and
the accompanying need for campaign funds from private donors. Public financing
supporters maintain that replacing private sources of funds with public money would
most effectively reduce potentially corrupting influence from private, “interested”
money. On the other hand, opponents of public financing question whether real or
apparent corruption from private fundraising is as serious a problem as critics claim.
They also argue that public financing would be an inappropriate use of taxpayer
dollars and would compel taxpayers to fund candidates they find objectionable.
In the early 1970s, supporters succeeded in enacting public financing in
presidential elections, a system which has been available since 1976. In addition,
many states and localities have provided public financing in their elections since the
1970s (and sometimes before). Today, 16 states offer some form of direct aid to
candidates’ campaigns, through fixed subsidies or matching funds. Perceptions about
the presidential and state public financing systems have shaped opinions about
adding public financing to congressional elections. Also shaping that debate was the
Supreme Court’s landmark 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling, which struck down
mandatory spending limits, but sanctioned spending limits which were voluntarily
accepted, such as those in conjunction with a public finance system.
Proposals for publicly funded congressional elections have been offered in
almost every Congress since 1956, and the issue was prominently debated in the mid-
1970s and the late 1980s through early 1990s. Proposals were passed twice by the
Senate in the 93rd Congress and by both the House and Senate in the 101st, 102nd, and
103rd Congresses. Only the 102nd Congress proposal was reconciled in conference
and sent to the President, who vetoed it. During the 101st through 103rd Congresses,
resistance to public funding was sufficiently strong, in part reflecting perceived lack
of public support, that the role of public funds per se was reduced in an effort to gain
support, while the broader concept of public benefits (more indirect or government-
mandated assistance to candidates) became more prominent in Congress.
This report reviews past proposals for and debate over congressional public
financing and the experiences with the presidential and state systems; and it offers
potential considerations for Congress in devising such a system for its elections,
should it choose to do so. The report will be updated periodically, on the basis of
congressional and state activity.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Underpinnings of Contemporary Congressional Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Presidential System Since the 1970s: A Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Linkage with Spending Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Arguments Supporting and Opposing Public Financing: Brief Overview . . . 7
Supporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Opposing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Legislative Proposals for Public Financing of Congressional Elections . . . . . . . . 9
Evolution During the Early 20th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
First Public Finance Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1950s and 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Congressional Activity Since the Mid-1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
90th Congress (1967-1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
92nd Congress (1971-1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
93rd Congress (1973-1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
94th Congress (1975-1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
95th Congress (1977-1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
96th Congress (1979-1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
97th — 99th Congresses (1981-1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
100th Congress (1987-1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
101st Congress (1989-1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
102nd Congress (1991-1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
103rd Congress (1993-1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
104th — 109th Congresses (1995-2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Devising a Congressional Public Finance System:
Options for Policymakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Setting Expenditure Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Coverage: General Elections Only or Primary Elections, Too? . . . . . . 27
Conditions for Receipt of Public Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Qualifying Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Public Funds: Matching Funds or Fixed Subsidies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Public Benefits Other Than Direct Subsidies to Candidates . . . . . . . . 29
Protecting Participants from Free-Spending Opponents
and Outside Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Other Disincentives Toward Non-Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Conditional Public Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Paying for Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
State Experiences with Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Types of Public Financing
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Eligibility and Conditions for Public Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Participation by Candidates
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Impact of Public Financing in the States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Money and Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

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Time Spent Fundraising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Diversity Among Candidates and Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Impact of Recent Public Financing Efforts in
Arizona and Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Public Opinion on Public Financing
and Spending Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Potential Considerations for Congressional Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix 1:
Public Finance Bills Passed by the House or Senate: 1973 — 1993 . . . . . . 60
Appendix 2:
Public Finance Bills in the 109th Congress: Summary of Key Provisions . . 70
List of Figures
Figure 1. States Offering Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 2. Types of Public Financing Offered in the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
List of Tables
Table 1. States Offering Public Financing to Statewide or
Legislative Candidate Campaigns* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 2. Congressional Election Public Finance Bills
Passed by House or Senate: Summary of Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

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Public Financing of Congressional Elections:
Background and Analysis
Introduction
Overview of Report
This first section provides the context for the debate on extending public
financing to congressional elections, beginning with a discussion of two major
political realities that inform that debate. The first is the presidential public financing
system that has been in place since 1976 and has had mixed success in realizing the
goals of its original sponsors. The second is the interplay between the concepts of
public financing and campaign spending limits, which are often linked but which
have very distinct characteristics; the 1976 landmark Supreme Court decision in
Buckley v. Valeo contributed to that linkage because of its allowance for only
voluntary spending limits, such as in conjunction with a public financing system.
The section concludes with a summary of arguments for and against public financing,
arguments which have not changed in essence over time but which have been shaped
by the political realities noted above.
The second section provides a historical review of efforts in Congress to enact
public financing of its elections (although some attention is paid to presidential
public financing as a precursor). The section begins with a brief review of early
congressional interest and activity in the 20th century, followed by a more detailed
Congress-by-Congress discussion beginning with the 90th Congress. Special
attention is paid to the two periods in which congressional activity on public
financing was the greatest: the Watergate-focused 93rd Congress and the 100th —
103rd Congresses. Public finance bills were passed by at least one chamber in those
two periods, although the latter period was marked by a move toward downplaying
public funds per se in favor of the broader concept of public benefits. The section
concludes with a review of the major features of congressional proposals, presented
as policy options to choose from in devising a congressional public finance system.
The third section examines the experience of the 16 states which provide some
form of public subsidies to candidates for state office. This section features a table
(Table 1) detailing these systems, and concludes with an analysis of the impact of
public finance programs in the states.
The fourth section offers a discussion of public opinion data on support for
public financing of elections, as well as for the related idea of campaign spending
limits. Public opinion is not as extensive on these questions as in the 1970s, when
the idea of public financing was particularly prominent.

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The final section reviews the experience from public finance systems at both the
state and presidential levels to offer some overarching observations for Congress
possibly to consider in devising a public finance system for its elections, should it
choose to do so.
The report concludes with two appendices, to augment the information in the
section on congressional proposals. The first appendix is a table (Table 2) providing
details of the public finance (or benefits) measures that have passed either chamber
(from 1973 - 1993); because they passed at least one chamber, these bills are perhaps
the most important for Congress to review before beginning a fresher look at the idea.
The second appendix provides a summary of the four public finance bills proposed
in the 109th Congress, to allow a more contemporary look at how recent public
finance proposals have evolved.
Underpinnings of Contemporary Congressional Debate
While public financing of congressional elections has been advocated for a
century, contemporary discussions of these proposals are informed by two basic
political realities of the past 30 years. First, the nation has had public financing in
presidential elections since 1976, and that system serves both as a model for
proposals to extend it to congressional elections and as a case study of how a
congressional system should and should not be structured. Second, in striking down
mandatory expenditure limits in 1976 while allowing voluntary limits in the context
of a public finance system, the Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo1 ruling resulted in
a closer linkage in the minds of policymakers between the distinct concepts of public
subsidies for election campaigns and limitations on campaign spending.
Presidential System Since the 1970s: A Model. Since 1976, public
funds have helped finance presidential elections, with the level of funds determined
by a taxpayer designations on a voluntary checkoff. This system was established
initially under the Revenue Act of 19712 and augmented by the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974.3 Candidates who meet eligibility
requirements and agree to voluntary limits on campaign expenditures are eligible for
matching funds in the primaries. In the general election, major party candidates
automatically qualify for full subsidies equal to the spending limit (in 2004, John
Kerry and George W. Bush each received $74.6 million for their fall campaigns);
minor party and independent candidates may also qualify for public funds by meeting
specified criteria. Also, political parties may receive funding for their nominating
conventions. As of June 2006, $1.435 billion has been “checked off” since the
option first appeared on tax forms in 1973, and candidates and parties have received
$1.332 billion in this manner since the 1976 election.
After three decades, presidential election public funding is by no means a
universally supported program, as reflected in declining taxpayer checkoffs (from a
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 P.L. 92-178; 85 Stat. 573.
3 P.L. 93-443; 86 Stat. 3.

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CRS-3
high of 28.7% of taxpayers checking “yes” on 1980 returns to 9.2% doing so on 2004
returns), attempts in the 102nd and 104th Congresses to end the system, and decisions
by major candidates to forgo public funding in the 2000 and 2004 primaries. While
supporters say that the system has curbed campaign spending and reliance on private
resources, opponents point to the large amounts of private funds spent in unregulated
ways, thus undermining the spending limits — a prime reason for giving public
funds.
Underlying most evaluations are sharply opposing views of public funding, a
divergence little changed from the start. Supporters see it as a democratic, egalitarian
system, offering the best chance to reduce the potentially corrosive effects of money
on the political process and renew public confidence in that process. Opponents see
public funding as a waste of tax money, which artificially skews the results and
forces taxpayers to fund candidates whom they oppose.
While candidate-controlled spending (subject to limits) may have been curbed
from pre-1976 levels, other forms of spending to benefit candidates have emerged
which have increasingly served to circumvent the spending limits. Even in the
general election, in which major party nominees are “fully funded” with public
monies, additional spending by parties and groups has arguably undermined the
intent of overall limits (most notably through party soft money,4 issue advocacy
messages, and activities by groups operating under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code5). Critics view this as an inherent obstacle to efforts to limit
spending; supporters see it as a problem that can and should be corrected to protect
the integrity of the system.
Few would argue that the presidential public finance system has freed
candidates from dependence on private money, but to the extent that large amounts
of public funds have been available, money’s perceived influence may have declined.
Moreover, what many see as the burden and distraction of fundraising has been
lessened, particularly for major party nominees. It is also true, however, that soft
money has allowed the wealthy again to make very large donations, through the
parties up until 2002 and most recently through 527 organizations, raising issues
comparable to those raised by the system in place prior to FECA.
Public funding supporters argue that the system has helped unknown candidates
attain far greater visibility, even to reach the point of nomination and election. In
4 “Soft money” generally is used to refer to money that may influence federal elections but
is raised and spent outside the purview of federal election laws and would be illegal if spent
directly on a federal election by a candidate, party, or political action committee (PAC).
Prior to enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), national
parties made extensive efforts to raise such money for their state affiliates, partly to boost
the national tickets beyond what could be spent directly.
5 Strictly speaking, the term “527” refers to a section of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides tax-exempt status to federal, state, and local political organizations, as defined in
that statute. Although most 527s operating today are also political committees operating
under federal and state election law, certain groups with 527 status are arguably not being
so regulated because their public communications do not contain express advocacy language
which has generally been held to be the standard for election law regulation.

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CRS-4
three of the eight presidential elections from 1976 to 2004 in which an incumbent
was seeking reelection, a challenger (historically underfunded) has defeated an
incumbent President.
While it is undeniable that the system forces taxpayers in effect to fund
candidates they may find repugnant, the prediction that public funding would
encourage fringe candidacies and thus “waste” public resources has largely not been
realized. Counting Lyndon LaRouche (who ran as a Democrat from 1980 to 2004)
and 11 minor party candidates who qualified for funding as “fringe” candidates, and
adding the $12.6 million in subsidies paid to the Reform Party for its 2000
convention, CRS calculations based on data compiled by the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) show that the $64.2 million they received is only 4.8% of all
public funding since 1976.6
The relative support and acceptance of public funding has varied. Support has
been strong among candidates (at least until 2000), the media, citizens’ groups, and
various outside panels studying the political process. But mass public acceptance has
not developed. Low checkoff rates mirror the fairly consistent opposition in opinion
polls to public financing per se, although support generally rises when the question
is posed as public funding with limits on spending and interest groups. (Public
opinion about public financing and expenditure limits is discussed later in this
report.)
Opponents note that public financing has not stemmed the decline in confidence
in the political system registered in opinion polls of the past 30 years. Supporters say
that such data argue for further reforms in the system and even the extension of
public funding to congressional races. They also insist that one must consider how
much worse the presidential system might be today were it not for public funding
(especially given the limits on contributions without mandatory spending limits).
Critics do not disagree that presidential elections are cleaner today than before 1976,
but insist that FECA’s disclosure provisions and funding source limits are far more
important factors than public funding.
Even among those who generally support the presidential public funding system,
concerns that structural problems have greatly eroded the system’s value have led to
recent calls for major amendments to bolster it. Thus, while the presidential public
funding system is an integral part of elections today, its future is by no means
certain.7
Linkage with Spending Limits. At the outset of any discussion on public
financing proposals, it is important to address the question of expenditure limits
because, almost invariably, legislative proposals for public funding are linked with
candidates’ adherence to spending limits. Despite this common linkage, public
6 Federal Election Commission, “Presidential Matching Fund Income Tax Checkoff Status,”
June 2006.
7 For a fuller explanation and discussion of the presidential system, see CRS Report
RL32786, The Presidential Election Campaign Fund and Tax Checkoff: Background and
Current Issues, by Joseph E. Cantor. (This section is excerpted from that report.)

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CRS-5
financing and spending limits are distinct concepts, with distinct potential benefits
and drawbacks. Public financing of elections, at its core, is aimed at reducing
reliance by politicians on private, interested sources of money for their elections.
Expenditure limits are essentially aimed at curbing rising and, in the view of many,
excessive amounts of money spent on elections.
In fact, from the time public financing was first proposed by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1907 until the Supreme Court’s 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo (424
U.S. 1 (1976)), the impetus for passage stemmed more from the concern over the
source of campaign money than the overall amount spent. In that landmark ruling,
the Court struck down mandatory spending limits (such as those imposed on
congressional candidates by the FECA Amendments of 1974), but allowed that in a
voluntary system of public financing, it was permissible to require candidate
adherence to spending limits as a condition of a government-provided benefit (i.e.,
public funds).8 Hence, spending limits in conjunction with public funding would be
permissible because candidates voluntarily accepted them.
In light of the Buckley decision, the prevailing view among policymakers has
been that public financing offers the only realistic means of controlling campaign
expenditures in congressional elections, short of enacting a constitutional amendment
to allow mandatory limits (which Congress has refused to support on several
occasions). Furthermore, the impetus for such a plan has appeared to shift more
toward controlling the level of spending than toward addressing the source of
campaign money, although the two are closely related. Indeed, even some who have
had reservations about public financing have moved to support it, as a last resort, to
curb rising campaign costs.
Invariably, assessments of potential effects of public funding are often tangled
up with those of the expenditure limits which generally accompany them. While
there are distinct reasons to favor public funding per se, perhaps its greatest appeal
has become its inducement to candidate acceptance of spending limits. It is
important to distinguish between the comparative merits and potential drawbacks of
each, however. Opponents of proposals advanced in recent years have charged that
public financing would constitute an “incumbent protection” measure. Yet, that
charge appears more appropriately leveled against spending limits, not public
funding. It is widely believed among political scientists that spending limits, equally
applied to both candidates in a race, would tend to work to the advantage of the
incumbent, who begins with greater name recognition and the resources associated
with office.9 While the spending limit aspect of a public finance system may thus
8 Footnote 65 in Buckley stated: “Congress may engage in public financing of election
campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate
to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the
size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forego private fundraising
and accept public funding.”
9 See, for example, Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), pp. 183-190; Citizens Research Foundation, New Realities, New
Thinking: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, University of Southern
(continued...)

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CRS-6
help incumbents more than challengers, it is also arguable that public subsidies (and
cost-reducing public benefits) could assist the challenger more than the incumbent,
especially where the challenger is, as is often the case, greatly underfunded compared
with the incumbent.
But if the political science community has generally looked with greater favor
on public funding (to enhance competition) than on spending limits (which could
stifle competition),10 it is also the case that public opinion has generally taken an
opposite view. As is discussed later in this report, opinion surveys invariably register
strong public support for the belief that too much money is spent on elections today
and for spending limits as a solution. Findings of support for public financing per se,
however, are mixed, at best. This appears to reflect differences in how questions are
worded, but there does appear to be a strong resistance to the concept of using
taxpayer money on elections.11
The dichotomy between the perspectives of election scholars and the general
public helps to explain the course of the debate on public finance proposals over the
past 30 years. The greater public support for spending limits than public financing
explains why, during the intensive debate in the 101st through the 103rd Congresses
(discussed below), the major challenge of spending-limit supporters was to reduce
the role of public funds in their proposals. As bills advanced in those Congresses,
the goal invariably became to minimize the role of public funds, even if only to make
it more indirect. Thus, the perceptions of public opinion can help explain the
progress or lack thereof of public financing proposals in recent years.
It should be noted that some of the goals sought in the public funding and
spending limit measures have been addressed in other legislation, less sweeping yet
often with significant bipartisan support. Proposals to lower campaign costs, without
spending limits, have been prominent in Congress at least until enactment of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). Bills to provide free or reduced-
rate broadcast time and postal rates have sought to reduce campaign costs and the
need for money, without the possibly negative effects of arbitrary limits. Bills to
provide for tax credits for small individual contributions have sought to encourage
a greater role for citizens vis-a-vis organized interest groups. These measures offer
the potential of realizing some of the aims of the more comprehensive measures but
without some of the perceived pitfalls.
9 (...continued)
California, 1997, pp. 18-19 (Majority Views).
10 See, for example: Citizens Research Foundation, New Realities, New Thinking: Report of
the Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, University of Southern California, 1997, pp.
16-19 (Majority Views).
11 Relevant polling and public opinion data are discussed later in this report.

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CRS-7
Arguments Supporting and Opposing Public Financing:
Brief Overview
Supporting. A few major points are common arguments in favor of public
financing. Supporters say that public financing can reduce the threat of political
corruption, enhance electoral competition, and allow candidates to focus on issues
rather than raising money. To many observers, the amount of money spent in
elections today is arguably corrupting the political system, forcing candidates and
officeholders to spend increasing amounts of time raising money, possibly creating
pressure on them to rely on affluent individuals and special interests for campaign
assistance, conceivably deterring candidates without personal fortunes from
attempting to run for office, and leaving an impression among some voters that
elections are “bought and sold.” Accordingly, one of the most prominent goals
behind public financing is reducing the potential for corruption or the appearance of
corruption. As political scientists Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel have
explained, “Public subsidies to candidates, whether in the form of direct grants or
matching funds, are seen as a way to minimize the undue influence and corruption
often ascribed to contributors and partisan fundraising.”12 Many former lawmakers,
interest group representatives, political professionals, and academic experts
submitted written testimony for the McConnell v. FEC lawsuit heard by a U.S.
District Court and the Supreme Court of the United States in their consideration of
BCRA. Some of this testimony included empirical analysis of claims about
potentially corrupting influences from private money in campaign politics and related
issues.13
Other public financing goals relate to electoral competition. Public financing
provides candidates — regardless of personal wealth — with financial resources to
wage campaigns.14 This allows candidates who might not otherwise run for office
to do so. As is noted in the discussion of states’ experiences with public financing,
most programs require that candidates demonstrate political viability before being
eligible for funds. If more candidates have access to funds, supporters say that
electoral competition should increase.
Finally, public financing is attractive to some because it is one of the few
constitutional ways to limit campaign spending — a major concern among campaign
reformers. Although the Supreme Court’s 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling held that
campaign spending generally could not be subjected to mandatory limits, candidates
could be required to limit spending in exchange for receiving public funding. As is
12 Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel, The States of Campaign Finance Reform
(Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2003), p. 10.
13 For an overview of some of this testimony, representing support for and opposition to
BCRA, see Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, and Trevor Potter, eds., Inside the
Campaign Finance Battle: Court Testimony on the New Reforms (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003).
14 See, for example, Anthony Gierzynski, “A Framework for the Study of Campaign
Finance,” in Joel A. Thompson and Gary F. Moncrief, eds., Campaign Finance in State
Legislative Elections (Washington: CQ Press, 1998), p. 21.

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discussed elsewhere in this report, some public financing systems — including the
presidential one — are today in jeopardy because major candidates fear that
observing spending limits associated with public financing will preclude them from
spending enough money to wage competitive campaigns.
Opposing. Objections to public financing are also varied. Many are rooted in
philosophical opposition to funding elections with taxpayer money, compelling
taxpayers to support candidates whose views are antithetical to theirs, and adding
another government program in the face of some cynicism toward government
spending. Opponents also raise administrative concerns: how can a system be
devised that accounts for different natures of districts and states, with different styles
of campaigning and disparate media costs, and is fair to all candidates — incumbent,
challenger, or open-seat, major or minor party, serious or “longshot”? Similarly,
opponents assert that public financing could distort elections by imposing the same
system on 50 different states with different degrees of competitiveness in individual
races and by providing even greater advantages to incumbents than already exist,
thereby decreasing the competitiveness of elections. In view of the relatively low rate
of participation in the voluntary checkoff for the existing presidential system (9.2%
of taxpayers checked “yes” on their 2004 tax returns when asked if they wanted to
fund the system), they see little evidence that the public would favor such a plan.
Some public financing opponents believe that government-funded campaign
subsides amount to “welfare for politicians,”15 and are an inappropriate use of
taxpayer dollars.16 These opponents argue that public financing could coerce
candidates into limiting their campaign spending — viewed as a form of political
speech — in exchange for funding, or that it could force taxpayers to indirectly fund
campaign messages they might find objectionable. On a related note, opponents
suggest that public financing could waste taxpayer money on “fringe” candidates who
represent political views that may be far outside the mainstream and who have little
chance of winning elections.17
In response to arguments that public funding is necessary to limit campaign
expenditures, those opposed to public financing often argue that campaign spending
is not high, especially compared with commercial advertising budgets or spending
on consumer goods.18 They argue that worthy candidates will win public support
without government intervention via public financing. Some researchers also suggest
15 John Samples, ed., Welfare for Politicians? Taxpayer Financing of Campaigns
(Washington: Cato Institute, 2005).
16 See, for example, Thomas M. Finneran, “The Case Against Taxpayer Financing: A View
From Massachusetts,” in John Samples, ed., Welfare for Politicians? pp. 23-30.
17 See, for example, Chip Mellor, “Three Lessons from Arizona,” in John Samples, ed.,
Welfare for Politicians? p. 38.
18 See CRS Report RL33580, Campaign Finance: An Overview, by Joseph E. Cantor; and
Ruth Marcus, “Costliest Race Nears End; Bush, Gore Running Close; U.S. Campaigns Fuel
$3 Billion In Spending,” Washington Post, Nov. 6, 2000, p. A1.

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that concerns about rising campaign costs are overstated, and that most campaign
fundraising comes from individuals who give less than the legal limit.19
Finally, opponents of public financing sometimes argue that proponents fail to
sufficiently support their arguments in favor of public financing, relying instead on
the “self-evidence” of its appeal.20 For example, although the appearance of
corruption or potential corruption is a common argument in favor of public financing,
political scientists Jeffrey Milyo and David Primo have found that scholarly research
on the topic is limited or anecdotal. The same, they say, is true for fears about
declining trust in government and declining voter turnout, which some contend could
be buoyed by public financing.21
Legislative Proposals for Public Financing of
Congressional Elections
While the idea of public financing of federal elections was first proposed in
1907, it was not until the 1950s that bills were first introduced in Congress to
implement such a plan. Since that time, legislative proposals have been offered in
nearly every Congress, while the extent of legislative activity around the issue has
varied according to the political climate and circumstances. In two very active
periods, bills to extend public financing to congressional elections have passed one
or both houses but were never enacted.
In the first period, during the 93rd Congress (1973-1974), the Senate twice
passed bills for public funding in congressional elections, widely seen as a response
to the unfolding Watergate scandal.22 In 1973, a bill was passed providing full
subsidies (equal to mandatory spending limits) to major party candidates in House
and Senate general elections. In 1974, a bill was passed providing matching funds
in House and Senate primaries and full subsidies (equal to the voluntary spending
limits) to major party candidates in House and Senate general elections. Both
provisions were later deleted in conference, in view of some strong opposition in the
House.
In the second period, the 100th through 103rd Congresses (1987 — 1993), the
House and Senate spent considerable amounts of time debating bills that featured the
twin ideas of voluntary spending limits and public financing. In the 101st, 102nd, and
103rd Congresses, both chambers actually passed such bills; the 102nd Congress bill
19 See, for example, Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder
Jr., “Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
vol. 17, no. 1 (winter 2003), pp. 105-130.
20 Jeffrey Milyo and David Primo, “Reform without Reason? The Scientific Method and
Campaign Finance,” in Welfare for Politicians? pp. 197-211.
21 Ibid.
22 Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign
Finance Law (NY: Praeger, 1988), pp. 42-51; Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance:
Myths and Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 7-9.

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was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush, but the bills in the other two Congresses
were never reconciled in conference.
In contrast to the first period, when one of the Senate-passed bills covered both
primary and general elections, bills in the second period offered benefits only for
general election candidates. More broadly, efforts in the more recent period reflected
a move toward paring down the level of public treasury funds going to campaigns,
in light of a less favorable political climate. The emphasis in this second period
shifted from public funds per se to public benefits. Public benefits were those either
financed with public resources — whether directly, as with public subsidies, or
indirectly, as with revenue forgone from tax incentives or postal discounts — or
mandated by government action, such as requirements for reduced broadcast rates,
at no cost to the U.S. Treasury. The common element was that they all constituted
incentives to participation in a voluntary system based on campaign spending limits.
Evolution During the Early 20th Century
The earliest suggestion to Congress of public subsidies for election campaigns
was apparently made by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 in his annual message
to Congress. Roosevelt saw reforms such as requiring disclosure and prohibiting
corporate contributions as worthwhile but difficult to enforce and inadequate in
deterring “an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying his own way into
office.” He suggested an admittedly radical approach of providing ample
appropriations to the major national political parties to fund their “organization and
machinery.” Parties receiving federal monies were to be limited to a fixed amount
that could be raised from individual contributors, all of which would be disclosed to
the public. It is unclear from the text of his message (the relevant portion of which
is reprinted below) whether Roosevelt intended this plan to be limited to presidential,
as opposed to all federal, campaigns. At the time, given the political parties’ central
role in financing all election campaigns, the distinction may not have been as great
as it would be today, when candidates take the lead role in financing their campaigns.
In any case, the section of the message was titled “Presidential Campaign Expenses.”
Under our form of government voting is not merely a right but a duty, and,
moreover, a fundamental and necessary duty if a man is to be a good citizen. It
is well to provide that corporations shall not contribute to Presidential or
National campaigns, and furthermore to provide for the publication of both
contributions and expenditures. There is, however, always danger in laws of this
kind, which from their very nature are difficult of enforcement; the danger being
lest they be obeyed only by the honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous, so as
to act only as a penalty upon honest men. Moreover, no such law would hamper
an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying his own way into office.
There is a very radical measure which would, I believe, work a substantial
improvement in our system of conducting a campaign, although I am well aware
that it will take some time for people so to familiarize themselves with such a
proposal as to be willing to consider its adoption. The need for collecting large
campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the
proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an
appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and
machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation
should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should

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CRS-11
accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or donor; and
the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be
provided.23
Roosevelt was not exaggerating when he commented that it would take “some time”
for people to familiarize themselves with such a proposal.
From the mid-1920s through the 1970s, select and special committees had been
established by every Congress (predominantly on the Senate side) to investigate
campaign expenditures — presidential or congressional — in recent elections.
Reports issued at the conclusion of the work of these committees often included
recommendations designed to correct shortcomings perceived in existing campaign
finance practices. In 1937, during the 75th Congress, the report of the Senate*s
Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures of Presidential, Vice
Presidential, and Senatorial Candidates in 1936 was released. Included in its section
of recommendations was a proposal for public funding of all federal elections, which
the committee passed along without judgment as to its merits. All private
contributions were to be prohibited under this plan. Under recommendation no. 9,
the report said,
It has been suggested that private contributions to political campaigns be
prohibited entirely and that instead all election campaign expenses should be
defrayed from public funds.24
Congress apparently took no action on this proposal.
Interest in public funding of political campaigns has often been aroused by
allegations of unethical conduct by public officials for accepting particular campaign
contributions. Such was the case on July 6, 1949, when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr., introduced a resolution to commission a study by the Committee on Rules and
Administration on the mechanics of establishing a system of public funding of
presidential campaigns. In introducing his resolution, Lodge responded to rumors
government corruption.25 The resolution — S.Res. 132 — read as follows:
Resolved. That the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration is authorized
and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation for the purpose
of obtaining such information with respect to the problems involved in financing
with governmental funds presidential election campaigns in the United States as
may be necessary to enable the committee to formulate and report at the earliest
23 Theodore Roosevelt, “Annual Message of the President of the United States,”
Congressional Record, vol. 42, Dec. 3, 1907, p. 78.
24 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures of
Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Candidates in 1936, Investigation of
Campaign Expenditures in 1936, report pursuant to S.Res. 225 (74th Cong.) and S.Res. 7
(75th Cong.), 75th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 75-151 (Washington: GPO, 1937).
25 Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts, p. 36.

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practicable date a bill providing for such method of financing presidential
election campaigns. 26
Lodge*s support for this concept, the details of which he envisioned coming out of
a congressional study, was summed up in this excerpt from his floor statement:
All this talk of an “office market,” and of putting high executive and diplomatic
positions on the auction block — all this breeding of suspicion and cynicism
would disappear, I believe, overnight if the primary cause of the evil were
obliterated at its root. If no private individual or officer of a corporation were
permitted by statute to contribute one cent to a presidential campaign there would
be a far cleaner atmosphere surrounding political appointments, and this would
encourage public-spirited men holding public office. If there are no bidders, there
can be no auction.27
Lodge acknowledged that the same principle could also be applied to other offices,
but he was limiting his suggestion to presidential races because of the enormous
number of appointments to public office at the President’s disposal. Apparently the
type of corruption which motivated Lodge in S. Res. 132 was the selling of
government positions rather than the broader notion of trading influence or access on
policy questions for campaign contributions. A concern over the latter possibility
would be a likely prerequisite for any proposal for public financing of congressional
campaigns. No action was taken on S. Res. 132 by the Committee on Rules and
Administration.
First Public Finance Bills. During the 84th Congress, the name of Theodore
Roosevelt was invoked when the first public funding bills were introduced in
Congress, almost 50 years after being suggested by Roosevelt. On February 20,
1956, Senator Richard Neuberger introduced S. 3242, to provide for direct public
subsidies for all major party campaigns for federal office, co-sponsored initially by
Senators Wayne Morse, James Murray, Paul Douglas, John Sparkman, and Mike
Mansfield. The identical bill was submitted two days later in the House as H.R. 9488
by Representative Frank Thompson. “Sometimes I call my bill the Teddy Roosevelt
bill, because of its origin,” observed Neuberger;28 Thompson commented that the bill
could “appropriately, enough, I think be called the Theodore Roosevelt Campaign
Contributions Act of 1956.”29
26 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., “Investigation of Problems Involved in Federal Financing of
Presidential Election Campaigns,” Congressional Record, vol. 95, July 6, 1949, p. 8888.
27 Ibid.
28 Richard Neuberger, “Federal Campaign Contributions to Relieve Officeholders of Private
Obligations,” Congressional Record, vol. 102, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 2855.
29 Frank Thompson, “Principle of Campaign Contributions by the Federal Government
Supported by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and David Lawrence,”
Extensions of Remarks, Congressional Record, vol. 102, Mar. 6, 1956, p. 4105.

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Neuberger, who quickly became identified as the chief congressional proponent
of public financing at the time,30 declared that S. 3242 was “the most far-reaching bill
ever proposed to strike loose the financial fetters from our democratic processes of
government.”31 The final impetus for the bill was the recent revelation of a large
campaign contribution offered to a Senator by an oil company during debate on
removing federal controls from natural gas prices. The alleged bribery attempt
contributed to Neuberger*s view that,
These contributions, in my opinion, have become an unbearable yoke to many
of the men who must accept them. They even have become onerous and
objectionable to the individuals who parcel out such contributions.32
Neuberger based his proposal on the belief that the system of raising campaign funds
from private sources hampered the independence of public officials, created doubts
among the public about the integrity of the government, and created an inequality in
gaining access to voters by various candidates. He continued in his statement to
articulate what would remain the major motivation for later advocates of publicly
financed elections:
An undemocratic element is introduced when one nominee can eclipse his
opponent not because of superiority of ability or of his policies, but merely
through a preponderance of coin of the realm33....We would not dream of
permitting our Presidents or our Senators and Representatives to draw their pay
from a private payroll or in the form of private contributions; they get paid by the
public for whom they act. Why, then, leave their campaigns for these offices to
be lavishly financed from private sources?34
Neuberger’s bill provided for the allotment of federal funds to the major
political parties, to be used for campaign expenditures of its candidates for federal
office. (In the 1950s, election financing was still substantially conducted by the
parties, in contrast with today, when party support is considered ancillary to the
expenditures of the candidates themselves.) A major party was defined as one which
received at least 10% of the vote in the previous national election. The total federal
contribution for a two-year period would be determined by multiplying 20 cents by
the average number of votes cast in the previous two presidential elections (for
presidential election years) and 15 cents by the average number of votes cast in the
previous two House elections (for non-presidential election years). The system
would be conducted on a voluntary basis and would allow for parties to accept
donations from private sources, provided that no individual’s contribution exceeded
$100 and that the total raised from these sources did not exceed the total federal
donation. The term “matching funds” was used by Neuberger to describe the system,
30 Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1960), p. 434.
31 Richard Neuberger, “Federal Campaign Contributions to Relieve Officeholders of Private
Obligations,” Congressional Record, vol. 102, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 2854.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 2857.
34 Ibid., p. 2858.

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but it differed from the present system of matching funds in presidential primaries in
that the federal subsidy in the latter case is determined by the amount raised
privately; in the Neuberger proposal, the amount that could be raised privately was
to be determined by how much the federal subsidy would be. The proposed system
was to be administered by a Federal Campaign Contributions Board, to include an
administrator and one representative from each major party.
1950s and 1960s. During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress turned its attention
to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,35 the law governing campaign financing since
1925, and to its perceived inadequacies both in limiting amounts of money raised and
spent in elections and in promoting transparency. Numerous hearings were held and
bills introduced aimed at improving the nation’s campaign finance laws generally.
A few bills providing direct public financing were introduced in nearly every
Congress since the 84th Congress (1955-1956), but most of these were proposed and
supported by a small minority of Members. A greater number of proposals, in this
period, however, did include indirect public financing of elections, in the form of tax
credits and deductions.
In 1962, a report was released by the President’s Commission on Campaign
Costs, established the previous year by President John F. Kennedy to make
recommendations for improving campaign finance practices and laws.36 While the
report was ostensibly focused on presidential elections, its findings were more
broadly applicable to all federal elections because of the extent to which the political
parties were at that time the major financiers of all federal campaigns. Its
recommendations, which included tax incentives to encourage individual donations
to political parties, did not include the proposal urged on it by many for direct public
subsidies. Rather, the commission expressed concern for public financing’s potential
to discourage citizen participation in campaigns, to redistribute power arbitrarily
within the parties, to encourage fraud, and to be administered unfairly. However, the
commission expressed interest in a “matching incentive system,” whereby small
individual donations to parties would be equally matched with U.S. Treasury funds.
Such a system found favor with the commission because the amount of subsidy
would be determined not by governmental action but by “private voluntary action.”37
The 1962 commission report thus advanced the concept of direct government
subsidies of campaigns for federal office.
In 1966, Congress took its first step toward public subsidies in federal elections
when it enacted the Presidential Campaign Fund Act, providing public subsidies to
major political parties for their presidential campaigns. The proposal, sponsored by
Senator Russell Long (and which he initially introduced as S. 3469), was added by
the Senate Finance Committee as an amendment to H.R. 13103, the Foreign Investors
Tax Act. The act was signed into law November 13, 1966, by President Johnson, as
P.L. 89-809. The following year, amidst congressional pressure to repeal the act, an
35 43 Stat. 1070.
36 U.S. President’s Commission on Campaign Costs, Financing Presidential Elections;
Report (Washington: GPO, 1964).
37 Ibid., p. 31-32.

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amendment was added to the Investment Tax Credit bill (H.R. 6950) to make the act
inoperative until Congress provided written guidelines on how the funds were to be
distributed. With approval of the bill as P.L. 90-26, the Presidential Campaign Fund
Act was effectively killed before it was ever implemented.
Congressional Activity Since the Mid-1960s
90th Congress (1967-1968). In the 90th Congress, the first public finance bill
that covered congressional elections was reported from committee. As reported by
the Senate Finance Committee,38 H.R. 4890, the Honest Elections Act of 1967,
provided for optional public financing for general election campaigns of presidential,
vice presidential, and senatorial candidates (the committee left the extension of the
system to House elections to that body). The system was based on permanent
appropriations of the funding necessary, with the stipulation that no private funds
could be raised from 60 days before to 30 days after the general election. Funds were
to be provided directly to candidates, not through the parties, as earlier bills had done,
perhaps in recognition of the onset of candidacies in the 1960s that were more
independent of the party structure. The bill was opposed by the committee’s six
Republican members, who protested its financial burden to taxpayers and its
unfairness to taxpayers who were thus forced to support candidates they opposed.
The measure never came to the Senate for a vote.
92nd Congress (1971-1972). The 92nd Congress marked a milestone in the
federal government’s evolving role in election finance, with enactment of FECA to
replace the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 as the nation’s chief statute governing
campaign finance and also the enactment of public financing in presidential general
elections. The latter was added as a floor amendment by Senator John Pastore during
Senate consideration of the Revenue Act of 1971. It set up the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund, financed through a $1 tax checkoff (as was first enacted in 1966),
to fund presidential general election campaigns. The Pastore amendment also
included tax credits and deductions for political contributions, an indirect form of
public financing. The amendment survived Senate debate and the House-Senate
conference; the underlying legislation survived a veto threat by President Nixon by
delaying implementation of the public finance system to the 1976 election. The
Revenue Act of 1971 was signed into law December 10, 1971 (P.L. 92-178).
93rd Congress (1973-1974). In the 93rd Congress, public financing of
elections became a major and continuing issue before Congress for the first time,
largely in response to the Watergate scandal unfolding in 1973 and 1974. To the
extent that large and unaccountable sums of campaign money seemed to be
connected to the scandal, many Members came to see the newly enacted FECA of
1971, which essentially required uniform disclosure of campaign money, as
inadequate in preventing the kinds of abuses then being uncovered. In addition,
public financing of presidential elections was not due to begin until 1976. Those
focusing on campaign finance law amendments came to center on the ideas of limits
on contributions and expenditures, and on extending public financing to
38 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Honest Elections Act of 1967, etc., report
to accompany H.R. 4890, S.Rept. 90-714, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1967).

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congressional elections. Some 76 bills were introduced in the House and Senate to
provide direct subsidies in congressional elections; in the House, more than 140
Members cosponsored such bills.
In July 1973, public finance supporters, led by Senators Edward Kennedy and
Hugh Scott, tried to add congressional public funding to the 1973 FECA
Amendments. The Kennedy-Scott amendment (no. 406) to S. 372 would have
provided public subsidies in House and Senate general elections, with major party
candidates eligible for a subsidy equal to the proposed spending limit. The
amendment was tabled on a 53-38 vote.39
Later in 1973, the Senate passed public financing of congressional elections, the
first time either chamber had ever done so. It took the form of amendment no. 651,
offered by Senators Kennedy, Scott, and others, to H.R. 11104, the Public Debt
Ceiling bill. As added on the Senate floor by a 52-40 vote, the amendment provided
for mandatory public financing in House and Senate general elections.40 Major party
House candidates were eligible to receive the greater of 15 cents per eligible voter,
or $90,000; major party Senate candidates were eligible for the greater of 15 cents
per eligible voter, or $175,000; private contributions were essentially eliminated in
the general election (minor party candidates were eligible for funding based on their
parties’ vote share in the previous election). H.R. 11104, as amended, passed the
Senate that day by a 58-34 vote.41 This provision was removed, however, when the
House refused to accept the Senate amendments.42 A leadership agreement resulted
in the matter being dropped from the public debt limit bill and killing the issue for
the first session of the 93rd Congress.43 (See Appendix 1 for details on this measure.)
By 1974, after a year of the unfolding Watergate scandal, support for public
financing of elections was growing in Congress. In February 1974, the Senate Rules
and Administration Committee reported a new version of the FECA Amendments (in
lieu of S. 372), which included public funding in presidential and congressional
primary and general elections.44 As reported with only one dissenting vote, S. 3044
created a system for all federal elections, which is still in place in presidential
elections: a voluntary system, with matching funds in the primaries and a fixed
39 “Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1973,” Debate and Vote in the Senate,
Congressional Record, vol. 119, July 26, 1973, p. 26115.
40 “Temporary Increase in Public Debt Limit,” Debate and Vote in the Senate,
Congressional Record, vol. 119, Nov. 27, 1973, p. 38231.
41 Ibid., p. 38240.
42 “Disagreeing to Senate Amendments to H.R. 11104, Public Debt Limit,” Debate and Vote
in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 119, Nov. 29, 1973, p. 38680.
43 Senate Twice Votes Campaign Financing Reform, Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
1973 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1974), vol. 29, p. 754.
44 General election funding in presidential elections had been enacted by the Revenue Act
of 1971, but the formula was changed in this legislation.

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subsidy in the general election, all funded from the checkoff on federal tax returns.45
The committee report expressed the view then in ascendancy about the need for
public funding:
The only way in which Congress can eliminate reliance on large private
contributions and still ensure adequate presentation to the electorate of
competing candidates is through comprehensive public financing. . . .The
election of federal officials is not a private affair. It is the foundation of our
government. As Senator Mansfield recently observed, it is now clear that “we
shall not finally come to grips with the problems except as we are prepared to
pay for the public business of elections with public funds.”46
Senate debate on S. 3044 lasted for 13 days, in which proponents were able to defeat
four amendments to drop public financing completely, two amendments to reduce the
level of public funds, one amendment to reduce funding to incumbents by 30%, and
one amendment to add three free mass mailings to general election candidates. The
Senate passed S. 3044 on April 11, 1974, by a 53-32 vote,47 following a second, and
successful, vote to invoke cloture. (See Appendix 1 for details on this measure.)
Public financing of congressional elections, however, was not included in the
House Administration Committee’s reported version of the 1974 FECA
Amendments, H.R. 16090. Supporters, led by Representatives John Anderson and
Morris Udall, attempted to add a voluntary matching system for House and Senate
general elections, but their amendment to H.R. 16090 was defeated by a 187-228
vote.48 Public financing of congressional elections was a particularly contentious
issue in the House-Senate conference on S. 3044, but ultimately it was dropped,
while the presidential public financing provisions were left intact. That bill did,
however, leave spending limits (without public funding) in place for congressional
elections, at different levels than in S. 3044 initially: $70,000 for House primaries
and general elections, the greater of eight cents per eligible voter, or $100,000, in
Senate primaries, and the greater of 12 cents per eligible voter, or $150,000, in
Senate general elections.49 Also, limits on spending from personal and family
resources were imposed on House candidates ($25,000) and Senate candidates
($35,000).50
94th Congress (1975-1976). Activity on behalf of public financing of
congressional elections subsided considerably after the 93rd Congress, which had seen
45 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, report to accompany S. 3044, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
S.Rept. 93-689 (Washington: GPO, 1974).
46 Ibid., p. 4-5.
47 “Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,” Debate and Vote in the Senate,
Congressional Record, vol. 120, Apr. 11, 1974, p. 10952.
48 “Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,” Debate and Vote in the House,
Congressional Record, vol. 120, Aug. 8, 1974, p. 27490.
49 Those spending limits were declared unconstitutional by Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.
50 P.L. 93-443.

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particularly strong momentum for governmental and electoral reforms as the
Watergate scandal was unfolding. Public finance supporters did, however, make
several unsuccessful attempts to revive the issue in the 94th through 96th Congresses.
During consideration of the FECA Amendments of 1976 in the 94th Congress,
Senate supporters of public financing failed to get congressional public financing
included in the bill reported by the Rules and Administration Committee (S. 3065).
House supporters, led by Representative Phil Burton, offered a floor amendment to
the FECA Amendments (H.R. 12406), providing for matching funds in House and
Senate general elections; the amendment failed on a 121-274 vote.51
95th Congress (1977-1978). The 95th Congress began auspiciously for
public finance supporters with the announced support of House Speaker Thomas P.
O’Neill, Jr., and Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, with the elevation of public
finance supporter Frank Thompson to House Administration chairman, and with a
series of election reform measures, including public financing of congressional
elections, by President Jimmy Carter.
The Senate Rules and Administration Committee considered S. 926, which, as
introduced by Senators Kennedy, Dick Clark, Alan Cranston, Charles Mathias, and
Russell Schweicker, proposed matching funds in Senate primaries and a combination
of subsidies and matching funds in Senate general elections. The reported version
of S. 926, however, deleted funding for primary elections, as suggested by sponsors,
in order to increase chances for passage in the House.52 Opposition to public
financing was strong enough to force three cloture votes to limit debate on S. 926.
After the final cloture vote failed, the Senate voted 58-39 for an amendment by
Senator James Allen to delete public financing of Senate general elections.53
The new House leadership support led to six days of House Administration
Committee hearings on public financing of congressional elections, although no
consensus developed over what approach to choose.54 An attempt to report a bill for
partial public funding of House general elections failed in October 1977, after
approval of two amendments offered by public finance opponents which added to the
costs of the system and were seen as making the bill more difficult to pass (one
extended funding to primaries; the other extended funding to all candidates who met
a contribution threshold). Following adoption of these amendments, Chairman
51 “Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,” Debate and Vote in the House,
Congressional Record, vol. 122, Apr. 1, 1976, p. 9096.
52 “Public Financing,” CQ Almanac: 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977 (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1978), vol. 33, p. 805.
53 “Public Financing of Senate Elections,” Debate and Vote in the Senate, Congressional
Record, vol. 123, Aug. 2, 1977, pp. 26022-26023.
54 U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, Public Financing of
Congressional Elections, hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 19; June 21, 23, 28; July
12, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977).

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Thompson discontinued the markup, saying the votes were lacking to report a
measure.55
On two occasions during the second session of the 95th Congress, the House
narrowly defeated rules to allow consideration of public finance measures. An
amendment to H.R. 11315, intended as a non-controversial set of amendments to
federal campaign finance law, was offered in March 1978 by Representatives
Thomas Foley and Barber Conable, proposing a matching fund system in House
general elections. The underlying bill became embroiled in controversy, however,
thus poisoning the atmosphere for House consideration of the public finance
amendment as well.56 The open rule, allowing for consideration of the Foley-
Conable amendment, was defeated on a 198-209 vote on March 21, 1978.57 Included
in those voting against the rule were some 25 Republicans who had reportedly
committed to voting for the public finance amendment.58
A second effort by public finance supporters came with a proposed amendment
to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) authorization bill for FY1979 (H.R.
11983). The amendment, similar to the one offered in March 1978, was offered by
Representatives Foley, Conable, Anderson, and Abner Mikva. In contrast with the
situation in March, the reported rule was a closed one, thus prohibiting amendments
on the floor. An effort to defeat the proposed rule was made by public finance
supporters, but it failed on a 213-196 vote on July 19, 1978.59 That vote, which
observers saw as reflecting congressional sentiment on public financing, ended
consideration of the issue for the 95th Congress.
96th Congress (1979-1980). As the 96th Congress began, the House
leadership accorded the efforts of public finance advocates — led by Representatives
Foley, Conable, Anderson, Udall, Mikva, and Tim Wirth — priority status by
designating their proposal H.R. 1. Similar to the failed amendments of the 95th
Congress, the bill provided for matching funds in House general elections, in
conjunction with voluntary spending limits. The House Administration Committee
held five days of hearings in March 1979 on this and other public finance bills.60 On
May 24, 1979, despite efforts by supporters to gain more support, the bill failed to
55 “Public Financing,” CQ Almanac, 1977, pp. 807-808.
56 Rhodes Cook, “Bill Lowering Spending Levels Reported,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Reports, vol. 36, Mar. 18, 1978, p. 718.
57 “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 11315, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1978,” Debate and Vote in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 124, Mar. 21, 1978,
pp. 7879-7880.
58 “Public Financing, Campaign Spending Bills,” CQ Almanac: 95th Congress, 2nd Session,
1978 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979), vol. 34, p. 771.
59 “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 11983, Federal Election Commission Authorization,
Fiscal Year 1979,” Debate and Vote in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 124, July 19,
1978, p. 21715.
60 U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, Public Financing of
Congressional Elections, hearings on H.R. 1 and related legislation, 96th Cong., 1st sess.,
Mar. 15, 20-22, 27, 1979 (Washington: GPO, 1979).

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be reported, on a 8-17 vote.61 With that vote, the momentum for extending public
financing to congressional elections that had begun in the 93rd Congress came to an
end.
97th — 99th Congresses (1981-1986). While public financing remained an
objective for many in Congress and bills continued to be introduced, the 97th through
99th Congresses saw no concerted effort in pursuit of this goal. In part, this reflected
a changed political environment, with Senate control during this period (1981-1987)
shifting to Republicans, generally less supportive of public financing than
Democrats, and with frustration over the failure to enact public financing in the 93rd
through 96th Congresses. Those advocating campaign finance reform set their sights
on a less sweeping goal during the 1980s, and much of the 1990s: restricting the
growing role of political action committees (PACs), the political agents of interest
groups, in the financing of congressional elections. Like public financing, curbs on
PACs were intended to lessen the importance of money, particularly “interested”
money, in elections. Unlike public financing, restrictions on PACs did not involve
the highly controversial issue of using tax revenues to fund campaigns and the
invariably associated goal of limits on campaign spending. But, despite 19 days of
hearings in the 97th through 99th Congresses, partisan stalemate on the PAC issue
kept any major campaign finance bills from floor votes.62
100th Congress (1987-1988). The political environment again shifted in the
100th Congress, with a Democratic majority in the Senate following the 1986
elections. With this change, the goal of campaign reform advocates quickly extended
from curbs on PACs to their longer-standing objective of public financing and
campaign spending limits in congressional elections. The twin ideas of voluntary
spending limits and participation incentives in the form of public funds or some form
of cost-saving benefits became the cornerstone of the leading reform proposals
through the 105th Congress.
On the first day of the 100th Congress, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd
joined Senator David Boren in cosponsoring S. 2, which became the focus of reform
efforts and eventually gained 50 additional cosponsors. As reported by the Rules and
Administration Committee, the bill featured public funding for Senate general
election candidates who agreed to spending limits (in both their primary and general
election campaigns) and aggregate PAC receipts limits for House and Senate
candidates.63 The public funding amount for major party candidates was equal to
80% of the state’s spending limit for the general election. The measure was brought
to the floor in June 1987, in the face of strong Republican opposition and the stated
intention of opponents to filibuster the measure. After a failed vote to invoke cloture,
sponsors of S. 2 offered an amendment to change the public funding component from
61 “Public Campaign Funds,” CQ Almanac: 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979 (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), vol. 35, pp. 553-556.
62 This changed late in the 99th Congress, on Aug. 12, 1986, when the Senate passed the
Boren-Goldwater amendment to curb PACs, although no further action was taken.
63 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senatorial Election
Campaign Act of 1987, report to accompany S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 100-58
(Washington: GPO, 1987).

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CRS-21
a full subsidy for major party candidates to a matching fund system, thereby reducing
in half the cost of the subsidy (and changing the expenditure limit formula as well).
Opponents were not mollified, and four successive cloture votes in June 1987 also
failed.
Sponsors made yet another attempt to scale back the public funds component
of the bill, in an effort to gain the needed votes to overcome the filibuster. The
second substitute amendment provided subsidies only to those whose opponents
exceeded the voluntary limits, as both a disincentive to the large spender and as a
means of “leveling the playing field.” In addition, the substitute offered lower postal
and broadcast rates to candidates who agreed to abide by the voluntary spending
limits, both as an incentive to participation in the system and as a means of curbing
campaign costs. This change also proved insufficient to ameliorate the opposition,
and, following three additional failed cloture votes, the measure was pulled from
further consideration in February 1988.64
101st Congress (1989-1990). House and Senate leaders offered and enabled
passage of bills featuring spending limits and public benefits (the concept of public
financing per se became broadened to public benefits as Members sought ways to
reduce the level of direct treasury funding to campaigns). The Senate Rules and
Administration Committee reported S. 137 (Boren-Mitchell), based on the final
version of S. 2 in the 100th Congress, with spending limits, public benefits, and a
PAC receipts cap.65 A substitute was offered May 11, 1990, reflecting several
features aimed at increasing support for a public benefits and spending limits system.
Public funds per se, in the form of direct cash payments to candidates, were to be
triggered only on a contingency basis, to compensate participating candidates against
free-spending opponents and independent expenditures against them (or for their
opponents). The principal subsidy for all participants was to take the form of
broadcast communication vouchers, whereby broadcasters would be reimbursed with
federal funds but no funds would be transmitted directly to candidates. The other
benefits were a reduced broadcast rate, through requiring the lowest unit rate be made
available only to participating candidates (and making such time not subject to
preemption), and a reduced postal rate; neither of these benefits involved direct
payments to candidates although the postal benefit did involve revenue loss to the
U.S. Postal Service. Even the spending limits, based on the same population-based
formula as was used in the 100th Congress bill, were adjusted as a means of
increasing Senate support, with the provision for an additional 25% in allowable
spending from small in-state donors.
Senate debate began July 30, 1990, and encompassed 16 roll-call votes on
amendments, including one by Senator Mitch McConnell to strike public funds
64 Between June 3, 1987, and Feb. 26, 1988, eight unsuccessful cloture votes occurred on
June 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, Sept. 10, 15, 1987, and Feb. 26, 1988.
65 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senatorial Election
Campaign Act of 1989, report to accompany S. 137, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 101-253
(Washington: GPO, 1990).

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CRS-22
entirely (defeated by 46-49)66 and another by Senator John Kerry to greatly increase
the level of public funds (defeated by 38-60).67 On August 1, 1990, the Senate passed
S. 137 on a 59-40 vote, with five Republicans for and only one Democrat against.
It featured voluntary Senate spending limits, communication vouchers, postal and
broadcast discounts, and subsidies to match independent expenditures and wealthy
opponents, plus other campaign finance provisions.68 (See Appendix 1 for details
on this measure.)
In the House, the Democratic leadership offered a measure which went even
further than the Senate bill in reducing the role of public funds as an incentive to
adhering to spending limits. In exchange for agreeing to spending limits, which were
set at $550,000 for a two-year election cycle (and an additional $165,000 in the case
of a nominee who won a competitive primary), H.R. 5400 (Swift) offered House
general election candidates three benefits, none of which involved direct payments
to candidates. These included lower rates on first- and third-class mailings in the last
90 days of an election, one free radio or TV spot for every two purchased, and a
100% tax credit for in-state contributors (up to $50, or $100 on joint returns). While
public funding was involved in H.R. 5400, it took a less direct form than with
candidate subsidies. H.R. 5400 was passed by the House on August 3, 1990, by a
255-155 vote.69 (See Appendix 1 for details on this measure.)
A conference committee was appointed, but, faced with large differences
between H.R. 5400 and S. 137 and a presidential veto, it never met.
102nd Congress (1991-1992). Public financing of congressional elections
advanced further in the legislative process during the 102nd Congress than ever before
or since. Bills comparable to those passed in the 101st Congress were approved by
the Senate and House and reconciled in conference, but vetoed by President George
H.W. Bush.
On March 20, 1991, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported
S. 3 (Mitchell-Boren), similar to S. 137 (101st Congress).70 When Senate debate
began May 15, the Boren substitute amendment was incorporated into S. 3. Debate
took place over six days and encompassed 21 roll-call amendment votes, including
one by Senator McConnell to eliminate the public funding and spending limits from
66 “Senatorial Elections Campaign Act,” Debate and Vote in the Senate, Congressional
Record, vol. 136, July 30, 1990, p. 20329.
67 Ibid., July 31, 1990, p. 20659.
68 Ibid., Aug. 1, 1990, p. 21074; the bill also included bans on PACs, party soft money, and
bundling, and curbs on out-of-state money and tax-exempt groups.
69 “Campaign Cost Reduction and Reform Act of 1990,” Debate and Vote in the House,
Congressional Record, vol. 136, Aug. 3, 1990, pp. 22251-22252.
70 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Election Ethics
Act of 1991, report to accompany S. 3, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 102-37 (Washington:
GPO, 1991).

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CRS-23
the bill (defeated on a 42-56 vote)71 and one by Senator Kerry to increase vastly the
public funding level in the bill (defeated on a 39-58 vote).72 On May 23, 1991, the
Senate passed S. 3 on a 56-42 vote, with all but five Republicans voting against and
all but five Democrats in favor.73 As passed, S. 3 included voluntary Senate spending
limits, an extra 25% allowance in spending from small in-state donations, broadcast
communication vouchers, broadcast and postal discounts, and conditional subsidies
to match non-complying opponents and independent expenditures.74 (See Appendix
1 for details on this measure.)
The House Administration Committee’s Task Force on Campaign Finance
Reform led to a Democratic bill, H.R. 3750 (Gejdenson), reported by the committee
on November 12, 1991,75 and amended by the Rules Committee on November 23.76
The bill replaced the free TV and radio time and the tax credit in the 101st Congress
bill with a matching fund system, while leaving some form of reduced mailing rates.
But concerns over perceived unpopularity of public funding led sponsors to omit
provisions to finance benefits, beyond allowing voluntary contributions to the Make
Democracy Work Fund, in the version brought to the House floor.77 The House
passed H.R. 3750 on November 25, 1991, by a 273-156 vote.78 As passed, it featured
voluntary House spending limits, in exchange for matching funds and lower postal
rates, with extra spending for runoffs or close primaries and extra matching funds to
offset non-complying opponents and independent expenditures.79 (See Appendix 1
for details on this measure.)
71 “Senate Election Ethics Act, Debate and Vote in the Senate,” Congressional Record, vol.
137, May 22, 1991, p. 11937.
72 Ibid., p. 11979.
73 Ibid., May 23, 1991, p. 12355.
74 It also included bans on PACs, bundling (discussed below), and party soft money; tax-
exempt group curbs; a requirement that candidates appear in broadcast ads; and a ban on
post-election repayments of candidate loans. S. 137 incorporated such floor amendments
as an honoraria ban, earned and unearned income limits, and debate requirements for
publicly funded presidential races.
75 U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives
Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1991, report to accompany H.R.
3750, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 102-340 (Washington: GPO, 1991).
76 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Providing for Consideration of H.R. 3750,
report to accompany H.Res. 299, 102nd Cong.,1st sess., H.Rept.102-365 (Washington: GPO,
1991).
77 “Two Campaign Finance Bills Passed,” CQ Almanac: 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992), vol. 47, p. 21.
78 “House of Representatives Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1991,”
Debate and Vote in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 137, Nov. 25, 1991, pp. 34708-
34709.
79 H.R. 3750 also included an aggregate cap on PAC and large donor receipts, a leadership
PAC ban, curbs on party soft money, and a ban on independent expenditures by lobbyists.

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A conference committee was appointed to reconcile the two passed bills and
filed its report April 3, 1992 (amended on April 8).80 The conference bill combined
features of S. 3 and H.R. 3750, leaving House and Senate spending limits and public
benefits largely intact for their own candidates. Major changes in the conference
version centered around other issues, such as PAC contribution limits, soft money,
and bundling.81 The conference also delayed implementation of the spending limits
and public funding systems pending enactment of a funding mechanism. (See
Appendix 1 for details on this measure.) The House passed the conference report
on April 9 by a 259-165 vote.82 The Senate followed suit on April 30 with a 58-42
vote.83 President Bush, citing his opposition to spending limits and public financing,
vetoed the bill May 9.84 On May 13, a Senate override vote failed by 57-42, thus
ending debate on the issue for the 102nd Congress.85
103rd Congress (1993-1994). At the start of the 103rd Congress, Democratic
leaders introduced bills identical to those in the 102nd Congress: H.R. 3 (Gejdenson)
and S. 3 (Boren). With a President of the same party in favor, 1993 reform prospects
seemed improved.
On March 18, 1993, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported
S. 3 (largely the bill vetoed in 1992, including the House provisions).86 Prior to the
Senate debate, President William J. Clinton made his own recommendations on May
7, 1993, which added such provisions to the vetoed 102nd Congress bill as
congressional broadcast vouchers and an increased tax checkoff financed by an end
to lobbying expense deductions.87
80 U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and
Election Reform Act of 1992, report to accompany S. 3, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 102-
479 and H.Rept. 102-487 (Washington: GPO, 1992).
81 Bundling refers to the collection of campaign funds for a candidate by an intermediary
(who is not an agent of the campaign) in amounts beyond what he or she could legally
donate to that candidate.
82 “Conference Report on S. 3, Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election
Reform Act of 1992,” Debate and Vote in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 138, Apr.
9, 1992, p. 9023.
83 “Senate Election Ethics Act — Conference Report,” Debate and Vote in the Senate,
Congressional Record, vol. 138, Apr. 30, 1992, p. 9964.
84 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Office of the Federal Register,
Public Papers of the President of the United States: George Bush, 1992-1993, vol. 1
(Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 736-737.
85 “Disapproval of S. 3 — The Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election
Reform Act of 1992,” Debate and Vote in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 138, May
13, 1992, p. 11146.
86 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Congressional Spending
Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993, report to accompany S. 3, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.,
S.Rept. 103-41 (Washington: GPO, 1993).
87 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Office of the Federal Register,
Public Papers of the President of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, vol. 1
(continued...)

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On May 21, Senate began debate on a leadership substitute to the committee
version of S. 3, focused solely on Senate elections and reflecting the Clinton proposal
and a federal PAC ban. Debate lasted for three weeks, encompassing three cloture
votes and 24 recorded amendment votes. The filibuster was not broken until
agreement was reached between Democratic leaders and seven Republicans to add
the Durenberger/Exon Amendment. This provision dropped the bill’s broadcast
vouchers, allowed subsidies only to offset independent spending and spending in
excess of the limits by non-complying opponents, and repealed the exempt function
income exclusion on principal campaign committees of candidates who exceeded
spending limits (in effect, subjecting them to a 34% tax on income).88 Passage of this
amendment cleared the way for a successful vote to invoke cloture and passage of S.
3 the next day on a 60-38 vote.89 (See Appendix 1 for details on this measure.)
The House leadership bill, H.R. 3, was reported from the House Administration
Committee on November 10, 1993, as amended by the committee and focused only
on House elections.90 The reported bill featured voluntary House spending limits
and communication vouchers (based on matching donations); other than contingency
funds to compensate for non-complying opponents and independent expenditures, no
other benefits were offered. After defeating a rule to allow votes on more
alternatives, the House, on November 22, 1993, passed H.R. 3 by 255-175.91
(See Appendix 1 for details on this measure.)
House and Senate compromise efforts were impeded by differences on PAC
limits and funding sources; both bills avoided establishing a funding mechanism for
the public benefits, deferring implementation until revenue legislation could be
enacted. Late in the second session, on September 29, 1994, Democratic leaders
announced a deal, but Senate Republicans led a filibuster against appointing
conferees, ending with a failed cloture vote (52-46) on September 30, 1994.92
104th — 109th Congresses (1995-2006). The shift to Republican control
of the House and Senate in 1995 effectively killed the momentum for public
financing in Congress, given generally strong Republican opposition to both public
financing and spending limits. Public finance bills continued to be introduced in
every Congress, including in the 104th when Senators John McCain and Russell
87 (...continued)
(Washington: GPO, 1994), pp. 584-589.
88 “Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993,” Debate and
Vote in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 139, June 16, 1993, p. 12952.
89 Ibid., June 17, 1993, p. 13246.
90 U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives
Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993, report to accompany H.R. 3,
103rd Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 103-375 (Washington: GPO, 1993).
91 “House of Representatives Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993,”
Debate and Vote in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 139, Nov. 22, 1993, pp. 31792-
31793.
92 “House of Representatives Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993,”
Debate and Vote in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 140, Sept. 30, 1994, p. 26962.

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Feingold introduced their first campaign finance reform bill, establishing themselves
as the Senate’s leading reform advocates. That bill (S. 1219) was the successor to
the bills passed in the previous three Congresses, and it reflected the same pre-1996
consensus among campaign finance reform advocates that prioritized curbing the
high cost of congressional elections and replacing private funds with other funding
sources.
The election of 1996 proved to be a watershed in the campaign finance debate,
as largely unregulated campaign activity (party soft money and election-related issue
advocacy) seemed to overshadow the regulated activity. In response, the leading
reform advocates in Congress made significant changes in their proposed legislation
at the start of the 105th Congress. S. 25 (McCain-Feingold), as well as its companion
H.R. 493 (Shays-Meehan), added provisions to the comparable 104th Congress bills
to allow federal regulation of election-related activity then being conducted as “issue
advocacy.” Following the most intensive congressional activity on campaign finance
reform since the 1970s, a revised S. 25 was offered in the fall of 1997, featuring
provisions on party soft money and issue advocacy. What was striking was that the
provisions on congressional spending limits and public benefits, and on PACs, the
key elements of reformers’ objectives for at least the previous 10 years, were
eliminated from the bill entirely. Thus, in one year’s time, the very nature of the
campaign finance debate had shifted from efforts to improve the existing regulatory
system to efforts to save it from becoming meaningless in the face of newly emerging
campaign practices. This debate, in the wake of the 1996 elections, was to last until
2002, when BCRA, commonly known as McCain-Feingold, was enacted.
109th Congress Bills. Appendix 2 contains summaries of the four public
finance bills introduced in the 109th Congress. All were House bills, dealing only
with House elections.
Two of the bills — H.R. 2753 (Andrews) and H.R. 4694 (Obey) — would have
provided public funding only in the general election. The Andrews bill would have
provided up to $750,000 (based on media costs in the district) to candidates who met
certain criteria, such as a $100 limit on individual donations and an 80% in-state
funding requirement; but, unlike others introduced, the bill would have imposed no
spending limit. The Obey bill would have established a mandatory spending limit,
based on the median household income in the district, and would have provided
public funds to equal those limits. The benefit would have been financed in part by
a tax on corporate income. The bill provided for fast-track consideration of a
constitutional amendment to allow mandatory spending limits if the limits in the bill
were struck down.
The other two bills — H.R. 3099 (Tierney) and H.R. 5281 (Leach) — would
have offered benefits in both primary and general elections. The Leach bill would
have provided funds to match contributions from in-state contributors and would
have imposed a $500,000 per election spending limit. The Tierney bill was the Clean
Money, Clean Elections measure, which would have provided public subsidies equal
to the spending limit in the primary and general election, specified allotments of free
broadcast time, and additional broadcast time at 50% of the lowest unit rate.
Candidates would have qualified by raising specified numbers of small donations.

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(The clean money model is discussed in greater detail under the States’ Experience
section of this report.)
Devising a Congressional Public Finance System:
Options for Policymakers
Based on the previous discussion of proposals that advanced in the legislative
process, one can see the wide range of features that any public finance proposal might
embody. This section enumerates some of the basic options facing Congress in any
consideration of such proposals. (Further potential considerations for congressional
public financing are discussed in the conclusion of this report. These considerations
are based in part on experiences in the states, which are discussed in the following
section.) CRS takes no position on any of the options presented here.
Setting Expenditure Limits. Establishing the limits on campaign
expenditures is perhaps the thorniest aspect of devising a public financing system.
It has become widely accepted in the political science community that, to the extent
that high spending in elections reflects a desirable level of competitiveness, low
spending limits can inhibit real competition.93 In other words, low spending limits
may reduce the chances for lesser known candidates to defeat candidates with higher
visibility and name recognition. It was this principle that has often led public finance
and spending limit proposals to be labeled by critics as “incumbent protection”
measures, because incumbents typically start elections with much higher visibility
than their challengers.
Spending limits for House campaigns have almost always been a specified
across-the-board amount ($600,000 in the last bill to pass the House, in 1993),
whereas the Senate limits have generally reflected a population-based formula. As
late as 1997 when the initial McCain-Feingold bill was offered in the 105th Congress,
the formula in Senate elections was essentially the same one incorporated into S. 2
(the leadership substitute) in the 100th Congress (in a general election — the lesser
of: (a) $5.5 million, or (b) the greater of (i) $950,000, or (ii) $400,000, plus 30 cents
times the voting age population (VAP), up to 4 million, and 25 cents times the VAP
over 4 million; in a primary — 67% of general election limit, up to $2.75 million;
and for a runoff — 20% of the general election limit).
The challenge for policymakers is to choose a spending limit that takes into
account the realities of today’s campaigns, allowing sufficient opportunity for a
genuine competition which serves the public’s interest. One way to offset potential
damage to the vibrancy of the electoral process resulting from too stringent limits
would be to increase the generosity of public funds and benefits, to lessen the need
for both raising and spending money.
Coverage: General Elections Only or Primary Elections, Too? While
the bills that advanced in the 1970s included public funds in the primaries, most
93 See, for example, Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, pp. 183-190;
Citizens Research Foundation, New Realities, New Thinking: Report of the Task Force on
Campaign Finance Reform, pp. 18-19 (Majority Views).

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measures in more recent Congresses have covered only general elections. This has
been the case not so much because the sponsors have not favored such coverage but
more because of strategic decisions about the reduced likelihood of enacting a more
complicated and more expensive system. Some have stated that they would settle for
public funding in general elections for now and hopefully later return to the primary
issue after some experience with a general election system. To some, however, the
lack of inclusion of primaries may represent a serious flaw in recent proposals, with
the prospect of private money entering the electoral system earlier and expenditures
aimed at influencing the general election made during primaries, all to evade the
restrictions of the general election system.94 The bills debated in the 100th — 103rd
Congresses incorporated the concept of providing benefits only in the general
election but conditioning those benefits on adherence to voluntary spending limits
in the primary as well as the general election.
Conditions for Receipt of Public Benefits. Invariably, proposals
condition receipt of benefits on adherence to voluntary spending limits, whether
solely in the election where the benefits are offered or in the primary as well as the
general election. Most also require candidates to limit spending from personal and
immediate family funds to a specified amount (generally applicable to loans as well).
Some bills have added a requirement that candidates participate in a specified
number of debates, and bills that passed in the 1990s added the requirement that
broadcast ads must include closed-captioning. There is considerable latitude in what
conditions may be imposed on candidates participating in this voluntary system.
Qualifying Requirements. In addition to requiring adherence to spending
limits, proposals typically have some sort of qualifying requirement to prove a
candidate is “serious” (i.e., that he or she has some degree of public support). Most
often, the qualifying requirement is a fundraising threshold, comprising relatively
small donations from a specified number of voters in that jurisdiction. Petition
signatures is another option.
Public Funds: Matching Funds or Fixed Subsidies? This choice may
be informed by the experience the nation has had under the presidential system for
the past 30 years, in which matching funds are available in the primaries and fixed
subsidies are offered to candidates in the general election. As is discussed in the next
section, the states also use a mix of these two forms of subsidies.
Fixed subsidies offer the advantage of simplicity and providing candidates
greater ability to plan their campaigns, but, depending on the percentage of the
spending limit the grant is intended to constitute, it can result in a much greater cost
(in the presidential system, for example, major candidates in the general election get
a subsidy equal to the spending limit). The matching fund approach would generally
be less expensive would offer the advantage of linking the receipt of public money
with a demonstration of voter appeal by the candidate. Matching fund systems may
offer the advantage of avoiding complex legislative or regulatory judgments about
who is and is not a “serious” candidate, with the meeting of fundraising thresholds
94 David W. Adamany and George E. Agree, Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign
Financing in America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 179-180.

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and the continuing raising of small donations considered an adequate means of so
doing. If a matching fund system is preferred, there is also the consideration of
whether funds should match contributions on an equal basis or a higher percentage
(some bills have proposed a two- or three-to-one match, at least in some
circumstances).
Public Benefits Other Than Direct Subsidies to Candidates.
Whereas the bills that advanced in Congress during the post-Watergate 1970s were
based on either direct subsidies or matching funds, the most prominent measures of
the late 1980s and early 1990s reflected a move away from direct public funding to
candidates. Instead, those bills featured either more indirect forms of public funding
or cost-reducing benefits that did not involve public funds at all. These indirect
public funding and public benefits measures, often designed to increase chances for
passage in the face of perceived public opposition to use of public funds in elections,
offer additional ideas in structuring a spending limits and public benefits package.
Indirect Public Funding. Several ideas have gained support in Congress at
various times that make use of public funds in ways other than direct payments from
the U.S. Treasury to the candidates, including the following:
! Tax credits for contributions to candidates abiding by limits — This
could provide a grassroots fundraising incentive to candidates who
agree to limit their expenditures. Most commonly, this takes the
form of a 100% tax credit for contributions to participating
candidates. Such a form of public funding is determined by citizens’
decisions at the grassroots level, rather than decisions of a
government agency, which supporters see as an important advantage.
Presumably, the prospect of raising small donations much more
easily would provide sufficient incentive for candidates to agree to
limit spending. Most observers of the political system argue that the
best kind of political money is that from individual citizens in small
amounts. (It should be noted that from 1972-1986, the federal
government allowed tax deductions or credits for political
contributions, but they were eliminated as part of overall tax reform;
also, many states have such incentives applicable to contributions in
their elections.)
! Broadcast vouchers to candidates — The single largest component
of the typical campaign budget (at least for statewide and national
offices) and the biggest single factor in the rise of campaign costs in
recent years has been broadcast advertising. Proposals have been
advanced whereby candidates would be allocated specified amounts
of broadcast vouchers, for which broadcasters would be reimbursed
from the federal treasury. Under this plan, public monies do not get
distributed directly to candidates, thus at least ostensibly avoiding
some of the objections to public financing per se while focusing on
what many consider the biggest single problem in campaign
financing — the high cost of media. However, the mechanics of
implementing such a plan, particularly in districts served by high

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CRS-30
density, high-cost media markets, pose potential concerns in terms
of fairness and the particulars of individual campaigns.
! Lower postal rates for candidates abiding by limits — Another
proposal which seeks to draw candidates into acceptance of
campaign spending limits is one which offers participating
candidates lower postal rates, such as those currently available to
political party committees. This proposal involves public funds, but
only indirectly, because the U.S. Postal Service would have to be
reimbursed for revenue forgone as a result of its implementation. It
is not clear to what extent a lower postal rate may serve as an
inducement to candidates to limit spending, since postage is not a
large component in a typical campaign budget, although it may well
be more important in House than Senate races (especially in high-
density media markets where media costs are seen as often
prohibitively expensive). Lower postal rates do offer the advantage
of acting to reduce campaign costs, generally seen as a worthwhile
goal, regardless of one’s position on spending limits or public
financing.
Public Benefits Without Public Funds. Proposals that passed in the 101st
— 103rd Congresses (and the Senate-passed version of the BCRA (McCain-Feingold)
in the 107th Congress) looked to broadcasters to offer some of the incentive toward
candidate participation. Because of broadcasters’ public interest obligations as part
of their license agreements, sponsors sought to require broadcasters to offer lower
rates to candidates participating in public funding, as a condition of their licenses and
at no cost to the U.S. treasury. (On the basis of this principle, the federal government
has since 1972 required broadcasters to charge political candidates at the lowest unit
rate (LUR) available to commercial advertisers for the same time and class of
advertising time.) Some proposals have gone beyond requiring still-lower rates to
requiring broadcasters to provide specified amounts of free time to participating
candidates. To the extent that these costs are removed from candidates, the overall
cost of elections could be significantly curbed, which, as with lower postal rates,
would appeal to many observers regardless of their views on spending limits and
public financing. Yet such proposals invariably invite strong opposition from the
broadcast industry. While the Senate version of BCRA in the 107th Congress offered
substantial reductions in broadcast rates to candidates, this provision was removed
in the House on a floor amendment.
Protecting Participants from Free-Spending Opponents and
Outside Groups. One concept present in most bills offered since the 100th
Congress but absent from the presidential system is protection offered to candidates
who participate in public financing but are faced with large expenditures by non-
participating opponents or are targeted in independent expenditures from outside
groups. Most commonly, provisions designed to remedy such situations would
! increase spending limits on participants to match expenditures by
opponents in excess of the spending limits and by independent
expenditures in amounts above a specified level; and/or

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CRS-31
! provide participants with additional public funds to match excessive
spending from non-participating opponents or for opposing
independent expenditures, perhaps with a cap on overall funds
provided in this circumstance.
Providing additional funds, or allowing for supplementary private funding, to
participating candidates facing non-participating opponents offers protection against
being greatly outspent and presumably would deter candidates considering forgoing
public financing. A potential problem with these disincentives is the increased costs
they would add to a public funding system, costs not easily predictable. What has not
been reflected in recent proposals but may have to be addressed in future ones is the
activity by outside groups (such as 527 political organizations) that spend money
outside the purview of federal election law (i.e., soft money).
Other Disincentives Toward Non-Participation. While public finance
bills have typically focused on offering benefits as an inducement toward agreeing
to expenditure limits, more recent proposals have also looked to add disincentives as
well, to impose some sort of penalty on candidates not participating in the system
(beyond providing benefits to the participating opponent). These proposals appeal
to those who would like to lessen the role of public funds but still wish to achieve
meaningful levels of participation in the system. Critics see these proposals as
heavy-handed measures designed to bludgeon candidates into participating, thus
casting doubts on whether participation can fairly be deemed to be voluntary. Some
of the disincentives advanced in recent years include the following:
! requiring a disclaimer on campaign advertisements of a candidate’s
non-participation — This provision, requiring non-participants to
state in their ads that they do not abide by spending limits, was
included in Senate bills passed in the 101st - 103rd Congresses;
! disallowing lowest unit rate requirement for non-participants — This
provision, included in the 101st Congress Senate bill, as passed,
would have removed the lowest unit rate requirement for candidates
not participating in the system; and
! tax campaigns of non-participating candidates — Political
campaigns are generally exempt from paying taxes on money
raised.95 The Senate bill passed in the 103rd Congress removed the
exempt function income exclusion on principal campaign
committees of candidates who exceeded spending limits, thus in
effect subjecting those campaigns to a 34% tax.
Conditional Public Subsidies. One idea closely related to the proposals
in the prior two sections is to provide public funds only as a last resort, when a
participant is faced by an opponent who exceeded spending limits or by opposing
independent expenditures. As is explained in the “State Experiences” section that
95 See CRS Report RS21716, Political Organizations Under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code, by Erika Lunder.

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CRS-32
follows, some states feature such a provision, aimed at curbing arguably excessive
campaign spending without incurring the expense to the taxpayers that most public
finance systems would incur. It would be applied on a very selective basis and would
presumably act as a strong inhibitor against only the most excessive campaign
spending. The Senate bill passed in the 103rd Congress contained this feature, in
addition to the direct incentives of lower postal and broadcast rates.
Paying for Public Financing. Clearly, the decisions made about the
aforementioned variables will determine the cost of any public finance system.
Estimates of costs of public finance systems vary considerably, according to the
details of the systems envisioned. For bills considered in the 101st - 103rd
Congresses, one can look to the required Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost
estimates, bearing in mind that the bills passed were often changed substantially from
those reported and for which estimates were provided. At the start of the 103rd
Congress, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported S. 3, which was
essentially the bill vetoed during the 102nd Congress and thus contained provisions
affecting both House and Senate elections. Benefits for House elections consisted
of matching funds (accounting for up to one-third of the spending limit) and reduced
mailing rates; Senate election benefits consisted of voter communication vouchers
(of up to 20% of the general election limit), reduced mailing rates, and contingent
public grants to compensate candidates opposed by free-spending opponents and by
independent expenditures. CBO estimated that this rather modest system (in terms
of level of public funds) would range in cost from $90 million to $175 million in the
1996 election cycle and from $95 million to $190 million in the 1998 election cycle.96
At the other extreme, the most generous proposal currently being advanced at
both federal and state levels is the “Clean Money, Clean Elections” measure, support
for which is spearheaded by the non-profit group Public Campaign. Its proposal,
which was H.R. 3099 (Tierney) in the 109th Congress and was last introduced in the
Senate as S. 719 (Wellstone) in the 107th Congress, would provide public funds in the
primary and general elections; such funds are intended to lower all candidate
spending in those elections. Public Campaign’s website states,
The cost of implementing such a system for Congressional elections is estimated
to be less than a billion dollars per year out of a federal budget of close to two
trillion dollars (that’s about a half of a 10th of a percent of the federal budget:
0.05%). That amounts to less than $10 per-taxpayer, per-year. 97
Thus, by Public Campaign’s estimates, congressional elections would cost somewhat
less than $2 billion every election cycle.
Most proposals since the mid-1970s have relied upon a tax checkoff, based on
the presidential model, whereby taxpayers could designate a certain number of tax
96 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Congressional Spending
Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993, report to accompany S. 3, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.,
S.Rept. 103-41 (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 40.
97 Public Campaign, “Annotated Model Legislation for Clean Money/Clean Elections
Reform” at [http://www.publicampaign.org/modelbill].

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CRS-33
dollars to go into the fund to pay for congressional elections. This idea is intended
to mitigate negative images that might arise from “taxpayer funding” of elections,
because of the direct role provided citizens in the distribution of tax revenues.
Because of those perceptions, however, the 101st — 103rd Congresses sought creative
ways to offset any losses to the U.S. Treasury, or remained silent on funding sources,
leaving those decisions to subsequent “enacting legislation.” Proposals since that
time have looked to such things as broadcast licensing fees, a tax on lobbyists, and
a tax on corporate income to offset treasury losses.98
State Experiences with Public Financing
Introduction
State public financing programs emerged primarily in the 1970s, although a few
states provided limited assistance to campaigns early in the 20th century.99 Prior to
the 1970s, many programs that did exist provided funding to political parties rather
than directly to candidate campaigns. (As noted previously, political parties were
historically the major funders of congressional campaigns, especially before the
1960s.) States vary considerably in whether they offer public financing, how they do
so, and why.100
Currently, 16 states offer some form of direct public financing to candidates’
campaigns (see Figure 1).101 Of those, seven states fund only statewide races
98 According to Public Campaign, in the previously cited material, “Revenue for the Clean
Money/Clean Elections Fund could come from some combination of these and other
sources: the qualifying contributions collected by participating candidates, an income tax
check-off system (similar to the one in place for presidential elections), a highly publicized
program of voluntary contributions, and direct government appropriations to make up the
balance of what is needed. The Clean Money/Clean Elections program could be offset (thus
requiring no tax increase) by the elimination of unnecessary tax exemptions and other
subsidies previously granted to major campaign contributors. It is estimated that such
subsidies currently cost taxpayers far more than what it would cost to provide full public
financing under a Clean Money/Clean Elections system.”
99 Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel, The States of Campaign Finance Reform , p. 5.
100 David Schultz, ed., Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform Law in the States
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), p. 19.
101 CRS obtained information about states’ public financing programs from various academic
publications, publications from independent research organizations, interest groups, and
consultations with individual scholars and researchers. Jennifer Drage Bowser at the
National Conference of State Legislatures, and Steven M. Levin at the Center for
Governmental Studies provided helpful background information. Several academic
researchers also provided extensive consultations about public financing and potential data
sources. Sources appear in table notes accompanying Table 1. In some cases, consulted
sources included organizations or scholars who have publicly supported or opposed public
financing. Also, sources sometimes provided different accounts of public financing in each
state. CRS contacted campaign finance officials in the states listed in Table 1 to clarify
(continued...)

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CRS-34
(Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
Vermont). Nine states fund legislative and statewide races (Arizona, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Wisconsin;
see Figure 2), although which statewide campaigns are eligible for funding varies.
Figure 1. States Offering Public Financing
101 (...continued)
cases of incomplete or contradictory information found in other sources. Notes
accompanying Table 1 provide additional information about alternative interpretations from
other sources. The number of states offering “public financing” depends on how the term
is defined, and whether assistance to candidates or candidates and parties is included. For
example, according to a 2006 media account, seven states offer public financing, although
the definition of “public financing” or source for this information was not provided. See
Elana Schor, “GOP Senator eyes public financing bill,” The Hill, Feb. 22, 2006, p. 3. By
contrast, Public Citizen suggests that “14 states, and 13 local jurisdictions provide some
form of public financing of candidate campaigns, with these numbers, especially at the local
level, regularly in flux.” See “Public Financing of Non-Presidential Campaigns,” fact sheet,
n . d . , a t [ h t t p : / / w w w . c i t i z e n . o r g / c o n g r e s s / c a m p a i g n / i s s u e s / p u b _ f i n /
index.cfm?ID=11062&relatedpages=1&catID=106&secID=1067]. A 2006 report by the
Center for Governmental Studies noted that “different forms” of public financing exist in
“25 states and 13 local jurisdictions.” See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public
Financing in American Elections (Los Angeles: Center for Governmental Studies, 2006),
p. x. A 2005 Common Cause analysis identified 14 states that “provide direct public
financing to candidates,” and 10 others that “provide minimal public financing to candidates
and/or political parties.” See “Public Financing in the States” at
[http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399].

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CRS-35
States have chosen two major public-financing frameworks. First, the clean
money, clean elections model (hereafter, clean money) is a national initiative
developed by an interest group and is designed to cover full campaign costs.102 Clean
money programs generally offer fixed subsidies to candidates once they meet basic
qualifying requirements. All qualifying candidates receive the same amount of
funding, which is, at least in theory, sufficient to cover all campaign costs.103 All
clean money programs are similar, with adaptations in each state (e.g., which offices
are covered). Second, and in contrast to the clean money model, other state public
financing mechanisms vary considerably. These programs are typically older, and
developed more individually. Through matching funds and other benefits, these
programs are designed to reduce the need for and impact from private fundraising,
but are less likely than clean money programs to offer full public financing to
participating candidates. States fund both approaches through a combination of tax
checkoffs, direct appropriations from state legislatures, revenues from various fines
and fees, and other sources. Additional details are discussed below.
Figure 2. Types of Public Financing Offered in the States
102 This report uses the terms “clean money” and “clean elections” in reference to the
interest group Public Campaign’s title for its public financing model. The terms are also
widely used in state public financing laws and in general campaign finance parlance. The
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) has taken a
similar approach in using the term “clean elections” in its research. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States That Offer
Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, GAO-03-453, May 2003, p. 79, footnote 4.
This CRS report takes no position on whether such labels are appropriate.
103 Exceptions vary by state. In some cases, third-party or independent candidates are not
eligible for as much funding as are major-party candidates.

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CRS-36
Types of Public Financing
As Table 1 and Figure 2 show, seven states offer some form of the clean money
model of public financing. The clean money model offers full public financing to
candidates who agree to certain restrictions, particularly spending limits. Candidates
who agree to those restrictions, which vary by state, receive public funds via fixed
subsidies. Specific amounts are determined by each state. The plan originated with
the interest group Public Campaign, which describes itself as “a non-profit, non-
partisan organization dedicated to sweeping reform that aims to dramatically reduce
the role of big special interest money in American politics.”104 The group advocates
the clean money program at the local, state, and federal levels around the country.
Currently, clean money programs in Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey (a
pilot legislative program), New Mexico, North Carolina, and Vermont offer public
financing to the candidates for the offices noted in Table 1. Although all clean
money programs are adapted to states’ individual needs (e.g., different offices are
covered in each state), the major components of the program are similar nationwide.
All programs were approved by voters or state legislatures between 1997 and 2005.
(During the 109th Congress, Representative John F. Tierney introduced H.R. 3099,
which embodied a clean money model for House elections. During the 107th
Congress, Senator Paul Wellstone introduced a similar bill, S. 719. Neither chamber
took any action on the bills.)
By contrast, 10 states offer public financing through programs other than the
clean money model: Hawaii, Florida, Nebraska, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey (gubernatorial campaigns), Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.105
While the clean money system features a uniform model for public financing and is
a relatively recent initiative, other public financing programs in the states vary
widely. Many of the latter programs were initiated in the 1970s, in the Watergate
aftermath. Some of the most notable differences between clean money models and
other programs are how candidates receive public funding and how much money is
available to those candidates. Although clean money funds are generally distributed
through subsidies that allocate fixed amounts to candidates, states that employ other
programs rely primarily on matching funds. The amount of matching funds
candidates receive depends on the amount of private contributions raised. States
generally match 100%, and sometimes more, of the amount a candidate raises
through private contributions.
Whether clean money models or other systems, public financing programs do
not guarantee unlimited funds. States generally limit the percentage of contributions
that may be matched, or cap the total amount of funds that may be disbursed.106
Available revenues often influence these decisions. For example, in Michigan, a tax
104 Public Campaign, “About Us” at [http://www.publiccampaign.org/about/index.htm].
105 New Jersey falls into both categories — clean money and other — because the state
offers non-Clean Money funding for gubernatorial campaigns, and Clean Money funding
to legislative candidates participating in a pilot public financing program.
106 For an overview of the maximum public funding allowed in the states, see Steven M.
Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, “State Table 3.”

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CRS-37
checkoff system funds public financing for qualifying gubernatorial candidates. Just
as in the presidential public-financing system, general-election funding in Michigan
takes priority. Funding is first reserved for general-election subsidies. If additional
funds are available, primary candidates may qualify for matching funds, which are
distributed on a pro-rated basis.107
Eligibility and Conditions for Public Funding
Proponents of public financing generally argue that unlimited private funding
encourages corruption, or at least forces candidates to spend too much time raising
money. Therefore, states often require that recipients of public funding observe
certain conditions on campaign conduct, which are designed to increase public
confidence in campaigns and limit or eliminate large amounts of time spent raising
private funds. Publicly financed candidates must agree to limits on spending and
fundraising. Some states also require publicly financed candidates to participate in
debates. Public funding recipients must demonstrate that they are politically viable
by raising a minimum level of private contributions before becoming eligible for
public funding. Some states’ individual contributions are limited to as little as $5.
Once candidates meet that threshold and other qualifying requirements, they become
eligible for public financing. In most cases, campaigns qualifying for public
financing may spend their privately raised contributions directly. In others, privately
raised “seed money” is transferred to a central state fund for redistribution among all
publicly financed candidates.
Participation by Candidates
How widely candidates take advantage of public financing depends largely on
whether opponents choose to participate in public financing, how various states
structure their public financing programs, or both. Public financing programs often
become dormant because potential participants believe that spending limits are too
low. In Maryland, for example, although public financing is available for
gubernatorial tickets, no major candidate has accepted that funding since 1994. Since
that time, major candidates have reportedly viewed the 30-cent-per-voter spending
limit as too low to enable effective campaigning.108
Low participation by candidates in public financing does not necessarily mean
that the program fails to influence campaigns. At least one state’s program appears
to have the most impact when public financing is not utilized at all. Nebraska’s
public financing program has offered matching funds to a variety of statewide and
legislative candidates since 1992, although it is rarely accepted. According to Frank
Daley, Executive Director of the state’s Accountability and Disclosure Commission,
public financing in Nebraska becomes available only if one candidate adheres to
spending limits while the other does not. If both candidates exceed spending limits,
107 This information is based on consultations with staff at Michigan’s Campaign Finance
Division (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 2, 2006).
108 Telephone conversations between R. Sam Garrett and Jared DeMarinis, Maryland
Director of Candidacy and Campaign Finance, June 30, 2006, and Aug. 24, 2006. The
amount is subject to annual adjustments.

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CRS-38
or if neither candidate exceeds spending limits, neither is eligible for public
financing. Essentially, public financing in the state offers “extra” money for those
facing high-spending opponents. Given the threat of opponents receiving public
funds, most candidates have chosen to limit spending voluntarily. As a result, public
financing’s greatest impact in Nebraska appears to be keeping private spending
down, rather than infusing greater amounts of public money into elections.109
109 Telephone conversation between R. Sam Garrett and Frank Daley, Executive Director
of the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission, July 31, 2006. For a brief
discussion of Nebraska’s program, see also Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. Gais, eds.,
The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States
(Albany, NY: The Rockefeller Institute Press, 1998), p. 60.

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CRS-39
Table 1. States Offering Public Financing to Statewide or Legislative Candidate Campaigns*
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
Arizona
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Tax checkoff
Clean moneya model
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
Secretary of State,
Matching funds
Various fines/fees
Attorney General, Treasurer, Supt.
(contingency mechanism, e.g.,
of Public Instruction, Corporation
for those facing non-publicly
Qualifying private contributions
Commissioner,
financed opponents who
raised by candidates
Mine Inspector)
exceed spending limits)b
State Legislature
Connecticut
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Revenues from unclaimed
Clean moneya model
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
propertyc
Attorney General, Comptroller,
Matching funds
Secretary of State, Treasurer)
(contingency mechanism, e.g.,
Public donations
for those facing non-publicly
State Legislature
financed opponents who
exceed spending limits)
Florida
Statewide
Matching funds
Appropriations from legislature
See table notes.d
(Governor, Chief Financial
Officer, Attorney General,
Agriculture Commissioner)d

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CRS-40
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
Hawaii
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
Office of Hawaiian Affairs)
Elections-related fines and fees
State Legislature
Other miscellaneous feese
Maine
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Tax checkoff
Clean moneya model
(Governor)f

Matching funds
Various fines/fees
State Legislature
(contingency mechanism, e.g.,
for those facing non-publicly
Appropriations from legislature
financed opponents who
exceed spending limits)
Excess qualifying contributions
raised by candidates
Maryland
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff g
No major candidate has
(Governor, Lt. Governor)
participated since 1994,
reportedly due to spending
limits.

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CRS-41
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
Massachusetts
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff
Availability of public funding
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
depends on the amount
Attorney General,
designated by tax checkoffs.
Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Funding is allocated first to
Treasurer, Auditor)
gubernatorial candidates,
then lower offices, if
State Legislature
available.h
Michigan
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff
General election is funded
(Governor)i
(primary election)
first. Public financing for
primary, if available, is then
Fixed subsidy
allocated on a pro-rated
(general election)
basis.j
Minnesota
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Tax checkoff
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
Attorney General, Secretary of
Appropriations from legislature
State, Auditor)k
“Public Subsidy” fundsl
State Legislature

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CRS-42
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
Nebraska
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff
(Governor, Secretary of State,
Attorney General,
Various fines/fees
Auditor of Public Accounts,
Public Service Commission, Univ.
Initial appropriation from
of Nebraska Board of Regents,
legislaturem
Board of Education)
State Legislature
New Jersey
Statewide
Matching funds
Appropriations from legislature
(Governor)
Tax checkoff
State Legislature
Direct subsidy
Appropriations from legislature
Clean moneya model
(pilot program)n
New Mexico
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Appropriations from legislature
Public financing available
(Public Regulation Commission)
only to candidates for the
Matching funds
Various fines/fees
Public Regulation
(contingency mechanism, e.g.,
Commission. The program is
for those facing non-publicly
Unspent previous public
a clean money model and
financed opponents who
financing monieso
took effect for 2006 election
exceed spending limits)
cycle.

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CRS-43
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
North Carolina
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Tax checkoff
Public financing available
(Judges for State Court of
only to judicial candidates.
Appeals, State Supreme Court
Attorney renewal fees
Clean moneya model.p
justices)
Rhode Island
Statewide
Matching funds
Tax checkoff
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
Secretary of State, Attorney
Appropriations from legislature
General, General Treasurer)
(secondary source)q
Vermont
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Corporate reporting fees
Clean moneya model
(Governor, Lt. Governor)
(primary source)
Unspent previous public
financing monies
Tax checkoff
Appropriations from legislature
Public donationsr

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CRS-44
How Candidates Receive
How Public Financing System
State
Candidates Eligible for Funding
Notes
Public Funding
is Funded
Wisconsin
Statewide
Fixed subsidy
Tax checkoff
Availability of public funding
(Governor, Lt. Governor,
depends on the amount
Attorney General, Secretary of
designated by tax checkoffs.s
State, Treasurer, Supt. of Public
Instruction, State Supreme Court
justices)
State Legislature
*Unless otherwise noted, all public financing programs reflected in the table apply to primary and general elections. The table does not include information on public funding for local
candidates.
Source: CRS research as described in the text above and the following notes.
Notes:
a. The clean money model (often also called clean elections) offers full public financing to candidates who agree to certain restrictions, particularly spending limits. Public financing
programs in Arizona and Maine are the most prominent statewide examples of this program, advocated by the interest group Public Campaign. Throughout the table, those
programs noted as clean money reflect information on the Public Campaign website at [http://www.publicampaign.org/where], although this does not necessarily mean that there
is a formal connection between Public Campaign and the public financing programs in those states.
b. This information came from Michael Becker, Voter Education Manager at the Citizens Clean Elections Commission (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 16, 2006).
c. According to Janice Thompson, a consultant for Public Campaign, if property proceeds do not meet public financing needs, the state may appropriate funds from corporate tax
revenues to compensate for the shortfall (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 24, 2006). Thompson also provided CRS with additional summary information about
Connecticut’s public financing program.
d. The 2006 Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) report also refers to “qualifying candidates” for Lieutenant Governor and Corporations Commissioner as being eligible for public
financing. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. 93. The CGS report also references various fines and fees to fund the state’s

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CRS-45
Campaign Financing Trust fund. According to Kristi Reid Bronson, Election Records Bureau Chief at the Florida Division of Elections, the trust fund no longer exists, although
it was funded by fines and fees. Bronson also reported that public financing — essentially funded by appropriations from the legislature — is available to the Governor and
members of the cabinet (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 24, 2006). As of 2003, the Governor’s cabinet includes the Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer,
and Commissioner of Agriculture. For additional information, see “Cabinet Process Summary”; document posted on the Florida Department of State website at
[http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/cabinet/cabprocess.html].
e. According to public financing information on the Common Cause website at [http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399], Hawaii’s program is also
funded by appropriations. The 2006 Center for Governmental Studies report also refers to “appropriated funds” when summarizing Hawaii’s public financing system. See Steven
M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. 93. Based on consultations with staff at Hawaii’s Campaign Spending Commission, only those methods
reflected in Table 1 currently fund the program (telephone conversation between R. Sam Garrett and a staff member, Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission, July 12, 2006).
As the commission’s Public Funding Guidebook: Candidate Committees explains, the legislature created the Hawaii Election Campaign Fund in 1979. See State of Hawaii,
Campaign Spending Commission, Public Funding Guidebook: Candidate Committees, Jan. 2006, p. i, at [http://www.hawaii.gov/campaign/Forms/Publications/CCPublications/
PFGuidebook/Public%20Funding%20Guidebook%20Candidate%20Committees.pdf]. This might explain other references to “appropriations.”
f. According to Sandy Thompson, a candidate registrar at the Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, the Governor is the only statewide elected officeholder
(other than federal officeholders); telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 17, 2006.
g. The 2006 Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) report also refers to direct appropriations and fines when summarizing Maryland’s public financing system. See Steven M. Levin,
Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. 93. Jared DeMarinis, Maryland’s director of candidacy and campaign finance, reported that a tax checkoff system
financed the program when it was last utilized (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, June 30, 2006). He also noted, however, that public financing legislation that failed
in 2006 would have authorized additional funding sources and extended public financing to legislative candidates. According to DeMarinis, the same legislation, modeled on
the Clean Money framework, is expected to be re-introduced during a future legislative session (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 24, 2006).
h. This information is based on consultations with staff at the Massachusetts Office of Campaign and Political Finance (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, July 12, 2006).
The 2006 CGS report also refers to direct appropriations and monies from a previous public financing fund when summarizing funding for Massachusetts’s public financing
system. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. 93. In 1998, Massachusetts voters, though a ballot initiative, approved a broad public
financing program for the state. That program was based on the Clean Money model. However, the legislature did not appropriate funds for the program. The law was reportedly
repealed in 2003, and replaced with the current system. See Thomas M. Finneran, “The Case Against Taxpayer Financing: A View From Massachusetts; and the “Massachusetts”
entry on the Common Cause website’s description of state public-financing programs at [http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399].
i. The 2006 CGS report notes that public financing is available to candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in
American Elections, p. 93. Based on consultations with staff at Michigan’s Campaign Finance Division, public financing is only available for gubernatorial candidates (telephone

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conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 16, 2006). Information posted on the Common Cause website also suggests that funding is limited to gubernatorial candidates; see
[http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399].
j. This information is based on consultations with staff at Michigan’s Campaign Finance Division (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 2, 2006).
k. According to Jeanne Olson, Executive Director of the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board, the state’s public financing system provides funding to the
gubernatorial ticket, which would include the Lt. Governor candidate. The latter office, however, is not allocated separate public financing (telephone conversation with R. Sam
Garrett, Aug. 18, 2006).
l. Public financing monies are distributed from the state’s General Fund, as allocated through the tax check-off, and an additional appropriation from the state legislature. In addition,
candidates agreeing to certain conditions (e.g., spending limits) may participate in the Public Subsidy program, which provides refunds from the state for private campaign
contributions from individuals (telephone conversation between R. Sam Garrett and Jeanne Olson, Executive Director, Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board,
Aug. 18, 2006). For a brief overview of the Public Subsidy program, see “Public Subsidy Issues,” document posted on the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure
Board website, Nov. 2005, at [http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/issues/public_subsidy.pdf].
m. The 2006 CGS report refers to direct appropriations, taxpayer contributions of income tax refunds, “amounts repaid to campaign finance limitation cash fund by candidates,” civil
penalties, and late filing fees when summarizing how Nebraska’s public financing system is funded. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American
Elections, p. 94. Common Cause also lists “appropriations” as a funding source; see [http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=507399]. In a telephone
consultation with one of the CRS authors, Frank Daley, Executive Director of the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission, reported that the legislature provided
an initial appropriation of $50,000 in 1992, but has not done so since. Currently, according to Daley, the tax checkoff and various fines and fees are the only funding sources
for public financing (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, July 31, 2006).
n. During the 2005 election cycle, an experimental public financing program was implemented in two General Assembly districts. A May 2006 final report issued by the New Jersey
Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission recommended that the legislature continue the program for the 2007 cycle. In September 2007, Assembly Speaker Joseph J. Roberts, Jr.,
“Announced the creation of a ...working group charged with the mission of drafting legislation” to reauthorize public financing for a “limited number of legislative campaigns
in 2007.” See New Jersey Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission, Final Report, submitted to the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, May 8, 2006, at
[http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/NJCCEC_FINAL.pdf]. For legislative background on the program and a brief historical overview, see New Jersey Citizens’ Clean
Elections Commission, Preliminary Report, submitted to Legislature of the State of New Jersey, Feb. 7, 2006; see [http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/
PRELIM_REPORT_FINAL2.pdf]; and New Jersey General Assembly, “Roberts Announces Bipartisan Working Group to Reauthorize Clean Elections for 2007,” press release,
Sept. 7, 2006.

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o. Some of the summary information about New Mexico’s public financing program came from the 2006 CGS report. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in
American Elections, p. 95. Clean Money programs generally rely on a grant system to distribute funding. Janice Thompson, a consultant for Public Campaign, reported that
her research suggests that the New Mexico program is funded primarily by utility fees and taxes (telephone conversations with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 2006), which is consistent
with the CGS findings.
p. Some of the information about North Carolina’s public financing program reflected in the table came from Jason Schrader, Audit Specialist in the Campaign Finance Division at
the North Carolina Board of Elections (telephone conversations with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 2006). For an early assessment of North Carolina’s first cycle of public financing
for judicial candidates, see Doug Bend, “North Carolina’s Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. 18,
no. 3 (summer 2005), pp. 597-609.
q. The 2006 CGS report lists only a checkoff as the funding mechanism for Rhode Island’s public financing system. See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in
American Elections, p. 97. Rhode Island law authorizes the state treasury to provide monies from the state’s general fund if “funds generated by the tax credit...fail to produce
sufficient money to meet the requirements of the public financing of the electoral system.” See R.I. G.L. § 17-25-29 at [http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE17/
17-25/17-25-29.HTM]. “Tax credit” in the preceding sentence appears to be a reference to the tax checkoff system. Hank Johnson, a staff member in the Campaign Finance
Division at the Rhode Island Board of Elections, confirmed that the program is financed by the checkoff system and general fund revenues distributed by the state treasury
(telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, August 2006).
r. According to information from staff at the Vermont Secretary of State’s office, corporate reporting fees are the major source of funding for the state’s public financing program, and
that not all other sources of funding authorized by statute have been utilized (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Aug. 2006).
s. Some of this information came from Dennis Morvak, an auditor in the Campaign Finance Division at the Wisconsin Elections Board (telephone conversations with R. Sam Garrett,
Aug. 22, 2006). Common Cause reports that “In recent years, the system has been damaged by a decline in the amount of funds generated by the check-off and growing spending
on independent expenditures and sham ‘issue ads.’” This report takes no position on Common Cause’s statement regarding issue advertising. The text of this report provides
additional information on the Wisconsin program, including citations to other critiques.

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Impact of Public Financing in the States
Despite recent scholarly research, there is little certainty about how changes in
American campaign finance law affect electoral outcomes.110 Research on the impact
of public financing is particularly limited, dated, or both. Public financing programs
in the states vary widely and were implemented at different times. Even basic
terminology can vary across states. All these factors limit opportunities for
comparing data.111 In answering whether public financing has achieved the various
goals proponents ascribe, one group of scholars wrote in 2006:
The short answer is that nobody knows because there has been no comprehensive
evaluation of public finance systems to identify what conditions and program
elements lead to successful outcomes. The conventional wisdom is based on
either a limited amount of data or anecdotal impression.112
Similarly, much of what is known about public financing is based on relatively
narrow evaluations of particular states or races.
Money and Competition. One of the major questions surrounding public
financing is whether publicly funded campaigns are more or less competitive than
those that are privately financed. Research often considers at least two different
measures of “competition” surrounding public financing: (1) the amount of money
at each campaign’s disposal; and (2) the margin of victory on election day. In theory,
public financing should foster lower-cost campaigns because public financing
generally requires observing spending limits and reduces fundraising costs. If more
candidates have access to funding through public financing, races might also be
closer on election day.113 Evidence on both fronts is mixed. In general, research
suggests that public financing can foster more competitive elections. However,
research on competition and public financing commonly emphasizes that most public
financing programs are in their infancy, and that more time and cases are needed to
draw definitive conclusions.

110 Donald A. Gross, Robert K. Goidel, and Todd G. Shields, “State Campaign Finance
Regulations and Electoral Competition,” American Politics Research, vol. 30, no. 2 (Mar.
2002), pp. 143-145; see also Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. Gais, eds., The Day After
Reform.
111 For an example of the difficulty in standardizing measures of public financing in
campaign finance research, see Christopher Witko, “Measuring the Stringency of State
Campaign Finance Regulation,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3 (fall 2005),
pp. 297-298. See also Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. Gais, eds., The Day After Reform,
chapter 4.
112 Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams, “Public Funding Programs
and Competition,” in Michael P. McDonald and John Samples, eds., The Marketplace of
Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics (Washington: Cato Institute and
Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 246.
113 On its own, however, public financing limits only candidate spending — not spending
by outside groups such as parties, interest groups, and 527 organizations.

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Public financing does appear to reduce financial disparities among candidates,
provided that all candidates participate in public financing. For example, research
on state legislative elections has found that public financing in Minnesota and
Wisconsin decreased financial disparities between challengers and incumbents.114
More access to money via public funding does not always foster closer races,115
although it can provide ballot access for candidates who might not otherwise be able
to run.116 From this perspective, public financing provides an avenue to consistent
competition in elections, but not necessarily closer elections. On the other hand, in
a comparative analysis of legislative elections in five states that offer public financing
— Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin — political scientists
Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams found that competition
generally increased after public financing was enacted, both in terms of the number
of incumbents facing challengers, and the number of “competitive” races.117 These
findings, however, were contingent upon sufficient funding to make the programs
attractive to candidates. Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence of public financing
favoring challengers or Democrats, although these findings are not systematic, and
other research disputes such findings.118
114 Joel A. Thompson and Gary F. Moncrief, eds., Campaign Finance in State Legislative
Elections, p. 112. These findings are based on evidence from only two states —
Minnesota and Wisconsin — because they were “the only states that allowed significant
public financing of state legislative elections at the time of this study,” which was published
in 1998. See Joel A. Thompson and Gary F. Moncrief, eds., Campaign Finance in State
Legislative Elections, p. 112.
115 For example, Kenneth Mayer and John Wood found that public financing reduced
campaign costs in Wisconsin, but generally did not foster closer elections. See Kenneth R.
Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness:
Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (Feb.
1995), pp. 69-88. A study of gubernatorial elections from 1978-1998 found that although
public financing provided to political parties led to higher gubernatorial campaign costs,
public financing provided directly to candidate campaigns led to lower-cost gubernatorial
races. Neither result was statistically significant, however, and the authors cautioned that
their findings on this point were “not definitive.” See Donald A. Gross and Robert K.
Goidel, The States of Campaign Finance Reform, p. 49.
116 Ibid, p. 111.
117 As the authors noted, however, their definition of “competitiveness” is “not a universally
accepted threshold.” They used a vote-margin between candidates of no more than 20% to
mark “competitive” elections. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda
Williams, “Public Funding Programs and Competition,” in Michael P. McDonald and John
Samples, eds. The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American
Politics, p. 259.
118 See, for example, Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel, The States of Campaign
Finance Reform, p. 73; and Patrick D. Donnay and Graham P. Ramsden, “Public Financing
of Legislative Elections: Lessons from Minnesota,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20,
no. 3 (Aug. 1995), pp. 351-364. On arguments that public financing favors Democrats and
incumbents, see Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American
Elections, p. 16.

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Regardless of candidates eligible for funding or the particulars of individual
campaigns, public financing becomes less popular, and therefore has less impact, if
not all major candidates have incentives to participate. Recent experience with
Wisconsin’s program, for example, suggests that publicly financed elections in that
state have not become more competitive. Some observers suggest that Wisconsin’s
program provides too little funding to be a major component of candidate’s overall
expenditures. Hawaii has reportedly experienced similar problems.119
Time Spent Fundraising. Some who support public financing suggest that
it can lead to more substantive campaigns by freeing candidates from the burdens of
raising large private contributions, providing more time to connect with voters and
discuss policy issues.120 Research indicates that public financing does decrease the
amount of time state legislative candidates spend raising money, but the finding holds
only for full public financing. A national survey of candidates who ran for state
legislatures in 2000 revealed that “[f]ull public funding can free candidates from
spending large amounts of time ‘dialing for dollars’ or making personal appeals to
prospective donors. By comparison, candidates who accepted partial public funds
devoted about the same time to fundraising as did candidates in states that did not
provide public funding.”121 If this finding holds in other kinds of races, it suggests
that partial public financing might do little to alleviate what has been called “the
money chase” of continual fundraising.122 By contrast, existing models of full public
financing can reduce candidates’ fundraising duties for individual campaigns.
Nonetheless, despite the assertion that full public funding “can free candidates to
spend less time with wealthy donors raising money and more time on other aspects
of campaigning,”123 it is unclear whether public financing makes campaigns more
“substantive,” or how such concepts would be measured. In addition, public
financing would not necessarily free candidates from fundraising for leadership PACs
or other entities that may serve to benefit their elections indirectly.124
119 Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams, “Public Funding Programs
and Competition,” pp. 263-265. On Wisconsin, see also Kenneth R. Mayer and John M.
Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from
Wisconsin, 1964-1990,” pp. 69-88.
120 Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. xi.
121 Peter L. Francia and Paul S. Herrnson, “The Impact of Public Finance Laws on
Fundraising in State Legislative Election,” American Politics Research, vol. 31, no. 5 (Sept.
2003), p. 535.
122 David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign
Finance Reform (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990).
123 Ibid.
124 “Leadership PACs” are committees that are technically independent from legislators, but
are generally established by and at least unofficially linked with those legislators. These
committees are legally distinct from a legislator’s personal campaign committee. At the
federal level, “Leadership PACs traditionally have been used by legislative leaders to
contribute to the campaigns of other members of Congress as a way of gaining a party
majority and earning the gratitude of their colleagues or as a way of financing nationwide
political activity by party leaders.” See Trevor Potter, “The Current State of Campaign
(continued...)

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Diversity Among Candidates and Donors. Those favoring public
financing suggest that it democratizes campaigns by providing more “average”
people with the resources to run, and enhances the role of small donations from
ordinary citizens. There is some evidence that public financing allows candidates
who would not otherwise do so, including minorities and women, to run for office.125
Clean Money programs requiring candidates to collect small private contributions
(e.g., $5 in Maine) also potentially expand the donor universe by creating an
important financial role for ordinary citizens who might be unable to make large
private contributions.126
The Impact of Recent Public Financing Efforts in Arizona and
Maine. Much of the recent attention to public financing has occurred because of
notable ballot initiatives in two states. In 1996 and 1998, respectively, Maine and
Arizona became the first states to provide full public financing for qualified
candidates for statewide and legislative offices. These two states are often
considered test cases for public financing because their programs are so
comprehensive. In both states, the first disbursements under these programs were
made in the 2000 election cycle.127 Both states adopted public financing modeled on
the clean money program, advocated by Public Campaign. Arizona and Maine offer
similar full public financing to statewide and legislative candidates. Although
Connecticut also recently adopted similar public financing, the program has not yet
been fully implemented.
BCRA128 directed the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government
Accountability Office) to study Arizona and Maine’s public financing programs. The
GAO report, issued in May 2003 and based on public financing offered in the 2000
and 2002 election cycles, found “inconclusive” and “mixed” results.129 According
to GAO, “In sum, with only two elections from which to observe legislative races and
only one election from which to observe most statewide races, it is too early to draw
causal linkages to changes, if any, that resulted from the public financing programs
in the two states.”130 GAO also found “inconclusive” and “mixed” results when
124 (...continued)
Finance Law,” in Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter,
The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005),
p. 52.
125 Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. xi.
126 Ibid.
127 U.S. General Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two
States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, p. 83.
128 P.L. 107-155; 116 Stat. 81.
129 U.S. General Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two
States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, “Highlights” page.
Regarding outside critiques of the GAO report, see Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner,
and Amanda Williams, “Public Funding Programs and Competition,” pp. 252-255.
130 U.S. General Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two
(continued...)

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examining whether the states met program goals in five areas: (1) voter choice
(measured in candidate emergence and participation in public financing); (2) electoral
competition (measured in percentage of competitive elections, decreases in
incumbent reelection rates, or smaller victory margins for reelected incumbents); (3)
interest group influence (measured by candidate and interest group reports through
interviews and surveys); (4) campaign spending (measured in candidate spending and
independent expenditures); and (5) voter participation (measured in turnout and
awareness in surveys of public financing).131 GAO found that despite program goals
of increasing the number of candidates running for office and making elections more
competitive, “the average numbers of state legislature candidates per district race in
Maine or Arizona in the 2000 and 2002 elections were not notably different than the
averages for the two previous elections, 1996 and 1998” (which did not have public
financing). GAO also found “inconclusive” results with respect to changes in
competition in the two states under public financing.132 Another group of
researchers, however, found that the number of contested races in Arizona legislative
elections increased by more than 10% from 2002 to 2004.133 There is also anecdotal
evidence of increased competition in districts that would have been uncompetitive
under private campaign financing, although at least one analysis suggests that
Maine’s program has not fostered more competitive elections.134
Despite contradictory data on effectiveness, candidate participation in both
states’ public financing programs “increased greatly” between 2000 and 2002.135 In
2004, majorities of candidates in both states participated in public financing. In
Arizona, 25% of candidates participated in public financing in the 2000 primary
election, compared with 27% in the general election. In 2002, those numbers
increased to 52% and 50%, respectively.136 In 2004, 61% of primary candidates
(statewide and legislative) participated in the clean money system, compared with
56% of general-election candidates.137 By contrast, in Maine, about one-third of
130 (...continued)
States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, “Highlights” page.
131 For a summary of findings in each of these five research areas, see U.S. General
Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States That Offer
Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, pp. 4-6.
132 Ibid., p. 4.
133 Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams, “Public Funding Programs
and Competition,” p. 257. In discussing this increase, the authors noted, “While we cannot
attribute this shift entirely to public funding,...it is likely to have played a key role.” Ibid.
134 Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel, The States of Campaign Finance Reform, p. 103;
and Patrick Basham and Martin Zelder, “Does Cleanliness Lead to Competitiveness? The
Failure of Maine’s Experiment,” in John Samples, ed., Welfare for Politicians? pp. 73-105.
135 U.S. General Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two
States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, p. 3.
136 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
137 “Demographics: 2004 Election,” table posted on the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections
Commission website at [http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/
(continued...)

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candidates participated in public financing during the 2000 primary and general
elections. By 2002, 51% of candidates participated in public financing during the
primary, and 62% participated during the general election.138 In 2004, 78% of
general-election candidates for the Maine legislature participated in public
financing.139 In the 2006 primary, 77% of Maine legislative candidates participated
in public financing, as did 80% during the general election.140 In 2004 and 2006,
more Maine Democrats than Republicans participated, but large majorities of
members of both parties did so.141 Preliminary data for 2006 indicated that
approximately 61% of primary candidates in Arizona participated in public financing,
as did approximately 60% of general election candidates. (These figures represent
candidates for all offices, not only legislative candidates).142
Candidates reported in surveys that they chose to accept public funding because
they did not want to feel beholden to private financiers, and believed that accepting
public funding allowed them to spend more campaign time “discussing issues.”143
Conversely, candidates in both states cited a variety of reasons for choosing not to
participate in public financing, including ideological opposition to public funding,
a belief that they could win without public funds, and an unwillingness to restrict
campaign spending as required for receiving public funds.144
Some observers have questioned the Arizona and Maine programs on
ideological or legal grounds.145 Fundamental to those arguments is that citizens could
be indirectly forced to provide financial support to politicians with whom they
137 (...continued)
20002004DEMOGRAPHICS.pdf]. The CRS authors computed the 56% figure based on
data in the table.
138 U.S. General Accounting Office, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two
States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, pp. 12-13.
139 Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, “Maine Clean
Election Act Overview,” document provided via e-mail to the CRS authors by Nathaniel T.
Brown, Candidate Registrar, Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,
Sept. 7, 2006.
140 Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, “Maine Clean
Election Act Overview: 2004 Participation Update,” document provided via e-mail to the
CRS authors by Nathaniel T. Brown, Candidate Registrar, Commission on Governmental
Ethics and Election Practices, Jan. 11, 2007.
141 Ibid.; Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, “Maine Clean
Election Act Overview,” provided Sept. 7, 2006; and, for 2006 primary data, e-mail to the
CRS authors by Nathaniel T. Brown, Candidate Registrar, Commission on Governmental
Ethics and Election Practices, Jan. 12, 2007.
142 This information came from Michael Becker, Voter Education Manager at the Citizens
Clean Elections Commission (telephone conversation with R. Sam Garrett, Jan. 9, 2007).
143 Ibid., p. 26.
144 Ibid., p. 28.
145 For an overview of these arguments, see, for example, Chip Mellor, “Three Lessons from
Arizona,” in John Samples, ed., Welfare for Politicians? pp. 31-47.

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disagree, since Arizona’s program is financed through various fines and fees.146
Some critics of Arizona’s program also contend that increased competition in the
state’s elections could be due to other factors, such as the impact of term limits.147
In addition, Maine’s program is, according to one report favoring public financing,
“plagued by private contributions to candidate leadership PACs.”148 One report also
found that although Maine’s program reduced “the role of private money in election
campaigns,” and although publicly financed challengers were able to attain “financial
parity” with incumbents, the long-term impact on electoral competition was
unclear.149 Political scientists Ray La Raja and Matthew Saradjian have raised the
possibility that public financing could increase independent expenditures by interest
groups and other organizations.150
Public Opinion on Public Financing
and Spending Limits
Surveys indicate that Americans generally support campaign finance “reform”
(generally meaning more regulation of money in politics) and are concerned about
the amount of money in campaigns. Nonetheless, public opinion about campaign
finance can be contradictory.151 These patterns are evident in the relatively limited
available data about attitudes on public financing. Historically, surveys reveal that
large pluralities or even majorities of Americans support public financing in
principle, but are hesitant to invest tax dollars to facilitate public financing. These
findings indicate that the wording, source, and timing of individual questions vary
greatly and can affect campaign finance polling results, as is always the case with
survey research, regardless of topic.
Majorities tend to support public financing when asked questions suggesting
favorable information about public financing, or in surveys conducted for pro-reform
clients.152 On the other hand, majorities tend to respond negatively to questions
focusing on costs of public financing or taxation.153 Survey respondents say that they
are neutral or positive toward public financing if question wording suggests that
146 Ibid., p. 32-33.
147 Robert J. Franciosi, “Elections in Arizona, Clean and Unclean,” in John Samples, ed.,
Welfare for Politicians? p. 58.
148 Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections, p. xiii.
149 Ray J. La Raja and Matthew Saradjian, “Clean Elections: An Evaluation of Public
Funding for Maine Legislative Contests,” Center for Public Policy and Administration,
University of Massachusetts, n.d., at [http://www.masspolicy.org/pdf/WP2004_2.pdf].
150 Ibid.
151 Anthony Gierznski, Money Rules: Financing Elections in America (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2000), pp. 50-51.
152 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
153 Ibid., p. 9; and John Samples, ed., Welfare for Politicians? pp. 8-9.

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public financing can limit the influence of “special interests” or campaign costs.154
On the other hand, survey questions that emphasize spending “taxpayer dollars” to
support public financing often yield disapproval from respondents. Americans have
been more willing in polls to support public financing after perceived scandals, such
as during the 1970s and 1990s.155
In Gallup polling conducted between 1972 and 1996, between 50% and 65% of
respondents favored “provid[ing] a fixed amount of money” for presidential and
congressional campaigns, while banning private contributions.156 Similarly, in a
1997 Washington Post poll, 49% of campaign contributors answered favorably when
asked if they would “favor or oppose having all federal elections financed out of
public funds, with strict limits on how much each candidate for president, US Senator
or Congressman could spend”; 48% were opposed.157 In the same poll, but with
spending limits omitted from question wording, only 26% responded favorably when
asked whether they would “favor or oppose the federal government financing
presidential and congressional elections out of tax money.”158
The polling data reviewed above illustrate that Americans have more
consistently supported containing campaign spending — a hallmark of public
financing programs — than public funding per se. For example, in a 1997 New York
Times/CBS News poll, 60% of respondents said that “limit[ing] the amount of money
that campaigns can spend” should be a “top” or “high” priority within campaign
finance reform efforts.159 In a Gallup poll from the same year, 79% of respondents
favored “putting a limit on the amount of money” congressional candidates could
“raise and spend on their political campaigns.”160 However, like all survey questions,
answers to spending questions are also affected by wording. For example, in a 1999
NBC News poll, only 17% of respondents (but the second-most-common answer)
presented with a list of potential campaign finance concerns said that “unlimited
contributions” concerned them most, compared with 37% who were most concerned
about “special interests.”161 More generally, in a 2002 ABC News/Washington Post
poll, 66% of respondents favored “stricter laws controlling the way political
154 Stephen R. Weissman and Ruth A. Hassan, “Public Opinion Polls Concerning Public
Financing of Federal Elections 1972-2000: A Critical Analysis and Proposed Future
Directions,” (Washington: Campaign Finance Institute, 2005), pp. 2-3, at
[http://www.cfinst.org/presidential/report2/pdf/PublicFunding_Surveys.pdf].
155 Ibid., p. 4.
156 Ibid., pp. 3-4. The poll reportedly varied in how often each office was mentioned.
157 Survey information gathered from Polling the Nations Survey Database at
[http://poll.orspub.com/]. Search conducted by CRS Information Professional Zina Watkins,
May 2006.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.

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CRS-56
campaigns raise and spend money.”162 It appears that regular, national polling about
public financing has been uncommon since the mid-1990s.
Potential Considerations for Congressional
Public Financing
Public financing has been debated in Congress and the states for decades. This
suggests that interest in the topic will continue. As Congress considers how, or
whether, to change the status quo, state experiences with public financing, as well as
the nation’s presidential public financing system, offer several potential lessons.
However, the great diversity among state programs makes interpreting those lessons
challenging. At the federal level, the presidential public financing system provides
partial matching funds to qualifying candidates in primaries, but far more substantial
fixed subsidies to candidates in the general election. At the state level, which
campaigns are eligible for public funding, how much funding is available, what
requirements are placed on candidates accepting public funding, and when programs
were implemented vary. The presidential public financing system and those in the
states all rely on either fixed subsidies (in the states, especially clean money models)
or matching funds to distribute public financing. Despite similar ways of delivering
funds to candidates, details about each program can vary greatly. These differences
have produced research that describes individual components of public financing
programs, but rarely draws systematic comparisons across states. In addition, only
two states — Arizona and Maine — currently provide full public financing for
legislative elections. (Others provide partial public financing for legislative
elections, but, again, vary widely.) Consequently, there are few certainties about how
public financing might apply to congressional campaigns. Nonetheless, several
potential considerations remain.
State models suggest two approaches163 to national public financing if Congress
decides to pursue subsidized congressional campaigns. First, most public financing
programs infuse public money into campaigns in hopes of limiting the impact of
private money. This approach essentially provides candidates with money so that
they do not have to raise their own — or can at least raise less. Second, some
models, such as Nebraska’s public funding program, have reportedly encouraged the
vast majority of candidates to limit spending on their own. Rather than providing
public funding to candidates based on the assumption that they will spend those
funds, the Nebraska program reserves public financing for candidates whose
162 Ibid.
163 The models discussed here are not the only potential avenues for delivering public
financing, although they are the mechanisms the states and the presidential system currently
use. Other options, such as the “Patriot dollars” program of partial public financing, in
which voters would receive small amounts of funds to be distributed to their favored
candidates via a blind trust, or subsidies for political parties or to purchase broadcast time,
are also possibilities. Yale University law professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres
proposed the “Patriot dollars” approach in their book Voting with Dollars. See Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

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CRS-57
opponents refuse to abide by relatively low spending limits. These two approaches
suggest a choice for Congress between public funding that concentrates primarily on
distributing money in anticipation of campaign needs versus creating incentives for
candidates to need less money by observing spending limits.164
In addition, creating a public financing system requires a choice between
funding primary elections or general elections, or both. Most existing state programs
have funded both types of elections, although general elections sometimes take
priority over primary elections and might be funded differently from primary
elections. While early congressional proposals generally covered primaries as well
as general elections, most prominent proposals since the 100th Congress have dealt
only with general election financing to reduce both costs and program complexity,
and to enhance chances for enactment.
Regardless of the chosen approach, public financing does not altogether
eliminate private money in politics. Even clean money programs require some
private fundraising to establish viability, albeit far less than under private financing.
In addition, some observers fear that public financing creates opportunities for more
financial influence from less accountable non-candidate sources — such as
independent expenditures and election-related “issue advocacy” by interest groups
— compared with the current system of private financing. Public financing systems
generally do not regulate fundraising or spending outside candidate campaigns,
although legislation could address such issues.
Congress might also wish to consider why some public financing programs have
been curtailed. In a few states, decisions by voters and candidates — not state
governments — appear to be most responsible for public financing programs falling
into disfavor. Experiences in the states suggest that in order to be viable, public
financing must have sufficient funding to make participation attractive to candidates.
As with public funds for presidential candidates, if public financing provides too
little money — or sets accompanying spending limits too low — to convince
candidates that they can wage effective campaigns, major candidates are likely to opt
out of the system, ultimately making it relevant only for minor candidates. (In 2004,
for example, both of the eventual major-party nominees for President opted out of
matching funds in the primaries.) Public support can also be important to enact and
maintain public financing. Despite regular congressional interest in public financing
since at least the 1950s, disagreements over many of the issues noted in this report
have thus far thwarted efforts to adopt public financing in legislative elections.
On a related note, effective public financing165 requires resources not only
adequate to make participation attractive to candidates, but also sufficient to
administer and enforce public financing. As law professor Richard Briffault has
explained,
164 Some combination of these two approaches might also be possible. However, most
programs offering contingency funds for those facing high spending by opponents assume
that those opponents do not participate in public financing.
165 This assumes that “effectiveness” is signaled by high levels of candidate participation.

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CRS-58
Public [campaign] funding requires administrators to determine who qualifies for
public funds, to disburse the funds, and to enforce whatever restrictions
accompany the funds. Can public administrators handle the job? In fact,
administrators have successfully handled the qualification of candidates and
disbursement of public funds in presidential elections. The real question is
whether they can enforce the rules — particularly the spending limits — that are
likely to accompany public funding.166
Comprehensive congressional public financing would, therefore, almost certainly
require substantial administrative and enforcement resources for the Federal Election
Commission.
Finally, public financing regulates only one area of campaign conduct. If
Congress were to adopt public financing for its elections, other regulations —
including those currently in place — would still be required to shape other areas of
campaign politics, such as political advertising and party activities. Public financing
would also not necessarily affect other factors that shape individual races. As one
pair of scholars wrote in 1995,
public financing of congressional elections, by itself, will not eliminate the
problem of uncompetitive elections. As in Wisconsin, public subsidies may
increase or prevent further deterioration in the competitiveness of contested
congressional races by giving challengers more of a level playing field. They
might not, however, encourage challengers to emerge in districts where the
incumbent is perceived as unbeatable.167
Public financing could have diverse impacts on congressional elections. Data
from the states show some evidence that public financing decreases financial
disparities between candidates and fosters closer margins of victory. However, these
findings are generally preliminary and are based on specific conditions in specific
states. Because public financing limits the amount of private financing of campaigns,
it is likely that public financing in congressional elections would reduce the amount
of time candidates spend raising money — at least for their own or others’ candidate
campaigns. On its own, however, public financing of candidate campaigns would not
affect activities by 527s, political parties, or other organizations. The same is true for
leadership PACs, unless they were prohibited by public financing legislation.
Evidence from the states also suggests that if Congress chooses to fund
congressional elections publicly, faith in the system and patience will be required.
As is discussed throughout this report, much about the impact of public financing is
simply unknown. Relatively few states offer public financing for legislative
elections. Individual components of those programs, such as funding levels,
conditions on candidates, and other factors, can vary substantially, making it difficult
to compare public financing across states or to draw firm inferences about how state
166 Richard Briffault, “Public Funding and Democratic Elections,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 148 (1999-2000), p. 585. The quotation above omits
Briffault’s footnote 70.
167 See Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral
Competitiveness,” p. 86.

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CRS-59
lessons might translate to congressional elections. It is clear from the presidential
public financing program, and state programs, that assessing the impact of public
financing takes multiple election cycles. As more states experiment with legislative
public financing, and do so for longer periods of time, potential lessons for adopting
congressional public financing will become clearer. It is also clear that in order to
be effective, public financing programs require levels of funding sufficient to make
them attractive to serious candidates, and to maintain those levels of funding over
time. Similarly, spending limits associated with public financing must be high
enough to convince candidates that they can compete in modern campaigns,
including in expensive broadcast media markets.

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Appendix 1:
Public Finance Bills Passed by the House or Senate: 1973 — 1993168
Table 2. Congressional Election Public Finance Bills Passed by House or Senate: Summary of Provisions
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
93rd Congress
House
General
Major-party candidates:
Greater of 15¢ per eligible
Mandatory system
Fixed subsidy equal to spending
voter, or $90,000
H.R. 11104,
limit
Financed by negative
S. Amt. 651
Parties may spend additional
tax checkoff (i.e., one
Minor-party candidates:
amounts
must opt not to have
Passed by Senate
Fixed subsidy based on prior
tax revenues used)
Nov. 27, 1973
vote history
Later dropped after
Senate
General
Major-party candidates:
Greater of 15¢ per eligible
House refused to
Fixed subsidy equal to spending
voter, or $175,000
accept Senate
limit
additions
Parties may spend additional
Minor-party candidates:
amounts
Fixed subsidy based on prior
vote history
168 Provisions in italics represent contingency provisions, which would have taken effect only under certain specified circumstances.

---

CRS-61
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
93rd Cong.
House
Primary
Matches $100 donations, up to ½
$90,000
Voluntary system
S. 3044
spending limit
Financed by negative
Passed by Senate
General
Major-party candidates:
$90,000
tax checkoff (i.e., one
Apr. 11, 1974
Fixed subsidy equal to spending
must opt not to have
limit
Parties may spend additional
tax revenues used)
amounts
Minor party candidates:
Fixed subsidy based on prior
vote history
Senate
Primary
Matches $100 donations, up to ½
Greater of 10¢ per eligible
spending limit
voter, or $125,000
General
Major-party candidates:
Greater of 15¢ per eligible
Fixed subsidy equal to spending
voter, or $175,000
limit
Parties may spend additional
Minor party candidates:
amounts
Fixed subsidy based on prior
vote history

---

CRS-62
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
101st Cong.
Senate
General
—
Broadcast communication
Contributions or loans from
Candidates who do
S. 137
vouchers of up to 20% of
candidate or family:
not participate are
Contingent subsidies to
general election spending
$250,000
ineligible for lowest
Passed Senate
compensate participant for:
limit
unit rate and are
Aug. 1, 1990
(A) independent expenditures
General election —
required to include in
against participant or for
Lowest unit rate for non-
The lesser of:
their advertisements a
opponent; and
pre-emptible broadcast
(A) $5.5 million, or
statement that they do
(B) expenditures by opponent in
time
(B) the greater of
not abide by spending
excess of spending limit
(i) $950,000, or
limits
Reduced mail rates, valued
(ii) $400,000, plus 30¢
up to 5% of the general
times the voting age
Total spending range:
election limit
population (VAP), up to 4
$1.6 - $8.3 million
(First-class mail at 1/4
million, and 25¢ times VAP
existing rate; third-class
over 4 million (may be
mail at 2¢ less than
exceeded by 25%, in small
existing rate)
in-state donations)
Primary election —
67% of the general election
limit, up to $2.75 million
Runoff —
20% of the general election
limit
Limits raised to equal
independent expenditures
against participants in primary
and removed if opponent
spends more than 133 1/3% of
limit

---

CRS-63
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
101st Congress
House
General
—
One free radio or TV spot
Candidate personal funds —
H.R. 5400
for every two purchased
$75,000
Passed House
First-class postage at ½
Election cycle —
Aug. 3, 1990
current rate and third-class
$550,000 (up to $300,000 in
postage at nonprofit rate,
primary), plus:
in the last 90 days of the
$165,000 if primary is won
election campaign
with less than 2/3 of vote
100% tax credit for in-state
Runoff —
contributors, up to $50
$100,000
($100 on joint returns)
Contingency provision:
Limits removed if non-
participant raises or spends
more than $200,000

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CRS-64
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
102nd Cong.
Senate
General
—
Broadcast communication
Contributions or loans from
Candidates who do
S. 3
vouchers of up to 20% of
candidate or family:
not participate are
Contingent subsidies to
general election spending
$25,000
required to include in
Passed Senate
compensate participant for:
limit
their advertisements a
May 23, 1991
(A) independent expenditures
General election —
statement that they do
against participant or for
50% lowest unit rate for
The lesser of:
not abide by spending
opponent, once over $10,000;
non-pre-emptible
(A) $5.5 million, or
limits.
and
broadcast time
(B) the greater of
(B) expenditures by opponent in
(i) $950,000, or
(Total spending range:
excess of spending limit
Reduced mail rates, valued
(ii) $400,000, plus 30¢ times
$1.6 million to $8.3
up to 5% of general
VAP, up to 4 million, and
million)
election limit
25¢ times VAP over 4
(first-class mail at 1/4
million
existing rate; third-class
mail at 2¢ less than
Primary election —
reduced first-class rate)
67% of general election limit,
up to $2.75 million
Runoff —
20% of general election limit
Contingency provision:
Limits raised to equal
independent expenditures
against participants in primary
or general, once over $10,000,
and removed if opponent
spends more than 133 1/3% of
limit

---

CRS-65
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
102nd Congress
House
General
Matching funds, up to $200,000,
Up to three mailings per
Candidate personal funds —
H.R. 3750
with first $200 from individuals
eligible voter, at same
$60,000
matched
reduced third-class postage
Passed House
rate as available to national
Election cycle —
Nov. 25, 1991
Contingent subsidies to
parties
$600,000 (up to $500,000 in
compensate participant:
general election), plus
(A) for independent expenditures
$150,000 if primary is won by
against participant or for
10% or less of vote
opponent;
(B) for expenditures by opponent
Runoff —
once in excess of 50% of general
$100,000
election spending limit, on a
matching basis; and
Contingency provision:
(C) if opponent makes personal
Limits are removed if opponent
contributions in excess of 50%
raises or spends more than
of general election limit, on 3-
50% of general election limit
to-1 matching basis
or when $60,000 in
independent expenditures are
made against the candidate or
for opponent

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CRS-66
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
102nd Congress
Senate
General
—
Broadcast communication
Candidate/family
Non-participants
S. 3
vouchers of up to 20% of
contributions/loans —
required to run
Conference version
Contingent subsidies to
gen. election spending
lesser of $250,000, or 10% of
disclaimer on ads that
compensate participant for:
limit
general election limit
they do not abide by
Vetoed
(A) independent expenditures
spending limits
May 9, 1992
against participant or for
50% lowest unit rate for
General election —
opponent; and
non-pre-emptible
the lesser of:
(Total spending range:
(B) expenditures by opponent in
broadcast time
(A) $5.5 million, or
$1.6 million to $8.3
excess of spending limit
(B) the greater of
million)
Up to 1 mailing per
(i) $950,000, or
eligible voter, at lowest 3rd
(ii) $400,000, plus 30¢ times
class non-profit rate
VAP, up to $4 million, and
25¢ times VAP over $4
million
Primary election —
67% of general election limit,
up to $2.75 million
Runoff —
20% of general election limit
Contingency provision:
Limits raised to equal
independent expenditures
against participants in general
election, once over $10,000,
and raised if opponent spends
more than 133 1/3% of limit

---

CRS-67
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
102nd Congress
House
General
Matching funds, up to $200,000,
Up to 1 mailing per
Candidate personal funds —
S. 3
with first $200 from individuals
eligible voter, at lowest
lesser of $250,000, or 10% of
Conference version
matched
third-class, non-profit rate
general election limit
Vetoed
Contingent subsidies to
Election cycle —
May 9, 1992
compensate participant:
$600,000 (up to $500,000 in
(A) for independent expenditures
general election), plus:
against participant or for
$150,000 if contested primary
opponent, once over $10,000;
is won by 10% or less of vote
and
(B) if opponent makes personal
Runoff —
contributions in excess of 50%
$100,000
of general election limit, on a 3-
to-1 matching basis
Contingency provision:
Limits removed if opponent
spends more than 80% of
general election limit or to
extent of independent
expenditures made against
candidate or for opponent,
once over $10,000

---

CRS-68
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
103rd Congress
Senate
General
—
50% lowest unit rate for
Candidate/family
Non-participants
S. 3
non-pre-emptible
contributions/loans —
required to run
Contingent subsidies to
broadcast time, in last 60
$25,000
disclaimer on ads that
Passed Senate
compensate participant for:
days of general election
they do not abide by
June 17, 1993
(A) independent expenditures
General election —
spending limits
against participant or for
Up to 2 mailings per
the lesser of:
opponent, once over $10,000
eligible voter, at lowest
(A) $5.5 million, or
Repeals exempt
from a single source; and
third-class, non-profit rate
(B) the greater of
function income
(B) expenditures by opponent in
(i) $950,000, or
exclusion on principal
excess of spending limit
(ii) $400,000, plus 30¢ times
campaign committees
VAP, up to 4 million, and
of candidates who
25¢ times VAP over 4
exceed spending
million
limits
Primary election —
(Total spending range:
67% of general limit, up to
$1.6 million to $8.9
$2.75 million
million)
Runoff —
20% of general limit
Contingency provision:
Limits are raised to equal
independent expenditures
against participants in general
election, once over $10,000,
and raised if opponent exceeds
limit by 100% of limit (but
spending not to exceed 200%
of limit)

---

CRS-69
Applicability
Public Benefits
Congress, Bill, &
Spending limits
Notes
Action
Chamber
Election
Direct Payments
Other Benefits
103rd Congress
House
General
—
Voter communication
Candidate personal funds —
H.R. 3
vouchers, based on
$50,000
Contingent subsidies to
matching first $200 from
Passed House
compensate participant for:
individuals, up to
Election cycle —
Nov. 22, 1993
(A) independent expenditures
$200,000
$600,000, plus:
against participant or for
$200,000 if contested primary
opponent, once over $10,000;
is won by 20% or less of vote
and
(B) close-primary winners (up to
Runoff —
$66,600 in additional vouchers)
$200,000
Contingency provision:
Limits removed if non-
participating opponent raises
or spends more than 25% of
general election limit or to
extent of independent
expenditures made against
candidate or for opponent,
once over $10,000
Abbreviation:
VAP = voting age population

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CRS-70
Appendix 2:
Public Finance Bills in the 109th Congress:
Summary of Key Provisions
H.R. 2753 (Andrews) — Public Campaign Financing Act of 2005
(Introduced June 7, 2005; referred to Committee on House Administration)
Public finance provisions:
! Would have provided public funding in House general elections in
amounts based on media costs in the area, up to $750,000 (with
indexing for future inflation), for specified campaign purposes (but
not a salary for candidate), within four months of general election,
for candidates who: (a) gather petitions signed by at least 3% of
registered voters or whose party received at least 25% of the vote in
prior general election; (b) limit individual donations to $100; (c)
raise at least 80% of funds in-state; and (d) participate in at least two
debates; would have required broadcasters to accept participating
candidate ads, until they constituted 40% of station’s total
advertising time.
Other provisions:
! Would have required FEC to allow state parties to file copies of
reports filed under state law if they contain substantially the same
information as required under federal law;
! Would have required prompt disclosure by non-party entities for
spending on “federal election activities” (as defined by BCRA), once
$2,000 threshold level is reached;
! Would have required candidate reports to be broken down by
primary, general, or runoff election;
! Would have prohibited bundling by PACs, parties, lobbyists, unions,
corporations, or national banks, or employees or agents acting on
their behalf.
H.R. 3099 (Tierney) — Clean Money, Clean Elections Act
(Introduced June 28, 2005; jointly referred to Committees on House Administration,
Energy and Commerce, and Government Reform)
Public finance provisions:
! Would have provided full public subsidies, 30 minutes of free
broadcast time in primary and 75 minutes in general election, and
additional broadcast time at 50% of lowest unit rate for House
candidates who participate in “clean money” system and spend no
private funds beyond subsidy once qualified;
! Would have allowed candidates, prior to qualification, to raise seed
money ($35,000, in contributions of $100 or less) for specified uses
other than broadcast ads; major party candidates would have

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qualified by raising $5 donations from 1,500 state voters; others
would have qualified by raising 150% of amount raised by major
party candidates;
! Subsidy would have equaled applicable percentage (60% for general
election, 40% for major party candidate in primary, and 25% for
other primary candidates) of 80% of base amount per election (base
amount would have been national average of winning House
candidate expenditures in three most recent general elections), but
amount was never to be less than amount provided in previous
election cycle;
! Would have reduced subsidy to 40% of amount otherwise
determined for unopposed candidates;
! Additional subsidies would have been provided to candidates
targeted in opposing independent expenditures and by non-
complying opponents once such spending exceeded 125% of
spending limit (maximum additional funds equals 200% of limit);
! Would have denied lowest unit rate to non-participating House
candidates;
! Would have financed benefits from House of Representatives
Election Fund using appropriated funds, qualifying contributions,
and unused seed money.
Other provisions:
! In House races with at least one “clean money” candidate, would
have limited party spending on behalf of a candidate to 10% of
general election candidate’s subsidy;
! Regarding “clean money” candidates: would have required 48-hour
notice of independent expenditures above $1,000 up to 20 days
before election and 24-hour notice of amounts above $500 in last 20
days;
! Would have amended “contribution” to include anything of value for
purpose of influencing a federal election and that was coordinated
with candidate;
! Would have defined “payment made in coordination with a
candidate” to include payments (1) in cooperation or consultation
with, or at request or suggestion of, a candidate or agent; (2) using
candidate-prepared materials; (3) based on information about
campaign plans provided by candidate’s campaign for purpose of
expenditure; (4) by a spender who during that election cycle had
acted in an official position for a candidate, in an executive,
policymaking, or advisory capacity; and (5) by a spender who had
used the same consultants as an affected candidate during election
cycle; would have deemed payments made in coordination with a
candidate as a “contribution” or “expenditure” (but exempted a
payment by a party in coordination with a “clean money” candidate);
! Would have added one FEC commissioner, recommended by other
members;
! Would have allowed random audits of campaigns;
! Would have given FEC authority to seek injunctions;

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! Would have changed standard to begin enforcement proceedings to
“reason to investigate”;
! Would have allowed FEC to petition Supreme Court;
! Would have expedited enforcement in last 60 days of election, with
clear and convincing evidence that violation had occurred, was
occurring, or was about to occur;
! Would have allowed subpoenas without chair’s signature;
! Would have required electronic filing of disclosure reports;
! Would have required 24-hour notice of all contributions received in
last 90 days of election;
! Would have prohibited preemption of House campaign broadcast
ads, unless beyond broadcasters’ control;
! Would have prohibited franked mass mailings from start of primary
election period through general election, unless Member was not a
candidate or mailing promotes public forum with candidate name
only;
! Included statement of findings and declarations;
! If any provision of act or this statute were held unconstitutional, the
remainder of act and statute would have been unaffected.
H.R. 4694 (Obey) — Let the Public Decide Campaign Finance Reform Act
(Introduced Feb. 1, 2006; jointly referred to Committees on House Administration,
Ways and Means, and Rules)
Public finance provisions:
! Would have set mandatory limits on House general election
spending based on median household income per district, with
maximum of $1.5 million for all major party candidates in highest
level district;
! Other districts’ limits would have been determined by subtracting
from $1.5 million: two-thirds of percentage difference between the
median household income in the district involved and the highest-
median-household-income district, multiplied by $1.5 million;
! Maximum expenditure by a major party candidate would have been
in the same ratio to the district-wide limit as the votes for that
candidate’s party in the last two House general elections in the
district were to the votes for all major party candidates in those two
elections;
! For purposes of establishing major party limit, only elections in
which there were at least two major party candidates were to have
been counted, and, if no such elections occurred, votes for Senate
elections during the same period were to be used as the basis;
! Maximum expenditure for minor party or independent candidates
would have been based on comparable ratios concerning that party’s
(or all independent candidates’) votes in House general elections in
the district, all federal offices in the state, or for presidential
elections in the state (whichever amount was highest);

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CRS-73
! Would have established mechanism for candidates to increase their
spending limits based on submission of petition signatures (not
applicable to candidate with highest limit in the race);
! Payments were to have been made to candidates for election
expenses in amounts equal to the expenditure limits calculated above
from a Grassroots Good Citizenship Fund, established within the
Treasury;
! Fund would have been financed by voluntary taxpayer designations
of any refunds owed them of at least $1, plus any additional
contributions they wished to make, and by a tax on corporations of
0.1% on taxable income above $10 million;
! Would have directed FEC to make extensive public service
announcements from January 1 to April 15 to promote the fund;
! Would have allowed only one other source for campaign
expenditures — contributions from national and state political
parties, of up to 5% of the applicable spending limit;
! Would have imposed a limit on House candidates in primary
elections equal to one-third of the applicable limit for the general
election;
! If any part of the act or these amendments were held
unconstitutional, would have provided for expedited (fast-track)
consideration by Congress of a constitutional amendment to allow
reasonable restrictions on contributions, expenditures, and
disbursements in federal campaigns.
Other provisions:
! Would have banned independent expenditures in connection with
House elections (but would have provided for fast-track
consideration of a constitutional amendment to allow reasonable
limits if the ban were held unconstitutional);
! Would have banned soft money spending in connection with House
elections (but would have provided for fast-track consideration of a
constitutional amendment to allow reasonable limits if the ban were
held unconstitutional).
H.R. 5281 (Leach) — Campaign Reform Act of 2004
(Introduced May 3, 2006; referred to Committee on House Administration)
Public finance provisions:
! Would have created House of Representatives Election Campaign
Account, within the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, to
provide matching payments to eligible House candidates;
! Eligibility would have been established by (1) raising at least
$10,000 from individuals in that election cycle; (2) qualifying for the
primary or general election ballot; (3) having an opponent in the
primary or general election; and (4) limiting receipts and
expenditures in election to $500,000 or the aggregate matching
payment limit, whichever was greater;

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! Would have provided for an equal match of contributions from in-
state individuals whose aggregate contributions to that candidate for
that election did not exceed $500;
! Aggregate matching payments were not to exceed $175,000 in an
election, unless (1) a non-eligible opponent raised more than
$500,000 for that election, in which case the matching fund payment
could have equaled the opponent’s receipts; (2) any opponent in a
contested primary raised more than $50,000, in which case the
payments could have been increased by up to $75,000; or (3) a
runoff occurred, in which case the payments could have been
increased by up to $50,000;
! Payments for House candidates were to have come from House of
Representatives Election Campaign Account, once Secretary of
Treasury determined that there were adequate funds for presidential
campaigns, and from supplemental authorizations by Congress.

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