Order Code RL32724
Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for Congress
Updated January 22, 2007
Colleen W. Cook
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States and Mexico have a special relationship as neighbors and
partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although
relations with Mexico are generally friendly, the enactment of border fence
legislation in October 2006 has caused some tension in the bilateral relationship.
Felipe Calderón of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) narrowly
defeated leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) in the disputed July 2, 2006, presidential election. Legal
challenges were resolved in September 2006, though López Obrador has not
conceded defeat. President Calderón was sworn into office on December 1, 2006.
During his first weeks in office he has focused on law and order matters, beginning
operations against drug cartels and extraditing 15 criminals to the United States on
January 19, 2007. U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales praised the extraditions
and has praised Calderón’s efforts to combat the drug cartels. Drug violence and
press freedom remain a concern.
Migration and border security concerns have dominated the bilateral relationship
in recent years. In September, Congress approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006
(P.L. 109-367) to authorize the construction of a border fence and other barriers
along 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. In September 2006, Congress also
approved initial funding for fence construction, $1.2 billion, through the FY2007
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act. Both the House and Senate
approved immigration reform measures (H.R. 4437 and S. 2611, respectively) but did
not meet in conference to resolve differences. Principal sticking points include the
House provision that criminalizes unlawful presence and Senate provisions to adjust
the status of certain illegal immigrants.
Bush Administration officials regularly praised Mexico’s counternarcotics
efforts under former President Vicente Fox and anticipate continued strong relations
under President-elect Felipe Calderón. Mexico is the leading transit country for
cocaine, a leading supplier of methamphetamine, and the leading foreign supplier of
marijuana to the United States. The USA Patriot Act Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177), enacted in March 2006, includes
provisions to combat methamphetamine smuggling from Mexico.
Since 1994, NAFTA institutions have been functioning, trade between the
countries has tripled, and allegations of violations of labor and environmental laws
have been considered by the trilateral institutions. The Bush Administration argues
that NAFTA has had modest positive impacts on all three member countries, but
Mexican farmers have strongly criticized the effects of NAFTA. Notable bilateral
trade disputes relate to trucking, telecommunications, tuna, sweeteners and anti-
dumping measures. For further information on Mexico, refer to the list of related
CRS products in the appendix. This report will be updated on a regular basis.

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-Mexico Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Calderón Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Fox Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Economic Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Foreign Policy Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bilateral Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Migration/Border Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Nature of the Immigration Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Executive Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Drug Trafficking Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Trade Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Recent Trade Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Political and Human Rights Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislation Relating to Mexico in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Methamphetamine Trafficking Enforcement Act of 2007 (S. 132) . . . . . . . 20
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007
(H.R. 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
AgJOBS Act of 2007 (H.R. 371) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Citizenship Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 133) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act
of 2007 (H.R. 98) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
H.R. 305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
H.Res. 18 and H.Res. 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
H.Con.Res. 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Legislation Relating to Mexico in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Border Security and Migration Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CRS Products on Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CRS Products on Immigration and Border Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CRS Products on Drug Trafficking and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CRS Products on Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
On January 19, 2007, Mexico extradited an unprecedented 15 prisoners to the
United States, including those who had not yet been tried in Mexico. Perhaps most
significantly, Mexico extradited Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, the alleged head of the
powerful Gulf cartel, who is believed to have maintained control of the cartel since
his 2003 imprisonment. Other senior drug traffickers extradited to the United States
on January 19, 2007, include Ismael Higuera Guerrero and Gilberto Higuera Guerrero
of the Tijuana cartel led by the Arellano Felix family; and, Hector Palma Salazar of
the Sinaloa cartel.
On January 18, 2007, Mexico’s pro-market president, Felipe Calderón,
announced a pact with producers of Mexico’s main staple, the corn tortilla, to cap the
price for 2007. Earlier in January, he authorized the import of 650,000 tons of corn
in an attempt to ease pressure on tortilla prices. The price pact is viewed as a
response to increasing discontent over the prices and to reduce inflationary pressures.
Tortilla prices increased 14% in the last year. Some analysts have blamed the price
increase on U.S. demand for ethanol and a poor U.S. corn harvest in 2006. Others
question this, noting that ethanol is made from yellow corn, not the white corn used
for tortillas. President Calderón has ordered an investigation into the price increase
to determine if it is the result of monopolistic practices of Mexico’s tortilla
producers. He also authorized the duty-free import of 650,000 tons of corn.
On January 16, 2007, Mexico’s Foreign Ministry submitted a diplomatic note
to the United States in protest of the fatal shooting of a Mexican migrant by a Border
Patrol agent in Arizona on January 12. The FBI is investigating the incident.
In December 2006 and January 2007, President Calderón launched efforts to
combat drug violence in the border city of Tijuana, the western state of Michoacán,
and the southern state of Guerrero. These efforts have been praised by U.S. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales.
From May to December 2006, there was significant public unrest in the southern
city of Oaxaca. The unrest was sparked by the violent repression of a peaceful
teachers strike. The situation had calmed down by the end of 2006. The violence led
to the deaths of nine people, including American journalist Bradley Will, and led to
the loss of significant tourism revenue.

Mexico extradited a record 63 prisoners to the United States during 2006,
including accused drug kingpin Francisco Rafael Arellano Felix. This is a significant

CRS-2
increase from the previous record of 41 set in 2005 and may be due to recent
decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court. In November 2005, the court determined
that life sentences without the possibility of parole were constitutional, thus
permitting extraditions to the United States. In a January 2006 ruling, the Court
determined that extraditions to the United States need only fulfill the requirements
of the 1978 extradition treaty between the two countries, not the general law on
international extradition.
In September 2006, after unsuccessfully attempting to achieve comprehensive
immigration reform, the 109th Congress approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-367), to authorize the construction of barriers along 700 miles of the U.S.-
Mexico border. After President Bush approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-367), Mexico and 27 other Latin American nations filed a protest against the
700-mile fence at the Organization of American States. Comprehensive immigration
reform measures approved by each house (H.R. 4437 and S. 2611) were not enacted
due to key differences such as the House provision that would criminalize unlawful
presence in the United States and Senate provisions to adjust the status of certain
illegal immigrants.
Felipe Calderón of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) narrowly
defeated leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) in Mexico’s July 2, 2006, presidential election.1 The election was
highly contested and it took until September 5, 2006, for Mexico’s Federal Electoral
Tribunal to resolve challenges to the election and name Felipe Calderón president-
elect. Following the vote, López Obrador supporters carried out a campaign of civil
disobedience until mid-September. Their campaign included the blockade of Mexico
City’s principal boulevard, Paseo de la Reforma, and is reported to have cost Mexico
City businesses over $500 million. López Obrador rejected the Tribunal’s decision
and his supporters named him the “legitimate president” at a National Democratic
Convention on September 16 and he inaugurated himself as President on November
20, 2006, the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution. Like his predecessor, Vicente
Fox, Calderón does not have a majority in congress and will need to reach out to
other parties to achieve some of his objectives, such private sector involvement in the
state oil company, PEMEX.
U.S.-Mexico Relationship2
Political Developments
Calderón Administration. Felipe Calderón of the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) was sworn in as President on December 1, 2006 in an unusually
1 For more information on the elections, see CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006
Elections
, by Colleen W. Cook.
2 This report draws heavily from CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for
the 109th Congress
, by Colleen W. Cook and CRS Report RL31876, Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 108th Congress
, by K. Larry Storrs.

CRS-3
brief inauguration ceremony due to fears that members of the PRD congressional
delegation would interrupt the ceremony. It is anticipated that Calderón will continue
the progress made in bilateral relations under President Fox, particularly in the area
of law enforcement cooperation. Felipe Calderón made his first official visit to the
United States as President-elect in early November 2006, after first visiting Canada
and several Latin American countries. During his visit, Calderón criticized the recent
authorization of 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border and noted that
it complicated U.S.-Mexico relations. He asserted that job-creation and increased
investment in Mexico would be more effective in reducing illegal migration from
Mexico than a border fence. Calderón signaled a shift in Mexican foreign policy
when he noted that while immigration is an important issue in the bilateral
relationship, it is not the only issue, as trade and economic development are also
important. President Calderón has called increasing drug violence in Mexico a threat
to the Mexican state, and has suggested reorganizing federal law enforcement to
address the issue.3 In his first weeks in office, President Calderón has emphasized
law and order through initiatives to combat drug cartels and has launched a job
creation initiative to both further Mexican development and reduce emigration to the
United States. While the PAN, along with the leftist PRD, made significant gains in
congressional elections, the PAN failed to win a majority in either house, meaning
that President Calderón will have to forge alliances with other parties in order to
achieve some of his campaign platforms, particularly his plan to allow private
investment in the oil sector.
Fox Administration. When Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for
Change coalition was inaugurated as President on December 1, 2000, for a six-year
term, he promised to promote free market policies, strengthen democracy and the rule
of law, fight corruption and crime, and end the conflictive situation in the state of
Chiapas. Fox’s inauguration ended 71 years of presidential control by the long
dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Fox was elected with 42.52% of the vote in the July 2, 2000 elections, with
support from the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecological
Party of Mexico (PVEM), which formed the Alliance for Change. Francisco
Labastida from the long-ruling and centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
came in second with 36.10% of the vote. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from the leftist
Alliance for Mexico came in third with 16.64% of the vote, with support from the
center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and four minor leftist parties.
Results from the July 2000 legislative elections produced a pluralistic legislature
where none of the major parties had a majority in either chamber. In the 128-member
3 “The Spectre of Rebellion Recedes in Mexico but Calderón Will Still Face Unrest and
Violence,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, September 2006; Kevin G. Hall
and Pablo Bachelet, “Mexico’s Calderón Gives Bush an Earful on Immigration,” Miami
Herald
, November 10, 2006; Patty Reinert, “Calderón Vows to Help Curb Illegal
Immigration,” Houston Chronicle, November 10, 2006; and, Jerry Kammer, “Calderón will
Pursue Other Topics with U.S.,” San Diego Union Tribune, November 10, 2006.

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Senate, the PRI has 60 senators, the PAN has 46, and the PRD has 15.4 Following
the July 2003 elections to renew the Chamber of Deputies, the PAN dropped from
206 deputies to 153 deputies (31% of the total), putting it in a weaker position to
support Fox’s program, while the PRI’s delegation increased from 211 to 224 (45%
of the total) and the PRD’s delegation increased from 50 to 95 (19% of the total).5
Economic Linkages
Mexico surpassed Japan in 1999 to become the United States’ second most
important trading partner following Canada. The United States is Mexico’s most
important customer by far, receiving about 87% of Mexico’s exports, including
petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and providing about 77%
of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60% of foreign
investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings.
Mexico is also the leading country in Latin America in terms of U.S. investment,
with the total stock of U.S. investment being about $71 billion in 2005.
With nearly 90% of the country’s exports going to the United States, Mexico’s
economy was strongly affected by the slowdown in the United States following the
terrorist attacks. Mexico’s economy contracted 0.8% in 2001, and grew only 0.9%
in 2002 and 1.3% in 2003, but it revived strongly in 2004 with a 4.4% growth rate,
the best in Fox’s presidency. Economic growth in 2005 was 3% with a record
750,000 jobs created. The earlier meager growth results under Fox contrasted with
economic growth averaging over 5% in the previous six years. Under the
circumstances, President Fox was forced to operate under austere budgets in 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004, reducing the funding for promised health and education
programs. Lacking majority support in Congress, Fox was unable to obtain approval
of major legislation, including a proposed tax reform and a proposed energy reform
that would permit greater private participation in the hydrocarbon and electricity
sectors, although Congress did pass a social security reform in July 2004. Calderón,
like his predecessor, lacks a majority in Congress, meaning that he will need to make
alliances with members from other parties to pass reforms such as his campaign
pledge to open up the oil sector to private investment.
These economic ties are a marked change from the past. Until the early 1980s,
Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent foreign policy was
often at odds with the United States. Beginning under President Miguel de la Madrid
(1982-1988), and continuing more dramatically under President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexico adopted a
series of economic, political, and foreign policy reforms. It opened its economy to
trade and investment, adopted electoral reforms that leveled the playing field, and
increased cooperation with the United States on drug control, border issues, and trade
matters. Cooperation under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
4 For more detail on the 2000 elections, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s Presidential,
Legislative, and Local Elections of July 2, 2000
, by K. Larry Storrs.
5 For more detail on the 2003 elections, see CRS Report RS21561, Mexico’s Congress and
July 2003 Elections
, by K. Larry Storrs.

CRS-5
and the annual cabinet-level meetings of the Binational Commission are the clearest
indications of the close and increasing relationships between the countries.
Foreign Policy Challenges
Under President Fox Mexico pursued a more activist and diversified foreign
policy, with greater involvement in UN activities, and stronger ties to Latin America
and Europe. He promoted the so-called Puebla-Panama Plan, which promotes
cooperative development efforts among the Central American countries and the
southeastern states of Mexico. He attempted to revive the G-3 group trade
preferences (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico), however Venezuela formally
withdrew from the group in November 2006 after joining the Common Market of the
South (Mercosur). Fox also sought better ties with Mercosur countries in South
America. He attempted to expand trade with the European Union under the EU-
Mexico free trade agreement that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under
the Mexico-Japan free trade agreement that entered into force in April 2005. Mexico
held a temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2002 and 2003 and expressed
support for continuing diplomatic efforts under United Nations auspices to achieve
the disarmament of Iraq, leading to expressions of disappointment from the Bush
Administration.
President Fox encouraged strong relations with the United States, and he called
for greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration agreement that
would regularize the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States.
Relations became strained during the debate on immigration reform in the United
States. After President Bush approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Mexico, with
the support of 27 other nations, denounced the proposed border fence at the
Organization of American States. Mexico also indicated that it will challenge the
border fence before the United Nations. (See Migration/Border Issues below for
more detail.)
Bilateral Issues for Congress
Migration/Border Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem. Widely cited demographers at the
Pew Hispanic Center estimated in March 2006 that there were 6.2 million
undocumented Mexican migrants residing in the United States in 2005, accounting
for 56% of the total estimated illegal alien population of 11.5 to 12 million.6 Mexico
takes the view that the migrants are “undocumented workers,” making the point that
since the U.S. market attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears
6 Pew Hispanic Center, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant
Population in the United States
, by Jeffrey Passel, March 7, 2006, data from the March 2005
Current Population Survey (CPS) and monthly CPS through January 2006conducted by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For more detail and
comparisons with earlier years, see CRS Report RS21938, Unauthorized Aliens in the
United States: Estimates Since 1986
, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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some responsibility. Mexico regularly voices concern about alleged abuses suffered
by Mexican workers in the United States, and for the loss of life and hardships
suffered by Mexican migrants as they utilize increasingly dangerous routes and
methods to circumvent tighter border controls. Mexico benefits from illegal
migration in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that dissipates the political
discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in Mexico; and (2) it is a
source of remittances by workers in the United States to families in Mexico,
estimated to be about $10 billion per year.
In February 2006, the Mexican Congress approved a concurrent resolution on
migration and border security in which Mexico acknowledges that Mexican workers
will continue to emigrate until there are more opportunities in Mexico. Mexico also
accepts the need to revisit its migration policies to consider enforcement of its
northern and southern borders, enforcement of Mexican immigration laws that
respects the human rights of migrants, and the need to combat human trafficking.
Perhaps most significantly, the Mexican resolution states that the Government of
Mexico does not promote illegal migration and calls for the development of a guest
worker program in the United States under the principle of shared responsibility. The
resolution commits Mexico to enforcing legal emigration “if a guest country offers
a sufficient number of appropriate visas to cover the biggest possible number of
workers and their families, which, until now cross the border without documents
because of the impossibility of obtaining them.”7
The 109th Congress considered competing measures for comprehensive
immigration reform and increased border security, including the enactment of the
Secure Fence Act of 2006 which authorizes construction of barriers along 700 miles
of the U.S. border with Mexico. Mexico has stated that the border fence will cause
difficulties in the bilateral relationship and goes against the trend of increased
cooperation on border security matters. The 109th Congress did not enact
comprehensive immigration reform because of disagreement over key provisions of
House and Senate proposals (see the section titled Legislation Relating to Mexico in
the 109th Congress for more detail). Congress last enacted major immigration reform
in 1986 and 1996. Main provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (P.L. 99-603) included civil and criminal penalties for U.S. employers who
knowingly hire undocumented workers; increased border control and enforcement
measures; anti-discrimination safeguards; provision for legalization of illegal aliens
who resided continuously in the United States before 1982; and a special legalization
for farm workers previously employed on American farms. In 1996, two laws
relating to immigration were enacted, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208) and the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The first measure
sought to control illegal immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year
for five years (FY1997-FY2001), along with additional personnel, equipment, and
procedures. The IIRIRA increased penalties for unlawful presence and created the
expedited removal program.8 Individuals who depart the United States after more
7 “Mexico-U.S.: Migration and Border Security,” Embassy of Mexico, February 2006.
8 For more information on expedited removal, see CRS Report RL33109, Immigration
(continued...)

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than 180 days of unlawful presence now face either a three or 10 year bar to
admission to the United States, depending on the total period of unlawful presence.
Both measures reduced the attractiveness of immigration by restricting the eligibility
of aliens for federal programs.9
Executive Initiatives. Immigration matters were frequently discussed at
meetings between President Bush and former President Fox with both presidents
supporting comprehensive immigration reform including the creation of a guest
worker program. Border security overtook immigration reform following the 2001
terrorist attacks, though, in January 2004, President Bush proposed comprehensive
immigration reform including a guest worker program and the 109th Congress
considered but did not enact such reform.10
The Operation Against Smuggling Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS)
is a bilateral effort to combat human smuggling established in August 2005. The
program was initially limited to the area between San Diego, California and Yuma,
Arizona, but was extended to El Paso, Texas in April 2006. As of October 2006,
OASISS led to the prosecution of 300 individuals, who were not eligible for
prosecution in the U.S. federal court system, in Mexico on smuggling or trafficking
charges.11
U.S. and Mexican authorities are also increasing joint efforts to combat crime
and increase border security. U.S. and Mexican border governors announced plans
to share crime data in August 2006. In April 2006, the U.S. Consul to Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas and the Mexican Consul to Laredo, Texas announced a joint-effort to
increase cooperation among the police forces to more effectively combat crime in the
Laredos. On February 19-20, 2004, Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Tom Ridge met with Mexican Government Secretary Santiago Creel in Mexico City
to review progress under the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership. The two leaders
signed the U.S.-Mexico Action Plan for Cooperation and Border Safety for 2004, as
well as a Memorandum of Understanding on the Safe, Orderly, Dignified and
Humane Repatriation of Mexican Nationals. They also committed to develop six
new Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) lanes for
pre-screened, low-risk individuals, and to develop five new Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) lanes for pre-cleared cargo.
8 (...continued)
Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
9 See CRS Report 95-881, Immigration Legislation in the 104th Congress, by Joyce Vialet.
10 For information on the President’s proposal and the congressional initiatives, see CRS
Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related To Guest Worker Programs,
by Andorra Bruno.
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff on ICE and CBP 2006 Fiscal Year Enforcement Numbers,” October 31,
2006, accessed at [http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1162293386835.shtm] on
December 8, 2006.

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On November 2, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff launched the
Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive, multi-year plan to secure U.S.
borders, and to reduce illegal immigration. The Department of Homeland Security
planned to achieve these objectives through increased detention and removal,
including an end to the “catch and release” of illegal immigrants; increased personnel
at borders and ports of entry; increased enforcement of immigration laws in the U.S.
interior, including worksite inspections; technological upgrades to assist in border
enforcement; and improved infrastructure. Increased funding was approved by
Congress in early October 2005 in the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2360/P.L. 109-90). DHS submitted its SBI strategic plan
to Congress in November 2006, including estimates of the cost of the technology and
infrastructure component referred to as SBInet. DHS indicated that SBInet will
allow the Department to gain operational control of the U.S. southern border by 2011
and will cost an estimated $7.6 billion. According to the plan DHS would have
control of some 345 miles of the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border by the end of
FY2007. Some criticized the plan for shifting the date of operational control of the
southern border to 2011 from 2008. The DHS Inspector General cautioned in
November 2006 testimony before House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight that DHS lacked sufficient staff to manage
the contract awarded to Boeing to implement SBInet and stated that costs could rise
to as much as $30 billion.
On March 23, 2005, President Bush, President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin
established the trilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America.
Through the SPP the three nations will seek to advance the common security and the
common prosperity of the countries through expanded cooperation and
harmonization of policies. The SPP not a treaty or agreement and is limited to the
existing legal framework relating to the trilateral relationship. The SPP seeks to
address security and commercial cooperation at the regulatory level. To
operationalize this partnership, the leaders established Ministerial-led working
groups that are to develop measurable and achievable goals in the specified areas.
In August 2006, the SPP working groups submitted their second report to SPP
leaders outlining completed initiatives and proposing new initiatives to ensure
common security and prosperity. The working groups have established an Avian and
Human Pandemic Influenza Coordinating Body and a North American
Competitiveness Council. Increased cooperation between U.S. and Mexican
Customs officials on money laundering has resulted in the seizure of millions of
dollars. The three countries are working to more efficiently determine the risk of
cargo at seaports. Mexico has implemented the Sea Cargo Initiative which allows
gathers data electronically before loading at a port of origin. Earlier completed
initiatives included measures to facilitate trade, such as the signing of a Framework
of Common Principles for Electronic Commerce,12 and border security through,
among other measures, an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to create an Alien
Smuggler Prosecution Program along the common border.
12 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications
, by M. Angeles Villarreal.

CRS-9
On March 5-6, 2004, President Fox, during a visit to President Bush’s ranch in
Crawford, Texas, announced that Mexicans with border crossing cards would be
exempted from the end-of-the-year requirement to be photographed and finger-
scanned upon entry into the United States under the US-VISIT program. On a related
matter, on June 29, 2004, Mexico and the United States signed a social security
totalization agreement, subject to congressional approval, that would eliminate dual
social security taxation and fill gaps in benefit protection for affected employees who
work in both countries.
Drug Trafficking Issues
Mexico remains a major supplier of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana,
as well as the major transit point for cocaine sold in the United States. Although
U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics efforts have been marked by distrust at times in the
past, with criticisms mounting in March of each year when the President was
required to certify that drug producing and drug transit countries were cooperating
fully with the United States, relations improved during the Fox administration (2000-
2006) and cooperation is expected to continue under President Calderón. Reforms
to the drug certification process enacted in September 2002, have helped improve
bilateral relations on drug cooperation. The revised procedures require the President
to make a report, not later than September 15 of each year, identifying the major drug
transit or major illicit drug producing countries. At the same time, he is required to
designate any of the named countries that has “failed demonstrably,” during the
previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to international counter-
narcotics agreements (defined in the legislation) and to take other counter-narcotics
measures.13 In the late 1990s, Congress acted to strengthen Border Patrol and
international interdiction efforts along the Southwest Border, and it passed the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120), which strengthened the
President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) to block the assets in the United States of designated international drug
traffickers.14
According to the State Department’s March 2006 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Mexico is the main foreign supplier of marijuana
and methamphetamine to the United States, and although it accounts for only a small
share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies about 30% of the heroin consumed
in the United States. The State Department estimates that between 70% and 90% of
13 U.S. assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless the President
determines that the provision of assistance to that country is vital to the national interest of
the United States or that the designated country subsequently made substantial counter-
narcotics efforts. Notwithstanding the general suspension of the previous drug certification
and sanctions procedures, subsection 706(5)(B) provides that the President may apply those
procedures at his discretion. A transition rule provides that for FY2003, the required report
was to be submitted at least 15 days before foreign assistance funds are obligated or
expended.
14 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action,
1986-2002
, by K. Larry Storrs.

CRS-10
cocaine entering the United States does so via Mexico or its periphery.15 Despite
Mexico’s major role as a producing and transit country in 2005, the Fox
Administration was credited with carrying out major efforts to eradicate and seize
illicit drugs, and praised Mexican efforts to combat methamphetamine production.
The State Department cited a regulatory change on imports of pseudoephedrine, a
precursor chemical used to make methamphetamine, which resulted in a 40%
decrease in pseudoephedrine imports. The State Department noted, however, that
interdiction of drugs was problematic and drug trafficking organizations were able
to corrupt officials and easily replace arrested members. The State Department
reported an unprecedented number of extraditions of criminals to the United States;
41 fugitives were extradited to the United States in 2005. Extraditions continued to
increase in 2006 with 63 extraditions, including accused drug kingpin Francisco
Rafael Arellano Felix of the Tijuana cartel.
Although in the past Mexico refused to extradite criminals facing the possibility
of life without parole to the United States, two recent decisions by the Mexican
Supreme Court are expected to facilitate extraditions to the United States. In
November 2005, in a partial reversal of its October 2001 ruling, the Court found that
life imprisonment without possibility of parole does not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. As a result of this decision, criminals facing life imprisonment may be
extradited to the United States. The Mexican Supreme Court ruled in January 2006
that U.S. extradition requests only need to meet the requirements of the 1978 bilateral
treaty, not the general law on international extradition.16 New President Felipe
Calderón has indicated that he will use extradition as a major tool to combat drug
traffickers.
Counternarcotics cooperation improved significantly during the Fox
administration. President Calderón has indicated that combating drug cartels will be
a priority of his administration and has called drug violence a threat to the Mexican
state. In December, he re-organized the two federal police agencies - the Federal
Investigations Agency (AFI) and Federal Preventative Police (PFP) - by placing them
under a single commander. Shortly after taking office, President Calderón launched
offensives against drug cartels and drug violence in the border city of Tijuana, the
western state of Michoacán, and the southern state of Guerrero, all areas with high
rates of drug violence. Some 6,500 military and police went to Michoacán in
December 2006, a key transit point for drugs and drug cartels are fighting for control
of the area. Soldiers and law enforcement have been tasked with arresting traffickers,
establishing check points, burning marijuana and opium plants, and four Navy ships
along the coast will work to interdict drug shipments. The Mexican government
reports early success in the effort, including identification of over 2,000 marijuana
plantations and interception of nearly 5 tons of marijuana.
15 Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, March 2006, hereafter INCSR 2006.
16 Jesus Aranda, “Allana la Corte el Camino para Extraditar a Connacionales a EU,” La
Jornada
, February 1, 2006; “Mexico: Court Clears Way for Faster Extraditions to U.S.,”
Latin American Weekly Report, February 7, 2006; and, U.S. Department of State, INCSR
2006
.

CRS-11
In January 2007, the Calderón administration sent nearly 3,000 military and
federal police to Tijuana. Corruption of local police by drug traffickers is of
particular concern, and federal officers have stripped Tijuana police of their weapons,
provoking the city’s public safety secretary to suspend patrols by city police citing
safety concerns. In mid-January 2007, 7,600 military and federal police were sent to
Guerrero to destroy marijuana plantations in that state and reduce violence. Critics
of the operations note that no major cartel leader has been arrested and that the efforts
are more about show than a concerted effort to end cartel violence.
According to Mexican officials, one of the key challenges to effectively
combating drugs is that under current legislation drug crime is solely in the
jurisdiction of federal law enforcement, and that state and local police cannot be used
to investigate drug offenses. The Mexican congress approved legislation in April
2006 that would extend jurisdiction on drug matters to state and local authorities, but
controversial language relating to possession of drugs for personal use led President
Fox to veto the legislation. Mexican officials hope that a similar reform can be
passed this year so that federal law enforcement can concentrate on prosecution of
cartel leaders and state and local authorities can investigate lower level drug crimes.
Officials also hope that any new legislation clearly indicates that criminal charges are
only waived in favor of treatment the first time that an individual is caught with a
small amount of drugs for personal use.17
There were several significant developments on drug trafficking issues during
2006. The U.S. Coast Guard captured Tijuana cartel leader Francisco Javier Arellano
Felix in the Sea of Cortez in August 2006. In December 2006, he pled not guilty in
federal court in San Diego to charges including personally ordering abductions and
murder; racketeering; and drug trafficking. U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
will determine whether he will seek the death penalty in the case; a decision to seek
the death penalty could cause tension with Mexico which prohibits the death penalty.
H is brother, Francisco Rafael Arellano Felix, was extradited to the United States in
September 2006.
A joint operation between the DEA and Mexican Agencia Federal de
Investigaciones (Federal Investigations Agency, AFI) resulted in the February 2
arrest of Oscar Arriola Marquez, leader of the Los Arriola Cartel. Oscar Arriola
Marquez is wanted in the United States for cocaine trafficking and money laundering.
According to the DEA, since 2001 the Los Arriola cartel smuggled an average of 2.4
tons of cocaine per month into the United States. The United States is requesting his
extradition.
On January 26, 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
announced the discovery of a tunnel from Tijuana to a warehouse in San Diego.
Mexican officials seized 2 tons of marijuana and U.S. officials seized 200 pounds of
marijuana. The 2,400-foot long tunnel is the longest tunnel ever found at the U.S.-
Mexican border.
17 CRS interview with Mexican Embassy officials, October 27, 2006.

CRS-12
On January 23, 2006, Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) troopers and
Hudspeth County Sheriff Deputies pursued three SUVs believed to be loaded with
marijuana toward the border where a humvee of armed men dressed in military style
uniforms was sighted on the U.S. side of the border. Following pursuit by the sheriff
deputies and DPS troopers, the SUVs turned back toward Mexico and a humvee of
men in what appeared to be Mexican military uniforms arrived to protect the SUVs
and the drug shipment. U.S. law enforcement seized one SUV with over 1,400
pounds of marijuana and another SUV returned to Mexico. The third SUV became
stuck in the Rio Grande, and the armed men unloaded the marijuana before burning
the SUV.
According to the Department of Homeland Security, from FY2001 to FY2005
there were 144 border incursions by the Mexican military. Dialogue with the
Mexican military has reduced the frequency of such incursions by half. On January
25, the Mexican government stated that the January 23 incident involved drug
traffickers, not the Mexican military. On January 25, 2006, U.S. Ambassador
Antonio O. Garza delivered a diplomatic note to Mexico requesting that the Mexican
government investigate the border incursion. On February 7, 2006, the Investigations
subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing on
border incursions. The U.S. and Mexican governments concluded that the Mexican
army was not involved in the incursion.
Trade Issues18
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent
years under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada. Total U.S. trade with Mexico more than tripled
in 10 years, from $81.5 billion in 1993 to a high of $270.9 billion in 2005, but the
balance of U.S. trade with Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994
to a generally growing deficit of $67.5 billion in 2005 (exports of $101.7 billion;
imports of $169.2 billion). High oil prices and growth in the maquiladora sector
explain much of the increase in the trade deficit for 2005. This change in the trade
balance has caused some Members of Congress to question the benefits of NAFTA.
Despite the deficit, Mexico is one of the fastest growing export markets for the
United States in recent years, and it became the second most important trading
partner after Canada in 1999.
The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements
on labor and environmental matters were completed in 1993. The agreements were
approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force on January
1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions are being
eliminated over a 15-year period, with most restrictions eliminated in the early years
of the agreement. Over the years, Clinton Administration and Bush Administration
spokesmen have argued that NAFTA has been successful in increasing U.S. exports
to Mexico, particularly in heavily protected areas such as agricultural products, and
in promoting job creation and investment in both countries.
18 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations, by
M. Angeles Villarreal.

CRS-13
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions. Several NAFTA institutions
mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The tripartite
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in
Dallas, Texas. In addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico; and the North American
Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, were created
to promote and finance border environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004
to permit the NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental
infrastructure along the border, and the measure (H.R. 254) was signed into law (P.L.
108-215) on April 5, 2004.
The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade,
environmental and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the
labor and environmental side agreements.
Under the labor side agreement, 34 petitions have been submitted alleging
noncompliance by one of the NAFTA countries with existing labor legislation, and
22 of these have been against Mexico, although some of the cases against the United
States involve working conditions and compensation for migrant workers.
Eleven submissions against Mexico were advanced to the next stage of
ministerial consultations. In one case, the U.S. National Administrative Office
(NAO) found that ministerial consultations were unnecessary as the record
sufficiently established a violation of Mexican labor law, and the others were
dropped or rejected on procedural grounds. In October 2003, complaints were jointly
filed in Canada and the United States alleging violations of workers’ rights in
garment factories in Puebla, Mexico. In August 2004, the U.S. NAO recommended
ministerial consultations. The Canadian NAO also recommended ministerial
consultations in May 2005. In the past year, three new submissions have been filed
against Mexico. In February 2005, the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA) and a coalition of labor unions filed a submission alleging that the labor law
reform proposed by the Mexican government violates workers’ rights protected under
the Mexican Constitution and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
In May 2005, the Airline Pilots Association of Mexico alleged that Mexico had
violated its rights to organize and collective bargaining. A submission filed in
January 2006 alleges violations of workers’ rights, forced labor and child labor at a
Rubie’s de Mexico plant in Tepeji del Rio, Hidalgo.
Under the trilateral CLC, the countries are cooperating in many areas, especially
occupational safety and rights of working women and children. Some argue that the
provisions have encouraged Mexico to enforce its own labor legislation. Others
argue that the provisions have been extremely weak and that numerous abuses
persist.19
19 For more information on the functioning of this institution, see CRS Report 97-861,
(continued...)

CRS-14
Under the environmental side agreement, 36 of the 58 petitions submitted since
1995 alleging non-compliance with environmental legislation involve Mexico.
Seven of the 14 active cases before the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Secretariat involve Mexico. In 2006 the Commission has acted on five of the seven
active cases and closed two cases that involve Mexico. On January 9, 2006, the
Secretariat published the final record finding that Mexican government failed to
respond within the time frame required by Mexican law to citizen complaints
alleging illegal logging and mineral extraction filed by 28 members of indigenous
communities in the Sierra Tarahumara. On January 10, 2006, the Council received
a response from the Mexican government to a petition alleging that construction of
a liquid natural gas regasification terminal off the coast of Baja, California, is in
violation of Mexican law.
The council is now reviewing the petition and response to determine if it is
necessary to prepare a full factual record. In June 2006, the petitioner withdrew
allegations filed with the Council on January 27, 2006, that the Mexican
government’s cleanup of heavy metal contamination at the site of former BASF
Mexico facilities does not sufficiently protect residents of Cuautla, Morelo, from
exposure to heavy metals. New petitioners filed similar complaints in July and
September 2006. The Council requested the Mexican government’s response to the
new petitions in August and September 2006. In November 2006, the Council
received a complaint charging that the Mexican government was not safeguarding
Los Remedios National Park.20
The CEC also developed plans and reports to facilitate North American
cooperation on environmental matters. In October 2005, the CEC began a project to
analyze blood samples of first-time mothers in Canada, Mexico and the United States
to determine maternal exposure to environmental contaminants. In November 2005,
the CEC published North American Conservation Action Plans to improve
cooperation in the conservation of each of the six species identified to be of particular
concern under the Strategic Plan for North American Cooperation for the
Conservation of Biodiversity. The six species of concern are the humpback whale,
black-tailed prairie dog, ferruginous hawk, Pacific leatherback sea turtle, pink-footed
shearwater, and Western burrowing owl. In January 2006, the CEC published a
report on children’s health and environmental indicators in North America.
Recent Trade Disputes. Major trade disputes between the countries have
involved: the access of Mexican trucks to the United States; opening the Mexican
telecommunications sector to international long distance competition; the access of
Mexican sugar and tuna to the U.S. market; the access of U.S. sweeteners to the
Mexican market; and Mexico’s ban (recently removed) on U.S. beef products
following the discovery of mad cow disease.
19 (...continued)
NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate, by
Mary Jane Bolle.
20 For more information, see CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues
and Initiatives
, by Mary Tiemann.

CRS-15
With respect to trucking issues, the Mexican government objected to the Clinton
Administration’s refusal, on safety grounds, to allow Mexican trucks to have access
to U.S. highways under the terms of NAFTA. A NAFTA dispute resolution panel
supported Mexico’s position in February 2001. President Bush indicated a
willingness to implement the provision, but the U.S. Congress required additional
safety provisions in the FY2002 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act
(P.L. 107-87). On November 27, 2002, with safety inspectors and procedures in
place, the Administration announced that it would begin the process that will open
U.S. highways to Mexican truckers and buses, but environmental and labor groups
went to court in early December to block the action. On January 16, 2003, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that full environmental impact
statements were required before Mexican trucks would be allowed to operate on U.S.
highways, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision on June 7, 2004.
On September 22, 2004, the House approved 339-70 an amendment to the
Transportation-Treasury Appropriations (H.R. 5025) that would prohibit
implementation of a rule allowing Mexican and Canadian truck operators an
additional two years to bring their trucks into compliance with U.S. safety provisions,
and this was eventually incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) that was approved by the Congress and the
President in November-December 2004. In October 2006, officials from the
Department of Transportation indicated that the Department is prepared to ensure
that Mexican trucks meet U.S. and Canadian safety provisions. The head of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, John Hill, indicated that a pilot project
could be implemented to allow a limited number of Mexican companies access to the
United States at some point in the future, but noted that there are “no immediate
plans” to open the border to Mexican trucks beyond the 20-mile commercial limit.21
The United States and Mexico are completing resolution of a long standing trade
dispute involving sugar and high fructose corn syrup. Mexico argued the sugar side
letter negotiated under NAFTA entitled it to ship net sugar surplus to the United
States duty free under NAFTA, while the United States argued that the sugar side
letter limited Mexican shipments of sugar. Mexico also complained that imports of
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sweeteners from the United States constituted
dumping, and it imposed anti-dumping duties for some time, until NAFTA and WTO
dispute resolution panels upheld U.S. claims that the Mexican government colluded
with the Mexican sugar and sweetener industries to restrict HFCS imports from the
United States.
In late 2001, the Mexican Congress imposed a 20% tax on soft drinks made with
corn syrup sweeteners to aid the ailing domestic cane sugar industry, and
subsequently extended the tax annually despite U.S. objections. In 2004, USTR
initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Mexico’s HFCS tax, and
following interim decisions, the WTO panel issued a final decision on October 7,
2005, essentially supporting the U.S. position. Mexico appealed this decision, and
in March 2006, the WTO Appellate Body upheld its October 2005 ruling. In July
21 Angela Greiling Keane, “Cracking Open the Border,” Journal of Commerce, October 23,
2006.

CRS-16
2006 the United States and Mexico agreed that Mexico would eliminate its tax on
soft drinks made with corn sweeteners no later than January 31, 2007.
The United States and Mexico reached a sweetener agreement in August 2006.
Under the agreement, Mexico can export 500,000 metric tons of sugar duty free to
the United States from October 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007. The United States
can export the same amount of HFCS duty free to Mexico during that time. NAFTA
provides for the free trade of sweeteners beginning January 1, 2008. The House and
Senate sugar caucuses expressed objections to the agreement, questioning the Bush
Administration’s determination that Mexico is a net-surplus sugar producer to allow
Mexican sugar duty free access to the U.S. market.22
On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna
in April 2000 under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in accordance with
internationally agreed procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged
the unharmed release of dolphins from nets. However, a federal judge in San
Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not been met, and the Federal
Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001. Under the Bush
Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the
dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island Institute and other
environmental groups filed suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the Commerce
Department from modifying the standards for the dolphin-safe label. On August 9,
2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush Administration’s modification
of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the original standards in the 1990
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, but that ruling was appealed to the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which heard the case on November 16, 2006.
On other issues, in early October 2002, the U.S.-Mexico working group on
agriculture dealt with major agricultural issues, including Mexico’s recent anti-
dumping decisions on apples, rice, swine, and beef, and safeguard actions on
potatoes. In January 2003, the countries agreed to permit Mexican safeguard
measures against U.S. imports of chicken legs and thighs, and in July 2003, these
safeguard measures were extended until 2008, with tariffs declining each year. In
September 2006, Mexico revoked anti-dumping duties imposed on U.S. rice imports
in 2002 following rulings by the WTO and WTO Appellate Body in 2005 which
found that the duties were contrary to WTO rules. Mexico banned beef imports from
the United States in December 2003 following the discovery of one cow infected
with mad cow disease in Washington state. Mexico resumed importation of boneless
beef in early March 2004, and bone-in beef in February 2006 in response to improved
beef cow screening.
22 “Bush Administration Defends Sugar Deal to Congress,” Inside U.S. Trade, November
3, 2006; “Grassley, U.S. Industry Welcome Agreement with Mexico on Sugar, HFCS,”
International Trade Reporter, August 3, 2006; and, “U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on
WTO Soft Drink Dispute Compliance Deadline,” International Trade Reporter, July 13,
2006.

CRS-17
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. Mexico has become
increasingly democratic, effectively ending 71-years of one party rule by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000 when Vicente Fox of the conservative
National Action Party (PAN) was elected president. Mexico has concentrated on
developing its political institutions and its election agency, the Federal Elections
Institute (IFE) and Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) were well-regarded going into
the 2006 presidential and congressional elections. The July 2, 2006, presidential race
was extremely close and final results were not announced until September 5 when
TEPJF completed adjudication of all the challenges. TEPJF rulings may not be
appealed. According to the final vote count, Calderón won just under 36% of the
vote, defeating PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador by less than 234,000
votes. Voter turnout was 59%.23
After the vote, Andrés Manuel López Obrador led a campaign of civil
disobedience, including the blockade of Mexico City’s principal avenue, Paseo de la
Reforma, until mid-September. The blockade reportedly cost Mexico City
businesses over $500 million in revenue. On September 1, 2006, PRD members of
congress prevented President Fox from delivering the state of the union address at
the Mexican congress. López Obrador rejected the election tribunal’s September 5
ruling and was named the “legitimate president” of Mexico at a democratic
convention of his supporters held on September 16 at the Zocalo, Mexico City’s main
square. He swore himself in as the “legitimate president” on November 20. It is not
clear how this parallel government will operate or how much support it has. In mid-
September PRD founder Cuahtémoc Cárdenas criticized López Obrador’s tactics as
undemocratic and criticized him for surrounding himself with advisors who helped
to orchestrate what many believe to be Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s fraudulent defeat
of Cuahtémoc Cárdenas in the 1988 elections.24
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses. According to the State
Department’s report issued in early March 2006 on human rights conditions in 2005,
the Mexican government generally respected human rights during the year, but many
serious problems remained. The conduct of state law enforcement officials and the
human rights situations in the southern states of Guerrero, Chiapas, and Oaxaca were
areas of special concern. The indigenous population remains marginalized.
Kidnaping was a major problem, with unofficial estimates of 3,000 kidnapings
during the year, some allegedly with police involvement. The actual number of
kidnapings may be higher, as many are unreported. There were credible reports that
the police sometimes tortured suspects to force confessions and that these
confessions were used in prosecution despite a constitutional prohibition. While the
government took action against some improper behavior by law enforcement
personnel, many officers committed crimes with impunity, and without fear of
prosecution. Narcotics-related killings and violence increased, particularly in the
23 For more information, see CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006 Elections, by Colleen
W. Cook.
24 “Mexico: López Obrador Declared ‘Legitimate President,’” LatinNews Daily, September
18, 2006; and “Critica CCS intolerancia perredista,” La Reforma, September 14, 2006.

CRS-18
northern border states, and there were credible reports that police and military forces
were protecting drug traffickers. Despite various judicial reforms, lengthy pretrial
detentions, lack of due process, and judicial inefficiency and corruption persisted.
Three journalists were killed in northern border areas and others were threatened.
Human rights workers were subjected to attacks, although reports of such attacks
diminished. Violence and discrimination against women, indigenous people,
religious minorities, homosexuals, and individuals with HIV/AIDS persisted.
Finally, there were reports of restrictions on freedom of association and inadequate
protection of worker rights.
Human rights conditions in Oaxaca were of particular concern in 2006, due to
significant political unrest from May to December 2006. The unrest was initially due
to the violent repression of a peaceful teachers union strike, but expanded to include
other parties and broader political interests. A central goal of the protesters was the
removal of Oaxacan governor Ulises Ruiz of the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI). The protests, led by the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO),
resulted in what amounted to a blockade of the historic city center, with millions of
dollars in lost tourist revenue. At least nine people were killed in the violence,
including American independent journalist Bradley Will. The Mexican Congress has
the power to remove the governor, but did not. On December 15, 2006, the Minister
of Government, Francisco Ramírez Acuña, rejected calls that President Calderón
request the governor’s resignation.
On December 11, 2006, thousands of protesters demanded Governor Ruiz’s
resignation and the withdrawal of federal police from the city. Federal troops
withdrew from Oaxaca on December 16, and the city has been relatively calm since
then. Human rights activists criticized the arrest of over 100 protesters in November
and December 2006. Many were released toward the end of the year, but APP leader
Flavio Sosa remains in custody in a high security prison outside Mexico City. APPO
insists that the conflict is not over and has protests planned for January 2007 and is
considering a march on January 27 calling for the Oaxacan governor’s resignation.
On January 4, Oaxacan officials confirmed that the federal prosecutor is investigating
the deaths of APPO supporters.25
Former President Fox pledged to investigate and prosecute those responsible for
human rights violations, including the “Dirty War” period from the 1960s to 1980s.
Human rights activists are critical of what they view as lukewarm efforts by his
administration to improve human rights in Mexico and to address past violations.
The National Commission on Human Rights presented a report to President Fox, on
November 27, 2001, that documented human rights abuses and disappearances of
persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named legal scholar Ignacio
Carrillo as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and other cases on January 4,
2002. In April 2006, the Fox administration announced that the special prosecutor’s
25 Gerardo Soriano and Paulina I. Valencia, “Investiga PGR Crímenes Cometidos durante
Conflicto en Oaxaca,” Notimex, January 4, 2007; Gerardo Soriano and Paulina I. Valencia,
“Asegura APPO que Conflicto en Oaxaca no Ha Terminado,” Notimex, January 4, 2007; and
“Calderón Opts for Ruiz,” Latin American Regional Report - Mexico and NAFTA, January
2007.

CRS-19
office would be disbanded. In November 2006, Ignacio Carrillo presented his final
report on the repressive era from the late 1960s to 1982. The report found that the
repression was a matter of state policy and led to the summary execution of over 700
Mexicans; torture; and the razing of villages.
The report has been praised by some as an acknowledgment of state
responsibility for the repression that can be used to prosecute those responsible for
human rights violations. Others remain critical, as no one has been convicted of
charges relating to these alleged crimes. Only one of the three presidents from this
period, Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), is still alive. President Echeverria is currently
facing genocide charges for his role in the repression of a 1968 student protest that
left dozens dead when he was interior minister. Echeverria tried to evade prosecution
by claiming the 30-year statute of limitations had expired. A judge rejected this
argument and re-instated the arrest order in November 2006 after he determined that
the statute of limitations did not go into effect until Echeverria left public office in
December 1976.
The unsolved murders of over 400 women killed and disappeared in Ciudad
Juárez and other parts of the northern state of Chihuahua since 1993 remain a
concern to human rights activists who maintain that the lack of prosecutions and
inadequate investigations demonstrate the level of impunity in Mexico and a lack of
official accountability to Mexican citizens. In February 2006, the Fox administration
closed the special prosecutors office charged with coordinating federal and state
investigations into the murders and folded it into an office responsible for crimes
against women throughout Mexico. The Mexican government also announced in
February 2006 that it found no evidence of a serial killings in Ciudad Juárez. In July
2006 the federal government closed its investigation into the rape and murder of 14
women after finding no evidence of a federal crime and returned the cases to state
authorities. In August 2006, three suspects were arrested in the United States for
alleged connection to the murder of eight women found in a cotton field outside
Ciudad Juarez.
Violations of press freedom remained a cause for concern in 2006. According
to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Mexico is the fourth most dangerous
country for journalists - tied with Colombia, Pakistan, and Russia. CPJ reports that
two journalists were killed as a result of their work, including American Bradley
Will, who was killed during civil unrest in Oaxaca. CPJ is investigating the deaths
of another five journalists and disappearance of a reporter to determine if they are
related to the individuals’ work. Journalists were victims of other acts of violence
in 2006; particularly in the north where threats have limited local media coverage of
the drug cartel violence. On February 6, 2006, gunmen suspected of ties with drug
traffickers attacked the offices of El Mañana newspaper in Nuevo Laredo, severely
wounding one reporter. On February 7, El Mañana announced it would cease
investigative reporting of drug trafficking. Tapes released on February 15 implicate
Puebla Governor Mario Marin in a plot to arrest journalist Lydia Cacho in December
2005. Lydia Cacho was arrested in Cancun and driven to Puebla where she was
charged with libel for allegations against a prominent businessman in her book about
pedophile networks. Mexico announced the creation of a special prosecutor for
crimes against journalists on February 15. The Deputy Attorney General for

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Organized Crime will continue to be responsible for crimes against journalists
committed by drug traffickers, terrorists, and human traffickers.
Other Issues
On February 3, 2006, the U.S. Department of Treasury requested that Starwood
Hotels expel a Cuban delegation staying at the Maria Isabel Sheraton Hotel in
Mexico City to attend a U.S.-Cuba energy seminar. U.S. sanctions prohibit U.S.
corporations from conducting business with Cuba. The Mexican congress called for
the Mexican government to send a diplomatic note to the United States alleging that
the expulsion of the Cubans violated Mexico’s sovereignty. Foreign Minister Luis
Ernesto Derbez determined such action was unnecessary as the hotel is facing
penalties under Mexican law. The dispute was settled in March 2006 and the hotel
was fined $220,000 for violating Mexico’s Law of Commerce and Investment
protection.
The President’s Budget Request for FY2007 cut International Military
Education and Training (IMET) aid to Mexico from $1.25 million to $50,000 to
comply with the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA, P.L. 107-206)
because Mexico had not signed a bilateral immunity agreement, or Article 98
agreement protecting American military from the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. Congress modified this restriction as part of the FY2007 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364). In November 2006, President Bush, pursuant to
section 574 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-102), also waived restrictions on FY2006
Economic Support Funds (ESF), for 14 countries, including Mexico.
Legislation Relating to Mexico
in the 110th Congress
Methamphetamine Trafficking Enforcement Act
of 2007 (S. 132)

Section Four of S. 132 expresses the sense of Congress that efforts to reduce the
trafficking of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals should be included in
all bilateral and multilateral negotiations of the U.S. Trade Representative, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General.
Section Four also expresses the sense of Congress that the Drug Enforcement
Administration should collaborate with law enforcement officials from countries that
are known to traffic in methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals and calls for
education, training, and information sharing on the international trafficking and use
of methamphetamine. Mexico is a leading foreign source of methamphetamine.
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 9)
Proposed by Senator Reid, S. 9 expresses the sense of Congress that both the
House and Senate should pass immigration reform that acknowledges the United

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States’ immigrant heritage, creates more effective border enforcement, prevents
illegal immigration, and reforms the legal immigration process. The measure has
been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. While this measure does not
specifically address Mexico, Mexico is the leading source of both legal and illegal
immigrants to the United States, thus any immigration reform in the United States
would likely affect Mexico.
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007 (H.R. 1)

Section 611 of H.R. 1 requires that the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security, with the Director of National Intelligence, and heads of other relevant
agencies, submit a report to Congress, no later than 270 days after the bill’s
enactment, on the status of U.S. efforts to collaborate with allies and international
partners to improve border security, global document security, and to exchange
terrorist information. Section 621 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
submit to Congress, no later than seven days after the bill’s enactment, his plan to
accelerate of an automated biometric entry and exit data system pursuant to Section
7208(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458). Section 711 of the measure calls for the presence of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at border state
intelligence fusion centers in order to improve dissemination of information amongst
the myriad of jurisdictions in border areas. This measure was approved by the House
on January 9, 2007, and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Government Affairs. If passed, this measure could affect law
enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border.
AgJOBS Act of 2007 (H.R. 371)
H.R. 371 reforms the H-2A, temporary agricultural worker provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and creates a temporary agricultural worker
program, called “blue card”, that includes derivative status for spouses and children
and allows for eligible blue card holders to adjust status to permanent residents
within seven years of the legislation’s enactment. This measure has been referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. While not specific to Mexico, Mexican
agricultural workers could potentially benefit from the proposed program.
Citizenship Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 133)
H.R. 133 would deny citizenship to children born in the United States whose
parents are not U.S. citizens or permanent residents. The measure has been referred
to the House Committee on the Judiciary. This measure would apply to all
nationalities, including children born to Mexicans in the United States who are not
citizens or permanent residents.

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Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security
Protection Act of 2007 (H.R. 98)

H.R. 98, introduced by Representative Dreier, seeks to curtail the hiring of
unauthorized workers by modifying social security cards to include a machine
readable strip and the creation of an employment eligibility database by the
Department of Homeland Security. Employers would be required to verify potential
employee’s eligibility to work in the United States before allowing the individual to
commence employment. The bill has been referred to the House Committees on
Judiciary, Homeland Security, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means. This
measure would affect all immigrants attempting to work illegally, including
Mexicans.
H.R. 305
H.R. 305, introduced by Representative Pearce, amends the Immigration and
Nationality Act to prohibit the parole into the United States of aliens who become ill
at a port of entry or who seek emergency medical assistance from a Department of
Homeland Security agent at, or near, the border. This measure has been referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. It is likely that this measure would most
often apply at the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian borders.
H.Res. 18 and H.Res. 22
H.Res. 18 and H.Res. 22, introduced by Representative King of Iowa and
Representative Goode of Virginia, respectively, express the House of Representatives
disapproval of the Social Security Totalization Agreement signed by Mexico and the
United States in 2004, which must still be submitted to the U.S. congress and
Mexican Senate for review. Both resolutions were referred to the House Committee
on Ways and Means.
H.Con.Res. 22
H.Con.Res. 22, introduced by Representative Goode, expresses the sense of
Congress that the United States should withdraw from NAFTA due to increased trade
deficits, and potential health and security risks of permitting Mexican trucks to
transport goods throughout the United States.

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Legislation Relating to Mexico in the 109th Congress
Border Security and Migration Measures
Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367). This law authorizes construction of
barriers along 700 miles of the U.S. border with Mexico. This act does not, however,
provide funding for the construction of these barriers. Congress appropriated $1.2
billion in initial funding to build the border fence under the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295).
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005 (H.R. 4437)/Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611).
Both houses approved immigration reform legislation during the 109th Congress, but
were unable to agree on key differences in the legislation, preventing enactment of
comprehensive immigration reform. In December 2005, the House approved the
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R.
4437) by a vote of 239 to 182. As passed by the House, the bill would, among other
things, strengthen border security, compel employers to use a pilot system to check
for employment eligibility, mandate retention of illegal immigrants, make it a crime
to be in the United States illegally or to assist illegal aliens, and require the
deployment of a fence and surveillance equipment along the Mexico-U.S. border.
The Senate approved the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (S. 2611) in May
2006 by a vote of 62-36. The bill contained many similarities with the House
measure, but there were key differences in the measures and there was no conference
to resolve the differences. Principal differences included the House provision that
would criminalize unlawful presence; Senate provisions to adjust the status of certain
illegal immigrants; and the Senate provisions to create a new temporary worker visa
category, H-2C, with a ceiling of 200,000 admissions annually. The Senate measure
would also allow eligible H-2C visa holders to adjust status to permanent residents.
Section 142 of S. 2611 establishes penalties for the construction or use of an illegally
built tunnel between the United States and another country, as well as for the
knowledge that such a tunnel was built on one’s property. Similar measures were
introduced in the House separate from the immigration reform measure, including
H.R. 4830, the Border Tunnel Prevention Act of 2006, approved by the House in
September 2006. Mexico is the number one country of origin of legal and illegal
immigrants to the United States, thus any immigration reform in the United States
would likely affect Mexico.
Other Immigration Legislation. A number of other immigration initiatives
were introduced in the 109th Congress, including some that were considered in the
debate on the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental. S. 359 (Craig)/H.R. 884 (Cannon),
the “AgJobs” Bill, would streamline the H-2A agricultural worker program, with
provision for adjusting to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. S. 1033 (McCain-
Kennedy)/H.R. 2330 (Kolbe) would grant temporary legal status to foreign workers
and to undocumented workers already employed in the United States, with provision
for adjusting to LPR status under various provisions and penalties. S. 1438 (Cornyn
and Kyl) would establish a new temporary foreign worker program under agreements
with foreign countries, but only after workers have returned to their home country.
Hearings on these bills, the Administration’s proposal, and related immigration and

CRS-24
border issues have been held in relevant committees, most recently on October 18,
2005, in the Senate Judiciary Committee, with two administration witnesses. Mexico
is the number one country of origin of legal and illegal immigrants to the United
States, thus any immigration reform in the United States would likely affect Mexico.
USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177).
Title VII of P.L. 109-177, enacted March 9, 2006, contains provisions relating to the
production and trafficking of methamphetamine, as well as the international
regulation of precursor chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine.
Section 721 requires importers of precursor chemicals to provide information on the
foreign chain of distribution of the chemicals. Section 722 requires the Secretary of
State to identify the five largest exporting countries and the five largest importing
countries of precursor chemicals and to certify annually that these countries are
cooperating fully with the United States in drug control efforts. Section 723 requires
the Secretary of State to cooperate with the government of Mexico to prevent the
smuggling of methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico, and to report
annually on the implementation efforts. Similar measures were enacted in March
2006 under Title VII of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 (P.L. 109-177). Similar provisions were introduced earlier in the
Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act (H.R. 3889).
REAL ID Act of 2005 (H.R. 418)/Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for FY2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13). H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005, was
introduced on January 26, 2005, by Representative Sensenbrenner, as a holdover
from consideration of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(S. 2845/P.L. 108-458) in December 2004. H.R. 418 was referred to the House
Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Government Reform, but no
formal consideration was undertaken. As introduced, this bill would revise the
standards for asylum applicants, expand the grounds for inadmissibility and
deportability of aliens for terrorist-related activities, establish identity card standards
for the issuance of drivers’ licenses that would seem to preclude the use of consular
ID cards, and provide waivers of laws to facilitate construction of a fence on the
U.S.-Mexico border near San Diego.
The House considered H.R. 418 on February 9-10, 2005, under a structured rule
allowing a manager’s amendment and five additional amendments. Two amendments
were defeated: the Nadler amendment that sought to strike Section 101 with revised
asylum standards,26 and the Farr amendment that sought to strike Section 102 with
waivers of laws to facilitate construction of a border fence. Three amendments were
approved: the Sessions amendment that facilitated repatriation of aliens ordered
deported by clarifying existing delivery bond authority, the Castle amendment that
required the entry into aviation security screening databases of information on
persons convicted of using a false drivers’ license for boarding an airplane, and the
Kolbe amendment that required an assessment of security needs along U.S. borders,
a plan to facilitate communications among relevant agencies at the border, and a pilot
project to test ground surveillance technologies to improve border security. H.R. 418
26 For more detail on changes to asylum standards, see CRS Report RL32621, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers
, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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as amended was later attached to the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations (H.R. 1268) as Division B, and the broader measure was approved
by the House on March 16, 2005.
When the Senate considered H.R. 1268 in April 2005, three immigration
measures were introduced. The first was the Chambliss amendment that would have
allowed guest farm workers to remain in the United States for up to nine years. The
second was the Craig-Kennedy amendment that would have allowed guest farm
workers who had worked in the United States for 100 days in the last year and who
worked 360 days in the next three to six years to become legal permanent residents.
The third was the Mikulski amendment to exempt seasonal workers who had worked
in the United States in previous years from the cap on H-2B visas for summer
tourism activities and the harvesting and picking of seafood like crabs and lobsters.
In the end, the Mikulski amendment was the only immigration provision to be
approved by the Senate.
In conference, the Mikulski amendment from the Senate version and the
provisions in the REAL ID Act in the House version were essentially retained in the
conference report (H.Rept. 109-72) on the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental (H.R.
1268). The conference report was approved by the House on May 5, 2005, and it was
approved by the Senate on May 10, 2005. It was signed into law (P.L. 109-13) by the
President on May 11, 2005.
Appropriations Measures
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2007 (H.R. 5522). The House
approved this bill on June 9, 2006, by a vote of 373-34. Section 587 of the House
approved bill limits International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
assistance to Mexico to $39 million. Senate action on the measure was not
completed during the 109th Congress, and foreign operations programs are currently
operating under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution (H.R. 5631/P.L.
109-289, as amended) which provides funding at the FY2006 level or the House-
passed FY2007 level, whichever is less. The continuing appropriations resolution
expires on February 15, 2007.
Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2006-FY2007 (H.R. 2601/S. 600).
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 600 (S.Rept. 109-35) on
March 10, 2005, with no provisions dealing with Mexico. The full Senate did not
consider the legislation.
The House International Relations Committee reported out H.R. 2601 (H.Rept
109-168) on July 13, 2005, with one provision on Mexico, and two additional
provisions were added during floor consideration on July 19-20, 2005, when the bill
was approved by the House and sent to the Senate for consideration. Section 1048 of
the bill, Training and Assistance to Identify Victims in Ciudad Juarez, a floor
amendment by Representative Reyes, urges the President and Secretary of State to
continue to express concern to Mexican officials over the abductions and murders of
young women in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juarez and authorizes the
Secretary of State to provide forensic training and assistance to Mexico to identify
unknown murder victims in the city. Section 1124 of H.R. 2601, a modified

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amendment by Representative Tancredo approved in the Committee markup, states
the sense of Congress that the U.S. government should work with the Mexican
government to urge the Mexican Supreme Court to revisit a 2001 decision so that the
possibility of life imprisonment without parole will not prevent the extradition of
criminal suspects from Mexico to the United States. It also calls for annual reports
on the number of requests for extradition by Mexico and the United States and the
number of extraditions by Mexico and the United States. As discussed in the “Drug
Trafficking Issues” section, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled in November 2005
that life imprisonment without parole does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, thereby allowing the extradition to the United States of criminals facing
such sentences. Section 1414 of H.R. 2601, a floor amendment by Representative
Hooley, calls upon the Secretary of State to take actions to prevent the smuggling of
methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico, including the provision of
equipment and technical assistance, and encouraging the Mexican government to
reduce the diversion of pseudoephedrine by drug trafficking organizations. It also
calls for an annual report on implementation efforts.
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 3057/P.L. 109-102).
The House passed H.R. 3057 on June 28, 2005, with the Beauprez and the Deal floor
amendments relating to extradition and Mexico. The Senate passed H.R. 3057 on
July 20, 2005, with the Chambliss floor amendment relating to extradition and
Mexico. Section 581 of the enacted legislation (P.L. 109-102) bars assistance to a
country that refuses to extradite to the United States any individual indicted in the
United States for killing a law enforcement officer, unless the Secretary of State
certifies in writing that the application of the restriction is contrary to the national
interest of the United States.
For Additional Reading
CRS Products on Mexico
CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006 Elections, by Colleen W. Cook.
CRS Report RL33244, Mexico’s Importance and Multiple Relationships with the
United States, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RS20611. Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections of
July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Products on Immigration and Border Security
CRS Report RS22574, Immigration Reform: Brief Synthesis of the Issue, by Ruth
Ellen Wassem.
CRS Report RL33125, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 109th Congress, by
Andorra Bruno, Coordinator.

CRS-27
CRS Report RL32169. Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 108th Congress,
by Andorra Bruno, Coordinator.
CRS Report RL32044. Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker
Programs, by Andorra Bruno.
CRS Report RL33181. Immigration Related Border Security Legislation in the 109th
Congress, by Blas Nuñez-Neto.
CRS Report RL32735, Mexico-United States Dialogue on Migration and Border
Issues 2001-2006, by Colleen W. Cook.
CRS Report RL33353, Civilian Patrols Along the Border: Legal and Policy Issues,
by Stephen R. Viña and Blas Nuñez-Neto.
CRS Report RS22026. Border Security: Fences Along the U.S. International
Border, by Blas Nuñez-Neto and Stephen R. Viña.
CRS Report RL32004. Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and
Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin.
CRS Report RL33106. Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background,
Legislation and Issues, by Lisa Seghetti, Coordinator.
CRS Report RL32616. 9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy in the 108th Congress, by Michael John Garcia and
Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL32094. Consular Identification Cards: Domestic and Foreign Policy
Implications, the Mexican Case, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno and
K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Products on Drug Trafficking and Policy
CRS Report RL33582, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy, by
Raphael F. Perl.
CRS Report RL32038. Drug Certification/Designation Procedures for Illicit
Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report 98-174. Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action,
1986-2002, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL32669. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Fox, December
2000 to October 2004, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS Products on Economic Issues
CRS Report RL32934. U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
CRS Report RL33541, Sugar Policy Issues, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RL31386. Industry Trade Effects Related to NAFTA, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
CRS Report 97-861. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights
and Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report RS21737. NAFTA at Ten: Lessons from Recent Studies, by J.F.
Hornbeck.
CRS Report 97-291. NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary
Tiemann.