Order Code RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security
Updated January 17, 2007
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but Iraq remains
unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded
by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is now a civil war. Mounting U.S.
casualties and financial costs — without clear signs of security progress — have
intensified a debate within the United States over whether to wind down U.S.
involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. U.S. Defense
Department reports are expressing more pessimism about security in Iraq and they,
as well as Bush Administration officials, are expressing some frustration at the
unwillingness of the Iraqi government to disband sectarian militias that are
committing violence against civilians of rival sects. U.S. difficulties in Iraq are
discussed in the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by
former Secretary of State James Baker and former House International Relations
Committee chair Lee Hamilton, which called the Iraq situation “grave and
deteriorating.”
Administration officials say President Bush, who says that progress is slower
and less extensive than was expected, addressed the nation on new initiatives in Iraq
on January 10, 2007. He announced a deployment of an additional 21,500 U.S.
forces to help stabilize Baghdad and restive Anbar Province, as well as other
measures to create jobs and promote political reconciliation. He and other officials
have previously asserted that U.S. policy has shown some important successes: two
elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term
parliament and government; a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution
(October 15, 2005); progress in building Iraq’s security forces; and economic
growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the
Administration has worked to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure,
particularly the security institutions.
Some in Congress — as well as the Iraq Study Group — believe that major new
initiatives are required that do not involve additional U.S. forces. The Study Group
recommendations focus on intensified regional diplomacy to enlist help from
neighboring states to calm their protege factions in Iraq. Others believe that sectarian
violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of civil war and that setting a timetable
for withdrawal, or otherwise reducing U.S. support for the Baghdad government,
might force compromise among Iraqi factions.
This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff;
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman; and CRS
Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by
Christopher Blanchard.
Contents
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq
National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . 4
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
and Ambassador Paul Bremer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 14
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Regional and International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental . 21
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Oil Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Zarqawi Faction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Sectarian Violence and Militias/Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Iranian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 33
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Iraq Study Group Report, President’s January 10 Initiative, and Other Options . 41
Altering Troop Levels or Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Troop Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
International and Regional Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Reorganize the Power Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Decentralization and Break-Up Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Negotiating With Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Economic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Shiite, Kurdish, and Secular Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 The territory that
is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British
forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in
1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but
were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni
Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance,
facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941,
during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of
Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence
of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was
killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was
only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri
al-Sa’id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of
Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a
Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in
Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during
Saddam’s rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian
philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was
to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.
CRS-2
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring
Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by
Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to try to do so
militarily because (1) the United Nations had approved only the liberation of Kuwait;
(2) Arab states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad; and (3) the
Administration feared becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2
Within days of the war’s end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq
and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S.
support, rebelled. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni
Muslim Republican Guard forces were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S.
forces and were intact to suppress the rebellion. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the
United States for not intervening on their behalf. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a
U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of
northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
Subsequent to the war, the thrust of U.S. policy was containment, consisting of
U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international economic
embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and southern
Iraq.3 However, President George H.W. Bush did pursue regime change as well, to
some extent, including reportedly sending Congress an intelligence finding that the
United States would try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The
Administration apparently believed that a coup from within the regime could produce
a favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup
failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.4
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 The implementation of these policies is discussed in CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former
Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
4 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.
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The Clinton Administration and Major Anti-Saddam Factions
During the Clinton Administration, the United States built ties to and
progressively increased support for several of the secular and religious opposition
factions discussed below. Some of these factions have provided major figures in
post-Saddam politics, while also fielding militias that are allegedly conducting acts
of sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However,
many observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups
had authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad
Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC
on a daily basis. Chalabi, who is about 65 years old, was educated in the United
States (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. As an Iraqi
governance structure was established, Chalabi was one of the rotating presidents of
the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). Since 2004, Chalabi has allied with and then
fallen out with Shiite Islamist factions; he was one of three deputy prime ministers
in the 2005 transition government, and he has since left Iraq for London. (A table on
U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).5
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
in Europe in the mid-1970s.7 Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an alleged Saddam regime
assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis. The INA enjoyed Clinton Administration support in 1996
after squabbling among other opposition groups reduced their viability.8 However,
5 Chalabi’s father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the
1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American
University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran
afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In April 1992, he was convicted
in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of $400 million. In a
fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC headquarters in
Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as part of an investigation of various
allegations, including provision of U.S. intelligence to Iran. The case was later dropped.
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
7 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
8 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
(continued...)
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the INA proved penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services, which arrested or executed
over 100 INA activists in June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military
incursion into northern Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from
the PUK. The incursion enabled Baghdad to rout INC and INA agents in the north.
The Kurds. The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. Historically fearful of persecution
by the Arab majority, the Kurds want to, at the very least, preserve the autonomy of
the post-1991 Gulf war period. The Kurds, both through legal procedures as well as
population movements, are trying to secure the mixed city of Kirkuk, which the
Kurds covet as a source of oil, and they have adopted a new oil development law that
some see as an attempt to secure oil resources located in the Kurdish region for the
Kurds alone. The Kurds achieved insertion of language in the permanent
constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk might formally
join the Kurdish administered region. (The Iraq Study Group report, released
December 6, 2006, in Recommendation 30 believes that this referendum should be
delayed, a proposal strongly criticized by Kurdish leaders.)9 For now, both major
Kurdish factions — the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani,
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masud Barzani — are
participating in Iraqi politics, the PUK more so than the KDP. Both were on the
IGC; Talabani went on to become Iraq’s president, while Barzani, on June 12, 2005,
was named “president of Kurdistan” by the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly that
was elected on January 30, 2005. 10
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have come to power in post-Saddam politics; Shiites
constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented in all pre-2003
governments. Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime change efforts
of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States. The undisputed Shiite
religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, remained in Iraq, albeit with a low
profile, during Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he was not involved in U.S.-backed
regime change efforts during the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of
emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.11 He has a network of agents (wakils) throughout Iraq
and among Shiites outside Iraq.
8 (...continued)
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
9 The report can be obtained at [http://www.usip.org].
10 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
11 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
CRS-5
About 85 years old, Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders. He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and favors modest dress for
women, and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and entertainment.12 He
was treated for heart trouble in the United Kingdom in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Within
the “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA) of Shiite political groupings, SCIRI shares power
with other factions, but SCIRI’s influence is bolstered by the fielding of a militia
force, the “Badr Brigades.” SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major
crackdown in 1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of
trying to overthrow him. During Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978),
he was hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim brothers
(including current leader Abd al-Aziz) that founded SCIRI. The Ayatollah was then
head of the Hawza. SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style
Islamic republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and
other aid from Iran. Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SCIRI
refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts with the United States.
When Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim visited Washington D.C. in early December 2006, the
Bush Administration reportedly urged him to give greater support to the government
of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
Da’wa Party/Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nuri al-Maliki. The Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party is both an ally and sometime rival of SCIRI. Da’wa did not directly join
the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 1990s. Its leader is
Ibrahim al-Jafari, a Da’wa activist since 1966 who fled to Iran in 1980 to escape
Saddam’s crackdown, later going to London. He was transitional Prime Minister
during April 2005-April 2006. His successor as Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, is
the number two Da’wa leader. Although there is no public evidence that Jafari or
Maliki were involved in any terrorist activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa
allegedly committed a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and
the December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese
Hezbollah was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Da’wa founder Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and
ideological linkages between Lebanese Hezbollah and Da’wa (as well as with
SCIRI). Hezbollah attempted to link release of the Americans they held hostage in
Lebanon in the 1980s to the release of 17 Da’wa prisoners held by Kuwait for those
attacks in the 1980s.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction. As discussed further throughout this paper,
Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as a major — some believe the most powerful — figure
in Iraq. He has been viewed as a young firebrand who lacks religious and political
weight. However, the more established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats,
are building ties to him because of his large following, particularly among poorer
Shiites who identify with other “oppressed Muslims” and who are therefore skeptical
12 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].
CRS-6
of any U.S. presence in the Middle East. By fully participating in the December 15,
2005, elections, Sadr appeared to distance himself from his uprisings in 2003 and
2004, although tensions flared again in 2006 between his militia forces and
international (particularly British) forces in Iraq as well as against rival Shiite
factions and Iraqi security forces. During 2003-2004, he used Friday prayer sermons
in Kufa (near Najaf) to agitate for a U.S. withdrawal. Pro-Sadr candidates also won
pluralities in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections. (In
Recommendation 35, the Iraq Study Group recommended that the United States try
to talk to Sadr, as well as Sistani, as well as with other parties except Al Qaeda-Iraq.)
Table 1. Major Shiite, Kurdish, and Secular Factions
Iraq National
Consists of many ex-Baathists and ex-military officers. Allawi was interim
Accord/Iyad al-
Prime Minister (June 2004-April 2005). Won 40 seats in January 2005
Allawi
election but only 25 in December 2005.
Kurds/KDP and
Talabani became president of Iraq after January 2005 and remains so.
PUK
Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s base in the Kurdish north. Many Kurds
are more supportive of outright Kurdish independence than are these leaders.
Together, the two factions field up to 100,000 peshmerga militia. Their
joint slate won 75 seats in January 2005 election but only 53 in December.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position in
Ayatollah Ali
government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become instrumental
al-Sistani
in major political questions. Helped forge UIA and brokered compromise
over the selection of a Prime Minister nominee in April 2006. Strongly
criticized Israel’s July 2006 offensive against Lebanese Hezbollah.
However, acknowledges that his influence is waning and that calls for Shiite
restraint are unheeded as Shiites look to armed parties and militias for
defense in sectarian warfare. Refuses to meet U.S. officials.
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party. It was established
Council for the
in 1982 by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq. First
Islamic
leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, killed by bomb in Najaf in August
Revolution in
2003. Current leader is his younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower
Iraq (SCIRI)
ranking Shiite cleric and a member of parliament (UIA slate), but he holds
no government position. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance
Minister, and another, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is a deputy president. Controls
“Badr Brigades” militia. As part of UIA, SCIRI has about 30 of its
members in parliament. Supports formation of Shiite “region” composed of
nine southern provinces. Has tense relations with Da’wa Party despite
common ideology and heritage.
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active against
Call) Party
Saddam Hussein in early 1980s. Founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, was
ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by Saddam regime in 1980.
Da’wa supporters tend to follow senior Lebanese Shiite cleric Mohammad
Hossein Fadlallah rather than Iranian clerics, and Da’wa is not as close to
Tehran as is SCIRI. Has no organized militia and a lower proportion of
clerics than does SCIRI. Part of UIA, controls about 28 seats in parliament.
CRS-7
Moqtada Al-
Young (about 31), the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah
Sadr Faction
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (killed, along with his other two sons, by regime
security forces in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam), and
nephew of Da’wa Party founder Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr.
Inherited father’s political base in “Sadr City,” a large (2 million
population) Shiite district of Baghdad, but also strong in Diwaniyah, Basra,
Amarah, and other major Shiite cities. Mercurial, has both challenged and
tacitly worked with U.S. forces in Iraq. Still clouded by allegations of
involvement in the April 10, 2003, killing in Iraq of Abd al-Majid Khoi, the
son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi and head of his London-based Khoi
Foundation. Formed “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003, although some militia
elements now believed beyond Sadr’s control. Now part of UIA, controls 32
seats in new parliament and ministries of health, transportation, and
agriculture (plus one organization of ministerial rank) and supports Prime
Minister Maliki. However, those parliamentarians have been boycotting
since the late November 2006 meeting between Bush and Maliki. Opposes
large Shiite “region” in the south. Does not meet with U.S. officials.
Fadilah Party
Fadilah (Virtue) holds about 15 seats in the 2006-2010 parliament as part
of the UIA coalition. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a
splinter group of the Sadr’s faction. Holds seats on several provincial
councils in the Shiite provinces and controls the protection force (Facilities
Protection Service) for the oil installations in Basra. Governor of Basra
Province is Fadilah member, helping party’s efforts to dominate the
provincial government there.
Hezbollah Iraq
Headed by ex-guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC and now in parliament. Party’s power base is southern marsh areas
around Amara (Maysan Province), north of Basra. Party militiamen play
major role in policing areas of the province.
Islamic Amal
A relatively small faction, Islamic Amal (Action) Organization is headed by
Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a moderate cleric. Power base is in
Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against Saddam regime in the 1980s.
Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime
in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30
election and has a member in the new cabinet (Minister of Civil Society
Affairs).
Ayatollah
Another Karbala-based faction, loyal to Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hassani.
Hassani Faction
His armed followers clashed with local Iraqi security forces in Karbala in
mid-August 2006. Hassani, along with Fadilah, are considered opponents
of Iran because of Iran’s support for SCIRI and Da’wa Party.
Iraq Liberation Act. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to
overthrow Saddam, beginning with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations act (P.L.
105-174). The sentiment was reflected more strongly in the “Iraq Liberation Act”
(ILA, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This law, signed by President Clinton
despite doubts about opposition capabilities, was viewed as an expression of
congressional support for the concept of promoting an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air
power. The Bush Administration has cited the ILA as evidence of a bipartisan
consensus that Saddam should be toppled.
CRS-8
The ILA stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998,
President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was a component of U.S.
policy toward Iraq. Section 8 states that the act should not be construed as
authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change. The ILA did
not specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from power. Section
7 provides for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups with “democratic
goals.” The law also gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth
of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting funds, to
opposition groups designated by the Administration.
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton made seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S.
military assistance under the ILA (P.D. 99-13): INC; INA; SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);13 and the small Movement for
Constitutional Monarchy (MCM).
In May 1999, the Clinton Administration provided $5 million worth of training
and “non-lethal” defense articles under the ILA. About 150 oppositionists underwent
civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense
Department-run civil affairs training to administer a post-Saddam government.
However, the Clinton Administration decided that the opposition was not sufficiently
capable to merit weapons or combat training. These trainees were not brought into
Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq.
Post-September 11, 2001:
Regime Change and War
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been advocates of a
regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy led the Bush
Administration initially to continue its predecessor’s emphasis on containment.14
Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to
confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During its first year,
Administration policy tried to strengthen containment of Iraq, which the
Administration said was rapidly eroding, by achieving U.N. Security Council
adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a “smart sanctions” plan. The plan
relaxed U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment15
13 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally de-listed.
14 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
15 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
(continued...)
CRS-9
in exchange for renewed international commitment to enforce the U.N. ban on
exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.
Bush Administration policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002, given as major combat in the U.S.-led war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as Iraq,
that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in
March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly urged greater U.S.
attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed war with Iraq.
Some accounts, including the books Plan of Attack and State of Denial by Bob
Woodward (published in April 2004 and September 2006, respectively), say that then
Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential
consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a
democracy after major hostilities ended. Other accounts include reported memoranda
(the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence officials, based on
conversations with U.S. officials. That memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the
Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and that it sought to
develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President Bush and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the House passed
H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons
inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
15 (...continued)
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-10
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. A “comprehensive”
September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the
“Duelfer report,”16 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The formal U.S.-led
WMD search ended December 2004,17 although U.S. forces have
found some chemical weapons caches left over from the Iran-Iraq
war.18 The UNMOVIC work remains formally active.19
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.20
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
Although it is not certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in
mid-2002 the Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early
2003, gave the President an active option to take that step. In concert, the
Administration tried to build up and broaden the Iraqi opposition and, according to
the Washington Post (June 16, 2002), authorizing stepped up covert activities by the
CIA and special operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002,
the State and Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups to
Washington, D.C. At the same time, the Administration expanded its ties to several
groups, particularly those composed of ex-military officers. The Administration also
began training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,21 although reportedly
only about 70 completed training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary, eventually
serving as translators during the war. At the same time, the Administration opposed
a move by the major factions to declare a provisional government, believing that
16 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
17 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
18 Pincus, Walter. “Munitions Found in Iraq Renew Debate.” Washington Post, July 1, 2006.
19 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].
20 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.
21 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.
CRS-11
doing so would prevent the emergence of secular, pro-democracy groups after
Saddam’s fall.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002) that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it. In January and February 2003, UNMOVIC Director
Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-
Baradei briefed the Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November
27, 2002. Although they were not denied access to suspect sites, they criticized Iraq
for failing to actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions, but also noted
progress and said that Iraq might not have retained any WMD. The Bush
Administration asserted that Iraq was not complying with Resolution 1441 because
it was not pro-actively revealing information.
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely, and no U.N. resolution authorizing
force was adopted. At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options
to disarm Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam
Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours
to avoid war. They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country22 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles. Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.
Some post-major combat evaluation (“Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused more on
combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored forces. No
WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it
22 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. See Washington Post, Mar. 27, 2003, p. A19.
CRS-12
is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km).
The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein appeared
with supporters that day in Baghdad’s mostly Sunni Adhamiya district. (Saddam was
captured in December 2003, and subsequently tried in Iraq and, on November 5,
2006, convicted for “willful killing” of Shiite civilians in Dujail in 1982. He was
hanged on December 30, 2006.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
According to the Bush Administration’s November 30, 2005, “Strategy for
Victory,” the U.S. long-term goal is to enable Iraq to be stable, unified, and
democratic, able to provide for its own security, a partner in the global war on
terrorism, and a model for reform in Middle East. The formal political transition has
advanced, but has still not achieved the level of political reconciliation needed to
cause an end to or reduction in levels of violence.
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and
Ambassador Paul Bremer. After the fall of the regime, the United States set up
an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty
would favor major factions and not produce democracy. The Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003.
He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.
The Administration’s immediate post-war policy did not make use of an extensive
State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a
year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.
The State Department project, which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on
major issues.23 Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi
regime. He and White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq)
organized a meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying
views and ethnicities. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in
Baghdad (April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month
later to name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly
disliked Garner’s toleration of Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders, among
other measures.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003). Bremer discontinued Garner’s political transition
process and instead appointed a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body. On July 13,
2003, he named this 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC), and in September
2003, the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to run the ministries, with roughly the
same factional and ethnic balance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite
23 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].
CRS-13
Muslims). Although there were some Sunni figures in the CPA-led political
structure, many Sunnis resented the U.S. invasion and opposed the IGC, which was
widely perceived in Iraq as an arm of U.S. decision-making. Adding to Sunni
resentment were some of the CPA’s most controversial decisions, including not to
recall members of the armed forces to service and to pursue “de-Baathification” —
a purge from government of about 30,000 Iraqis at four top ranks of the Baath Party.
(In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group says that the United States should
encourage the reintegration of ex-Baathists into national life.)
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty and direct elections. In
November 2003, the United States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by
June 30, 2004, and that national elections would be held by the end of 2005.
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The CPA decisions were
incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which was drafted mostly by the major anti-Saddam factions (signed on
March 8, 2004).24 It provided a roadmap for political transition, including (1)
elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly; (2)
drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, and put to a national
referendum by October 15, 2005; and (3) national elections for a permanent
government, under the new constitution (if it passed), would be held by December
15, 2005. The new government would take office by December 31, 2005. Under the
TAL, any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds majority. If that
happened, a new draft was to be developed and voted on by October 15, 2006. In
that case, the December 15, 2005, elections would have been for another interim
National Assembly. The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government,” and their peshmerga militia were allowed to operate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.” After considering several other options,
the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to select that government.25
Dominated by senior faction leaders, it was named and began work on June 1, 2004.
The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the
advertised June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. There was a president (Ghazi
al-Yawar), and Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, heading
a cabinet of 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was
24 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website at [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].
25 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post,
Apr. 15, 2004.
CRS-14
roughly the same as in the IGC. The defense and interior ministers were Sunni
Arabs.
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. and partner country
involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution 1483 (cited above) provided for a U.N.
special representative to Iraq, and “called on” governments to contribute forces for
stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established U.N. Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).26 The size of UNAMI in Iraq has increased to a few
hundred, headed by former Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, primarily
focused on promoting political reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring
human rights practices and humanitarian affairs. In an attempt to satisfy the
requirements of several nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition force
presence, the United States achieved adoption of Resolution 1511 (October 16,
2003), authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
(In Recommendations 7 and 26 and several other recommendations, the Iraq Study
Group calls for increased U.N. participation in reconciliation and international
diplomacy on Iraq.)
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq,
as well as authorizing a coalition component force to protect U.N. personnel and
facilities. The Resolution contained the following provisions:
! It “authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for security. Iraqi
forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and the
relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The
U.S.-led coalition retained the ability to take prisoners.
! It stipulated that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.” Resolution 1637 (November 11, 2005) and Resolution
1723 (November 28, 2006) each extended the coalition military
mandate for an additional year (now lasting until at least December
31, 2007), unless earlier “requested by the Iraqi government.” The
renewal resolutions also required review of the mandate on June 15,
2006 and June 15, 2007, respectively.
! Resolution 1546 deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces
(Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi
26 Its mandate has been renewed each year since, most recently by Resolution 1700 (Aug.
10, 2006).
CRS-15
government. No SOFA has been signed to date, and U.S. forces
operate in Iraq and use its facilities under temporary memoranda of
understanding. Major facilities include Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad
air bases, as well as the arms depot at Taji; all are being built up with
U.S. military construction funds in various appropriations. Former
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in July 2005 that U.S. military
lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq for the
duration of U.S. involvement there.
! In subsequent related developments, the Defense Appropriation for
FY2007 (P.L. 109-289) contains a provision, first passed in the
House version of the measure, prohibiting use of U.S. funds to
establish permanent military installations or bases in Iraq. The same
law contains a provision that the Defense Department not agree to
allow U.S. forces in Iraq to be subject to Iraqi law. (In
Recommendation 22, the Iraq Study Group recommends that the
President should state that the United States does not seek
permanent military bases in Iraq.)
! It established a 100-seat “Interim National Council” to serve as an
interim parliament. The body, selected in August,27 did not have
legislative power but was able to veto government decisions with a
two-thirds majority. The council held some televised “hearings;”
it disbanded after the January 2005 elections for a parliament.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the handover, designed in part to lower the U.S. profile in Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover, the state of occupation ceased.
Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte) established
U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991.
A U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with
about 1,100 U.S. personnel.28 Negroponte was succeeded in July
2005 by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously
Ambassador to Afghanistan and who takes an activist approach.
Subject to Senate confirmation, he will be succeeded by Ryan
Crocker, currently Ambassador to Pakistan. An FY2005
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of
$658 million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and
to fund embassy operations. The large new embassy complex, with
21 buildings on 104 acres, is under construction. The FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $1.327 billion
for U.S. embassy operations and security. (In Recommendations 73-
76, the Iraq Study Group report lays out several initiatives that could
27 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.
28 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS-16
be taken “to ensure that [the United States] has personnel with the
right skills serving in Iraq.”)
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Resolution 1723 (November 28, 2006) extends the
IAMB monitoring of the DFI until December 31, 2007, subject to
review by June 15, 2007. Resolution 1546 also gave Iraq
responsibility for close-out of the “oil-for-food program;”29
Resolution 1483 ended that program as of November 21, 2003. (In
Recommendation 23, the Iraq Study Group says the President should
restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.)
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by the State Department through the U.S. Embassy and
a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office
(IRMO).” IRMO, headed since June 2006 by Ambassador Joseph
Saloom, has about 150 U.S. civilian personnel working outside
Baghdad at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs,
discussed further below. A separate “Project Contracting Office
(PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William McCoy (now under the
Persian Gulf division of the Army Corps of Engineers), funds
infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants, and school
renovations.
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing
on the three national votes that would be held in 2005. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, mostly
boycotted, and no major Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA to win a
slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate
the government formed subsequently. PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named
president; Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister. U.S. officials said publicly this
government was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had
a Sunni Arab as Assembly speaker; deputy president; deputy prime minister;
Defense Minister; and five other ministers. (Discussed further in CRS Report
RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Permanent Constitution. Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was
approved on October 15, 2005. Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in
two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni
opposition to it was its provision for a weak central government (“federalism”): it
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with
29 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-17
their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in
controlling revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this
concept because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites,
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues. A promised
constitutional review, intended to mollify Sunnis, has not been completed. (In
Recommendation 26, the Iraq Study Group recommends that this review be
conducted on an urgent basis. Recommendation 28 says that all oil revenues should
accrue to the central government, not regions.)
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some harder line Sunnis
moved into the political arena: the Sunni “Concord Front” and Iraqi Front for
National Dialogue put forward major slates. The results were court-certified on
February 10, formally beginning the formation of a government, but the convening
of the “Council of Representatives” (COR) was delayed until March 16 by
wrangling over the post of Prime Minister. With the UIA alone well short of the
two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally form a government, Sunnis, the secular
groupings, and the Kurds succeeded in ousting Jafari as Prime Minister and, with
Sadr’s support, engineering selection instead of his top Da’wa aide, Nuri al-Maliki
(April 22). Talabani was selected to continue as president, with two deputies Adel
Abd al-Mahdi of SCIRI and Tariq al-Hashimi of the Concord Front. (The former
has lost one and the latter has lost three siblings to sectarian violence in 2006.) A
COR leadership team was selected as well, with hardline U.S. critic Mahmoud
Mashadani as speaker.
Amid U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won approval of a 39-
member cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Among his
permanent selections were Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-
Zubaie as deputy prime ministers. Four ministers (environment, human rights,
housing, and women’s affairs) are women. Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts
named, a total of seven are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one
is Christian (minister of human rights, Ms. Wijdan Mikha’il). Sadr loyalists were
named to the ministries of agriculture, health, and transportation.
Maliki did not immediately name permanent figures for the major posts of
Interior, Defense, and Ministry of State for National Security because major factions
could not agree on nominees. After several weeks of negotiation, on June 8, 2006
he achieved COR confirmation of three compromise candidates for those posts. The
Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had
been expelled from the Iraqi military and the Baath Party for criticizing Saddam’s
decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. The Interior Minister, Jawad al-Bulani, is a
Shiite from the UIA bloc but is an engineer by training and not closely affiliated with
any of the major UIA component factions, and he is the subject of reported
maneuvers by some major Shiite factions to oust him. The choice for Minister for
National Security was Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite from a Da’wa Party faction.
CRS-18
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968. Fled Iraq in 1980
after Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran. Fled to Syria when he refused Iran’s
orders that he join pro-Iranian Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
war. Headed Da’wa offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party newspaper.
Elected to National Assembly in January 2005 and chaired its “security committee.”
Publicly supported Hezbollah (which shares a background with his Da’wa Party)
during July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, prompting congressional criticism
of him during his July 2006 visit to Washington DC. Believed sympathetic to Kurds’
efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish region. Has tense relations with SCIRI,
whose activists accuse Maliki of surrounding himself with Da’wa members and
shutting SCIRI out of his inner circle. Believed to be politically dependent on Sadr’s
support and has, to date, refused to crack down — or allow sustained U.S. crackdowns
— on Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, causing U.S. frustration. In October 2006, said he
is an ally of the United States but is “not America’s man in Iraq.” Following the
Bush-Maliki meeting in Jordan on November 30, 2006, President Bush reiterated that
Maliki is “the right guy for Iraq.”
According to the Iraq Study Group report, the Iraqi government has put forward
several milestones to achieve national reconciliation: (1) by early 2007, approval of
a provincial election law (which would presumably lead to more Sunnis on provincial
councils; the 51-seat Baghdad city council has only one Sunni Arab, for example),
approval of a law on sharing of oil revenues, approval of a new de-Baathification
law, approval of a law to curb militias, an increase in security spending over 2006
levels, the raising of interest rates and appreciation of the Iraqi dinar, and an increase
in domestic gas prices; (2) by March 2007, a referendum on amending the
constitution; (3) by April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military; (4) by
May 2007, implementation of the militias law, approval of an amnesty agreement
(with insurgent supporters), and completion of reconciliation efforts; (5) by June
2007, the holding of provincial elections; (6) by September 2007, Iraqi security
control of all 18 provinces; and (7) by December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance.
As of President Bush’s January 10, 2007, speech announcing new initiatives in
Iraq, none of the above milestones had been completely met. However, on June 25,
2006, Maliki did introduce a “National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,”
intended primarily to persuade insurgent groups to enter the political process. In
August 2006, the major factions agreed to share oil revenue on the basis of
population size, although the Kurds’ insistence on their right to sign deals with
outside firms to explore for oil in the Kurdish areas has delayed final passage of the
oil law. A constitution review committee has been established, but it has not to date
drafted proposed amendments. On January 17, 2007, Iraqi leaders said they were
close to a final draft on an oil law, which might go to parliament within the next
week, and that they had returned 700 ex-Baathists to their jobs. In addition, several
Iraqi Army divisions are now under Iraqi control and the Iraq Security Forces now
have security control for the provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf.
A further complication to political reconciliation has been the insistence of
SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on legislation to implement the constitutional
authorization for forming new regions (federalism). A law to provide for new
CRS-19
regions was passed on October 12, 2006, over Sunni opposition, but the factions
agreed to delay the formation of any new region for 18 months.
In other efforts, U.S. officials have reportedly tried to forge a new parliamentary
coalition among mainstream Shiites, Sunnis, and secular blocs that would exclude
Sadr. This strategy reportedly ran into opposition from Ayatollah Sistani, who has
sought to ensure full cooperation among all Shiite blocs. Some take the view that,
should Maliki not cooperate with the President’s January 10, 2007, plan and refuse
or fail to curb Sadr and his Mahdi Army, the United States might try to engineer his
replacement by deputy president and SCIRI leader Adel Abd al-Mahdi; President
Bush’s meeting with SCIRI leader Hakim in Washington, DC in early December
2006 fed such speculation.
Regional and International Relations. The Iraqi government has received
diplomatic support, even though most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite
and Kurdish domination of the regime. As of September 2006, there are 46 foreign
missions in Iraq, including most European and Arab countries. Jordan has appointed
an ambassador and Kuwait has pledged to do so. Iran upgraded its representation to
Ambassador in May 2006. At an Arab League meeting in late March 2006, Arab
states pledged to increase their diplomatic representation in Iraq, and to consider
other help (aid, debt relief) to bolster the Iraqi government, although movement on
appointments has been slow because of attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco, and Russia in 2005 and 2006.
At the same time, Turkey is complaining that Iraq’s Kurds are harboring the
anti-Turkey PKK guerrilla group in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been threatening
to send in forces if the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi Kurdish factions do not arrest
members of that group who are in Iraq. The threat prompted the U.S. naming of an
envoy to Turkey on this issue in August 2006 (Gen. Joseph Ralston, ret, former Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
CRS-20
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Ghazi al-Yawar
Yawar has cooperated with the U.S. since the invasion.
(Iraqis Party)
Served as President in the Allawi government and deputy
president in the post-January 2005 government, but he is
not in the post-2005 permanent government.
Iraqi Concord Front
The Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Tariq al-Hashimi, now a deputy president. IIP withdrew
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
from the January 2005 election but led the Sunni “Concord”
coalition in December 2005 elections. Critical of but
accepts U.S. presence. Coalition Includes Iraqi General
People’s Council of Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the Sunni
Endowment. The Front holds 44 seats in new parliament.
Hashimi visited the United States in December 2006 and
met with President Bush, expressing support for a new
governing coalition that would exclude Sadr’s faction.
Iraqi Front for National
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis on
Dialogue
the new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the outcome
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
and now advocates major revisions to the new constitution.
Holds 11 seats in the new parliament. Parliament Speaker
Mahmoud Mashadani, a hardliner, is a senior member; in
July 2006, he called the U.S. invasion “the work of
butchers.”
Muslim Scholars
Hardline Sunni Islamist group, has boycotted all post-
Association
Saddam elections. Believed to have ties to and influence
(MSA, Harith al-Dhari
over insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S.
and
withdrawal from Iraq. Dhari attended October 2006
Abd al-Salam al-
meeting in Mecca with other Iraqi religious figures,
Qubaysi)
agreeing to condemn sectarian killings. Nonetheless, Iraqi
government issued a warrant for Dhari’s arrest in November
2006 for suspected ties to the Sunni insurgency, causing
Dhari to remain outside Iraq.
Iraqi Insurgents
Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although an
eight group “Mujahedin Shura” was formed in early 2006,
led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi). Proclaimed
an “Islamic State of Iraq” led by Baghdadi (October 2006).
Some groups led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others by
Islamic extremists. Major Iraqi factions include Islamic
Army of Iraq, New Baath Party, Muhammad’s Army, and
the 1920 Revolution Brigades.
Foreign Fighters/
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq. Were led by Abu Musab al-
Al Qaeda in Iraq
Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, until he was killed in U.S.
airstrike June 7, 2006. Succeeded by Abu Hamza al-
Muhajir. Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite civilians to
spark civil war. Related foreign fighter faction, which
includes some Iraqis, is Ansar al-Sunna, but this group is
not in the Mujahedin Shura.
CRS-21
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental.
The United States and its coalition partners have tried to build civil society and
democracy at the local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the
past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically. A State
Department report to Congress in October 2006 details how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”
(IRRF) is being spent (“2207 Report”):
! About $1.014 billion is allocated for “Democracy Building;”
! About $71 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law” programs;
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel;
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses;
! $10 million is for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil society/
conflict resolution activities;
! $10 million is for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime); and
! $15 million is to promote human rights and human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! Several projects that attempt to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives. About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), local enclaves to
provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as discussed in the
section on security, below. The conference report on an FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) designated $50 million
in ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP operating. That level of
aid is expected in FY2007 under provisions of a continuing
resolution (P.L. 109-383).
CRS-22
! Programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote independent media.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul. In August 2006,
another $130 million in U.S. funds (and $500 million in Iraqi funds)
were allocated to assist Baghdad neighborhoods swept by U.S. and
Iraqi forces in “Operation Together Forward.”
! As noted above, according to Maliki’s national reconciliation plan,
a law on elections for provincial councils is to be drafted by the end
of 2007 and provincial elections held by June 2007.
(Recommendation 29 of the Iraq Study Group report says provincial
elections “should be held at the earliest possible date.”)
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report on P.L. 109-102) incorporated a Senate amendment
(S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each to the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-
234) provided another $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy promotion, allocated
to various organizations performing democracy work there (U.S. Institute of Peace,
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, National
Endowment for Democracy, and others). A female American staffer for NDI was
killed in an ambush in Baghdad on January 17, 2006.
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. As discussed
in recent reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR),
the difficult security environment has slowed reconstruction.30 For more detailed
information on U.S. spending and economic reconstruction, see CRS Report
RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
A total of about $34 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funding,
of which $20.917 billion has been appropriated for the “Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) in two supplemental appropriations: FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.42 billion. Of
the IRRF funds, about $20.285 billion has been obligated, and, of that, about $16.79
30 The defense authorization bill for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) set October 1, 2007, for
termination of oversight by the SIGIR. However, P.L. 109-440 extends that term until 10
months after 80% of the IRRF have been expended but includes FY2006 reconstruction
funds for Iraq in the definition of the IRRF. The SIGIR’s mandate is therefore expected to
extend until some time in 2008.
CRS-23
billion has been disbursed. According to State Department reports, the sector
allocations for the IRRF are as follows:
! $5.03 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.013 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.724 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $469 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $746 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental/FY2007. To continue reconstruction, the
Administration requested FY2006 supplemental funds of $1.6 billion and $479
million for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S.
funds. The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.485
billion. The House passed FY2007 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 5522) provides
$305.8 million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction, about $175 million less than requested.
It also provides requested funds for counter-narcotics ($254 million) and anti-
terrorism ($18 million). The Senate version of that bill provides the total requested
($752.785 million), but it allocates the funds as $453.77 million in ESF; $108 million
in democracy funds (DF); $171.6 in INCLE (international narcotics and law
enforcement funds); and $18.23 million in anti-terrorism funds (NADR, non-
proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs). Foreign Operations
programs for FY2007 are currently operating under the terms of a continuing
appropriations resolution (P.L. 109-383, as amended) that provides funding at the
FY2006 level or the House-passed FY2007 level, whichever is less. The continuing
appropriations resolution expires on February 15, 2007.
The FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-289) provides another $1.7
billion for the Iraqi security forces (discussed further below) and $500 million in
additional funds for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) under
which U.S. military can expend funds for small construction projects intended to
build good will with the Iraqi population. (In Recommendation 64, the Iraq Study
Group says that U.S. economic assistance to Iraq should be increased to $5 billion
per year rather than be “permitted to decline.” Recommendation 67 calls on the
President to appoint a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.)
Iraq provides some additional funds for reconstruction. In 2006, and again in
2007, the Iraqi government has allocated $2 billion in Iraqi revenues for development
activities. U.S. officials are hoping that Iraq will take over the U.S. role as funding
source for new reconstruction projects as U.S. funds transition in 2007 to sustainment
CRS-24
operations for projects already built. Additional U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction funds
for the President’s January 10, 2007, initiative are discussed later.
Oil Revenues. The oil industry is the driver of Iraq’s economy, and
rebuilding this industry has received substantial U.S. attention. Before the war, it
was widely asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed
second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction
costs. The oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led
invasion (only about nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of
insurgents and smugglers. Insurgents have focused their attacks on pipelines in
northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total pipeline system is over 4,300 miles
long.) The attacks, coupled with corruption, smuggling, and other deterioration, has
kept production and exports below expected levels, although high world oil prices
have more than compensating for the output shortfall. The northern export route was
shut in early 2006 but is now in operation. The Iraqi government needs to import
refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining capacity. The alleged smuggling
of oil, particularly by the Fadila party that has many members in the oil industry, has
been a source of intra-Shiite rivalry and clashes in Basra. (In Recommendation 62,
the Iraq Study Group says that the Iraqi government should accelerate oil well
refurbishment and that the U.S. military should play a greater role in protecting oil
infrastructure.)
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that a pending oil law might
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries, and both China and Russia, reportedly with some success, are pushing to
include provisions in any new oil law that would give preference to development
contracts signed during the Saddam era. Among newer investors, Poland reportedly
is negotiating with Iraq for possible investments in Iraq’s energy sector. As
referenced above, in December 2005, it was reported that a Norwegian company,
DNO, had contracted with the Kurdish administrative region to explore for oil near
the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs who view this as a
move by the Kurds to control their own oil revenues. The field might eventually
produce about 100,000 barrels per day. (In Recommendation 63, the Iraq Study
Group says the United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector and
assist in eliminating contracting corruption in that sector.)
CRS-25
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Oil Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2007 to
(weekly avg.)
(pre-war)
war)
(2004)
(2006)
date)
1.99 million
$17
$31.3
$0.4
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.47 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War Load
Current
(hrs. per
Served (MWh)
Load Served
day)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
83,000
3.0
7.8
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.9 billion (2002)
$33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
U.S. oil imports from Iraq
660,000 bpd
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
January 10, 2007. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the
1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. In an effort to encourage private U.S. investment in
Iraq, the Bush Administration has lifted most U.S. sanctions on Iraq, beginning with
Presidential Determinations issued under authorities provided by P.L. 108-7
(appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
CRS-26
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.31
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime, and
estimated of Saddam Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not
including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. In 2004, the “Paris Club”
of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes
them. However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.32 On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States has employed a multi-
faceted approach to stabilizing Iraq. However, at a news conference on October 11,
2006, and in several subsequent statements, President Bush has said that progress is
insufficient and too slow. The Iraq Study Group says the “...situation in Iraq is grave
and deteriorating,”33 a view that appears widely shared by experts. The deterioration
in security is, at least partly, the result of growing sectarian violence — which some
major news organizations now openly call a “civil war” — superimposed on a
tenacious Sunni-led insurgency. The following sections analyze the U.S.-led
approach to securing Iraq.
Congress has mandated two major periodic Administration reports on progress
in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department quarterly report, which DOD has titled
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” was required by an FY2005 supplemental
31 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
32 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss.
33 p.xiii of the Executive Summary of the Iraq Study Group Report. December 6, 2006.
CRS-27
appropriation (P.L. 109-13), and renewed by the FY2007 Defense Appropriation
(P.L. 109-289). The latest version was issued in November 2006 and provides some
of the information below. Another report, first issued April 6, 2006 (“1227
Report”), is required by Section 1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006
(P.L. 109-163).
Table 4. Key Security/Violence Indicators
Indicator
Previous Level
Current Level
Number of Insurgents
-
25,000 U.S. estimates;
(Iraqi citizens)
Iraqi estimates run to
40,000, helped by 150,000
supporters
Number of non-Iraqi
-
1,300 - 3,500
Fighters in Insurgency
Number of Attacks/day
120/day (mid-2006)
150/day
(all types)
Attacks on Infrastructure
13/day (2004)
1/day
Iraqi Police Killed
12,000
Number of Shiite militiamen
20,000 (2003)
80,000 (60,000 Mahdi,
15,000 Badr, 5,000 other)
Internally Displaced Persons
300,000 (August 06)
460,000
Iraqis Leaving Iraq
-
1.4 million (incl. 700,000
(since fall of Saddam)
to Jordan, 600,000 to
Syria)
Iraq Civilian Deaths
38/day (end 2005)
94/day (all 2006)
Iraqi Army Battalions
-
104
engaged in operations
Iraqi Army and Special
57 (May 2006)
94
Operations Battalions in the
Lead on Operations
National Police Battalions
6 (May 2006)
5
in the Lead
Number of Provinces Under
0 (end 2005)
3 (Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and
Iraqi Security Control
Najaf. Maysan and Wasit
to be handed over by
February 2007)
Sources: Information in this table is provided by a variety of sources, including U.S. government
reports on Iraq, Iraqi statements, the Iraq Study Group report, U.N. figures, and press reports.
Note: Additional figures on total numbers of Iraqi security forces, by force component, is contained
in tables below.
CRS-28
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. forces and the Iraqi government
has defied official U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. The Administration’s
“National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (November 30, 2005) said that many
insurgents are motivated by opposition to perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy,
and to Shiite political dominance. Others want to return the Baath Party to power,
although, according to many experts, some would accept a larger Sunni political role
without the Baath. Still others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that
want to defeat the United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region. The
insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated within cities and wider
provinces. However, in early 2006, a group of Iraqi insurgent factions announced the
formation of a national “Mujahedin Shura (Council)” purportedly including Al
Qaeda in Iraq.
Despite their growing coordination, the insurgents have failed to derail the
political transition,34 although they have succeeded, to some extent, in stimulating
high levels of sectarian violence and in stimulating a debate in the United States over
the continuing U.S. commitment in Iraq. Sunni insurgent groups have conducted
several large-scale (50 insurgents fighters or more) attacks on police stations and
other fixed positions during 2006, as well as several mass kidnappings of 50 or more
people at a time from fixed locations. Other targets of their grenades, IEDs
(improvised explosive devices), mortars, and direct weapons fire are U.S. forces and
Iraqi officials and security forces, as well as Iraqi civilians working for U.S.
authorities, foreign contractors and aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution
facilities, and water, power, and other infrastructure facilities. A New York Times
report of December 19, 2006, said that Sunni insurgents had succeeded in destroying
many of the power stations that feed electricity to Baghdad, contributing to the
relative lack of power there. Whole Sunni-dominated neighborhoods of Baghdad,
including Amiriya, Jihad, Amal, and Doura, not to mention the Anbar Province city
of Ramadi, have increasingly served as Sunni insurgent bases, and these districts are
also the front lines of sectarian warfare with Shiite militias pushing west from the
largely Shiite districts east of the Tigris River in Baghdad.
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency
in Resolution 1618 (August 4, 2005), condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers and foreign
diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.3 million
in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Zarqawi Faction.35 A numerically small but politically
significant component of the insurgency is non-Iraqi, constituted as an organization
called Al Qaeda-Iraq. The faction was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a
34 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, April 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, December 2005.
35 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS-29
Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside
other Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union.36 He was killed in a June 7, 2006,
U.S. airstrike and has been succeeded by the little known Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
(also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian national. Some U.S. commanders
say Al Qaeda-Iraq is increasingly gaining political influence among Iraqi Sunnis in
Fallujah and other parts of Sunni-inhabited Anbar Province, and Al Qaeda Iraq
fighters briefly conducted public shows of force in several cities in Anbar Province
in October 2006 and in Mosul in December 2006.
Al Qaeda-Iraq has been a U.S. focus from very early on in the war because of
its alleged perpetration of large scale suicide and other bombings against both
combatant and civilian targets. This trend began with major suicide bombings in
2003, beginning with one against U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad
(August 19, 2003),37 followed by the August 29, 2003, bombing in Najaf that killed
SCIRI leader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The faction, and related factions, have
also kidnapped a total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those.
Zarqawi’s strategy was to spark Sunni-Shiite civil war, an outcome that appears to
be developing. In actions intended to spread its activities outside Iraq, Al Qaeda-
Iraq reputedly committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian
port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there, as well as the November 10,
2005, bombing of Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan.
Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said
that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and
weapons),38 although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not
decisive. Largely because of this outside support, the first 17 recommendations of
the Iraq Study Group report call for intensified regional diplomacy, including multi-
lateral diplomacy with Syria and Iran, in an effort to persuade outside parties not to
stoke the violence in Iraq by aiding protege factions in Iraq.
In September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of
allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going
into Iraq. These reports led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S.
sanctions against Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of
36 Zarqawi himself came to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates, after
escaping the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. He made his way to northern Iraq, after
transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking refuge with a Kurdish Islamist
faction called Ansar al-Islam near the town of Khurmal. After the Ansar enclave was
destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi went to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the
Association of Unity and Jihad. He then formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a
reputed exchange of letters) and changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in
Mesopotamia (Iraq).” It is named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that
designation from the earlier Unity and Jihad title, which was designated as an FTO in
October 2004.
37 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
38 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
CRS-30
some suspected financiers of the insurgency. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by
moves such as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi
to Iraqi authorities. The latest DOD “Measuring Stability” report says that Syria
provides help to Sunni insurgents, mainly Baathist factions.
Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,39 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Press reports say that Saudi officials told visiting Vice President Cheney in
November 2006 that the Saudis might be compelled to assist Iraq’s Sunnis if the
United States withdraws from Iraq.
Sectarian Violence and Militias/Civil War?
The security environment in Iraq has become more complex over the past year
as Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence has increased. Top U.S. officials now say that
sectarian-motivated violence — manifestations of an all-out struggle for political and
economic power in Iraq — has now displaced the Sunni-led insurgency as the
primary security challenge in Iraq. Senior U.S. officials, most notably the leaders of
the Iraq war effort (Gen. John Abizaid and George Casey) at a Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on August 3, 2006, have said the sectarian violence
risks becoming all-out civil war, but that they do not consider Iraq in a civil war now.
Several Members have characterized the violence in Iraq as civil war. The Iraq Study
Group report does not use that term to characterize the multi-faceted violence in Iraq.
Most trace the escalation of sectarian violence to the February 22, 2006, Al
Qaeda-Iraq bombing of the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The destruction of
its dome set off a wave of purported Shiite militia attacks on about 60 Sunni
mosques and the killing of about 400 persons in the first days after the sectarian
attacks. Since then, the violence has taken the form of weapons fire (including
mortar fire), abductions, and attacks on mosques, markets, and apartment buildings.
frequented or inhabited by members of the rival sect, intended at least in part to drive
rival sects out of mixed neighborhoods. Press accounts (New York Times, December
24, 2006) say the attacks are converting mixed Sunni-Shiite districts of Baghdad,
such as Hurriya, into predominantly Shiite districts. Many of those abducted turn up
bound and gagged, dumped in rivers, facilities, vehicles, or fields. The sectarian
violence was given further impetus by suicide bombings on November 23, 2006, that
killed more than 200 mostly Shiites. Sunnis are accusing the Shiites of using their
preponderant presence in the emerging security forces, as well as their party-based
militias, to commit the atrocities, but many Shiites, for their part, blame Sunni
insurgents for the instigation.
The sectarian violence has caused U.S. officials to assert that the new
government must dismantle 23 known militias. Of them, seven, including the
peshmerga and the Badr Brigades, were recognized in CPA Order 91 as “anti-
39 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
CRS-31
Saddam forces” and were given incentives in that Order to disband. U.S. forces have
conducted some operations to curb them, particularly the Mahdi Army of Sadr.
During July 17-24, 2006, for example, U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted 19 operations
against purported sectarian “death squads.” In late 2005, U.S. forces uncovered
militia-run detention facilities (“Site 4”) and arrested those (Badr and related Iraqi
police) running them. U.S. officials as well as the new Interior Minister Jawad
Bolani are moving to remove militiamen and death squad participants from the
security forces. In October 2006, Bolani fired 3,000 Ministry employees for alleged
sectarian links, and he fired two major commanders of National Police components.
On October 3, 2006, an entire brigade of National Police were taken out of duty
status for retraining for alleged toleration of sectarian killings in Baghdad. On the
other hand, Sunnis in the city of Balad accused U.S. and Iraqi forces of failing to act
when Shiite militias killed several dozen Sunnis in sectarian violence in the city on
October 14, 2006. In addition, in comments to journalists, some U.S. commanders
express frustration with Maliki for forcing them to release suspected Mahdi militia
commanders and to dismantle U.S. checkpoints in Sadr City, set up to try to prevent
Shiite sectarian militiamen from operating. In an apparent attempt to demonstrate
increased cooperation following President Bush’s announcement on January 10,
2007, of a new security plan, it was reported that, in recent weeks, the Maliki
government had arrested several dozen Mahdi Army commanders.
The strains between Maliki and the United States were exacerbated by the
failure of a mid-2006 Baghdad security plan. This “Operation Together Forward”
was announced on July 25, 2006, during the visit of Prime Minister Maliki to the
United States, involving about 4,000 additional U.S. troops deployed in Baghdad
(supplementing the 9,000 U.S. forces there already). The operation focused on such
violent districts as Doura, Amiriyah, Rashid, Ghaziliyah, and Mansour. U.S.
commanders said, early on in the operation, that violence in these districts had
dropped substantially, over 50% in some cases. However, in late October 2006, U.S.
military officials said publicly that the operation had not reduced violence overall and
would be “re-focused.” The failure was attributed, in part, to Iraq’s deployment of
only two out of the six battalions committed to the operation (only 1,500 soldiers out
of 4,000 committed).
Iraqi Christians and their churches have become major targets of Shiite and
Sunni armed factions, viewing them as allies of the United States. Since the fall of
Saddam Hussein, as many as 100,000 Christians might have left Iraq, leaving the
current size of the community in Iraq at about 600,000 - 800,000. The two most
prominent Christian sects in Iraq are the Chaldean Catholics and the Assyrian
Christians.
The three major organized militias in Iraq are discussed below, although it is
primarily the Shiite militias and their Sunni antagonists that are believed responsible
for sectarian violence.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of which are
providing security in the Kurdish regional area (Dahuk,
Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil Provinces). Some are in the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and deployed in such cities as Mosul, Tal Affar, and
CRS-32
Baghdad. Peshmerga units have sometimes fought each other; in
May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with each other over
territory, customs revenues, and control over the Kurdish regional
government in Irbil.
! Badr Brigades. This militia is led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of
parliament). The Badr Brigades were recruited, trained, and
equipped by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, aligned with Iran’s
hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas
conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party
officials. Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi
prisoners of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed
SCIRI as an Iranian puppet and Badr operations in southern Iraq
during the 1980s and 1990s did not shake Saddam’s grip on power.
The Badr “Organization” registered as a separate political entity, in
addition to its SCIRI parent, during elections in 2005. Badr
militiamen play unofficial policing throughout southern Iraq, and
many Badr members also reputedly are in the National Police.
! Mahdi Army. The November 2006 “Measuring Stability” report says
this militia “has replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous
accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq.”
This represents a gaining of strength since U.S. military operations
suppressed Mahdi uprisings in April and August of 2004. That
fighting was ended with compromises under which Mahdi forces
stopped fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their weapons
for money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of
prisoners, amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid. Mahdi
assertiveness since 2005 accounted for a sharp deterioration of
relations between the Mahdi Army and British and U.S. forces, and
between Sadr and other Iraqi leaders more generally. At least 30
British soldiers have died in suspected Mahdi attacks in southern
Iraq since late 2005, including a British helicopter shot down in May
2006. Since mid-2006, U.S. casualties have been occurring in areas
where Sadr is strong, including Sadr City, Diwaniyah, and Kut, and
U.S. and Iraqi forces fought a major engagement with Mahdi forces
in Diwaniyah in October 2006. That followed a major clash
between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in Diwaniyah in August
2006, resulting in more than 20 Iraqi troops killed. Mahdi forces
also shelled a British base near Amarah in August 2006, contributing
to a British decision to leave the base, and the militia took over
Amarah briefly for a few days in late October 2006. However, some
experts, citing independent minded Mahdi commanders such as one
named Abu Deraa, believe Sadr himself has tried to rein in Mahdi
violence but no longer has full control of his armed following.
Iranian Support. U.S. officials, and some Sunni Iraq political leaders, have
repeatedly accused Iran of aiding Shiite militias. On June 22, 2006, General Casey
reiterated past assertions by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Peter Pace that the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of Iran’s Revolutionary
CRS-33
Guard is providing armed Iraqi Shiite factions (most likely Sadr’s Mahdi forces)
with explosives and weapons. Because of Iran’s support for Shiite militias, the
United States and Iran announced in March 2006 that they would conduct direct talks
on the issue of stabilizing Iraq, but Iran subsequently said the talks were not needed
because Iraq had a new government, and no talks have been held. The Iraq Study
Group (Recommendations 9, 10, and 11) says that the United States should engage
Iran multilaterally to enlist its assistance on Iraq, but in an interview with journalists
on December 14, 2006, Secretary of State Rice rejected the Study Group
recommendation by saying that the United States would not likely bargain with Iran,
such as electing not to try to sanction Iran for its nuclear program advancement, to
obtain its assistance in stabilizing Iraq.40 A clearer sign of the Administration
position came in the President’s January 10, 2007, initiative, which included
announcement of an additional aircraft carrier group and additional Patriot anti-
missile systems to the Gulf, moves clearly directed against Iran. At the same time,
U.S. forces arrested alleged Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Forces agents — two
at a SCIRI compound in Baghdad and five more at a compound in Irbil. The Iraqi
government compelled the release of the first two arrested; the others are still held.
(For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.)
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
As outlined in the November 2005 “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the
Administration continues to try to refine its stabilization strategy, with increasing
focus on curbing sectarian violence. Options for further alterations, set to be
announced in January 2007, are discussed later in this paper.
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Since November 2005, the Administration has publicly articulated a strategy called
“clear, hold, and build,” intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning
Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents.
The strategy, based partly on an idea advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the
September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,41 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to preventing insurgent re-infiltration and
promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that
could eventually expand throughout Iraq. The strategy formed the basis of Operation
Together Forward (I and II) as well as the President’s January 10, 2007, initiative,
discussed below.
In conjunction with the U.S. strategy, the Administration has formed Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used extensively in Afghanistan. Each
PRT is civilian led, composed of about 100 U.S. State Department and USAID
officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as
the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the
Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry representatives. The concept ran into
40 Kessler, Glenn. “Rice Rejects Overture to Iran and Syria,” Washington Post, December
15, 2006.
41 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.
CRS-34
some U.S. military objections to taking on expanded missions, but the debate was
resolved with an agreement by DOD to provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs. Thus
far, ten PRTs have been inaugurated, of which the following seven are run by the
United States: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad, Anbar Province, two in Salah ad-Din
Province, and Baquba. Of the partner-run PRTs, Britain has formed a PRT in Basra,
Italy has formed one in Dhi Qar province, and South Korea runs one in Irbil.
According to the State Department, plans are to open an additional twelve PRTs,
including six more in Baghdad and three more in Anbar. These plans will necessitate
adding 400 diplomats and contractors to staff the new PRTs.
PRT Funding. The FY2006 supplemental request asked for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs, of which the enacted version, P.L. 109-234, provides
$229 million. The requested $675 million for development grants to be distributed
by the PRTs is fully funded through the ESF appropriation for Iraq in this law. In
connection with the President’s January 10, 2007 initiative and its provision to add
PRTs, the Administration will ask for $414 million in additional FY2007 funds for
PRTs.
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The Administration
position is that continued combat operations against the insurgency, and increasingly
against sectarian militias, are required. About 135,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down
from 160,000 there during the December 2005 election period and consistent with
2005 baseline troop levels). U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint
Task Force-7, CJTF-7) is a multi-national headquarters “Multinational Force-Iraq,
MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey. As of December 2006, the
head of Multinational Corps-Iraq, is Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno.
A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat has been Anbar Province,
which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi (provincial capital), the latter of
which is the most restive of all Iraqi cities and which is assessed to have virtually no
functioning governance. However, a reported assessment by a U.S. intelligence
officer in August 2006 said that U.S. efforts in Anbar were failing and that the
province is “lost” politically. Still, there are about 40,000 U.S. troops in Anbar
conducting combat primarily in and around Ramadi. In the run-up to the December
15, 2005, elections, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted several major operations (for
example Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel
Curtain, and Ram) to clear contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from
Sunni cities along the Euphrates River.
Casualties. As of January 18, 2006, 3,019 U.S. forces and about 250
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 125 U.S. civilians working
on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, 2,873 have occurred since
President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003,
and about 2,434 were by hostile action. Estimates of Iraqi civilian death rates are
noted in the “security indicators” table above. About 34,000 are estimated to have
died in sectarian violence in 2006. As of January 2007, about 650 U.S. civilian
contractors have been killed in Iraq. (See CRS Report RS22532, Iraqi Police and
Security Forces Casualty Estimates, and CRS Report RS22537, Iraqi Civilian
Deaths Estimates, both by Hannah Fischer.)
CRS-35
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)42
A major pillar of existing U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces
(ISF) that could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in a June 28, 2005
speech, “Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down.”43 The Iraqi government says that the ISF should be capable of securing
Iraq by mid-2007, although U.S. commanders are skeptical that such a target could
be met. The Iraq Study Group recommends that the training and equipping of the ISF
should be completed by the first quarter of 2008 (Recommendation 42.) With the
total ISF goal of 325,000 virtually reached, current Defense Department plans are to
increase the number of U.S. forces embedded with or mentoring the ISF from 4,000
to well over 10,000, a plan endorsed by the Iraq Study Group report, although the
Study Group envisioned that training effort as part of a transition from U.S.-led
combat to supporting ISF-led combat. (Recommendations 43 and 44).
The tables below detail the composition of the ISF and provide Administration
assessments of force readiness. As of January 10, 2007, there are 323,000 total ISF:
134,700 “operational” military forces under the Ministry of Defense and 188,300
police and police commando forces “trained and equipped” under the Ministry of
Interior. The commander of the ISF training mission, the Multinational Transition
Security Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I), is Gen. Martin Dempsey. However, police
figures include possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15,
2005) who are absent-without-leave or might have deserted. The police live in their
areas of operation, and attendance is hard to account for. Because of the deficiencies
in ISF performance discussed below, the target level of the ISF has been increased
to about 400,000.
U.S. commanders say they are progressively turning over greater formal
responsibility to the ISF, although areas under ISF control or leadership are not
necessarily pacified or stable. In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense began
assuming operational control of Iraqi military forces from the U.S.-led coalition.
About one-third of the ISF is now under Iraqi operational control. U.S. and partner
forces have now turned over to the ISF 40 out of 111 forward operation bases, and
as shown in the earlier table, whole provinces are being turned over to ISF control.
The Iraqi proposals for the timetables for additional Iraqi control are discussed above
in the section on the political transition; for example, by April 2007, Iraq is to assume
full control of its military. By September 2007, Iraq is to have security control of all
18 provinces; and, by December 2007, it is to be completely self-reliant. U.S.
commanders express substantial skepticism that these time frames can be met. (A
map showing area under Iraqi control and ISF lead can be found in the Iraq Weekly
Status Report of the State Department, available at [http://www.state.gov/
p/nea/ci/c3212.htm]).
42 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
43 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
CRS-36
The most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report, released November 2006,
reiterates U.S. official statements of progress in building the ISF, while continuing
previous criticisms, including the observation that the ISF continue to lack an
effective command structure, independent initiative, or commitment to the mission,
and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.44 U.S. commanders have told
journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire ISF unit to desert or refuse
to undertake a specified mission.45 As noted above, ISF were unable to secure
Baghdad under Maliki’s security plan for the city, necessitating the infusion of U.S.
forces in July-August 2006. Iraqi forces also were unable to prevent looting of the
British base, cited above, abandoned by British forces in August 2006 in Amarah.
A major issue is ethnic balance and involvement in sectarian violence. U.S.
commanders have consistently acknowledged difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into
the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they are trying to correct. Most of the ISF,
particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed in the north.
There are few units of mixed ethnicity, and, as discussed above, many Sunnis see the
ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments of repression and responsible for
sectarian killings. One controversial element of the January 10, 2007, new Baghdad
security plan is its apparent reliance on several mostly Kurdish brigades, a
deployment likely to be resented by both Shiite and Sunni Arabs in the capital.
The Iraq Study Group and other reports reserve their most vocal criticism for the
police forces, particularly the National Police, because of rampant corruption and
alleged involvement in sectarian violence, as noted throughout this paper. In 2005,
U.S. officials stated that 2006 would be the “year of the police,” but little progress
has now been noted. The Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 50-61) contain
several suggestions for reforming and improving the police, including assigning the
lead role in advising and training the anti-crime portions of the police forces to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and transferring those police forces that are involved in
anti-insurgency operations to the Ministry of Defense from their current
organizational structure under the Ministry of Interior.
Weaponry. Most observers say the ISF are severely underequipped, dependent
primarily on donations of surplus equipment by coalition members. Some of its
equipment is discussed in the table below. The October 2006 report of the SIGIR
([http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx]) notes problems with
tracking Iraqi weapons; of the approximately 370,000 weapons turned over to Iraq
by the United States since Saddam’s fall, only 12,000 serial numbers were properly
recorded. Some fear that some of these weapons might have fallen into the hands of
insurgents or sectarian militias, although it is also possible the weapons are still in
Defense and Interior Ministry stocks but are not catalogued. (In Recommendation
45, the Iraq Study Group said the United States should encourage the Iraqi
government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests for U.S. arms and that
departing U.S. combat units should leave behind some of their equipment for use by
the ISF.)
44 Fallows, James. “Why Iraq Has No Army.” Atlantic Monthly, December 2005.
45 Castaneda, Antonio. “Iraqi Desertions Complicate U.S. Mission.” Associated Press, Jan.
31, 2006.
CRS-37
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. The Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this
training and equipping mission:
! According to the State Department, a total of $5.036 billion in IRRF
funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for,
and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, as of
September 20, 2006, about $4.938 billion has been obligated and
$4.621 billion of that has been disbursed.
! An FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be
controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.
Of that amount, about $4.7 billion has been obligated. Therefore,
the total obligated (spent) for the ISF to date is about $9.6 billion.
! The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provided another $3
billion for the ISF but withholds the remaining ISF facilities
construction funding.
! The FY2007 Defense appropriations law (P.L. 109-289) provides an
additional $1.7 billion to train and equip the ISF. Some Defense
officials said in late October 2006 that there might be a supplemental
FY2007 request for additional ISF funding in conjunction with the
decision to train more ISF than the 325,000 current goal.
CRS-38
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces
(As of January 10, 2007)
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
123,700 total; current goal is 131,000. Forces
$1.097 billion for
in units are in 112 battalions (about 70,000
facilities; $707
personnel). Trained for eight weeks, paid
million for
$60/month. Has mostly East bloc equipment,
equipment; $656
including 77 T-72 tanks donated by Poland.
million for
training, personnel,
and operations
Iraqi
About 3,000 personnel, included in Army total
Intervention
above. Trained for 13 weeks.
Force
Special
About 1,600 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Operations
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando
Forces
Battalion. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in
Jordan.
Strategic
About 2,900 personnel in seven battalions to
Infrastructure
protect oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure.
Battalions
The goal is 11 battalions.
Mechanized
About 1,500. Recently transferred from
Police
Ministry of Interior control.
Brigade
Air Force
About 900, its target size. Has 9 helicopters,
$28 million
3 C-130s; 14 observation aircraft. Trained for
allocated for air
six months. UAE and Jordan to provide other
fields (from funds
aircraft and helos.
for Iraqi Army,
above)
Navy
About 1,100, the target size. Has a Patrol Boat
Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment.
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at
Umm Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya
oil terminals. Some training by Australian
Navy.
Totals
134,700
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units (10 per
Trainers
battalion), involves about 4,000 U.S. forces (increasing to 10,000),
run by Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-
I). Training at Taji, north of Baghdad; Kirkush, near Iranian border;
and Numaniya, south of Baghdad. All 26 NATO nations at NATO
Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at Rustamiyah (300 trainers).
Others trained at NATO bases in Norway and Italy. Jordan,
Germany, and Egypt also have done training.
CRS-39
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces
(As of January 10, 2007)
Force/Entity
Size/Strength
IRRF
Funds
Allocated
Ministry of Interior
Total size unknown. 3,000 employees dismissed
in October for corruption/sectarianism.
Iraqi Police Service
135,000, including 1,300 person Highway Patrol.
$ 1.806
(IPS)
(About the target size.) Gets eight weeks of
billion
training, paid $60 per month. Not organized as
battalions.
Dignitary Protection
About 500 personnel
National Police
About 24,400. Comprises “Police Commandos,”
Public Order Police,” and “Mechanized Police.”
Organized into 28 battalions. Overwhelmingly
Shiite. Gets four weeks of counter-insurgency
training. Iraq Study Group (Recommendation 50)
proposes transfer to MOD control.
Emergency Response
About 300, able to lead operations. Hostage
Unit
rescue.
Border Enforcement
28,100. Controls 258 border forts built or under
$437
Department
construction. Has Riverine Police component to
million
secure water crossings. Iraq Study Group
(incl. $3
(Recommendation 51) proposes transfer to MOD
million
control.
for
stipends
to 150
former
WMD
workers.
Totals (all forces)
188,300. Current Goal is 195,000
Training
Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel (DOD-lead) as embeds and
partners. Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan
International Police Training Center; Baghdad Police College
and seven academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Iraq Study
Group (Recommendation 57) proposes U.S. training at local
police station level. Countries doing training aside from U.S.:
Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark,
Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany (now suspended),
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Growing allegations that some of the 145,000
$53
Service (FPS)
members of the FPS, which are attached to
million
individual ministries, are involved in sectarian
allocated
violence. U.S. and Iraq began trying to rein in the
for this
force in May 2006 by placing it under some
service
Ministry of Interior guidance, including issuing
thus far.
badges and supervising what types of weapons it
uses. (In Recommendation 54, the Iraq Study
Group says the Ministry of Interior should
identify, register, and otherwise control FPS.)
CRS-40
Coalition-Building and Maintenance46
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions. As of January 10, 2007, 25 other countries are contributing about
14,138 forces, down from about 28,000 in 2005, and the total is expected to fall
further. (A list of contributing countries, although not force levels, can be found in
the Department of State’s “Iraq Weekly Status Report” referenced earlier.) Poland
and Britain lead multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively.
The UK-led force (UK forces alone number about 7,500) is based in Basra, but
Britain said it will likely halve its force by mid-2007. The Poland-led force (Polish
forces number 900, down from a high of 2,600 in 2005) is based in Hilla and include
forces from the following foreign countries: Armenia, Slovakia, Denmark, El
Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan.
However, Poland says it might withdraw its remaining forces by the end of 2006.
Italy completed its withdrawal in December 2006 after turning over Dhi Qar Province
over to ISF control.
The coalition shrinkage began with Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300
troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings
and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war
effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua followed Spain’s
withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in July 2004 after
one of its citizens was taken hostage. On the other hand, many nations are replacing
their contingents with trainers for the ISF or financial contributions or other
assistance to Iraq. Among other changes are the following.
! Ukraine, which lost eight soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent attack,
withdrew most of its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 2005
elections. However, in March 2006 it sent in a 150-person force to
take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where
Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000
in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil
in Kurdish-controlled Iraq). The deployment has been extended
until the end of 2007.
! Japan completed its withdrawal of its 600-person military
reconstruction contingent in Samawah on July 17, 2006. The
46 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-41
Australian forces protecting the Japanese contingent (450 out of the
total Australian deployment in Iraq of 1,350) moved to other areas.
! Denmark said in May 2006 it will keep its forces in Iraq (Basra),
although it withdrew 80 of its 530-person force in May 2006.
! In July 2006, Romanian leaders began debating whether to withdraw
or reduce its 890 forces in Iraq.
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
also train civilian personnel. In addition to the security training offers discussed
above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help train Iraqi police,
administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005 Brussels conference
discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help Iraq write its
permanent constitution and reform government ministries. The FY2005
supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional
counter-terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
Iraq Study Group Report, President’s January 10
Initiative, and Other Options
President Bush, Congress, and observers have debated U.S. policy in Iraq amid
widespread concurrence, including from President Bush, that progress in Iraq has
been unsatisfactory. The President has said he weighed the December 6, 2006,
report of the Study Group, as well as input from several other reviews under way,
including one directed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace and
another under direction of the National Security Council, and he announced a new
initiative for Iraq on January 10, 2007. In the immediate run-up to the speech, a
number of senior personnel shifts were announced: U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad is to
be replaced by Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker, Gen. Abizaid is to be replaced
as CENTCOM Commander by Admiral William Fallon; and Gen. Casey is to be
replaced as head of MNF-I by General David Petraeus, who previously led U.S.
troops in the Mosul area and, on another tour, established the training and equipping
program for the ISF. Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary
in December 2006.
The President’s January 10, 2007, initiative on Iraq, based on the outcome of the
reviews, is intended to bring security to Baghdad and create conditions under which
Iraq’s communities can reconcile. The plan, which in many ways reflects
recommendations in a January 2007 report by the American Enterprise Institute
entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,”47 involves the infusion of
an additional 17,500 U.S. forces to Baghdad and 4,000 Marines to restive Anbar
47 The two principal authors of the report are Frederick W. Kagan and Jack Keane (General,
U.S. Army, ret).
CRS-42
Province. The plan envisions that these forces, along with additional Iraqi forces,
will be able to secure and hold neighborhoods and areas cleared of insurgents and
thereby cause the population not to depend on militias or other armed elements for
security. The plan, as announced by the President, requires cooperation from the
Iraqi government, such as progress on the reconciliation steps discussed earlier. In
addition, the Baghdad security plan requires the commitment of 3 Iraqi brigades
(about 6,000 soldiers), and an unspecified number of police commandos and regular
police, in nine sectors of Baghdad. Iraq is to designate a commander and deputy
commander of Baghdad and commit $10 billion in unspent Iraqi funds for
reconstruction. The President’s plan reportedly includes at least $1.2 billion in new
U.S. aid, including $414 million for PRTs, and the remainder for job creation and
CERP projects, in part to revive long-dormant state-owned factories. Perhaps most
important is the commitment to allow U.S. and Iraqi forces to conduct raids and
patrols against Shiite militias, which presumably will bring U.S. forces into conflict
with the Mahdi Army. However, there is substantial outside skepticism that the
Maliki government will uphold the commitment to conduct even-handed security
operations against Shiite militias and against Sunni insurgents in Baghdad, and press
reports say there are U.S.-Iraq disagreements over how to implement the plan with
respect to precisely that issue.
The President’s January 10 plan appears to deviate substantially from many
aspects of the Iraq Study Group report. The Iraq Study Group was launched in March
2006; chosen by mutual agreement among its congressional organizers to co-chair
are former Secretary of State James Baker and former Chairman of the House
International Relations Committee Lee Hamilton. The eight other members of the
Group are from both parties and have held high positions in government. The group
was funded by the conference report on P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which
provided $1 million for operations of the group. The Group submitted its report to
President Bush on December 6, 2006 (full text at [http://www.usip.org]). Some of
the specific recommendations have been discussed throughout this paper when
developments relevant to the recommendation are analyzed. Among the major
themes of the 79 recommendations, along with comparable or contrasting features
of the President’s plan, are the following:
! Heightened regional and international diplomacy, including with
Iran and Syria, and including the holding of a major international
conference in Baghdad (Recommendations 1-12). The President’s
January 10 initiative was highly critical of both Iran and Syria and
outlined additional measures to prevent both states from interfering
in Iraq; in the case of Iran, the President announced that a second
aircraft carrier group would go to the Persian Gulf and related
measures.
! As part of an international approach, renewed commitment to Arab-
Israeli peace (Recommendations 13-17). This was not a major
feature of the President’s plan, although he did discuss stepped up
U.S. diplomacy on this issue.
! Additional economic, political, and military support for the
stabilization of Afghanistan (Recommendation 18). This was not
CRS-43
specified in the President’s plan, although there is reported
consideration of a U.S. troop and aid increase for Afghanistan.
! Setting milestones for the Iraqi government to achieve political
reconciliation, security, and governance, including possibly
withholding some U.S. support if the Iraqi government refuses or
fails to do so (Recommendations 19-37). The President’s plan does
not threaten to reduce support for the Iraqi government if it fails to
uphold its commitments.
! Prioritizing training of the ISF rather than U.S. direct combat
(Recommendations 40-45). The President’s plan prioritizes U.S.
combat but includes substantially increased U.S. embedding with
Iraqi units.
! Giving greater control over police and police commando units to the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which is considered less sectarian than the
Ministry of Interior that now controls some of these forces, and
reforming the Ministry of Interior (Recommendations 50-58). The
President’s plan, according to a White House fact sheet released on
January 10, requires reform of the Ministry of Interior.
! Securing and expanding Iraq’s oil sector (Recommendations 62-63).
The President’s plan expects Iraq to pass a pending oil law, which
would, in part, encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector.
! Increasing economic aid to Iraq and enlisting more international
donations of assistance (Recommendations 64-67). The President’s
plan includes increases in aid, as discussed above.
! Ensuring that the United States has the right skills serving in Iraq
and has sufficient intelligence on developments there
(Recommendations 73-79). This is not specifically addressed in the
President’s plan.
Reaction on key foreign policy and defense committees to the President’s plan
appeared to be negative, judging from hearings on Iraq held right after the plan was
announced. The contention appeared to center on the announcement that additional
U.S. forces would go to Iraq, and many experts say additional forces will delay the
time when Iraq’s security forces can handle their own security affairs. Others say that
increasing troops does not resolve the underlying political differences in Iraq.
Supporters of the plan said that it offers substantially more prospects of success than
any of the likely alternatives. Around the time of the President’s speech, several
congressional resolutions were introduced opposing an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq
(H.R. 353, H.Con.Res. 23, H.Res. 41), and some Senators from both parties say they
will press for a vote soon on a Senate resolution, S.Con.Res. 2, introduced January
17, expressing disapproval of adding troops to Iraq. Another Senate resolution, S.
233, would prohibit the expenditure of U.S. funds for a troop increase. Some
Members say they plan legislation supporting the President’s initiative and opposing
any binding efforts to limit funds for the deployment.
CRS-44
The sections below discuss options that have been under discussion even before
the release of the Iraq Study Group report, and some of the ideas discussed may be
similar to some of the recommendations of the Study Group as well as the President’s
plan.
Altering Troop Levels or Mission
President Bush has opposed major reductions in troop levels or changes to their
mission, stating that the United States must uphold its “commitment” to the Iraqi
government. The President and his supporters maintain that the Iraqi government
would collapse upon an immediate pullout, causing full-scale civil war, and would
represent a victory for terrorists and create chaos in the region, drawing in regional
powers to the fighting in Iraq. Others argue that the loss of the Iraq effort could
cause terrorists to attempt attacks in the United States itself. In the 109th Congress,
H.Res. 861 stated that “... it is not in the national security interest of the United States
to set an arbitrary date for the withdrawal or redeployment” of U.S. forces from Iraq;
the resolution passed the House on June 16 by a vote of 256-153, with 5 voting
“present.”
Troop Increase. Some observers (but not the Study Group report) have said
that the United States should increase troops levels in Iraq even further to tamp down
sectarian violence and prevent Sunni insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations. The American Enterprise Institute paper mentioned above
recommends that at least 20,000 additional U.S. forces would be required to secure
Baghdad, a number roughly in line with the President’s January 10 plan. However,
the AEI report’s authors say that a troop “surge” needs to be relatively sustained,
lasting at least 18 months, to have the desired effect,48 although U.S. officials,
including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have thus far talked in terms of about
six months.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members have argued that the United States
should begin to withdraw immediately, maintaining that the decision to invade Iraq
was a mistake in light of the failure thus far to locate WMD, that the large U.S.
presence in Iraq is inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in
additional U.S. casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take
this position include most of the approximately 50 Members of the “Out of Iraq
Congressional Caucus,” formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative
John Murtha, ranking member (now chairman) of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, publicly called for an “immediate” pullout (over six months). His
resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable
date” and the maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence, mostly in Kuwait
(some say U.S. troops could be based in the Kurdish north) from which U.S. forces
could continue to battle Al Qaeda - Iraq. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written
by Representative Duncan Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee), expressed the sense “that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be
terminated immediately;” it failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005.
48 Keane, Jack and Frederick Kagan. “The Right Type of Surge,” Washington Post op-ed,
December 27, 2006.
CRS-45
Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative considered in the 109th Congress
is the setting of a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal or the beginning of a withdrawal.
The Iraq Study Group suggests a winding down of the U.S. combat mission by early
2008 but does not recommend a firm timetable. This option was typified by H.J.Res.
55, introduced by Representative Neil Abercrombie, which called on the
Administration to begin a withdrawal by October 2006. H.Con.Res. 348, introduced
by Representative Mike Thompson, called for a redeployment of U.S. forces no later
than September 30, 2006. In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view
that the United States needs to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to
withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (FY2006 defense authorization bill)
to compel the Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal during 2006.
Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that
stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but requires an Administration
report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal.
That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of
significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing
79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the
conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163).
On June 22, 2006, the Senate debated two Iraq-related amendments to an
FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766). One, offered by Senator Kerry, setting
a July 1, 2007, deadline for U.S. redeployment from Iraq, was defeated 86-13.
Another amendment, sponsored by Senator Levin, called on the Administration to
begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006, but with no deadline for full
withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39.
Troop Reduction. Depending on the results of the President’s January 10,
2007, initiative, some might revive debate on a possible troop reduction. U.S.
officials have said that success of the January 10 initiative might pave the way for an
eventual U.S. force reduction, although some envision a reduction if the plan does
not succeed and the Administration adopts recommendations close to those of the
Iraq Study Group. General Casey, during a visit to Washington in late June 2006,
presented to President Bush options for a substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in
Iraq, beginning as early as September 2006. According to reports of the Casey plan,
which the Administration said was one option dependent on security progress, U.S.
force levels would drop to about 120,000 by September 2006, with a more
pronounced reduction to about 100,000 by the end of 2007. The plan faded, as have
all previous such reduction plans, when the security situation did not calm.
International and Regional Diplomacy
As noted above, many of the Iraq Study Group recommendations propose
increased regional, multi-lateral, and international diplomacy, beyond steps already
taken by the Administration. One idea, included in the Study Group report, is to
form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on Iraq’s
factions to compromise. In the 109th Congress, these ideas were included in several
resolutions, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although
several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal.
Other ideas involve recruitment of new force donors. In July 2004, then Secretary
CRS-46
of State Powell said the United States would consider a Saudi proposal for a
contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq,
reportedly under separate command. Some Iraqi leaders believed that such
peacekeepers would come from Sunni Muslim states and would inevitably favor
Sunni factions within Iraq. On the other hand, several experts believe that the lack
of progress in stabilizing Iraq is caused by internal Iraqi disputes and processes and
that new regional or international steps would yield minimal results. For more
information, see CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
Another idea is to identify a high-level international mediator to negotiate with
Iraq’s major factions. Some Members of Congress wrote to President Bush in
November 2006 asking that he name a special envoy to Iraq to follow up on some of
the Administration’s efforts to promote political reconciliation in Iraq.
Political Reconciliation and Reorganization
Some proposals involve different methods for altering Iraq’s power structure so
that no major ethnic or sectarian community feels excluded or has incentive to back
violence. The Iraq Study Group report recommends seeking the involvement of the
United Nations, Iraq’s neighbors, and other interested countries in promoting
reconciliation within Iraq.
Reorganize the Power Structure. Some experts believe that adjusting
U.S. troop levels would not address the underlying causes of violence in Iraq. Those
who want to build a unified and strong central government, including the Bush
Administration, have identified the need to assuage Sunni Arab grievances through
the political process. The Administration has tried to accomplish that objective, in
part by prodding the dominant factions to move forward on the reconciliation steps
discussed earlier, although without success to date. There is little agreement on what
additional or alternative package of incentives, if any, would persuade most Sunnis
leaders — and their constituents — to fully support the government. Some believe
that Sunnis might be satisfied by a wholesale cabinet reshuffle that gives several
leading positions, such as that of President, to a Sunni Arab, although many Kurds
might resent such a move because a Kurd now holds that post.
Decentralization and Break-Up Options. Some commentators believe in
a more substantial re-distribution of power. They maintain that Iraq cannot be
stabilized as one country and should be broken up into three separate countries: one
Kurdish, one Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab. Another version of this idea,
propounded by Senator Biden and Council on Foreign Relations expert Leslie Gelb
(May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed) is to form three autonomous regions,
dominated by each of the major communities. A former U.S. Ambassador and an
adviser to the Kurds, Peter Galbraith, also advocates this option. According to this
view, decentralizing Iraq into autonomous zones would ensure that Iraq’s territorial
integrity is preserved while ensuring that these communities do not enter all-out civil
war with each other. Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns about equitable
distribution of oil revenues, an international organization should be tapped to
distribute Iraq’s oil revenues.
CRS-47
Critics of both forms of this idea believe that any segregation of Iraq, legal or
de-facto, would cause parts of Iraq to fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful
neighbors. Others believe that the act of dividing Iraq’s communities in any way
would cause widespread violence, particularly in areas of mixed ethnicity, as each
community struggles to maximize its territory and its financial prospects. This
recommendation was rejected by the Iraq Study Group as potentially too violent and
difficult to implement.
Negotiating With Insurgents. A related idea is to negotiate with
insurgents. The Iraq Study Group report welcomes contact with almost all parties in
Iraq, with the exception of Al Qaeda-Iraq (Recommendations 34-35). The
Administration — and the Iraqi government — appears to have previously adopted
this recommendation to some extent. As noted, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad and
various Iraqi leaders, such as President Talabani, have reached out to Sunni
politicians known to have ties to the insurgency. Former Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld confirmed to journalists in June 2005 that such discussions had taken place
between insurgent representatives and some U.S. military commanders in the field.
The U.S. talks reportedly have been intended to help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s
foreign insurgent faction. However, no major insurgent faction has lain down arms
in response to any talks with U.S. personnel or Iraqi officials. The insurgents who
have attended such talks reportedly want an increased role for Sunnis in government,
a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and a withdrawal of the Shiite-dominated ISF from
Sunni regions. Some U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with
insurgents increases insurgent leverage and emboldens them to continue attacks.
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option. Another option began receiving
discussion in October 2006 as Iraqi elites began to sense a growing rift between the
Administration and Maliki. Some Iraqis believe the United States might try to use
its influence among Iraqis to force Maliki to resign and replace him with a military
strongman or some other figure who would crack down on sectarian militias.
However, experts in the United States see no concrete signs that such an option might
be under consideration by the Administration. Forcing out Maliki would, in the view
of many, conflict with the U.S. goal of promoting democracy and rule of law in Iraq.
Economic Measures
Some believe that the key to calming Iraq is to accelerate economic
reconstruction. According to this view, accelerated reconstruction will drain support
for insurgents by creating employment, improving public services, and creating
confidence in the government. This idea was incorporated into the President’s
January 10 initiative and, prior to that, in the decision to form PRTs, as discussed
above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone will produce major political
results because the differences among Iraq’s major communities are fundamental and
resistant to economic solutions.
Another idea has been to set up an Iraqi fund, or trust, that would ensure that all
Iraqis share equitably in Iraq’s oil wealth. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal
(December 18, 2006) Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator John Ensign
supported the idea of an “Iraq Oil Trust” modeled on the Alaska Permanent Fund.
CRS-48
Table 7. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
INC
War crimes Broadcasting
opposition
Total
activities
FY1998
—
2.0 5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio
Free Iraq”)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in
(INC radio)
Iraq)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-
(about 14.5
FY2003
million of this
went to INC)
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, April 2004.
CRS-49
Figure 1. Map of Iraq