Order Code RL30153
Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
Updated January 8, 2007
John D. Moteff
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy and Implementation
Summary
The nation’s health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution
of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, functions, and systems
across which these goods and services move are called critical infrastructures (e.g.,
electricity, the power plants that generate it, and the electric grid upon which it is
distributed).
The national security community has been concerned for sometime about the
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to both physical and cyber attack. In May 1998,
President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive No. 63. The Directive set
up groups within the federal government to develop and implement plans that would
protect government-operated infrastructures and called for a dialogue between
government and the private sector to develop a National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan that would protect all of the nation’s critical infrastructures by the year 2003.
While the Directive called for both physical and cyber protection from both man-
made and natural events, implementation focused on cyber protection against man-
made cyber events (i.e. computer hackers). However, given the physical damage
caused by the September 11 attacks, physical protections of critical infrastructures
has received increased attention.
Following the events of September 11, the Bush Administration released
Executive Order 13228, signed October 8, 2001, establishing the Office of Homeland
Security. Among its duties, the Office shall “coordinate efforts to protect the United
States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.” In
November 2002, Congress passed legislation creating a Department of Homeland
Security. Among its responsibilities is overall coordination of critical infrastructure
protection activities. In December 2003, the Bush Administration released
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, reiterating and expanding upon
infrastructure protection policy and responsibilities. In June 2006, the Bush
Administration released its National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This Plan
presents the process by which the Department of Homeland Security intends to
identify those specific assets most critical to the United States, across all sectors,
based on the risk associated with their loss to attack or natural disaster, and then to
prioritize activities aimed at maximizing the reduction of those risks for a given
investment.
This report discusses in more detail the evolution of a national critical
infrastructure policy and the institutional structures established to implement it. The
report highlights five issues of Congressional concern: identifying critical assets;
assessing vulnerabilities; allocating resources; information sharing; and, regulation.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: In Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . 3
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Restructuring by the Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pre-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Initial Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chertoff Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 . . . . . . . . 15
Policy Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Government - Sector Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council . . . . . . 18
Internal Agency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
National Critical Infrastructure Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk,
and Prioritizing Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Issues and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Identifying Critical Assets, Functions, and Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Allocating Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Federal Funding for Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The Preparedness Directorate’s FY2007 Budget Request and Appropriations
for Infrastructure Protection and Information Security and Other
Relevant DHS Budget Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
List of Tables
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table A.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Funding by Department . . . . . . . . 32
Table A.2 Funding for the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
Introduction
Certain socioeconomic activities are vital to the day-to-day functioning and
security of the country; for example, transportation of goods and people,
communications, banking and finance, and the supply and distribution of electricity
and water. Domestic security and our ability to monitor, deter, and respond to
outside hostile acts also depend on some of these activities as well as other more
specialized activities like intelligence gathering and command and control of police
and military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and capabilities could
have a major impact on the country’s well-being.1
These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets,
functions, information, and systems forming what has been called the nation’s
critical infrastructures. These infrastructures have grown complex and
interconnected, meaning that a disruption in one may lead to disruptions in others.2
Disruptions can be caused by any number of factors: poor design, operator error,
physical destruction due to natural causes, (earthquakes, lightening strikes, etc.) or
physical destruction due to intentional human actions (theft, arson, terrorist attack,
etc.). Over the years, operators of these infrastructures have taken measures to guard
against, and to quickly respond to, many of these threats, primarily to improve
reliability and safety. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the
subsequent anthrax attacks, demonstrated the need to reexamine protections in light
of the terrorist threat, as part of an overall critical infrastructure protection policy.3
1 As a reminder of how dependent society is on its infrastructure, in May 1998, PanAmSat’s
Galaxy IV satellite’s on-board controller malfunctioned, disrupting service to an estimated
80-90% of the nation’s pagers, causing problems for hospitals trying to reach doctors on
call, emergency workers, and people trying to use their credit cards at gas pumps, to name
but a few.
2 The electricity blackout in August 2003 in the United States and Canada illustrated the
interdependencies between electricity and other elements of the energy market such as oil
refining and pipelines, as well as communications, drinking water supplies, etc.
3 Besides loss of life, the terrorist attacks of September 11 disrupted the services of a number
of critical infrastructures (including telecommunications, the internet, financial markets, and
air transportation). In some cases, protections already in place (like off-site storage of data,
mirror capacity, etc.) allowed for relatively quick reconstitution of services. In other cases,
(continued...)

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CRS-2
This report provides an historical background and tracks the evolution of such
an overall policy and its implementation. However, specific protections associated
with individual infrastructures is beyond the scope of this report. For CRS products
related to specific infrastructure protection efforts, the reader is encouraged to visit
the Homeland Security Current Legislative Issues webpage and look at the Critical
Infrastructure Security link.
Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: In Brief
As discussed further below, a number of federal executive documents and
federal legislation lay out a basic policy and strategy for protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructure. To summarize, it is the policy of the United States to enhance
the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure has been
defined as those systems and assets, the destruction or incapacity of which would:
! cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to
those from the use of weapons of mass destruction,
! impair Federal departments and agencies’ abilities to perform
essential missions or ensure the public’s health and safety,
! undermine State and local government capacities to maintain order
and deliver minimum essential public services,
! damage the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly
functioning of the economy...,
! have a negative effect on the economy through the cascading
disruption of other critical infrastructure,
! or undermine the public’s morale and confidence in our national
economic and political institutions.4
The federal government will work with states, localities, and the owners and
operators of critical infrastructure (in both the private and public sector) to identify
those specific assets and systems that constitute the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Together, these entities will assess those assets’ vulnerabilities to the threats facing
the nation (natural or manmade, i.e. all hazards), determine the level of risk
associated with possible attacks or the impacts of natural events on those assets, and
identify and prioritize a set of protection measures that can be taken to reduce those
risks. Primary responsibility for protection, response, and recovery lies with the
owners and operators.5 However, the federal government holds open the possibility
3 (...continued)
service was disrupted for much longer periods of time.
4 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Released December 17, 2003. A more general
definition is given in statute (P.L. 107-71, Sec. 1016): “... systems and assets, physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.”
5 See White House. Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security,
p. 33, “Private firms bear primary and substantial responsibility for addressing the public
(continued...)

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CRS-3
of intervening in those areas where owners and operators are unable (or unwilling)
to provide what it, the federal government, may assess to be adequate protection or
response.6
The reader who is not interested in the evolution of this policy and the
organizational structures that have evolved to implement it can proceed to the Policy
Implementation and/or Issues sections of this report.
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection
This report takes as its starting point the establishment of the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996.7 Its tasks
were to: report to the President the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats
to the nation’s critical infrastructures (focusing primarily on cyber threats);8
recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation plan for protecting
critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals to
increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect
recommendations.
The PCCIP released its report to President Clinton in October 1997.9
Examining both the physical and cyber vulnerabilities, the Commission found no
immediate crisis threatening the nation’s infrastructures. However, it did find reason
to take action, especially in the area of cyber security. The rapid growth of a
computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of potential hackers), the
inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the easy
availability of hacker “tools” (available on many websites), and the fact that the basic
tools of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) are the same essential
technologies used by the general population indicated to the Commission that both
threat and vulnerability exist.
5 (...continued)
safety risks posed by their industries....”
6 Op. Cit., p. 33, “The plan will describe how to use all available policy instruments to raise
the security of America’s critical infrastructure and key assets to a prudent level....In some
cases the Department may seek legislation to create incentives for the private sector to adopt
security measures.... In some cases, the federal government will need to rely on regulation.”
7 Executive Order 13010. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol. 61, No.
138. July 17, 1996. pp. 3747-3750. Concern about the security of the nation’s information
infrastructure and the nation’s dependence on it preceded the establishment of the
Commission.
8 Given the growing dependence and interconnectedness of the nation’s infrastructure on
computer networks, there was concern that computers and computer networks presented a
new vulnerability and one that was not receiving adequate attention.
9 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures, October 1997.

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The Commission generally recommended that greater cooperation and
communication between the private sector and government was needed. The private
sector owns and operates much of the nation’s critical infrastructure. As seen by the
Commission, the government’s primary role (aside from protecting its own
infrastructures) is to collect and disseminate the latest information on intrusion
techniques, threat analysis, and ways to defend against hackers.
The Commission also proposed a strategy for action:
! facilitate greater cooperation and communication between the
private sector and appropriate government agencies by: setting a top
level policy-making office in the White House; establishing a
council that includes corporate executives, state and local
government officials, and cabinet secretaries; and setting up
information clearinghouses;
! develop a real-time capability of attack warning;
! establish and promote a comprehensive awareness and education
program;
! streamline and clarify elements of the legal structure to support
assurance measures (including clearing jurisdictional barriers to
pursuing hackers electronically); and,
! expand research and development in technologies and techniques,
especially technologies that allow for greater detection of intrusions.
The Commission’s report underwent interagency review to determine how to
respond. That review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998.
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63)10 set as a national goal the
ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both
physical and cyber) by the year 2003. According to the PDD, any interruptions in the
ability of these infrastructures to provide their goods and services must be “brief,
infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally detrimental to the
welfare of the United States.”11
PDD-63 identified the following activities whose critical infrastructures should
be protected: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply;
aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce;
emergency and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of
government services; public health services; electric power, oil and gas production,
and storage. In addition, the PDD identified four activities where the federal
government controls the critical infrastructure: internal security and federal law
enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign affairs; and national defense.
10 See The Clinton’s Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63, White Paper, May 22, 1998. Available at the Federation
of American Scientists website: [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm].
11 Ibid.

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A lead agency was assigned to each of these “sectors” (see Table 1). Each lead
agency was directed to appoint a Sector Liaison Official to interact with appropriate
private sector organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a Sector
Coordinator to work with the agency’s sector liaison official. Together, the liaison
official, sector coordinator, and all affected parties were to contribute to a sectoral
security plan which was to be integrated into a National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan. Each of the activities performed primarily by the federal government also were
assigned a lead agency who was to appoint a Functional Coordinator to coordinate
efforts similar to those made by the Sector Liaisons.
The PDD also assigned duties to the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism.12 The National Coordinator
reported to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.13 Among his many duties outlined in PDD-63, the National Coordinator
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63
Department/Agency
Sector/Function
Commerce
Information and Communications
Treasury
Banking and Finance
EPA
Water
Transportation
Transportation
Justice
Emergency Law Enforcement
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Fire Service
Health and Human Services
Emergency Medicine
Energy
Electric Power, Gas, and Oil
Justice
**Law Enforcement and Internal Security
Director of Central Intelligence
**Intelligence
State
**Foreign Affairs
Defense
**National Defense
** These are the functions identified by PDD-63 as being primarily under federal control.
chaired the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. This Group was the
primary interagency working group for developing and implementing policy and for
coordinating the federal government’s own internal security measures. The Group
12 The National Coordinator position was created by Presidential Decision Directive 62,
“Combating Terrorism.” PDD-62, which was classified, codified and clarified the roles and
missions of various agencies engaged in counter-terrorism activities. The Office of the
National Coordinator was established to integrate and coordinate these activities. The
White House released a fact sheet on PDD-62 on May 22, 1998.
13 President Clinton designated Richard Clarke (Special Assistant to the President for Global
Affairs, National Security Council) as National Coordinator.

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included high level representatives from the lead agencies (including the Sector
Liaisons), the National Economic Council, and all other relevant agencies.
Each federal agency was made responsible for securing its own critical
infrastructure and was to designate a Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer
(CIAO) to assume that responsibility. The agency’s current Chief Information
Officer (CIO) could double in that capacity. In those cases where the CIO and the
CIAO were different, the CIO was responsible for assuring the agency’s information
assets (databases, software, computers), while the CIAO was responsible for any
other assets that make up that agency’s critical infrastructure. Agencies were given
180 days from the signing of the Directive to develop their plans. Those plans were
to be fully implemented within two years and updated every two years.
The PDD set up a National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Council
was to be a panel that included private operators of infrastructure assets and officials
from state and local government officials and relevant federal agencies. The Council
was to meet periodically and provide reports to the President as appropriate. The
National Coordinator was to act as the Executive Director of the Council.
The PDD also called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. The Plan
was to integrate the plans from each of the sectors mentioned above and should
consider the following: a vulnerability assessment, including the minimum essential
capability required of the sector’s infrastructure to meet its purpose; remedial plans
to reduce the sector’s vulnerability; warning requirements and procedures; response
strategies; reconstitution of services; education and awareness programs; research
and development needs; intelligence strategies; needs and opportunities for
international cooperation; and legislative and budgetary requirements.
The PDD also set up a National Plan Coordination Staff to support the plan’s
development. Subsequently, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO,
not to be confused with the agencies’ Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officers) was
established to serve this function and was placed in the Department of Commerce’s
Export Administration. CIAO supported the National Coordinator’s efforts to
integrate the sectoral plans into a National Plan, supported individual agencies in
developing their internal plans, helped coordinate national education and awareness
programs, and provided legislative and public affairs support. Coordinating the
development of and maintaining the National Plan is now part of the Department of
Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership program.
Most of the Directive established policy-making and oversight bodies making
use of existing agency authorities and expertise. However, the PDD also addressed
operational concerns. These dealt primarily with cyber security. The Directive called
for a national capability to detect and respond to cyber attacks while they are in
progress. Although not specifically identified in the Directive, the Clinton
Administration proposed establishing a Federal Intrusion Detection Network
(FIDNET) that would, together with the Federal Computer Intrusion Response

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Capability (FedCIRC), established just prior to PDD-63, meet this goal.14 The
Directive explicitly gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to expand
its existing computer crime capabilities into a National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC). The Directive called for the NIPC to be the focal point for federal
threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, early warning capability, law enforcement
investigations, and response coordination. All agencies were required to forward to
the NIPC information about threats and actual attacks on their infrastructure as well
as attacks made on private sector infrastructures of which they become aware.
Presumably, FIDNET15 and FedCIRC would feed into the NIPC. According to the
Directive, the NIPC would be linked electronically to the rest of the federal
government and use warning and response expertise located throughout the federal
government. The Directive also made the NIPC the conduit for information sharing
with the private sector through an equivalent Information Sharing and Analysis
Center(s) operated by the private sector, which PDD-63 encouraged the private
sector to establish. Later, many of these functions were transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S.
CERT) and the National Operations Center (NOC), discussed later in this report,
perform similar tasks today.
While the FBI was given the lead, the NIPC also included the Department of
Defense, the Intelligence Community, and a representative from all lead agencies.
Depending on the level of threat or the character of the intrusion, the NIPC was to
have been placed in direct support of either the Department of Defense or the
Intelligence Community.
Quite independent of PDD-63 in its origin, but clearly complimentary in its
purpose, the FBI offers a program called INFRAGARD to private sector firms. The
program includes an Alert Network. Participants in the program agree to supply the
FBI with two reports when they suspect an intrusion of their systems has occurred.
One report is “sanitized” of sensitive information and the other provides more
detailed description of the intrusion. The FBI will help the participant respond to the
intrusion. In addition, all participants are sent periodic updates on what is known
about recent intrusion techniques. The FBI has set up local INFRAGARD chapters
that can work with each other and regional FBI field offices. In January, 2001, the
FBI announced it had finished establishing INFRAGARD chapters in each of its 56
field offices. Rather than sector-oriented, INFRAGARD is geographically-oriented.
The national program was transferred to the NIPC, before it was absorbed by the
Department of Homeland Security. The program is now managed by the FBI’s Cyber
14 FedCIRC was renamed the Federal Computer Incident Response Center and has since
been absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security
Division.
15 From the beginning FIDNET generated controversy both inside and outside the
government. Privacy concerns, cost and technical feasibility were at issue. By the end of
the Clinton Administration, FIDNET as a distributed intrusion detection system feeding into
a centralized analysis and warning capability was abandoned. Each agency, however, is
allowed and encouraged to use intrusion detection technology to monitor and secure their
own systems.

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Division and is concerned with both cyber and physical threats to critical
infrastructure.
It should also be noted that the FBI had, since the 1980s, a program called the
Key Assets Initiative (KAI). The objective of the KAI was to develop a database
of information on “key assets” within the jurisdiction of each FBI field office,
establish lines of communications with asset owners and operators to improve
physical and cyber protection, and to coordinate with other federal, state, and local
authorities to ensure their involvement in the protection of those assets. The program
was initially begun to allow for contingency planning against physical terrorist
attacks. According to testimony by a former Director of the NIPC, the program was
“reinvigorated” by the NIPC and expanded to include the cyber dimension.16 The
Department of Homeland Security is now responsible for creating a data base of
critical assets.
Restructuring by the Bush Administration
Pre-September 11. As part of its overall redesign of White House
organization and assignment of responsibilities, the in-coming Bush Administration
spent the first eight months reviewing its options for coordinating and overseeing
critical infrastructure protection. During this time, the Bush Administration
continued to support the activities begun by the Clinton Administration.
The Bush Administration review was influenced by three parallel debates. First,
the National Security Council (NSC) underwent a major streamlining. All groups
within the Council established during previous Administrations were abolished.
Their responsibilities and functions were consolidated into 17 Policy Coordination
Committees (PCCs). The activities associated with critical infrastructure protection
were assumed by the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness PCC. At the
time, whether, or to what extent, the NSC should remain the focal point for
coordinating critical infrastructure protection (i.e. the National Coordinator came
from the NSC) was unclear. Richard Clarke, himself, wrote a memorandum to the
incoming Bush Administration advocating that the function should be transferred
directly to the White House.17
Second, there was a continuing debate about the merits of establishing a
government-wide Chief Information Officer (CIO), whose responsibilities would
include protection of all federal non-national security-related computer systems and
coordination with the private sector on the protection of privately owned computer
systems. Shortly after assuming office, the Bush Administration announced its desire
not to create a separate federal CIO position, but to recruit a Deputy Director of the
Office of Management and Budget that would assume an oversight role of agency
16 Testimony by Michael Vatis before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Technology and Terrorism. Oct. 6, 1999. This effort was transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security.
17 Senior NSC Official Pitches Cyber-Security Czar Concept in Memo to Rice. Inside the
Pentagon. Jan. 11, 2001. p. 2-3.

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CRS-9
CIOs. One of the reasons cited for this was a desire to keep agencies responsible for
their own computer security.18
Third, there was the continuing debate about how best to defend the country
against terrorism, in general. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) proposed a new National Homeland
Security Agency. The recommendation built upon the current Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) by adding to it the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol,
Customs Service, and other agencies. The Commission recommended that the new
organization include a directorate responsible for critical infrastructure protection.
While both the Clinton and Bush Administration remained cool to this idea, bills
were introduced in Congress to establish such an agency. As discussed below, the
Bush Administration changed its position in June 2002, and proposed a new
department along the lines of that proposed by the Hart/Rudman Commission and
Congress.
Post-September 11. Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President
Bush signed two Executive Orders relevant to critical infrastructure protection.
These have since been amended to reflect changes brought about by the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (see below). The following
is a brief discussion of the original E.O.s and how they have changed.
E.O. 13228, signed October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland
Security, headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.19 Its
mission is to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive
national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats and attacks.”
Among its functions is the coordination of efforts to protect the United States and its
critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. This includes
strengthening measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and
distribution; telecommunications; public and privately owned information systems;
transportation systems; and, the provision of food and water for human use. Another
function of the Office is to coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of these
critical infrastructures after a disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.
The EO also established the Homeland Security Council. The Council is made
up of the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and
Human Services, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Directors of FEMA,
FBI, and CIA and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The EO was
later amended to add the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other White House and
departmental officials can be invited to attend Council meetings.20 The Council
advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security.
18 For a discussion of the debate surrounding this issue at the time, see CRS Report
RL30914, Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges, by
Jeffery Seifert.
19 President Bush selected Tom Ridge to head the new Office.
20 For more information on the structure of the Homeland Security Council and the Office
of Homeland Security, see CRS Report RL31148. Homeland Security: The Presidential
Coordination Office, by Harold Relyea.

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The agenda for those meetings shall be set by the Assistant to President for
Homeland Security, at the direction of the President. The Assistant is also the
official recorder of Council actions and Presidential decisions.
In January and February 2003, this E.O. was amended (by Executive Orders
13284 and 13286, respectively). The Office of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
the President, and the Homeland Security Council were all retained. However, the
Secretary of Homeland Security was added to the Council. The duties of the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security remain the same, recognizing the
statutory duties assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security as a result of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below).
The second Executive Order (E.O. 13231) signed October 16, 2001, stated that
it is U.S. policy “to protect against the disruption of the operation of information
systems for critical infrastructure...and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are
infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least damage
possible.”21 This Order also established the President’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board. The Board, consisting of federal officials, was authorized to
“recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for
critical infrastructure...” The Board also was directed to propose a National Plan on
issues within its purview on a periodic basis, and, in coordination with the Office of
Homeland Security, review and make recommendations on that part of agency
budgets that fall within the purview of the Board.
The Board was chaired by a Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace
Security.22 The Special Advisor reported to both the Assistant to the President for
National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Besides
presiding over Board meetings, the Special Advisor, in consultation with the Board,
was to propose policies and programs to appropriate officials to ensure protection of
the nation’s information infrastructure and to coordinate with the Director of OMB
on issues relating to budgets and the security of computer networks.
The Order also established the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.
The Council is to provide advice to the President on the security of information
systems for critical infrastructure. The Council’s functions include enhancing
public-private partnerships, monitoring the development of ISACs, and encouraging
the private sector to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of critical
information and telecommunication systems.
Subsequent amendments to this E.O. (by E.O. 13286) abolished the President’s
Board and the position of Special Advisor. The Advisory Council was retained, but
now reports to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released a National Strategy for
Homeland Security. The Strategy covered all government efforts to protect the
21 Executive Order 13231 — Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.
Federal Register. Vol. 86. No. 202. Oct. 18, 2001.
22 President Bush designated Richard Clarke.

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CRS-11
nation against terrorist attacks of all kinds. It identified protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructures and key assets (a new term, different as implied above by the
FBI’s key asset program) as one of six critical mission areas. The Strategy expanded
upon the list of sectors considered to possess critical infrastructure to include public
health, the chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, the
defense industrial base, and agriculture and food. The Strategy also added continuity
of government and continuity of operations to the list, although it is difficult to see
how the latter would be a considered sector. It also combined emergency fire service,
emergency law enforcement, and emergency medicine as emergency services. And,
it dropped those functions that primarily belonged to the federal governments (e.g.
defense, intelligence, law enforcement). It also reassigned some of the sectors to
different agencies, including making the then proposed Department of Homeland
Security lead agency for a number of sectors — postal and shipping services, and the
defense industrial base. It also introduced a new class of assets, called key assets,
which was defined as potential targets whose destruction may not endanger vital
systems, but could create a local disaster or profoundly affect national morale. Such
assets were defined later to include national monuments and other historic attractions,
dams, nuclear facilities, and large commercial centers, including office buildings and
sport stadiums, where large numbers of people congregate to conduct business,
personal transactions, or enjoy recreational activities.23
The Strategy reiterated many of the same policy-related activities as mentioned
above: working with the private sector and other non-federal entities, naming those
agencies that should act as liaison with the private sector, assessing vulnerabilities,
and developing a national plan to deal with those vulnerabilities. The Strategy also
mentioned the need to set priorities, acknowledging that not all assets are equally
critical, and that the costs associated with protecting assets must be balanced against
the benefits of increased security according to the threat. The Strategy did not create
any new organizations, but assumed that a Department of Homeland Security would
be established (see below).
On December 17, 2003, the Bush Administration released Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD essentially updated the policy of the
United States and the roles and responsibilities of various agencies in regard to
critical infrastructure protection as outlined in previous documents, national
strategies, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below). For example, the
Directive reiterated the Secretary of Homeland Security’s role in coordinating the
overall national effort to protect critical infrastructure. It also reiterated the role of
Sector-Specific Agencies (i.e. Lead Agencies)24 to work with their sectors to identify,
prioritize, and coordinate protective measures. The Directive captured the expanded
set of critical infrastructures and key assets and Sector-Specific Agencies
assignments made in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The Directive
also reiterated the relationship between the Department of Homeland Security and
other agencies in certain areas. For example, while the Department of Homeland
23 The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets. February 2003. p. 71.
24 This report will continue to use the term “Lead Agency” to refer to the agency assigned
to work with a specific sector.

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CRS-12
Security will maintain a cyber security unit, the Directive stated that the Director of
the Office of Management remains responsible for overseeing government-wide
information security programs and for ensuring the operation of a federal cyber
incident response center within the Department of Homeland Security. Also, while
the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for transportation security,
including airline security, the Department of Transportation remains responsible for
control of the national air space system.
The only organizational change made by the Directive was the establishment of
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee which
will advise the Homeland Security Council on interagency policy related to physical
and cyber infrastructure security.
The Directive made a few other noticeable changes or additions. For example,
the Department of Homeland Security was assigned as Lead Agency for the chemical
and hazardous materials sector (it had been the Environmental Protection Agency).
The Directive required Lead Agencies to report annually to the Secretary of
Homeland Security on their efforts in working with the private sector. The Directive
also reiterated that all federal agencies must develop plans to protect their own
critical infrastructure and submit those plans for approval to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget by July 2004.
The Bush Administration policy and approach regarding critical infrastructure
protection can be described as an evolutionary expansion of the policies and
approaches laid out in PDD-63. The fundamental policy statements are essentially
the same: the protection of infrastructures critical to the people, economy, essential
government services, and national security. National morale was added to that list.
Also, the stated goal of the government’s efforts is to ensure that any disruption of
the services provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration, and
manageable. The infrastructures identified as critical were essentially the same
(although expanded and with an emphasis placed on targets that would result in large
numbers of casualties). Finally, the primary effort is directed at working
collaboratively and voluntarily with the private sector owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to identify critical assets and provide appropriate protection.

Organizationally, there remains an interagency group for coordinating policy
across departments and for informing the White House (Homeland Security Council,
supported by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Coordinating Committee). Certain
agencies have been assigned certain sectors with which to work. Sectors are asked
to organize themselves to assist in coordination of effort and information sharing.
A Council made up of private sector executives, academics, and State and local
officials was established to advise the President. Certain operational units (e.g., the
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and elements of the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (at the FBI)) were initially left in place, though later
moved to and restructured within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
where the Undersecretary of Preparedness is responsible for coordinating the
implementation of policies and programs (see below). However, DHS takes a much
more active role in identifying critical assets, assessing vulnerabilities, and
recommending and supporting protective measures than did these earlier operational

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CRS-13
units. Also, the manpower and resources devoted to these activities have greatly
increased.
One major difference between PDD-63 and the current Administration’s efforts
is a shift in focus. PDD-63 focused on cybersecurity. While the post-September 11
effort is still concerned with cybersecurity, its focus on physical threats, especially
those that might cause mass casualties, is greater than the pre-September 11 effort.
This led to some debate and organizational instability initially. The early executive
orders discussed above segregated cyber security from the physical security mission
with the formation of the Office of Homeland Security and the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. Dissolution of the Board and the subsequent
establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating
Committee, responsible for advising the Homeland Security Council on both physical
and cyber security issues, would appear to reunite these two concerns within a single
White House group.25
Department of Homeland Security
Initial Establishment. In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296), establishing a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The act assigned to the new Department the mission of preventing terrorist
attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the nation to such attacks, and responding
rapidly should such an attack occur. The act essentially consolidated within one
department a number of agencies that had, as part of their missions, homeland
security-like functions (e.g., Border Patrol, Customs, Transportation Security
Administration). The following discussion focuses on those provisions relating to
critical infrastructure protection.
In regard to critical infrastructure protection the act transferred the following
agencies and offices to the new department: the NIPC (except for the Computer
Investigations and Operations Section), CIAO, FedCIRC, the National Simulation
and Analysis Center (NISAC),26 other energy security and assurance activities
within DOE, and the National Communication System (NCS).27 These agencies
25 Computer security advocates have sought to highlight cyber security issues by maintaining
a separate organization high within the bureaucracy. There now exists both an Assistant
Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications and an Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection, both reporting to the Undersecretary for Preparedness. While the
latter is concerned with both physical and cyber security issues, the former is focused on
cyber security issues.
26 The NISAC was established in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), Section 1062. The
Center builds upon expertise at Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos National
Laboratory in modeling and simulating infrastructures and the interdependencies between
them.
27 The NCS is not a single communication system but more a capability that ensures that
disparate government agencies can communication with each other in times of emergencies.
To make sure this capability exists and to assure that it is available when needed, an
interagency group meets regularly to discuss issues and solve problems. The NCS was
(continued...)

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CRS-14
and offices were integrated within the Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) (one of four operational Directorates established
by the act).28 Notably, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is
responsible for securing all modes of the nation’s transportation system, was not
made part of this Directorate (it was placed within the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate); nor was the Coast Guard, which is responsible for port
security. The act assigned the rank of Undersecretary to the head of each Directorate.
Furthermore, the act designated that within the Directorate of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection, there were to be both an Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis, and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
Among the responsibilities assigned the IA/IP Directorate were:
! to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety
of sources in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the
terrorist threat;
! to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of
key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States,
including risk assessments to determine risks posed by particular
types of attacks;
! to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability
assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and
support measures;
! to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources
and critical infrastructures;
! to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System;
! to work with the intelligence community to establish collection
priorities; and,
! to establish a secure communication system for receiving and
disseminating information.
In addition, the act provided a number of protections for certain information
(defined as critical infrastructure information) that non-federal entities, especially
private firms or ISACs formed by the private sector, voluntarily provide the
Department. Those protections included exempting it from the Freedom of
Information Act, precluding the information from being used in any civil action,
27 (...continued)
initially established in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration to ensure communications
between military, diplomatic, intelligence, and civilian leaders, following the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Those activities were expanded by the Reagan Administration to include emergency
preparedness and response, including natural disaster response. The current interagency
group includes 23 departments and agencies. The private sector, which own a significant
share of the assets needed to ensure the necessary connectivity, is involved through the
National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee (NSTAC). The National
Coordinating Center, mentioned later in this report, and which serves as the
telecommunications ISAC, is an operational entity within the NCS.
28 The other operational directorates included Science and Technology, Border and
Transportation Security and Emergency Preparedness and Response.

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CRS-15
exempting it from any agency rules regarding ex parte communication, and
exempting it from requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The act basically built upon existing policy and activities. Many of the policies,
objectives, missions, and responsibilities complement those already established (e.g.,
vulnerability assessments, national planning, communication between government
and private sector, and improving protections).
Chertoff Reorganization. Secretary Chertoff (the second Secretary of
Homeland Security), as one of his Second Stage Review recommendations, proposed
restructuring the IA/IP Directorate and renaming it the Directorate of Preparedness.
The IA function was merged into a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The
IP function, with the same missions as outlined in the Homeland Security Act,
remained, but was joined by other existing and new entities. The renamed
Directorate included elements from Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, including its principal grant-making functions and
some of the preparedness functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). A new position of Chief Medical Officer was created within the
Directorate and the U.S. Fire Administration and the Office of National Capital
Region Coordination were transferred into the Directorate. In addition, the
restructuring called for an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications (a position long sought by many within the cyber security
community) and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
According to the DHS press release, the mission of the restructured Directorate
was to “facilitate grants and over see nationwide preparedness efforts supporting first
responder training, citizen awareness, public health, infrastructure and cyber security,
and [to] ensure proper steps are taken to protect high-risk targets.”
Other recommendations resulting from the review that may impact infrastructure
protection included moving the Homeland Security Operations Center, now called
the National Operations Center, out of the old IA/IP Directorate and placing it within
a new Office of Operations Coordination; and, a new Directorate of Policy, which is
described as serving as the primary Department-wide coordinator of policies,
regulations, and other initiatives. The conference committee report on the
Department’s FY2006 appropriations (H.Rept. 109-241) approved these changes.
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 is Title VI of the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295). This act relocates
the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland
Security and explicitly preserves it as a distinct entity within the Department. While
a full discussion of this reorganization and its implications is beyond the scope of this
report, it should be noted that the grant making functions previously merged with the
critical infrastructure protection activities of the Preparedness Directorate were
transferred with the Agency. The critical infrastructure protection activities
associated with the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection and the Assistant

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CRS-16
Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications remain in the Preparedness
Directorate.29
Policy Implementation
Government - Sector Coordination. The number and breakdown of
sectors and lead, or sector specific agencies, have expanded and changed since the
assignments made by PDD-63 (and noted in Table 1 of this report). As mentioned
above, the Bush Administration has expanded the number of sectors considered to
possess critical infrastructure and made some changes in assignments. Table 2,
below, shows the current list of sectors and their lead agencies, as defined in the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan released June 2006.
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments
Department/Agency Sector/Subsector
Agriculture
Agriculture
Food
Agriculture
Meat/Poultry
Health and Human Services
All other
Treasury
Banking and Finance
EPA
Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems
Health and Human Services
Public Health and Healthcare
Defense
Defense Industrial Base
Interior
National Monuments and Icons
Energy
Energy1
Homeland Security
Transportation Systems2
Homeland Security
Postal and Shipping
Homeland Security
Information Technology
Homeland Security
Communications
Homeland Security
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste
Homeland Security
Chemical
Homeland Security
Emergency Services
Homeland Security
Dams
Homeland Security
Commercial Facilities
Homeland Security
Government Facilities
1. While noted here as a single sector, in practice it is represented by two relatively separate
sectors: electric power (except for nuclear power facilities); and the production, refining,
29 These activities form the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Program.

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CRS-17
and some distribution of oil and gas. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for both.
However, the Department of Homeland Security (through the Transportation Security
Administration) is the lead agency for the distribution of oil and gas via pipelines. Nuclear
power is considered its own sector.
2. While noted here as a single sector, Transportation includes all modes of transportation:
rail, mass transit (rail and bus), air, maritime, highways, pipelines, etc. The Transportation
Security Administration within the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with
the Department of Transportation, is the lead agency for all but the maritime subsector, for
which the Coast Guard, also within the Department of Homeland Security, acts as lead
agency.
PDD-63 called for the selection, by each Lead Agency, of a Sector Liaison
Official (representing the Lead Agency) and a Sector Coordinator (representing the
owners/operators of each sector). While most agencies quickly identified their Sector
Liaison Official, it took more time to identify Sector Coordinators. Different sectors
present different challenges for coordination. Some sectors are more diverse than
others (e.g., transportation includes rail, air, waterways, and highways; information
and communications include computers, software, wire and wireless
communications) and raise the issue of how to have all the relevant players
represented. Other sectors are fragmented, consisting of small or local entities.
Some sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, and energy have more
experience than others in working with the federal government and/or working
collectively to assure the performance of their systems.
In addition to such structural issues are ones related to competition. Inherent in
the exercise is asking competitors to cooperate. In some cases it is asking competing
industries to cooperate. This cooperation not only raises issues of trust among firms,
but also concerns regarding anti-trust rules.
Over time, Sector Coordinators were selected for most of the sectors identified
under PDD-63. Typically, a representative from a relevant trade organizations was
chosen to act as sector coordinator. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency selected the Executive Director of the Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies to act as Sector Coordinator for the water sector. In the case of the law
enforcement sector (no longer identified as a separate sector), the National
Infrastructure Protection Center helped create a Emergency Law Enforcement
Services Forum, consisting of senior state, local, and non-FBI law enforcement
officials. In the case of banking and finance, the Sector Coordinator was chosen from
a major banking/finance institution, who doubled as the Chairperson of the Financial
Services Sector Coordinating Council, an organization specifically set up by the
industry to coordinate critical infrastructure protection activities with the federal
government.


In December 1999, a number of the sectors formed a Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security to share information and strategies and to identify
interdependencies across sectoral lines. The Partnership was a private sector
initiative. The federal government was not officially part of the Partnership, but the
Department of Homeland Security (and CIAO before that) acted as a liaison and
provided administrative support for meetings. Sector Liaisons from lead agencies
were considered ex officio members. The Partnership helped coordinate its members

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CRS-18
input to a number of the national strategies released to date and were to provide input
into the National Plan called for in PDD-63.
While initially working with this organizational structure, the Bush
Administration promoted a new Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnership Model.
Resembling the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council approach, this newer
Model expanded the sector liaison and sector coordinator model of PDD-63 into
Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils for each
sector. The primary objective was to expand both owner/operator and government
representation within all sectors. Now, for example, the Water Sector Coordinating
Council consists of two owner/operator representatives, along with one non-voting
association staff, from each of the following participating organizations: the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, the American Water Works
Association, the American Water Works Association Research Foundation, the
National Association of Clean Water Agencies, the National Association of Water
Companies, the National Rural Water Association, the Water Environment
Federation, and the Water Environment Research Foundation. The Water
Government Coordinating Council is chaired by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Lead Agency, but also includes the Department of Homeland Security,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Interior, and the Center for
Disease Control. Government Coordinating Councils can also include state, local,
and tribal government entities. The Sector Coordinating Councils are to establish
their own organizational structures and leadership and act independently from the
federal government. Also, under this model, the Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security has been designated the Private Sector Cross-Sector
Council. The Sector Coordinating Councils are to provide input into both the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the individual Sector Specific Plans (see
below). Many of the issues governing the progress made in identifying and working
with the sector coordinators model of PDD-63 continue with the sector coordinating
councils.30
In March 2006, the Department of Homeland Security used its authority under
the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Section 871) — to form advisory
committees that are exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463)
— to establish the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC).31 The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires advisory committees
generally to meet in open session and make written materials available to the public.
The purpose of waiving this act for the CIPAC is to facilitate more open discussion
between the sector coordinating councils and the government coordinating councils
(if not with the public). DHS acts as the Executive Secretariat. Members include
owner/operators that are members of their respective sector coordinating councils or
belong to an association that is a member of the coordinating council. Members also
include federal, state, local, and tribal government entities that belong to their
respective government coordinating councils. While the CIPAC is exempt from the
30 See, U.S. Congress. General Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Progress Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’
Characteristics. GAO-07-39. October 2006.
31 See, Federal Register. Vol. 71 No. 57. pp. 14930-14933. March 24, 2006.

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Federal Advisory Committee Act, DHS stated in its public notice that it will make
meeting dates and appropriate agendas available. There is a CIPAC webpage on the
DHS website.32
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council. The
Clinton Administration released an Executive Order (13130) in July, 1999, formally
establishing the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. Just prior to leaving
office, President Clinton put forward the names of 18 appointees.33 The Order was
rescinded by the Bush Administration before the Council could meet. In Executive
Order 13231,34 President Bush established a National Infrastructure Advisory Council
(with the same acronym, NIAC) whose functions are similar to those of the Clinton
Council. On September 18, 2002, President Bush announced his appointment of 24
individuals to serve on Council.35 The E.O. amending 13231 makes some minor
modifications to NIAC. Primarily, the Council now reports to the President through
the Secretary of Homeland Security.36
Internal Agency Plans. There had been some confusion about which
agencies were required by PDD-63 to submit critical infrastructure plans. The
Directive required every agency to develop and implement such a plan. A
subsequent Informational Seminar on PDD-63 held on October 13, 1998 identified
two tiers of agencies. The first tier included lead agencies and other “primary”
agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and Veteran’s Affairs. These agencies
were held to the Directive’s 180 day deadline. A second tier of agencies were
identified by the National Coordinator and required to submit plans by the end of
February, 1999. The “secondary” agencies were Agriculture, Education, Housing
and Urban Development, Labor, Interior, General Services Administration, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All
of these “primary” and “secondary” agencies met their initial deadlines for submitting
their internal plans for protecting their own critical infrastructures from attacks and
for responding to intrusions. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO)
assembled an expert team to review the plans. The plans were assessed in 12 areas
including schedule/milestone planning, resource requirements, and knowledge of
existing authorities and guidance. The assessment team handed back the initial plans
32 See, [http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/committees/editorial_0843.shtm]. This site was last
visited on November 13, 2006.
33 White House Press Release, dated Jan. 18, 2000.
34 Executive Order 13231 — Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.
Federal Register. Vol. 66. No. 202. Oct. 18, 2001. pp. 53063-53071. The NIAC is
established on page 53069.
35 See White House Press Release, Sept. 18, 2002. Information on the Council’s
membership and activities can be found on the Department’s website at
[http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/committees/editorial_0353.shtm]. Site was last visited on
November 21, 2006.
36 The membership and activities of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council can be
found on the DHS website. See,
[http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/committees/editorial_0353.shtm]. Site was last visited on
December 12, 2006.

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CRS-20
with comments. Agencies were given 90 days to respond to these comments. Of the
22 “primary” and “secondary” agencies that submitted plans, 16 modified and
resubmitted them in response to first round comments.
Initially, the process of reviewing agency plans was to continue until all
concerns were addressed. Over the summer of 1999, however, review efforts slowed
and subsequent reviews were put on hold as the efficacy of the reviews was debated.
Some within the CIAO felt that the plans were too general and lacked a clear
understanding of what constituted a “critical asset” and the interdependencies of
those assets. As a result of that internal debate, the CIAO redirected its resources to
institute a new program called Project Matrix. Project Matrix is a three step process
by which an agency can identify and assess its most critical assets, identify the
dependencies of those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct
control of the agency, and prioritize. CIAO offered this analysis to agencies,
including some not designated as “primary” or “secondary” agencies, such as the
Social Security Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Participation by the agencies was voluntary.37
In the meantime, other agencies (i.e. those not designated as primary or
secondary) apparently did not develop critical infrastructure plans. In a much later
report by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (dated March 21, 2001),
the Council, which was charged with reviewing agencies’ implementation of PDD-
63, stated that there was a misunderstanding as to the applicability of PDD-63 to all
agencies. The Council asserted that all agencies were required to develop a critical
infrastructure plan and that many had not, because they felt they were not covered by
the Directive. Also, the Council found that of the agency plans that had been
submitted, many were incomplete, had not identified their mission-critical assets, and
that almost none had completed vulnerability assessments. Two years later, the
Government Accountability Office38 reported that four of the agencies they reviewed
for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (HHS, Energy, Commerce, and
EPA) had still not yet identified their critical assets and operational dependencies, nor
have they set any deadlines for doing so.39
Interestingly, HSPD-7 reestablished a deadline for agencies to submit critical
infrastructure protection plans to the Director of OMB for approval by July 2004.
The Director of OMB provided guidance on how agencies should meet their
requirement (Memorandum M-04-15, June 17, 2004). The memorandum stated that
plans for the physical protection of assets would be subject to interagency review
coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security, with DHS providing a written
evaluation of each agency’s plans within 120 days. Agency cyber security plans
would be reviewed by OMB, as part of the requirements associated with the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002, included as Title III of E-
37 The use of Project Matrix’s methodology continues under HSPD-7.
38 Note: The General Accounting Office has had its name changed legislatively to the
Government Accountability Office.
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for
Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors. Repot to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives. GAO-03-233. Feb. 2003. pp. 4-5.

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Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). These plans are to provide information to
be included in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (see below). DHS and
OMB have not been willing to provide CRS with the status of these reports.
National Critical Infrastructure Plan. PDD-63 called for a National
Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would be informed by sector-level plans and
would include an assessment of minimal operating requirements, vulnerabilities,
remediation plans, reconstitution plans, warning requirements, etc. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Act each have called for
the development of a comprehensive national infrastructure protection plan, as well,
although without specifying deadlines and what that plan should include. HSPD-7
called for a comprehensive National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Protection by the end of 2004. According to HSPD-7, the National Plan
should include a) a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources, including how the Department will work
with other stakeholders; b) a summary of activities to be undertaken in order to carry
out the strategy; c) a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure
information and threat warnings with other stakeholders; and d) coordination with
other federal emergency management activities.
In January 2000, the Clinton Administration released Version 1.0 of a National
Plan for Information Systems Protection.40 In keeping with the original focus of
PDD-63, the Plan focused primarily on cyber-related efforts within the federal
government. The Bush Administration, through the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, released The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
in February 2003, which could be considered Version 2.0 of the Clinton-released
Plan. It addressed all stakeholders in the nation’s information infrastructure, from
home users to the international community, and included input from the private
sector, the academic community, and state and local governments. Also in February
2003, the Office of Homeland Security released The National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. This strategy took
a broad perspective of the issues and needs associated with organizing the nation’s
efforts to protect its critical infrastructure; identifying roles and responsibilities,
actions that need to be taken, and guiding principles.

The Department of Homeland Security missed the December 2004 deadline for
releasing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan called for in HSPD-7. It did
publish an Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan in February 2005.
According to media reports, some in the private sector complained they were not
adequately consulted.41 The Department subsequently released for public comment
40 Defending America’s Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection.
Version 1.0. An Invitation to a Dialogue. The White House. 2000.
41 See “Still Waiting: Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure Overdue from DHS,”
Congressional Quarterly. Homeland Security-Transportation & Infrastructure Newsletter,
Jan. 28, 2005. The Newsletter is electronic and available by subscription only. See,
[http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/10
9/hsnews109-000001507251.html@allnews&metapub=HSNEWS&seqNum=827&searc
(continued...)

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a “draft” National Infrastructure Protection Plan in November 2005.42 A final version
of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was approved June 30, 2006.43
The NIPP identifies and integrates specific processes by which an integrated
national risk management effort can proceed. For example, it defines and seeks to
standardize, across all sectors, the process for identifying and selecting assets for
further analysis, identifying threats and conducting threat assessments, assessing
vulnerabilities to those threats, analyzing consequences, determining risks,
identifying potential risk mitigation activities, and prioritizing those activities based
on cost-effectiveness.44 The NIPP also calls for implementation plans for these risk
reduction activities, with timelines and responsibilities identified, and tied to
resources. Each lead agency is to work with its sector to generate Sector Specific
Plans, utilizing the processes outlined in the NIPP. DHS will then use these same
processes to integrate the sector specific plans into a national plan that identifies
those assets and risk reduction plans that require national level attention because of
the risk the incapacitation of those assets pose to the nation as a whole. According
to the NIPP, Sector Specific Plans are due 180 days after release of the NIPP (that
would mean they are due at the end of 2006). It is not clear from the NIPP when the
cross-cutting national-level plan would be released. However, the first annual review
of Sector Specific Plans and the NIPP is to be conducted one year after the NIPP’s
release (i.e. in June 2007).
It should be noted, that some sectors and agencies have performed already some
or all of these risk management steps using various techniques and processes. The
NIPP requires that each sector and lead agency ensure that previous work meets the
basic requirements associated with the processes described in the NIPP.
Distinguishing between a strategy and plan, and whether these documents yet
fulfill the requirement for the comprehensive national plan called for in the
Homeland Security Act, is beyond the scope of this report. However, each
succeeding document does appear to refine further some goal, objective, or initiative
discussed in preceding documents.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). PDD-63 envisaged
a single ISAC to be the private sector counterpart to the FBI’s National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC), collecting, analyzing, and sharing incident and response
information among its members and facilitating information exchange between
government and the private sector. The idea of a single ISAC evolved into each
41 (...continued)
hIndex=1]. The article was last viewed on December 28, 2006.
42 See Federal Register, vol.70, no. 212, Nov. 3, 2005, pp. 66840-66841.
43 The NIPP can be found at [http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm].
This site was last visited on November 21, 2006.
44 For a discussion of a basic risk management process in a critical infrastructure context,
see CRS Report RL32561, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences, by John
Moteff.

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CRS-23
sector having its own center. ISACs differ somewhat from sector coordinating
function in that they were to be 24/7/365 operations, where incidents experienced by
owner/operators, as well as threat information from the government, could be
reported, analyzed, and shared. Many were conceived originally as concentrating on
cyber security issues, and some still function with that emphasis. However, others
have incorporated physical security into their missions.
ISACs were formed around two primary models. One model involved ISAC
members legally incorporating and establishing either their own ISAC operations or
contracting operations out to a security firm. The banking, information, water, oil
and gas, railroad, and mass transit sectors followed this approach.
The other model involved utilizing an existing industry or government-industry
coordinating group and adding critical infrastructure protection to the mission of that
group. The electric power (which uses North American Electricity Reliability
Council (NERC)) and the telecommunications sector (which uses the National
Coordinating Center (NCC)) followed this model. The emergency fire services
sector incorporated ISAC functions into the existing operations of the U.S. Fire
Administration, which has interacted with local fire departments for years.
Different federal financial support models were developed for ISACs, too. In
some cases, ISACs received start up funding from their Lead Agency (e.g., drinking
water received funding from EPA). In some cases, that support continues, in some
cases the support has not continued (e.g., DOE no longer supports the energy ISAC).
Other ISACs have always been self-supporting. The individual ISACs have formed
a group called the ISAC Council.45 Their formation and function experience some of
the same variation as the coordinating councils, for some of the same reasons.
While PDD-63 envisioned ISACs to be a primary conduit for exchanging
critical infrastructure information between the federal government and specific
sectors, the Department of Homeland Security has developed a number of other
information sharing systems and mechanism. For example, US-CERT (the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team) publishes information on the latest
computer-related vulnerabilities and threats and information on how to respond to a
specific incident. U.S.-CERT also accepts incidents reports. It also manages the
National Cyber Alert System, to which any organization or individual can
subscribe. The Department also has developed a Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN). HSIN initially served as the primary communication network for
communicating and analyzing threat information between government law
enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. The HSIN is being
expanded to include each critical infrastructure sector (dubbed HSIN-CI) as part of
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnership Model (i.e. through each sector and
government coordinating council).
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Department established what is now
called the Infrastructure Protection Executive Notification Service (ENS), which
45 See, [http://www.isaccouncil.org/sites/index.php]. This site was last visited on November
21, 2006.

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CRS-24
connects DHS directly with the Chief Executive Officers of major industrial firms.
The ENS is used to alert partners to infrastructure incidents, to disseminate warning
products, and to conduct teleconferences. The Department is also responsible for
operating the Critical Infrastructure Warning Network (CWIN), which provides
secure communications between DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies, the
private sector, and international agencies. CWIN does not rely on the Public Switch
Network or the internet.

Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk, and
Prioritizing Protective Measures. Among the activities assigned to the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 were:

! access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety of
sources in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the
terrorist threat;
! carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of key
resources and critical infrastructure, of the United States including
risk assessments to determine risks posed by particular types of
attacks;
! integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability
assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and support
measures.
Furthermore, according to the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the Department of Homeland Security: a) “in
collaboration with other key stakeholders, will develop a uniform methodology for
identifying facilities, systems, and functions with national-level criticality to help
establish protection priorities;” b) “ will build a comprehensive database to catalog
these critical facilities, systems, and functions;” and c) “will also maintain a
comprehensive, up-to-date assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness across
critical sectors.” Furthermore, these efforts “will help guide near-term protective
actions and provide a basis for long-term leadership focus and informed resource
investment.”
Following September 11, 2001, owners/operators of critical infrastructure
assets, to varying degrees, began identifying critical assets, assessing their
vulnerabilities to attack, and developed security plans or beefed up protections. For
example, the Federal Transit Authority assessed the vulnerabilities of the nation’s
largest mass transit systems. The freight rail companies developed additional
security measures to coincide with the level of threat identified by DHS’s color-
coded National Alert System. Drinking water authorities, through the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188), were required to conduct
vulnerability assessments and to develop security plans based on those assessments.
Port facilities and maritime vessels were required by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (P.L. 107-295) to do the same. The American Petroleum Institute, the
North American Electric Reliability Council, and other industry associations offered
guidance to their respective members on how to conduct vulnerability assessments
and to manage their risk from possible attack. However, DHS’s ability to coordinate
this activity developed more slowly, and its ability to develop a uniform methodology

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CRS-25
that would allow it to generate a set of national priorities is unfolding just now with
the release of its NIPP, described above.
However, during this same time, DHS has engaged in at least two other sets of
activities that have, also to varying degrees, identified critical assets, assessed their
vulnerabilities, and provided assistance to increase protection of these sites.

Shortly before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, as part of
Operation Liberty Shield46, what was then called the Protective Services Division of
the newly-formed Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
identified a list of 160 assets or sites, including chemical and hazardous materials
sites, nuclear power plants, energy facilities, business and finance centers, and more,
that it considered critical to the nation based on their vulnerability to attack and
potential consequences. During the course of the year, that list grew to 1,849 assets
or sites.47
According to testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on April
1, 2004, then-Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
Frank Libutti, made reference to 1700 sites identified by DHS as being high priority
sites.48 According to the testimony, DHS intended to visit each of these sites to
assess their vulnerabilities to various forms of attack and to meet with local law
enforcement officials to assist them in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans
(BZPPs). BZPPs focus on protections that can be taken “outside the fence,”
including how to identify threatening surveillance, patrolling techniques, and how to
assert command and control if an incident should occur. DHS has provided training
and technical assistance to help state and local law enforcement entities develop their
own BZPPs. The BZPP activity is now integrated into the State and Local Grants
Program. In addition to these “outside the fence” activities, DHS has conducted Site
Assistance Visits (SAVs) at selected sites, on a voluntary basis, to discuss with
owners and operators vulnerabilities and protective measures that can be taken
“inside the fence.” SAVs form an integral part of the “comprehensive reviews
(CRs)” DHS is performing on both nuclear power facilities and high-priority
chemical facilities. Once these two sectors are completed, DHS is planning to
conduct comprehensive reviews of other sectors.
In addition to its selection of high priority sites and subsequent site visits,
vulnerability assessments, and buffer zone protection plans, DHS also has been
supporting infrastructure protection at the state and local level through its State and
Local Grant Programs. Specific grant programs include the State Homeland Security
Formula-based Grants, the High Threat and the High Density Urban Area Grants
(both of which primarily support first responder needs, but include certain
46 Operation Liberty Shield was a comprehensive national plan to protect the homeland
during operations in Iraq.
47 See, Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
Developing the National Asset Database. OIG-06-04. June 2006.
48 According to the Department’s Inspector General report, these 1,700 assets refer to the
1,849 assets identified in its research.

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CRS-26
infrastructure protection expenditures), Port Security Grants, Rail and Transit
Security Grants, Intercity Bus Security Grants, and Highway Security Grants. The
Buffer Zone Protection Plan grants have been added to this set of programs. Before
receiving funds, grants recipients must identify specific critical infrastructure assets,
conduct threat and vulnerabilities assessments, and develop a plan for how they
intend to use grant funds to reduce those vulnerabilities through eligible
expenditures.49
Issues and Discussion
Congress interest in critical infrastructure protection principally is focused on
reviewing the progress and effectiveness of DHS’s efforts in critical infrastructure
protection.

Identifying Critical Assets, Functions, and Systems. There has
been some debate about the progress and effectiveness of DHS’s efforts at identifying
high priority assets. For example, when developing the initial list of priority sites
during Operation Liberty Shield, certain utility operators, when presented a list of
what DHS considered to be critical electric power assets, noticed that some of the
entries were not currently in use.50 According to the DHS Inspector General, DHS
itself determined that its early list of priority sites was unreliable.51
Over time, according to the DHS Inspector General, this initial priority list
evolved into what is now called the National Asset Database, which, as of January
2006, contained over 77,000 entries. While DHS apparently has made progress on
the reliability of the information contained in the Database, it continues to draw
criticism for including thousands of assets that many believe have more local
importance than national importance. There is some confusion as to what the
National Asset Database is meant to be. Critics of the Database assume it is a
continuation of DHS’s list of high priority sites. DHS asserts that it is an inventory
of assets, from which critical assets may be drawn.52
In his response to the Inspector General’s report, the Undersecretary for
Preparedness stated that DHS does not intend to have one definitive prioritized list
of critical assets. He further stated that it would not be possible or useful to develop
one.53 However, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protections has stated that
49 For more information on the grant programs and the FY2007 awards, see CRS Report
RL33583, Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant
Allocation Methods; and CRS Report RS22383, FY2007 Appropriations for State and Local
Homeland Security, both by Shawn Reese.
50 Based on personal communication with industry official, September 29, 2003.
51 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
Developing the National Asset Database. Op cit. p. 16.
52 For more discussion of the issues associated with the National Asset Database see, CRS
Report RL33648, Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database, by John Moteff.
53 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in
(continued...)

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CRS-27
DHS does maintain a list of more than 600 high priority sites, which it uses to focus
DHS operations, resource allocation and grants.54 It is not clear from these officials’
statements what relation this current list of 600 high priority sites has to DHS’s
earlier priority list or the current Database.
Also, implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is
suppose to contribute to the identification of assets that are most critical to the nation.
It remains to be seen how effective this process will be.
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Risk. Assuming DHS does maintain
a list of high priority assets, it is not clear how many of these have been visited, had
their vulnerability and risk assessed, or have had buffer zone protection plans
developed and implemented to-date.
According to the Senate Appropriation Committee’s report accompanying the
FY2005 DHS appropriation,55 150 vulnerability assessments of high valued sites
were expected to be completed in FY2004, and another 400 to be assessed in
FY2005. According to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP)
FY2006 budget request, vulnerability assessments had been conducted at 50 high-
priority sites during FY2004. No estimate was given for how many might be done
during FY2005.
According to the IA/IP FY2006 budget request, 800 BZPP’s had been
implemented by the end of the calender year 2004. The FY2006 budget request also
stated that the Directorate planned to ensure that 1000 BZPPs would be implemented
in FY2005. The FY2007 budget request stated that BZPPs had been implemented
at over 1800 high priority sites.
According to the IA/IP FY2006 budget request, between 150 and 180 SAVs had
been conducted during FY2004. According to its FY2007 budget request, 200 were
conducted in FY2005, and it expected to complete another 150 per year after that.
However, according to DHS’s Performance Budget Overview for FY2007, it
does not appear that nearly so many vulnerability assessments and BZPPs have been,
or will be, completed and implemented by the end of FY2007. DHS’s Performance
Budget Overview matches specific programs with specific performance measures.
Something called the Infrastructure Protection Program (perhaps what is now referred
to as the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) budget activity (see
Appendix)) has five performance measures listed. The first three deal with high-
priority sites and associated vulnerability assessments, buffer zone protection plans,
and the implementation of protective actions. According to the Performance Budget
Overview, looking back to FY2005, the goals for each of these were less than 100%
53 (...continued)
Developing the National Asset Database. Op cit. p. 31.
54 USA Today. “Database is Just the 1st Step,” by Robert Stephan. July 21, 2006. p. 8A.
55 U.S. Congress. Senate. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005.
Report accompanying S. 2537. S.Rept. 108-280. June, 17, 2004. p. 77.

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of the priority sites56. Furthermore, the highest goal set for FY2007 was having
BZPPs implemented at 38% of the priority sites.
Allocating Resources. It is a matter of policy, as articulated in the
documents discussed above, that federal resources should focus on those critical
infrastructure assets that, if attacked, pose the greatest risks to the nation.
Risk, in the context of critical infrastructure and terrorism, can be defined as the
potential consequence associated with a particular kind of attack or event against a
particular target, discounted by the likelihood that such an attack or event will occur
(threat) and the likelihood that the target will sustain a certain degree of damage
(vulnerability). Threat includes not only the identification of specific adversaries, but
also their intentions and capabilities (both current and future). Consequences include
lives and property lost, short term financial costs, longer term economic costs,
environmental costs, etc. Given this definition, risk is not threat, nor vulnerability
to a threat, nor the estimated consequences associated with a specific attack, but
some integration of the three.57
According to the NIPP, the allocation of resources is to be a two step process.
First, those critical assets which pose the greatest risk to the nation if attacked (i.e.
those assets that score highest when integrating threat, vulnerability, and
consequences) are to be given the highest priority. The second step is to identify and
support those protective measures that are likely to provide the greatest risk reduction
for any given investment.
Federal resources are spent in a number of ways, including agencies’ internal
budgets for operations and programs, grants to states and localities, and research and
development funding for universities and industry. The most publicized debates on
the allocation of federal resources focuses primarily on grants to states and localities.
The formula-based State Homeland Security Grants, mentioned above, has been
criticized by some for allocating more dollars per capita to states that some perceive
as having lower risks than other states. Congress has not been able to agree on if, or
how, to modify the allocation of those funds. The other grant programs mentioned
above (i.e. the High-threat, High-density Urban Area grants and the sector specific
grants) are discretionary. According to DHS, allocation of these funds are based on
a calculation not only of risk, but also on need. With the allocation of FY2006 High-
Threat, High-Density Urban Area grants, some cities which perceive themselves as
56 DHS set a goal of having BZPPs implemented at 70% of its high-priority sites. The actual
amount was 18%. DHS set a goal of having vulnerability assessment done at 10% of its
high-priority sites. The actual amount was 14%. It is not clear how the number of sites for
which vulnerability assessments have been done can be less than the number of sites for
which BZPPs have been implemented, unless DHS does not conduct vulnerability
assessments for some of the BZPPs.
57 Note, that in many cases these factors may not be independent. In other words, the
likelihood that a particular asset may be attacked may increase if it is perceived to have a
high vulnerability and/or the consequences of the attack are great. For more discussion of
how risks can be assessed and its implications for decision making, see CRS Report
RL32561, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating,
and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences, by John Moteff.

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CRS-29
having greater risk (or at least being more at threat or could suffer greater losses)
received less funding than they did the previous year, while other cities perceived as
having lower risks saw their funds increased. DHS stated that one reason for this was
the way it determined the unmet needs of the area and the programs proposed by the
areas to address those needs. Faced with criticism from those cities and states that
received a drop in funds, DHS has stated it will rework its grant review process. In
addition, Congress has requested that the Government Accountability Office review
the validity, relevance, reliability, timeliness and availability of the risk factors used
by DHS in its discretionary grant programs. Meanwhile, Congress continues to set
its own priorities by specifying the amount of funds that go to each these grants
programs.
Information Sharing. Information sharing in the context of homeland
security encompasses a very complex network of proposed connections. There is
information sharing between federal agencies, especially between intelligence
agencies, and between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. There is
information sharing between federal agencies and their state and local counterparts.
There is information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies and the private
sector. There is information sharing within and between the private sectors. And
there is information sharing between all of these entities and the public. A multitude
of mechanisms have been established to facilitate all of this information sharing.
While the multitude of mechanism may cause some concern about inefficiencies, a
highly connected, in some cases redundant, network may not be a bad thing. A
primary concern is if these mechanisms are being used and are effective.
In the past, information flow between all of these stakeholders has been
restrained, or non-existent, for at least three reasons: a natural bureaucratic reluctance
to share information, technological difficulties associated with compatibility, and
legal restraints to prevent the misuse of information for unintended purposes.
However, in the wake of September 11, given the apparent lack of information
sharing that was exposed in reviewing events leading up to that day, many of these
restraints are being reexamined and there appears to be a general consensus to change
them. Some changes have resulted from the USA PATRIOT Act (including easing
the restrictions on sharing of information between national law enforcement agencies
and those agencies tasked with gaining intelligence of foreign agents). The
legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security also authorizes efforts
to improve the ability of agencies within the federal government to share information
between themselves and other entities at the state and local level. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) reorganized the entire
intelligence community, in part to improve the level of communication and
coordination between the various intelligence organizations.58 The legislation also
required the President to establish an information sharing environment (ISE) for
the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and
tribal entities, and the private sector.
58 See also CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, Tracking Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.

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While the federal government is trying to increase the amount of information
shared among appropriate stakeholders, it is also trying to maintain a tight control
(short of classification) on who gets to see what information. A variety of
designations have been given to information the federal government wishes to control
(critical infrastructure information (see below), homeland security information,
terrorism information, sensitive security information). A catch-all term for these and
other designations of controlled information is “sensitive but unclassified.”
Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector, critical infrastructure protection relies to a large extent
on the ability of the private sector and the federal government to share information.
However, it is unclear how open the private sector and the government have been in
sharing information. The private sector primarily wants from government
information on specific threats which the government may want to protect in order
not to compromise sources or investigations. In fact, much of the threat assessment
done by the federal government is considered classified. For its part, the government
wants specific information on vulnerabilities and incidents which companies may
want to protect to prevent adverse publicity or to keep confidential company
practices. Success will depend on the ability of each side to demonstrate it can hold
in confidence the information exchanged. From the private sector’s point-of-view,
too, is concern about whether providing this information might lead to future
regulatory action or other liabilities.
Sharing information between government and the private sector is made more
complex by the question of how the information will be handled within the context
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In particular, the private sector is
reluctant to share the kind of information the government wants without it being
exempt from public disclosure under the existing FOIA statute. The Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 214) exempts information defined as critical
infrastructure information from FOIA (as well as providing other protections).
Similar FOIA exemptions are offered in other legislation. For example, the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L.107-188, Sec. 401, see
below) exempts certain security-related information from FOIA. Even with these
protections in statute, it is uncertain how much information on assets, vulnerabilities,
incidents, etc. is flowing into DHS.59

The FOIA exemptions for critical infrastructure information (CII) and other
types of sensitive but unclassified information is not without its critics. The non-
government-organizations that actively oppose government secrecy are reluctant to
expand the government’s ability to hold more information as classified or sensitive.
These critics, and others, feel that the protections offered to CII and other types of
sensitive but unclassified information is too broad and believe that controls are
59 In February 2005, OMB Watch won a FOIA case asking DHS for the number of
submissions, rejections, program procedures, etc. associated with the critical infrastructure
information (CII) program. DHS acknowledged the receipt of 29 submissions of CII
documents, 22 of which were approved as CII by DHS. See, DHS Finally Speaks on CII at
[http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/2683/-1/321]. Site last viewed on Dec. 26,
2006.

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CRS-31
stifling public debate and oversight, as well as impeding technological advances that
could benefit both security and the economy.60
Regulation. As a general statement of policy, owners and operators of critical
infrastructure are to work with the federal government on a voluntary basis. Sharing
information with the federal government about vulnerability assessments, risk
assessments, and the taking of additional protective actions is meant to be voluntary.
However, the degree to which some of the activities are mandated varies across
sectors. In some cases, sectors are quite regulated. Nuclear power plants must meet
very specific standards for assessing their vulnerabilities to very specific types of
attacks and to take the necessary actions to address those vulnerabilities. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission enforces these regulations. The Maritime
Transportation Security Act (P.L.107-295) requires facilities at ports, and certain
vessels, to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop and implement security
plans (including naming a security officer who is responsible for developing and
implementing these plans). The vulnerability assessments and security plans are
reviewed by the Coast Guard. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188) requires community drinking water systems to
conduct vulnerability assessments and to incorporate the results of those assessments
into their emergency response plans. The vulnerability assessments must be
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA must also
receive certification that the emergency response plans have been appropriately
modified to reflect the vulnerability assessments. This same Act also amended the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require all facilities engaged in
manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding food for consumption to register with
the Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, the Food and Drug Act
was amended to require regulations specifying the types of information these
facilities needed to keep on record for a specified amount of time to assist the
Secretary in determining if a food product has been adulterated and represents a
public health problem. The FY2006 DHS appropriation bill (P.L. 109-295, Sec.
550), authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, for three years, to issue interim
final regulations requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans for certain
chemical facilities, except those covered by the Maritime Transportation and Security
Act or other relevant acts affecting drinking water authorities, or those operated by
the Department of Energy or the Department of Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
At the other end of the spectrum are sectors such as information and
telecommunication, oil and gas, commercial (i.e. malls and office buildings) where
similar activities (i.e., vulnerability assessments, etc.) are encouraged but not
mandated.
60 For a discussion of the issues associated with sensitive but unclassified information as it
relates not only to scientific and technological information, but other policy relevant
information held by or given to the federal government, see CRS Report RL33303,
“Sensitive But Unclassified Information” and Other Controls: Policy and Options for
Scientific and Technical Information, by Genevieve J. Knezo.

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Appendix
Federal Funding for Critical Infrastructure Protection
It is not possible to definitively determine how much funding the federal
government devotes to critical infrastructure protection. The Homeland Security Act
requires the President’s Budget to include a budget analysis of homeland security
activities across the federal government. For purposes of its analysis, OMB
categorizes funding according to the mission areas defined in the National Strategy
for Homeland Security. These include intelligence and warning; border and
transportation security; domestic counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure and key
asset protection; defending against catastrophic events; and emergency preparedness
and response. While there is a separate category for critical infrastructure protection,
activities included in some of the other mission areas can also be relevant or
necessary for critical infrastructure protection. Table A.1. below shows the funding
figures for the critical infrastructure protection mission area taken from the FY2007
budget’s analysis.
Table A.1. Critical Infrastructure Protection Funding by
Department
($ in millions)
FY2005
FY2005
FY2006
FY2006
FY2007
Department
enacted
suppl.
enacted
suppl.
request
Agriculture
150.7
93.2
46.0
Defense
10838.2
847.8
11096.8
11304.3
Energy
1456.1
1523.7
1503.6
HHS
168.2
181.7
188.8
Homeland Security
2580.9
2678.5
2898.0
Justice
468.8
1.3
521.1
568.3
Transportation
137.0
132.5
154.0
Veterans Affairs
212.8
273.5
271.2
NASA
220.5
212.6
203.7
NSF
315.2
317.2
359.4
Social Security
150.6
172.0
178.5
Postal Service
503.0
.....
.....
Other Agencies
633.9
0.4
649.2
675.0
Grand Total
17835.9
849.4
17851.7
18350.6
Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2007 Analytical Perspectives. Chapter 3.
Homeland Security Funding Analysis. p. 26.
Much of this funding is spent by agencies to protect their own critical
infrastructure. It also includes funds that agencies may spend working with states,
local governments, and private owners/operators to reduce their respective

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vulnerabilities. DHS activities include both of these as well as activities associated
with coordinating the national effort.
Other mission areas include activities that might also be considered part of the
effort to protect critical infrastructure. For instance, the intelligence and warning
mission area includes threat analysis, risk analysis, and the sharing of that
information with other stakeholders, including states, localities, and the private
sector, each of which factor into critical infrastructure protection. Border and
transportation security includes activities associated with protecting airports, sea
ports, and other transportation modes.
In many cases, funding for homeland security (and critical infrastructure
protection) is buried within a number of different accounts, activities, programs, and
projects. It is not possible to track Congressional appropriations in each of these
mission areas within the agencies’ appropriations bills. Agencies may not know
themselves until their appropriations are allocated.
The Preparedness Directorate’s FY2007 Budget Request and
Appropriations for Infrastructure Protection and Information
Security and Other Relevant DHS Budget Activities
Just as it is difficult to account for all the federal activities associated with
critical infrastructure protection in the federal government, it is also difficult to track
the critical infrastructure protection activities within the Department of Homeland
Security. Below (Table A.2) is the FY2007 budget request and appropriations for
the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security portion of the Preparedness
Directorate’s budget.61 Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) is
one of seven budget activities within the Preparedness Directorate’s budget. In turn,
the IPIS budget supports eight program or project activities, as listed in the table.
Each of these support a number of subprograms. The Management and
Administration activity supports the salaries and administrative expenses of IPIS.
While the subprograms are not discussed further in this Appendix, some of their
activities may have been referred to in the text of this report (e.g. activities associated
with Critical Infrastructure Information, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
or the National Asset Database).
61 The IPIS budget activity supports the same (though slightly restructured) infrastructure
protection programs and projects of the “old” Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Refofrm Act of 2006,
(Title VI of the FY2007 DHS appropriations bill), which transferred FEMA and the state
and local grant programs out of the Preparedness Directorate, left the IPIS program in the
Preparedness Directorate.

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Table A.2 Funding for the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate
($ in millions)
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Budget Activity
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2007
Program/Project Activity
actual
enacted
request
Apprn.
a
Management and administration
82,509
84,650
77,000
Critical infrastructure outreach
98,254
111,055
101,100
101,100
and partnerships
Critical infrastructure
43,684
67,815
71,631
69,000
identification and evaluation
National infrastructure
20,000
19,800
16,021
25,000
simulation and analysis center
Biosurveillance
1,569
13,959
8,218
8,218
Protective actions
149,868
90,485
32,043
32,043
Cyber security
54,205
92,415
92,205
92,000
National security/emergency
137,523
141,206
143,272
143,272
preparedness telecommunications
Total IPIS (w/o Management
(505,703)
(536,735)
(464,490)
(470,633)
and Administration)
Total IPIS
619,244
549,140
547,633
Source: FY2007 Congressional Justification. Preparedness Directorate. Infrastructure Protection and
Information Security and the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, (H.Rept.
109-699, accompanying H.R. 5441, P.L. 109-295).
a. The Management and Administration account of the “old” IA/IP Directorate for FY2005 is not
comparable to the Management and Administration account of the “new” Preparedness
Directorate.

Another part of the FY2007 Preparedness Directorate’s budget which includes
some critical infrastructure protection activities is the State and Local Programs
budget activity. Included in this budget activity are the formula-based State
Homeland Security Grant Program and the discretionary High-threat, High-density
Urban Areas grants, the grant programs directed at specific transportation modes (e.g.
ports, rail, trucking, mass transit, and intercity bus.), and the grants for Buffer Zone
Protection Program (BZPP). The State Homeland Security Grants and the High-
threat, High-density Urban Areas Grants primarily support first responder
capabilities, but funding can also be spent on critical infrastructure protection
expenses (such as the purchase of cameras, sensors, etc.).

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In FY2006, Congress appropriated $544 million for the formula-based State
Homeland Security grants and $1.1 billion for the various discretionary grant
programs. For FY2007, the Administration requested $633 million for the formula-
based State Homeland Security grants and $1.4 billion for the discretionary grants
($838 million for the High-threat High-density Urban Area grants and $600 million
for the mode-specific programs and BZPP). Congress appropriated $525 million for
the State Homeland Security grants, $770 million for the High-threat High-density
Urban Area grants, and a total of $459 for the mode-specific and BZPP grants.
The Administration once again requested that the individual discretionary grants
for specific transportation modes, ports and the BZPP, be aggregated into a single
Targeted Infrastructure Protection grant program, with the allocation based on the
Department’s calculation of risk and need. Congress again rejected that request in
the FY2007 appropriation bill, choosing instead to specify the allocations between
modes ($210 million for ports, $12 million for trucking, $12 million for intercity bus,
$175 million for rail and mass transit, and $50 million for BZPP).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate is responsible for overseeing the security of the
nation’s transportation sectors (as directed by the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, P.L. 107-71). Aviation security consumes a large fraction of the TSA
budget. The Administration requested $4.7 billion in FY2007 for all facets of
aviation security activities such as passenger and baggage screening; the purchase,
installation, and operation of explosive detection equipment; and airport perimeter
security. Of this amount, the Administration expects to offset $3.7 billion with fees.
TSA also requested $37.2 million for its surface transportation security activities,
primarily for staffing and for rail inspectors and canines. Congress appropriated
slightly more than $4.7 billion for all aviation security programs and anticipated only
$2.4 billion in offsetting fees. Congress appropriated the requested level for surface
transportation security efforts.
The Coast Guard is the lead agency for security of the nation’s ports. While the
Coast Guard budget does not include a specific security-related line items, OMB
estimated, in its homeland security analysis, that the FY2007 budget included more
than $2 billion for port security, primarily for Coast Guard activities. In the FY2007
appropriation bill, Congress specified $15 million for port security inspections.
Finally, the Science and Technology Directorate budget supports research and
development in a number of areas relevant to critical infrastructure protection. Two
or its research portfolios are Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity. In FY2007,
the Administration requested $15 million for Critical Infrastructure and $23 million
for Cybersecurity. Congress appropriated $35 million and $20 million, respectively.

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