Order Code RL33512
Transportation Security:
Issues for the 110th Congress
Updated January 3, 2007
David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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Transportation Security: Issues for the 110th Congress
Summary
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to
terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is
difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is
how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response
that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack
without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners
to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The act gave the TSA broad
authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these
risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been the subject of considerable
congressional oversight. Funding authorization for the TSA’s aviation security
functions expired at the end of FY2006.
A series of bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia since 2004
highlight the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. The volume
of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all rail
passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo. Nevertheless, there
are steps that can be taken to reduce the risks and consequences of an attack. These
include vulnerability assessments, emergency planning, and emergency response
training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and
emergency medical personnel, as well as purchase of communication and safety
equipment. Additional options include increasing the number of transit security
personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations, and
conducting random inspections of passengers, platforms, and trains.
A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and waterborne cargo is the
desire of government authorities to track a given freight shipment at a particular time,
particularly the tracking of marine containers as they are trucked to and from
seaports. Security experts believe this is a particularly vulnerable point in the
container supply chain. Debate over who should pay for cargo security, government
or industry, and whether mandates or guidelines are the best approach to ensure
industry’s due diligence in protecting their supply chains are other leading issues.
The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347) will provide grant funds
for security improvements to seaports. Hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation
raises numerous security issues. Members of Congress want to know whether current
federal policies, regulations, and grants could more effectively promote hazmat
transportation security at reasonable costs. There are issues regarding routing of
hazmat through urban centers, and debate persists over the pros and cons of rerouting
high-hazard shipments.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Passenger Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Baggage Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
In-Flight Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Transit and Passenger Rail Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cargo Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Imported Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Private Industry’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Paying for Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program . . . . . . . . . 12
Hazmat Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Hearings, Reports, and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Non-Mode Specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Transit and Passenger Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Surface and Marine Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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Transportation Security:
Issues for the 110th Congress
Most Recent Developments
On December 21, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the rail transportation of toxic-by-inhalation
materials through high threat urban areas. Among other things, DHS is proposing
that railroads ensure that carloads of these materials are not left unattended while
awaiting transfer among railroads, that railroads reduce the amount of standstill time
for these carloads, and that railroads track and locate these carloads upon request
from DHS.1 On the same day, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking that would require railroads to analyze the safety and
security risks of certain hazardous material routes and investigate whether an
alternative route is safer and more secure.2
Background and Analysis
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack.
The difficulty and cost of protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a
core question for policymakers: how much effort and resources to put towards
protecting potential targets versus pursuing and fighting terrorists. While hardening
the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to
deter terrorists. The focus of this report is how best to construct and finance a system
of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and
consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel,
commerce, and civil liberties.
For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principle policy objectives
that would support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the passengers and the cargo flowing through the system, (2)
ensuring the trustworthiness of the transportation workers who operate and service
the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle the cargo, (3) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the system, such as the
carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers, and (4) establishing a perimeter of security
around transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy
objectives are concerned with preventing an attack from within a transportation
1 See Federal Register, vol. 71, no. 245, pp. 76852-76888.
2 See Federal Register, vol. 71, no. 245, pp. 76834-76850.

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system, such as occurred on September 11, 2001. The concern is that attackers could
once again disguise themselves as legitimate passengers (or shippers or workers) to
get in position to launch an attack. The fourth policy objective is concerned with
preventing an attack from outside a transportation system. For instance, terrorists
could ram a bomb-laden speed boat into an oil tanker, as they did in October 2002
to the French oil tanker Limberg, or they could fire a shoulder-fired missile at an
airplane taking off or landing, as they attempted in November 2002 against an Israeli
charter jet in Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these objectives is difficult,
at best, and in some modes, is practically impossible. Where limited options exist for
preventing an attack, policymakers are left with evaluating options for minimizing
the consequences from an attack.
A narrower set of policy questions consider how to tailor a security strategy that
corresponds with the service requirements of each particular mode. For instance,
while prescreening all airline or cruise ship passengers is possible, pre-screening all
transit riders is practically impossible. Likewise, inspecting 100% of imported
marine cargo is practically impossible, so inspectors rely heavily on shipment
documentation to select which shipments to examine more closely. The issue for
policymakers is deciding whether ensuring the trustworthiness of the passengers and
cargo flowing through each mode of transportation can be reasonably achieved and,
if so, how best to achieve it without impeding travel and commerce. Another issue
is ensuring the trustworthiness of the companies that operate in the system. The
TSA’s “known shipper” program for cargo carried aboard passenger planes and
Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) “Trade Partnership Against Terrorism” (C-
TPAT) program for cargo imported by all modes are initiatives designed to ensure
the trustworthiness of the companies that operate in the system. These two programs
essentially require the companies that routinely operate in their respective
transportation systems to vouch for the trustworthiness of each other and to alert
authorities when they spot any anomalies or suspicious activity. A point of
contention is to what extent government can rely on the transportation industry to
exercise due diligence in protecting their operations from terrorist attack. In addition
to the integrity of transportation companies, there is also the issue of the
trustworthiness of their employees. In January 2005 the TSA implemented its
Hazardous Material Threat Assessment Program, which requires commercial drivers
seeking certification to transport hazardous materials to undergo a security screening.
As requested by Congress, the TSA is developing a universal biometric
transportation worker ID card that is intended to restrict access to sensitive areas
within transportation facilities. One unresolved issue is deciding what should
disqualify a transportation worker from obtaining a card. What sort of background
would make someone a “security risk?”
In its oversight role, the 110th Congress will likely continue to examine the
effectiveness of DHS initiatives to strengthen transportation security, including the
degree of coordination among agencies within DHS towards that effort. The 110th
Congress will likely debate financial issues, such as what level of spending will buy
what level of security and who should pay for security: federal taxpayers, state and
local governments, system users, or some sort of cost share arrangement among all
of the above. How federal security dollars should be allocated across the country will
likely be a focal point of the debate.

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Aviation Security
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the TSA and mandating a federalized
workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The
act gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and
take steps to mitigate these risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been
the subject of considerable congressional oversight. Aviation security policy and
programs will likely be of considerable interest in the 110th Congress as funding
authorization for most of the TSA’s aviation security functions expired at the end of
FY2006, and others are set to expire at the end of FY2007.
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach. Aviation security policy since
September 11, 2001, consists of two basic principles: a risk-based approach for
allocating limited security resources to where they are considered most needed, and
a multi-layered strategy that establishes redundancies to thwart a potential terrorist
attack.
The risk-based approach implemented by the TSA has been criticized by some
who believe that an overemphasis on allocating resources to screening airline
passengers has left the system vulnerable to attacks in other areas — namely air cargo
operations; airport access controls; protecting airliners from shoulder-fired missiles;
and the security of general aviation aircraft. In essence, these critics argue that the
implementation of aviation security policy since September 11, 2001, has focused too
heavily on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios — such as suicide hijackings
and luggage bombs carried out by airline passengers — and has not given enough
attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
Given the emphasis on protecting against bombings and suicide hijackings, the
multi-layered concept for aviation security is most apparent in the protection of
passenger airliners. Passengers undergo prescreening to check their names against
lists of known and suspected terrorists, then passengers and their carry-on items are
screened and checked baggage is passed through explosive detection systems (EDS)
prior to aircraft boarding. Once on board, security measures such as air marshals,
hardened cockpit doors, and armed pilots provide added layers of security to thwart
an attempted hijacking. The principle objectives of these measures are to prevent
aircraft bombings and hijackings by terrorist passengers. However, the effectiveness
of the TSA’s implementation of virtually all of these security layers has been brought
into question at some time or another since its creation.
Passenger Prescreening. Efforts to improve passenger prescreening have
been impacted by concerns over the adequacy of measures to protect fliers’ personal
information and not infringe upon their civil rights. Critics argued that the TSA’s
ever-expanding vision for prescreening was to include data mining of commercial
and government databases to look for indicators that someone may pose a threat, and
searches of notoriously inaccurate criminal databases. These concerns were spurred
by vague statements issued by the TSA as to how it might authenticate passenger
identity and check for possible links to terrorism along with media reports linking

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passenger prescreening to controversial proposals such as the Department of
Defense’s Total Information Awareness program to detect terrorists by mining
personal data. This controversy ultimately led the TSA to scrap its proposed
enhanced passenger prescreening system, the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening II (CAPPS II), in August 2004, and pursue enhanced prescreening
capabilities under a new system called Secure Flight. While Secure Flight is touted
to be a significantly scaled down approach to prescreening compared to CAPPS II,
concerns over data protections and redress procedures for passengers falsely
identified by the system have also delayed its deployment. Provisions in the FY2007
Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-295) prohibit the TSA from fully
deploying the Secure Flight program until these ongoing concerns are adequately
addressed and also prohibit the use of commercial data or the transfer of passenger
data to a non-federal entity. While commercial databases have potential to
authenticate the identity of passengers, concerns have been raised about TSA’s past
handling of passenger data in a manner that was not fully explained to the public,
leading to this restriction on the transfer of personal data between the government
and private entities other than the initial exchange of passenger name records from
the airlines.
Recently, privacy advocates have raised considerable concerns over the
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a data-mining program for assessing the risk of
all international travelers, as well as freight carried on international flights. Recent
public disclosure regarding the scope of this program and associated data collection
and data retention policies, in November 2006, have renewed debate over whether
certain passenger information collection and analysis practices unduly infringe upon
privacy rights, or whether they are necessary actions to assess terrorism risks to
aviation.
The TSA is also implementing a Registered Traveler (RT) program designed to
speed the passage through security checkpoints of frequent fliers who voluntarily
submit background information and biometric identifiers. Initial trials of the RT
program concept concluded in October 2005, and the TSA has plans to roll out a
nationwide RT program sometime in 2007. According to the TSA, it will be up to
individual airports to determine if they wish to participate in the future RT program.
Trials of a public-private partnership similar to the proposed nationwide RT program
are still ongoing at Orlando International Airport. About 20 airports are expected to
be part of the initial roll out of the nationwide RT program. However, as TSA moves
forward with RT, the airline industry, which once backed this program as a means
to reduce hassles for frequent fliers, now characterizes the manner in which it is
being implemented as having limited and questionable benefit.
Passenger Screening. With regard to screening passengers, the TSA has
struggled to strike a balance between effectively screening passengers for threat
objects without causing undue delays and hassles to travelers. While the TSA is
usually keeping passenger wait times below the stated objective of 10 minutes in
most airport checkpoint queues, audits of airport screening have concluded that
screener performance still needs improvement. The Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General found that screener training, screening
technology, policies and procedures, and management and supervision of screening
operations all contributed to observed deficiencies in screener performance.

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Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA give priority attention
to implementing technology and procedures for screening passengers for explosives,
something not currently done routinely at screening checkpoints. Provisions to
improve checkpoint technologies to detect explosives were included in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, hereafter
the “Terrorism Prevention Act”). To address the issue of detecting explosives carried
by passengers, the TSA pilot tested walk-through trace detection portals and has
implemented procedures for conducting pat-down searches of passengers for
explosives. Full deployment of the walk-through trace detection portals, or puffer
machines, for use in secondary screening of selected passengers has been part of the
TSA’s strategy for screening passengers for explosives, but this initiative has been
put on hold due to maintenance issues with deployed systems. The effectiveness of
the strategy has also been brought into question by the recent foiled plot to bomb
U.S.-bound airliners using liquid explosives. The TSA is working to identify
strategies and technologies that more completely address the explosives threat posed
by passengers and carry-on items.
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening. A key issue in
the debate over aviation security immediately following September 11, 2001, was
whether airport security screeners should be federalized. At that time, airport
screening operations suffered from high turnover, poor supervision and training, low
wages, and a lack of regulatory oversight. All of these factors were believed to have
contributed to a poor performing and highly vulnerable screening system.
Federalizing the screener workforce was offered as a potential solution to address
these deficiencies. However, while Congress ultimately resolved to federalize the
screener workforce at most airports under ATSA, the act also set up a pilot program
using contract screeners at five airports and gave all airports the option to request
private screeners on an airport-by-airport basis starting November 19, 2004. While
several airports had expressed an interest in private screening, they are being cautious
in proceeding because the TSA has offered few details and limited guidance on how
private screening will be implemented. Another factor that has limited airport
interest in private screening has been lingering liability concerns. Language in the
FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90, Section 547)
indemnifies airports from liability relating to their decisions to either request private
screeners or continue using federal screeners and from any claims that may arise due
to negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of airport security screeners,
whether they be federal or private. Nonetheless, while the pilot program airports
have all continued to use private screeners, interest in the TSA’s Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) — or opt-out program — for private screeners among
other airports has been limited, and only one has converted to private screening
operations since the program was made available.
Baggage Screening. While airports are, for the most part, meeting
mandated requirements to inspect checked bags with explosive detection system
(EDS) equipment 100% of the time, airports are continuing to struggle with the
daunting task of integrating these systems into baggage handling and sorting
facilities. To address these needs, Congress established (in Vision 100, P.L. 108-
176) an Aviation Security Capital Fund with a mandatory funding level of $250
million annually and a total authorized funding level of $500 million per year through
FY2007. Congress also gave the TSA the authority to issue letters of intent (LOIs)

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to airports, committing future funding toward in-line EDS integration projects.
Despite these measures, efforts to integrate EDS systems at all airports is progressing
slowly, prompting the 9/11 Commission to recommend that the TSA expedite
installation of these in-line baggage screening systems. Provisions to expedite and
increase funding for in-line baggage screening were included in the Terrorism
Prevention Act. However, in contrast to authorization language in Vision 100 (P.L.
108-176) that set federal funding levels for aviation security capital projects at 90%
for large and medium hubs and at 95% for all other airports, appropriations language
(see P.L. 109-90; P.L. 109-295) has limited the federal share of project costs under
LOIs to 75% for medium and large hubs, and 90% for all other airports in FY2006
and FY2007. Meeting funding needs for airport security projects and setting
priorities amid budgetary constraints remains an ongoing challenge for Congress.
Air Cargo Security. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns that,
while 100% of passenger baggage is required to be screened, only a relatively small
amount of cargo carried on passenger airplanes is screened or inspected. The 9/11
Commission recommended that TSA intensify its efforts to identify, track, and screen
potentially dangerous cargo. Congress responded by increasing funding for air cargo
security operations and research to $115 million in FY2005, compared to $85 million
in FY2004, and designating funds for expanding the known shipper program for
vetting shipments on passenger aircraft; increasing oversight of cargo security; and
continuing research and development of technologies to improve air cargo security.
In both FY2006 and FY2007, funding for air cargo security operations has been set
at $55 million. Language in the FY2006 DHS appropriations act also directs the
TSA to work with other DHS components to develop technologies that will aid in
meeting the objective of screening 100% of all cargo placed on passenger airliners,
and language in the FY2007 direct the TSA to work with industry to increase the use
of EDS equipment for cargo screening.
The 9/11 Commission also recommended deploying at least one hardened cargo
container on each passenger airliner for carrying suspect cargo. While this
recommendation was reflected in a Terrorism Prevention Act provision mandating
a study of the proposal to deploy blast resistant cargo containers, the 9/11
Commission noted that this is progressing slowly. While hardened containers are
designed to mitigate the threat of a terrorist bomb carried in a cargo shipment or
luggage, some policymakers believe that the only effective way to mitigate such a
threat is to screen all cargo placed on passenger aircraft as is currently done for
checked baggage. The TSA, however, has cautioned that such an approach is not
technically and logistically feasible at the present time without unduly impacting
cargo operations on passenger aircraft. The TSA has instead proposed a strategic
plan calling for the use of risk-based prescreening techniques to identify cargo for
targeted inspection or exclusion from carriage on passenger aircraft and a threefold
increase in random inspections. The TSA is working on a freight assessment system
for assigning risk to cargo shipments and targeting screening and inspection efforts
on elevated risk cargo. It is anticipated that the TSA will fully deploy this system
sometime in FY2008.

In addition to improving the screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft,
improvements in security programs for all-cargo operations are planned to protect
against unauthorized access to large all-cargo aircraft. Under new cargo security

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rules, secured areas of airports will be expanded to include cargo operations areas
thus requiring criminal background checks and security threat assessments for an
estimated 50,000 additional airport workers. The new regulations also impose
requirements on freight forwarders that ship by air and require security threat
assessments for workers with access to cargo including an estimated 51,000 off-
airport employees of freight forwarding companies. Also, under the pending
regulations, an industry-wide database of known shippers would be established and
maintained by TSA to allow freight forwarders and airlines to vet cargo shipments.
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls. While ATSA mandated
background checks for all workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft and
secured areas of airports, concerns over the adequacy of security measures for these
workers have been raised because, in some cases, airport workers are permitted to
bypass airport screening checkpoints. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress
called for the physical screening of all workers with access to aircraft or secured
areas. ATSA also called for the TSA to explore the use of biometrics and other
identification technologies for credentialing transport workers and the use of
biometrics for airport access controls. The Terrorism Prevention Act required the
TSA to issue guidance on the use of biometrics for airport access controls and the use
of biometric technology to verify the identity of law enforcement officers authorized
to carry firearms on passenger airliners.
In-Flight Security Measures. Existing in-flight security measures consist
primarily of federal air marshals, armed pilots on some flights, and hardened cockpit
doors. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was greatly expanded under ATSA
and air marshals are required on all high risk flights. In November 2003, the Federal
Air Marshal program was taken out of the TSA and realigned with the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, the DHS Second Stage
Review (2SR), issued in June 2005, proposed that the FAMS be placed back in the
TSA, a proposal that Congress agreed to in report language accompanying the
FY2006 DHS appropriations act. FAMS is once again part of the TSA. Recently,
FAMS has been criticized by some current and former air marshals for procedures
– such as dress codes and check-in procedures – that, they assert, compromise the
covert mission of FAMS and place marshals and the traveling public at risk.
Despite the administration’s initial reservations over allowing airline pilots to
be armed, airline pilots may receive training allowing them to serve as armed federal
flight deck officers under provisions set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296). Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program to include all-
cargo pilots and other flight crew members such as flight engineers. Congress
appropriated $25 million for FY2006 for the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)
program and cabin crew self-defense training. However, there are lingering concerns
that the procedures to apply for the FFDO program are too cumbersome and the
training site is too remote to accommodate many pilots interested in participating in
the program. Some participants and observers have also voiced concerns that
restrictive policies over carrying guns outside the cockpit potentially limit the
program’s effectiveness.
ATSA also mandated the implementation of hardened cockpit doors and
stringent controls regarding access to the flight deck. The Terrorism Prevention Act

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contains a provision to study the use of secondary flight deck barriers — a concept
United Airlines had been moving forward with on its own initiative — to overcome
the vulnerability introduced when a hardened cockpit door is opened in flight for
meal service or when a pilot needs to access the aircraft lavatory.
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat. Concerns have also been raised over
the potential threat to civil aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles (also known as
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems or MANPADS). Appropriations language in
FY2003 directed the DHS to establish a program evaluating the feasibility of
adopting military aircraft anti-missile systems for use on passenger jets. This
program is still ongoing. Two contract teams, led by Northrop-Grumman and BAE
Systems, are developing prototype anti-missile systems. Language in the Terrorism
Prevention Act calls for the FAA to implement an expedited process to certify the
safety of aircraft-based counter-MANPADS systems and also includes language
directing the administration to urgently pursue international arms-control agreements
to limit the proliferation of MANPADS. FY2007 DHS appropriations (P.L. 109-
295) provided $40 million for counter-MANPADS research and development. Of
this, $35 million is designated for evaluating the suitability of aircraft-based systems
in the airline industry. This appropriation is down from the FY2006 level of $110
million, reflecting a shift from a technology development effort to a technology
evaluation phase during FY2007. In addition to the funding of aircraft-based
counter-MANPADS systems, a smaller amount of funding has been allocated for
research on ground-based protection systems. In April 2006, the DHS issued a
solicitation seeking alternative counter-MANPADS technologies for a demonstration
project and recently awarded contracts for research and development efforts that will
assess ground-based MANPADS countermeasures, in addition to the ongoing
aircraft-based counter-MANPADS system development and evaluation initiatives.
General Aviation Security. While some policymakers have expressed
concern that security measures for general aviation aircraft are, in their estimation,
weak and practically non-existent, general aviation operators have countered that they
have been overburdened by unnecessary airspace and airport restrictions. General
aviation restrictions are most prevalent in the Washington, DC area, where the city
is encircled by a 15-mile radius flight restricted zone in which general aviation
operations are significantly limited, and a larger air defense identification zone
where pilots must strictly adhere to special air traffic control procedures. In August
2005, the DHS implemented a security plan permitting certain general aviation
flights — mostly large charter and corporate operations — to resume at Washington
Reagan National Airport (DCA) which is located at the center of the flight restricted
area.
At various times, flight restrictions have also been put in place over New York
City, Chicago, and elsewhere. General aviation pilots have been restricted from
flying over Disney and other theme parks, and over stadiums during major sporting
events, leading some general aviation advocates to question whether special interests
were using the umbrella of security concerns to curtail unwanted advertising
overflights. General aviation advocates also point to a large number of restricted
airspace violations – more than 1,000 per year since the terrorist attacks of 2001 – as
evidence that security-related restrictions are overly complex and too broad in scope.
Almost one- half of these violations occurred in the airspace around Washington,

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DC, where complex communications procedures have been put in place over a wide
area. Also, about one-quarter of the violations occurred in airspace temporarily
restricted around sites during presidential visits. The scope of restricted airspace
around sites visited by the President has been a particular concern to general aviation
operators because the size of these areas has grown significantly, identifying the
boundaries of these temporary restrictions is often difficult for pilots, and systems for
disseminating information regarding the location and effective times of restrictions
is imperfect.
Securing general aviation operations continues to be a significant challenge
because of the diversity of operations, aircraft, and airports. Measures put in place
thus far, such as the Airport Watch program and TSA’s general aviation security
guidelines, rely heavily on the vigilance of the pilot community to detect and report
suspicious activity. In the area of flight training, flight training providers are engaged
in verifying citizenship or confirming that background checks have been properly
completed by the TSA before providing training to foreign nationals, as mandated
under P.L. 109-176. A provision in the Terrorism Prevention Act would allow
aircraft leasing and charter companies to voluntarily provide the TSA with names of
prospective customers for prescreening against the consolidated terrorist watchlist.
Also, the FY2006 DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-90) requires the DHS to assess
security vulnerabilities from general aviation aircraft and identify steps that can be
taken to enhance the security of general aviation aircraft and airports. (CRS contact:
Bart Elias)
Transit and Passenger Rail Security
A series of recent bombings — of passenger train in Mumbai in July 2006, of
transit trains and a bus in London in July 2005, and of commuter trains and subway
trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004 — illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail
systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems — primarily subway systems —
in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do
airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed
primarily for easy access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led
to concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to ‘softer’ targets, such as transit
or passenger rail. A key challenge Congress faces is balancing the desire for
increased rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of transit systems,
with the potential costs of an attack, and with other federal priorities.
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to
subject all rail passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo.
Consequently, transit security measures tend to emphasize managing the
consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to reduce
the risks, as well as the consequences, of an attack. These include conducting
vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; and emergency response training and
drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency
medical personnel. Additional options include increasing the number of transit
security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations,
and conducting random inspections of passengers’ bags, platforms, and trains
visually and with the aid of bomb-sniffing dogs.

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The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of
securing bus passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers
each weekday in the United States. Some transit systems have installed video
cameras on their buses, and Congress has provided grants for security improvements
to intercity buses. But the number and operation characteristics of transit buses make
them all but impossible to secure.
There are no independent assessments of transit security needs and costs. The
Department of Homeland Security provides grants for transit, passenger rail, and
freight rail security under the Urbanized Areas Security Initiative program. Congress
provided $150 million for these grants for FY2005 and again for FY2006, and $175
million for FY2007. In the 109th Congress, bills were introduced to authorize billions
in federal grants for transit and passenger rail security; the Senate-passed version of
H.R. 4954, the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006, included an authorization for
$4.5 billion in rail and transit security spending (that provision was not included in
the enacted version of the bill). The transit community has requested $5.2 billion in
federal funding for security-related capital improvements, and $800 million annually
in security-related operating assistance. The ability of the transit community to pay
these costs themselves is limited; transit agencies run operating deficits and require
government assistance just to maintain their operations. In light of current and
projected federal deficits, federal activities potentially face constrained budgets.
Given limited resources, some argue that the federal government could better
enhance domestic security, at less cost, through strengthening the anti-terrorist efforts
of intelligence-gathering and law-enforcement agencies rather than providing
piecemeal funding for security improvements to the many potential domestic targets.
(CRS contact: David Randall Peterman)
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security
Cargo Visibility. A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and
waterborne cargo is to what extent government authorities need the capability to track
a given shipment at a particular time. Much of the attention with regard to cargo
visibility concerns the tracking of marine shipping containers. Marine containers are
not currently outfitted with tracking devices, but it is common practice to seal
container doors with tamper-evident fixtures. Security officials are concerned that
a particularly vulnerable stage in the container shipping process occurs when
containers are trucked to the overseas port of loading or when they are trucked from
the U.S. port of unloading to their final U.S. destination. At this stage, the integrity
of the shipment rests solely with the trustworthiness or due diligence of the truck
driver. A sensor or tracking device could help ensure the integrity of container
shipments during these vulnerable stages. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, there
has been rapid development of palm-sized tracking devices and sensors that could be
inserted on an interior wall of a container. However, while this so-called “smart-
box” technology is being tested in selected routes, it has not been resolved whether
and how best to deploy it on a widespread basis. In the near term, shippers and
carriers favor using the best container seals currently in use rather than moving to the
more costly sensor and tracking devices. Congress is likely to continue its oversight
of the technological development of container security devices and debate whether
these devices can be effectively deployed to improve cargo security.

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CRS-11
Imported Cargo. Of particular concern is ensuring the integrity of imported
cargo. Over 11 million marine containers from all corners of the globe arrive at U.S.
seaports annually, while 11 million truckloads and over 2 million railcars arrive at
U.S. land border crossings. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has issued new requirements requiring freight carriers to
report cargo manifests (shipment information) before they reach U.S. borders.
Container ships must report shipment details on each container 24 hours before it is
loaded at a foreign port. Truckers from Canada and Mexico must report their trailers’
contents from 30 minutes to an hour prior to border arrival and railroads must report
this information two hours prior to border arrival. CBP analyzes the cargo manifests
and other intelligence to select which cargo units to physically inspect. CBP’s
selection process is thus critical in keeping terrorists and their weapons from being
smuggled into the country. In its oversight role, Congress is scrutinizing CBP’s
cargo inspection process. In the Port Security Improvement Act (P.L. 109-347),
Congress required DHS to evaluate whether additional cargo information is needed
to evaluate shipment risk and required DHS to reexamine its targeting system to
determine where improvements to the system could be made. Congress also required
DHS to set up a pilot program at three overseas ports to test the feasibility of
scanning all U.S.-bound containers at those ports.
Private Industry’s Role. Because most surface and marine freight
transportation assets are owned by private industry, and because there are too many
shipments for government to monitor on its own, government officials have to rely
extensively on private industry to tighten control over their supply chains. Industry
has taken steps to protect their operations from terrorist infiltration. The Association
of American Railroads has conducted a security risk assessment that prioritizes the
industry’s assets and lists countermeasures to be taken at different alert levels.
Railroads have also created a “Railway Alert Network” that is designed to make sure
individual railroads receive timely threat information. Barge operators have created
a “Model Vessel Security Plan” through their industry association, the American
Waterways Operators. The American Trucking Associations has expanded a
“Highway Watch” program to include training for drivers on how to spot suspicious
activity. Intermodal (container) shippers have created a “Smart and Secure Trade
Lanes” program to evaluate anti-tampering and tracking devices for marine
containers. An issue for policymakers is determining the best approach for ensuring
private industry’s cooperation and due diligence over the long term. For example,
policymakers are evaluating which security measures should be mandated versus
which ones should be issued as guidelines or “best practices.” How to validate that
the agreed upon security measures are in fact being carried out by industry is also an
issue. With regard to CBP’s Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program,
Congress requested DHS to conduct a pilot program to test whether third party
entities could be used to validate shippers’ compliance with the program.3
Paying for Cargo Security. Freight carriers and shippers are private, for-
profit corporations, which raises the issue of whether they or general taxpayers
should pay for security improvements. Advocates for public funding argue that
homeland security is a national concern and therefore a federal government
3 See section 218 of P.L. 109-347.

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CRS-12
responsibility that should be paid for from the general Treasury. Others argue that
carriers and shippers are the direct beneficiaries of improved cargo security. They
argue that it is in their own economic interest to protect their assets from terrorist
attack, that additional security measures also deter cargo theft which is costly to the
freight industry, and that therefore they should bear the cost of security
improvements. Several legislative efforts to establish a security fee paid by industry
to generate funds for a federal port security grant program have failed in Congress.
Meanwhile, some ports and freight carriers are beginning to add security surcharges
to their freight invoices while other carriers are presumably incorporating extra
security-related costs in their freight rates.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. On May
22, 2006 the TSA and the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) at U.S. ports.4 Longshoremen, port truck drivers, merchant mariners, and
other maritime workers will need to apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted
access to port facilities or vessels. The card will use biometric technology for
positive identification and TSA will conduct a security threat assessment on each
worker before issuing a card. The security threat assessment will use the same
procedures and standards established by TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous
materials. These standards examine criminal history, immigration status, mental
capacity, and terrorist activity to determine whether a worker poses a security threat.
A worker will pay a fee of between $95 to $149 depending on the type of worker, and
that is intended to cover the cost of administering the cards. Port facility operators
will be responsible for deploying card readers at the gates to their facilities. TSA is
considering whether to incorporate the TWIC system into all modes of transportation.
As TWIC nears implementation, issues for Congress include what affect
implementation could have on the near-term supply of port workers. (CRS contact:
John Frittelli)
Hazmat Cargo Security
Hundreds of thousands of trucks and railroad tank cars transport tons of
hazardous materials (hazmat) daily. These shipments can be used as instruments or
targets of terror. There is a virtually unlimited number of ways that the hazmat
transportation system is at risk from terrorists. For example, tank trucks can be
attacked, drivers can be killed, and loads can be hijacked and released during
shipment. Simply put, there are too many points of vulnerability to ensure security
during hazmat transportation. A major challenge is to cost effectively increase the
security of these shipments, especially those that pose the most danger to the public,
while still meeting, to the extent possible, the transportation requirements of
commerce.
Industry and government are gradually implementing a “layered” system of
measures affecting shippers, carriers, and drivers to reduce associated security risks.
This system involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. The
Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Homeland Security (DHS) have taken
4 Federal Register, v. 71, no. 98, May 22, 2006, pp. 29396-29462.

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actions to enhance the security of hazmat transportation. For example, DOT requires
shippers and carriers to implement security plans regarding specified hazmat
transportation. DOT grants encourage state and some local governmental personnel
to conduct hazmat inspections and to plan and train for spills of these materials.
Also, this Department has contacted thousands of companies that are seeking to
improve their security programs, and has established communication links with
industry.
DHS conveys threat information to law enforcement and industry, and conducts
vulnerability assessments. DHS administers a grant that provides for the training and
communications infrastructure which truck drivers, highway workers, and others use
to report potential security threats and safety concerns on the Nation’s roads. DHS
screens commercial drivers applying for an endorsement to carry hazardous materials
to determine whether a driver poses a security threat necessitating denial of the
hazmat endorsement. DHS has also deployed radiation detection equipment at
interstate truck inspection stations. Whether the pace of these actions is adequate or
not is subject to debate. It is widely recognized that more could be done to promote
hazmat transportation security, but additional costs would be incurred and tradeoffs
would need to be considered.
There remain many issues associated with hazmat transportation security. Many
Members of Congress want to know whether current federal policies, regulations, and
grants could more effectively promote hazmat transportation security at reasonable
costs. There are issues regarding routing of hazmat through urban centers and debate
persists over the pros and cons of rerouting high hazard shipments. Requiring
tracking devices for hazmat shipments and limiting security requirements to just
those hazardous commodities that are potentially the most dangerous are also topics
of debate. Other options include increased security awareness training for state truck
inspectors and certain employees of truck leasing companies, and requiring enhanced
security plans and communication systems for carriers of high hazard materials
shipments beyond those now required. Each of these options poses costs that need
to be evaluated within the context of other investments. (CRS Contact: John
Frittelli)

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Congressional Hearings, Reports, and Documents
Non-Mode Specific
House Committee on Homeland Security. Department of Homeland Security: Major
Initiatives for 2007. September 26, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment. Transportation Security
Administration's Office of Intelligence: Progress and Challenges. June 14,
2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. H.R. 4954, To improve maritime and
cargo security through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.
April 4, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. H.R. 4954, to improve maritime
and cargo security through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes:
the “SAFE Port Act.” March 16, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The President's Proposed FY07
Budget: Risk-Based Spending at the Transportation Security Administration.
February 16, 2006.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Proposed
Reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security, July 19, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Department
of Homeland Security — Second Stage Review, July 14, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. The Secretary’s Second-Stage Review.
July 14, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Proposed FY2006 Budget:
Integrating Homeland Security Screening Operations. March 2, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget
Proposal for FY2006. February 15, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The
Department of Homeland Security: The Road Ahead. January 26, 2005.

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Aviation
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Aviation.
Airline Passenger Baggage Screening: Technology and Airport Deployment
Update. June 29, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The Future of Registered Traveler.
November 3, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Improving Management of the
Aviation Screening Workforce. July 28, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to
Improve Aviation Security - Part II, July 19, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to
Improve Aviation Security, July 13, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler
Program, Part II. June 16, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler
Program. June 9, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Screening of Airline Pilots:
Sound Security Practice or Waste of Resources. May 13, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. General Aviation
Security and Operations. June 9, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget
Proposal for FY2006. April 26, 2005.
GAO Report GAO-05-457. Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains. Released May 2, 2005.
Transit and Passenger Rail
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Transit Security Training
Procedures. September 28, 2006.

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House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on
Highways, Transit, and Pipelines. Transit and Over-the-Road Bus Security.
March 29, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks - Part II. October 20, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. After the
London Attacks: What Lessons Have Been Learned to Secure U.S. Transit
Systems?. September 21, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks. September 7, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology. The London Attacks: Training to
Respond in a Mass Transit Environment. July 26, 2005.
Surface and Marine Cargo
House Department of Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. H.R. 5604, Screening Applied
Fairly and Equitably to Truckers Act of 2006. June 16, 2006.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Railroads.
Current Issues In Rail Transportation of Hazardous Materials. June 13, 2006.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Future of
Port Security: The GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. April 5, 2006.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation. National Strategy for Maritime Security.
January 24, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Reforming HAZMAT Trucking
Security. November 1, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Domestic Passenger
and Freight Rail Security. October 20, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Homeland Security Missions of
the Post- 9/11 Coast Guard. June 8, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Container
Security Initiative and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: Securing
the Global Supply Chain or Trojan Horse?. May 26, 2005.

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Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Port Security. May
17, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on
Highways, Transit, and Pipelines. Background Check Process for Truckers’
Hazmat Endorsements. May 11, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Railroads.
New Technologies for Rail Safety and Security. April 28, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Implementation.
April 20, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. FY2006 Budget for the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Programs; H.R. 889, The Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2005. March 3, 2005.
Inspector General Report OIG-05-10. Review of the Port Security Grant Program.
January 2005.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33194, Securing General Aviation, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32022, Air Cargo Security, by Bartholomew Elias.
CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers:
Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues, by Dana Shea and
Daniel Morgan.
CRS Report RS22234, Homeland Security: Protecting Airspace in the National
Capital Region, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32625, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, by David
Randall Peterman.
CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and
Maritime Security, by John F. Frittelli.
CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attack on Seaports: Threat and Response,
by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RS21997, Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear
Attack Using Oil Tankers, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RS21125, Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations — Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RS22041, Legal Issues Concerning State and Local Authority to
Restrict the Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail, by Todd B.
Tatelman.
CRS Report RL32740, Security Threat Assessments for Hazmat Drivers, by David
Randall Peterman.
CRS Report RL32851, Hazardous Materials Transportation Security: Highway and
Rail Modes, by Paul F. Rothberg.

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CRS Report RL33048, Marine Security of Hazardous Chemical Cargo, by Paul W.
Parformak and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL32073, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues
for Congress, by Paul W. Parformak.

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