Order Code RL31126
Lobbying Congress: An Overview
of Legal Provisions and
Congressional Ethics Rules
Updated December 27, 2006
Jack Maskell
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division

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Lobbying Congress: An Overview of Legal Provisions
and Congressional Ethics Rules
Summary
This report provides a brief overview and summary of the federal laws, ethical
rules and regulations which may be relevant to the activities of those who lobby the
United States Congress. The report provides a summary discussion of the federal
lobbying registration and disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, questions on the propriety of contingency
fees for lobbying, restrictions on lobbying with federal funds, post-employment
(“revolving door”) lobbying activities by former federal officials, and House and
Senate ethics rules which may be relevant to contacts with private lobbyists.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was enacted to replace a nearly 50-year
old lobbying registration law that was seen as vague and inadequate. The more
recent legislation establishes clearer criteria and thresholds for determining when an
organization or firm should register its employees or staff as lobbyists. The Act is
directed at professional lobbyists, that is, those who receive payments to lobby for
an employer or a client, and requires the registration and reporting of certain
identifying information and general, broad financial data. In addition to the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act requires the registration and
reporting from those who act as agents of a foreign government or foreign political
party, and who engage in “lobbying” or other similar political advocacy activities on
behalf of their foreign principal.
Various provisions of federal law have been enacted and regulations
promulgated to restrict the use of any federal funds for lobbying purposes, either by
the agencies of the federal government or by federal contractors or grantees.
In attempts to limit what has been perceived to be potential undue or improper
influence in governmental processes, restrictions have been adopted to limit the post-
employment lobbying of certain high ranking officials of the federal government for
a period of time after those officials leave government service (so-called “revolving
door” laws). Similarly, to deal with the potential for, or perceptions of, undue or
improper influences, both Houses of Congress have adopted internal rules regarding
the acceptance of gifts and favors by Members, officers or employees of the House
or Senate from private sources, particularly from registered lobbyists or agents of
foreign principals. No gifts may be accepted by Members, officers or employees,
except as permitted in the Rules of the respective chamber.

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Contents
Introduction/Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Foreign Agents Registration Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Contingency Fees For Lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Federal Funds Subsidizing or Reimbursing Lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-Employment Lobbying by Federal Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Ethics Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Honoraria, Private Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Unwritten Standards of Conduct and Propriety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Other Statutory Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Campaign Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Bribery, Illegal Gratuities, and Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Further Ethical Considerations for Attorneys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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Lobbying Congress: An Overview of Legal
Provisions and Congressional Ethics Rules
This report is intended to provide a brief overview and summary of the federal
laws, ethical rules and regulations which may be relevant to the activities of those
who lobby the United States Congress. The report provides a summary discussion
of the federal lobbying registration and disclosure requirements of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the propriety of
contingency fees for lobbying, restrictions on lobbying with federal funds, post-
employment (“revolving door”) lobbying activities by former federal officials, and
House and Senate ethics rules which may be relevant to contacts with private
lobbyists by Members, officers and employees of Congress.
Introduction/Background
Although the term “lobbying” may have developed a somewhat sinister and
pejorative connotation over the years, the activities involved in lobbying are
intertwined with fundamental First Amendment rights of speech, association and
petition,1 and may facilitate the exchange of important information and ideas between
the government and private parties.2 For those who act in a representative capacity
for a client, lobbying the legislature for a change in the state of the law may be an
important part of the services provided to the client. However, because of the
substantial potential for undue or wrongful influence from those who are paid to
influence the legislative process, there has developed a body of law and rules to
regulate lobbying activities, as well as to regulate the activities of public officials in
their interactions with those who lobby, particularly with reference to the potentially
corrupting effect of large sums of money on the legislative process.3 There are
1 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-138 (1961); note generally, Hope Eastman, Lobbying: A Constitutionally Protected
Right, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1977), and discussion in
Browne, “The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and
the Right to Petition the Government,” 4:2 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
717(1995).
2 S.Rept. 99-161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., “Congress and Pressure Groups: Lobbying in a
Modern Democracy,” Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 1-14 (1986).
3 The Supreme Court expressed concern as early as 1853 with paid lobbying activities and
undue influence, finding that a secret contingency contract for lobbying was void and
unenforceable as a matter of public policy because it “tends to corrupt or contaminate, by
improper influences, the integrity of our ... political institutions” by “creat[ing] and
bring[ing] into operation undue influences” by those “stimulated to active partisanship by
(continued...)

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several federal statutory laws, as well as Rules of the House and Senate, which either
apply to lobbying specifically, or which may be relevant to congressional lobbyists
because the provisions bear upon a Member’s or congressional employee’s dealings
with those who attempt to influence the legislative process.
Because of First Amendment protections and guarantees, the federal
“regulation” of lobbying activities engaged in by private citizens takes the form
generally of disclosure and reporting of such activities and the financing behind those
activities, as opposed to specific limitations or restrictions on advocacy. Even when
regulation on lobbying merely requires disclosures and reporting, such regulation, in
the area of political and public-policy advocacy, may still be subject to careful
scrutiny by the courts. Court decisions in this and related areas have looked to
determine whether there exists any “chilling” of, or deterrent to the exercise of,
citizens’ First Amendment rights caused by such required disclosures, and if so,
whether that is counter-weighed by important governmental and societal interests
promoted by the regulations, such as transparency and openness in government, and
the protection of basic governmental processes from undue influences.4
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
In 1995 Congress completely rewrote the 50-year old law (the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946) which had required certain registrations and
disclosures of lobbying activities directed at Members of Congress. The “Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995”5 now provides more specific thresholds, and clearer and
broader definitions of “lobbyist” and “lobbying” activities and contacts which will
trigger the requirements for the registration and reporting of persons who are
compensated to engage in lobbying.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 is directed at so-called “professional
lobbyists,” that is, those who are compensated to engage in certain lobbying activities
on behalf of a client or an employer.6 In addition to covering only those who are paid
to lobby, the initial “triggering” provisions of the law cover only lobbying activities
which may be described as “direct” contacts with covered officials. The law’s
registration requirements are not separately triggered by “grass roots” lobbying
activities. That is, an organization which engages only in “grass roots” lobbying,
3 (...continued)
the strong lure of high profit.” Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 57 U.S. 314, 333-
334 (1853).
4 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 143, 150 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
5 P.L. 104-65, December 19, 1995, 109 Stat. 691, as amended by the Lobbying Disclosure
Technical Amendments Act, P.L. 105-166, April 6, 1998.
6 See H.R. Rpt. 104-339, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1995).

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regardless of the extent of “grass roots” lobbying activities, will not be required to
register its members, officers or employees who engage in such activities.7
The Act recognizes generally two kinds of lobbyists: (1) “in house” lobbyists
of an organization or business — employees of that organization or business who are
compensated, at least in part, to lobby on its behalf; and (2) “outside” lobbyists —
members of a lobbying firm, partnership, or sole proprietorship that engage in
lobbying for “outside” clients. When registration is required from a paid “lobbyist”
under the lobbying law, such registration is done by the organization or the lobbying
firm. That is, a business or organization which has employees who engage in a
certain amount of lobbying on its behalf (“in-house” lobbyists), must register and
identify its employee/lobbyists. “Lobbying firms” or entities (including a sole
practitioner) who lobby or have employees, partners or associates who lobby for
“outside” clients, must file a separate registration for each client represented,
identifying such things as the lobbyist, the client and the issues.
The previous lobby registration statute enacted in 1946, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Harriss, supra, was criticized for employing a
general and equivocal test for registration and reporting, concerning whether
lobbying was one’s “main” or “principal purpose,” and for providing no specific
thresholds, or clear measures to trigger the requirements of the law. The Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, however, provides more specific thresholds, triggering
measures, and de minimis amounts.
Expenditure Threshold. There is a de minimis expense threshold below which
the requirement for registration by organizations and lobbying groups or firms will
not be triggered. Any organization which uses its own employees as lobbyists (in-
house lobbyists) will not need to register if the organization’s total expenses for
lobbying activities do not exceed $24,500 in a six-month period.8 A lobbying firm
(including a self-employed individual) does not need to register for a particular
“outside” client if its total income from that client for lobbying related matters does
not exceed $6,000 in a six month filing period.9
Contact and Time Threshold. A “lobbyist” under the disclosure law is an
organization’s employee who engages in lobbying, or is someone who works on his
7 Once an organization has met the threshold requirements for “direct” lobbying and is
registered, certain background activities and efforts “in support of” its direct “lobbying
contacts,” which may include activities which also support other activities or
communications which are not lobbying contacts, such as grass roots lobbying efforts, may
need to be disclosed generally as “lobbying activities.” 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7). Note H.R. Rpt.
No. 104-339, 104th Cong.,1st Sess., “Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995,” 13-14 (1995). The
instructions of the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate also note that
“Communications excepted by Section 3(8)(B) will constitute ‘lobbying activities’ if they
are in support of other communications which constitute ‘lobbying contacts.’”
8 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(A)(i). The threshold amount is adjusted every four years, 2 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a)(3)(B), and was adjusted January 1, 2005.
9 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(A)(ii). The threshold amount is adjusted every four years, 2
U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(B), and was adjusted January 1, 2005.

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or her own or for a lobbying firm and is retained by an organization or entity to lobby
on its behalf, who makes more than one “lobbying contact,” and spends at least 20%
of his or her total time for that employer or client on “lobbying activities” over a six-
month period.10 A “lobbying contact” is an oral or written communication to a
covered official, including a Member of Congress, congressional staff, and certain
senior executive branch officials, with respect to the formulation, modification or
adoption of a federal law, rule, regulation or policy. The term “lobbying activities”
is broader than “lobbying contacts,” and includes “lobbying contacts” as well as
background activities and other efforts in support of such lobbying contacts.
Items Disclosed on Registration. Under the Act a “lobbyist” needs to be
registered within 45 days after making the requisite lobbying contacts or within 45
days of being employed to make such contacts, whichever is earlier. Registration
will be on identical forms filed with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the
House. The information on the registrations will generally include identification of
the lobbyist, the client or employer, and any organizations other than the client that
contribute more than $10,000 for the lobbying activities in six months and play a
major role in supervising or controlling the lobbying activities; an identification of
any foreign entity that owns 20% of the client, controls the activities of the client or
is an interested affiliate of the client; a list of the issues on which the registrant
expects to engage in lobbying, and those on which he or she has already lobbied for
the client or employer.
Reports. In addition to the registration of lobbyists, semi-annual reports,
covering January 1 - June 30, and July 1 - December 31, are required to be filed.
These reports will identify the lobbyist, clients and employers, and issues upon which
one lobbied, and are to provide a good faith estimate of lobbying costs, rounded to
the nearest $20,000 (if expenses exceed $10,000).
Oral or Written Identifications to Officials Being Lobbied. The Act expressly
requires that a lobbyist, upon the request of any “covered official” during an oral
contact, provide an identification of his or her client, whether or not the lobbyist is
registered under the Act, and a disclosure of any interests of foreign affiliates.11 If
a written lobbying contact is made, the lobbyist is required on his or her own to
identify any foreign entity on whose behalf the contact is being made, and any foreign
entity which owns 20% of the client or organization, controls or supervises the client,
or is an affiliate with a direct interest in the lobbying activities.
Registration and Filing Information. Registrations, as well as the semi-annual
reports from already registered lobbyists, are made to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, Legislative Resource Center, and to the Secretary of the Senate,
Office of Public Records. Forms for registration and reporting, and detailed filing
instructions for lobbying firms and organizations with lobbyists, are available from
the offices of the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate, and may be
accessed online, with instructions and programs to facilitate electronic filing for the
House available at [http://lobbyingdisclsoure.house.gov], and for the Senate at
10 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10).
11 2 U.S.C. § 1609.

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[http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/generic/lobbying_registration.htm]. The
reports and registrations made to these legislative offices are maintained as public
records which may be researched and examined by the press, the public, by
Members’ offices, and have been made available online at [http://sopr.senate.gov].
Foreign Agents Registration Act
In addition to the required registrations under the new federal Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA)12 may be relevant if one is acting for or on behalf of a foreign government
or a foreign political party or entity, or other foreign entity, and is engaging in
“lobbying” activities as part of the representation for that foreign client. As amended
by the new Lobbying Disclosure Act, if one is representing the interests of a foreign
government or a foreign political party, such agent must continue to register under
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, but then need not register under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act. However, persons representing private foreign entities, and who
lobby in the United States, should register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act rather
than the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Those properly registered under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act are exempt from registering under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act, as amended by the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, and its amendments, provides that “agents of a foreign principal”13 must
file a registration statement not with the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the
Senate, but with the Attorney General listing detailed financial and business
information,14 must file and label all informational materials,15 and keep detailed
books and records open to inspection by public officials.16 An “agent” is defined in
the law as one who acts “at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a
foreign principal, or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly
supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in part by a
foreign principal....”17
The types of activities on behalf of a “foreign principal” that would subject an
“agent” to coverage under the Act include “political activities”; acting as a “public
relations counsel,” publicity agent or political consultant; collecting or disbursing
contributions for the foreign principal; and representing the interests of the foreign
12 See now 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq.
13 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) and (c).
14 22 U.S.C. § 612.
15 22 U.S.C. § 614. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 eliminated the use of and the
definition of the term “political propaganda,” now employing the more neutral term
“informational material.”
16 22 U.S.C. § 615.
17 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1).

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principal “before any agency or official of the Government of the United States.”18
The term “political activities” also includes activities which may generally be
characterized as among those commonly considered to be “lobbying” activities:
The term “political activities” means any activity that the person engaging in
believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or
official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public
within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the
domestic or foreign policies of the United States....19
There are several exemptions to the registration and record-keeping
requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, including exemptions for the
official activities of diplomats and consular officers and the activities of certain
officials of foreign governments; exemptions for persons engaging only in “private
and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of bona fide trade or commerce” for such
foreign principal; and an exemption for certain legal representation of foreign
principals by attorneys in judicial or on-the-record, formal agency proceedings.20
Contingency Fees For Lobbying
A contingency fee arrangement for “lobbying” activities before Congress is one
in which the payment for such activities is contingent upon the success of the
lobbying efforts to influence the legislative process to have legislation adopted or
defeated in the United States Congress. There is no statute under federal law which
expressly addresses the issue of contingency fees with respect to all lobbying
activities before the Congress. Contingency fees may be expressly barred, however,
under certain circumstances. There is in federal law, for example, an express
prohibition against contingency fee arrangements with respect to seeking certain
contracts with the agencies of the federal government.21 Activities which might
generally or colloquially be called “lobbying,” but which involve making
representations on behalf of private parties before federal agencies to obtain certain
government contracts, may thus be subject to the contingency prohibitions.22
18 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(i)-(iv).
19 22 U.S.C. § 611(o).
20 22 U.S.C. § 613.
21 41 U.S.C. § 254(a), 10 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (defense contracts). Note Federal Acquisition
Regulations [FAR], 48 C.F.R. § 3.400 et seq. Negotiated solicitations and contracts are
required to contain a contractor warranty that no contingent fees were paid. FAR, 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.203-5.
22 The reason for this contingency fee ban has been explained as follows: “Contractors’
arrangements to pay contingent fees for soliciting or obtaining Government contracts have
long been considered contrary to public policy because such arrangements may lead to
attempted or actual exercise of improper influence....” Nash, Schooner, & O’Brien, The
Government Contract Reference Book, A Comprehensive Guide to the Language of
Procurement, Second Edition, at 119 (George Washington University 1998).

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Contingency fees are also prohibited for lobbying the Congress by persons who
must register as agents of foreign principals under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act. The prohibition is upon agreements where the amount of payment “is
contingent in whole or in part upon the success of any political activities carried on
by such agent.”23 The covered “political activities” of such agents under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act include any activity which the agent “intends to, in any way
influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States ... with
reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of
the United States ...,” and thus includes the activities of “lobbying” Members and
staff of Congress on legislation or appropriations.24
Although there is no general federal law expressly barring all contingency fees
for successful lobbying before Congress, there is a long history of judicial precedent
and traditional judicial opinion which indicates that such contingency fee
arrangements, when in reference to “lobbying” and the use of influence before a
legislature on general legislation, are void from their origin (ab initio) for public
policy reasons, and therefore would be denied enforcement in the courts.25
Explaining the reason for such policy, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the
Court, noted that it was the “tendency” in such contract agreements to provide
incentives towards corruption, as such agreements “invited and tended to induce
improper solicitations ... intensified ... by the contingency of the reward.”26 It should
be noted that the laws of 39 States prohibit outright, and the laws of a 40th State limit
the amount of, contingency fees for successful legislative lobbying,27 and this may
further limit the probability of judicial enforcement of a contingency fee contract,
even one for lobbying the Congress.
While the tradition and practice have been for the courts to look disfavorably
upon contingency fee arrangements for successfully influencing public officials in
performing discretionary actions, it should be noted that in some instances
contingency fee contracts based on the success of legislation have been upheld and
enforced in a few courts when the duties contracted for were professional services
that did not involve traditional, statutorily defined “lobbying” or the use of personal
23 22 U.S.C. § 618(h).
24 22 U.S.C. § 611(o).
25 “Contingent fee arrangements, conditioned on the obtaining of favorable legislation, are
unenforceable in the courts.” Luff v. Luff, 267 F.2d 643, 646 (D.C.Cir. 1959). See Marshall
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., supra at 336 (1853); Tool Company v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
45, 54 (1864); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874); Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S.
71 (1906); Noonan v. Gilbert, 68 F.2d 775 (D.C.Cir. 1934); Brown v. Gesellschaft Fur
Drahtlose Telegraphie, 104 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C.Cir. 1939), cert denied 307 U.S. 640 (1939);
Ewing v. National Airport Corporation, 115 F.2d 859, 860 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 312
U.S. 705 (1941); note also Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d
457 (11th Cir. 1996), upholding against constitutional challenge Florida statute barring
contingency fees.
26 Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71, 79 (1906).
27 Note survey of State laws in CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum,
“Contingency Fees for Lobbying Activities,” September 21, 2000.

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influence before the legislature,28 or where the client had a legitimate claim or legal
right to be asserted in a matter before the legislature (e.g., “debt legislation”).29
As noted in the instructions of the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the
Senate, if contingency fees are permitted and used in a lobbying agreement with
respect to lobbying before the Congress, the making of such a contract for a
contingent fee “triggers a registration requirement at inception.” The fee is disclosed
in semi-annual reports in the period “that the registrant becomes entitled to it.”
Federal Funds Subsidizing or Reimbursing Lobbying
There are general restrictions under federal law and regulations against the use
of federal funds for lobbying activities. Federal criminal law states a general
prohibition against the use of funds appropriated by Congress for the purposes of
certain “lobbying” activities and publicity campaigns directed at influencing
Congress or state or local legislatures on pending legislation.30 Contractors and
grantees of the federal government may not be reimbursed out of federal contract or
grant money for their lobbying activities, unless authorized by Congress, under the
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) drafted to encompass the
principles set out in an earlier circular from the Office of Management and Budget
that applies to non-profit grantees of the federal government.31

Under the guidelines of provisions known as the “Byrd Amendment,” as
amended by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, federal grantees, contractors,
28 Weinstein v. Palmer,32 NW2d 154 (Minn. 1948); Johnston v. J.R. Watkins Co., 157 P.2d
755, 757 (Okla. 1945): “A contract for purely professional services such as drafting a
petition for an act, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts ...” is not within
Oklahoma’s statutory ban on “lobbying” on a contingent fee basis.
29 As to “debt legislation” and claims (as opposed to general or “favor legislation”), see
discussion in Brown v. Gesellschaft, supra at 229; Grover v. Merritt Development Co., 47
F. Supp. 309 (D.Minn. 1942); and 51 Am Jur. 2d, “Lobbying,” § 4 at 995, citing State ex rel.
Hunt v. Okanogan County, 153 Wash 399, 280 P 31; Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn 269, 271
NW 493; Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn 183, 246 SW 520.
30 18 U.S.C. § 1913, as amended by P.L. 107-273, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 1778 (November 2,
2002); note also general appropriations riders in yearly appropriations acts prohibiting the
use of appropriations for “propaganda or publicity purposes” not authorized by Congress,
see e.g., P.L. 109-115, Sections 821, 824 (119 Stat. 2501); and P.L. 108-199, Division F,
“Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agency Appropriations, 2004,” Sections 621,
624, 118 Stat. 355, 356 (January 23, 2004). Generally, this language is thought to permit
executive branch officials to contact Members of Congress and their staffs directly, but to
prohibit executive branch officials from conducting costly letter-writing or similar publicity
campaigns urging the public to contact Members of Congress about legislation. 2 Op.
O.L.C. 30 (1978); 5 Op. O.L.C. 180 (1981); 13 Op. O.L.C. 300 (1989); Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice, “Guidelines on 18 U.S.C. § 1913” (April 14, 1995); and
GAO opinions, B-302504, March 10, 2004; B-212069, October 6, 1983; B-284226.2,
August 17, 2000; and GAO, B-301022, March 10, 2004. The criminal statute was enacted
originally in 1919 and there is no record of any prosecution under the law.
31 48 C.F.R. §§ 31.205-22; 31.701 et seq.; note OMB Circular A-122, ¶B21, as added 49
F.R. 18276 (1984).

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recipients of federal loans or those with cooperative agreements with the federal
government, are also prohibited by law from using federal monies to “lobby” the
Congress, federal agencies or their employees with respect to the awarding of federal
contracts, the making of any grants or loans, the entering into cooperative
agreements, or the extension, modification or renewal of these types of awards.32
Federal contractors, grantees and those receiving federal loans and cooperative
agreements must also report lobbying expenditures from non-federal sources which
they used to obtain such federal program monies or contracts. 33
Charitable organizations, including religious organizations, which are exempt
from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (organizations
to which contributions may be tax-deductible for the donor under § 170(c)(2)), are
limited in the amount of lobbying in which they may engage if they wish to preserve
this preferred tax-exempt status from the federal government.34
Section 18 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 places statutory restrictions
upon the lobbying activities of certain non-profit organizations which are tax-exempt
under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. This provision, which is
commonly called the “Simpson Amendment,” prohibits section 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations from engaging in any “lobbying activities,” even with their
own private funds, if the organization receives any federal grant, loan, or award.35
The legislative history of the provision clearly indicates, however, that a 501(c)(4)
organization may separately incorporate an affiliated 501(c)(4), which will not
receive any federal funds, and which could engage in unlimited lobbying.36 The
method of separately incorporating an affiliate to lobby, which was described by the
amendment’s sponsor as “splitting,” was apparently intended to place a degree of
separation between federal money and private lobbying while permitting an
organization to have a voice through which to exercise its protected First Amendment
rights of speech, expression and petition: “If they decided to split into two separate
32 31 U.S.C. § 1352(a).
33 31 U.S.C. § 1352(b). See common agency regulations implementing “Byrd Amendment,”
at 55 F.R. 6735-6756 (February 26, 1990).
34 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 501(h), 4911, 6033; see IRS Regulations at 55 F.R. 35579-35620
(August 31, 1990), effecting 26 C.F.R. Parts 1, 7, 20, 25, 53, 56, and 602. The Supreme
Court has upheld such loss of special tax-exempt privilege for “substantial” lobbying noting
that although lobbying is a protected right, and although the government may not indirectly
punish an organization for exercising its constitutional rights by denying benefits to those
who exercise them, lobbying activities are not one of the contemplated “exempt functions”
of these organizations for which they have received the preferred tax status, and that
Congress does not have to “subsidize” such lobbying activities of private organizations
through preferred tax status of receiving deductible contributions if it does not choose to do
so. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544-546 (1983).
35 2 U.S.C. § 1611.
36 H.R. Rpt. 104-339, supra at 24.

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501(c)(4)’s, they could have one organization which could both receive funds and
lobby without limits.”37
It may also be noted that while 501(c)(4)’s which receive certain federal funds
may not engage in “lobbying activities,” the term “lobbying activities” as used in that
prohibition is expressly defined in that law to include only direct “lobbying contacts
and efforts in support of such contacts,” such as preparation, planning, research and
other background work intended for use in such contacts.38 Organizations which
engage only in grass roots lobbying and public advocacy, and do not make direct
contacts or communications with covered officials, would therefore not appear to be
engaging in any prohibited “lobbying activities” as defined under this provision.
Post-Employment Lobbying by Federal Officials
There are various “post-employment” or “revolving door” conflict of interest
restrictions upon certain officers and employees of the federal government which
may work to restrict their lobbying of the Congress on particular matters or for a
certain period of time after such officials leave office. In addition to the “switching
sides” restrictions which apply generally to all former executive branch employees
representing private parties before officers and employees of the executive branch in
matters on which the employee had worked or had authority over while with the
government,39 there are certain so-called “cooling off” or “no contact” periods which
may apply to any matter before one’s former agency, department or branch of
government, regardless of whether or not one had worked on it while with the
government.
As to those restrictions relevant to lobbying the Congress, the statute prohibits
former Members of Congress from making representations, that is, appearances or
communications with intent to influence, on any matter before any Member, officer,
or employee of the entire legislative branch of government for one year after the
Member leaves office.40 The staff of a Member, if compensated above a particular
rate, may not “lobby” that Member or his or her staff for one year after leaving
employment, and covered staff of committees may not lobby any Members or staff
37 141 Congressional Record 20045, 20053, July 24, 1995, statements of Senator Simpson.
38 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7).
39 All officers and employees of the executive branch are prohibited from “switching sides”
on a specific case or matter, that is, they are prohibited from ever making “with the intent
to influence” any communication or appearance on behalf of a private party before a federal
department or agency on a particular matter involving specific parties if the employee had
worked personally and substantially on that matter for the government while in its employ.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). A similar restriction on “switching sides” applies for two years to
executive branch personnel who, although they did not work on the matter personally or
substantially, had such particular matter involving specific parties under their official
responsibility while with the government. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2). See also definitions at 18
U.S.C. § 207(i)(1)(A).
40 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1).

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of that committee for one year after leaving employment.41 The “cooling off” period
for former executive branch officials, however, would not restrict such former
officials from general lobbying directed at the U.S. Congress immediately after their
government employment.42
In addition to the “cooling off” periods that apply to a broad range of matters,
there also exists for former government officials, including Members of Congress,
more narrow restrictions applicable to representations concerning foreign trade,
treaties, or foreign governmental representations. Under such restrictions, no federal
employee or official, including a Member or employee of Congress, who has
participated in trade or treaty negotiations on behalf of the United States and had
access to certain non-public information may, for one year after leaving office,
represent, aid, or advise any other person with respect to such ongoing trade or treaty
negotiations.43 In addition, those high-level government officials who are subject
to the general one-year “cooling off” or “no contact” bans, including Members of
Congress and certain congressional staff, are also prohibited, for one year after
leaving the government, from lobbying for, representing, aiding, or advising any
official foreign entity with the intent to influence the official actions of any officer
or employee of a department or agency of the United States, including Members of
Congress.44
Congressional Ethics Rules
In addition to statutory laws applicable to lobbyists and lobbying, there are
internal congressional rules in both the House and the Senate which establish and
provide ethical guidelines and standards of conduct for Members, officers and
employees of those bodies. While these are internal rules and are not necessarily
enforceable against, nor applicable directly to private parties who lobby the Congress,
these House and Senate Rules will obviously impact and influence the activities and
conduct of lobbyists. Ethical guidelines and professional standards for lobbyists
expressed by voluntary organizations of professional lobbyists may contain a specific
requirement for compliance with congressional ethical standards. The guidelines
adopted by the American League of Lobbyists, for example, provide in part that “A
lobbyist should not cause a public official to violate any law, regulation or rule
41 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2),(3). In addition, Senate Rules impose a one-year post-employment
ban on lobbying by Members and staff. All former staff of a Senator, if they are registered
lobbyists or paid by registered lobbyists, are prohibited from lobbying that Member and staff
for one year, and all such former committee staff are barred for one year after leaving from
lobbying the Members and staff of that committee. Senate Rule 37, cl. 9.
42 Restrictions on high level executive branch officials prohibit such officials from making
representational communications and appearances before their former agencies for one year
after leaving the government, and restrict for one year certain very high level officials from
making representational or advocacy communications or appearances before their former
agency and to any individual who occupies an executive level position anywhere in the
executive branch, but does not apply to lobbying Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) and (d).
43 18 U.S.C. § 207(b).
44 18 U.S.C. § 207(f); note definitions at 18 U.S.C. § 207(i)(1)(B).

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applicable to such public official.”45 It is probably stating the obvious to note that
conduct and pressures exerted by a lobbyist which place a Member of Congress or
a congressional staffer in a compromising ethical position may in the long run be
counterproductive to one’s lobbying goals.
Gifts.
Restrictive rules on the acceptance of gifts from private sources were adopted
by both Houses of Congress for their Members and staff in 1995, and the House
Rules were amended in 1999.46 The Rules prohibit the solicitation of any gift from
persons such as lobbyists, and generally prohibit the receipt of most gifts by
Members, officers, and employees of the Congress from private sources, except in
those circumstances expressly permitted in the applicable Senate or House Rule.
Although the general rule is that the receipt of all gifts is generally prohibited unless
authorized by the Rules, the House and Senate Rules list over 20 express exceptions
to the gift prohibition.
The House and Senate gift rules serve, in effect, as both an implementation and
exceptions to the statutory gift provisions enacted into law in 1989, as part of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of gifts from any
person doing business with or seeking action from one’s agency, or who is affected
by the performance of one’s official duties.47 Since the exceptions in the House and
Senate gift rules allow for the receipt of gifts in certain circumstances, but do not
authorize the solicitation of any such gifts, Members, officers and employees are still
prohibited by law from soliciting any gifts from those doing business with or seeking
action from the Congress. This discussion is intended only as a summary and
overview of the gift restrictions. For specific fact situations, and details on the
prohibitions, reference should be made to the actual language of the applicable House
or Senate Rule, and to interpretations of the House Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct or the Senate Select Committee on Ethics.
General Restriction. The House and Senate Rules now provide that
Members, employees, and officers of the House or Senate may not solicit gifts and
may not accept gifts from any source except in narrowly defined circumstances
expressly set out in the respective Rules.
The limitations and prohibitions in these Rules apply not only to gifts given
directly to the Member, officer, or employee of the House or Senate, but also gifts to
a family member of the Member, officer, or employee, if the gift is given “with the
knowledge and acquiescence” of the Member, officer, or employee, and if the
45 American League of Lobbyists, “Code of Ethics,” Article 2, Section 2.2, adopted on
February 28, 2000.
46 S.Res. 158, 104th Cong. (July 28, 1995); H.Res. 250, 104th Cong. (November 16, 1995),
see H.Res. 9, 106th Cong., January 6, 1999, providing for de minimis exception.
47 P.L. 101-194, Section 303, 5 U.S.C. § 7353; specifically 5 U.S.C. § 7353(b)(1).

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Member, officer, or employee “has reason to believe the gift was given because of”
his or her official position.48
Gifts from Lobbyists. While gifts from all private sources are generally
covered by the prohibitions and restrictions of the House and Senate gift rules, the
provisions may apply to gifts from lobbyists on an even more restrictive basis, as
some of the exceptions made to the general prohibitions will allow these kinds of
gifts from the general public, but will not exempt gifts from registered lobbyists or
from agents of foreign principals registered under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act. Specifically, while a lobbyist or foreign agent may be a “relative” or a “personal
friend” of a Member, officer and employee, and may thus fit within one of those two
exceptions to the gift ban, the “personal hospitality” of a lobbyist or a foreign agent
is not separately exempt from the rules prohibitions, and thus Members and
employees may not accept meals or lodging in the home of a lobbyist solely under
the “personal hospitality” exemption.49 Similarly, while contributions to an
authorized legal defense fund are permitted from anyone as an express exemption to
the gifts rules, such contributions may not be received from lobbyists or foreign
agents under that exemption;50 nor may necessary travel or transportation expenses
for “fact finding” or other such events “in connection with” official duties be
accepted from lobbyists or from foreign agents.51
Lobbyists and agents of foreign principals are expressly prohibited from
providing anything to an entity or organization that is “maintained or controlled” by
a Member, officer, or employee;52 are prohibited from making charitable
contributions on the basis of a recommendation or designation of a Member, officer,
or employee (other than a contribution in lieu of an honorarium if properly reported
within 30 days);53 and may not make any contribution or expenditure relating to a
conference or retreat or the like sponsored by or affiliated with an official
congressional organization for or on behalf of Members, officers or employees.54
De Minimis Exception. Both the House and Senate Rules currently provide
a de minimis exception for gifts from private sources, and allow for the acceptance
of a gift (including the gift of a meal) if the gift has a value of less than $50.55 Gifts
aggregating $100 or more in a year from any one source, however, may not be
accepted. Any gift of $10 or more will be counted toward the yearly aggregate, but
no specific accounting or formal record keeping for all such gifts of $10 or more is
expressly required by the Rules. Certain items of “nominal value” or with “little
48 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(2)(B)(i); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(b)(2)(A).
49 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(P); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(17); see infra p. 16.
50 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(E) and cl. 5(c)(3); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(5) and cl. 3(c).
51 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(1)(A); Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(a)(1).
52 House Rule 25, cl. 5(c)(1); Senate Rule 35, cl. 3(a).
53 House Rule 25, cl. 5(c)(2) and (d); Senate Rule 35, cl. 3(b) and 4.
54 House Rule 25, cl. 5(c)(4); Senate Rule 35, cl. 3(d).
55 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(1)(B); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(a)(2).

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intrinsic value,” such as greeting cards, baseball caps and T-shirts, are also expressly
exempt from the gifts limitation.56
Exception for Gifts from Family and Friends. One of the major
categories of exemption from the strict gifts prohibitions are gifts from one’s
relatives, and gifts from personal friends. The House and Senate gift bans, seeking
not to unduly interfere with normal family and personal relationships, allow the
receipt and exchange of gifts from and between family members.57
Similarly, Members, officer and employees may continue to exchange gifts with
or receive gifts from personal friends.58 If a gift from a personal friend is to exceed
$250 in value, however, the Member, officer, or employee must get a written
determination from the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in the
House, or the Senate Select Committee on Ethics in the Senate, that the exception
still applies.59 In an effort not to create too large a potential “loophole” within the
gifts rules by allowing one to merely claim that any gift-giver is a “friend,” the rules
establish certain criteria or factors to be considered in determining whether one
qualifies as a personal “friend,” including whether the Member, officer, or employee
has a history of personal friendship and gift exchange with this individual; whether
the individual in question paid personally for the gift, or was reimbursed or claimed
a tax deduction for it; and whether the Member, officer, or employee knew that
similar gifts were given by this individual to other Members, officer or employees.60
A person who is a lobbyist by profession, but is also a relative or a personal
friend (as defined) of a Member of Congress or of a congressional staffer, may
therefore continue to participate in normal gift giving and gift exchanges based on
that personal relationship with his or her relative, friend or fiance(e).
Meals, Food, and Refreshments. A meal provided to the Member, officer,
or employee is considered a “gift” to that Member, officer, or employee, and may not
be accepted unless it meets other specific exceptions.61 Since there is a general
exemption for gifts of less than $50, however, a meal may generally be accepted as
long as the value of the meal is below that amount (and does not exceed the $100
yearly aggregate from that one source).62 When food or refreshments are offered
56 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(W); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(23).
57 Family member is defined in the Ethics in Government Act to include a wide variety of
relatives and specifically the fiance(e) of the Member, officer, or employee. 5 U.S.C.A.
App. 6, § 109(16). House Rule 25, cl.5(a)(3)(C); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(3).
58 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(D)(i); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(4)(A).
59 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(5); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(e).
60 House Rule 25 cl.5(a)(3)(D)(ii)(I)-(III); Senate Rule 35,cl. 1(c)(4)(B)(i)-(iii).
61 See definition of “gift,” House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(2)(A); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(b)(1).
62 In the House, a gift rule change in 2003 now provides that the value of food sent by an
outside, private source to a congressional office for the staff will be prorated among the
employees sharing the items, to determine if such value is less than $50 per staff employee,
(continued...)

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simultaneously (same time and place) to both a Member, officer, or employee and his
or her spouse or dependent, only the food provided to the Member, officer, or
employee will be considered a “gift” for the purpose of figuring the amount of such
a gift under the Rules.63
It should be noted also that under both the House and Senate Rules,
refreshments and food of “nominal value,” when not part of a meal, are expressly
exempt from the gifts restriction and may be accepted without violation of the gift
rules.64 This exception would appear to allow one to partake of refreshments,
appetizers, or hors d’oeuvres commonly served at receptions and parties, without
regard to the gift prohibition, and without regard to whether the sponsor is a
“lobbyist,” a lobbying organization, or an entity which employs lobbyists.
Although meals are generally included in the definition of a “gift,” and although
free meals from private individuals or organizations are not in themselves exempt
from the gift ban, there are a number of situations and instances where a Member,
officer, or employee may accept such a meal under the House and Senate gift rules,
even without regard to the $50 de minimis limitation. Members, officers, and
employees would be able to accept such gifts of meals when in connection with
attendance at a political fundraising event sponsored by a political organization;65
from family and personal friends;66 in connection with outside, private business
employment activities, employment discussions with a prospective employer, or
when provided by a political organization in connection with a campaign event
sponsored by the political organization;67 in the course of permissible “training”
events when served to all attendees as an integral part of the event;68 when an
individual provides “personal hospitality” at his or her personal or family residence
(but a registered lobbyist or agent of a foreign principal does not qualify for the
personal hospitality exemption);69 in connection with the permissible attendance at
“widely attended” gatherings, including charitable events, when taken in a group
62 (...continued)
rather than having the entire amount attributable to the employing Member (as previously
done). House Rule 25, clause 5(a)(1)(B), H.Res. 5, 108th Congress, January 7, 2003. The
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has noted certain caveats in this new
Rule, including the direction that food must be refused entirely “if the person offering it has
a direct interest in the particular legislation or other official business on which staff is
working at the time”; and that any such gifts may not be solicited. “Recent Gift Rule
Amendment,” Memorandum, April 11, 2003, at 1 - 2.
63 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(2)(B)(ii); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(b)(2)(B).
64 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(U); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(22).
65 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(B); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(2).
66 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(C) and (D); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(3) and (4).
67 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(G)(i)-(iii); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(7)(A)-(C).
68 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(L); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(13).
69 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(P); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(17).

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setting;70 or in connection with the acceptance of necessary expenses for approved
“fact-finding” or officially connected conference expenses.71
Exception for Personal Hospitality. In addition to the exceptions for gifts
from relatives and gifts made on the basis of “personal friendship,” the House and
Senate gift rules also exempt from the gift prohibitions certain gifts of “personal
hospitality” provided by an individual who is not a registered lobbyist nor an agent
of a foreign principal.72 The personal hospitality must be provided by an individual,
and not a corporation or an organization, for a non-business purpose at the personal
residence or on property or facilities owned by the individual or his or her family.
Exception for Attendance at Widely Attended Gatherings. Members,
officers or employees are expressly permitted, as an exception to the gift rules, to
accept an offer of free attendance at a “widely attended” gathering, such as a
“convention, conference, symposium, forum, panel discussion, dinner, viewing,
reception, or similar event,” when the free attendance is offered by the sponsor of the
event, and when the Member, officer, or employee is either to “participate” in the
event, or, if the Member, officer, or employee is not participating, when the event is
deemed “appropriate to the performance of the official duties” or the representative
function of the Member, officer, or employee attending.73 A House Member, officer,
or employee may also bring an accompanying individual to such an event,74 and a
Senator, officer or employee of the Senate may also bring an accompanying
individual if others in attendance will be so accompanied, or when appropriate to
assist in the representation of the Senate.75 When permitted to attend, the “free
attendance” which one may accept is intended to include the waiver of the conference
or other fee, local transportation, and food, refreshments, entertainment and
instructional material provided to all the attendees as an integral part of the event.
The acceptance of entertainment or food collateral to the event, or not taken in a
group setting, is not permitted as part of the exception, and would be considered as
a gift and therefore within the gift limitations.76
Exception for Charitable Events. The attendance of a Member, officer,
or employee at a charitable event is generally treated as attendance at a “widely
attended” gathering. That is, it appears that Members, officers, and employees were
intended to be able to accept (for themselves and an accompanying individual) free
attendance at charitable events, including the waiver of entrance or other such fees,
and the provision of meals, food, and entertainment provided as an integral part of
the event to all attendees. In the House, the Member, officer, or employee, however,
70 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(4); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(d).
71 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b); Senate Rule 35, cl. 2.
72 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(P); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(17).
73 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(3)(Q) and cl. 5(a)(4)(A)(i) and (ii); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(c)(18)
and cl. 1(d)(1)(A) and (B).
74 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(4)(B).
75 Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(d)(2).
76 House Rule 25, cl. 5(a)(4)(D); Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(d)(4).

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is expressly prohibited from accepting “reimbursement for transportation or lodging”
expenses (other than for local transportation) in connection with such event.77 In the
Senate, when a charitable event is not substantially recreational in nature (that is,
when the event is not, for example, a celebrity golf, tennis, or ski event or the like),
and when the Senator, officer, or employee meets the requirements for “necessary”
expenses for travel regarding “fact-finding” or other officially connected events, such
“necessary” expenses may be accepted for charitable fund-raising events.78
Exception for Necessary Expenses for “Officially Connected”
Travel, “Fact-Finding” Events, and Conferences. Members, officers, and
employees of the House and Senate may, under certain conditions and restrictions,
continue to accept (from other than lobbyists or agents of a foreign principal)
reimbursement or payment in kind for “necessary transportation, lodging and related
expenses for travel” for such things as fact-finding trips, meetings, speeches,
conferences or similar events “in connection with the duties of the Member, officer
or employee as an officeholder.”79 Such reimbursement, since it is in connection
with the official duties of a Member or employee, is considered in theory to be a
reimbursement to the House of Representatives or to the Senate, rather than a
prohibited personal gift to the Member, officer, or employee, when certain conditions
and restrictions are observed.
Employees of the House or Senate must receive advance approval to accept any
such reimbursements; and Members, officers and employees must provide a detailed
disclosure of the expenses reimbursed within 30 days after the travel is completed.80
In the House of Representatives, transportation expenses may not be accepted for
travel for more than four days within the United States or seven days exclusive of
travel time outside of the United States, unless approved in advance by the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct;81 while in the Senate travel expenses
for such events are authorized only for up to three days for travel within the United
States and seven days for foreign travel.82
The permission to accept “necessary” travel expenses for events “in connection
with the duties of a Member, officer or employee as an officeholder” does not apply
to any events “which are substantially recreational in nature.”83 Furthermore, the
permissible expenditures which may be reimbursed under the exception are limited
to “reasonable expenditures” for “transportation, lodging, conference fees and
77 House Rule 25, cl.5(a)(4)(C).
78 Senate Rule 35, cl. 1(d)(3), and Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(a)-(e). Note CRS Report RL33047,
Restrictions on the Acceptance of ‘Officially Connected’ Travel Expenses From Private
Sources Under House and Senate Ethics Rules, by Jack Maskell.
79 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(1), Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(a).
80 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(1)(A)(i) and cl. 5(b)(2) and (3); Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(a)(1)(A) and
(B), cl. 2(b) and (c).
81 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(4)(A).
82 Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(d)(1).
83 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(1)(B); Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(a)(2).

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materials, and food and refreshments,” and expressly do not extend to expenditures
for “recreational activities,” nor for expenditures for entertainment “other than that
provided to all attendees as an integral part of the event.”84 In the House of
Representatives, Members, officers and employees may accept permissible
reimbursement expenses for such officially connected events for an accompanying
relative,85 and in the Senate acceptable expenses may include the expenses for a
Member’s, officer’s or employee’s spouse or child if attendance is “appropriate to
assist in the representation of the Senate.”86
Other Exceptions. Other exceptions to the strict prohibition on the receipt
of any gifts include anything for which fair market value is paid or anything not used
and promptly returned; political contributions or attendance at political fundraisers
sponsored by a political organization; payments to legal defense funds (other than
those from lobbyists and foreign agents); gifts from another Member, officer, or
employee of the Senate or House; food, refreshments, lodging, transportation and
other benefits resulting from outside business or employment activities, from
prospective employers, or provided by a political organization in connection with a
fundraiser or campaign event; pensions and similar benefits from a former employer;
informational materials sent to a Member’s office in the form of books, articles,
periodicals, written material, or tapes; awards or prizes in events open to the public;
honorary degrees and nonmonetary awards for public service; training if in the
interest of the House of Representatives or the Senate; bequests and inheritances;
items which may be received under the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act,87 the
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act,88 or other statute; anything paid for
by federal, State, or local government; opportunities and benefits generally available
to the public or to a group of federal or government employees; a plaque, trophy or
commemorative item; anything for which the House Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct or the Senate Select Committee on Ethics provides a waiver; and
home-State products donated to the Member primarily for promotional purposes such
as display or free distribution, and which are of minimal value to any individual
recipient.
Honoraria, Private Compensation.
It had been a somewhat common practice in the past, although subject to much
criticism, for a “special interest” or lobbying group, or a group or organization
represented by a lobbyist, to invite a Member of Congress or a senior staffer to speak
or appear before the group in connection with subject matters of interest to the
organization, and to offer the Member or congressional staffer an “honorarium” for
the speech or personal appearance. Under ethics provisions in House and Senate
Rules, however, the practice of receiving an “honorarium” for a speech, article, or an
84 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(4)(B) and (C); Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(d)(2) and (3).
85 House Rule 25, cl. 5(b)(4)(D).
86 Senate Rule 35, cl. 2(d)(4).
87 5 U.S.C. § 7342.
88 22 U.S.C. § 2458a.

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appearance is now flatly prohibited for all Members of the House and the Senate,
Senate staff, and for senior House employees and officers.89
The honoraria prohibitions in the House and Senate exclude the costs of “actual
and necessary” travel expenses provided or reimbursed by the sponsor of the event,
that is, transportation and subsistence expenses incident to the event provided to the
official and his or her spouse or family member may be accepted. In the Senate, a
Senator may bring an employee acting as an aide to an event rather than a family
member. A contribution to charity of up to $2,000 may generally be made by the
sponsor of the event in lieu of the payment of an honorarium to the member or
employee, without violation of this provision or the new gift rule.90
The receipt of any outside earned income or compensation from private parties
by Members and staff of Congress will encounter other restrictions and limitations.
As a general standard, the congressional rules in the House and in the Senate prohibit
a Member or an employee from receiving any compensation or allowing any
compensation “to accrue to his beneficial interest from any source, the receipt of
which would occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from his position in
Congress.”91 Other restrictions exist on the receipt of outside income, such as
prohibitions on receiving any compensation (or certain gifts) from foreign
governments;92 Member of Congress contracts with the federal government or receipt
of any benefits out of federal government contracts;93 receiving compensation for
representational services before federal agencies;94 and “self dealing” with “private
foundations,” which are the subject of certain tax restrictions.95
89 House Rule 25, cl. 1(a)(2); Senate Rule 36. House officers and employees compensated
less than 120% of the minimum pay for a GS-15 may receive an honorarium if the subject
matter is not directly related to their official duties, the payment is not made because of their
status as House officials or employees, and the offering entity does not have interests
substantially affected by the performance or non-performance of their official duties.
Although the statutory honoraria ban was found unconstitutional for federal employees in
United States v. N.T.E.U., 513 U.S. 454 (1995), and although the Department of Justice has
ruled that it will not enforce the statutory ban against any officer or employee even in the
legislative or judicial branches of government (see Office of Legal Counsel Opinion,
February 26, 1996), Members and employees of the House and Senate still come within and
are subject to the prohibitions in House and Senate Rules.
90 Senate Rule 36, see §§ 501(c) and 505(3) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as
added by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989; Senate Rule 35, cl. 4; House Rule 25, cl. 1(c), and
House Rule 25, cl. 4(b) and cl. 5(d).
91 House Rule 23, cl. 3; Senate Rule 37, cl. l.
92 Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 8.
93 18 U.S.C. §§ 431, 432; 41 U.S.C. § 22.
94 18 U.S.C. § 203.
95 26 U.S.C. §§ 4941, 4946.

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Earned income rules and restrictions enacted into law and contained in House
and Senate Rules provide that all Members of Congress and certain senior staff96 are
subject to an outside earned-income cap which is equal to 15% of the official salary
of a level II in the Executive Schedule; and they may not (1) affiliate with a firm to
provide compensated professional services involving a fiduciary relationship; (2)
allow any such firm to use one’s name; (3) practice a profession which involves a
fiduciary relationship for compensation; (4) serve for compensation as an officer or
board member of any association or corporation; or (5) receive compensation for
teaching without prior approval of the Standards of Official Conduct Committee.97
Income received over certain amounts, as well as certain gifts, and reimbursements
for travel, must be publicly disclosed by the recipient official in annual personal
financial disclosure statements required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
as amended.98
Unwritten Standards of Conduct and Propriety.
It should be kept in mind that in addition to express written rules, either the
House or the Senate may exercise its constitutional authority for the self-protection
and integrity of the institution by disciplining a Member or employee of that body for
conduct which violates no express House or Senate Rule or law, but which is found
contrary to acceptable ethical norms and/or which tends to bring the institution into
dishonor or disrepute.99 The Senate, for example, has censured a Senator for placing
a paid lobbyist for a trade association with interests in particular tariff legislation, on
the staff of the committee considering such legislation, with access to the confidential
committee material. In this censure of Senator Bingham in 1929 for conduct which
violated no express rule or law, the resolution noted that the action of the Senator
“while not the result of corrupt motives on the part of the Senator from Connecticut,
is contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics and tends to bring the Senate into
96 The limitations apply to non-career employees in the government who are compensated
at a rate equal to or more than 120% of the base salary for a GS-15. 5 U.S.C. App., - Ethics
in Government Act, § 501(a); House Rule 25, cl. 4(a); Senate Rule 36.
97 5 U.S.C. App., - Ethics in Government Act, §§ 501(a), 502. Senate staff earning in excess
of $25,000 are subject to somewhat similar limitations by Senate Rules, and may not
affiliate with a firm or partnership to provide professional services for compensation; may
not permit one’s name to be used in such a form; may not practice a profession for
compensation “to any extent” during regular office hours of the Senate; and may not be an
officer or board member of any publicly held or regulated corporation, financial institution
or business entity (does not include non-profit, tax-exempt organizations). Senate Rule 37,
cl. 5 and 6.
98 5 U.S.C. App., Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101 et seq.; House Rule 26; Senate Rule 34.
99 Constitution, Article I, Section 5. Note H.R.Rpt. 90-27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26, 29
(1967); House Rule 23, cl. 1; Ethics Manual for Members, Officers and Employees of the
U.S. House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-16 (1992); S.Res. 338, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., Sec. 2(a) (1964), Standing Orders of the Senate, Senate Manual, § 79; S.Rept. 83-
2508, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1954); Senate Ethics Manual, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14
(2000).

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dishonor and disrepute....”100 The House of Representatives has disciplined Members
based in part on violations of provisions of the “Code of Ethics for Government
Service” which states, among other provisions, that an elected or appointed official
in the government should not accept favors or benefits “under circumstances which
may be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his
government duties.”101
Members, staff and those who deal with them on a professional basis must thus
be cognizant not only of express ethics rules, regulations and statutory provisions,
but must also be sensitive to the perceptions and appearances of impropriety, special
access or favoritism that may result from particular transactions and activities.
Other Statutory Considerations
Campaign Contributions.
Lobbyists are not as a class prohibited from making campaign contributions to
the campaign of a Member of Congress, nor are there specific limitations on federal
campaign contributions because one is a “lobbyist.” However, with respect to
campaign contributions to a Member of Congress, and in a federal election generally,
it should be noted that cash contributions over $100 are prohibited by federal law;102
that political contributions from the treasury funds of corporations, national banks,
labor unions, or from federal government contractors are prohibited by federal law;103
that campaign contributions are prohibited from foreign nationals,104 or by one in the
name of another;105 that there are limitations (indexed for inflation) on amounts that
may be contributed to federal candidates of $2,000 per election, primary or run-off
from individuals, and $5,000 per election, primary or run-off from political action
committees (multi-candidate committees);106 that political contributions to federal
candidates are required to be publicly reported by the recipient campaign committee
of the candidate;107 and that no campaign contributions may be converted by a
Member of Congress to personal use.108
100 S.Res. 146, 71st Cong. (1929). Note S. Doc. No. 92-7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., “Senate
Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972” (1972).
101 72 Stat. Part II, B12, ¶5.
102 2 U.S.C. § 441g.
103 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 441c.
104 2 U.S.C. § 441e.
105 2 U.S.C. § 441f.
106 2 U.S.C. § 441a.
107 2 U.S.C. § 434. For a general overview of current federal campaign finance law, see CRS
Report RL31402, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: Summary and Comparison with
Previous Law, by Joseph E. Cantor and L. Paige Whitaker.
108 House Rule 23, cl. 6; Senate Rule 38, cl. 2; note 2 U.S.C. § 439a.

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Bribery, Illegal Gratuities, and Fraud.
Whenever things of value are offered to a public official, consideration should
be given to the federal criminal law provisions that concern bribery and illegal
gratuities, and to those provisions of federal criminal law proscribing fraudulent
deprivation of the “honest services” of a public official.
Under the bribery law, a federal official may not “corruptly” receive or solicit,
and no one may corruptly offer or give, anything of value “in return for ... being
influenced in the performance of any official act.”109 The “corrupt” nature of the
transaction is part of the required intent which is characteristic of a “bribe.” This
element of the offense — a corrupt agreement or bargain — has been described as
requiring some express or implied quid pro quo involved in the transaction, that is,
something given in exchange for something else.110 The bribe under these
circumstances must be shown to be the thing that is the “prime mover or producer of
the official act” performed or agreed to be performed.111 Even a campaign
contribution could be the “thing of value” given as a bribe, since the recipient public
official need not benefit personally from a bribe that is received by a third party, such
as a campaign committee. In United States v. Anderson,112 the court upheld the
conviction of a registered lobbyist for a mail-order company for bribing a Senator
with “campaign contributions” to vote on certain postal rate legislation, when the
evidence was sufficient to indicate a “corrupt intent” to influence by means of such
payments, as opposed to the permissible activity of merely giving “campaign
contributions inspired by the recipient’s general position of support on particular
legislation.”113
In addition to the bribery clause, the so-called “illegal gratuities” section of the
same statute prohibits the giving or the receipt of something of value, other than as
provided by law, “for or because of” an official act done or to be done.114 Campaign
contributions given for a political candidate who is a federal officeholder are unlikely
to be involved in the case of illegal gratuities, since the thing of value given in the
case of an illegal gratuity (unlike for a bribe) must be received for the official
“personally” or for himself.115
109 18 U.S.C. § 201, see specifically 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
110 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404 (1999); United
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C.Cir. 1974); United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730,
734, 735 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 1995).
111 United States v. Brewster, supra at 72, 82.
112 509 F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
113 Id. at 330-331. Political contributions to entities do not in themselves constitute bribes
“even though many contributors hope that the official will act favorably because of their
contributions.” United States v. Tomblin, supra at 1379.
114 18 U.S.C. § 201(c).
115 United States v. Brewster, supra at 77. The statute was amended in 1986, P.L. 99-646,
§46(f),(g), 100 Stat. 3601-3604, to provide technical amendments to the criminal code,
(continued...)

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However, as to personal gifts to a public official, it should be noted that the
“illegal gratuities” clause is less exacting than the bribery clause as to the required
intent. The “illegal gratuities” section does not require a specific “corrupt” intent,
nor a corrupt bargain or quid pro quo such that the gift or other thing of value is the
“motivator” or the influence for the official act, as is required in the bribery
provision.116 Rather, the illegal gratuities provision requires merely that the thing of
value given or received was “other than as provided by law,” and was given or
received “for or because of” some identifiable official act. Since the illegal gratuity
need not be the motivator of an official act, nor is it required that the illegal gratuity
be intended to influence an official act, an illegal gratuity may even be given after an
act has already been performed, as a “thank you” or in appreciation for the official
act. The Supreme Court explained the differing intents required in the two clauses
as follows:
The distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent element. Bribery requires
intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while
illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or
because of” an official act. In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro
quo — a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an
official act. An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may constitute merely a
reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may have
already determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.117
Although no specific illegal bargain, or “corrupt” intent, in giving or receiving
an illegal gratuity need be shown, there is nevertheless a criminal intent requirement
embodied in the characterization “illegal gratuity” (the criminal receipt of a payment)
as distinguished from a mere “gift” unrelated to any official act. That intent has been
described as knowingly being compensated or rewarded (or intending to compensate
or reward an official), other than as provided by law for one’s salary, for an official
governmental act already performed or to be performed in the future by the official.118
While some cases in the circuits had gone so far as to find that a specific official act
need not be contemplated or identified for a payment or gift to constitute an “illegal
gratuity,” as long as the payment or gift was given to a recipient who is in a “position
115 (...continued)
including changing the terms “for himself” to “personally.” There is no indication of an
intent to change the substance of the elements of the offense. If facts are developed that
contributions, ostensibly made to a third party or entity “for or because of” official acts done
or to be done by a public official, were in fact used or expended in a manner to financially
enrich or financially benefit the official personally, then it might be argued that such funds
were received “personally” or “for himself.” Contributions to a campaign committee,
therefore, which are wrongfully converted to personal use and are used, for example, to pay
for personal living expenses of a public official, or other personal expenses such as
transportation, clothing, or food, might arguably be considered payments received
“personally” for or by the official.
116 Brewster, supra at 72; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, supra at 404 - 405.
117 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, supra at 404 - 405.
118 United States v. Brewster, supra at 81, 82, quoting earlier Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527 (1972);United States of Irwin, 354 F.2d 192,
196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).

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to use his authority in a manner which could affect the gift giver,”119 the Supreme
Court in the Sun-Diamond case confirmed that such so-called “status gifts,”
unconnected to any identified official act, were not violative of the criminal illegal
gratuities provision.120 Such so-called “status gifts,” without the requisite criminal
intent of a connection to any official act, are regulated and controlled by federal
regulations and administrative provisions for executive branch officers and
employees,121 and in the case of Members and employees of Congress are governed
by the House and Senate Rules discussed above.
It should be noted that Congress in 1988 amended the mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes to expressly include within the scope of those criminal laws a “a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”122 Under the
current mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, therefore, when a Member of Congress
receives something of value, such as a “gift” from a lobbyist or another private
individual, and there can be shown some connection between the gift and public
services provided, or some influence intended by the donor or recipient on the
performance of an official “service” by the Member of Congress, then a violation of
this law might be established, although the exact parameters of the prohibition, the
required connection or “nexus” of the gift to a particular “service,” and the precise
kinds of official acts that would constitute the “services” contemplated by the law are
not entirely settled as matters of federal law.123
Further Ethical Considerations for Attorneys
As a profession, attorneys may be called upon more often than others to provide
legislative representational services for clients. When lobbying the Congress, as in
providing other professional services for a client, there are certain ethical rules,
guidelines, and considerations which are unique to and need to be recognized and
observed by attorneys.
The American Bar Association has promulgated Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which have been adopted in one form or another within the various
119 United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 69 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980
(1978); United States v. Allessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 94 (1976).
120 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, supra at 406 - 410. See also United States v.
Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
121 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.201 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7353.
122 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346. The “honest services” provision was added by Congress
in 1988 to rectify the gap in the law pointed out in the McNally decision (McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 (1987)), which had found that the mail fraud and wire fraud laws,
as then worded, did not include the deprivation of the “intangible” right of honest services
of a public official. P.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508, November 18, 1988.
123 Compare, e.g.,United States v. Espy, 23 F.Supp.2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1998); United States
v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1020,
1024-1026 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 116 (1979); and United States v. Ney,
Criminal Information, (D.D.C. September 15, 2006).

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jurisdictions. These rules discuss ethical considerations and norms for attorneys in
not only representing clients before courts, but also in representing clients in non-
adjudicatory matters, such as before a legislature:
RULE 3.9: Advocate in Non-adjudicative Proceedings
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in
a non-adjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a
representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a)
through (c), 3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5.
COMMENT:
[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and
executive and administrative agencies acting in a rulemaking or policy-making
capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the
matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be
able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing
before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with
applicable rules of procedure.
[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before non-adjudicative bodies,
as they do before a court. The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject
lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However,
legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal
with them as they deal with courts.
The ethical rules referenced in Rule 3.9 concern, among other items, duties of
attorneys not to knowingly make false statements, or to fail to disclose a material fact
to a tribunal when such non-disclosure may further a fraud or criminal act of the
client (Rule 3.3), as well as specific prohibitions on improper and undue influence
of an officer (Rule 3.5). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also note that it
is “professional misconduct” for a lawyer to “state or imply an ability to influence
improperly a government agency or official” (Rule 8.4(e)).
Attorneys should also be aware that in addition to federal post-employment
“revolving door” laws, under the American Bar Association Model Rules after a
lawyer leaves public employment he “shall not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government
agency consents after consultation.”124 This may in some instances limit the
representational activities of attorneys for clients before Congress when the attorneys
have left public employment; the issue would most likely not arise in the context of
general lobbying activities by the attorney, but rather in his or her capacity as
counselor for someone subject to such proceedings as committee investigatory
proceedings and hearings.125
124 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.11.
125 See discussion, for example, of former rule as it applied to litigation in General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 648-651 (2d Cir. 1974); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan
Am World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22 (D.D.C. 1984).

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