Order Code RL31559
Proliferation Control Regimes:
Background and Status
Updated December 26, 2006
Sharon Squassoni, Coordinator
Steve Bowman and Steven A. Hildreth
Specialists in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status
Summary
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states
and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral
regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress
may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the
Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferation-specific legislation in the
110th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on
the regimes.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive
multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and
domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn
of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While
there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of
nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India
and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device
in 2006; Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004; and Iran was
found to be in non-compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of
the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan has spurred new thinking about
how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology.
However, the possible extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and
other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT, has raised questions about what
benefits still exist for non-nuclear weapons states that remain in the treaty regime.
The chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regimes contain
three elements: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal
Australia Group coordinates export controls on CBW-related materials and
technology. Current Australia Group issues are expansion of membership, possible
transhipment of restricted commodities, and the Group’s relationship to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. After 25 years of negotiations, the CWC entered into force in
April 1997. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use
of chemical weapons, and mandates the destruction of existing chemical weapon
arsenals. BWC states parties have not yet been able to agree upon a verification
protocol to be added to the Convention.
The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not on a treaty, but an informal
agreement created in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The
MTCR’s goal is to limit the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Thirty-four countries now adhere to the guidelines, which have been modified over
time to include missile systems designed for the delivery of chemical and biological
weapons. The regime, which has no enforcement organization, is thought to have
been instrumental in blocking several missile programs, but it has been unable to stop
North Korean missile development, production, and exports, or to win the full
cooperation of Russian and Chinese entities. This report is updated annually.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Status and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
State-to-State Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Treaties and Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1970 . . . 11
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1987 . . . 12
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga) . . . . . . . 13
African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Pelindaba) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone
(Treaty of Bangkok) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Other Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
G-8 Global Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Proliferation Security Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Related Arms Control Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Implementing the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Zangger Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
U.S. Government Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
U.S. Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Legislation . . . . 27
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Issues for the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Treaties and Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

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Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Implementing the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Australia Group (AG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
U.S. Government Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
U.S. Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Export Administration Act of 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Arms Export Control Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Biological Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Additional CW/BW Nonproliferation Policy Provisions
in Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Issues for the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Australia Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chemical Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Biological Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Domestic Controls and Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Missile Proliferation Control Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Implementing the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
International Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
U.S. Government Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
U.S. Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Missile Technology Control Act of 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The Arms Export Control Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The Export Administration Act of 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Additional Missile Nonproliferation Policy Provisions
in Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Issues for the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A. Proliferation Control Regime Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Appendix B. Additional Legislation and Executive Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
List of Tables
Table 1. Proliferation Control Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. U.S. Legal Framework for Proliferation Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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Proliferation Control Regimes:
Background and Status
Introduction1
The United States has historically led the international community in
establishing regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and missiles. The regimes and their member countries use cooperative and
coercive measures to achieve nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives.
Multilateral agreements and organizations are supplemented by strong bilateral
cooperation among key allies, unilateral political and economic actions, and recourse
to military operations should they become necessary. Congress supports the
nonproliferation regimes primarily by providing statutory authority and funding for
U.S. participation, establishing policy, and mandating punitive actions to help
enforce the international standards set by the regimes.
The term “regime” often refers to the entire array of international agreements,
multilateral organizations, national laws, regulations, and policies to prevent the
spread of dangerous weapons and technologies. The nuclear nonproliferation regime
is presently the most extensive, followed by those dealing with chemical and
biological weapons, and then by the missile regime. The difficulty of producing
nuclear weapons material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and the great
awareness of nuclear weapons’ destructiveness together have been conducive to
creating a complex regime with widespread agreement on the priority of nuclear
nonproliferation. Chemical weapons are easier to make and rely on readily available
precursors, and they are far less destructive. Biological weapons also rely on dual-
use technology, and as technology has spread, efforts to build a more extensive
control regime have intensified. Finally, there is no international consensus on the
danger of missile proliferation to support a nonproliferation treaty or a binding
regime with enforcement mechanisms.
A key aspect of all the regimes is their attempt to control exports of sensitive
goods and technologies through supplier agreements. These are the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee for nuclear technology, the Australia
Group for chemical and biological weapons technology, and the Missile Technology
Control Regime. In the last decade, these export control regimes have expanded their
membership, expanded and refined their control lists, and increased coordination
among member states. At the same time, however, the non-binding nature of some
of the regimes and growing resistance to them by certain countries, including some
regime members, limits their effectiveness. A major dilemma is whether to include
new members, such as Russia and China, that are not U.S. allies and do not have
1 This report was updated with the assistance of research associate Jill Marie Parillo.

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CRS-2
reliable export controls, or to limit membership to countries with excellent
nonproliferation credentials. Regime members are afforded special access to
controlled technology by the other members, so this issue also affects decisions on
whether to include non-allies. Table 1 lists the proliferation control regimes, their
components and statutory authority. There are many arms control treaties and other
activities that address aspects of WMD and conventional weapons beyond the
regimes covered in this report.2
Status and Trends
The nonproliferation regimes have prevented many risky transfers over the
years. However, several factors undermine their effectiveness. One is the difficulty
of addressing underlying motivations of countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Regional security conditions as well as the desire to compensate
for other countries’ superior conventional or unconventional forces have been
common motivations for WMD programs. Some countries may want WMD to
dominate their adversaries. Prestige is another reason why certain countries seek
WMD. Another factor working against the regimes is the steady diffusion of
technology over time — much of the most significant WMD technology is 50 years
old, and growing access to dual-use equipment makes it easier for countries or groups
to build their own WMD factories from commonly available civilian equipment.
There are at least two problems common to all of the nonproliferation regimes
— the lack of universal membership and gaps in verification. In the nuclear regime,
India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not members of the NPT. Apart from
diplomatic questions about how to treat their status as states with nuclear weapons
not sanctioned by the NPT, those countries are not bound by that treaty’s prohibition
on sharing nuclear technology. They are also not members of the export control
groups. The international community seems to be at a loss for how to bring these
states into the nonproliferation regimes without tacitly agreeing to their acquisition
of nuclear weapons. A major objection to the proposed U.S. nuclear cooperation
agreement with India is the perception that it legitimizes India’s nuclear weapons
program without extracting any significant concessions. Moreover, although India
has agreed to strengthen its nuclear export controls, Pakistan faces no such
obligation. Like India, Pakistan is not bound by any NPT obligations, whether or not
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan sold nuclear technology on the black market with or
without Pakistani government acquiescence. Revelations of centrifuge enrichment
technology sales to Libya, Iran, and North Korea in 2004 galvanized the international
community to examine strengthening implementation of national export controls and
interdiction. Unfortunately, the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to address these
and other challenges facing the NPT, including North Korea’s withdrawal in 2003
and Iran’s noncompliance in 2005.
In the CBW area, some states suspected of having military programs are still
outside the treaty. Within the treaties, there are some members (e.g., Iran under the
CWC and Russia under the BWC) suspected of continuing programs. In the missile
2 For coverage of these subjects, see CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, Amy F. Woolf, coordinator.

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CRS-3
area, although the Hague Code of Conduct has widespread membership, MTCR is
still not adhered to by many states (e.g., China, North Korea) that are responsible for
proliferating missile technologies.
Continued diplomatic support for the treaties may face some hurdles. In the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, many non-weapons states link their continued
cooperation with progress in implementing Article VI of the treaty (steps toward
eventual nuclear disarmament by the five nuclear weapons states). In recent years,
several developments have generated criticism: the United States’ abrogation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, which many
criticize as having little real impact and no verification; the U.S. Senate’s rejection
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; failure to proceed on a fissile material
production cutoff treaty in Geneva; and perceived interest in new U.S. nuclear
weapons.

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Table 1. Proliferation Control Regimes
U.S.
Suppliers Groups and
International
Regime
Formal Treaties
U.S. Legal Framework
Government
Informal Agreements
Organization
Agencies
Nuclear
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Zangger Committee, 1971
International
AEA, 1954
State,
Treaty (NPT), 1970
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group,
Atomic Energy
NNPA, 1978
Defense,
Convention on Physical
1975
Agency (IAEA)
FAA, 1961
Commerce,
Protection of Nuclear
G-8
U.N. Conference
AECA, 1976
Energy (+
Material, 1987
on Disarmament
EAA, 1979
national
Treaty of Tlatelolco
NPPA, 1994
laboratories),
Treaty of Rarotonga
Ex-Im Bank, 1945
Treasury
Treaty of Pelindaba
Nunn-Lugar 1991
NRC,
Treaty of Bangkok
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
intelligence
Treaty on a nuclear-
proliferation (NP) Act, 1992
agencies
weapons-free-zone (NWFZ)
Iran & Syria NP Act
in Central Asia
START Protocols
Treaty of Moscow, 2002
Chemical
Geneva Protocol, 1925
Australia Group, 1984
OPCW
EAA, 1979
State,
and
Chemical Weapons
U.N. Conference
AECA, 1976
Defense,
Biological Convention (CWC) 1993
on Disarmament
Biological Weapons Anti-
Commerce,
Terrorism Act
Treasury,
Chem-Bio Weapons Control intelligence
Biological and Toxin
Warfare Elimination Act, 1991
agencies
Weapons Convention
Nunn-Lugar
(BWC)
Freedom Support Act
Iran-Iraq Arms NP Act, 1992
Iran & Syria NP Act
Missiles
Missile Technology Control
FAA, 1961
State,
Regime, 1987
AECA, 1976
Defense,
International Code of
EAA, 1979
Commerce,
Conduct, 2002
Missile Tech. Control Act, 1990 Treasury,
Freedom Support Act
NASA
Iran-Iraq NP Act
intelligence
Iran & Syria NP Act
agencies
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Legislation abbreviations: AEA — Atomic Energy Act; AECA — Arms Export Control Act; EAA — Export Administration Act; FAA — Foreign
Assistance Act; NNPA — Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978; NPPA — Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

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State-to-State Relations
In addition to a formal framework of control agreements, close political
relationships with key allies and other countries are very important for U.S. efforts
to counter the spread and the use of WMD. Initiatives by allies, such as the G-8
Global Partnership to Combat the Spread of WMD, demonstrate resolve to tackle
specific proliferation problems. In May 2003, President Bush launched the
Proliferation Security Initiative (see description below). Many of these relationships,
nonetheless, are strongly influenced by other political, military, and economic issues
that sometimes take precedence over proliferation concerns. In practice,
nonproliferation competes with important policy objectives such as trade, regional
issues, and domestic political considerations, and uneven implementation of
nonproliferation policy can result. In particular, it appears that the Bush
administration has elevated counterterrorism cooperation above nonproliferation
cooperation in a few cases.
A more difficult challenge exists when key U.S. allies and friends seek WMD
and missiles of their own or transfer WMD technology. In that circumstance, a
breakthrough in establishing trust and cooperation might ease some of the underlying
security concerns that motivate countries to acquire WMD or to transfer WMD
technology. Perhaps the hardest challenge for nonproliferation policies is to reduce
the desire of countries for weapons of mass destruction. It is sometimes possible to
change regional security conditions through alliances, arms transfers, arms control,
or negotiations aimed at settling conflicts. However, eliminating underlying
motivations takes time, and the next best option may be to delay WMD development
for as long as possible. Libya’s decision in December 2003 to give up its nuclear,
chemical weapons, and missile programs is a good example of a state that apparently
decided the costs of WMD programs exceeded their benefits.
Unilaterally, the United States uses sanctions to support its nonproliferation
objectives. Various laws authorize or require the President to impose unilateral
sanctions on countries that acquire, use, or help other countries to obtain WMD or
missiles. Sanctions can affect U.S. aid, cooperation, and impose restrictions on U.S.
technology exports. The effectiveness of sanctions often depends on persuading
other countries to support or respect U.S. sanctions. Even without multilateral
support, sanctions can still highlight strong U.S. opposition to WMD proliferation.
However, strong sanctions are rarely imposed on U.S. friends or allies that acquire
WMD.
Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence
U.S. armed forces have developed programs to help prevent the spread of
WMD, to deter or prevent their use, and to protect against their effects. Defense
cooperation and arms transfers to U.S. allies can ease concerns about security that
can lead them to consider acquiring WMD, and also signal potential adversaries that
acquisition or use of WMD may evoke a strong military response. U.S. conventional
and nuclear military capabilities and the threat of retaliation help deter WMD attacks
against U.S. forces, territory, or allies. Counterproliferation capabilities have been
expanded in recent years to include more advanced “passive” and “active” defense

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measures. Passive counterproliferation tools include protective gear such as gas
masks and detectors to warn of the presence of WMD. Active measures include
missile defenses to protect U.S. territory, forces, and allies; precision-guided
penetrating munitions and special operation forces to attack WMD installations; and
intelligence gathering and processing capabilities. Intelligence is crucial to U.S.
nonproliferation efforts, particularly in helping shape policy options. Intelligence
agencies track foreign WMD programs, monitor treaty compliance, and attempt to
detect transfers of WMD goods and technology. The United States cooperates with
certain allies to prepare for possible counterproliferation actions. Although
counterproliferation has emerged as a main pillar of the Bush administration strategy
to combat WMD, political and technical hurdles (hidden underground bunkers,
locations near civilians, etc.) tend to make counterproliferation a last resort, after
other options have failed.
One tool of counterproliferation that the Bush Administration has highlighted
has been interdiction of WMD-related equipment shipments at sea, on land, and by
air. President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31,
2003. PSI, described as an activity rather than an organization, aims to better
coordinate states’ efforts to interdict such illicit shipments, based on existing legal
authorities.3 More than 70 countries have expressed interest in cooperating in PSI.
Congressional Role
Congress has been actively engaged in nonproliferation legislation for close to
sixty years. In addition to laws affecting diplomacy, treaty implementation and
military options, legislation effecting restrictions on foreign aid, sanctions, and
export controls help establish nonproliferation policy and congressional oversight of
executive branch nonproliferation policies.
Congress enacted strict controls on nuclear energy and cooperation in the first
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. By the 1950s, however, it became clear that the U.S.
nuclear weapons program needed materials from abroad and that pure denial of
materials and technology had neither stopped the Soviet Union nor the UK from
acquiring nuclear weapons. The 1954 revision of the Atomic Energy Act reflected
a shift in strategy from that of prevention through denial to one of influence through
cooperation. However, as allies planned to sell sensitive enrichment and
reprocessing equipment to states outside of the NPT in the 1970s (e.g., Pakistan,
South Korea, and Brazil), Congress reacted by passing several laws to slow down
nuclear commerce and implement sanctions against those states clandestinely
pursuing nuclear weapons. Controls on exports of chemical and biological agents
with military applications and missiles have been regulated under the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) of 1968, and their dual-use technologies have been regulated
under the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and its predecessors, but these
controls were implemented relatively later in the 1980s. Table 2 lists the major U.S.
laws enacted to limit the transfer of WMD and WMD technology. Over time, most
laws have been amended to address the range of WMD threats, but there are a few
laws that address only one kind of weapon of mass destruction; some laws have
3 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni.

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focused on a proliferation threat from a particular country. Nunn-Lugar-related
legislation and the Freedom Support Act address the range of WMD, but focus on
Russia and the NIS. In addition, legislation related to Iran and Syria span the range
of WMD proliferation. See Appendix B for relevant text from nonproliferation-
related legislation.
Organization of the Report
The following sections will describe the nuclear, biological, chemical, and
missile nonproliferation regimes. Each section will include (a) a background section
with a brief history of the regime; (b) a section setting out the treaties and agreements
that authorize or affect the regime; (c) a brief description of how the regime is
implemented; (d) U.S. laws authorizing or affecting the regime; and (e) issues for
110th Congress. More detailed information on regime membership, specific
provisions in law and relevant executive orders are contained in appendices.

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Table 2. U.S. Legal Framework for Proliferation Control
Target
Title
Public Law
Application
Nuclear
Chemical
Biological
Missiles
Notes
Country
Export-Import Bank Act of
P.L. 79-173
financing
X
X
X
X
Various
P.L. 107-189 added
1945
P.L. 107-189
cutoff for
enforcement of AECA,
reauth
nuclear
EAA, IEEPA as
safeguards
justification for denying
violations
financing, extending
and nuclear
purview of law to
tests after
CW/BW/missile areas
1977
Atomic Energy Act 1954
P.L. 83-703
exports;
X
Various
P.L. 95-342 added Sec
cutoff in
Sec 129
129
nuclear
cooperation
Foreign Assistance Act 1961
P.L. 87-195
aid cutoff
X
X
X
X
Various
NPPA repealed relevant
Sec 307e
Sec 498
Russia
sections in FAA and
Sec 620 E (e)
A(b)
placed them in AECA.
Sec 620 (y)
Cuba
Reference to FAA is
deemed now to refer to
sections 101 or 102 in
AECA.
Arms Export Control Act 1968 P.L. 90-629
exports, aid
X
X
X
X
Various
* NPPA 94
cutoff;
Sec 3f
Sec 81**
Sec 81
Sec 72, 73,
**P.L. 102-182 added in
sanctions
Sec 101, 102*
74
1991
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
P.L. 95-242
sanctions
X
Various
See Atomic Energy Act
1978
Export Administration Act
P.L. 96-72
export
X
X
X
X
Various
Sec 11C added in 1991
1979
controls
Sec 5, 6
Sec 6(m),
Sec 6(m),
Sec 5, 6(l),
by P.L. 102-182.
11C
11C
11B
Biological Anti-Terrorism Act
P.L. 101-298
treaty:
X
N.A.
Implements BWC
1989
BWC
Missile Technology Control
P.L. 101-510,
sanctions
X
Various
Added Chapter VII to
Act 1990
Title XVII
AECA, Sections 6 (L)
and 11B to EAA 1979

---

CRS-9
Target
Title
Public Law
Application
Nuclear
Chemical
Biological
Missiles
Notes
Country
Chemical and Biological
P.L. 102-182,
sanctions
X
X
Various
Weapons Control and Warfare Title III
Elimination Act 1991*
Nunn-Lugar 1991
P.L. 102-228
assistance
X
X
X
X
Russia
Amendment to CFE
Cooperative Threat Reduction
P.L. 103-160
programs
Treaty;
Act 1993
X
X
X
X
Title XI
Iran-Iraq Arms
P.L. 102-484
sanctions
X
X
X
X
Iran, Iraq
Nonproliferation Act 1992
Title XVI
Freedom Support Act
P.L. 102-511
assistance
X
X
X
X
NIS
Title V
programs
Nuclear Proliferation
P.L. 103-236,
sanctions
X
Various
Consolidated np
Prevention Act 1994
Title VIII
legislation into AECA,
moving it from FAA
Chemical Weapons
P.L.105-277
treaty:
X
N.A.
Convention Implementation
CWC
Act 1998
North Korea Threat Reduction P.L. 106-113
assistance;
X
North
Act of 1999
(consolidated
nuclear
Korea
appropriations)
cooperation
Iran and Syria
P.L. 109-122
third-party
X
X
X
X
Iran, Syria Covers transfers to and
Nonproliferation Act 2006
sanctions
from states
Syria Accountability and
P.L. 108-175
Export
X
X
X
X
Syria
Lebanese Sovereignty
controls,
Restoration Act of 2003
sanctions
Foreign Operations, Export
P.L. 109-102
Financing,
X
Russia
Financing, and Related
assistance
Programs Appropriations Act,
cutoff
2006
Iran & Libya Sanctions Act
P.L. 109-267
third-party
X
X
X
X
Iran, Libya Renewed by H.R. 6198,
(amended by
sanctions
Iran Freedom Support
H.R. 5877)
Act until 2011, signed by
President on Sept. 30,
2006

---

CRS-10
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive
multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and
domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn
of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While
there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of
nuclear weapons, several challenges have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan
tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003; Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons
program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in compliance with its treaty obligations
in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan has
spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including enhanced export
controls and greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the possible
extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to
India, a non-party to the NPT, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for
non-nuclear weapons states that remain within the treaty regime.
In 2004, there were five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia,
Great Britain, France, China), three de facto nuclear weapons states (India, Israel,
Pakistan), and one country — North Korea — that has probably secretly produced
enough plutonium for between two and eight bombs. This is considerably less than
predicted 40 years ago, when President Kennedy warned of the possibility that, by
the 1970s, the United States could “face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-
five nations may have these weapons.”
The nonproliferation regime has not stopped all proliferation, but it has helped
restrain nuclear ambitions and solidified an international norm of behavior strongly
condemning proliferation. Many countries that could make nuclear weapons have
not, but some have at one time or another taken significant steps towards acquiring
a nuclear weapons capability. Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, and South Korea all have had nuclear weapons development
programs. Both Japan and Germany had nuclear weapons programs during the
Second World War, but did not succeed in making nuclear weapons before their
programs were halted at the end of the war. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Sweden,
Taiwan, and South Africa abandoned their nuclear weapons programs and joined the
NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as former
Soviet republics with inherited nuclear weapons on their soil, also opted to join the
NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Despite its membership as a non-nuclear
weapons state in the NPT, Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in
December 2003.4
Only a few countries maintain an interest in developing nuclear weapons, but
it is difficult to predict how many countries or terrorist groups may in the future want
a nuclear weapons capability. Some of the major challenges in preventing nuclear
proliferation will include the following:
4 See CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Sharon
Squassoni.

---

CRS-11
! controlling access to sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, such
as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, via multilateral
ownership or some other mechanism;
! strengthening physical protection of all source and special nuclear
materials globally, with continued emphasis on controlling nuclear
materials smuggling from the former Soviet Union and other
countries with weak controls;
! strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards
system;
! strengthening national export control laws and regulations, per U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540;
! negotiating with North Korea to verify and dismantle its nuclear
weapons program;
! restraining nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan;
! restraining nuclear programs in the Middle East, including those of
Israel and Iran;
! preventing U.S. technology from aiding the development of WMD
and delivery systems in foreign countries;
! strengthening international verification and enforcement of
nonproliferation agreements.
Treaties and Agreements
The NPT [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html] is
the centerpiece of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Other relevant treaties include
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. In addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States has
also entered into bilateral agreements and initiatives, such as the G-8 Global
Partnership to Combat WMD. Finally, actions the United States takes in related
areas of arms control may have an impact on the nonproliferation regime.
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1970. It
took just three months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 for the
first proposals to emerge from governments to control the “destructive uses” of
nuclear energy. It took twenty-five years, however, for the NPT to emerge as the
blueprint for nuclear nonproliferation.5 In 1968, the treaty demarcated nuclear-
weapon states from non-nuclear-weapon states by defining nuclear-weapon states
as those states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. This definition implied that there
would only ever be five “legitimate” nuclear-weapon states — the United States,
Russia, Great Britain, France, and China. All other states would join as non-nuclear
5 Previous proposals included a 1945 proposal by the United States, Britain, and Canada
proposed to establish a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to eliminate “the use of atomic
energy for destructive purposes,” a 1957 “package” of measures (from Canada, UK, France,
and United States) to the U.N. Disarmament Commission that included a commitment not
to transfer nuclear weapons, a 1964 program proposed by the United States for
nonproliferation. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of
the Negotiations, 1990 edition, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 89.

---

CRS-12
weapon-states, agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As of 2006, there are188 parties to the NPT,
including all five nuclear weapons states.6 Although Cuba signed the NPT in 2002,
North Korea withdrew from the treaty officially in April 2003.
The pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons is verified through the application
of “nuclear safeguards” measures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
founded in 1957, devised a system of nuclear material accountancy coupled with
periodic and special inspections to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from
peaceful uses to military uses. Each non-nuclear-weapon-state party to the NPT
must negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to submit all nuclear material in its
possession to regular inspections.7 After learning several lessons from Iraq’s and
North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programs, the IAEA launched a major effort to
strengthen its safeguards system (see below) in 1992.
The incentive for non-nuclear-weapon states to submit to inspections is a
promise by advanced nuclear countries to promote “the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.”8 The nuclear-weapon states also agree to “pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament....”9
In 1995, NPT members voted to make the treaty permanent. The members also
agreed on a stronger review process to oversee compliance with the treaty. However,
many members of the NPT are dissatisfied and the future of the treaty is not
guaranteed. (see discussion of implementation)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1987.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [http://www.iaea.
org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html] sets international standards
for nuclear trade and commerce. The treaty had 121 parties in September 2006. The
Convention outlines security requirements for the protection of nuclear materials
against terrorism and provides for the prosecution and punishment of offenders of
international nuclear trade laws. Parties to the treaty agree to report to the IAEA on
the disposition of nuclear materials being transported and agree to provide
appropriate security during such transport.
For several years, the United States has been trying to strengthen this treaty to
address the issue of nuclear terrorism by extending controls to domestic facility
security, not just transportation. In July 2005, states parties convened to amend the
6 This number excludes the DPRK.
7 These agreements are called “full-scope safeguards.” Other states have partial safeguards
agreements, including India, Pakistan and Israel, which can either apply to material or
facilities. All of the five nuclear weapons states have voluntary safeguards agreements,
which cover a portion of facilities and materials.
8 NPT, Article IV-2.
9 NPT, Article VI.

---

CRS-13
convention. They extended the Convention’s scope to cover not only nuclear
material in international transport, but also nuclear material in domestic use, storage,
and transport, as well as the protection of nuclear material and facilities from
sabotage. The new rules will come into effect once they have been ratified by
two-thirds of the States Parties of the Convention, which could take several years.
As of September 18, 2006, only six states had deposited their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, or approval with the depositary.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. In the last 35 years, some states have
concluded treaties to declare their regions to be “nuclear weapons-free.” These
regions now include Latin America, Central and Southeast Asia, the South Pacific,
and Africa.
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco). [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//
tlatelolco.html]. This treaty establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Latin
America. Protocol I of the treaty obligates non-Latin American countries that have
territories in the zone (U.S., U.K., Netherlands, France) to accept the provisions of
the treaty with respect to those territories. Protocol II contains a negative security
pledge by the nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.) “not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty....”
In 1994, treaty holdouts Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed on, and in 1995 Cuba
signed the treaty (which entered into force in 2002).
C e n t r a l A s i a n N u c l e a r W e a p o n s F r e e Z o n e .
[http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/central_asia.html]. Signed on
September 8, 2006, this treaty creates a NWFZ in the five Central Asian states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The treaty,
which is the first nuclear weapon-free zone located entirely in the northern
hemisphere, prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, or
possession of any nuclear explosive device within the zone. The treaty requires
signatories to accept enhanced IAEA safeguards on nuclear material and activities,
addresses the impact of production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons on the
environment, and implements measures to meet international standards for nuclear
facility security.
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf331.shtml]. Eleven
nations of the South Pacific have established a NWFZ for their region which
prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons by its members and bans the
manufacture or permanent emplacement of nuclear weapons within the zone by
signatories outside of the Pacific region. The treaty does not inhibit transit through
the zone by nuclear-armed or powered military ships or aircraft. In 1996, the United
States, France, and Britain signed the protocols to the treaty, which are nearly
identical to those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Before signing the treaty protocols,
France conducted its last nuclear tests at its test site in French Polynesia. The United
States is the only nuclear-weapon state that has not ratified the protocol.

---

CRS-14
African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//pelindaba.html]. In April
1996, 53 countries signed the Treaty of Pelindaba, declaring Africa a NWFZ. The
African NWFZ closely follows the models of the South Pacific and Latin American
zones, and thus was able to attract the support of the United States and other weapons
states after certain criteria were satisfied. This nuclear-weapon-free zone is not yet
in force and the United States and Russia have not ratified the relevant protocol.
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc548.pdf]. A
group of 10 Southeast Asian nations declared a NWFZ for their region in late 1995
and the treaty entered into force in 1997. The United States and other weapons states
declined to sign the protocols to the zone because the treaty contained controversial
definitions of its members’ sovereignty over territorial seas. The United States
maintains that the language of the treaty is inconsistent with the Law of the Sea and
could inflame territorial disputes as well as interfere with rights of passage.
Modifications of the language are under consideration. In 1999, China announced
it would sign the protocol but has deferred its signature.
Other Agreements. The United States has concluded arrangements with
several states on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral basis in an effort to address
specific programs. In 1994, the United States signed the Agreed Framework with
North Korea (which was terminated in 2003). In 2002, the United States initiated a
“10 plus 10 over 10" effort within the G-7 to provide additional funding for nuclear
nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union (NIS), now called the G-8 Global Partnership to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction. As noted earlier, the United States also created the Proliferation
Security Initiative in 2003.
The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. In October 1994, the United
States signed an agreement with North Korea to freeze its plutonium production
facilities (reactors and reprocessing plant) in exchange for assistance, and, eventually,
two 1000-megawatt, light water nuclear reactors.10 North Korea received shipments
of heavy fuel oil to compensate for energy that theoretically might have been
generated from the reactors it agreed to shut down. The deal required North Korean
compliance with its full-scope safeguards agreement before completion of the new
reactors. Such compliance hinged on several issues, including resolution of how
much undeclared plutonium North Korea might have separated prior to 1994.
Experts generally agree that the amount is at least sufficient for 1-2 bombs (about 12
kg).
10 North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but delayed inspections until 1992. In February
1993, North Korea denied access by IAEA inspectors to two sites which IAEA (and U.S.
intelligence) believed held evidence of clandestine nuclear work. On March 12, 1993, North
Korea notified the United Nations Security Council that it was withdrawing from the NPT,
which permits withdrawal after three months notice. It subsequently suspended its
withdrawal, but claimed to have “unique status” under the NPT, and continued to block
inspections. See CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and
Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksh, and CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
Latest Developments, by Sharon Squassoni.

---

CRS-15
An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor
construction project. KEDO negotiated several agreements with North Korea on the
legal, financial and territorial aspects of the project. South Korea was to build the
reactors and pay for about 60-70% of the deal. Japan and other countries were to pay
for the rest. The United States payed for oil shipments and payed for storage of the
spent nuclear fuel rods that were removed from North Korea’s test reactor in 1994.
In October 2002, North Korea’s reported admission of a secret uranium
enrichment program set in motion a series of events that are similar to the 1994 crisis
from which the Agreed Framework emerged. In December 2002, the United States
cut off its shipment of heavy fuel oil and pronounced that the Agreed Framework
would be terminated. North Korea announced it would restart its plutonium
facilities, breaking seals and expelling IAEA inspectors at the end of December 2002.
In January 2003, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT, which
became effective in April 2003. The Bush Administration has said it favors a
diplomatic solution and proposed Six-Party talks with North Korea (including the
United States, North Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea). Although
several rounds have been held, none yet has yielded progress in disarming North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

G-8 Global Partnership. At a summit held in June 2002 in Kananaskis,
Canada, G-8 members agreed to a Global Partnership to halt the spread of weapons
of mass destruction and related materials and technology. The G-8 members agreed
to raise $20 billion over 10 years in nonproliferation assistance to Russia, of which
the United States committed to providing $10B. Projects relating to disarmament,
nonproliferation, counterterrorism and nuclear safety will focus initially on Russia,
but the initiative will be open to other states as well.11 The Global Partnership
reiterated its commitment to these nonproliferation programs at the June 2004 Sea
Island summit, and also agreed to consider expanding the application of cooperative
threat reduction assistance to states outside the former Soviet Union. This would
mirror U.S. efforts to expand its own cooperative threat reduction assistance to states
outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union, for example, Albania.12 Many
experts agree that funding has fallen short of the $20 billion goal, both in pledges and
actual funds spent.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. At the July 2006
summit, the United States and Russia launched another initiative - the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Although there are few details yet on
specific programs or funding, the initiative appears to exceed the G-8 Global
11 See Fact Sheet on G-8 Summit, Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, June 27, 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House.
[http://usinfo.state.gov].
12 See CRS Report RL32359, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of
Options, by Sharon Squassoni.

---

CRS-16
Partnership in its scope. According to a White House fact sheet issued at the time,
the Initiative has the following goals:13

! Improve security of nuclear material and radioactive substances and
nuclear facilities;
! Detect and prevent illicit trafficking in such materials, especially by
terrorists;
! Develop responses to nuclear terrorist attacks;
! Cooperate in developing technical means to combat nuclear
terrorism;
! Take all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking
to acquire or use nuclear materials; and
! Strengthen national legal frameworks to ensure the effective
prosecution of terrorists.
Proliferation Security Initiative. President Bush announced the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 to improve multilateral
cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related
materials at sea, on land, and in the air. Administration officials have stressed that
PSI is an activity, not an organization. The purpose is to strengthen the enforcement
of already-existing export controls associated with nonproliferation treaties. States
agreed to a set of interdiction principles in Paris in September 2003 and more than
70 nations now support PSI.14
Related Arms Control Agreements. Article VI of the NPT calls for an end
to the arms race and progress toward disarmament. For many non-nuclear-weapon
states, Article VI embodies the quid pro quo of the NPT — while non-nuclear-
weapon states give up their right to develop nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states
agree to eventually disarm. In the 1990s, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) was seen as the next step toward nuclear disarmament.15 By the mid-1990s,
all nuclear weapons states were observing a moratorium on testing, which the treaty
would have made permanent. The parties completed negotiations and signed the
CTBT in 1996; President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate in September
1997 and in 1999, the Senate voted against the treaty.16 The treaty remains on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee calendar.
Unilateral and bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons have also been important
within the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as demonstrations of good
13 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060715-3.html].
14 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni.
15 In the early 1990s, a test ban and a treaty halting the production of nuclear material
(known as fissile material production cutoff treaty), were viewed as the next steps. No
progress has been made to date on negotiating a production cutoff treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament.
16 See CRS Report RL33548, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, by
Jonathan Medalia.

---

CRS-17
faith by the nuclear weapons states towards the eventual goal of disarmament. In
January 2002, the Bush Administration released the results of its “Nuclear Posture
Review,” announcing that U.S. nuclear planning would no longer address the
“Russian threat,” but would need to meet a range of threats from unspecified
countries. The redirection would be accompanied by a large, unilateral reduction in
deployed nuclear weapons. However, the new policy also included development of
a controversial missile defense capability, improving the nuclear weapons
“infrastructure” to allow resumption of testing, and possible development of new
weapons more rapidly. Although the Administration statement did not indicate that
such activities were contemplated or necessary, the suggestion that they might be in
the future caused dismay in nonproliferation circles.17 In May 2002, Presidents Bush
and Putin signed what has become known as the Treaty of Moscow, which will
reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1700 and 2200
by 2012.18 This treaty has been viewed alternately by some observers as a step
toward nuclear disarmament and by others as a step back from nuclear disarmament,
since its reductions are not permanent and apply only to deployed forces rather than
the stockpile of weapons as a whole.
For many countries, the ABM Treaty was an important symbol of a commitment
by the United States and USSR to ratchet down the nuclear arms race, and its June
2002 abrogation represents to some a setback in disarmament. On the other hand,
some observers have argued that U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will have little
impact on other states’ nuclear force postures, including that of China.19
On May 18, 2006, the United States tabled a draft Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT) at the CD in Geneva. The proposed U.S. treaty would

! enter into force with the signatures of the five nuclear weapons
states;
! ban new production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for
use in nuclear weapons for 15 years;
! be extended only by consensus of the parties;
! allow high-enriched uranium enrichment for naval fuel;
! contain no verification mechanism.
Some perceive a ban on producing fissile material for weapons as much more
relevant today than it was a decade ago, a view supported by the Bush
Administration’s May 18, 2006, proposal.20 Concern about terrorist access to large
17 See CRS Report RS21133, The Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues,
by Amy F. Woolf.
18 See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: the Strategy Offensive Reductions
Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
19 See CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles:
Status and Trends, by Sharon Squassoni.
20 See CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:
Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT), by Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill Marie

---

CRS-18
stockpiles of fissile material has only grown since the Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs began in the early 1990s and particularly since September 11, 2001.
Revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market sales of
uranium enrichment technology in 2004 have spurred efforts not only to shut down
networks, but restrict even “legitimate” technology transfer. Recent proposals to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime, including those of Mohamed ElBaradei,
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have focused
on tighter controls on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, renewed disarmament
effort, and creative approaches toward states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) — India, Pakistan, and Israel.21 An FMCT could play a pivotal role in
implementing that agenda, by helping to gain broad support for new multilateral
arrangements to restrict enrichment and reprocessing, helping to strengthen
consensus among NPT parties, and by achieving a concrete step towards
disarmament. Lastly, an FMCT is viewed by many nonproliferation experts as the
sine qua non for nuclear cooperation with India. At a minimum, President Bush has
proposed to make Indian support for FMCT negotiations a prerequisite for engaging
in nuclear cooperation.
Implementing the Regime
Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is perhaps the most visible
aspect of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the success of nonproliferation efforts
relies on the sturdy functioning of national export control laws and implementation,
the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers’ Group multilateral coordination of
export controls, and effective inspections conducted by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Equally important is the quid pro quo of technical
assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that the IAEA provides.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA, a U.N.-
affiliated international organization, was established in 1957 to “accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity,” and to
ensure “that assistance provided by it...is not used in such a way as to further any
military purpose.”22 With the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, it performs the
dual missions of verifying NPT obligations and providing assistance in peaceful
nuclear technology to developing nations. By September 2006, the Agency had 141
member states and an annual budget of about $322 million.23 The IAEA safeguards
system monitors nuclear materials and technology to deter and detect diversions from
peaceful to military uses.
The administrative structure of the Agency resembles that of the United Nations.
The General Conference includes all members and meets annually. The Board of
20 (...continued)
Parillo.
21 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards,” Washington Post, June 14, 2006.
22 The IAEA Statute is found at [http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html].
23 See [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2005/anrep2005_full.pdf] for the
2005 annual report.

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CRS-19
Governors has 35 members, nine of which are permanent advanced nuclear nations,
with the remaining Board members serving one-year terms as representatives of
regional nuclear interests. The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the Agency.
It is headed by the Director General, who is the chief policy-making official. The
current Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, is an Egyptian diplomat who
previously served as head of the IAEA’s legal department. Dr. ElBaradei and the
IAEA won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.
In over 25 years of inspections, five states have been declared in violation of
their safeguards agreements: Iraq, North Korea, Romania, Libya, and Iran. Following
revelations in 1991 of Iraq’s clandestine activities, the IAEA developed a
strengthened safeguards program (formerly called “93+2") to improve its ability to
detect unreported nuclear activities in non-weapons states. The program includes
! provision of intelligence information to the IAEA by member states
about suspect nuclear activities;
! access for inspectors to any location on a timely basis;
! new safeguards technology;
! measures to promote complete transparency and reporting of all
nuclear commerce;
! sufficient financial resources to carry out the IAEA’s expanded
responsibilities.
State parties to the NPT have been required to ratify new “model protocol”
agreements to their existing nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA
(INFCIRC/540). President Bush submitted the U.S. model protocol agreement to the
Senate for its consent to ratification in 2002 and the Senate ratified it in 2004.
Implementing the legislation, however, has not yet passed the Senate. A continuing
issue will be adequate funding for the IAEA safeguards. The annual $121M
safeguards budget is insufficient to carry out the IAEA’s new responsibilities; the
Agency estimates it typically spends about $135M each year on safeguards, relying
on extrabudgetary contributions. Thus, the IAEA’s ability to carry out its growing
responsibilities and efforts to upgrade its safeguards system continue to be limited
by members’ reluctance to increase the IAEA budget.
Since September 11, 2001, the IAEA has been promoting efforts to help prevent
terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear or
radiological devices. These have focused primarily on upgrading its assistance in
physical security, in locating orphaned radioactive sources, and in promoting
enhancement of the Convention on the Protection of Physical Security. The IAEA
established a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in
2001 and an action Plan on Combating Nuclear Terrorism in 2002. In 2005, the
IAEA Board of Governors adopted a four-year Nuclear Security Plan.24
In response to revelations in 2004 about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s
clandestine nuclear sales to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, the IAEA’s Director
General has proposed seven steps to enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
24 See GC(50)/RES/11.

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CRS-20
These include a five-year moratorium on construction of uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing facilities; conversion of nuclear reactors using highly
enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium; making the Additional Protocol
the verification norm of the NPT; revisiting U.N. Security Council actions in
response to a state’s withdrawal from the NPT; universal implementation of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540; acceleration of Article VI actions by nuclear
weapons states (toward nuclear disarmament); and resolution of regional security
tensions that give rise to proliferation, including a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free
zone.25
The case of Iran’s noncompliance with its safeguards obligations continues to
present challenges for the IAEA and the nonproliferation regime. In September
2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran’s breaches of its obligations
constituted noncompliance. After Iran resumed enrichment-related activities and
suspended interim application of its Additional Protocol in January, the Board
referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council. In March, the U.N. Security
Council issued a presidential statement that called upon Iran to reinstate its
suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy
water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and implement
transparency measures.
On June 6, 2006, the permanent five members of the Security Council plus
Germany (P-5 plus 1) offered Iran a new negotiating proposal, which included
incentives such as affirmation of Iran’s inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy,
assistance in building state-of-the-art light water reactors for Iran, a peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement between EURATOM and Iran, fuel supply guarantees,
dismissing U.N. Security Council consideration of Iran’s NPT noncompliance, WTO
membership, and an end to certain US sanctions to allow Iran to purchase agriculture
appliances and Boeing aircraft parts. In return, Iran would suspend enrichment- and
reprocessing-related activities, resume implementation of the Additional Protocol and
fully cooperate with the IAEA. Iran’s moratorium could be reviewed once several
conditions had been met, including resolving all outstanding issues and restoring
international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The
proposal also outlined several measures targeted at Iran’s nuclear program should
Iran not agree to cooperate: a ban on nuclear-related exports, freeze of assets,
travel/visa bans, suspension of technical cooperation with the IAEA, a ban on
investment in related entities, and on Iranians studying abroad in nuclear and
missile-related areas. Broader measures could include an arms embargo, no support
for WTO membership, and a general freeze on assets of Iranian financial institutions.
Iranian officials insisted on deferring a response until August 2006, which
prompted the Security Council to pass Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. The resolution called upon Iran to take the steps required
by the Board of Governors (fully suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, stop construction of the IR-40 heavy water-moderated reactor, ratify and
implement the Additional Protocol and implement transparency measures), endorsed
25 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, “Seven Steps to Raise World Security,”
Financial Times, February 2, 2005.

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CRS-21
the P-5 plus 1 proposal, and stated the Council’s intention, should Iran fail to comply
with previous demands, to adopt sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
Charter. Unfortunately, the August 31 deadline passed with little progress reported
by the IAEA in resolving outstanding issues. Key members of the U.N. Security
Council, such as China and Russia, reportedly have been opposed to sanctions.
The Zangger Committee. In 1971, a group of seven NPT nuclear supplier
nations formed the Nuclear Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee,
to assist in restricting nuclear trade as called for in Article III of the NPT.26 In 1974,
the Zangger Committee compiled a list of nuclear export items that could be
potentially useful for military applications of nuclear technology. The nuclear
suppliers agreed that the transfer of items on the list would “trigger” a requirement
for IAEA safeguards to assure that the items were not used to make nuclear
explosives. The Zangger list included reactors, reactor components, and certain
nuclear materials such as heavy water. In recent years, the list of controlled items has
been expanded and updated. Membership is voluntary and implies no formal
commitments for enforcement of the guidelines. In 2006, the Zangger Committee
had 36 members27 and continued to meet twice each year to exchange information
and upgrade its list of controlled commodities.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Shaken by the 1974 test of a nuclear
explosive device by India, the major nuclear suppliers in 1975 established a set of
unpublished nuclear export guidelines.28 In 1978, the group, known as the London
Club, added new members and announced a common policy regarding nuclear
exports. While the NPT’s Zangger list initially included only nuclear materials and
components used directly in weapons development, the London Club adopted more
restrictive export control guidelines that included some dual-use items, with civil and
military applications. The NSG guidelines called for suppliers to exercise restraint
regarding transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology, and required the
provision of physical security for transferred nuclear facilities and materials,
acceptance of safeguards on replicated facilities (based on a design transferred from
a London Club member-state), and prohibitions against retransfer of nuclear exports
to third parties.
Although NSG guidelines were in place, members took no further actions until
1991. Concerned about Iraq’s successful procurement of dual-use items and
apparently inconsistent enforcement of nuclear export controls in several supplier
countries, the NSG convened in March 1991 for the first time since 1978 to update
its list of controlled commodities. The expanded group agreed on new guidelines in
January 1992 for transfers of a wider range of nuclear-related, dual-use equipment,
material and technology and jointly adopted the longstanding U.S. policy of requiring
full-scope safeguards for all nuclear exports. (Nations purchasing nuclear technology
26 See [http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/default.htm] for Zangger website.
27 See Appendix A for list of Zangger Committee members.
28 See [http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org] for NSG website.

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CRS-22
must open all nuclear facilities to inspection, not just the facility in which an
imported item is used.)29 The NSG has expanded to 45 members.30
Some developing nations have objected to the NSG because it further divides
the technologically advanced nuclear “haves” from the “have nots” and creates
additional obstacles to their access to nuclear technology. A few countries have
turned to suppliers outside of the NSG to avoid the requirement for full-scope
safeguards on nuclear exports. The emergence of new nuclear suppliers that do not
subscribe to NSG guidelines undermines the efforts of NSG members to control the
spread of nuclear weapons.
The strengthening of NSG export policy after the Gulf War responded to
numerous examples of illegal, covert, and suspicious nuclear trade involving Western
firms and countries such as India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, South
Africa, and others. These transfers underscored the limitations of voluntary export
controls, but they also motivated U.S. officials to push for further tightening of NSG
restrictions on world nuclear exports. However, as a voluntary association, the NSG
has no formal administrative structure, no legal authority to influence the nuclear
trade policies of its members, and no formal enforcement mechanism.
In 2005, the United States approached the NSG to create an exception for India
to the NSG’s requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply.
Such an exception would be necessary for the United States to implement its
proposed civil nuclear cooperation initiative with India.31 Key NSG members, such
as the United States, Russia, and France, support a country-specific exception, while
other members question whether such an approach might be damaging to the
nonproliferation regime. NSG members may take up the issue in 2007, after the U.S.
Congress approves an exception to such requirements in U.S. law. It is not clear
when that will happen.
U.S. Government Organization. The Departments of State, Energy,
Defense, Commerce and the intelligence community are all involved in the
formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.
! The National Security Council coordinates nonproliferation policy.
! The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department,
negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation, represents U.S.
nonproliferation interests with other states and international
organizations such as the IAEA, and administers some
nonproliferation assistance programs.
29 The new guidelines appeared as an International Atomic Energy Agency document,
INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 and Part 2, July 1992.
30 See Appendix A for NSG membership. China, Lithuania, Estonia, and Malta joined the
NSG at the May 2004 plenary.
31 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by
Sharon Squassoni.

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CRS-23
! The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation
strategy and policy, and also administers Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs.
! The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to
support nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its
national laboratories. DOE also administers nonproliferation
programs to control fissile material in the former Soviet Union and
elsewhere.
! The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports
subject to concurrence by the Department of State.
! The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use
exports as mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Act, which requires controls on “all export items, other
than those licensed by the NRC, which could be, if used for purposes
other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for
nuclear explosive purposes.”
! The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through
its Office of Foreign Assets Control, and enforces export control
through the U.S. Customs Service;
! The Director of National Intelligence has a National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) that coordinates intelligence on
proliferation issues within the intelligence community.
! Several interagency working groups coordinate the various
responsibilities for nonproliferation policy.
Since September 11, 2001, significant U.S. government interest has focused on
counterproliferation programs — that is, military measures against weapons of mass
destruction. Although the Department of Defense has had programs in place for
several years, efforts in this area have been renewed. Counterproliferation includes
active and passive defenses to protect U.S. and allied troops, although protection
against nuclear weapons is far more difficult than protecting against chemical
weapons. The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction described counterproliferation as including interdiction, deterrence,
defense and mitigation.32 Preemption is explicitly described as an option under
defense and mitigation policies.
U.S. Laws33
The main legislative pillars of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy are the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1968.
32 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 11, 2002. See
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf].
33 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and
Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.

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CRS-24
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).34 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
established legal authority for the commercial and military development of nuclear
energy. It gave primary authority for the development and oversight of the U.S.
government’s nuclear programs to a civilian agency: the Atomic Energy Commission
(now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). In 1974, these duties were divided
between the NRC and the Department of Energy. A major purpose of the act was to
establish controls on the export of nuclear materials, goods, information, and
technology. Under the AEA, the State Department must negotiate an agreement for
nuclear cooperation as a precondition for exports of sensitive U.S. nuclear technology
to any foreign country. Each agreement must meet several standards outlined in the
AEA. Moreover, the act contains penalties and restrictions for countries that do not
uphold the terms of nuclear agreements with the United States. Congress reviews all
such agreements before they can enter into force.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).35 Congress and the
Carter Administration viewed U.S. leadership and control over the international
nuclear fuel cycle as an effective means of restraining the spread of uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities throughout the world. Enrichment
and reprocessing technologies are key technologies for states aspiring to develop
nuclear weapons. While reaffirming the U.S. commitment to be a reliable supplier
of nuclear technology and fuels, the act established an important new requirement
for nations importing U.S. nuclear technology and materials: they must accept full-
scope safeguards on their entire nuclear program. This standard was adopted by NSG
members in 1992. The act also established a requirement of prior U.S. approval for
retransfers or reprocessing of material or equipment as well as to material produced
using U.S.-exported technology. These measures gave the United States much more
control over the foreign uses of U.S.-origin nuclear material.
Title III of the NNPA includes such varied measures as requiring the
Department of Energy to obtain NRC licenses to distribute source and special
material and establishment of criteria for terminating nuclear exports from the United
States (which affects bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements) to include detonation
of a nuclear device, termination/abrogation or violation of IAEA safeguards, or
engaging in activities involving nuclear material which have significance in the
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices (covering a wide array of activities).
Additional prohibited acts included violating a nuclear cooperation agreement with
the United States; assisting a non-nuclear-weapon state in activities involving nuclear
material that could potentially help in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear
explosive device; or enriching any U.S. source or special material without the
permission of the United States. The NNPA requires (in Section 601) the President
to report annually to Congress on the Government’s efforts to prevent nuclear
proliferation.
34 P.L. 83-703, 42 U.S.C. 2011.
35 P.L. 95-242, 22 U.S.C. 3201.

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CRS-25
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA.)36 The Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S. government military sales, loans, leases,
financing, and licensing of commercial arms sales to other countries. The AECA
coordinates such actions with other foreign policy considerations, including
nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for military exports, sales,
leases, loans, and financing.
! Section 3(f) (22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or
leases to any country that the President determines is in material
breach of binding commitments to the United States under
international treaties or agreements regarding nonproliferation of
nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special nuclear
material.
! Section 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exports or assistance in
exporting (financial or otherwise) munitions to countries that
provide support for terrorism. Included in the definition of acts of
international terrorism are: “all activities that the Secretary [of State]
determines willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of
nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully aid or
abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special
nuclear material.” The President can rescind a determination or
waive sanctions if essential to the national security interests of the
United States.
! Section 101 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (formerly section 669 of the Foreign
Assistance Act) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to
countries that deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment,
materials, or technology unless the supplier agrees to place such
under safeguards and the recipient has full-scope safeguards. The
President, who makes the determination, can waive sanctions if they
will have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, given
assurances that the recipient will not acquire, develop, or assist
others in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.
! Section 102 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (formerly section 670 of the
Foreign Assistance Act) prohibits foreign economic or military
assistance to countries that deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing
equipment, material, or technology to or from another country; or
any non-nuclear-weapon state which illegally exports from the
United States items that would contribute to nuclear proliferation.
The President, who makes the determination, can waive the sanction
if he finds that ending assistance would adversely affect U.S.
nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize the common defense and
security. The section further prohibits assistance (except
humanitarian or food assistance), defense sales, export licenses for
U.S. Munitions List items, other export licenses subject to foreign
36 P.L. 90-629, 22 U.S.C. 2751. Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 39, addresses Arms
Export Control. Subchapter VII addresses control of missiles and missile exports or
technology; subchapter VIII addresses chemical weapons and biological weapons, and
subchapter X addresses nuclear nonproliferation controls.

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CRS-26
policy controls, and various credits and loans to any country that the
President has determined transfers a nuclear explosive device,
design information, or component to a non-nuclear weapons state,
or is a non-nuclear weapons state and receives a nuclear device,
design information, or component, or detonates a nuclear explosive
device.
Much of the language on nuclear nonproliferation controls that had been
incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act earlier (including the 1977 Glenn-
Symington amendments on enrichment and reprocessing and the 1985 Pressler
amendment related to Pakistan) were incorporated into the AECA in 1994 by the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (see discussion below).
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA). The Export Administration
Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) authorizes the executive branch to regulate private sector
exports of particular goods and technology to other countries. Although the act
expired in 1989, export controls have been implemented under executive orders and
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).37 The EAA coordinates
such actions with other foreign policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and
determines eligibility of recipients for exports. Section 5 (50 U.S.C. app. 2404)
authorizes the President to curtail or prohibit the export of any goods or services for
national security reasons: to comply with other laws regarding a potential recipient
country’s political status or political stability, to cooperate with international
agreements or understandings, or to protect militarily critical technologies. Section
6 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405) authorizes the President to curtail or prohibit the export of
goods or services for foreign policy reasons. Within Section 6, for example, Section
6(j) establishes the State Department’s list of countries found to be supporting acts
of international terrorism, a list on which many other restrictions and prohibitions in
law are based.
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
(P.L. 79-173) establishes the Export-Import Bank of the United States and authorizes
the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of
commodities and services between the United States and foreign countries. Key
nuclear-nonproliferation-related provisions were added in 1978. These include
Section 2(b)(1)(B) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) and Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)),
which together allow the Bank to deny credit generally if that credit does not help
advance U.S. nuclear proliferation policy, and specifically, if a person or country has
a) violated, abrogated or terminated a nuclear safeguards agreements; b) violated a
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States; or c) aided or abetted a non-
nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to acquire
unsafeguarded special nuclear material. There is a provision for presidential waiver.
(See Appendix B for details.)
37 See CRS Report RL31832, The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and
Debate, Ian F. Fergusson.

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CRS-27
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was amended in 200238 to allow denial of
Ex-Im Bank financing for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Arms
Export Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or the Export
Administration Act of 1979, extending its purview from strictly nuclear to CW, BW,
and missile-related concerns.
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. In 1994 Congress
approved the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, (NPPA, Title VIII, of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, P.L. 103-236) which
primarily strengthened penalties against persons who aid or abet the acquisition of
nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons materials, or countries (non-
nuclear-weapon states) that obtain or explode nuclear devices. Sanctions include
cutoff of U.S. assistance, prohibition on involvement with U.S. government
procurement, stringent licensing requirements for technology exports, and opposition
to loans or credits from international financial institutions. These sanctions were
imposed on India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests in May 1998, but were
gradually relaxed. Legislation passed in the 106th Congress extended the President’s
authority to relax sanctions on India and Pakistan for a year, and the Senate passed
a bill suspending sanctions on the two countries for five years. The FY2000
Department of Defense Appropriations bill (P.L. 106-79) extended the authority to
suspend sanctions. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush
lifted all remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan in response to support of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan.
The NPPA defined for the first time in U.S. law the term “nuclear explosive
device.” It defined “terrorism” as used in the AECA, to include activities that assist
groups or individuals to acquire any nuclear explosive device. It included a sense of
Congress that identified 24 measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards, some of which
have been implemented. Relevant sections include Section 821 (22 U.S.C. 3201
note), which requires U.S. government procurement sanctions; Section 823 (22
U.S.C. 3201 note), which requires U.S. executive directors of international financial
institutions to vote against finance that might promote nuclear proliferation; and
Section 824 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note), which takes aim at financial institutions and
persons involved with financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation
through the provision of financing. (See Appendix B for specific details.)
Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Legislation. In
late 1991, Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (which became
known as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment), establishing programs to assist with the safe
and secure storage and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia and the Newly
Independent States (NIS). These programs initially focused on the “loose nukes”
problem, but have broadened their focus to address a variety of proliferation risks
associated with weak political control over nuclear materials, equipment, and
expertise, as well as CW, BW, and missiles. This effort has expanded to include the
CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation programs in DOE and the State
38 See The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, P.L. 107-189.

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CRS-28
Department.39 In the FY2004 defense authorization act, there was a provision to
allow $50 million of unobligated funds to be spent on cooperative threat reduction
outside the former Soviet Union. So far, the Bush administration has spent $38.5
million of CTR funds in Albania to dispose of CW-related items.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992. Section 1602 of the
Defense Authorization for FY1993 (Title XVI, P.L. 102-484, as amended) extended
existing sanctions on Iraq to Iran. The law states that it is the policy of the United
States to oppose any transfer to Iran or Iraq that could contribute to either country’s
ability to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons.
Section 1604 requires the President to impose sanctions against any person whom he
has determined to be engaged in such transfers. Section 1605 similarly addresses
activities of foreign governments. The 104th Congress amended the law (by passage
of section 1408(a), P.L. 104-106, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996) to make it apply to transfers contributing to the development of weapons of
mass destruction as well as advanced conventional weapons.
Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. The law (P.L. 106-178) imposes
penalties on countries whose companies help Iran’s efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and missile delivery systems. In 2005, P.L. 109-112, Iran
Nonproliferation Amendments Act, added Syria to the law and added sanctions for
transfers to and from those countries. In 2006, both Houses introduced legislation
to add North Korea to the law as well (H.R. 5805, S. 3667) and on September 30,
2006, the House passed the Senate’s bill (S. 3728).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2006. This law (P.L. 109-102) withheld 60 percent of
funds set aside for assistance to the Russian government until the President certifies
that assistance to Iran has ceased. Assistance constitutes technical training, expertise,
technology, or equipment needed to build a nuclear reactor, develop research
facilities or programs, or ballistic missile technologies.
Issues for the 110th Congress
Since September 11, 2001, much of Congress’s attention in the area of the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has focused on how to mitigate the
threat U.S. citizens face right now — improving domestic preparedness against
WMD terrorism and improving intelligence capabilities to detect evidence of
proliferation-related activities. Above all, however, most sources agree that the U.S.
government should continue to address nuclear proliferation at the source — securing
nuclear materials in Russia and the NIS and halting information flows from WMD-
knowledgeable scientists to countries of proliferation concern.
Other key nuclear nonproliferation issues for Congress include:
39 See CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues
for Congress, Amy F. Woolf.

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CRS-29
! implementing DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to
improve controls on nuclear materials, equipment, and expertise in
Russia and the NIS and expanding these efforts to countries outside
the NIS;
! monitoring efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program;
! monitoring Iran’s nuclear program, including Russian and Chinese
nuclear exports and assistance;
! opposing the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and
preventing those countries from exporting WMD technology;
! strengthening the IAEA safeguards system to enforce the NPT and
maintaining the NPT;
! maintaining and expanding adherence to NSG nuclear export control
standards;
! curbing dangerous Chinese and Russian nuclear exports;
! banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Closer to home, Congress will be asked to consider how to dispose of tons of
excess plutonium from dismantled Russian and U.S. warheads without increasing
proliferation risks; and how U.S. arms control and defense cooperation (particularly
missile defense cooperation) might affect proliferation risks. In particular, Congress
may exert oversight over key nonproliferation programs, such as Proliferation
Security Initiative, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Proliferation Regime40
Prohibitions against the use of chemical weapons date back to the International
Peace Conferences that met at the Hague in 1899 and 1907; these pre-World War I
prohibitions were reaffirmed in the 1919 Versailles Treaty and further expanded in
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Although public horror at the nature of these weapons
rivals that accorded to nuclear weapons, it has been much more difficult to constrain
their proliferation and use. They do not require as extensive an infrastructure as do
nuclear weapons and the technologies are much more widely disseminated, making
it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities.41 In addition,
there has been a weaker consensus on the need to control these weapons, in part
because they are viewed as less destructive than nuclear weapons. The regimes that
have grown up around these weapons, while not as extensive as the nuclear
nonproliferation regime, include treaties, supplier agreements, and domestic laws.
40 Prepared by Steven R. Bowman, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division.
41 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since 2001,” Disarmament Forum, 2006.

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CRS-30
Treaties and Agreements
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) are the two primary treaties related to CBW
proliferation. The United States is a State Party to both the BWC and the CWC.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Culminating 25 years of
negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in January
1993.42 The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, and there are 178 state
parties, including the United States.43
For states party to the treaty, the CWC prohibits the development, production,
stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Convention mandates the
destruction of chemical weapon arsenals within 10 years of its coming into force.
The CWC also restricts the international transfer of chemicals deemed useful in the
production of chemical weapons, so-called “precursors.” Most precursor chemicals
are dual-use, with legitimate peaceful applications. The CWC establishes extensive
lists or “schedules” of precursors whose production, use, and transfer must be
reported to the CWC’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW). The schedules are designated I - III, in order of their potential usefulness
in chemical warfare. Schedule I chemicals may be exported only to states parties
(i.e., nations that have ratified the CWC). In accordance with treaty provisions, as
of April 2000, the export of Schedule II chemicals to non-states parties became
prohibited, and the extension of these export restrictions to Schedule III chemicals
is under consideration.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Biological Weapons
Convention [http://www.opbw.org/] was concluded in 1972, with U.S. ratification
and entry in force in 1975.44 The BWC has 155 states parties;16 signatory states have
not yet acceded to the treaty.45 The Convention bans the development, production,
and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no
justification for peaceful purposes.” The development, manufacture, and possession
of BW weapons or delivery systems is also prohibited. States parties also agree not
to transfer biological agents or toxins for any but peaceful purposes.
The United Kingdom first tabled a draft treaty in 1968 that contained
verification provisions. Assuming the Soviet Union would reject such a proposal,
the United States, with U.K. agreement, privately negotiated a treaty text with the
Soviets that did not include a verification mechanism. On the same day in 1969, both
the United States and the Soviet Union tabled identical draft treaties. In 1969, the
United States declared a unilateral end to its offensive BW program and suggested
separating the BW issue from the chemical-biological arms control negotiations in
Geneva. Negotiations on this proposal took only three years to conclude.
42 [http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html].
43 [http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_frameset.html].
44 [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/text/bwc.htm].
45 [http://www.opbw.org/].

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Implementing the Regime
International Organizations. The CBW nonproliferation regime relies on
the Australia Group and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) [http://www.opcw.org/], which was created by the CWC. There is no
independent international organization to administer the Biological Weapons
Convention. Currently, BWC member states report all defensive biological activities
to the United Nations’ Department of Disarmament Affairs. This information is
reported to all BWC member states, with the State Department as the international
point of contact within the U.S. government.

Australia Group (AG). In 1984, United Nations investigators officially
confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq War. In response,
the United States and several other countries began to implement export controls on
chemicals that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. In 1985, Australia
proposed that concerned countries meet in order to coordinate their export controls
and share information to enhance their effectiveness. The first meeting took place
in June 1985, and biennial meetings continue at the Australian embassy in Paris.
The Australia Group [http://www.australiagroup.net/index_en.htm] has
established a list of chemicals and equipment that are subject to control. In 1990, in
response to growing concerns over the proliferation of covert biological weapons
programs, certain biological agents and research/production equipment were added
to the control list. Australia Group guidelines do not call for prohibiting the export
of control list items, but rather establishing monitoring and licensing procedures,
with export denial only if there is reason to suspect potential contribution to a CBW
program. The Group’s list does not curtail legitimate trade.
As noted, the Australia Group does not have an independent administrative
organization. National governments administer their own export control programs.
As an informal effort, it is not based on international treaty, is not affiliated with any
international organization, and has no independent administrative structure. It
operates entirely upon consensus of its 40 members (see Appendix A), and its
decisions are not binding. Countries are admitted to membership only upon the full
consensus of current members, and must have demonstrated compliance with the
CWC and BWC, and have an effective export control regime.
The Australia Group has agreed to add controls on the transfer of information
and knowledge that could aid BW proliferation. These included “catch-all”
constraints covering items that are not on control lists, adding eight toxins to the
control list, adopting controls on technology associated with dual-use biological
equipment, and agreeing to control intangible technology transfer (i.e. by phone, fax,
or internet) that could be used to advance CBW programs.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The
OPCW is headquartered in The Hague. It has four components:
! Conference of States Parties — Comprises all nations who have
ratified the Convention; meets annually; has the responsibility to

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ensure compliance and levy sanctions; selects the Executive
Council;
! Executive Council — Comprises 41 states parties on a two-year
rotation46; directs the routine administration of the OPCW;
! Technical Secretariat — Comprises a permanent international work
force; administers and monitors treaty compliance (inspections, data
collection and assessment);
! Scientific Advisory Board — Comprised of independent experts to
advise the OPCW on relevant scientific and technical issues.
U.S. Government Organizations. In the United States, the following
offices, among others, participate in administering the CBW export control program,
with State serving as the international point of contact:
! Department of Commerce — Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau
of Industry and Security;
! Department of State — Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security — Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation administers the CWC and export controls;
! Department of Defense — Deputy Under-Secretary for Technology
Security Policy and Counterproliferation;
! The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through
its Office of Foreign Assets Control;
! The Department of Homeland Security enforces export control
through the U.S. Customs Service.
U.S. Laws47
U.S. laws pertaining to chemical and biological weapons proliferation include
statutes and executive orders, the most important of which are the Export
Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act. These statutes operate on the
principle that licenses are required for the export of certain goods, and that it is
government policy to deny such licenses if there is a danger that the items will
contribute to CBW proliferation. In addition, bills to implement the Chemical
Weapons Convention were introduced in the 103rd Congress (S. 2221/H.R. 4849)
and the 104th Congress (S. 1732), though none was reported from committee. In the
46 By virtue of the treaty-prescribed method of selecting rotational members, the United
States will always have a seat on the Executive Council.
47 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and
Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.

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CRS-33
105th Congress, implementing legislation was incorporated into the FY1999 Omnibus
Appropriations Act, and signed into law October 20, 1998 (P.L. 105-277).
Export Administration Act of 1979. (P.L. 96-72, Section 6(m) and 11C,
50 U.S.C. App. 2405m and 2410c). This act requires a license for the export of dual-
use goods or technology that “would directly and substantially” assist CBW
proliferation. Under the act, the Secretary of Commerce maintains a list of such
goods. Exports to countries which have entered into an agreement for the control of
restricted goods (i.e. Australia Group members) are exempted from licensing
requirements. The EAA requires the President to impose procurement and import
sanctions on foreign persons who contribute to CBW proliferation through exports.
Arms Export Control Act. Section 81 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2798)
provides the State Department the authority to maintain licensing of the export of
chemical and biological agents and munitions. It also provides criminal penalties for
violation and specifies sanctions against foreign persons who contribute to CW or
BW proliferation through exports, and against countries which use chemical or
biological weapons or make substantial preparations to do so.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991.48 This act mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages international
sanctions, against countries that use chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law. Section 307 (22 U.S.C. 5605) requires the President to terminate
foreign assistance (except humanitarian, food, and agricultural assistance) arms sales
and licenses, credits, guarantees, and certain exports to a government of a foreign
country that he has determined has used or made substantial preparation to use
chemical or biological weapons. Within three months, the President must determine
and certify to Congress that the government: is no longer using chemical or
biological weapons in violation of international law, is no longer using such weapons
against its own people, has provided credible assurances that such behavior will not
resume, and is willing to cooperate with U.N. or other international observers to
verify that biological and chemical weapons are not still in use. Without this
three-month determination, sanctions are required affecting multilateral development
bank loans, U.S. bank loans or credits, exports, imports, diplomatic relations, and
aviation access to and from the United States. The President may lift the sanctions
after a year, and may waive the imposition of these sanctions.
Biological Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989. This act (P.L. 101-298)
implements the Biological Weapons Convention, providing criminal penalties for its
violation. It does not amend either the Export Administration Act or the Arms
Export Control Act.
Additional CW/BW Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in
Legislation. Congress has expressed views on CW/BW nonproliferation policy
and U.S. government organization to implement those policies in several other laws.
CBW-related provisions have been included in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
48 Title III, P.L. 102-182, 22 U.S.C. 5601-5606.

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Act of 1992, the Freedom Support Act, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act.
These and other provisions are listed in Appendix B.
Issues for the 110th Congress
Export Controls. Effective export controls are critical tools in all
international efforts to stem the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
The General Accountability Office (GAO) continues to find shortcomings in the
implementation of U.S. exports. In reviewing the Department of Commerce’s
administration of export controls on dual-use items (i.e. items that can be used for
both legitimate and proscribed activities), the GAO noted in June 2006 that the
Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
has not comprehensively analyzed available data to determine what dual-use
items have actually been exported. Further, contrary to government management
standards, BIS has not established performance measures that would provide an
objective basis for assessing how well the system is protecting U.S. interests.49
In addition, GAO determined that BIS’s watchlist of ineligible exporters and
export control violators was incomplete and not regularly reviewed for accuracy.
GAO also expressed concern that a large number of its previous recommendations
for improving controls on sensitive items have not been implemented, thereby
increasing the likelihood of improperly exporting dual-use or defense-related items.50
Australia Group. There are three significant current issues concerning the
Australia Group: (1) expansion of membership; (2) possible transhipment of
restricted commodities through AG members; and (3) the AG’s relationship to the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
The question of membership expansion has been a perennial one, as countries
seek AG membership to avoid the export controls imposed on non-members. The
AG has remained relatively small because of its inclusion only of countries seriously
dedicated to CBW non-proliferation and capable of maintaining an effective export
control regime. Some have argued that extending membership to countries such as
Russia could provide greater leverage in encouraging export control improvements.
To date, however, AG members have not been persuaded that the advantages of such
action outweigh the potential for dilution of the regime’s effectiveness and new
obstacles to consensus-building.
The transhipment issue arises because AG members are exempted from the
export licensing requirements for restricted goods and technology. Member states
assume that exports to AG members will be controlled by the receiving nation’s
export control regime once in that country and therefore are not subject to
unauthorized reshipment. Critics of this exemption maintain that, in practice,
monitoring unlicenced shipments is almost impossible, and that countries such as
Iran and Iraq have been able to elude export controls through multiple transhipments.
49 Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed, GAO-06-638, June 2006, p. 1.
50 Ibid, p. 31.

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This controversy reflects the perpetual tension between nonproliferation controls and
the desire for unfettered commerce with major trading partners.
One apparent weakness in the system is related to information exchange. A
2002 GAO report stated that, in particular, the United States failed to report 27
export license denials to AG members between 1996 and 2002.51 In 2006, GAO
reported that the State Department had not acted upon corrective recommendations.52
The question of the Australia Group’s relationship to the Chemical Weapons
Convention revolves around the Convention’s Article XI which declares that states
parties will not:
maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international
agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention,
which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge....
The Australia Group maintains that its export control regime is compatible with
the objectives of the Convention, and therefore not prohibited. All AG members
have agreed, however, to review their export controls to ensure they are consistent
with the Convention. A number of developing countries, led by Iran (a CWC state
party), maintain that the AG controls should be dropped — particularly for CWC
states parties. They view the controls as a tool of economic oppression on the part
of developed countries, even though no country has been able to provide an example
where AG controls have resulted in a denial of exports for legitimate purposes. This
issue continues to be pressed within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention. Some provisions of the CWC’s
implementing legislation (P.L. 105-277) have raised concerns from CWC supporters.
These include
! Section 213 — sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation
from the U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary
information through the actions of OPCW employees. Critics,
however, maintain that, as worded, this section does not place a high
enough burden of proof on the claimants, and consequently could
lead to excessive and unfounded claims against the government. To
date, no U.S. firm has sought compensation under this provision.
! Section 237 — grants the President the right to deny a request for
inspection if it “may cause a threat to U.S. national security
interests.” The CWC contains no provision permitting denial of an
inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the United
States in non-compliance. They maintain that even if never
exercised, this section’s existence will encourage other nations to
51 Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43. p. 1.
52 Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed. GAO-06-638. p. 31.

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CRS-36
enact similar exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verification
regime.
! Section 253 — exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC
control lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams
from reporting and inspection requirements. This is intended to ease
potential burdens, particularly on paper manufacturers, but critics
believe the exemption is too broadly worded and would rule out an
effective non-intrusive sampling technique for inspectors.
In early 2002, the Bush Administration led a successful effort to have Jose
Bustani removed as the Director-General of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat.
Citing “disdain for the OPCW Executive Committee” and inappropriate
administrative and budgetary policies among other charges, the State Department
made a concerted and sustained effort to gain support after Bustani refused to
voluntarily resign. On April 21, 2002 the Conference of OPCW State Parties voted
48-7, with 43 abstentions to support the U.S. position and on July 25, 2002,
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter was confirmed as the OPCW’s new Director-General.
DG Pfirter’s term was set to expire in July 2006, but in November 2005, state parties
approved another four-year term.
Though the United States attributed the OPCW’s fiscal difficulties to DG
Bustani’s mismanagement, others have pointed to the U.S. and Russia’s repeated
delinquency in annual dues payments and inspection cost reimbursements as having
contributed significantly to the OPCW’s budget shortfalls. In 2002, the United States
refused to support a budget increase to address a backlog of inspections, and was
successful in having its pro-rated portion of the annual dues reduced from 25% to
22%. These actions have raised questions among CWC supporters concerning the
U.S. commitment to the OPCW. However, the United States approved an overall
OPCW budget increase of 6.7% for 2004, for a total budget to $86.5 million. The
total OPCW 2005 budget was 75.8 million Euros ($97.7 million), of which the
United States assessment was 16.7 million Euros ($21.5). The budget stabilized in
2006, at $75.6 million Euros ($95.2 million).
In April 2006, the United States submitted a formal request to the OPCW
Chairman and Director-General to extend the U.S.’s final chemical weapons
destruction deadline from April 2007 to April 2012, the latest possible date allowed
under the CWC.53 The United States added that even a 2012 deadline would be
impossible to meet; the United States holds the second largest stockpile of chemical
weapons in the world. By March 2006, 10,103 metric tons (34.6%) of the U.S.
declared stockpile of chemical agents was destroyed.54 U.S. officials told CWC state
parties that although strongly committed to the goals of the CWC, they “continued
53 Ambassador Eric Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW, Statement
Concerning Request to Extend the United States’ Destruction Deadline Under the Chemical
W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n , A p r i l 2 0 , 2 0 0 6 . A v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/64878.htm]
54 “US Will Miss Treaty Deadline to Destroy Chemical Agent,” Environment News Service,
July 10, 2006. See [http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2006/2006-07-10-01.asp]

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to encounter delays and difficulties” in destroying their stockpile.55 These delays
have generally resulted from the need to meet state and federal environmental
requirements and from both local and congressional concerns over the means of
destruction. Russia will also announce a needed extension of its destruction deadline
at the next CWC Conference of States Parties (December 5-8, 2006).
Biological Weapons Convention. For most of the 1990s, BWC state
parties sought ways to address the BWC’s lack of compliance verification and
enforcement provisions. The most extensive effort to draft an adaptation protocol
regarding these issues all but collapsed at the last BWC Review Conference in
November 2001. After ten years of negotiation, the United States declared the
adaptation protocol draft unacceptable, and rejected it as a basis for further
negotiation. In rejecting the draft protocol, the Bush Administration stated that
The draft Protocol will not improve our ability to verify BWC compliance. It will
not enhance our confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those
countries seeking to develop biological weapons. In our assessment, the draft
Protocol would put national security and confidential business information at
risk56
At the same time, the United States introduced a number of proposals which it
suggested that nations undertake on a unilateral basis to enhance biological weapons
non-proliferation. These were to:
! Enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited BW
activities with strong extradition requirements;
! Establish an effective United Nations procedure for investigating
suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use;
! Establish procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns;
! Commit to improving international disease control and to enhance
mechanisms for sending expert response teams to cope with
outbreaks;
! Establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and
genetic engineering of pathogenic organisms;
! Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of
ethical conduct that would have universal recognition; and
! Promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and
shipment of pathogenic organisms.
In the wake of the U.S. statement, the Review Conference was unable to reach
consensus on a final conference declaration. Many in the arms control community
criticized the U.S. position as “self-imposed isolation from the mainstream of BWC
diplomacy.”57 In light of continued U.S. opposition, the chairman of the November
55 Amb. Javits, April 20, 2006 statement.
56 Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention
States Parties, Geneva, Switzerland, July 25, 2001.
57 Nicholas Sims, “Route-Map to OPBW: Using the Fifth Review Conference,” Chemical
(continued...)

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2002 Review Conference presented a minimal program, emphasizing only annual
meetings to discuss strengthening national laws and ways to respond to BW attacks.
The United States, which did not attend the review conference, endorsed this work
program. Expert-level meetings have focused on, among other things, maintaining
security of pathogens, enhancing capabilities to respond to outbreaks, broadening
mechanisms for surveillance, improving the ability to combat infectious disease, and
creating codes of conduct for scientists. The 6th Review Conference is scheduled for
late November 2006.
It is not likely that tension over a verification mechanism will be alleviated by
the 6th Review Conference, but common ground to improve the BWC exists. All
parties share a common interest in improving capabilities to respond to disease
outbreak (natural or intentional) and to prevent non-state actors from obtaining
bioweapons.58 States with advanced technology and systems of reporting and
surveying disease can share information with states less advanced in these areas, a
process that began in the Expert Meetings. Keeping bioscience work transparent and
keeping a good system of reporting can help states distinguish between basic research
and weapons-intended research. This is another area where information sharing
could take place. The 6th Review Conference could also find agreement on linking
work done by the World Health Organization (WHO) with BWC.
As with the CWC, many developing nations, again headed by Iran, are seeking
removal of Australia Group controls and increased biotechnical cooperation in
exchange for accepting any enhancements to the BWC.
Domestic Controls and Legislation. The 109th Congress considered
measures to improve domestic preparedness against bioterrorism, including
reauthorizing funding to enhance state and local public health infrastructure and the
possible creation of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(BARDA).59 BARDA, under the aegis of the Department of Health and Human
Services, would help coordinate federal efforts to develop antidotes and vaccines
against biological weapons and infectious diseases. The 109th Congress also oversaw
development of a National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC). The NBACC program was initiated to identify potential biological
threats by assessing vulnerabilities and potential consequences, while also developing
a national capability to conduct forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and
terrorism. Given the difficulty of differentiating between offensive and defensive BW
research, some observers have suggested that initiatives such as NBACC could raise
questions among BWC member states about U.S. activities, particularly in the
absence of formal verification or additional confidence-building measures.
57 (...continued)
and Biological Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 56, June 2002, p. 2.
58 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (para 2) mandates states to adopt and
enforce laws that prohibit non-state actors from manufacturing or acquiring bioweapons.
59 For more information on biological terrorism countermeasures see CRS Report RS21507,
Project Bioshield, by Frank Gottron.

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Missile Proliferation Control Regime60
In the early 1980s, the United States and its allies became concerned over the
rapid spread of missiles as the advanced industrial nations’ monopoly on missile
technology gave way to a diffusion of missiles and missile technology throughout
much of the world. In April 1987, the United States, Canada, France, West Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom created the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear
weapons. Thirty-four countries are now partners in the MTCR.61 In addition, China,
Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have agreed to observe MTCR guidelines
but without becoming MTCR partners. Israel additionally has completed a
memorandum of understanding with the United States affirming its commitment to
abide by MTCR guidelines.
The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition and development
of missiles can be delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers
agree to control exports of missiles and the equipment and technology used in missile
production. The MTCR is similar in this regard to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It differs from the nuclear,
chemical, and biological non-proliferation regimes in that the MTCR is not supported
by a treaty and has no international organization to verify or enforce compliance.
Rather, the MTCR is a set of common export control guidelines adopted and
administered independently by each of the partner nations.
The specific missile equipment and technology subject to the guidelines is
described in an annex to the MTCR Guidelines and divided into two categories.
Each of the member countries is to exercise particular restraint in considering
transfers of items in Category I which include complete rocket systems and
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems capable of delivering a 500- kilogram (1,100-
pound) payload to a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) or more, and complete
subsystems of such missiles and vehicles. There is a strong presumption by the
MTCR to deny transfers of these systems and components. The guidelines further
state the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized. Export
restraints are to be applied to Category II items, which consist of other components,
equipment, material, and technology that would be usable in the production of
missiles and UAVs. Category II also includes, at item number 19, complete rocket
systems and UAVs with a 300-km range but not capable of delivering a 500-kg
payload to that range (as covered by Category I), and in item number 20, individual
rocket stages and rocket engines and production equipment usable for systems with
a range of 300 km with less than a 500-kg payload.
In January 1993, MTCR partners revised the guidelines to limit the risks of
proliferation of missile delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction:
chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons. The guidelines now
60 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division.
61 See Appendix A for a list of current partners.

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call for particular restraint and the presumption to deny transfers of any missiles
(whether or not they are included in the annex) and of any items in the annex if the
government judges that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of
mass destruction.62 This addition is commonly referred to as a “catch-all” clause.

The MTCR has undergone a transformation from a small group of Western
industrial countries to a more inclusive group of countries. Argentina, with its
Condor II missile program, was originally one of the primary targets of the Regime,
but that country terminated development of Condor II and is now a full partner in the
MTCR. South Africa and Brazil had active missile programs but are now partners.
Whereas the Soviet Union was the primary source for missiles to the Third World in
the 1970s and 1980s, Russia has become a partner in the MTCR, although the United
States has sanctioned Russian organizations for improper exports to Iran. China has
been, and still is, another significant supplier of missiles and missile technology to
developing countries but committed to observing the MTCR guidelines and pledged
not to transfer surface-to-surface missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds. In spite
of these commitments, Russian and Chinese organizations and individuals continue
to supply components and technical assistance for missile production.
North Korea has become the primary supplier of missiles and missile technology
to developing countries. Iran, Syria, India, and Pakistan are the other countries of
major concern regarding the development and acquisition of missiles. Missile
programs in China, Egypt, and South Korea have also caused concern in Washington.
Cruise missiles have always been included with ballistic missiles and space-launch
vehicles in the MTCR but are now receiving greater attention as advanced propulsion
and guidance technology is becoming more widely available.
The United States long ago stated its support for expanding membership of the
MTCR “to include additional countries that subscribe to international non-
proliferation standards, enforce effective export controls, and abandon offensive
ballistic missile programs.”63 The United States will not support space launch
programs in non-MTCR countries but will consider exports of MTCR items for use
in space-launch programs by MTCR countries on a case-by-case basis. The United
States and other MTCR countries are promoting regional efforts to reduce the
demand for missiles and persuade countries to forgo the acquisition of missiles.
62 According to the guidelines, the government judgment on the likely use of the missile
items will be made, “on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated
according to factors including:
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems
(other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the
recipient states...; and
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.”
63 U.S. Department of State, Reprint of White House Press Release, Non-Proliferation and
Export Control Policy, September 27, 1993.

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Some nations have not joined the MTCR, affirming their sovereign right to
acquire, develop, deploy, and export missiles. It has been particularly difficult to
control dual-use technologies which may be used for civilian space launch vehicles,
civil aviation, general industry, and tactical weapons. MTCR member states have
been working since about 1999 on a complementary effort which has become known
as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
On November 25, 2002, the ICOC entered into force and the United States was an
initial subscribing member. The Code includes broad principles, general
commitments and modest confidence-building measures. The United States sees the
ICOC as “an important addition to the wide range of tools available to countries to
impede and roll back this proliferation threat.”64 The code attempts to fill the gap of
demand-side incentives by offering “cooperation” with respect to civilian space-
launch vehicle technology in exchange for significant nonproliferation commitments.
However, such cooperation is to be worked out between states and is not specified
in the draft document, making incentives for cooperation appear a bit elusive.
Implementing the Regime
International Organization. Although the MTCR has no international
organization, partner countries hold monthly meetings in Paris among embassy
representatives (called “points of contact” meetings), hold technical experts’
meetings (including information exchanges) and convene a plenary once each year.
In this manner, partners revise the guidelines and the equipment annex and admit
new partners. At the Madrid 2005 Plenary, partners emphasized that the threat of
proliferation of WMD delivery systems constitutes a threat to international peace and
security and stressed the need to reduce the risks associated with terrorism in this
regard.
U.S. Government Organization. The Office of Defense Trade Controls of
the State Department administers the regulations governing the export of items on the
Munitions List — those items that are subject to controls under the AECA and the
ITAR. The Bureau of Industry and Security in the U.S. Department of Commerce
administers the regulations governing the export of items on the Commerce Control
List — those items that are primarily for civilian use but have applications for the
development, testing, or production of missiles.
The Missile Technology Export Control Committee is an interagency group,
chaired by a State Department official, that reviews controversial missile export
license cases. The Missile Trade Analysis Group, another interagency group chaired
by a State Department representative, reviews intelligence reports on diversions of
missile technology from legitimate recipients to others.
Officials in the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation and regional bureaus also undertake diplomatic initiatives to
dissuade additional nations from developing missiles, to persuade other countries to
64 John R. Bolton, Remarks at the Launching Conference for the ICOC, The Hague, The
Netherlands, November 25, 2002. See [http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15488.htm]

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adopt export controls on missile technology, and to reduce the perceived need for
missiles.
Department of Defense officials have established a counter-proliferation policy
that addresses export controls, security relationships with friendly and hostile
countries, defensive and offensive military operational concepts, and equipment.
Many organizations within the Department implement the various aspects of the
counter-proliferation policy, but the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Policy has the primary responsibility for counter-proliferation policy formulation.
The Department of the Treasury also oversees U.S. embargoes through its
Office of Foreign Assets Control, and helps enforce export controls through the U.S.
Customs Service.
U.S. Laws65
The United States has maintained stringent controls on missiles and missile
technology under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 121, hereafter the ITAR).
In the early 1980s, the United States also unilaterally adopted tighter export
controls on dual-use equipment and technology that could benefit foreign missile
programs. Dual-use controls have been placed in the Export Administration
Regulations (15 C.F.R. 730-799) pursuant to the authority of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.) and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Successive
administrations have updated regulations to reflect changes adopted by the MTCR,
changes in U.S. law, and the changing international political environment. The
Export Administration Act of 1979 has expired several times, but the President has
invoked his authority to continue in effect the system of controls that had been
maintained under the act.
Members of Congress became interested in missile proliferation in the mid-
1980s because of evidence of Third World missile development and acquisition
programs and because the developing threat was an additional consideration in
funding research into ballistic missile defenses. Libya had purchased Soviet Scud
missiles and Iran and Iraq were firing missiles at each other. Congress had little or
no involvement in shaping the MTCR, since it was neither a treaty nor an executive
agreement. Soon after the Regime was announced in April 1987, it became apparent
that companies and individuals from a number of MTCR member countries (such as
West Germany, Italy, Britain, and France) were transferring goods and technical
assistance to missile development teams in Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Egypt, and
elsewhere. In 1987, the United States also learned that China had transferred
intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia. Many Members of Congress thought
the MTCR needed enforcement mechanisms, additional members, and stricter
compliance.
65 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and
Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.

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Several bills were introduced in the 101st Congress with the intention of
strengthening the U.S. position on missile nonproliferation. Several bills that
included sanctions against nations, companies, and individuals who violate the
MTCR guidelines gained widespread bipartisan congressional support. Bush
Administration officials maintained that the President already had sufficient authority
to reprimand or sanction foreign governments, companies, and individuals for
inappropriate missile transfers and objected to the imposition of mandatory statutory
sanctions. President George H.W. Bush pocket-vetoed the Export Administration
Act of 1990, which included a missile nonproliferation provision, as well as the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act. However, he signed the defense
authorization bill that contained a nearly identical section on missile nonproliferation
policy.
The Missile Technology Control Act of 1990. The act became law in the
101st Congress (H.R. 4739, Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510). It added Chapter 7 to the Arms Export Control
Act, sections 6(l) and 11B to the Export Administration Act of 1979, and established
an annual reporting requirement. Chapter 7 of the AECA has been amended several
times.
The Arms Export Control Act. (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) Chapter 7 of the
AECA requires the President to impose sanctions on U.S. and foreign individuals
who improperly conduct trade in controlled missile technology. If a person
inappropriately transfers MTCR Category II goods or technology, he/she will be
denied, for two years, any U.S. Government contracts relating to missile equipment
or technology, and U.S. export licenses for missile equipment and technology. The
AECA requires sanctions for at least two years if a person inappropriately transfers
Category I items; these include denial of all U.S. Government contracts and export
licenses for any item on the U.S. Munitions List. If the President determines that a
foreign person has substantially contributed to the design, development, or
production of missiles by a non-MTCR country, he shall prohibit for at least two
years U.S. imports of items produced by that person. The act includes presidential
waivers, exclusions, determination requirements, and definitions that allow the
Administration to take no action in certain circumstances.
These sanctions may be waived by the President, and they generally do not
apply to transfers of missile goods or technology to an MTCR adherent or from an
MTCR adherent. The United States has imposed missile sanctions against entities
in several countries including China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, Iran,
Russia, India, Syria, and Egypt.
The Export Administration Act of 1979. (Sections 6 (l) and 11B, 50
U.S.C. app. 2405 and app. 2410b). Similarly, the EAA requires controls on U.S.
missile-related exports and sanctions against U.S. and foreign persons who
improperly transfer dual-use goods or technology listed in the MTCR annex. If a
person improperly transfers Category II goods or technology, he will be denied export
licenses for two years for missile equipment and technology controlled under the
EAA. If a person improperly exports Category I goods or technology, he will be
denied export licenses for at least two years for all items controlled under the EAA.
If a foreign person exports goods or technology that substantially contribute to the

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CRS-44
design, development, or production of missiles in a non-MTCR country, he will be
denied license to import his products into the United States for at least two years.
Actions that trigger sanctions under the provisions of either the AECA or the EAA,
require commensurate sanctions under the other act.
Additional Missile Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in Legislation.
Over the years, Congress has called for additional sanctions, expressed views on
nonproliferation policies related to missiles or advanced conventional weapons, and
expressed views on the organization of the U.S. Government to implement those
policies in several other laws. There are provisions related to missile proliferation
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act of
2006, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the Freedom Support Act,
and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. These and other laws are listed in
Appendix B.
Issues for the 110th Congress
A perennial problem is whether the MTCR and the associated U.S. sanctions are
effective enough to warrant the economic and political costs to the United States, and
whether additional or alternative feasible measures would increase effectiveness.
Many analysts consider the MTCR a successful vehicle of quiet diplomacy. The
MTCR has been credited with slowing missile development in Brazil and India, and
blocking a collaborative program of Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq to build the Condor
missile. This missile would have been a significant improvement over the Scud-
based missiles used by Iraq in the Gulf War. Russia and China have probably
stopped exporting entire missiles that fall under the parameters of the MTCR, but
continue to transfer components and technology. Most European countries and Asian
allies have tightened their export control laws and some have prosecuted individuals
who have smuggled missile technology as well as nuclear and chemical production
technology. Accurate long-range missiles are expensive and difficult to develop and
produce. Because most countries cannot produce and integrate all of the
sophisticated components required, the MTCR and complementary export controls
will probably continue to impede development of the most advanced missiles.
The major current challenge, however, is that much of the international
commerce in missiles and missile technology occurs between nations that do not
adhere to MTCR guidelines. China and North Korea are not members, although
China promised to observe the guidelines after the United States had twice imposed
economic sanctions on Chinese companies for transferring missile items to Pakistan,
on the condition that the United States would lift those sanctions. North Korea’s
missile development, production, deployment, and export of missiles has apparently
not been hindered by the MTCR. In particular, North Korean exports of missile
production technology to Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Egypt seriously undercut the
international standards and goals of the Regime. In the view of some analysts, the
activities of North Korea demonstrate the failure of the MTCR and the necessity of
the other measures.
Some difficulties associated with the nuclear, chemical, and biological
nonproliferation regimes may be even more acute with respect to missile technology.

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The notion of a suppliers’ regime dividing the world into “haves” and have-nots” is
even more exacerbated in the case of missiles, since there is no treaty and no quid pro
quo for the have-nots. The International Code of Conduct is an attempt to address
this “carrot” side of the carrot-stick equation, but the lack of specificity on incentives
is viewed by some as too limited and by others as too potentially expansive. Also,
there is a common perception that technology is shared among MTCR members,
although the guidelines call for the strong presumption of denial of Category I-class
missiles and technology to anyone. The U.S. decision in 2002 to elaborate what
constitutes “rare occasions” (wherein Category I presumption of denials could be
overruled) lends credence to this view.66
Further, while many of the materials associated with nuclear weapons can be
identified and controlled, the materials and components used in missiles are
commonly used in a wide range of commercial manufacturing processes. Ballistic
missiles can be nearly indistinguishable from civilian space launch vehicles, and
some missile production equipment, technology, and materials are difficult to
distinguish from civilian items. This is particularly acute in the case of UAVs.
As developing nations become increasingly capable of producing missiles
indigenously, the effectiveness of supplier controls is gradually being eroded. A
growing list of nations now produce ballistic missiles and are increasingly less
dependent on imported materials. Some analysts see attempts to control missile
technology exports as futile and argue for the fewest export restrictions possible,
emphasizing the importance to the U.S. economy of exports. Others say the U.S.
Government should not allow the export of any goods that are likely to harm U.S.
national security, despite the potential effect on some American business interests.
In addition to the promotion of exports, other foreign policy and national
security goals may also compete with missile nonproliferation for government
attention and action. For instance, U.S. leaders hope to encourage Russia and China
to become stable and responsible actors in their regions and in the international
community, to pursue economic and political reforms, and to respect internationally
recognized human rights. The United States seeks the cooperation of those two
countries and many others in efforts to block nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug
trafficking, and organized crime. Although missile nonproliferation will remain an
issue of utmost importance, other goals may occasionally be given greater emphasis.
However, when political leaders suspend missile nonproliferation policies in favor
of other goals, the credibility of the U.S. missile policy and that of the MTCR are
damaged. It can become more difficult to persuade other countries to comply with
a set of standards when the United States appears to enforce the standards on a
selective basis. The priority to be given to missile nonproliferation has occasionally
been a point of contention between Congress and the administration.
Congress has established economic sanctions that must be imposed on
companies that trade in missile technology contrary to the MTCR guidelines. The
66 Testimony given by Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Proliferation Controls in a hearing before Senate Government Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, June 11, 2002.

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CRS-46
imposition, lifting, and waiving of these sanctions frequently cause controversy.
Some analysts suggest these negative actions should be coupled with positive
incentives to induce countries to refrain from proliferation. Positive incentives could
include trade credits, development assistance, military assistance, technology
transfers, access to space launch and satellite capabilities, or security guaranties. But
other analysts contend the security benefits derived from adhering to the MTCR
should be sufficient and that the United States should not try to buy compliance.
According to many foreign policy specialists, the underlying political and
security problems that drive proliferation must be resolved before meaningful curbs
can be applied to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The
United States and its partners in the MTCR have helped countries, particularly
neighbors in regions of ongoing conflict, to adopt confidence-building measures such
as those that have contributed to security and cooperation in Europe. They also try
to help correct regional imbalances of military forces and to facilitate peace
negotiations and arms control talks.
Security alliances and military assistance can play a role in restraining missile
development. The U.S. security umbrella over Western Europe and parts of Asia and
the transfer of large quantities of advanced conventional weapons helped to dissuade
a number of U.S. allies from developing weapons of mass destruction and helped
deter aggression. Some analysts contend that the security of some allies was
enhanced by the deterrent power of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles previously deployed
in their territory or, possibly in the case of Israel, by indigenous weapons. The U.S.
Government has also decided that it is appropriate to sell missiles (U.S. Army
Tactical Missile Systems) with a potential range of 250 km to Turkey, Greece, South
Korea, Britain, France, and Germany, though it forbids sales of missiles with a range
of 300 km. However, the superiority of U.S. military technology may actually
persuade some adversary countries to develop weapons of mass destruction and
missiles as their best means of deterring U.S. intervention.
Some analysts see missile defense systems as a proper alternative to export
controls, though most see them as supplementing other military, political, and
economic measures (including export controls and sanctions). The United States will
probably deploy theater and national missile defense systems and has provided
defensive missiles to some allies in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. As the
United States seeks to increase defense cooperation in the area of missile defenses,
issues could arise about the applicability of MTCR guidelines. One particular case
where questions have arisen is the proposed transfer of Arrow missile defense
systems from Israel to India, which requires U.S. approval.67 Air defense missiles
and anti-theater ballistic missiles probably enhance the security of U.S. allies, but
none are expected to be 100 percent effective. In some cases, such as Taiwan,
deployments might increase tensions. The Administration and Congress will have
67 In a hearing on Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, July 29, 2002, Vann Van Diepen, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Proliferation Controls, stated that the Arrow interceptor is a MTCR Category-1 class missile
and that Israel would have to go through the necessary procedures to decide it could
overcome a strong presumption of denial to make such a sale.

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to weigh carefully defense policy objectives against nonproliferation policy
objectives in this area.

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CRS-48
Appendix A. Proliferation Control
Regime Membership
NSG (45) (* = Zangger member)
MTCR (34)
Australia Group (40)
Argentina*
Argentina
Argentina
Australia*
Australia
Australia
Austria*
Austria
Austria
Belarus
Belgium*
Belgium
Belgium
Brazil
Brazil
Bulgaria*
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Canada*
Canada
Canada
China*
Croatia
Cyprus*
Cyprus
Czech Republic*
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
Denmark*
Denmark
Denmark
Estonia
Estonia
European Commission
Finland*
Finland
Finland
France*
France
France
Germany*
Germany
Germany
Greece*
Greece
Greece
Hungary*
Hungary
Hungary
Iceland
Iceland
Ireland*
Ireland
Ireland
Italy*
Italy
Italy
Japan*
Japan
Japan
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Latvia
Lithuania
Lithuania
Luxembourg*
Luxembourg Luxembourg
Malta
Malta
Netherlands*
Netherlands
Netherlands
New Zealand
New Zealand
New Zealand
Norway*
Norway
Norway
Poland*
Poland
Poland
Portugal*
Portugal
Portugal
Romania*
Romania
Russian Federation*
Russian Federation
Slovakia*
Slovakia
Slovenia*
Slovenia
South Africa*
South Africa
South Korea*
South Korea
South Korea
Spain*
Spain
Spain
Sweden*
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland*
Switzerland
Switzerland
Turkey*
Turkey
Turkey
Ukraine*
Ukraine
Ukraine
United Kingdom*
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United States*
United States
United States

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CRS-49
Appendix B. Additional Legislation and
Executive Orders
Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title
VII, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-293, 50
U.S.C. 2301 note.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Title XVI, Arms
Control Matters, Nonproliferation Provisions, P.L. 103-160.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Title XV, Arms
Control Matters, Nonproliferation Provisions, P.L. 103-337; 22 U.S.C.
2751 note.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992, Title XV, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a
begins at section 1505 of Act.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Title V, Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons Restrictions, P.L. 104-132, 18 U.S.C.
831 note, and 2331, 42 U.S.C. 262 note, 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994, Title VIII, Part A,
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995,
P.L. 103-236, 22 U.S.C. 2551 note.
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-
201, 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Title XI and XIII:
Verification of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements,
Assistance - P.L.107-228 (Sec. 1101) 22 USC 2651 note.
Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005, 70 FR 38567) Blocking Property of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters.
Executive Order 13222 (August 17, 2001, 66 FR 44025, August 22, 2001)
Continuation of Export Control Regulations, upon the expiration of
the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Continued on August 15, 2002 by notice published in
Federal Register on August 16, 2002.
Executive Order 13128 (June 25, 1999, 99FR 16634) Implementation of
the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act.

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Executive Order 13049 (June 11, 1997, 62 FR 32471) Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Executive Order 13030 (December 12, 1996, 61 FR 66187) Administration
of Foreign Assistance and Arms Exports.
Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994, 59 F.R. 59-9, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) Declares the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery as an unusual and extraordinary threat and
declares a national emergency to deal with that threat.
Amended by EO 13094 (July 28, 1998, 63 FR40803 and by
EO 13128 (June 25, 1999, 64 FR 34703).
Executive Order 12946 (January 20, 1995, 60 F.R. 4829, 22 U.S.C. 2551
note) Establishes the President’s Advisory Board on Arms
Proliferation Policy.
Executive Order 12851 (June 11, 1993, 58 F.R. 33181, 22 U.S.C. 2797 note)
Delegates President’s authority under the Export Administration Act,
Arms Control Export Act, and the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control, Warfare Elimination Act, National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1993, and Foreign Relations Authorizations Act
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, to the Secretaries of State,
Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, and Director of ACDA.
Executive Order 11850 (April 8, 1975, 40 F.R. 16187, 50 U.S.C. 1511 note)
Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot
control agents.

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